DNV-RU-SHIP Pt.6 Ch.2

RULES FOR CLASSIFICATION
Ships
Edition July 2023
Part 6 Additional class notations

Chapter 2 Propulsion, power generation and
auxiliary systems
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DNV AS
FOREWORD
DNV rules for classification contain procedural and technical requirements related to obtaining and
retaining a class certificate. The rules represent all requirements adopted by the Society as basis
for classification.
© DNV AS July 2023
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CHANGES – CURRENT
Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

This document supersedes the July 2022 edition of DNV-RU-SHIP Pt.6 Ch.2.
The numbering and/or title of items containing changes is highlighted in red.
Changes July 2023, entering into force 1 January 2024
Topic Reference Description
Battery, scope Sec.1 [1.3.2] Updated text referring to DNV-CG-0660 for alternative designs.
Sec.1 [2.1] Updated text referring to new class guideline for design
philosophy.
Battery, application Sec.1 [1.4.1] Included guidance note referring to Pt.4 Ch.8 for electrical
energy storage (EES) installations < 20 kWh.
Battery, references Sec.1 [1.5.1] Included references to Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7.
Battery, definitions Sec.1 Table 2 Included definition of liquid cooled EES system and manned
control station.
Battery, compliance Sec.1 Table 4 Increased limit for required type approval of electrochemical
documents capacitor systems to systems with capacity above 20 kWh.
Included Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7 as certification standard for

type approval (TA) and product certificate (PC) of Lithium-ion
battery system and electrochemical capacitor system.
Battery, system Sec.1 Table 5 Included Z030 - Arrangement plan for toxic zone plan.
documentation requirements
Removed Z160 - Operation manual and Z163 - Maintenance
manual removed.
Updated additional description for Z010 - Vessel arrangement,

G040 - Fire control plan, and S012 - Ducting diagram for the
ventilation system.
Battery(Safety) operation Sec.1 Table 7 Added column Info for the documentation requirements for the
and maintenance manuals onboard documentation.
Battery, component Sec.1 Table 8 Included S010 - Piping diagram for liquid cooled EES systems.
documentation requirements
Battery(Safety), Sec.1 [2], Restructured for improved readability.

restructuring Sec.1 [4]
Battery(Safety), capacity Sec.1 [2.2.1] New subsection with limitation of stored capacity in one space.
limitation
Battery(Safety), space Sec.1 [2.2.2] Updated requirement for location of EES space in case of
location and integrity collision/grounding.
Sec.1 [2.2.3.1] Updated requirement for space structural integrity in case of

explosion.
Sec.1 [2.2.3.2], New requirements for gas- and watertight space.

Sec.1 [2.2.3.3]
Rules for classification: Ships — DNV-RU-SHIP Pt.6 Ch.2. Edition July 2023 Page 3
Propulsion, power generation and auxiliary systems
DNV AS

Battery(Safety), access and Sec.1 [2.2.4.1] New requirement prohibiting access from passenger spaces.
escape
Sec.1 [2.2.4.2] Updated requirement for doors to be also gas- and watertight.
Sec.1 [2.2.4.3] Updated subsection for doors/hatches regarding indication and

signboard.
Sec.1 [2.2.4.4] New requirement for escape way(s).
Sec.1 [2.2.4.5] New requirement for warning signboards.
Battery(Safety), toxic area Sec.1 [2.2.5.2] Updated requirement for location of ventilation outlet.
Battery(Safety), equipment Sec.1 [2.2.6.2] New requirement prohibiting through runs of pipes.
inside EES space
Battery(Safety), drainage Sec.1 [2.2.7] New subsection for drainage.
Battery(Safety), Sec.1 [2.3.1] New subsection addressing the risk of humidity/salt/dust in the
environmental control space.
Battery(Safety), ventilation Sec.1 [2.3.2.1] Updated requirement for also the inlet duct to be directly from
ducts open air.
Sec.1 [2.3.2.2], Updated requirements to the construction of the ventilation

Sec.1 [2.3.2.3] ducts.
Battery(Safety), ventilation Sec.1 [2.3.3.1] Updated requirement to arrangement inside EES space.
openings
Sec.1 [2.3.3.2], New requirement to prevent water ingress to the batteries.
Sec.1 [2.3.3.3],
Sec.1 [2.3.3.4]
Sec.1 [2.3.3.5] New requirement for wire mesh.
Sec.1 [2.3.3.6] Updated requirement to outside location.
Battery(Safety), mechanical Sec.1 [2.3.4.1] Updated requirement for ventilation to be of extraction type.
ventilation
Sec.1 [2.3.4.3] Included automatic power supply change-over with alarm.
Battery(Safety), ventilation Sec.1 [2.3.5.1] Updated requirement to manual and local control.
control
Sec.1 [2.3.5.2] Updated regarding reduced ventilation during normal condition.
Sec.1 [2.3.5.3] New requirement for stop of ventilation to enable opening of

door.
Sec.1 [2.3.5.4] New requirement for signboard to run ventilation before

entering.
Sec.1 [2.3.5.5] Updated requirement to start space ventilation on high cell

temperature.
Battery(Safety), integrated Sec.1 [2.3.6] New requirement that integrated off-gas ducts shall be
off-gas duct connected to an independent outlet duct to open air following
the principal requirements for the space outlet duct.
Sec.1 [4.12.3] New requirement for maintaining integrity of the integrated off-
gas duct when modules are removed.
DNV AS

Battery(Safety), off-gas Sec.1 [2.4.1.3] Updated power supply requirements.
detection
Sec.1 [2.4.2.1] Updated requirements and guidance to gas detectors.
Sec.1 [2.4.2.2] New requirement regarding off-gas detection for integrated off-
gas duct.
Battery(Safety), fire safety Sec.1 [2.5.2.3] New subsection with clarification regarding fire detection.
Sec.1 [2.5.2.4] New subsection for fire alarm to be provided in the space.
Sec.1 [2.5.3.1] Added general requirement to the fire extinguishing system.
Sec.1 [2.5.3.2] Removed option for only gas based system and added option
for combined system.
Sec.1 [2.5.3.3] New subsection addressing vessels built of non-metallic

materials.
Sec.1 [2.5.3.4] Updated requirements to water based extinguishing systems.
Sec.1 [2.5.3.5] New subsection for combined systems.
Battery (Safety), liquid Sec.1 [2.6] New subsection with requirements to liquid cooling supply
cooling system piping inside the EES space.
Sec.1 [4.11] New subsection with requirements to liquid cooling system

inside the battery system.
Battery(Safety), electrical Sec.1 [2.7.1], Updated requirements for circuit protection and isolation for the
system Sec.1 [2.7.3] supply to the EES system.
Sec.1 [2.7.3] Updated requirement to insulation monitoring.
Sec.1 [2.7.4] Updated requirements for the controls for emergency

disconnection.
Battery(Safety), on board Sec.1 [2.8] Included onboard test requirements for ventilation and cooling
tests systems.
Battery(Safety), operational Sec.1 [2.9.1.3] New requirement for operational procedures to include locating
procedures and isolating earth faults.
Battery, battery system Sec.1 [4.2] Updated text referring to new class guideline for content.
safety description
Battery, battery system Sec.1 [4.3.1] New requirement regarding accessibility.

assembly
Battery, electrical protection Sec.1 [4.5.1] Updated requirements to short circuit and over current
devices protection.
Sec.1 [4.5.2] Updated requirements to control switchgear.
Battery, short circuit and Sec.1 [4.6] Updated requirements to short circuit and earth fault proof
earth fault proof installation installation.
Battery c, insulation Sec.1 [4.7] Updated requirements for insulation monitoring.

monitoring
Battery, cooling failure alarm Sec.1 [4.9.2] Updated list of alarms with cooling failure.
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Battery, safety functions Sec.1 [4.10] Clarified that manual disconnection and disconnection upon gas
detection is included as safety functions.
Battery, liquid cooled battery Sec.1 [4.11] Strengthened requirements for liquid cooled battery system due
systems to incidents.
Battery, battery systems with Sec.1 [4.12] Introduced requirements for battery systems with integrated
integrated off-gas ventilation off-gas ventilation ducts.
ducts.
Battery, testing Sec.1 [4.13.2] Limited methods for thermal runaway triggering and adjusted
propagation test requirements.
Sec.1 [4.13.4] Introduced a requirement for visual inspection.

Sec.1 [5.4]
Sec.1 [4.13.5] New subsection specifying applicable environmental tests.
Tank documentation Sec.5 Table 2 Added documentation requirements for specific tank types.
Documentation requirement Sec.5 Table 2 Added document requirement for inert gas system and NDT
procedure.
Documentation requirement Sec.5 Table 2 Added requirement to do calculations according to recognized

standard.
Compliance documents Sec.5 Table 3 Added requirement for certification of independent fuel tanks.
Fuel tank hold space for type C Sec.5 [4.8.1.5] Added requirement for location of type C fuel tank to be in
tanks compliance with IGF code.
Arrangement for portable gas Sec.5 [5.1.4.5], Added requirements for arrangement for portable gas tanks.
tanks Sec.5 [8.2.2.2]
Hazardous zone for detachable Sec.5 [5.1.5.3], Added requirement for Zone 2 will be created surrounding pipe
pipe connection in gaseous Sec.5 [8.2.2.3] connections in gaseous lines on open deck.
lines on open deck
Stop valves for pressure relief Sec.5 [5.2.2.3] Aligned with IMO requirements.
valves (PRV)
Pressure relief for space Sec.5 [5.2.2.11] Aligned with Pt.5 Ch.7.
between the primary and
secondary barrier for
independent tanks.
Fuel tank hold space for type C Sec.5 [7.2.2.2] Added requirement for location of type C fuel tank to be in
tanks compliance with IGF code.
Hazardous zone definition Sec.5 [8.2.2.3] Added rule requirement in line with already established
for spaces contaioning fans practice.
serving other hazardous zones
Dedicated panel for gas Sec.5 [9.1.2.4], Updated rule text to clarify that dedicated panel is required for
alarms. Sec.5 [9.1.2.5] gas alarm presentation.
DNV AS

Gas detectors of self- Sec.5 [9.1.2.11], Updated text for accepting gas detectors of self-monitoring type
monitoring type in place of Sec.5 [9.2.4.5], in place of voting principle.
voting principle Sec.5 [9.3.2],
Sec.5 Table 10
Stress analysis of piping Sec.6 Table 4 Added documentation requirement of stress analysis for pipes
operating above 300 bar to align with IMO requirements.
Documentation requirements Sec.6 Table 4, Updated documentation requirements for LFL fuelled and
Sec.6 Table 5 Gasoline INST.
Drip trays Sec.6 [3.1.1.2] Clarified requirements to drip tray arrangements.
Dry running of pumps Sec.6 [3.3.1.8] Added requirement for dry running protection bar to align with
IMO requirements.
Tank entry space Sec.6 [3.4.1.5] Added requirement to oxygen and gas sensors bar to align with
IMO requirements.
Clarification of ventilation fan Sec.6 [3.5.2.4] Clarified redundancy for fuel preparation rooms and double
redundancy walled pipe ventilation.
Nitrogen room Sec.6 [3.7.1.7] Added requirement to sensors bar to align with IMO
requirements.
Blanking arrangements for Sec.6 [3.7.1.9] Added requirement for blanking arrangements on nitrogen lines
nitrogen bar to align with IMO requirements.
Fire protection Sec.6 [5.2.2] Modified requirement from A-0 to A-60 to align with IMO
requirements.
Fire detection for passenger Sec.6 [5.3.4.5] Added requirement for portabe fire detection equipment for
ships vessels where fire patrols are required bar to align with IMO
requirements.
Hazardous zone definition for Sec.6 [6.2.2.3] Added rule requirement in line with already established
spaces containing fans serving practice.
other hazardous zones
Location of gas detectors Sec.6 [7.3.3.1] Copied locations from IMO guidelines.
Portable gas detector Sec.6 [7.3.3.9] Added requirement for supply of at least one portable gas
detector bar to align with IMO requirements.
Location of manual ESD Sec.6 [7.3.6] Aligned with IMO requirements.
Change of setpoint of gas Sec.6 Table 8 Changed alarm limit for gas detection to 200 ppm.
detection alarm in FPR
Boilers Sec.6 [8.3] Added requirements for LFL fuelled boilers, with similar
philosophy as LNG fuelled boilers bar to align with IMO
requirements.
Documentation requirements Sec.8 [1.6] Added requirement for water safety systems to be documented
for Fuel ready(ammonia) class notation.
Minimum distance piece Sec.9 [2.3.2.3] Aligned minimum thickness requirements with the requirements
thickness for the ER notation.
WAPS, WAPS foundation Sec.12 [2.2.3] Clarified foundation strength analysis.
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WAPS, stability Sec.12 [2.2.2.3] Clarified WAPS, influencing on ship stability.
Tank documentation Sec.13 Table 2 Added documentation requirements for specific tank types.
Documentation requirement Sec.13 Table 2 Added separate document requirement for NDT procedure, inert
gas system, and storage tanks.
Required compliance Sec.13 Table 3 Added compliance documents.

documentation
Gas safe machinery space Sec.13 [3.2.1.3] Added requirement to gas safe machinery space.
Arrangement for portable gas Sec.13 [5.1.4.5], Added requirements for arrangement for portable gas tanks.
tanks Sec.13 [8.2.2.2]
Hazardous zone for detachable Sec.13 [5.1.5.3], Added requirement for Zone 2 will be created surrounding pipe
pipe connection in gaseous Sec.13 [8.2.2.3] connections in gaseous lines on open deck.
lines on open deck
Stop valves for PRVs Sec.13 [5.2.2.3] Aligned with IMO requirements.
Pressure relief for space Sec.13 [5.2.2.11] Aligned with Pt.5 Ch.7
between the primary and
secondary barrier for
independent tanks.
Redundancy requirement for Sec.13 [5.4.4.3] Added requirement for redundancy for inert gas components in
inert gas system case containment system relies on continuous nitrogen supply
for containment and/or gas detection.
Fuel tank hold space for type C Sec.13 [7.2.1.2] Added requirement for location of type C tanks to be in line
tanks with IGF code.
Hazardous zone definition for Sec.13 [8.2.2.3] Added requirement in line with already established practice.
spaces containing fans serving
other hazardous zones
Gas detectors of self- Sec.13 [9.1.2.10], Updated text for accepting gas detectors of self-monitoring type
monitoring type in place of Sec.13 [9.2.4.5], in place of voting principle.
voting principle Sec.13 Table 10,
Sec.13 [9.3.2]
Gas detection equipment Sec.13 [9.2.4.6] Added requirement for test design, installation and testing
standard for gas detection equipment.
Alternative design Sec.14 [1.3], Added IGF code alternative design approach required to be
Sec.14 [3.3.7], followed for matters related to fire safety & life saving.
Sec.14 [7]
Tank documentation Sec.14 Table 4 Added documentation requirements for specific tank types, PPE
plans and water safety systems.
Access to tank connection Sec.14 [3.3.1.3], Added requirement that access from engine room to TCS, FPR
space (TCS), fuel preparation Sec.14 [3.3.2.9], and bunkering station is not permitted.
room (FPR), and bunkering Sec.14 [3.3.4.4]
station
DNV AS

Water safety systems Sec.14 [3.3.2.7], Added additional water systems related to limiting spread
Sec.14 [3.3.4.8], of toxic ammonia gas. For bunkering station also for hull
protection from low temperatures. Requirements for availability
Sec.14 [3.3.4.10],
of such systems clarified.
Sec.14 [3.3.6.4],
Sec.14 [5.1.4.6],
Sec.14 [5.2.2.8],
Sec.14 [5.6.3],
Sec.14 [6.1.1.8]
Bunkering station Sec.14 [3.3.4], Included direct requirements for closed bunkering station. Open
Sec.14 [10.3.2.4] or semi-enclosed bunkering stations on case-by-case basis.
Ship-shore link (SSL) Sec.14 [3.3.4.14] Added required SSL for bunkering.
Fuel tank means of emptying Sec.14 [4.1.1.7] Introduced requirement for means of safely discharging
ammonia fuel tank contents to shore in case of single failure in
fuel tank pump required.
Vent outlets Previous Sec.14 Deleted requirement for gas vent outlets to be lead to ARMS.
[5.2.2.9]
Vapour return Sec.14 [5.3.2.3] Added requirement for vapour return to be fitted with isolation
between ships sides.
Bunkering connection Sec.14 [5.3.3.4] Required bunkering connection dry disconnect and breakaway
coupling.
Nitrogen system Previous Sec.14 Deleted requirement for redundancy in nitrogen generation
[5.4.1.2] system compressors.
Ventilation push buttons Sec.14 [6.1.1.10] Added requirement for ventilation push button also required
outside served room.
Ventilation Sec.14 [6.1.2.3] Added requirements for toxic ventilation ducting through spaces
not designed to safely contain ammonia leaks.
Toxic zones, bunkering station Sec.14 [9.2.2.5] Added clarification that bunkering station is allowed to be
grouped in same toxic zone as ventilation outlet from secondary
enclosures and vent mast.
Hold space pressure relief Sec.14 [9.2.2.11], Included location and capacity requirements for hold spaces for
Sec.14 [9.2.2.12] type A, B and membrane type tanks.
Dispersion analysis Sec.14 [9.2.2.17] Introduced requirement for dispersion analysis.
Gas safety functions Sec.14 Table 13 Aligned table with the rule text.
Gas detection Sec.14 [10.2.4.1] Added requirement of gas detection in spaces housing
ventilation fans for spaces design to contain ammonia leaks.
Editorial corrections
In addition to the above stated changes, editorial corrections may have been made.
DNV AS
CONTENTS
Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Changes – current................................................................................................. 3
Section 1 Electrical energy storage.......................................................................25

1 General.............................................................................................. 25
1.1 Introduction................................................................................... 25
1.2 Objective....................................................................................... 25
1.3 Scope............................................................................................ 25
1.4 Application..................................................................................... 25
1.5 References..................................................................................... 26
1.6 Definitions and abbreviations........................................................... 27
1.7 Procedural requirements.................................................................. 29
2 Class notation Battery(Safety).......................................................... 34
2.1 Safety philosophy for the onboard installation.................................... 34
2.2 Arrangement of EES spaces............................................................. 34
2.3 Environmental control and ventilation of the EES space....................... 36
2.4 Off-gas detection............................................................................ 39
2.5 Fire safety for EES spaces............................................................... 40
2.6 Liquid cooling system for battery systems..........................................42
2.7 Electrical system.............................................................................42
2.8 Testing on board.............................................................................43
2.9 Operation and maintenance............................................................. 44
3 Class notation Battery(Power)...........................................................44
3.1 General..........................................................................................44
3.2 System design................................................................................44
3.3 Testing...........................................................................................47
3.4 Operation and maintenance............................................................. 48
4 Battery system.................................................................................. 48
4.1 General..........................................................................................48
4.2 Safety description........................................................................... 48
4.3 Battery system assembly................................................................. 48
4.4 Battery cells and modules................................................................49
4.5 Electrical protection devices............................................................. 49
4.6 Insulation coordination.................................................................... 50
4.7 Insulation monitoring...................................................................... 50
4.8 Battery management system............................................................50
4.9 Battery alarms................................................................................51
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4.10 Battery safety functions................................................................. 52

4.11 Liquid cooling systems...................................................................53
4.12 Integrated off-gas ventilation ducts................................................. 54
4.13 Testing......................................................................................... 54
5 Electrochemical capacitor system and installations........................... 57
5.1 General..........................................................................................57
5.2 Design principles for electrochemical capacitor installation with
Battery(Safety) notation..................................................................... 57
Battery(Power) notation..................................................................... 57
5.4 Electrochemical capacitor system...................................................... 57
6 Appendix............................................................................................ 58
6.1 List of alarms and monitoring parameters.......................................... 58
Section 2 Periodically unattended machinery space - E0 and ECO........................ 63

1 General.............................................................................................. 63
1.1 Introduction................................................................................... 63
1.2 Scope............................................................................................ 63
1.3 Application..................................................................................... 63
1.4 Definitions......................................................................................63
1.5 Documentation............................................................................... 64
1.6 Periodical test.................................................................................65
2 System arrangement......................................................................... 66
2.1 General..........................................................................................66
2.2 Automatic control system................................................................ 67
2.3 Alarm system................................................................................. 67
2.4 Protective safety system..................................................................68
2.5 Communication............................................................................... 70
2.6 Fire safety and fire detection and alarm system..................................70
3 Class notation E0............................................................................... 71
3.1 Extent of monitoring....................................................................... 71
3.2 Arrangement on the bridge.............................................................. 79
3.3 Arrangement in the engine room...................................................... 80
3.4 Control of propulsion machinery from the navigation bridge..................80
3.5 Electric power supply...................................................................... 80
3.6 Fire safety..................................................................................... 81
3.7 Special requirements for ships less than 300 gross tonnage with
propulsive output less than 1000 kW per engine...................................... 81
4 Class notation ECO............................................................................ 82
4.1 General requirements...................................................................... 82
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4.2 Control station................................................................................82

4.3 System arrangement....................................................................... 82
4.4 Extent of monitoring....................................................................... 83
5 Survey................................................................................................83
5.1 General..........................................................................................83
Section 3 Fuel cell installations - FC..................................................................... 87

1 General.............................................................................................. 87
1.1 Objective....................................................................................... 87
1.2 Scope............................................................................................ 87
1.3 Application..................................................................................... 87
1.4 Class notations............................................................................... 87
1.5 Definitions......................................................................................89
1.6 Documentation............................................................................... 90
1.7 Required compliance documentation..................................................94
1.8 Operation and maintenance manuals.................................................94
2 Materials............................................................................................ 95
2.1 General..........................................................................................95
3 Design principles for FC(Power) notation.......................................... 95
3.1 General..........................................................................................95
4 Requirements for fuel cell power systems........................................96
4.1 Piping arrangement for fuel cell power system.................................. 96
4.2 Exhaust gas and exhaust air outlets................................................ 96
4.3 Purge gas outlets.......................................................................... 96
5 Design principles for fuel cell spaces............................................... 96
5.1 Fuel cell spaces.............................................................................. 96
5.2 Location and access........................................................................ 97
5.3 Ventilation......................................................................................97
6 Fire safety..........................................................................................98
6.1 General..........................................................................................98
6.2 Fire protection................................................................................ 98
6.3 Fire detection and alarm systems..................................................... 99
6.4 Fire extinguishing.......................................................................... 99
7 Electrical systems.............................................................................. 99
7.1 General..........................................................................................99
7.2 Area classification......................................................................... 100
8 Control, monitoring and safety systems.......................................... 101
8.1 General........................................................................................ 101
8.2 Fuel cell power installation - control and monitoring......................... 103
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8.3 Fuel cell power installation - safety................................................. 104

9 Manufacture, workmanship and testing........................................... 106
9.1 FC fuel piping systems.................................................................. 106
9.2 On board testing of FC plant.......................................................... 106
9.3 Survey and testing of electrical equipment in hazardous area.............107
Section 4 Fuel treatment and conditioning systems - Fuel.................................. 108

1 General............................................................................................ 108
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................108
1.2 Scope.......................................................................................... 108
1.3 Application................................................................................... 108
1.4 Environmental conditions............................................................... 108
1.5 Definitions.................................................................................... 108
1.6 Certification.................................................................................. 109
1.7 Documentation..............................................................................109
1.8 General requirements.................................................................... 110
2 System arrangements and components........................................... 110
2.1 System for storage and transfer of fuel............................................110
2.2 Fuel oil settling and daily service tanks............................................111
2.3 Fuel treatment system...................................................................112
Section 5 Gas fuelled ship installations - Gas fuelled LNG.................................. 114

1 General............................................................................................ 114
1.1 Objective......................................................................................114
1.2 Scope.......................................................................................... 114
1.3 Application................................................................................... 114
1.4 Classification.................................................................................114
1.5 Definitions.................................................................................... 115
1.6 Procedural requirements................................................................ 119
1.7 Required compliance documentation................................................ 127
1.8 Onboard documentation................................................................. 129
1.9 Signboards................................................................................... 131
2 Materials.......................................................................................... 131
2.1 General........................................................................................ 131
3 Ship arrangement............................................................................ 132
3.1 Ship arrangement principles........................................................... 132
3.2 Arrangement of machinery spaces...................................................132
3.3 Arrangement of other spaces containing fuel systems........................ 134
3.4 Arrangement of air locks................................................................137
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4 Fuel containment systems............................................................... 138

4.1 General........................................................................................ 138
4.2 Location of fuel containment system............................................... 138
4.3 Liquefied gas fuel tanks................................................................. 140
4.4 Compressed gas fuel tanks............................................................ 146
4.5 Portable liquefied gas fuel tanks..................................................... 147
4.6 Loading limit for liquefied gas fuel tanks.......................................... 148
4.7 Maintenance of fuel storage condition.............................................. 148
4.8 Requirements depending on fuel tank location.................................. 149
5 Piping systems.................................................................................150
5.1 General........................................................................................ 150
5.2 Pressure relief systems.................................................................. 156
5.3 Fuel bunkering system...................................................................158
5.4 Nitrogen installations..................................................................... 159
5.5 Exhaust system............................................................................ 160
5.6 Other ship systems....................................................................... 160
6 Ventilation systems......................................................................... 161
6.1 Ventilation of spaces..................................................................... 161
7 Fire safety........................................................................................164
7.1 General........................................................................................ 164
7.2 Fire protection.............................................................................. 164
7.3 Fire extinction...............................................................................165
7.4 Fire detection and alarm systems....................................................166
8 Electrical systems............................................................................ 166
8.1 General........................................................................................ 166
8.3 Inspection and testing................................................................... 168
8.4 Maintenance................................................................................. 169
9.1 General........................................................................................ 169
9.2 Fuel installation control and monitoring............................................171
9.3 Fuel installation safety................................................................... 175
10 Gas turbines and boilers................................................................ 180
10.1 Gas fuelled boiler installations.......................................................180
10.2 Gas fuelled turbines.....................................................................181
11 Manufacture, workmanship and testing......................................... 182
11.1 Fuel containment system..............................................................182
11.2 Fuel piping systems..................................................................... 182
11.3 Valves........................................................................................ 184
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11.4 Expansion bellows....................................................................... 184

11.5 Pumps........................................................................................184
11.6 Shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems....................... 184
11.7 Onboard testing.......................................................................... 184
Section 6 Low flashpoint liquid fuelled engines - LFL fuelled and gasoline
refuelling and storage installations - Gasoline INST........................................... 185
1 General............................................................................................ 185
1.1 Objective......................................................................................185
1.2 Scope.......................................................................................... 185
1.3 Application................................................................................... 185
1.4 Class notations............................................................................. 185
1.5 Definitions and abbreviations..........................................................186
2 Materials.......................................................................................... 194
2.1 General........................................................................................ 194
3 Arrangement and design................................................................. 194
3.1 General........................................................................................ 194
3.2 Fuel storage................................................................................. 195
3.3 Fuel transfer and supply................................................................ 198
3.4 Access......................................................................................... 201
3.5 Ventilation of hazardous spaces containing LFL fuel installations.......... 202
3.6 Fuel bunkering in ships other than tankers....................................... 203
3.7 Inert gas/nitrogen installations....................................................... 204
3.8 Exhaust system............................................................................ 205
4 Strength of LFL fuel tanks..............................................................205
4.1 General........................................................................................ 205
4.2 Corrosion addition......................................................................... 206
4.3 LFL fuel design density.................................................................206
4.4 Design loads.................................................................................206
5 Fire safety........................................................................................206
5.1 General........................................................................................ 206
5.2 Containment of fire....................................................................... 206
5.3 Fire fighting..................................................................................207
5.4 Gasoline installation...................................................................... 208
6.1 General........................................................................................ 208
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6.4 Maintenance................................................................................. 210

7.1 General........................................................................................ 211
7.2 Control system............................................................................. 211
7.3 Safety system...............................................................................212
7.4 Engine monitoring......................................................................... 216
8 Engines, pumps and boilers............................................................. 217
8.1 Pumps......................................................................................... 217
8.2 Engines........................................................................................ 218
8.3 Boilers......................................................................................... 219
9.1 General........................................................................................ 219
9.2 Fuel tanks.................................................................................... 220
9.3 Piping system............................................................................... 220
9.4 Onboard testing............................................................................ 221
10 Operation manual.......................................................................... 221
10.1 General...................................................................................... 221
11 Personnel protection......................................................................222
11.1 General...................................................................................... 222
12 Ship type considerations................................................................222
12.1 Chemical tankers.........................................................................222
12.2 Passenger vessels........................................................................224
Section 7 Redundant- and alternative propulsion............................................... 225

1 General............................................................................................ 225
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................225
1.2 Objective......................................................................................225
1.3 Scope.......................................................................................... 225
1.4 Application................................................................................... 225
1.5 Class notations............................................................................. 226
1.6 References................................................................................... 233
1.9 Survey and test upon completion....................................................237
2 Technical requirements for AP(m, x)............................................... 238
2.1 System arrangement..................................................................... 238
2.2 System configuration..................................................................... 239
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2.3 Auxiliary systems.......................................................................... 239

2.4 Propulsion- and steering control systems......................................... 239
3 Technical requirements for RP(B, x)................................................240
3.1 System design.............................................................................. 240
3.3 Auxiliary system........................................................................... 242
3.4 Propulsion, steering and auxiliary control system.............................. 242
4 Technical requirements for RP(2, x) and RP(3, x)........................... 243
4.1 System design.............................................................................. 243
4.3 Auxiliary systems.......................................................................... 248
4.4 Propulsion, steering and auxiliary control system.............................. 250
4.5 Separation requirements for RP(3, x).............................................. 251
Section 8 Alternative fuels - Fuel ready.............................................................. 252

1 General............................................................................................ 252
1.1 Objective......................................................................................252
1.2 Scope.......................................................................................... 252
1.3 Application................................................................................... 252
1.4 Definitions.................................................................................... 252
1.5 Class notation - Fuel ready...........................................................252
1.6 Documentation..............................................................................255
2 Requirements for attributes.............................................................261
2.1 Requirements for attribute D.......................................................... 261
2.2 Requirements for attribute S.......................................................... 262
2.3 Requirements for attribute P.......................................................... 262
2.4 Requirements for attributes MEc, AEc or Bc.................................... 263
2.5 Requirements for attributes MEca, AEca or Bca............................... 263
2.6 Requirements for attributes MEi, AEi or Bi...................................... 263
2.7 Requirements for attribute Tc.........................................................263
2.8 Requirements for attribute Ti......................................................... 263
2.9 Requirements for attribute Misc..................................................... 264
Section 9 Scrubber ready.................................................................................... 265

1 General............................................................................................ 265
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................265
1.2 Class notation – Scrubber ready..................................................... 266
1.3 Documentation..............................................................................267
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2 Ship arrangement and installation...................................................270

2.1 Scrubber ready with qualifier D...................................................... 270
2.2 Scrubber ready with qualifier C.......................................................271
2.3 Scrubber ready with qualifiers H or O..............................................273
2.4 Scrubber ready with qualifier HS.....................................................274
2.5 Scrubber ready with qualifier R.......................................................274
2.6 Scrubber ready with qualifier S.......................................................275
2.7 Scrubber ready with qualifier Misc...................................................275
Section 10 Shaft alignment - Shaft align............................................................ 276

1 Objectives........................................................................................ 276
2 Scope............................................................................................... 276
3 Application....................................................................................... 276
4 Class notations................................................................................ 276
5 References....................................................................................... 277
6 Documentation requirements...........................................................277
7 Design requirements........................................................................279
7.1 Shaft align(1).............................................................................279
7.2 Shaft align(2).............................................................................280
8 Alarm and monitoring...................................................................... 281
9 Installation inspection..................................................................... 281
9.1 Survey......................................................................................... 281
9.2 Procedure.....................................................................................282
9.3 Oil sampling points....................................................................... 283
9.4 Lubricant viscosity....................................................................... 283
9.5 Oil type compatibility.....................................................................283
10 Shipboard testing...........................................................................283
10.1 Partial propeller immersion........................................................... 283
10.2 Running in of aft bearing............................................................. 283
10.3 Minimum RPM............................................................................. 283
10.4 Rate of bearing temperature rise...................................................283
10.5 Oil analysis................................................................................. 283
10.6 Test of alarms.............................................................................284
Section 11 Safe return to port, orderly evacuation and abandonment................ 285

1 General............................................................................................ 285
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................285
1.2 Objective......................................................................................285
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1.3 Scope.......................................................................................... 285

1.4 Application................................................................................... 286
1.5 Class notation...............................................................................287
1.6 Structure of the SRtP rules and approach for the goal based standard.. 287
1.7 SRtP in service............................................................................. 288
1.8 Rebuild and refurbishment............................................................. 289
1.10 Survey, inspection, test and verification......................................... 296
1.11 Installation................................................................................. 297
1.12 Definition and abbreviations......................................................... 298
1.13 References..................................................................................300
2 Life-cycle approach and newbuilding work process......................... 301
2.1 Life cycle approach....................................................................... 301
2.2 Work process................................................................................302
3 Safe return to port - SRtP............................................................... 303
3.1 General........................................................................................ 303
3.2 SRtP casualty threshold (failure modes)........................................... 305
3.3 Remain operational........................................................................309
4 System arrangement - SRtP............................................................ 312
4.1 General........................................................................................ 312
4.2 Propulsion.................................................................................... 313
4.3 Steering....................................................................................... 314
4.4 Navigational systems..................................................................... 315
4.5 Fuel oil........................................................................................ 316
4.6 Internal communication................................................................. 317
4.7 External communication................................................................. 318
4.8 Fire water.................................................................................... 319
4.9 Fixed fire extinguishing systems..................................................... 320
4.10 Fire detection and alarm.............................................................. 321
4.11 Bilge.......................................................................................... 322
4.12 Ballast........................................................................................324
4.13 Internal watertight doors..............................................................324
4.14 Safe areas.................................................................................. 326
4.15 Flooding detection system............................................................ 328
4.16 Control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems................................330
4.17 Electrical power generation and distribution.................................... 330
4.18 Lighting system...........................................................................331
4.19 Stability computer....................................................................... 332
5 Orderly Evacuation and Abandonment - OEA................................... 332
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5.1 General........................................................................................ 332

5.2 OEA - casualty scenario (failure modes)...........................................333
5.3 Remain operational........................................................................334
6 System arrangement - OEA............................................................. 334
6.1 General........................................................................................ 334
6.2 Electrical power generation and distribution......................................334
6.3 Fire main..................................................................................... 335
6.4 Internal communication................................................................. 335
6.5 External communication................................................................. 336
6.6 Bilge system.................................................................................337
6.7 Lighting system............................................................................ 337
6.8 Guidance system...........................................................................337
Section 12 Wind assisted propulsion systems - WAPS....................................... 339

1 General............................................................................................ 339
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................339
1.2 Objective......................................................................................339
1.3 Scope.......................................................................................... 339
1.4 Application................................................................................... 339
1.5 Class notation...............................................................................340
1.6 References................................................................................... 340
2 Requirements...................................................................................344
2.1 Requirements for the design of WAPS units to be installed on a ship.....344
2.2 Requirements for ship integration................................................... 345
2.3 Focus areas.................................................................................. 347
2.4 Operational manual....................................................................... 347
2.5 Maintenance and inspection............................................................347
3 Testing............................................................................................. 347
3.1 Quayside testing........................................................................... 347
3.2 Sea trials..................................................................................... 347
Section 13 Gas fuelled ship installations - Gas fuelled LPG................................. 349

1 General............................................................................................ 349
1.1 Objective......................................................................................349
1.2 Scope.......................................................................................... 349
1.3 Application................................................................................... 349
1.4 Classification.................................................................................349
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1.5 Definitions.................................................................................... 349

1.8 Signboards................................................................................... 365
2 Materials.......................................................................................... 365
2.1 General........................................................................................ 365
3 Ship arrangement............................................................................ 366
3.1 Ship arrangement principles..........................................................366
3.2 Arrangement of machinery spaces................................................. 366
3.3 Arrangement of other spaces containing fuel systems....................... 366
3.4 Arrangement of air locks.............................................................. 369
3.5 Location of fuel containment systems.............................................370
4.1 General...................................................................................... 372
4.2 Liquefied gas fuel tanks............................................................... 372
4.3 Portable liquefied gas fuel tanks.................................................... 378
4.4 Loading limit for liquefied gas fuel tanks.........................................379
4.5 Maintenance of fuel storage condition.............................................379
4.6 Requirements depending on fuel tank location................................. 380
5 Piping systems.................................................................................381
5.1 General...................................................................................... 381
5.2 Pressure relief systems................................................................ 385
5.3 Fuel bunkering system................................................................. 387
5.4 Nitrogen installations................................................................... 388
5.5 Exhaust system...........................................................................389
5.6 Other ship systems......................................................................390
6.1 Ventilation of spaces.................................................................... 390
7 Fire safety........................................................................................392
7.1 General...................................................................................... 392
7.2 Fire protection............................................................................ 392
7.3 Fire extinction............................................................................. 392
7.4 Fire detection and alarm systems.................................................. 394
8.1 General...................................................................................... 394
8.2 Area classification........................................................................ 395
8.4 Maintenance............................................................................... 397
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9.1 General...................................................................................... 397

9.2 Fuel installation control and monitoring.......................................... 399
9.3 Fuel installation safety................................................................. 403
10.1 Gas fuelled boiler installations..................................................... 408
10.2 Gas fuelled turbines................................................................... 409
11.1 Fuel containment system............................................................ 409
11.2 Fuel piping systems................................................................... 410
11.3 Valves...................................................................................... 411
11.4 Expansion................................................................................. 411
11.5 Pumps...................................................................................... 412
11.6 Shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems...................... 412
11.7 Onboard testing.........................................................................412
Section 14 Gas fuelled ship installations - Gas fuelled ammonia.........................413

1 General............................................................................................ 413
1.1 Objective......................................................................................413
1.2 Scope.......................................................................................... 413
1.3 Application................................................................................... 413
1.4 References................................................................................... 413
1.6 Classification.................................................................................417
1.9 Signboards................................................................................... 429
2 Materials.......................................................................................... 429
2.1 General........................................................................................ 429
3 Ship arrangements...........................................................................431
3.1 Ship arrangement principles........................................................... 431
3.2 Arrangement of machinery spaces...................................................432
3.3 Arrangement of other spaces containing fuel systems........................ 432
3.4 Arrangement of air locks................................................................437
4.1 General........................................................................................ 437
4.2 Location of fuel containment systems.............................................. 438
4.3 Liquid gas fuel tanks..................................................................... 441
4.4 Portable liquefied gas fuel tanks..................................................... 446
4.5 Loading limit for liquefied gas fuel tanks.......................................... 447
DNV AS
4.6 Maintenance of fuel storage condition.............................................. 447

4.7 Requirements depending on fuel tank location.................................. 448
5 Piping systems.................................................................................449
5.1 General........................................................................................ 449
5.2 Pressure relief systems.................................................................. 453
5.3 Fuel bunkering system...................................................................455
5.4 Nitrogen installations..................................................................... 456
5.5 Exhaust system............................................................................ 457
5.6 Other ship systems....................................................................... 457
6.1 Ventilation of spaces..................................................................... 458
7 Fire safety........................................................................................459
7.1 General........................................................................................ 459
7.2 Fire protection.............................................................................. 460
7.3 Fire extinction...............................................................................460
7.4 Fire detection and alarm systems....................................................462
8 Electrical systems...........................................................................462
8.1 General........................................................................................ 462
9 Area classification and toxic zones.................................................. 463
9.2 Discharge of toxic vapours............................................................. 464
10 Control, monitoring and safety systems........................................ 465
10.1 General...................................................................................... 465
10.2 Fuel installation control and monitoring.......................................... 467
10.3 Fuel installation safety................................................................. 471
11.1 Gas fuelled boiler installations.......................................................476
11.2 Gas fuelled turbines.....................................................................476
12.1 Fuel containment systems............................................................ 477
12.2 Fuel piping systems..................................................................... 477
12.3 Valves........................................................................................ 479
12.4 Pumps........................................................................................479
12.5 Shutdown valves in liqufied gas fuel piping systems.........................479
12.6 Onboard testing.......................................................................... 479
Section 15 Operational reliability........................................................................ 480

1 General............................................................................................ 480
1.1 Introduction..................................................................................480
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1.2 Objective......................................................................................480

1.3 Scope.......................................................................................... 480
1.4 Application................................................................................... 482
1.5 Class notations............................................................................. 482
1.6 References................................................................................... 483
1.9 Required compliance documentation................................................ 491
1.10 Survey and test upon completion.................................................. 492
2 Enhanced reliability......................................................................... 494
2.1 Introduction..................................................................................494
2.2 General........................................................................................ 494
2.4 Propulsion system......................................................................... 499
2.5 Steering systems.......................................................................... 500
2.6 Power system............................................................................... 501
3 Enhanced manoeuvring reliability....................................................505
3.1 General........................................................................................ 505
3.3 Dynamic positioning system........................................................... 507
3.4 Manoeuvring thrusters................................................................... 508
3.5 Power system............................................................................... 508
4 Operational flexibility and predictability.......................................... 509
4.1 General........................................................................................ 509
Changes – historic.............................................................................................. 513
DNV AS
SECTION 1 ELECTRICAL ENERGY STORAGE
Part 6 Chapter 2 Section 1

1 General
1.1 Introduction
This section facilitates the use of electrical energy storage (EES) installations on electric and hybrid vessels.
1.2 Objective
This section sets requirement for safety and availability of EES installations on board vessels.
1.3 Scope
1.3.1 The rules in this section cover requirements to the EES space and to the design, installation and
certification requirements for lithium-ion battery systems and electrochemical capacitor systems.
Guidance note:
Battery systems with other chemistries than lithium-ion will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The main principles in this
section will be applied.
---e-n-d---o-f---g-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
1.3.2 This section provides prescriptive requirements to EES installations on board vessels. The
requirements prescribe technical solutions that may not be suitable for certain vessel designs, such as
vessels constructed of materials other than steel and for vessels of smaller size. According to Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1
[2.5.9], alternatives to detailed requirements may be accepted when the overall safety and reliability level
is found to be equivalent or better than that of the rules. See [2.1] for documenting equivalent safety for
alternative designs to the detailed requirements in this section. DNV-CG-0660 provides further guidance on
how to document an equivalent safety and reliability level for EES installations.
1.3.3 The requirements in [2] shall be complied with in addition to the general fire safety measures in
applicable statutory regulations.
Guidance note:
Statutory regulations, such as SOLAS and the 2000 HSC Code, do not include regulations regarding fire safety measures suitable
for these types of EES installations. The requirements in [2] are providing fire safety measures for such EES installations. The
requirements in [2] do not cover the full scope of fire safety measures in the statutory regulations, hence shall be complied with in
addition to the general fire safety measures in applicable statutory regulations.
1.4 Application
1.4.1 Class notation
Vessels complying with the requirements given in this section will be assigned the additional class notation
Battery(Power) or Battery(Safety), as specified in Table 1.
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Table 1 Class notation

Class notation Qualifier Purpose Application
Battery Power For vessels where the EES — All-electric vessel, i.e. all
Mandatory: power is used for electrical main sources of power
propulsion of the vessel. are based on EES.
Yes
— Hybrid vessel where one
Design requirements:
of the main sources of
[2] and [3] power is based on EES.
Survey requirements for — Hybrid vessel having an
fleet in service: operational mode where
Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 and Pt.7 the vessel is operating
Ch.1 Sec.4 on EES power only, with
the other main source of
power in standby.
— Hybrid vessel using
the EES system as a
redundant source of
power for main and/
or additional class
notations, e.g. dynamic
positioning.
Safety For vessels where the — Hybrid vessels not using

aggregated EES installation the EES power as a main
in one EES space has an source of power.
rated capacity of 20 kWh or — Hybrid vessels using
above and not having the the EES power for only
Battery(Power) notation. peak shaving and/or load
levelling.
— Vessels using EES power
solely when moored.
Guidance note:
Requirements to EES installations with a rated capacity less than 20 kWh are found in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2.
1.5 References
1.5.1 Relation to other parts of the rules
The requirements in this section are additional to the rules for main class and for other class notations. In
particular:
— piping systems, see Pt.4 Ch.6
— pressure equipment, including liquid cooling units, see Pt.4 Ch.7
— electrical installations, see Pt.4 Ch.8
— control and monitoring systems, see Pt.4 Ch.9
— use of batteries as a part of the dynamic positioning systems, see Ch.3 Sec.1 and Ch.3 Sec.2
— electrical shore power connection, see Ch.7 Sec.5.
1.5.2 Standards
The test requirements for EES systems is partly based on the following standards:
DNV AS
— IEC 60092-101 Electrical installations in ships - Definitions and general requirements.

— IEC 62619 Secondary cells and batteries containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes - Safety
requirements for secondary lithium cells and batteries, for use in industrial applications.
— IEC 62620 Secondary cells and batteries containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes - Secondary
lithium cells and batteries for use in industrial applications.
— UL 810A Standard for safety - Electrochemical Capacitors.
— UN Manual of test and criteria - Sub-Section 38.3 - Lithium metal and lithium ion batteries.
1.5.3 Informative references

— Technical Reference for Li-ion Battery Explosion Risk and Fire Suppression, DNV Document No.
1144K9G7-12, Report No. 2019-1025.
1.6 Definitions and abbreviations

Definitions and abbreviations are given in Table 2 and Table 3.
Table 2 Definition of terms
Term Definition
battery cell smallest building block in a battery, a chemical unit
battery cell block group of cells connected together in parallel configuration
battery management collective terminology comprising control, monitoring and protective functions of the battery
system system
battery module assembly of cells including electronic control
battery pack one or more modules including complete BMS and can be used as a standalone unit
battery string number of cells or modules connected in series with the same voltage level as the battery system
battery system whole battery installation including battery modules, electrical interconnections, BMS and other
safety features
C-Rate current (A) used to charge/discharge the EES system divided by the rated ampere-hours (Ah)
capacitor cell single capacitor
capacitor cell block group of capacitors connected together in parallel configuration
capacitor collective terminology comprising control, monitoring and protective functions of the capacitor
management system system
capacitor module assembly of capacitors including electronic control
capacitor pack one or more modules including complete CMS and can be used as a standalone unit
capacitor string number of cells or modules connected in series with the same voltage level as the capacitor
system
capacitor system whole capacitor installation including capacitor modules, electrical interconnections, CMS and
other safety features
CP-Rate power (W) used to charge/discharge the EES system divided by the rated Watt-hours (Wh)
EES converter equipment controlling the charging and discharging of the EES system.
EES space electrical energy storage room for lithium-ion batteries and/or electrochemical capacitors
DNV AS
Term Definition

EES system whole EES installation including modules, electrical interconnections, battery or capacitor
management system and other safety features
electrical energy storage of electrical energy including battery and capacitor

storage
electrochemical electric double layer capacitor that stores electrical energy in an electrochemical cell, covering
capacitor also supercapacitors, ultracapacitors, asymmetric capacitors and Li-ion capacitors.
energy management system/function providing monitoring and control of the energy capacities of the EES system
system/function
liquid cooled EES EES system provided with either direct liquid or liquid-to-air cooling of batteries/capacitors
system
manned control location normally manned so that any alarms are readily noticed by an operator
station Guidance note:
The term is used in a wider meaning than the SOLAS definition of the term control station and
includes an engine control room ECR (if any).
off-gas gases released from EES cell(s) during an abnormal incident (vaporised electrolyte, thermal
runaway exhaust gas)
sealed battery battery that remains closed and does not release either gas or liquid when operated within the
limits specified by the manufacturer
state of charge available capacity expressed as percentage of the rated capacity (0% - 100%)
state of health reflects the general condition of an EES system and its ability to deliver the specified performance
compared with a new EES system (0-100%)
thermal runaway accelerating self sustained temperature increase
worst case failure failure mode which, after a failure, results in the largest reduction of availability of power/energy
Table 3 Abbreviations
Term Definition
ACH air changes per hour
AE available energy
AP available power
BMS battery management system
CID current interrupting device
CMS capacitor management system
EES electrical energy storage
EMS energy management system/function
HVIL high voltage interlock loop
LEL lower explosion limit
DNV AS
Term Definition

SOC state of charge
SOH state of health
WCF worst case failure
1.7 Procedural requirements

1.7.1 Required compliance documentation
Products shall be delivered with compliance documents according to Table 4.
Table 4 Compliance documents required for the notations Battery(Power) and Battery(Safety).
Compliance
Compliance
Object document 1) Additional description
standard
type
Lithium-ion — [4] Battery systems with capacity ≥ 20 kWh and < 50 kWh.
1)
battery system — Pt.4 Ch.6 Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7 are applicable for liquid cooled EES systems.
TA — Pt.4 Ch.7
— Pt.4 Ch.8
— Pt.4 Ch.9
— [4] Battery systems with capacity ≥ 50 kWh.

— Pt.4 Ch.6 Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7 are applicable for liquid cooled EES systems.
3)
PC — Pt.4 Ch.7
— Pt.4 Ch.8
— Pt.4 Ch.9
Electrochemical — [5.4] Electrochemical capacitor systems with capacity ≥ 20 kWh (72 MJ) and
capacitor system — Pt.4 Ch.6 < 50 kWh (180 MJ).
2)
TA — Pt.4 Ch.7 Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7 are applicable for liquid cooled EES systems.
— Pt.4 Ch.8
— Pt.4 Ch.9
— [5.4] Electrochemical capacitor systems with capacity ≥ 50 kWh (180 MJ).

— Pt.4 Ch.6 Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7 are applicable for liquid cooled EES systems.
3)
PC — Pt.4 Ch.7
— Pt.4 Ch.8
— Pt.4 Ch.9
EES converter — [2.7.5] The EES converter, including the EES converter control system, shall be
PC — Pt.4 Ch.8 certified as outlined in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.1 Table 8.
— Pt.4 Ch.9
Energy — [3.2.3] Only applicable for the Battery(Power) notation.

management — Pt.4 Ch.8 If the energy management functionality is integrated with another
system PC system, e.g. as part of the power management system (PMS) or
— Pt.4 Ch.9
the integrated automation system (IAS) then the systems should be
certified together.
DNV AS
Compliance

Compliance
standard
type
1) The battery management system (BMS) shall be certified as a part of the battery system.
2) The capacitor management system (CMS) shall be certified as a part of the electrochemical capacitor system.
3) The issuance of the product certificate (PC) may be based on a valid type approval certificate (TA), with a limited
case-by-case design approval as stated in the type approval certificate (TA), and a manufacturer survey agreement
(MSA).
1)
Unless otherwise stated the compliance standard is the rules.
TA = type approval, PC = product certificate
Guidance note:
General description of services for certification of materials and components is given in class programme DNV-CP-0337. Type
approval programme for EES systems is given in class programme DNV-CP-0418.
1.7.2 Documentation requirements
1.7.2.1 General
General requirements for documentation can be found in DNV-CG-0550 Sec.6. See DNV-CG-0550 Sec.5 for
definition of the documentation types.
1.7.2.2 System design

Documentation related to system design shall be submitted as required by Table 5 for the Battery(Safety)
notation and with additional documentation required by Table 6 for the Battery(Power) notation.
Table 5 System design, documentation requirements for Battery(Safety)
Object Documentation type Additional description Info
EES spaces Z030 – Arrangement plan Arrangement showing EES system and all other
equipment inside the EES space(s) including FI
ventilation and gas detection.
Z010 - Vessel arrangement Position of EES space(s) relative to other spaces/

areas, separation of EES space(s) from vessel
outer shell, location of EES space(s) with respect FI
to vessel damage waterline or main deck, and
access door(s) to the EES space(s).
G170 – Safety philosophy Safety philosophy for the EES space(s), see [2.1]. FI
G060 – Structural fire protection

AP
drawing
G040 – Fire control plan Arrangement plan with content according to DNV-
CG-0550 Sec.5 [2.5.5] as applicable for the EES AP
space(s).
G200 – Fixed fire extinguishing Fixed total flooding fire-extinguishing for the EES
AP
system documentation space(s).
Z030 – Arrangement plan Arrangement of the fire detection in the EES

AP
space(s).
DNV AS

I030 - System block diagram Fire detection system.
AP
(topology)
S012 – Ducting diagram for the Detailed arrangements of the ventilation ducts
ventilation system and openings serving the EES space(s), including
AP
capacity and location of fans with motors and any
other components in the ventilation ducts.
Z253 – Test procedures for quay Test plan for the EES installation on board.
AP
and sea trial
I030 - System block diagram Gas detection system.

AP
(topology)
Z030 - Arrangement plan Toxic zone plan showing safety distances as

required in [2.2.5.2] in relation to openings to
AP
enclosed spaces, air inlets and outlets, escape
ways and mustering station.
E090 - Table of ex installation AP
Main EES power I030 – System block diagram Including interfaces with:
system (topology) - EES converters
- power and energy management systems FI
- alarm system
- other systems.
Electric power E170 – Electrical schematic Emergency disconnection of the EES system,
system drawing including location of emergency disconnection AP
controls.
AP = For approval, FI = For information
Table 6 System design, additional documentation requirements for class notation Battery(Power)
Electric power E220 – System philosophy An overall description of the propulsion and power
system installation for all relevant operating modes, FI
including charging.
E040 – Electrical load balance Load balance (energy and power) including size
of EES systems, EES converter capacity and
discharge/recharge capacity. The load balance shall
AP
reflect the operational mode stated in the system
philosophy. Available propulsion power after worst
case failure shall be calculated, see [3.2.2.1].
1.7.2.3 Onboard documentation

Documentation related to onboard documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 7 for use onboard
the vessel.
DNV AS
Table 7 Onboard documentation for class notation Battery(Power)

EES spaces Z160 - Operation manual See [2.9.1] and for vessels with Battery(Power)
FI, L
notation [3.4.1].
Z163 - Maintenance manual See [2.9.2] and for vessels with Battery(Power)
FI, L
notation [3.4.2].
FI = for information, L = local verification
1.7.2.4 Components
Documentation related to component shall be submitted as required by Table 8.
Table 8 Documentation requirements for class notation Battery(Power)
Lithium-ion battery Z072 – Safety description See [4.2]. AP

system
E120 – Specification Including ratings and environmental data. Short
circuit current capacity shall be stated for both
maximum (fully charged new battery) and
AP
minimum (discharged battery at estimated end of
lifetime) capacity. Maximum inductive load that
can be disconnected shall be stated.
E170 – Electrical schematic Schematic drawing of the battery system showing

drawing the battery packs, strings and modules, including AP
switchgear and control gear.
S010 - Piping diagram For liquid cooled EES systems. AP
Z252 – Test procedure at See [4.13].

AP
manufacturer
Z261 - Test report Type test report from testing of battery cells,
if the battery system is not type approved, see FI
Table 9.
Z262 - Report from test at Type test report from testing of the battery
manufacturer system, if the battery system is not type FI
approved, see Table 10.
I020 – Control system functional Battery management system (BMS).

AP
description
I030 – System block diagram Battery management system (BMS).

AP
(topology)
I050 – Power supply arrangement Battery management system (BMS). AP
I080 – Datasheet with Battery management system (BMS).

AP
environmental specifications
I110 – List of controlled and Battery management system (BMS).

AP
monitored points
I150 – Circuit diagram Battery management system (BMS). AP
DNV AS

I320 - Software change handling Battery management system (BMS).
AP
procedure
Z265 – Calculation report Documentation of the SOH and SOC calculation. FI
Electrochemical Z072 – Safety description See [4.2]. AP

capacitor system
E120 – Specification Including ratings and environmental data. Short
circuit current capacity shall be stated for both
maximum (fully charged new capacitors) and AP
minimum (discharged capacitors at estimated end
of lifetime) capacity.
E170 – Electrical schematic Schematic drawing of the capacitor system

drawing showing the capacitor packs, strings and modules, AP
including switchgear and control gear.
S010 - Piping diagram For liquid cooled EES systems. AP
Z252 – Test procedure at See [5.4].

AP
manufacturer
Z261 - Test report Type test report from testing of capacitor cells,
if the capacitor system is not type approved, see FI
Table 11.
Z262 - Report from test at Type test report from testing of the capacitor
manufacturer system, if the capacitor system is not type FI
approved, see Table 12.
I020 – Control system functional Capacitor management system (CMS).

AP
description
I030 – System block diagram Capacitor management system (CMS).

AP
(topology)
I050 – Power supply arrangement Capacitor management system (CMS). AP
I080 – Datasheet with Capacitor management system (CMS).

AP
environmental specifications
I110 – List of controlled and Capacitor management system (CMS).

AP
monitored points
I150 – Circuit diagram Capacitor management system (CMS). AP
I320 - Software change handling Capacitor management system (CMS).

AP
procedure
Energy I200 – Control and monitoring See [3.2.3] and Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.1.
management system documentation AP
system
EES converter See Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.1 Table 7.
1.7.3 Testing requirements
1.7.3.1 Shipboard testing shall be arranged according to [2.8] and [3.3].
DNV AS
1.7.3.2 Testing of the lithium-ion batteries and electrochemical capacitors at manufacturers shall be arranged

according to [4] and [5] respectively.
2 Class notation Battery(Safety)
2.1 Safety philosophy for the onboard installation

2.1.1 The EES space shall be arranged such that incidents in the EES system will not endanger the safety
of passengers, crew and vessel. The safety philosophy for the EES space shall be documented. The safety
philosophy shall address all the hazards described in DNV-CG-0660 and provide a description of safety
barriers implemented in the design, construction and operation to mitigate possible consequences in case of
a failure or incident. The safety philosophy shall also identify any alternative designs and document a safety
level equivalent to that required by the prescriptive requirements in this section.
2.1.2 The safety philosophy shall reflect the actual EES system and the integration with other systems on
board. The safety description for the EES system, as required in [4.2], shall be used as basis.
2.2 Arrangement of EES spaces

2.2.1 Stored energy
The energy storage capacity within one EES space shall be limited to 5 MWh.
2.2.2 Location on board

The EES space shall be positioned aft of the collision bulkhead. For steel vessels the boundaries of the EES
space shall not be part of the vessel's outer shell (sides, stern and bottom). For vessels constructed of
materials other than steel, the safety philosophy in [2.1] shall address the preventive measures regarding
risk of water ingress into the EES space caused by damage to the outer shell.
2.2.3 Structural integrity
2.2.3.1 For vessels constructed of steel, the boundaries of the EES space (bulkheads and decks) shall have
strength as for watertight boundaries with a minimum static design pressure of 20 kN/m2. The stiffeners
shall have shear connections at both ends. For vessels constructed of materials other than steel, the safety
philosophy in [2.1] shall address the structural integrity in case of explosion inside the EES space.
2.2.3.2 The EES space boundaries shall be gastight towards other spaces.
2.2.3.3 The EES space boundaries shall be watertight when located below the vessel's damage waterline, or
when located below the main deck on ships not subject to damage stability requirements.
2.2.4 EES space access and escape
2.2.4.1 There shall be no direct access to the EES space from areas where passengers have access.
2.2.4.2 Openings and penetrations in the boundaries of the EES space shall maintain the fire, gastight and
watertight integrity of the space.
2.2.4.3 Access doors or hatches shall be normally closed. Doors shall be self-closing or provided with alarm
on the bridge. Open/close indication shall be provided on the bridge. Signboards shall be fitted on the doors/
hatches informing that the doors/hatches shall be kept closed.
DNV AS
2.2.4.4 The EES space shall be arranged with escape way(s). At least one of the escape ways shall be

independent of spaces of high fire risk, such as machinery spaces of category A, cargo spaces, ro-ro spaces
and galleys.
2.2.4.5 Entrances to the EES space shall be arranged with signboards warning about the presence of an EES
system inside the space.
2.2.5 Gas hazardous areas
2.2.5.1 Explosion hazard

Areas in open air (see Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.1 Table 1) within 1.5 m from the inlet/outlet ventilation openings to/
from the EES space and, if arranged, the ventilation openings from the EES integrated ventilation duct (see
[2.3.6]) are classified as extended hazardous area zone 2 with respect to explosion hazard.
2.2.5.2 Toxic hazard

Areas in open air within 3 m from the ventilation openings referred to in [2.2.5.1] are classified as toxic
zones. Air intakes, air outlets or openings to other enclosed spaces shall not be located within these zones.
The ventilation openings shall be located so that toxic gases do not represent a hazard to crew or passengers
and at a safe distance from all escape routes, emergency exits, muster stations and launching stations.
Guidance note:
The areas around the inlet ventilation openings are also considered as explosive and toxic gas hazardous areas due to the risk of
back-pressure during a fire incident in the EES space.
2.2.6 Equipment inside the EES space
2.2.6.1 Only equipment associated with the EES system shall be placed within the EES space, see DNV-
CG-0660 for guidance. Installed equipment shall be addressed in the safety philosophy.
2.2.6.2 Pipes other than those serving the EES space and the equipment therein are not accepted inside the
EES space. Excepted are drainage pipes from spaces above the EES space provided the drain pipes are fully
welded, have minimum pipe thickness of SCH160, are arranged with internal corrosion protection, and are
self draining.
2.2.6.3 Fire hydrants shall not be located inside the EES space.
2.2.6.4 Equipment located 0.4 m, or closer, to the ceiling in the EES space shall be suitable for zone 2
installation. The temperature class and gas group for this equipment shall as minimum be T2 and IIC.
Guidance note:
— This requirement does not apply to the EES system.

— The ceiling should in this context be taken as the underside of any fire insulation fitted to the structural ceiling of the space.
— Equipment that is not required to be in operation during an off-gas event may, as an alternative, be arranged to de-energize
upon gas detection.
2.2.7 Drainage
2.2.7.1 For EES spaces arranged with a water based fire extinguishing system according to [2.5.3], a
drainage system shall be provided.
2.2.7.2 The drainage system shall have a capacity at least equal to that of the water based fire extinguishing
system. Where the water is discharged by means of a pump pumping directly from a bilge well or bilge tank,
the capacity of the bilge pump shall be at least 125% of the combined capacity of the water-spraying system
pumps.
DNV AS
2.2.7.3 The drainage system shall be operable from outside the EES space at a position in the vicinity of the

fire extinguishing system controls.
2.3 Environmental control and ventilation of the EES space

2.3.1 Environmental control
The EES space shall be arranged to meet the environmental specifications of the EES system with respect to
ambient temperature, humidity, cleanliness and salinity. The associated risks shall be addressed in the safety
philosophy document in [2.1].
2.3.2 Ventilation system fire and gas integrity
2.3.2.1 The ventilation system serving the EES space shall be separated from ventilation systems serving
other spaces and arranged with inlets and outlets directly to open air.
Guidance note:
See [2.3.6] for additional ventilation outlet duct for EES systems arranged with integrated off-gas ventilation duct.
2.3.2.2 For vessels built to DNV Ship rules, the ventilation ducts shall be arranged as per requirements to
ducts serving machinery space of category A according to SOLAS Ch.II-2 Reg.9. For vessels built to DNV High
speed and light craft rules, the ventilation ducts shall be arranged as per requirements to ducts serving areas
of major fire hazard according to HSC Code Ch.7.
2.3.2.3 The ducts shall be gastight and able to withstand the off-gas temperature. The ducts to and from the
EES space shall be made of steel and designed to minimum A0 standard.
2.3.2.4 The ducts shall be arranged with means of closing when the EES space is fitted with a combined fire-
extinguishing system according to [2.5.3.5].
2.3.3 Ventilation openings
2.3.3.1 Inside the EES space the ventilation inlet and outlet shall be arranged to provide air circulation
throughout the space. The space shall not be arranged with dropped ceiling or other obstructions that may
cause gas accumulation. The outlet centreline shall be located 0.4 m, or closer, to the ceiling.
Guidance note:
— The ceiling should in this context be taken as the underside of any fire insulation fitted to the structural ceiling of the space.
2.3.3.2 The ventilation ducts shall be so arranged that possible ingress of water does not reach the EES
system. A broken ventilation duct shall be taken into account when designing the ingress protection.
2.3.3.3 The ventilation duct shall be so arranged that possible condensation inside of the ventilation duct
does not reach the EES system.
2.3.3.4 The ventilation openings inside the EES space shall not be located directly above the EES cabinet.
2.3.3.5 The outside ventilation openings shall be arranged with a wire mesh of 13 mm or less.
2.3.3.6 The outside ventilation openings shall be arranged to prevent sea water from entering and at a
height sufficient to meet the International Load Line Convention without arranging any closing appliances.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

See [2.2.5] regarding further requirements to location and explosive/toxic zones on open deck.
2.3.4 Mechanical ventilation
2.3.4.1 The ventilation system in [2.3.2] shall be arranged with a dedicated extraction ventilation fan
located at the outlet to ensure under-pressure in the EES space and the ventilation ducts.
2.3.4.2 The ventilation fan shall be of non-sparking type according to Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 [2.6]. If the fan motor
is installed inside the duct, the fan motor shall be suitable for zone 2 with minimum temperature class T2 and
gas group IIC.
2.3.4.3 The ventilation fan shall have power supply from two separate supply circuits, one from the main
source of power and one from the emergency source of power. An automatic change over shall be arranged.
Upon loss of any of these power supplies an alarm shall be initiated at a manned control station, see Pt.4
Ch.8 Sec.2 [6.1.1].
2.3.4.4 The ventilation fan shall have a capacity not less than six air changes per hour (ACH).
2.3.5 Control and monitoring
2.3.5.1 Manual control of the EES space ventilation system shall be arranged outside the EES space at a
manned control station and locally at the entrance to the EES space. The manual controls shall override the
automatic controls required in [2.3.5.5]. Failures in the remote or automatic controls shall not affect the local
control of the ventilation.
2.3.5.2 If the EES space ventilation is arranged for continuous operation, the fan may be arranged to run
at lower capacity during normal operation but shall automatically increase to the off-gas capacity required in
[2.3.4.4] upon detection of any of the conditions listed in [2.3.5.5].
2.3.5.3 For EES spaces with more than six air changes per hour, manual control for temporary stop of the
ventilation shall be located close to the door(s) inside and outside of the room to reduce the differential
pressure while opening the door.
Guidance note:
The manual control on the outside of the door may be provided by the local control required in [2.3.5.1].
2.3.5.4 If the EES space ventilation system is not in continuous operation, a signboard shall be fitted at the
entrance to run the ventilation before entering the space.
2.3.5.5 Ventilation of the EES space shall be automatically activated upon:

— gas detection in the EES space, see [2.4.3.1]
— high cell temperature detection, see [4.8.4], in case EES system with separate off-gas duct according to
[2.3.6] is not arranged.
2.3.5.6 The EES space ventilation ducts shall not be fitted with any means of closing other than those
required by [2.3.2.2] and [2.3.2.4]. It shall be possible to manually open and close any fire dampers.
2.3.5.7 The following shall be monitored at a manned control station:

— ambient temperature in EES space
— indication of ventilation running in the EES space, see [2.3.4]
— indication of ventilation running for the integrated off-gas ventilation duct as applicable, see [2.3.6.3].
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Additional equipment (e.g. CCTV, IR camera, monitoring of actual gas concentration) giving situational awareness to crew may be
beneficial.
2.3.5.8 The following shall give an alarm at a manned control station:

— high ambient temperature of EES space
— failure of EES ventilation and failure of either power supply for EES ventilator fan.
2.3.5.9 EES space temperature alarm and indication shall be independent of the EES system.
2.3.6 Ventilation from EES systems with integrated off-gas ventilation ducts
2.3.6.1 For EES systems arranged with an integrated off-gas ventilation duct according to [4.12], the
integrated ventilation duct shall be connected to an outlet ventilation duct directly to open air. This outlet
duct shall be arranged in addition to and independent of the EES space outlet duct required in [2.3.2], see
Figure 1.
Figure 1 Ventilation of EES space and integrated off-gas duct
2.3.6.2 The arrangement of this outlet ventilation duct shall comply with the requirements in [2.3.2.1] to
[2.3.2.3] and [2.3.3.2] to [2.3.3.5].
2.3.6.3 For EES systems designed according to design option 2 as given in [4.4.1], the outlet duct shall
be arranged with a mechanical exhaust ventilation complying with [2.3.4.1] to [2.3.4.3] and [2.3.5] and
ensuring an under pressure in the off-gas duct.
2.3.6.4 The capacity of the mechanical exhaust ventilation shall be as determined by analysis considering the
number of cells releasing off-gas during thermal runaway in an EES cell. This calculation shall be included in
the safety philosophy.
2.3.6.5 The exhaust ventilation required by design option 2 shall be automatically activated upon either
gas detection in the integrated ventilation duct, see [2.4.2.2], or upon high cell temperature detection, see
[4.8.4].
DNV AS
2.4 Off-gas detection
2.4.1 Gas detection system
2.4.1.1 The EES space shall be arranged with a gas detection system.
2.4.1.2 The gas detection system shall be independent of the EES system.
2.4.1.3 The gas detection system shall have power supply from two separate supply circuits, one from the
main source of power and one from the emergency source of power. An automatic change over shall be
arranged for the two supply circuits.
2.4.2 Arrangement
2.4.2.1 Gas detectors in the space

Gas detectors shall be positioned to provide as early as possible detection. The EES off-gas may be both
lighter and heavier than air depending on the temperature of the off-gas, hence minimum two detectors are
required in the EES space with one located in the ceiling and one close to the floor.
Guidance note:
— CO, H2 or other gas detector detecting gas components of the EES off-gas may be used as an alternative to a purpose-made
gas detector.
— In case continuous extraction ventilation during normal operation is provided for the ESS space, one of the gas detectors can
be fitted in the EES space outlet ventilation duct.
2.4.2.2 Gas detector in the integrated off-gas duct

In case a separate outlet ventilation duct is arranged according to [2.3.6], gas detection shall also be
arranged inside the integrated off-gas duct or enclosed cabinet if start of the ventilation is based on gas
detection according to [2.3.6.5].
Guidance note:
Use of an Ex-proof smoke detector for gas detection inside the integrated off-gas duct or enclosed cabinet is considered equivalent.
2.4.3 Protective functions and alarms
2.4.3.1 Gas detection shall at a level of no more than 30% LEL:

— ensure automatic disconnection of the EES system according to [4.10.4]
— give alarm on the bridge
— start the EES space exhaust ventilation fan required in [2.3.4] in case of gas detection in the EES space
according to [2.4.2.1]
— start the exhaust ventilation fan for the integrated off-gas ventilation duct, if gas detection in the duct is
arranged according to [2.4.2.2].
2.4.3.2 Failures in the gas detection system or failure of either of the two power supplies in [2.4.1.3] shall
give alarm in a manned control station.
DNV AS
2.5 Fire safety for EES spaces
2.5.1 Fire integrity
2.5.1.1 An EES space that contains an EES system with stored energy of less than 100 kWh shall be defined
as:
— areas of moderate fire hazard ('fire category B') on vessel built according to IMO HSC code
— fire category 7 (other machinery space) on a cargo vessel and on a passenger ship carrying not more than
36 passengers built according to SOLAS Ch. II-2
— fire category 11 (other machinery space) on a passenger vessel carrying more than 36 passengers built
according to SOLAS Ch. II-2.
An EES space that contains an EES system with stored energy of 100 kWh or more shall be defined as:
— areas of major fire hazard ('fire category A') on vessel built according to IMO HSC code
— fire category 6 (machinery space of category A) on a cargo vessel and on a passenger ship carrying not
more than 36 passengers built according to SOLAS Ch. II-2
— fire category 12 (machinery space of category A) on a passenger vessel carrying more than 36 passengers
built according to SOLAS Ch. II-2.
2.5.1.2 For vessels built according to SOLAS Ch. II-2 fire integrity of any EES spaces (above or below
100kWh) shall in addition to [2.5.1.1] have A-60 fire integrity towards:
— machinery spaces of category A as defined in SOLAS Reg. II-2/3
— enclosed cargo areas for carriage of dangerous goods.
For vessel built according to IMO HSC Code, the note 2 of table 7.4-1 and 7.4-2 shall not be applied (for
instance, full structural fire protection is deemed necessary between a machinery space and an EES space).
2.5.1.3 See [2.2.4] regarding access doors to the EES space.
2.5.1.4 For vessels built according to other standards than SOLAS Ch. II-2 or the IMO HSC Code, the fire
category and structural fire protection shall provide equivalent protection to the above.
2.5.2 Fire detection and fire alarm
2.5.2.1 A fixed fire detection system shall be provided in all EES spaces. Combined smoke and heat
detectors or a combination of smoke and heat detectors shall be installed. The arrangement shall comply
with the international code for fire safety systems (FSS code).
2.5.2.2 The components of the fire detection system installed inside the EES space shall be of a certified safe
type for use in explosive atmosphere according to [2.2.6.4].
2.5.2.3 The EES space shall be considered as a machinery space of category A in the context of fire
detection. Sections of the fire detection system covering the EES space shall not serve detectors covering
accommodation, service and control stations.
2.5.2.4 Fire alarms shall be provided as for a machinery space of category A.
2.5.3 Fire extinguishing
2.5.3.1 The EES space shall be protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system that can extinguish the EES
fire or control and provide continuous cooling of the EES space.
2.5.3.2 Any of the following systems will be accepted when modified as outlined in this section:
DNV AS
— water based system according to IMO MSC/Circ. 1165, as amended by MSC.1/Circ.1269 and MSC.1/

Circ.1386
— a combined system as defined by [2.5.3.5].
Guidance note:
Water based extinguishing system is recommended due to its inherent heat absorbing capabilities.
2.5.3.3 Vessels built of non-metallic materials, such as fiber reinforced plastic, shall have a fixed fire
extinguishing system limiting heat from the fire dissipating into the load bearing structures. A total flooding
water mist as per [2.5.3.4] or a combined system as per [2.5.3.5] shall be provided.
2.5.3.4 Fixed water-based fire extinguishing system

1) The water based systems shall be designed to discharge fresh water for 60 minutes operation.
2) When freshwater is no longer available, there shall be an audible and visible alarm on the navigational
bridge.
3) The fresh-water specification shall also comply with maker's specification for the water supply (see IMO
MSC.1/Circ. 1516 for details).
4) The water based system shall be served by dedicated fresh-water tank(s) or from utility service tanks
with low-level alarms.
2.5.3.5 Combined system

1) The EES space may be protected with both a gas based and freshwater based water spray system. The
systems shall be separate with independent components.
2) Instructions for use of the systems, including preferred order and hold time for the gas, shall be
available on board.
3) The gas system shall be designed as follows:
— For the gaseous agent or CO2 the design concentration shall be based upon the gas NOAEL
concentration for chemical gases, minimum 52% for inert gases and minimum 45% for CO2.
— EES spaces with stored energy of 100 kWh or more shall be provided with a second independent
charge with same capacity as the first charge (a 2 x 100% system).
— For all gases the following shall be documented:
— pressure peaks and under-pressure expected during release of the extinguishing gas
— structural integrity of doors and ventilation dampers in the boundary of the space when exposed to
these pressure peaks and under-pressures. Doors and dampers shall remain intact after exposure.
4) The freshwater based water spray system shall be designed as follows:
— The water spray system shall be designed to supply fresh water through its nozzles for 30 minutes.
If the water tank is shared with other systems, a low level alarm shall be provided when water level
drops below the 30 minutes capacity.
2
— The spray nozzles shall be designed for a flow of 5.0 litres per minute per m for the entire protected
space. Alternatively, the system may be installed as a total flooding system, applying the nozzle
DNV AS
installation specification based on IMO MSC/Circ. 1165. Only requirements relevant for nozzles shall

be implemented, not pump design.
— The spray nozzle shall be of heat and corrosion resistant material and be of approved type.
— The water pump, valves, power supply and other system supply components shall be located outside
the protected space.
— Piping, including couplings, shall be galvanised steel or stainless steel or of equivalent heat resisting
material.
Guidance note:
Some water mist systems are only accepted with stainless steel piping, as per their approvals.
— The water pump may be used for other services if it can be immediately available for protection of the
EES space.
— The controls for opening valves and start of pump shall be readily accessible and adjacent to the
release controls for the gas fixed fire extinguishing system.
2.5.3.6 One portable extinguisher suitable for fires in electrical systems shall be readily available inside the
space or immediately outside one of the entrances.
2.6 Liquid cooling system for battery systems

2.6.1 For EES systems provided with liquid cooling, the cooling liquid supply inside the EES space shall
comply with the requirements in this subsection. The requirements to the liquid cooling system inside the
battery system assembly are given in [4.11].
2.6.2 Pipes, joints and piping components in the cooling liquid supply shall comply with the requirements in
Pt.4 Ch.6.
2.6.3 Pipe joints outside the EES system assembly shall be screened to prevent spray of cooling liquid on the
battery system enclosure in case of leakage.
Guidance note:
IP X5 EES system enclosure is considered to provide the required screening.
2.7 Electrical system

2.7.1 Circuit protection
Circuit protection for the power supply to the EES system shall be arranged according to Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2
[7.2].
Guidance note:
See [4.5.1] regarding circuit protection for the supply from the EES system.
2.7.2 Insulation monitoring

Electrical insulation to earth of each EES system shall be monitored and low level shall give alarm. The
insulation monitoring shall be coordinated with the EES system internal monitoring device, see [4.7].
2.7.3 Isolation of the EES system

Switchgear providing means for safe isolation of the EES system shall be arranged. The switchgear shall
disconnect both poles.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Equipment suitable for isolation is defined in IEC 60947-1 clause 7.1.7. Contactors are therefore not accepted as suitable for
isolation.
2.7.4 Emergency disconnection of the EES system
2.7.4.1 Control for emergency disconnection of the EES system as required in [4.10.2] shall be arranged at
the following locations:
— adjacent to (outside of) the EES space
— navigation bridge.
2.7.4.2 The control for emergency disconnection shall comply with Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [8.6.1].
2.7.5 EES converters
2.7.5.1 The converters shall communicate with and operate within the limits given by the EES system.
2.7.5.2 The converters shall be designed with the needed capacity specified by the EES application.
2.7.5.3 The converters shall protect the EES system against overvoltage and undervoltage. The voltage
protection shall be independent of the EES system, i.e. utilize independent voltage sensors and be
independent of the battery or capacitor management system.
The protection levels shall be within the allowable operating values of the EES system.
Guidance note:
Alternatively when the vessel has several EES converters and/or a EES converter located on shore then the independent voltage
protection could be implemented in the DC switchboard where the EES system is connected.
2.7.5.4 Charging and discharging failure shall give alarm at a manned control station.
2.7.5.5 When an EES converter is located onshore then the requirements given in [2.7.5.1] and [2.7.5.3]
shall be fulfilled.
2.8 Testing on board

2.8.1 After installation on board, tests according to [2.8.2] to [2.8.4] shall be performed.
Guidance note:
For general requirements to testing of:
— piping systems, see Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.10 [6]

— electrical installations, see Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 [4.4]
— control systems, see Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.1 [4.4].
2.8.2 EES control, monitoring and safety functions

— Test of correct interface between the EES converters and the EES system.
— Test of EES converter's independent EES voltage protection functions.
— Test of the EES system and its auxiliaries, including alarms, emergency disconnection and safety
functions.
DNV AS
— Test of functions in the EES space (e.g. ventilation, drainage, liquid cooling, gas detection, fire detection,

leakage detection) as installed.
2.8.3 Ventilation system

The EES space ventilation inlet and outlet ducts in [2.3.2], as well as the ventilation outlet duct from the
integrated off-gas duct in [2.3.6], shall be subjected to a leak test for the purpose of verifying gas tightness
outside of the EES space.
2.8.4 Cooling system

For liquid cooled EES systems, the liquid cooling system inside the EES system shall be hydrostatically tested
after assembling with a pressure of 1.5 x design pressure and with a holding time of one (1) hour.
2.9 Operation and maintenance

2.9.1 Operating procedures
2.9.1.1 Instructions for operation of the EES space and EES system shall be provided on board.
2.9.1.2 The operating procedures shall include emergency operation procedures for handling the EES
systems and ventilation in case of an external fire and in the event of an internal thermal incident.
2.9.1.3 The operating procedures shall include procedures for how to locate and isolate earth faults in the
EES system.
2.9.2 Maintenance plan

A plan for systematic maintenance and function testing shall be provided on board describing in detail the
required maintenance of components, how systems shall be tested, and what shall be observed during the
tests.
3 Class notation Battery(Power)
3.1 General
The requirements given for Battery(Safety) in [2] shall be fulfilled.
3.2 System design

3.2.1 EES system
3.2.1.1 When all the main sources of power is based on EES only, the main sources of power shall consist of
at least two independent EES systems located in two separate EES spaces.
3.2.1.2 The cables from the EES system to the main switchboard shall follow the routing requirements as
given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [9.5].
3.2.1.3 An EES system shall be able to supply the short circuit current necessary to obtain selective tripping
of downstream circuit breakers and fuses.
3.2.1.4 It shall be possible to operate the EES system locally. This local operation shall be independent from
any remote control (e.g. PMS, IAS) systems, in accordance with the requirements of Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.4 [3.1.6].
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The local operation workstation can be located at the EES system, the switchboard room or at the EES converter. Local operation
is understood as being able to connect the EES system to the switchboard. The requirement for local operation applies only for
vessels where the EES is necessary in order to maintain propulsion, i.e. this does not apply to hybrid solutions where the main
class propulsion requirement is fulfilled by diesel or gas fuelled propulsion engine(s) or generator(s).
3.2.2 EES capacity
3.2.2.1 When an EES system replaces one of the required main sources of power in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [2.1.1],
the capacity of the EES system shall be sufficient for the intended operation of the vessel. This applies both
to normal operation and after a worst case failure.
Minimum remaining propulsion power after worst case failure (Pprop_wcf) shall be calculated based on
remaining power for the propulsion motors after the worst case single failure have occurred, e.g. loss of a
main switchboard or loss of a main power source. Minimum remaining propulsion power after worst case
failure (Pprop_wcf) shall be documented in the electrical load balance.
Guidance note:
— In addition to Pprop_wcf, the vessels dependency of the EES will be stated in the appendix to the class certificate as an operational
limitation.
— Where the EES system form a part of the dynamic positioning (DP) system, worst case failure is based on relevant requirements
and failure modes for the applicable DP notation.
3.2.2.2 When EES systems are used as redundant power sources for dynamic positioning, the capacity of the
EES systems (available power and available energy) shall be sufficient for the planned operation. See Ch.3
Sec.1 and Ch.3 Sec.2.
3.2.2.3 The SOC and SOH of the EES systems shall be monitored and available for the operator.
3.2.2.4 In case of over-temperature in a EES system, a request for manual load reduction shall be issued
both visually and acoustically on the bridge. Alternatively an automatic load reduction can be arranged.
3.2.2.5 Monitoring of EES systems supplying propulsion power for dynamic positioning systems, shall follow
requirements as given in Ch.3 Sec.1 [6.12], and Ch.3 Sec.2 [6.10] as applicable.
3.2.3 Energy management system
3.2.3.1 Energy management system (EMS) shall be installed.

Guidance note:
The EMS functions may be integrated in the vessel's automation system, the power management system or DP control system.
3.2.3.2 For EES systems providing power to main and/or redundant propulsion or dynamic positioning, the
energy management system shall provide a reliable measure of the available energy and power, taking into
consideration the EES systems SOH and SOC.
Guidance note:
The calculation of available energy and power should take into account the possible inaccuracy of the SOC and SOH given by the
EES system.
3.2.3.3 For a vessel depending on the stored energy in the EES for seagoing operation, the following shall be
calculated:
DNV AS
1) Remaining time for seagoing operation (Top)

Guidance note:
The calculation of remaining time for seagoing operation, Top, should be based on the available energy and the average
power consumption for relevant period.
where
Top = remaining time for seagoing operation [h]
AE = available energy [kWh]
Pavr = average power consumption for relevant period [kW].
2) Remaining time for seagoing operation after worst case single failure (Twcf). Only applicable for vessels
depending on the energy stored in EES for propulsion after worst case failure.
Guidance note:
Twcf, should be based on remaining
The calculation of remaining time for seagoing operation after worst case single failure,
available energy and power consumption after a worst case single failure (component failure), see [3.2.2.1].
If
then
where
Twcf = remaining time for seagoing operation after worst case single failure (component failure) [h]
AEwcf = available energy after worst case single failure (component failure) [kWh]
Pprop_wcf = calculated propulsion power consumption after a worst case single failure (component failure) [kW]
Pcont_wcf = remaining power after worst case failure, generated from 'continuous available' power sources, e.g diesel
generators [kW]
Paux_wcf = calculated auxiliary power consumption after a worst case single failure (component failure) [kW].
DNV AS
3) Remaining time for powering emergency consumers (Tem). Only applicable for vessels depending on the

energy stored in the EES for supplying emergency consumers.
Guidance note:
The calculation of remaining time for powering emergency consumers, Tem, should be based on the remaining available
energy after worst case failure and the designed power consumption for emergency consumers.
If
then
where
Tem = remaining time for emergency consumers [h]
AEwcf = available energy after worst case failure (fire and flooding) [kWh]
Pem = designed power consumption from EES for emergency consumers according to load balance [kW]
Pcont_wcf = remaining power after worst case failure, generated from 'continuous available' power sources, e.g diesel
generators [kW].
3.2.3.4 The following parameters shall be provided with remote monitoring at the navigating bridge:
— available energy (AE) of the EES systems
— available power (AP) of the EES systems
— remaining time for seagoing operation (Top)
— remaining time for seagoing operation after worst case failure (Twcf) if the vessel is depending on the
energy stored in the EES for propulsion after worst case failure
— remaining time for powering emergency consumers (Tem) if the vessel is depending on the energy stored
in the EES for supplying emergency consumers.
3.2.3.5 The following warning and alarm shall be provided the navigating bridge:
— If the vessel is depending on the energy stored in the EES for propulsion after worst case failure then
an individual warning shall be given at the navigating bridge when the EES system reaches minimum
capacity as required for the intended operation or voyage. This warning shall be based on the remaining
time for seagoing operation after worst case single failure (Twcf). The warning level will be operator set
accordingly to the vessels operation(s).
— If the vessel is depending on the energy stored in the EES for supplying emergency consumers then an
individual alarm shall be given at the navigating bridge when the EES system reaches minimum capacity
as required for powering the emergency consumers.
3.3 Testing
3.3.1 Testing
Supplementary to the tests stated in [2.8], the following shall be verified by testing:
— verify that the EES capacity (SOH) is consistent with the SOH value calculated for all the EES systems. If
there is a larger deviation than +/- 5%, then the values in the EES system shall be adjusted
— charging and discharging capacities to verify maximum C-rates as specified for the intended operation of
the vessel.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

— Verification of SOH may be performed by coulomb counting during a complete charge or discharge or other method as
documented in the maintenance manual, see [3.4.2].
— Requirements for testing of the electrical installation is given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 [4.4] and Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.12 [2.1].
— Requirements for testing of the control systems is given in Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.1 [4.4].
3.4 Operation and maintenance

3.4.1 Operation
Operating instruction shall be kept on board and shall include the following in addition to the emergency
procedures stated in [2.9.1]:
— charging procedure
— normal operation procedures of the EES system
— local operation procedure
— conditions and procedures to prepare the EES system for extended period of standby.
3.4.2 Maintenance
A maintenance plan for the EES system shall be kept on board and shall include verification procedures for
SOH in addition to the elements stated in [2.9.2].
4 Battery system
4.1 General
The requirements given in this section are related to lithium-ion battery systems.
Guidance note:
Battery systems with other chemistries will be considered on a case-by-case basis, see also DNV-CG-0660.
4.2 Safety description

The safety description shall as a minimum address all the hazards described in DNV-CG-0660 related to the
battery system and provide descriptions of safety barriers implemented in the design to mitigate possible
consequences in case of failures or incidents.
4.3 Battery system assembly

4.3.1 Accessibility
The requirements in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.4 [1.1.3] b) and e) apply.
4.3.2 Ingress protection

The requirements for IP rating of the battery systems depend on the location. As a minimum, IP 44 is
required.
Guidance note:
General requirements for ingress protection is given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 Table 1. Additional ingress protection should be considered
as the EES system is not possible to de-energize.
DNV AS
4.3.3 Materials

The battery system shall be made of a flame-retardant material.
Guidance note:
Tests for flame retardant properties are described in IEC 60092-101. Flammability test in accordance with UL94 5VA, 5VB, V0 and
V1 can also be accepted.
4.3.4 Signboards
Relevant parts of Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 [2.5.2]apply.
4.4 Battery cells and modules

4.4.1 Propagation prevention
The design of a module should prevent propagation of a thermal runaway from one cell to another cell.
Alternatively, as a minimum, a system shall be designed such that a thermal runaway in one cell may spread
within that module but will not propagate to another module. The amount of off-gas considered in the
analysis shall be dependent on the number of cells which release off-gas. Demonstration of system capability
with respect to either approach shall be verified by testing as defined in [4.13.2] in accordance with one of
these two options:
1) No propagation between cells within a module.
2) No propagation between modules.
Design option 2) is only accepted where the sum of the cells that propagate in the module is limited to 11
kWh.
4.4.2 Agent for propagation prevention
4.4.2.1 Any active agent for prevention of thermal runaway propagation shall be designed to release
automatically.
4.4.2.2 The agent for battery systems arranged with an extinguish agent as an active part to prevent
thermal runaway, shall be provided with the fixed fire extinguishing system required by [2.5].
4.5 Electrical protection devices

4.5.1 Short circuit and overcurrent protection
4.5.1.1 Short circuit and overcurrent protection according to Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [7.2] shall be provided.
4.5.1.2 The connections from battery modules to the short circuit and overcurrent protection shall be
arranged inherently short circuit and earth fault proof. The requirements in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 [1.1.4] apply,
however, bare conductors mounted on isolating supports are not accepted. All conductors shall be provided
with insulation.
4.5.2 Control switchgear
4.5.2.1 The battery system shall be arranged with control switchgear (e.g. a main power contactor) for
disconnection of the battery system as required in [4.8] and [4.10].
4.5.2.2 The control switchgear shall disconnect both poles.
4.5.2.3 The control switchgear shall have a rating not less than the maximum charge and discharge current.
DNV AS
4.5.2.4 Control switchgear contactors shall be protected against the possibility of breaking current exceeding

their load break capacity in fault situations.
4.5.2.5 If delay triggering of control switchgear is used for selectivity, the time delay shall not exceed 2 s.
4.5.3 Safety interlocks

Where main power connectors are used, these shall have integrated safety interlock (HVIL), securing that
connection/disconnection can only be performed when the supply (e.g. a main contactor) is disconnected.
Guidance note:
HVIL is not required for connections requiring tools for disconnection.
4.6 Insulation coordination

4.6.1 The clearance and creepage distances as given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.4 [1.1.8] shall be met for all busbars
including terminals. For other live parts the clearance and creepage distances shall be according to Pt.4
Ch.8 Sec.3 [4.6.1]. The clearance distances shall be based on the highest charge voltage. The d creepage
distances shall be based on the working voltage.
4.6.2 Cell swelling inside a module shall not lead to insulation breakdown (or other hazards). This shall be
addressed in the safety description.
4.7 Insulation monitoring

4.7.1 Electrical insulation to earth of each battery system shall be monitored and low level shall give alarm
in a manned control station.
4.7.2 The insulation monitoring of the battery system shall be located inside the battery system on the
battery side of any switchgear in [4.5.1] and [4.5.2].
4.7.3 The insulation monitoring shall remain in operation when the battery system is not connected.
4.7.4 The insulation monitoring device of the battery system shall be coordinated where necessary with
other insulation monitoring devices in the electrical distribution system to ensure that the devices are not
affecting each others operation and that continuous insulation monitoring of the battery system is ensured.
4.8 Battery management system

4.8.1 General
The battery system shall have an integrated battery management system (BMS).
4.8.2 Control
The BMS shall provide voltage balancing of the cells and modules.
4.8.3 Monitoring
The following parameters shall be measured:
— cell voltage
— cell or module temperature
— battery string current.
DNV AS
4.8.4 Protection

The BMS shall protect the battery system from the following faults by disconnection of the control switchgear
in [4.5.2]:
— over-current
— over-voltage and under-voltage
— over-temperature.
Guidance note:
Protection of over current may also be done by limiting the current from the battery converter.
4.8.5 Indication
The following parameters shall be indicated at local control panels or in remote workstations:
— system voltage
— maximum, minimum and average cell voltage
— maximum, minimum and average cell or module temperature
— battery string current.
Guidance note:
The values may be calculated in an external system.
4.8.6 Communication
4.8.6.1 The BMS shall communicate the voltage and current limits and limits for charging and discharging to
the battery converter.
4.8.6.2 The following parameters shall be calculated and be available for the energy management system
(EMS):
— state of charge of the batteries (SOC)
— state of health of the batteries (SOH).
Guidance note:
Methods for estimating SOC and SOH should be based on best industry practice for the relevant battery technology. Such methods
may use a combination of measurements, electrochemical models and prediction algorithms, and take factors such as battery
characteristics, operating temperature, charge rates, cell aging and self-discharge into account.
4.9 Battery alarms

4.9.1 General
Any abnormal condition in the battery system shall be alarmed in a manned control station with individual or
group-wise indication in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3 [1.5].
4.9.2 Alarms
The abnormal conditions to be alarmed shall as a minimum include:
— high cell or module temperature
— over- and undervoltage
— battery system disconnection
— tripping of battery breakers/contactor
— communication alarm
— cooling failure
DNV AS
— liquid cooling leakage

— low insulation level
— other safety protection functions
— unbalanced cell voltage for battery systems that are designed with independent overcharge protection
based on voltage monitoring of the modules, see [4.10.3].
4.9.3 Alarm thresholds

Abnormal conditions that can develop into safety hazards shall be alarmed before reaching the hazardous
level.
4.10 Battery safety functions

4.10.1 General
The battery system shall be provided with safety functions according to [4.10.2] to [4.10.5]. The control
switchgear in [4.5.2] shall be used for disconnection of the battery system upon activation of a safety
function.
Guidance note:
General requirements for protective safety action, automatic or manual shutdown can be found in Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3 [1.1.3] and Pt.4
Ch.9 Sec.3 [1.4.10].
4.10.2 Emergency disconnection system
4.10.2.1 The battery system shall be arranged with an emergency disconnection system.
Guidance note:
It is accepted that the emergency disconnection is delayed in order to give time for 'soft' shutdown by the control system.
4.10.2.2 The emergency disconnection system shall be independent of the BMS and alarm systems in [4.8]
and [4.9].
4.10.2.3 See [2.7.4] for requirements to the controls for the emergency disconnection system.
4.10.3 Independent overcharge protection
4.10.3.1 The battery modules shall be equipped with an independent overcharge protection.
4.10.3.2 The protection shall be arranged with components independent from those used for the BMS and
alarms in [4.8] and [4.9].
4.10.3.3 This protection shall be arranged either by temperature monitoring or voltage monitoring.
4.10.3.4 If temperature sensors are arranged in close vicinity of each other in the battery module so that loss
of functionality of a broken sensor element or circuitry will be mitigated by a neighbouring sensor, the sensor
element/circuitry for the overcharge protection may be common with the sensor element/circuitry in [4.8]
and [4.9]. Such arrangements shall still be designed independent of CPUs and other electronic in [4.8] and
[4.9], i.e. no single failure shall affect both functions.
4.10.3.5 For systems with cells provided with CID or similar functioning devices, the requirement for
independent overcharge protection is considered met.
4.10.4 Gas detection

The battery system shall be automatically disconnected in case of gas detection according to [2.4.3.1].
DNV AS
4.10.5 Other protective functions

Other protective functions shall be implemented if the battery type or design used comprises additional
hazards. The protective functions shall be fail-safe and independent of the BMS and alarms in [4.8] and
[4.9].
4.10.6 Alarms
The following shall give alarm in a manned control station:
— activation of emergency disconnection and protective safety functions
— failures rendering the safety functions out of operation in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.2 [2.2.1] and
Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3 [1.4.3].
4.11 Liquid cooling systems

4.11.1 General
4.11.1.1 Battery systems arranged with liquid cooling systems for cooling of the battery cells and/
or modules shall comply with the requirements in this section. This covers both direct liquid cooling
arrangements with liquid cooling units cooling the modules and/or cells, and arrangements with liquid-to-
air heat exchanger inside the battery assembly arranged with cooling air ducts for cooling of modules and/or
cells.
4.11.1.2 Battery systems and battery modules shall be designed such that the risk of a cooling liquid
leakage inside the system enclosure and module is minimized and does not lead to hazardous creepage
currents, electrolysis, short circuit, electric arcing, earth faults or other hazards.
Guidance note:
All main electrical connections should be located at the top of the system as far as possible.
4.11.2 Piping system
4.11.2.1 The liquid cooling piping systems shall comply with Pt.4 Ch.6.
4.11.2.2 The use of pipe couplings inside the battery system shall be kept to a minimum. Detachable pipe
connections shall be limited to those which are necessary for mounting and dismantling.
4.11.3 Cooling units

Liquid cooling units for direct cooling of modules and/or cells shall comply with Pt.4 Ch.7. The liquid cooling
units shall be defined as pressure equipment Class I covering all design temperatures and pressures.
Guidance note:
Pt.4 Ch.7 Sec.4 [1.1.4] will in general be applicable for the liquid cooling units.
4.11.4 Separation
4.11.4.1 The battery system electrical circuitry shall be shielded from any heat exchanger and cooling liquid
piping components such as pumps and valves, as well as pipe connections from/to the external cooling liquid
supply.
4.11.4.2 Pipe and cable penetrations through shielding partitions shall be provided with watertight glands.
DNV AS
4.11.5 Leakage detection

4.11.5.1 Leakage detection shall be arranged inside the battery system enclosure. Leakage detection inside
the enclosure shall result in automatic closing of liquid coolant supply.
4.11.5.2 Detection of leakage inside modules shall be arranged for modules that are provided with liquid
cooling inside.
4.12 Integrated off-gas ventilation ducts

4.12.1 When the battery system is arranged with an integrated off-gas ventilation duct, this duct shall
ventilate all off-gas generated during a cell thermal runaway from the battery modules directly to open air,
see [2.3.6].
4.12.2 Battery systems designed according to design option 2) as given by [4.4.1] shall incorporate an off-
gas ventilation duct.
4.12.3 The integrity of the off-gas ventilation duct shall not be affected when modules are removed.
Guidance note:
A dummy plug or other means of providing continuity of the off-gas ventilation duct with the modules removed may be accepted.
4.13 Testing
4.13.1 General
A test programme for functional and safety tests at the manufacturer shall be submitted for approval before
testing.
4.13.2 Propagation testing

Propagation requirements are taken as defined in IEC 62619 (§7.3.3 and Appendix B) modified to one of the
following two design options:
1) The battery system is designed for no propagation between cells within a module.
— The test shall be repeated three (3) times and successful each time.
— The test shall be performed in an ambient temperature of minimum 45°C.
— The triggering method for thermal runaway shall be by overcharge or heating.
— The triggering cell shall be located in worst-case location and in worst-case orientation with regard to
propagation.
— All cells within the module must be electrically connected, except if overcharge method is used for
initiate the thermal runaway, then the cell being overcharged can be electrical disconnected.
— The module shall be considered under test for 24 hours after thermal runaway.
— If an active agent is used to prevent propagation it shall be automatically released. It shall be tested
in the same configuration with which it will be installed.
— Acceptance criteria is defined as only the cell which is directly caused to fail by testing show fire or
off-gassing and that all other cells in module show no external signs of thermal runaway and still
produce a measurable voltage within normal operating range. Neighbouring cells equipped with CID
may have no measurable voltage if the cells' CID is activated due to high temperature. For such cells,
it is acceptable that the voltage is not measurable. For liquid cooled modules the integrity of the liquid
cooling system shall be intact.
DNV AS
2) The battery system is designed for no propagation between modules - with or without an extinguishing

agent.
— The test shall be repeated three (3) times and successful each time.
— The test shall be performed in an ambient temperature of minimum 45°C.
— The triggering method for thermal runaway shall be by overcharge or heating.
— The triggering cell shall be located in worst-case location and in worst-case orientation with regard to
propagation.
— All cells within the module shall be electrically connected, except if overcharge method is used for
initiate the thermal runaway, then the cell being overcharged can be electrical disconnected.
— The module shall be considered under test for 24 hours after thermal runaway.
— Neighbouring modules should be located at the least favourable positions. The test plan shall include
justification of why the chosen positions are considered least favourable.
— Neighbouring modules shall contain live cells in standard configuration. Alternatively modules
can be configured with dummy cells of similar thermal characteristics, in which case the passing
criteria is that a temperature of 85°C is not reached anywhere in the module, as detected at the
least favourable locations. The test plan shall include justification of why the chosen positions are
considered least favourable.
— If an active agent is used to prevent propagation it shall be automatically released. It shall be tested
in the same configuration with which it will be installed.
— Acceptance criteria is defined as only cells within the module which is directly caused to fail by testing
show fire or off-gassing and that all cells in neighbour modules show no external signs of thermal
runaway and still produce a measurable voltage within normal operating range. For liquid cooled
systems the integrity of the liquid cooling system shall be intact.
4.13.3 Lithium-ion cell tests

The cells shall be type tested accordingly to Table 9.
All the cell tests shall be performed at a recognized laboratory.
Table 9 Type tests of battery cells.
Item Test Comments Test type
1 external short circuit IEC 62619 7.2.1 (alternatively UN38.3 T-5) TT
2 impact IEC 62619 7.2.2 (alternatively UN38.3 T-6) TT
3 thermal abuse IEC 62619 7.2.4 (alternatively UN38.3 T-2) TT
4 forced discharge IEC 62619 7.2.6 (alternatively UN38.3 T-8) TT
TT = type test
4.13.4 Lithium-ion battery system tests and inspection

The battery system shall be tested and inspected in accordance with Table 10.
The type tests (TT) shall be carried out at the initial certification and shall be witnessed by the Society.
The routine tests (RT) shall be performed for each product certification and shall be witnessed by the Society.
Table 10 Tests of battery systems.
Test
Item Test Comments
type
1 propagation/internal thermal event IEC 62619 7.3.3 - with amendments given in [4.2.2] TT
2 overcharge with voltage IEC 62619 8.2.2 TT
DNV AS
Test

Item Test Comments
type
3 overcharge with current IEC 62619 8.2.3 TT
4 overheating control IEC 62619 8.2.4 TT
5 sensor failures detection of all failure modes of the sensors TT
6 cell balancing according to specification TT
7 SOC validation according to specification TT
8 capacity validation IEC 62620 6.3.1 TT
function and failure response testing normal operation and failure response of the BMS, see Pt.4 Ch.9
9 TT/RT
Sec.2 [2]
independent safety function test — emergency disconnection function

— independent overcharge protection (not required for cells
10 TT/RT
with CID)
— HVIL
dielectrical strength (high voltage Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.4 [4.1.4]

test) Battery cells that might be damaged by the test can be
11 TT/RT
disconnected to ensure that the test voltage can be applied
without damaging the battery cells.
12 insulation resistance Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 Table 5. TT/RT
cooling failure test Failures of fans, loss of coolant and leakage detection tested
13 TT
according to specification.
pressure test of coolant piping/ Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.10 [4]

14 TT/RT
hoses
Visual inspection Verification of clearances and creepages, short circuit proof

15 TT
installation, possible off-gas ducting etc.
RT = routine test, TT = type test
Guidance note:
— If a battery system is divided into smaller units, the unit can be tested as representative of the battery system.
— The dielectrical strength and the insulation resistance routine test (RT) can be performed as tests in the production process.
Documentation from testing on the actual battery components shall be presented to the Society.
4.13.5 Lithium-ion battery environmental tests

The environmental tests shall be according to DNV-CG-0339. The tests shall be carried out at the first
certification and witnessed by DNV or performed at a recognized laboratory:
— Dry heat test, DNV-CG-0339 Sec.3 [7] shall be tested with temperature class B.
— Flame-retardant test, DNV-CG-0339 Sec.3 [16] item 16.1 shall be tested, see [4.3.3], if flammable
materials is used.
— Inclination test, DNV-CG-0339 Sec.3 [11] is not required to be performed.
— Ingress protection according to IEC 60529.
DNV AS
5 Electrochemical capacitor system and installations
5.1 General
The subsections [2], [3] and [4] are applicable for electrochemical capacitor installations with the adjustment
given in [5.2], [5.3] and [5.4].

Battery(Safety) notation
The subsection [2] is applicable for electrochemical capacitor installations with the following adjustments:
— [2.3.6.3] to [2.3.6.5] are not applicable as only design option 1 according to [4.4.1] is accepted.
— [2.7.5] The following additional requirement applies: The EES converter shall protect the electrochemical
capacitor system against too high inrush current.
— [2.7.5.3] Only overvoltage protection is applicable.

Battery(Power) notation
Subsection [3] is applicable for electrochemical capacitor installations.
5.4 Electrochemical capacitor system

The subsection [4] is applicable for electrochemical capacitor systems with the following adjustment:
Guidance note:
When the word battery is stated in [4], then it shall be understood as electrochemical capacitor in this context.
— Only the design option 1 is accepted, see [4.4.1].

— The BMS shall be read as CMS, see [4.8].
— The emergency disconnection shall also consider emergency discharge of the electrochemical capacitor
system if the electrochemical capacitors type can handle this without damage, see guidance note in
[4.10.2.1].
— Only independent overcharge protection by voltage monitoring is accepted for systems with cells without
CID or similarly functioning devices, see [4.10.3].
— Only the test for design option 1) is accepted, see [4.13.2].
— The cell tests in Table 9 shall be replaced with the tests given in Table 11, see [4.13.3].
Table 11 Type tests of electrochemical capacitor cells.
1 pull out or torque UL 810A 11.1 or 11.2 TT

o
2 short circuit at 55 C UL 810A 13 TT
3 abnormal charge UL 810A 14 TT
4 heating UL 810A 16 TT
5 dielectric withstand UL 810A 17 TT
DNV AS

6 crush UL 810A 18.2 TT
7 impact UL 810A 18.3 TT
TT = type test
— [4.13.4] The system tests and inspection in Table 10 shall be replaced with the tests given in Table 12.
Table 12 Tests and inspection of electrochemical capacitor systems.
Test
Item Test Comments
type
1 propagation/internal thermal event [4.13.2] TT

o
short circuit at 55 C (under normal UL 810A 13
2 TT
and single fault condition)
abnormal charge (under normal and UL 810A 14

3 TT
single fault condition)
o
4 temperature rise test UL 810A 15 with adjustment for 45 C ambient temperature TT
5 sensor failures detection of all failure modes of the sensors TT
6 cell balancing according to specification TT
function and failure response testing normal operation and failure response of the BMS, see Pt.4 Ch.9
7 TT/RT
Sec.2 [2]
independent safety function test — emergency stop function

— independent voltage based disconnection (not required for
8 TT/RT
cells with CID)
— HVIL
dielectrical strength (high voltage Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.4 [4.1.4]

9 TT/RT
test)
10 insulation resistance Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.10 Table 5 TT/RT
cooling failure test failures of fans, loss of coolant and leakage detection tested
11 TT
according to specification
pressure test of coolant piping/ Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.10 [4]

12 TT/RT
hoses
Visual inspection Verification of clearances and creepages, short circuit proof

13 TT
installation, possible off-gas ducting etc.
RT = routine test, TT = type test
6 Appendix
6.1 List of alarms and monitoring parameters

The alarm and monitoring requirements in the rule text are listed in Table 13.
DNV AS
Table 13 List of alarms and monitoring parameters

Shutdown/
Monitoring/
System Item Control Alarm disconnection Comment
display
with alarm
EES space Doors and Open/closed Open [2.2.4.3] Bridge

hatches [2.2.4.3]
Ambient Ambient HA [2.3.5.8] Monitoring

temperature temperature and alarm at
[2.3.5.7] manned control
station
Ventilation Status of Failure Possible Monitoring

ventilation [2.3.5.8] shutdown of and alarm at
[2.3.5.7] ventilation manned control
upon fire station
detection [2.5]
Ventilation Power supply Failure

[2.3.4.3] [2.3.4.3]
Off-gas Manual and Possible

ventilation automatic start shutdown of
ventilation
upon fire
detection [2.5]
Fire Smoke Alarm [2.5.2.1] Bridge

detection in
EES space
[2.5.2.1]
Water based Alarm [2.5.3.4] Bridge

extinguishing
system, end
of fresh-water
discharge
Gas Start HA gas Disconnection Alarm at bridge

ventilation fans detection in of EES system upon activation
[2.4.3.1] EES space [2.4.3.1] of the required
[2.4.3.1] safety actions
failure of gas
detection
system
and power
supply failure
[2.4.3.2]
Emergency Manual
disconnection disconnection
EES system [4.10.2]
DNV AS
Shutdown/

Monitoring/
display
with alarm
EES converter Charging / Keep current / Charging/ Alarm at

discharging voltage within discharging manned control
the limits given failure station
by the BMS/ [2.7.5.4]
CMS [2.7.5.1]
and the limits
set directly in
the converter
[2.7.5.3]
EES system Cell balancing Control cell HA [4.9.2] IR or IL, alarm

balancing on bridge
[4.8.2]
Cell voltage System voltage Protection HA, LA [4.9.2] IR or IL, alarm

and max, min against on bridge
and average overvoltage
cell voltage and
[4.8.3] undervoltage
[4.8.4]
Cell / module Max, min and Protection HA [4.9.2] IR or IL, alarm

temperature average temp. against over on bridge
[4.8.3] temp. [4.8.4]
EES string EES string Protection IR or IL

current current [4.8.3] against over
current [4.8.4]
Charging limits Provide

charging/
discharging
limits to EES
converter
[4.8.6.1]
EES system Alarm [4.9.2] IR or IL, alarm

disconnection on bridge
Tripping of Alarm [4.9.2]

EES system
breaker/
contactor
Communication Alarm [4.9.2]

alarm
Cooling failure Alarm [4.9.2]
Liquid cooling Alarm [4.9.2] IR or IL, alarm

leakage on bridge
Insulation Electrical LA, alarm Alarm at

monitoring insulation level [4.9.2] manned control
of the EES station
system
DNV AS
Shutdown/

Monitoring/
display
with alarm
HVIL Protection
against unsafe
connection/
disconnection
of power
connectors
[4.5.3]
Additional for Battery(Power) notation:
EES system EES system SOC and SOH Calculate SOC Monitoring at a
charge level [3.2.2.3] and SOH for control station
EMS function
[4.8.6.2]
EES module HA, Automatic

temperature LR or request
for manual LR
[3.2.2.4]
EMS Capacity status Available Calculate Bridge

energy available
[3.2.3.4] energy
[3.2.3.2]
Available power Calculate Bridge

[3.2.3.4] available power
[3.2.3.2]
Remaining time Calculate Bridge

for seagoing remaining time
operation for seagoing
[3.2.3.4] operation
[3.2.3.3]
Remaining time Calculate LA, warning Monitoring and

for seagoing remaining time if capacity is alarm at bridge
operation after for seagoing not sufficient
worst case operation after for intended
single failure worst case voyage /
[3.2.3.4] single failure operation
[3.2.3.3] [3.2.3.5]
Remaining time Calculate LA, alarm Monitoring and

for powering remaining time when the EES alarm at bridge
emergency for powering system reaches
consumers emergency minimum
[3.2.3.4] consumers capacity as
[3.2.3.3] required for
powering the
emergency
consumers
[3.2.3.5]
DNV AS
Shutdown/

Monitoring/
display
with alarm
IR = remote indication.
IL = local indication.
LA = alarm for low value.
HA = alarm for high value.
LR = load reduction.
DNV AS
SECTION 2 PERIODICALLY UNATTENDED MACHINERY SPACE - E0

AND ECO
1 General
1.1 Introduction
The additional class notations E0 and ECO apply to periodically unattended machinery spaces, where
machinery, alarm and automation arrangements provide for the safety of the ship in all sailing conditions,
including manoeuvring, and when alongside, which are equivalent to that of a ship having machinery spaces
attended. Cargo handling is not included.
1.2 Scope
When all machinery and auxiliary systems in the engine room necessary for the performance of the main
functions, are fitted with instrumentation and automation equipment in compliance with the requirements of
Pt.4 Ch.9, and the relevant parts of this section, then class notations E0 or ECO may be granted.
1.3 Application
The additional class notation E0 is considered to meet the regulations of SOLAS regulation II-1/E, for
periodically unattended machinery spaces, when alarms, required for E0 in this section, are relayed to the
bridge and the engineers' accommodation. Additionally, a bridge control system for the main propulsion
machinery, arranged as specified in Pt.4 Ch.1, and a watch responsibility transfer system are also required to
be installed.
The additional class notation ECO is considered to meet the regulations of SOLAS regulation II-1/31.3 for
continuous supervision from a control station when alarms, required for ECO in this section, are initiated in
an attended centralised control station, and a remote control system for the main propulsion machinery is
installed at this station.
For the additional class notation ECO, it is not required to have remote control from the bridge, of main
propulsion machinery, or any safety functions installed in the engine room other than those required by main
class.
The assignment of class notations E0 and ECO is based on the assumptions that:
— engineering staff can attend the machinery space at short notice
— periodical test of all field instruments, required by these rules, is performed according to an approved
plan.
The plan shall be kept on board and presented at annual and complete periodical surveys, as specified in Pt.7
Ch.1 Sec.6. For the format and the contents of the plan, see [1.6.1].
1.4 Definitions
Table 1 Definitions of terms
Term Definition
main alarm system centralized system for alarm handling. Located in engine room or in engine control room if
provided
DNV AS
Term Definition

local (sub) alarm systems system for monitoring a single process segment or function
Normally to have facilities for local alarm handling and with interface to the main alarm
system.
Guidance note:
The local alarm system may only give visual signal when the audible signal is handled by the
main alarm system.
protective safety system system that is activated on occurrence of predefined abnormal process condition to bring
the process / EUC to a safe state
The safety action may be automatic or manual.
extension alarm system the main alarm systems extension to the engineers' accommodation and the navigation
bridge which shall be in operation when the engine room is unattended
engineers’ alarm alarm system, which shall be provided to operate from the engine control room or the
manoeuvring platform, as appropriate, and shall be clearly audible in the engineers'
accommodation
(SOLAS regulation II-1/38)
Guidance note:
The engineers' alarm is normally an integral part of the extension alarm system, but may be a
separate system.
1.5 Documentation
1.5.1.1 The basic documentation requirements for control and monitoring systems are given in Pt.4 Ch.9
Sec.1. The additional documentation required for E0 and ECO shall be submitted as required by Table 2 and
Table 3.
Table 2 Documentation requirements for E0
For approval (AP) or

Object Documentation type Additional description
For information (FI)
Extension alarm and I200 - Control and monitoring system

watch responsibility documentation AP
system
Vessel control and I110 - List of controlled and All alarms required for the
monitoring systems monitored points equipment in the machinery
spaces by Pt.4 and the alarms for
E0 notation according to Table 4 AP
- Table 13 in [3], including alarm
groups and cross reference to
P&IDs.
I260 - Field instruments periodic test See [1.6].

AP
plan
DNV AS

Fire detection and I200 - Control and monitoring system

AP
alarm system documentation
AP = for approval, FI = for information
For class notation ECO, see [4]:
Table 3 Documentation requirements for ECO

Vessel control and I110 - List of controlled and All alarms required for the
monitoring systems monitored points equipment in the machinery spaces
by Pt.4 and the alarms for ECO
AP
notation according to Table 4 - Table
13 in [3], including alarm groups
and cross reference to P&IDs.
I260 - Field instruments periodic See [1.6].

AP
test plan
Fire detection and I200 - Control and monitoring

alarm system in system documentation AP
machinery spaces
1.5.1.2 For control and monitoring systems installed to meet the requirements of this section, an operation
manual (Z161) and a maintenance manual (Z163) shall be kept on board.
1.5.1.3 For general requirements to documentation, including definition of the info codes, see DNV-CG-0550
Sec.6.
1.5.1.4 For a full definition of the documentation types, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.5.
1.5.2 Operation instructions

On the bridge and at the control stand in the engine room, instructions shall be fitted, stating routines to be
followed in connection with transfer of control to and or from the engine room, and precautions to be taken
at alarm conditions.
1.6 Periodical test

1.6.1 General
1.6.1.1 All field instruments required by these rules shall be tested regularly according to the plan for
periodical test.
1.6.1.2 The plan for periodical test shall identify all field instruments required by these rules. The plan shall
in addition describe how each instrument shall be tested, describe the expected result and also identify the
test intervals according to [1.6.3].
DNV AS
Guidance note 1:

The plan for periodical test should contain the following information:
— only the field instruments as required by these rules, alternatively, a clear identification of these field instruments and eventual
instruments recommended by the manufacturer of the machinery.
— unique instrument identification (tag number)
— service description
— measuring range and unit
— limits for alarm, slowdown and shutdown
— test interval
— test method (may be a reference to a detailed description also describing necessary test equipment)
— expected result (e.g. shutdown)
— record / log of performed tests.
The Society may upon request provide a sample plan.
Guidance note 2:
The plan for periodical test may be in printed or electronic version, but it must be evident that the contents are approved. If
the ship is under PMS (planned maintenance system) survey arrangement Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.7, the complete content of the plan for
periodical test is assumed to be incorporated in the planned maintenance system.
1.6.2 Testing
Testing of field instruments shall, if not otherwise agreed, include the physical sensor and the whole signal
loop, and verify correct functionality, indication and alarming.
Guidance note:
Different ways of testing the field instruments may be applied, according to manufacturers' recommendations and as described
in the plan for periodical test. The installation of the field instrument should allow for easy hook-up to a test kit (e.g. via a 3-way
valve, thermo-well etc). Where this is not feasible e.g. due to access limitations, alternative test methods may be acceptable, e.g.
by comparing two or more sensors measuring the same process parameter, hooking up a temporary reference test sensor, etc.
Analogue sensors should be tested by varying the process parameter over the operating range.
1.6.3 Test intervals

All field instruments for critical alarms shall be tested every six months, unless more frequent testing is
specified by the maker of the machinery or system. This applies to shut down alarms for main- and auxiliary
engines and boilers. The test intervals for all other field instruments as required by these rules shall not
exceed twelve months.
Guidance note:
The critical alarms for rotating machinery are typically low lube oil pressure, over-speed and crankcase explosive conditions; and
for boilers low water level.
2 System arrangement
2.1 General
2.1.1 Extent of automation
2.1.1.1 The extent of automation shall be sufficient to permit unattended engine room operation for 24
hours, or for the maximum continuous operation time when less than 24 hours. Normal service at sea and
DNV AS
normal manoeuvres is presumed. Normal manoeuvres do not include emergency manoeuvres, where alarm

and safety limits may be exceeded.
2.1.1.2 Starting of engine plant and transfer to various operating modes may be accepted as manual
operations, if the need for such actions will not arise at short notice.
2.2 Automatic control system

2.2.1 Special requirements
2.2.1.1 Where the bilge pumps are arranged for automatic starting, alarms shall be initiated if the influx of
liquid is greater than the pump capacity and when the pump is operating more frequently than what would
normally be expected.
2.2.1.2 Starting air receivers shall be automatically charged.
2.3 Alarm system

2.3.1 General
2.3.1.1 A main alarm system shall be installed at the machinery control station in the engine room or in the
engine control room, if provided.
2.3.1.2 An extension alarm system shall be installed on the navigation bridge, engineers' cabin and public
spaces.
2.3.1.3 Alarms in local (sub) systems covering functionality which is required by the rules shall initiate alarm
in the main alarm system. Alarms from each such local system shall either be transferred individually to the
main alarm system or be arranged as one common alarm.
The common alarm to the main alarm system shall not be inhibited by acknowledged alarms in the local
alarm system, but shall be activated by any new detected alarm by the local alarm system.
2.3.1.4 Activation of safety shut down through any required protective safety system shall initiate separate
alarm in the main alarm system.
2.3.1.5 The main alarm system including the extension alarm system shall be continuously powered. In case
of loss of the normal power supply, an automatic change over to a continuously available power supply with a
capacity for at least 30 minutes is required.
2.3.2 Alarm system on the bridge
2.3.2.1 When machinery spaces are attended, the engine room alarms and indicators on the bridge shall
be minimized. When the propulsion machinery is remote controlled from the navigation bridge, only engine
room alarms and indicators which requires the attention of the navigation officers shall be activated on the
navigation bridge.
2.3.2.2 When machinery spaces are unattended, any alarm condition from machinery and systems installed
in the engine room shall initiate an alarm on the bridge with individual or group wise indication through the
extension alarm system. The visual alarm signal shall remain present until acknowledged in the engine room.
2.3.2.3 Alarm conditions within one group shall not prevent the initiation of alarms in other groups. New
alarms within a group shall not be inhibited by acknowledged existing alarms.
DNV AS
2.3.2.4 The extension alarm system on the bridge and in the accommodation shall be so designed that

failures such as loss of power supply or broken cable connection to the main alarm system in the engine
room, initiate an alarm.
2.3.2.5 It shall not be possible to reduce the light intensity of alarm indicators on the bridge below the
intensity necessary in normal daylight. Automatic adjustment of light intensity based on ambient light
conditions is accepted.
2.3.2.6 Power failure to the extension alarm system shall initiate an audible alarm with visual indication on
the bridge.
2.3.3 Alarm systems in the engineers’ accommodation
2.3.3.1 When the machinery spaces are unattended, any alarm condition in the main alarm system shall
initiate alarm in the duty engineers' cabin and in all public spaces the duty engineer may reside, with
individual or group wise indication and alarm through the extension alarm system.
Local silencing of the audible alarm on the bridge or in the accommodation spaces shall not acknowledge the
alarm in the engine room.
2.3.3.2 The extension alarm system shall be activated by the watch responsibility transfer system.
2.3.3.3 When the engine room is unattended, the engineers' alarm shall be activated if an alarm has not
received attention locally, within a limited time.
(SOLAS regulation II-1/51.1.5)
Guidance note:
Limited time should normally be understood to be between one to three minutes.
2.3.4 Watch responsibility transfer system
2.3.4.1 A system for activating and deactivating the extension alarm system to the navigation bridge shall be
provided.
2.3.4.2 The system shall initiate audible and optical (flashing light) warning at both control positions when
watch transfer is requested, and the warning shall remain in operation until acknowledged.
2.3.4.3 The responsibility shall not be transferred before acknowledged at the receiving end.
2.3.4.4 Indication shall be provided showing which control station has the watch responsibility.
2.3.4.5 Transfer of watch keeping responsibility to the navigation bridge shall not be possible before the
extension alarm system has been set to a duty engineer's cabin. The watch keeping responsibility panel shall
indicate which engineer is on duty.
2.4 Protective safety system

2.4.1 General
2.4.1.1 Protective safety systems shall cover fault conditions which could lead to complete breakdown,
serious damage or explosion.
2.4.1.2 Power failure in protective safety systems shall not cause loss of propulsion or steering functions.
DNV AS
2.4.2 Automatic start of pumps

2.4.2.1 Faults in the mechanical or electrical system of the running pump are not to inhibit automatic start of
the standby pump.
2.4.2.2 Automatic start of the standby pump shall be initiated by the process parameter which is being
monitored, e.g. low pressure signal, and shall be arranged so that the standby pump does not stop
automatically when first started (locking circuit).
2.4.2.3 Manual start and stop of the pumps shall be possible without initiating an alarm for the automatic
start of the standby pump.
2.4.2.4 When a pump is standby, this shall be clearly indicated on the operator panel.
2.4.3 Automatic stop of auxiliary engines and propulsion machinery
2.4.3.1 External circuitry for safety and alarm shall be arranged such that a failure to any one system or
function cannot spread to another system or function. An alarm shall be initiated for voltage failure.
Guidance note:
The systems for safety and alarm should be separately fused. Similarly, automatic stop circuits for individual units should be
separately fused.
2.4.3.2 The safety system shall be arranged so that a single open circuit in wiring between sensors
and control unit, or between control unit and actuators, including external stop circuit, does not cause
unintentional stop. This requirement can be waived if the manoeuvrability is maintained after shutdown of
one unit, see Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3 [1].
Guidance note:
A single system based on normally open contacts can be accepted; alternatively, a system with normally closed contacts where
discrimination between loop failure and stop signals is provided.
2.4.3.3 In case of an automatic stop of one engine in a multi-engine plant, measures shall be taken to avoid
overload of the running engine.
2.4.3.4 All parameters which may cause automatic stop shall initiate an alarm prior to stop.
Guidance note:
Propulsion machinery is defined as all machinery which will cause loss of the propulsion function if stopped, with exception of main
boilers.
2.4.4 Automatic stop of oil fired auxiliary boilers
2.4.4.1 Connections between sensors and control unit shall be based upon normally closed contacts, so that
an open circuit will lead to shutoff of the oil supply.
2.4.4.2 The parameter causing an automatic stop shall be identified on the control panel.
DNV AS
2.5 Communication
2.5.1 General
The two-way voice communication system, according to SOLAS Reg. II-I/50, shall be supplied by a battery or
an uninterruptible power supply as a stand-by power supply sufficient to operate the system for at least 30
minutes.
2.6 Fire safety and fire detection and alarm system

2.6.1 General
2.6.1.1 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system shall be installed in accordance with the relevant
provisions of SOLAS regulation II-2/7 (Pt.4 Ch.11) in periodically unattended machinery spaces.
(SOLAS regulation II-2/ 7.4)
2.6.1.2 This fire detection system shall be so designed and the detectors so positioned as to detect rapidly
the onset of fire in any part of those spaces, and under any normal conditions of operation of the machinery
and variations of ventilation, as required by the possible range of ambient temperatures.
Except in spaces of restricted height and where their use is especially appropriate, detection systems using
only thermal detectors shall not be permitted.
2.6.1.3 The detection system shall initiate audible and visual alarms distinct in both respects from the alarms
of any other system not indicating fire.
The audible and visual alarms shall be located in different places, sufficient to ensure that the alarms are
heard and observed on the navigation bridge and by a responsible engineer officer. When the navigation
bridge is unmanned, the alarm shall sound in a place where a responsible member of the crew is on duty.
(SOLAS regulation II-2/7.4.2)
Guidance note:
Thermal detectors only may be used in workshops adjacent to machinery spaces when the nature of the work being carried out will
cause erroneous alarms. This guidance note only applies if the compartments themselves do not contain fuel oil installations.
2.6.1.4 Where fire detectors are provided with timers (e.g. in workshops) for inhibiting the alarm, these shall
be arranged to automatically reset the alarm upon completion of timer and shall not be possible to negate for
period exceeding 15 minutes. The inhibited state shall be clearly indicated.
2.6.1.5 Fire detectors shall be type approved.
2.6.1.6 Manually operated call points shall be located at the following positions:
— passageways and stairways, including emergency exits, having nearby entrance to engine and boiler
rooms
— navigation bridge
— control station in engine room.
Guidance note:
Manual call points should be located as required by SOLAS regulation II-2.
2.6.1.7 Start of fire pumps shall be arranged according to the requirements in SOLAS regulation
II-2/10.2.1.2.2.2.
DNV AS
3 Class notation E0
3.1 Extent of monitoring

3.1.1 General
3.1.1.1 The control and monitoring systems shall cover machinery and auxiliary systems in the engine room,
necessary for the performance of the main functions, as specified in Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1 [1.2].
3.1.1.2 The parameters to be monitored will depend upon output and type of engine as well as arrangement
of the machinery plant. The parameters listed in Table 4 to Table 13 are in general corresponding to
those specified in Pt.4, but some additional parameters may be required to comply with E0 rules. Other
combinations than those listed may be accepted, when the chosen monitoring can detect fault conditions in
an equivalent satisfactory manner.
— For propulsion engines, see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 10.
— For propulsion turbines, see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.3 Table 4.
— For shafting, propeller, gear, clutch and elastic couplings, see Pt.4 Ch.4.
— For auxiliary engines, see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 11.
— For auxiliary turbines, see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.3 Table 5.
— For auxiliary boiler, see Pt.4 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 2 and Pt.4 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 7.
— For gas turbines, see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.2 Table 8.
3.1.2 Safety actions
3.1.2.1 The required safety shutdowns for propulsion systems in Pt.4 shall be automatically executed. Manual
activation from the bridge of safety actions for propulsion machinery may be accepted if running of the
machinery does not jeopardize the safety. Manual activation will not be permitted for:
— overspeed protection
— lubricating oil pressure
— crankcase explosive conditions (for trunk piston engines)
— short circuit in electrical propulsion plants.
The alarm for manual activation of shut down shall be independent from the main alarm system.
3.1.2.2 For automatic shutdowns that do not protect a propulsion engine from immediate break down an
emergency device shall be arranged to override these safety actions.
The override facility shall be arranged such that unintentional operation is prevented and initiate a visual and
audible indication when operated, see Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.4 [1.4.8].
3.1.2.3 For multi-engine propulsion plants, overriding of safety shutdowns and slowdowns, as required by
Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.4 [1.4.8] is not required if manoeuvrability of the vessel is maintained after activation of
shutdown or slowdown on one of the engines.
Table 4 Control and monitoring of propulsion engines
Item Reference
Propulsion engines Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 10
DNV AS
Table 5 Control and monitoring of propulsion turbines

Gr 2
Gr 1 Automatic Gr 3
System Item Indication alarm start of stand- Shut down Comment
load reduction by pump with alarm
with alarm
1)
1.0 Lubricating inlet pressure (after filter) IR, IL, LA AS SH
oil
inlet temperature IR, HA
filter differential pressure IR, HA
level in system tank LA
2.0 Bearings bearing temperature IR, HA
3.0 Turbine over-speed LR or SH, if

speed applicable, to
LR SH
be activated
automatically
4.0 Condenser vacuum IR, LA SH

system
vacuum pump stopped AS
level IR, HA AS SH
level if non-cavitating
IR, LA
condensate pump
salinity HA
5.0 Cooling inlet/outlet differential

water (main pressure IR, LA AS
condenser)
6.0 Slow turning over-speed

SH
arrangement
7.0 Gland steam inlet pressure to turbine IR, LA, HA
exhaust fan stopped A
8.0 Hydraulic pressure

IR, LA AS
system
9.0 Vibration level HA SH
10.0 Rotor axial displacement IR, HA SH
DNV AS
Gr 2

Gr 1 Automatic Gr 3
System Item Indication alarm start of stand- Shut down Comment
load reduction by pump with alarm
with alarm
Gr 1 = sensor(s) for indication, alarm, load reduction (common sensor permitted but with different set points and
alarm shall be activated before any load reduction)
Gr 2 = sensor for automatic start of standby pump
Gr 3 = sensor for shut down
IL = local indication − (presentation of values) in vicinity of the monitored component
IR = remote indication − (presentation of values) in engine control room or another centralized control station such
as the local platform/manoeuvring console
A = alarm activated for logical value
LA = alarm for low value
HA = alarm for high value
AS = automatic start of standby pump with corresponding alarm
LR = load reduction, either manual or automatic, with corresponding alarm
SH = shut down with corresponding alarm.
For definitions of load reduction (LR) and shut down (SH), see Pt.4 Ch.1.
1) The shut down shall be so arranged as not to prevent admission of steam to the astern turbine for braking.
Italic text in table is equivalent to Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.3 Table 4.
Table 6 Control and monitoring of main steam and feed water installation
Gr 2 Gr 3
Gr 1
Automatic start Shut down of
Alarm
of stand-by pump boiler with
Load reduction with alarm
1)
alarm
Water system
Water level, high HA

5)
Water level, high HA SH
Water level, low LA
Water level, low SH

2)
Water circulation SH
Steam system
Steam pressure, LA, HA, LR

3)
Steam temperature HA
Feed water system
Atmospheric drain tank, level LA, HA
Deaerator, level LA, HA
DNV AS
Gr 3

Gr 1 Gr 2
Automatic start Shut down of
Alarm
of stand-by pump boiler with
Load reduction with alarm
1)
alarm
Deaerator, pressure LA, HA
Feed water
6)
Temperature HA
Pressure LA AS
Feed water temperature HA
High pressure feed water
Level HA
Fresh water generator

4)
Water system HA
Water level, high HA

5)
Water level, high HA SH
Water level, low LA
Water level, low
Table 7 Control and monitoring of shafting, propeller, gear, clutch and elastic couplings
Gr 1 Gr 2
Gr 3
Indication Automatic
Shut
start of stand- Comment
alarm down with
by pump
load reduction 1) alarm
with alarm
1.0 Shafting
Separate thrust bearings, To be provided for shaft power >

temperature 5000 kW. Sensor to be placed in
the bearing metal or for pads, in
IL or IR, HA
the oil outlet. Maximum permissible
temperature to be marked on the
indicators.
Oil lubricated fluid film bearings, To be provided for shaft power >
temperature 5000 kW.Sensors to be located near
the bearing surface at the area of
IL or IR, HA
highest load.Maximum permissible
temperature to be marked on the
indicators.
Stern tube lubricating oil tank, level LA
Stern tube lubricating oil, pressure Applicable to forced lubrication.

LA
or flow
2.0 Additional requirements for TMON
DNV AS
Gr 2

Gr 1 Gr 3
Shut
alarm down with
by pump
with alarm
Aft stern tube bearing, temperature Applicable to oil lubricated systems

HA
only.
3.0 Servo oil for CP-propeller
Pressure The indicators shall be able to show

IL, IR, LA AS
sudden peaks in servo pressure.
Level IL, LA
Differential pressure over filter HA
4.0 Gear bearing and lubricating oil
Oil lubricated fluid film bearings Applicable for gears with a total
IR, HA
(axial and radial) temperature transmitted power of 5 MW or more.
Thrust bearing, temperature Applicable for gears with a total

transmitted power of 5 MW or more.
IR, HA, LR
Sensor to be placed in the bearing
metal or for pads in the oil outlet.
Lubricating oil, pressure At bearings and spray if applicable.

IL, IR, LA AS SH
Shut down or clutch disengagement.
Differential pressure over filter IL, HA Alarm in case of clogged filter.
Lubricating oil, temperature IL or IR, HA At inlet to bearings, i.e. after cooler.
Lubricating oil, temperature IL or IR In sump, or before cooler.

2)
Sump level IL or IR For splash lubricated gears.
5.0 Integrated clutch activating media
Hydraulic oil pressure SH means either declutching or

IL, IR, LA, LR AS SH
engine stop.
6.0 Twist of elastic couplings
Angular twist amplitudes IR, HA SH Applicable when failure of the elastic

element leads to loss of torque
Mean twist angle IR, HA transmission.
3)
DNV AS
Gr 2

Gr 1 Gr 3
Shut
alarm down with
by pump
with alarm
Gr 1 = common sensor for indication, alarm, load reduction (common sensor permitted but with different set points
and alarm shall be activated before any load reduction)
IL = local indication (presentation of values), in vicinity of the monitored component
IR = remote indication (presentation of values), in engine control room or another centralized control station such
LR = load reduction, either manual or automatic, with corresponding alarm, either slow down (r.p.m. reduction) or
alternative means of load reduction (e. g. pitch reduction), whichever is relevant
SH = shut down with corresponding alarm. May be manually (request for shut down) or automatically executed if
not explicitly stated above.
1) to be provided when standby pump is required
2) for gears with totally transmitted power of 500 kW or less, dipstick inspection is considered adequate
3) may be omitted if the vessel is equipped with a “take me home” device, e.g. a electric motor connected to the
gearbox (so-called PTH or PTI). Exemption may also be accepted for couplings that are of a design that enables
the full torque to be transmitted in the event of failure of the elastic elements. Such emergency claw devices are
not getting-home devices, but only meant for temporary emergency in order to prevent loss of manoeuvrability in
harbours, rivers, etc.
Italic text in table is equivalent to Pt.4 Ch.4.
Table 8 Control and monitoring of auxiliary engines
Item Reference
Auxiliary engines Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 11
Table 9 Control and monitoring of auxiliary turbines
Gr 1 Gr 2
Gr 3
Indication Automatic start
System Item Shut down Comment
of stand-by
Alarm with alarm
pump with alarm
1.0 Lubricating Inlet pressure (after

IR or IL, LA SH
oil filter)
Inlet temperature IR, HA
Level in system tank LA
DNV AS
Gr 2

Gr 1 Gr 3
Indication Automatic start
System Item Shut down Comment
of stand-by
Alarm with alarm
pump with alarm
2.0 Turbine Overspeed SH, if applicable, to be

speed SH activated automatically,
see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.3 [5.2].
3.0 Condenser Pressure IR, HA, SH

system
Level HA AS If vacuum condenser.
1)
4.0 Steam inlet Pressure IR or IL, LA
5.0 Rotor Axial displacement When driving electric

IR, HA SH
generator.
Gr 1 = sensor(s) for indication and alarm

IL = local indication − (presentation of values) in vicinity of the monitored component
IR = remote indication − (presentation of values) in engine control room or another centralized control station such
SH = shut down with corresponding alarm.
1) only for turbines driving generators, may be omitted if LA for boiler steam pressure is provided.
Italic text in table is equivalent to Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.3 Table 5.
Table 10 Control and monitoring of auxiliary boiler
Alarm
1.0 Condenser
Condenser pressure HA
2.0 Uptake
1)
Uptake temperature HA
1) When heat exchangers are integral with the boiler. For fire detection.
Note: In addition to the monitoring requirements in Pt.4 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 2 and Pt.4 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 7,
auxiliary boilers shall be provided with monitoring according to Table 10 above.
DNV AS
Table 11 Control and monitoring for electrical power plant

Gr 1
Alarm
1.0 Generator
1)
Lubricating oil, pressure LA
Voltage LA, HA
Frequency LA
Disconnection of nonessential consumers A
Gr1 = sensor for alarm

A = alarm activated.
1) to be provided if separate system.
Table 12 Monitoring of miscellaneous objects
Item Alarm Comments
Bilge wells 2 independent alarm circuits.

Minimum 2 detectors.
Level, engine room, high x
Purifiers For heavy fuel oil.
Temperature, oil inlet, high x
Temperature, oil inlet, low x
Waterseal, loss x
Soot-blowers, sequence stopped x
Automatic control system, power failure x Electric, pneumatic, hydraulic.
Alarm and safety system, power failure x
Remote control system, power failure x
Fire alarm systems, failure x
DNV AS
Table 13 Monitoring of tanks

Item Item Comments
2),3) 5)
Fuel oil service tanks, level LA, HA When automatic filling of tanks is
1) 6) arranged, alarm shall be initiated if the
Lubricating oil tank, level LA level exceeds safe level.
7)
Lubricating oil tank, temperature HA
1)
Piston coolant expansion tank, level LA
Cylinder cooling water in expansion tank,

2) LA
level
1)
Fuel valve coolant in expansion tank, level LA
Sludge and drain tanks, level HA
Service tanks, level LA
Expansion tanks, level LA
Circulating tanks, level LA
Fuel oil drain collecting tanks, level HA
Gr1 = sensor for alarm

1) applicable to cross-head propulsion engines, see IACS UR M35

2) applicable to cross-head and trunk propulsion engines, see IACS UR M35
3) applicable to auxiliary reciprocating internal combustion engines driving generators, see IACS UR M36
4) HA required if no suitable overflow arrangement is provided
5) HA is required for propulsion engines only, if no suitable overflow arrangement is provided
6) where separate lubricating oil systems are installed (e.g. camshaft, rocker arms, etc.), individual level alarms are
required for the tanks
7) where service tank or settling tanks are fitted with heating arrangements, a high temperature alarm shall be
provided if the flashpoint of the fuel oil can be exceeded (SOLAS regulation II/2 4.2.5.2).
3.2 Arrangement on the bridge

3.2.1 General
3.2.1.1 Individual alarms are required for:

— automatic shutdown of main boiler
— automatic shutdown and/or slowdown of propulsion machinery
— request for manual shutdown and/or slowdown of propulsion machinery
— power failure bridge alarm system
— failure in the remote control systems with respect to propulsion machinery, including controllable pitch
propeller if arranged
— failure in the remote control systems with respect to steering
— low starting air pressure for reversible propulsion engines.
DNV AS
3.2.1.2 The propulsion plant shall be restarted after a blackout, either manually from the navigation bridge or

automatically. When manual starting from the navigation bridge is arranged, an indication shall be provided
when the propulsion can be restarted, i.e., when all systems are in normal operating condition.
The starting arrangement shall be simple to operate.
Guidance note:
Steam propulsion plants are exempted from these requirements.
3.2.1.3 Resetting of the propulsion machinery safety system shall be arranged when it is activated at black
out. The reset action may either be automatic, or manually activated from the bridge, e.g. by bringing the
manoeuvring lever to stop position. The reset shall only be possible when all the applicable parameters are in
normal condition.
3.3 Arrangement in the engine room

3.3.1 General
Indicating instruments, alarm displays and manoeuvring devices shall be centralised in a convenient position,
in or adjacent to the engine room.
Guidance note:
The layout of instruments in the control desk should comply with generally accepted ergonomical principles. Red lamps should be
used only as alarm lamps.
3.4 Control of propulsion machinery from the navigation bridge

3.4.1 General
3.4.1.1 The general requirements to control of propulsion machinery from the navigation bridge are given in
Pt.4 Ch.1.
3.4.1.2 Remote control shall be performed by a single control device for each independent propeller, with
automatic performance of all associated services, including where necessary, means of preventing overload of
the propulsion machinery. (SOLAS regulation II-1/49.1.1)
3.4.1.3 Failure in the remote control system shall initiate alarm and the present speed and direction of thrust
of the propeller shall be maintained.
3.4.1.4 The number of consecutive automatic attempts which fail to produce a start shall be limited to
safeguard sufficient starting air pressure. An alarm shall be provided indicating low starting air pressure set
at a level which still permits starting operations of the propulsion machinery. (SOLAS regulation II-1/49.7)
Guidance note:
The above principle is valid for any means of stored energy intended for starting. .
3.5 Electric power supply

3.5.1 General
3.5.1.1 Arrangements shall be provided to prevent overloading of the generating sets.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

A generating set consists of one electrical generator and its prime mover.
3.5.1.2 Standby generating sets shall have separate cooling water and lubricating oil pumps. Alternatively,
automatic start of standby pumps shall be arranged when they also serve other generating sets.
3.5.2 Secondary distribution systems

For essential consumers with power supply from secondary distribution systems, precautions against power
failure shall be similar to those taken for units having power supply from the main system. E.g. the following
means may be applied:
— adequate automatic emergency lighting for access to standby transformer for the lighting system and
operating gear for manual connection
— automatic connection of standby transformer
— parallel connection of a sufficient number of transformers and arrangement for selective disconnection
— automatic connection of emergency source of power
— dividing the system in two or more circuits with automatic switchover.
In this context, essential consumers are units and equipment necessary for manoeuvring of the ship,
including navigation lights and sufficient lighting (either as part of the normal lighting or as separate
emergency lighting) in the engine room, on the bridge, in the chart room, in all passageways and stairways
of the accommodation.
3.6 Fire safety

3.6.1 General
Where the Society finds it necessary, oil fuel and lubricating oil pressure pipelines shall be shielded or
otherwise suitably protected to avoid as far as practicable oil spray or leakages on to hot surfaces or into
machinery air intakes. Fuel oil injection pipes on all engines, irrespective of cylinder bore, shall be effectively
shielded and secured. The number of joints in such piping systems shall be kept to a minimum and, where
practicable, leakages from high pressure oil fuel pipes shall be collected, and safe drainage to a collecting
tank shall be provided (see Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 10 and Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 11).
3.7 Special requirements for ships less than 300 gross tonnage with
propulsive output less than 1000 kW per engine
3.7.1 General
The requirements in [3.1], [3.2], [3.3], [3.5] and [3.6] do not apply.
3.7.2 Extent of monitoring

An alarm shall be initiated for the following conditions:
— fire in engine room
— bilge level, high
— power failure, alarm and remote control system
— for drivers, power transmissions and driven units according to Pt.4 Ch.3, Pt.4 Ch.4 and Pt.4 Ch.5.
Main and auxiliary engines, see Pt.4 Ch.3.
3.7.3 Arrangement on the bridge and engineers’ accommodation

All alarms in the engine room shall initiate an alarm on the navigation bridge, and engineers’ accommodation
individual or collective.
DNV AS
3.7.4 Fire safety

Fuel oil injection pipes on all engines, irrespective of cylinder bore, shall be effectively shielded and clamped.
3.7.5 Fire alarm system

The ship shall have a fire alarm system that shall be initiated in the event of fire in the engine room and or
boiler room.
Guidance note:
The fire detectors may be arranged as a single loop provided it is normally closed.
The fire detectors loop(s) may be connected to the machinery alarm system provided separate indication on the navigation bridge
is arranged.
4 Class notation ECO
4.1 General requirements

4.1.1 Application
This section applies to machinery operation with continuous supervision from a centralised control station.
The control station shall provide control and monitoring devices necessary to make the machinery operation
as safe and effective as it would be under direct supervision.
4.2 Control station

4.2.1 Arrangement
4.2.1.1 The arrangement shall be such that all supervision and manual operations which are necessary for
safe operation of the machinery plant can be carried out at the control station. This will imply that stopping
of machinery, starting of stand-by units etc. in case of machinery faults shall be possible from the control
station if not automatically carried out.
4.2.1.2 The control station shall be located in the engine room or in its close proximity. The control station
may be arranged on or adjacent to navigation bridge provided it does not interfere with the navigation bridge
control positions, and an additional centralised control position is arranged in or adjacent to the engine room.
This control position shall permit some machinery control and monitoring facilities as required in [4.1.1].
4.3 System arrangement

4.3.1 General
The requirements of [2] shall be complied with to the extent applicable.
4.3.2 Alarm system
4.3.2.1 A system of alarm displays shall be provided in the centralised control station for easy identification
of machinery faults.
4.3.2.2 An extension alarm system and a watch responsibility transfer system to the navigation bridge and
the engineers' accommodation is not required.
4.3.3 Safety system

The safety systems specified in [2.4] can be omitted with the exception of the safety functions required in
Pt.4. Corrective actions at machinery faults are presumed to be carried out manually.
DNV AS
4.3.4 Remote control system

Propulsion machinery shall be arranged for remote control from the centralised control station. The
requirements given in [2] and Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.4 shall be complied with to the extent applicable.
4.3.5 Fire alarm system

The fire alarm system shall satisfy the requirement of [2.6].
4.4 Extent of monitoring

4.4.1 General
Monitoring of machinery shall comply with the requirements in [3], Pt.4 Ch.3, Pt.4 Ch.4 and Pt.4 Ch.5.
5 Survey
5.1 General
5.1.1 Trials
5.1.1.1 Upon completion of the installation, trials shall be carried out alongside quay and at sea in the
presence of the surveyor for E0 and ECO notations. The test in [5.1.8] for the extension alarm system is not
applicable for the ECO notation.
5.1.1.2 The sea trials should be reserved solely for testing of the automatic and the remote control systems,
and the fire alarm system. Other tests should be completed alongside quay.
5.1.1.3 The sea trials shall include a four hours continuous operation with unattended machinery spaces.
Agreement shall be made in advance in each case for personnel that will be present in the control room.
Guidance note:
The four hour test may be combined with the endurance test of the engines.
Personnel for ordinary upkeep and control of the machinery shall not to be present in the engine room. Special measurements can
be carried out according to agreement, e.g. noise measurements.
5.1.1.4 A detailed test programme, including expected test results, shall be prepared and submitted for
approval prior to the trials. The programme shall be kept on board, all filled in and signed by the surveyor
upon completion of the trials.
5.1.1.5 Recording of important automatically controlled parameters may be required as part of the testing.
5.1.2 Monitoring system

Alarms and safety actions as required by these rules shall be tested. Failure conditions shall be simulated as
realistically as possible, preferably by letting the monitored parameters exceed the alarm and safety limits.
5.1.3 Blackout recovery

It shall be tested that, after a blackout and subsequent automatic restoration of power, the propulsion and
steering function can be restored from the bridge without manual intervention in the engine room.
5.1.4 Fire detection- and alarm system

After installation, the fire detection and fire alarm system shall be tested under varying conditions of engine
operation and ventilation.
DNV AS
5.1.5 Remote propulsion control systems

5.1.5.1 Testing of the remote control system for the propulsion machinery shall be carried out at sea. Prior to
testing, the propulsion machinery shall run for at least one hour.
5.1.5.2 All tests included in the test programme for the remote control system shall be carried out without
manual assistance from the engine room, and all systems shall be in operation as normal for unattended
machinery space.
5.1.5.3 The remote control system shall be tested at sea to demonstrate stable control and operation of the
propulsion system with its necessary auxiliaries over the full operating range, and regardless of the type of
propulsion. It shall be demonstrated that necessary ramping/controller functions are implemented to ensure
that any operation of the manoeuvring levers do not cause shutdown, instability or damage to the propulsion
machinery or power generating units.
The different tests described below may be seen as the expected functional test scope for certain propulsion
remote control systems, but other equivalent tests may be more appropriate depending on the actual
installation on board.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

1) Ships with fixed pitch propeller
a) The test programme should as a minimum include the following manoeuvres:
i) from stop to dead slow ahead. Proceed stepwise to full ahead. Before each step increase, the r.p.m. of the
previous setting shall have reached its steady state condition
ii) from approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go quickly to slow astern. Proceed stepwise to full astern
iii) stop
iv) after approximately five minutes stop, start ahead
v) when the ship has reached approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go quickly to half astern
vi) when the ship is 'dead in the water', go quickly to full ahead
vii) when the ship has reached approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go quickly to dead slow ahead
viii) when the r.p.m. is nearly stabilized, go quickly to full ahead
ix) when the ship has reached approximately half speed ahead, go to stop and back to dead slow ahead within one
second.
b) With air compressors stopped, make 12 starts with the remote control system, alternating between ahead and astern.
This applies to reversible engines using starting air for re-start.
c) Testing of possible automatic restarts. Go to ahead and let the engine repeat the predetermined starting at tempts. Go
to stop. Return to ahead and check that an additional starting attempt is affected. This applies to diesel engines only.
d) Simulate failures causing automatic load reduction or stop of the engine. Cancel if possible this safety action and show
that the engine is again controllable from the bridge.
e) During bridge control at half speed ahead, cut out power supply to the remote control system. No immediate critical
situation shall arise. Switch over to standby manual control in the engine room, and show that this control system
functions satisfactorily.
f) At approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, test the emergency stop system.
2) Ships with controllable pitch propeller
a) The tests specified below apply to remote control systems with a single manoeuvring lever on the bridge. For plants
with dual lever control, one for r.p.m. and one for pitch, the tests to be carried out will be considered in each case.
i) start the engine, from the bridge if possible, and go to dead slow ahead. Proceed stepwise to full ahead. Before
each step increase, the r.p.m. of the previous setting shall have reached its steady state condition
ii) from approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go quickly to dead slow astern. Proceed stepwise to full astern
iii) go to neutral position
iv) after approximately 5 minutes in neutral position, go to ahead
v) when the ship has reached approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go quickly to 2/3 of full astern
vi) when the ship is 'dead in the water', go quickly to half ahead.
b) Simulate failures causing automatic load reduction or stop of the engine. Cancel if possible this safety action and show
that the engine is again controllable from the bridge.
c) During bridge control at half speed ahead, cut out power supply to the remote control system. No immediate critical
d) At approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, test the emergency stop system.
DNV AS
3) Steam turbine ships

a) The test programme should as a minimum include:
i) from stop to dead slow ahead. Proceed stepwise to full ahead. Before each step increase, the r.p.m. of the
previous setting shall have reached its steady state condition
ii) from full speed ahead, reduce stepwise to stop with the same intervals
iii) from stop, increase stepwise to full astern. Run until the ship has reached a fair speed astern
iv) from full astern, reduce stepwise to stop
v) show that the automatic turning arrangement operates satisfactorily during the stop period. Go to full ahead
vi) after approximately 10 minutes full ahead, go quickly to stop
vii) after approximately 5 minutes stop, go quickly to 2/3 of full astern
viii) when the ship is 'dead in the water', go quickly to full ahead
ix) when the ship has reached approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go quickly to 2/3 of full astern and run until the
ship is «dead in the water»
x) go to full ahead. When the ship has reached approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, go to stop and back to dead
slow ahead within 1 second. Transfer control to the engine room.
b) Repeat the first four manoeuvres using the manoeuvring system in the engine room. Transfer control to the bridge.
c) During bridge control at half speed ahead, cut out power supply to the remote control system. No immediate critical
d) Simulate failures causing automatic load reduction or stop of turbines. Cancel, if possible, this safety action and show
that the turbines are again controllable from the bridge.
e) At approximately 2/3 of full speed ahead, test the emergency stop system.
5.1.6 Main alarm system

All functions of the main alarm system shall be tested.
5.1.7 Watch responsibility transfer system

All functions of the watch responsibility transfer system shall be tested.
5.1.8 Extension alarm system

For E0 notation, all functions of the extension alarm system shall be tested.
DNV AS
SECTION 3 FUEL CELL INSTALLATIONS - FC

1 General
1.1 Objective
The objective of this section is to provide requirements for fuel cell power installations with respect to safe
operation and availability.
1.2 Scope
The scope includes requirements for the design and arrangement of fuel cell power installations and the fuel
cell space. It covers all aspects of the installation from primary fuel supply up to, and including, the exhaust
gas system. Further the following is covered:
— reformers used to convert liquid or gaseous primary fuels to reformed hydrogen rich gas
— control, monitoring and safety systems
— manufacture, workmanship and testing.
The use of fuel cells is currently not covered by international conventions, hence such installations will
require additional acceptance by the flag authorities.
The requirements for fuel cell installation rooms will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Guidance note:
Requirements for storage, preparation and distribution of fuel are covered by the rules of the relevant fuel: Sec.5 Gas fuelled ship
installations, Sec.6 Low flashpoint liquid fuel engines, Sec.13 and Sec.14.
1.3 Application
These requirements applies to all vessels with fuel cell power installations on board.
1.4 Class notations

Vessels complying with the requirements given in this section will be assigned the additional class notation
FC, as specified in Table 1.
DNV AS
Table 1 Additional class notations - FC

FC Power Fuel cell power installations — All-electric vessel, i.e. all

Mandatory: intended for electrical main sources of power
propulsion. are based on fuel cells.
Yes
— Hybrid vessel where one
of the main sources of
Sec.3 power is based on fuel
FIS requirements: cells.
Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 and Pt.7 — Hybrid vessel having an
Ch.1 Sec.3 operational mode where
the vessel is operating
on fuel cell only, with
the other main source of
power in standby.
Safety Fuel cell power installations — Hybrid vessels not using

where the main source of the fuel cell as a main
power is based on other source of power.
energy converters than fuel — Hybrid vessels using
cells or on electrical energy the fuel cell as range
storage (ESS). extender.
— Vessels using fuel cell
solely when moored.
DNV AS
1.5 Definitions
The terms defined in Table 2 are used in this document.
Term Definition
Exhaust air iexhaust from the cathode side of the fuel cell
Exhaust gas exhaust from the reformer or anode side of fuel cell
Fuel cell (FC) isource of electrical power in which the chemical energy of a FC fuel is converted directly into
electrical and thermal energy by electrochemical oxidation
Fuel cell power fuel cell power system and the components and systems required to convert electrical power
installation for the ship
Fuel cell power system group of components which may contain fuel or hazardous vapours, e.g. fuel cell(s), fuel
reformer(s) and associated reformed fuel piping systems
Fuel reformer arrangement of all related fuel reforming equipment for processing gaseous or liquid primary
fuels to reformed fuel for use in fuel cells
Fuel cell space space or enclosure containing fuel cell power systems or parts of fuel cell power systems
Harzardous area an area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is or may be expected to be present, in
quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of
equipment
Hazardous areas are divided into zone 0, 1 and 2 as defined below and according to the area
classification specified in [7.2].
zone 0 Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or is

present for long periods.
zone 1 Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal
operations.
zone 2 Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in
normal operation and, if it does occur, is likely to do so only infrequently
and will exist for a short period only.
Guidance note:
The definition of hazardous area is only related to the risk of explosion. In this context, health,
safety and environmental issues, i.e. toxicity, is not considered.
Primary fuel fuel supplied to the fuel cell power system
Process air air supply to the reformer and /or the cathode side of the fuel cell
Purge gas gas (gaseous primary fuel, reformed fuel or inert gas) released from the anode side of a dead
end fuel cell
Reformed fuel hydrogen rich gas from the reformer usable for the fuel cell
Unacceptable loss of when it is not possible to sustain or restore normal operation of the propulsion machinery in
power the event of one of the essential auxiliaries becoming inoperative, in accordance with SOLAS
regulation II-1/26.3
DNV AS
Term Definition

Ventilation air air used to ventilate the fuel cell space
1.6 Documentation
1.6.1 Plans and particulars
1.6.1.1 Special components, equipment or systems not covered in the different parts of the existing rules
may be required to be documented. Documentation requirements for such components and equipment will
be subject to special consideration.
1.6.1.2 Documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 3.
Table 3 Documentation requirements for class notation FC
Fuel cell power Z030 – Arrangement plan Giving location of:

installation
— machinery and boiler spaces, accommodation,
service and control station spaces
— FC fuel piping
— ventilating pipes and ducts, doors and openings to FI
FC spaces and other hazardous areas
— entrances, air inlets and openings to
accommodation, service and control station spaces
— purge lines and safety blow-off lines of gaseous
fuels.
G010 – Risk analysis FI
G080 – Hazardous area

AP
classification drawing
I260 – Field instruments periodic See [1.8.1.2].

AP
test plan
S010 – Piping diagram (PD) AP
S011 – Piping and instrumentation

AP
diagram (P & ID)
Z060 – Functional description AP
Z072 – Safety description The safety aspects in this connection are for instance
explosion hazards, fire effects from the fuel cell itself
or from the fuel cell support systems. If a fuel cell is AP
connected to the grid any potential hazards affecting
the ship’s total power system should be included.
Z254 – Commissioning procedure AP
Fuel cell Z030 – Arrangement plan Arrangement drawings of the fuel cell including
dimensions, materials, operating temperatures, FI
pressures, weights.
DNV AS

Z060 – Functional description Including:
— fuel cell principles
— specification of FC module outer surface
temperature.
— voltage and current levels in different parts of the FI
cell type of fuels
— maintenance plan (replacement of stack, etc.)
earthing principles
— short circuit contribution capability.
Z252 – Test procedure at The test programme can be based on the IEC standard
manufacturer 62282-3-100 'Stationary fuel cell power systems-
AP
Safety', but shall also have to take the environmental
and operating conditions in a ship into account.
Fuel cell pressure C010 – Design criteria — design pressure

containing — design temperature
components
— volume(s)
— fluid(s) AP
— additional loads, if applicable
— proposed set pressure of safety valve
— pressure equipment class.
C020 – Assembly arrangement Including valves and fittings.

FI
drawing
C030 – Detailed drawing Including attachments and supports. AP
C040 – Design analysis AP
C050 – Non-destructive
AP
testing(NDT) plan
Fuel cell - piping S010 – Piping diagram (PD) Plans of the following piping systems shall be submitted
for approval:
— FC fuel piping
— vent lines of safety relief valves or similar piping
— cooling/ heating water system in connection with FC AP
fuel system if fitted
— drawings and specifications of insulation where such
insulation is installed
— specification of electrical bonding of piping
— specification of heat tracing arrangements if fitted.
S090 – Specification of piping,

AP
valves, flanges and fittings
P020 – Sizing calculations For safety relief valves and pressure/vacuum relief
AP
valves.
DNV AS

Fuel cell space - S010 – Piping diagram (PD) Plans of the following piping systems shall be submitted
piping for approval:
— FC fuel piping
— vent lines of safety relief valves or similar piping
— cooling/ heating water system in connection with FC AP
fuel system if fitted
— drawings and specifications of insulation where such
insulation is installed
— specification of electrical bonding of piping
— specification of heat tracing arrangements if fitted.
S090 – Specification of piping,

AP
valves, flanges and fittings
P020 – Sizing calculations For safety relief valves and pressure/vacuum relief
AP
valves.
Fuel cell spaces – S012 – Ducting diagram (DD) Plans of the following equipment and systems with
ventilation particulars shall be submitted:
— arrangements and specifications of mechanical
ventilation systems in spaces covering FC fuel
systems, giving capacity and location of fans and
their motors. For fans and ventilators; drawings and
material specifications of rotating parts and casings
— arrangement and specifications of piping systems for
AP
gas freeing and purging of FC and piping
— for fixed gas detection and alarm systems:
specification and location of detectors, alarm devices
and call points, and cable routing layout drawing
— bilge and drainage arrangements in FC module, if
applicable
— air inlet arrangement including filters
— exhaust arrangement.
S030 – Capacity analysis AP
C030 – Detailed drawing Rotating parts and casing of fans. AP
Fuel cell spaces – I200 – Control and monitoring

AP
gas detection and system documentation
alarm system,
fixed Z030 – Arrangement plan Detectors, call points and alarm devices. AP
Fuel cell spaces - G060 Structural fire protection

AP
fire protection drawing
G200 – Fixed fire extinguishing

AP
system documentation
Fuel cell spaces - I200 – Control and monitoring

AP
fire detection and system
alarm system
Z030 – Arrangement plan Detectors, call points and alarm devices. AP
DNV AS

Fuel cell spaces G080 – Hazardous area Location of electric equipment in hazardous area shall
AP
- electrical classification drawing be shown with cross reference to E090.
installation
E090 – Table of Ex-installation AP
Z163 – Maintenance manual For electrical installations in hazardous areas. FI
E130 – Electrical datasheet FI
E110 – Cable data sheet and If not type approved by the Society.
AP
design drawing
E220 – Electrical system Documentation showing that the electrical power

philosophy system’s overall properties are in compliance with Pt.4
Ch.8 shall be submitted. Such documentation may be in
the form of system descriptions, system analysis and/or
test programs/reports, covering:
— voltage and frequency variations during steady state
and transient modes
— description of current DC components generated by
the FC
— black out and dead ship recovery required in [3.1] FI
— active and reactive load capacities
— configuration of the system in all operating modes
and subsequent power distribution philosophy for
different vessel systems or services (essential,
important and emergency services)
— system behaviour in relevant failure modes.
— the reliability and availability shall be documented
through analysis, complemented with results from
development testing, as well as full scale testing.
Fuel cell power I200 – Control and monitoring Functionality as required by [8].
installation– system documentation
control and AP
monitoring
system
Fuel cell power I200 – Control and monitoring Functionality as required by Table 6.
AP
installation safety system documentation
system
G130 - Cause and effect diagram — shall cover the safety systems as required by Table
6
AP
— interfaces to other safety and control systems shall
be included.
Fuel cell - Z163 – Maintenance manual FI

manuals
Z161 – Operation manual — gas freeing and inerting procedures
— normal operation procedures of the FC system FI
— emergency operation procedures of the FC system
Fuel cell - testing Z253 – Test procedure for quay

AP
and sea trial
AP = For approval; FI = For information
DNV AS

Sec.6.
1.7 Required compliance documentation

Equipment shall be delivered with compliance documents as listed in Table 4.
Table 4 Compliance documents
Compliance Compliance
Object 1) Additional description
document type standard
Fuel cell power installation PC
Pressure equipment PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.7.
Valves PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.6.
Electrical equipment PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8.
Fuel cell control and monitoring system PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.
Fuel cell safety system PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.
Flammable gas detection system PC
1) Unless otherwise specified the compliance standard is the Society’s rules.

PC = product certificate
1.8 Operation and maintenance manuals

1.8.1 Contents
1.8.1.1 An operation manual containing procedures as listed in Table 3 shall be kept on board.
1.8.1.2 A plan for systematic maintenance and function testing shall be kept on board showing in detail how
components and systems shall be tested and what shall be observed during the tests. Columns showing test
dates and verification of tests carried out shall be included. The plan shall include:
— all instrumentation, automation and control systems affecting the FC system
— test intervals to reflect the consequences of failure involving a particular system. Functional testing of
critical alarms should not exceed 3 month intervals. For non-critical alarms, the longest intervals are not
to surpass 12 months.
The plan shall be included in the ship’s maintenance system. See Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.1 [3.1.1].
1.8.1.3 The maintenance manual referred to in Table 2, shall be in accordance with the recommendations in
IEC 60079-17 and 60092-502 and shall contain necessary information on:
— overview of classification of hazardous areas, with information about gas groups and temperature class
— list of equipment sufficient to enable the certified safe equipment to be maintained in accordance with
its type of protection (list and location of equipment, technical information, manufacturer's instructions,
spares, etc.)
— inspection routines with information about level of detail and time intervals between the inspections,
acceptance/rejection criteria
DNV AS
— records of inspections, with information about date of inspections and name(s) of person(s) who carried

out the inspection and maintenance work.
1.8.1.4 Updated documentation and maintenance manual shall be kept on board, with records of date
and names of companies and persons who have carried out inspections and maintenance. Inspection and
maintenance of installations shall be carried out only by experienced personnel whose training has included
instruction on the various types of protection of apparatus and installation practices to be found on the
vessel.
2 Materials
2.1 General
2.1.1 Material requirements
2.1.1.1 Materials shall be accordance with the requirements in Pt.2 of the rules.
2.1.1.2 The materials shall be suitable for the intended application and shall comply with recognized
standards.
2.1.1.3 Use of flammable materials shall be minimized as far as practicable and requires the approval of the
Society.
2.1.2 Requirements for piping systems
2.1.2.1 Austenitic stainless steel (e.g. 304, 316, 304L and 316L) shall be used for materials in contact with
reformed fuel. Other materials may be approved after special consideration.
2.1.2.2 The materials used for auxiliary piping shall meet the requirements of Pt.4 Ch.6.
2.1.2.3 The materials used for primary fuel piping shall meet the requirements of Sec.5, Sec.6 or Pt.4 Ch.6
as applicable.
2.1.2.4 The certification of materials used for primary or reformed fuel piping shall be in accordance with
Sec.5, Sec.6 or Pt.4 Ch.6 as applicable.
3 Design principles for FC(Power) notation
3.1 General
3.1.1 The design shall ensure that a single failure in the FC power installation shall not lead to an
unacceptable loss of power.
3.1.2 The fuel cell power installation shall be so designed that safety actions required by the rules shall not
lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
3.1.3 If the power from the fuel cell is needed for restoration of power in a black out or dead ship situation,
the recovery arrangements shall be documented and approved in each case.
DNV AS
4 Requirements for fuel cell power systems
4.1 Piping arrangement for fuel cell power system

All pipes containing primary or reformed fuel for fuel cell power systems, where fitted, shall:
1) not be led through enclosed spaces outside of fuel cell spaces
2) be fully welded as far as practicable
3) be arranged to minimise the number of connections.
Guidance note:
When piping for primary or reformed fuel need to pass enclosed spaces, the rules of the relevant fuels are valid.
4.2 Exhaust gas and exhaust air outlets

4.2.1 Exhaust air and exhaust gases from the fuel cell power systems shall be led to the open air and shall
not be combined with ventilation systems.
4.2.2 If the presence of explosive gases cannot be excluded, the exhaust air and/or exhaust gas shall be
arranged as an outlet from a hazardous zone.
4.3 Purge gas outlets

Purge piping from the fuel cell power systems shall be led separately to the open air and shall be arranged as
an outlet from a hazardous zone.
5 Design principles for fuel cell spaces
5.1 Fuel cell spaces

5.1.1 Fuel cell spaces shall be considered as hazardous zone 1 and all electrical equipment including the FC
stack itself shall be certified for zone 1.
Guidance note 1:
In specific cases where the administration accepts the prescriptive area classification to be inappropriate, area classification
according to IEC 60079-10 should be applied, taking into account the following guidance: All electrical equipment needs to
comply with the resulting area classification but at least suitable for zone 2 installation. Equipment for fuel cell spaces should
be documented to be suitable for the calculated zone. This documentation should state compliance with a minimum enclosure
protection as per IEC 60079-15, maximum temperature for internal or external surfaces according to the temperature class for the
area and that the equipment contains no ignition sources during normal operation.
Guidance note 2:
In specific cases where the administration accepts inerting, the following guidance should be taken into account: as ignition
hazards are mitigated by inerting, there is no need for an immediate (emergency) shutdown of the fuel supply in case of leakage
detection.
5.1.2 Fuel cell space boundaries shall be gas tight towards other enclosed spaces in the ship.
5.1.3 Fuel cell spaces shall be designed to safely contain fuel leakages.
DNV AS
5.1.4 Fuel cell spaces shall be arranged to avoid the accumulation of hydrogen rich gas by having simple

geometrical shape and no obstructing structures in the upper part. Large fuel cell spaces shall be arranged
with a smooth ceiling sloping up towards the ventilation outlet. Thin plate ceiling to cover support structure
under the deck plating is not acceptable.
5.1.5 Fuel cell spaces containing fuel reformers shall also comply with the requirements relevant for the
primary fuel.
5.1.6 Tanks for intermediate storage of primary or reformed fuel, if necessary, shall be located outside the
fuel cell space containing the fuel cells.
5.1.7 In general the surface temperature of components and pipes in the fuel cell space shall never be
above the self- ignition temperature for the fuel used.
5.1.8 Fuel cell power systems with reformed fuel temperatures above the self-ignition temperature shall be
subject to special consideration by risk analysis.
5.1.9 Failures leading to dangerous overpressure in fuel cell spaces, e.g. gas pipe rupture or blow out of
gaskets shall be mitigated by suitable explosion pressure relief devices and ESD arrangements.
5.2 Location and access

5.2.1 Fuel cell spaces shall be arranged outside of accommodation, service and machinery spaces of
category A and control stations.
Guidance note:
The arrangement of the fuel cell space on board should be evaluated within the risk assessment. This assessment should cover the
impact on the ships main functions due to accidental scenarios.
5.2.2 Where an independent and direct access to the fuel cell spaces from the open deck cannot be
arranged, access to fuel cell spaces shall be through an air lock which complies with Sec.5 [3.4].
5.2.3 For small fuel cell spaces having the possibility for gas freeing of the fuel cell power system before
entering, the access may be evaluated case-by-case considering gas tightness and need for access during
normal operation.
5.3 Ventilation
5.3.1 General
5.3.1.1 Fuel cell spaces shall be equipped with a mechanical ventilation system of the extraction type
providing effective ventilation of the complete space, also taking into consideration the density of potentially
leaking fuel gases. The fans shall be of non-sparking construction according to Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 [2.6].
Guidance note:
To enhance ventilation in areas containing leakage sources, the use of ventilation hoods should be evaluated.
5.3.1.2 The ventilation rate in fuel cell spaces shall be sufficient to dilute the average gas/vapour
concentration below 25% of the flammable range in all maximum probable leakage scenarios due to technical
failures.
5.3.1.3 Any ducting used for the ventilation of fuel cell spaces shall not serve any other spaces.
DNV AS
5.3.1.4 Ventilation ducts from spaces containing reformed fuel piping or release sources shall be vertical or

steadily ascending and without sharp bends to avoid any possibility for gas to accumulate.
5.3.1.5 Electric fan motors shall not be located in ventilation ducts for fuel cell spaces unless the motor is
certified for hydrogen and other fuels.
5.3.1.6 Two fans shall be installed for the ventilation of the fuel cell space with 100% capacity each. Both
fans shall be supplied from separate circuits.
Guidance note:
The ventilation fans should be operated in an alternating cycle to test that all fans are operable at all times.
5.3.1.7 In case of loss of ventilation or loss of negative pressure in the fuel cell space the fuel cell power
system shall carry out an automatic shut down of the fuel supply to the fuel cell space.
5.3.1.8 Protective screens with a mesh spacing of not more than 13 mm shall be mounted at the outer
openings of ventilation ducts.
5.3.2 Ventilation air inlet
5.3.2.1 Ventilation air inlets for fuel cell spaces shall be taken from areas, which in the absence of the
considered inlet would be non-hazardous.
5.3.2.2 Ventilation air inlets for non-hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from non-hazardous areas at
least 1.5 m away from the boundaries of any hazardous area.
5.3.3 Ventilation air outlet
5.3.3.1 Ventilation air outlets from fuel cell spaces shall be located in an open area which, in the absence of
the considered outlet, would be of the same or lesser hazard than the ventilated space.
6 Fire safety
6.1 General
6.1.1 General
6.1.1.1 The requirements in this section are additional to those given in SOLAS Ch.II-2.
6.1.1.2 The fuel cell space shall be regarded as a machinery space of category A according to SOLAS Ch.II-2
for fire protection purposes.
6.2 Fire protection

6.2.1 Construction
Fuel cell spaces shall have A60 insulation to all surrounding spaces including separation walls between fuel
cell spaces.
Guidance note:
Where this is deemed to be impracticable, the Society may accept equivalent solutions. This requires an acceptance by the flag
administration.
DNV AS
6.3 Fire detection and alarm systems
6.3.1 Detection
6.3.1.1 An approved fixed fire detection system shall be provided for the FC spaces.
Guidance note:
The type of fire detection system should be decided on basis of the actual fuels and combustible gases that may be present in the
spaces. Hydrogen should be given special attention as a hydrogen fire is difficult to detect. It creates no smoke, very little heat
radiation and burns with a flame that is almost invisible to the eye in daylight.
6.3.1.2 Smoke detectors only are not considered sufficient for rapid fire detection.
6.3.1.3 Where the fire detection system does not include means of remotely identifying each detector
individually, the detectors shall be arranged on separate loops.
6.3.1.4 At fire detection the ventilation of the fuel cell space shall stop automatically.
6.4 Fire extinguishing

6.4.1 General
6.4.1.1 A fixed fire-extinguishing system is required in fuel cell spaces.

Guidance note:
Where this is deemed to be impracticable, the Society may accept equivalent solutions. This requires an acceptance by the flag
administration.
6.4.1.2 The fire-extinguishing system shall be suitable for use with the specific primary and reformed fuels
and fuel cell technology used.
6.4.1.3 Required safety actions at fire detection in the FC space are given in Table 7.
6.4.2 Fire dampers
6.4.2.1 Air inlet and outlet openings shall be provided with fire dampers, which shall be operable from
outside the fuel cell space.
6.4.2.2 Before release of the fire extinguishing system the fire dampers shall be closed.
7 Electrical systems
7.1 General
7.1.1 General
7.1.1.1 The requirements in this section are additional to those given in Pt.4 Ch.8.
DNV AS
7.1.1.2 Electrical equipment and wiring shall in general not be installed in hazardous areas unless essential

for operational purposes. The type of equipment and installation requirements shall comply with Pt.4 Ch.8
Sec.11 according to the area classification as specified in [7.2].
7.1.1.3 It shall be ensured that the fuel cell can be disconnected from the electrical load at any load
condition.
7.1.1.4 The inverter shall be so designed that reverse power, such as breaking power, cannot pass into the
fuel cell power installation.
7.1.1.5 The outgoing circuits on a fuel cell arrangement shall be provided with a switch disconnector for
isolating purposes so that isolating for maintenance is possible. Contactors are not accepted as isolating
devices.
Guidance note:
For definition of switch disconnector, see IEC 60947-3.
7.1.1.6 With reference to IEC 60079-20, the following temperature class and equipment groups may be used
for potential ship fuels:
Table 5 Temperature class and equipment groups
Temperature class Equipment group
Natural gas T1 IIA
LPG (propane, butane) T2 IIA
Hydrogen T1 IIC
Methyl alcohol T2 IIA
Ethyl alcohol T2 IIB
7.2 Area classification

7.2.1 General
7.2.1.1 In order to facilitate the selection of appropriate electrical apparatus and the design of suitable
electrical installations, hazardous areas are divided into zones 0, 1 and 2 according to the principles of the
standards IEC 60079-10 and guidance and informative examples given in IEC 60092-502 for tankers. Main
features of the guidance are given in [7.2.2].
7.2.1.2 Areas and spaces other than those mentioned in [7.2.2] shall be subject to special consideration. The
principles of the IEC standards shall be applied.
7.2.2 Definition of zones
7.2.2.1 Hazardous areas zone 0

The interiors of buffer tanks, reformers, pipes and equipment containing low flashpoint fuel or reformed fuel,
any pipework of pressure-relief or other venting.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Instrumentation and electrical apparatus in contact with the gas or liquid should be of a type suitable for zone 0. Temperature
sensors installed in thermo wells, and pressure sensors without additional separating chamber should be suitable for installation in
zone 0.

1) Fuel cell spaces.
2) Areas on open deck, or semi- enclosed spaces on deck, within 3 m of any reformed fuel or purge gas
outlets, or fuel cell space ventilation outlets and around other reformed fuel valves and reformed fuel
pipe flanges.
3) Fuel cell exhaust air and exhaust gas outlets.
4) Areas on open deck or semi-enclosed spaces on deck, within 1.5 m of fuel cell space entrances, fuel cell
space ventilation inlets and other openings into zone 1 spaces.
5) Enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces in which other sources of release of reformed fuel are located.

1) Areas within 1.5 m surrounding open or semi-enclosed spaces of zone 1 as specified in [7.2.2.2], if not
otherwise specified in this standard.
2) Air locks.
Guidance note:
Where requirements of [7.2.2] is deemed to be impracticable, the Society may accept classification according to IEC-60079-10.
This requires an acceptance by the flag administration.
7.2.2.4 Ventilation ducts shall have the same area classification as the ventilated space.
7.2.2.5 Fuel cells not certified for zone 1 shall be deenergized in case of gas detection.
8 Control, monitoring and safety systems
8.1 General
8.1.1 Functional requirements
The control, monitoring and safety systems applied to a fuel cell power installation shall be arranged to fulfil
the functional requirements stated below:
— Leakages of gaseous fuel / vapour shall be detected and alarmed.
— A fuel safety system shall be arranged to automatically close down the fuel supply system and isolate
ignition sources, upon fault conditions which may develop too fast for manual intervention and upon
system failures in accordance with these rules and the installations safety philosophy.
— Control, monitoring and safety systems shall be arranged to avoid spurious shutdowns of the fuel supply
system.
— Information and means for manual intervention shall be available for the operator.
8.1.2 Arrangement of gas control, monitoring and safety systems
8.1.2.1 Each fuel cell power installation shall be fitted with dedicated systems for gas/vapour detection, fuel
safety functions and fuel control and monitoring functions. Gas detection system and fuel safety system are
considered to be protective safety systems, see Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3 [1.4].
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The controllers may be part of the same redundant network if arranged in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3. Note that the
protective safety systems shall, if part of an integrated network, be arranged in a separate network segment in accordance with
Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.2 [1.4.2] and Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.4 [3].
8.1.2.2 Monitoring requirements for the fuel cell power installation are given in Table 5 and Table 6. Table
6 gives alarm requirements for gas detection and other conditions, Table 7 give requirements to protective
safety functions with alarm to be handled by the fuel safety system. For alarm conditions found in Table 7,
separate sensors shall be arranged for the gas control and monitoring system and for the fuel safety system.
8.1.2.3 Gas/vapour detection alarms as required by [8.2.1.1] shall be given both at the bridge, at the
control location for bunkering and locally. If alarming depends on network communication, the functionality
shall be handled by the separate network segment arranged for the fuel cell power installation safety
functions.
8.1.2.4 Fuel gas safety alarms as specified in Table 7 shall be given at the bridge. If alarming depends on
network communication, the functionality shall be handled by the separate network segment arranged for the
fuel installation safety functions.
8.1.2.5 Gas detection functionality and fuel safety functionality for a fuel supply system inside fuel cell space
can be implemented in a common system unit if the system is redundant.
8.1.2.6 The signals required to support the safety functions given in Table 7 shall be hardwired, and
arranged with loop monitoring unless they are inherently fail safe.
Guidance note:
The requirement for hardwired signals is not applicable for signals sent to other systems for additional safety actions as specified in
Table 7.
8.1.2.7 The output signals required to perform the safety actions specified in Table 7 shall be electrically
independent of the fuel control system.
Guidance note:
This implies that the output signal should be separate from any control loop, and connected to e.g. separate solenoids and breaker
terminals/coils.
8.1.2.8 Where gas/vapour detection shall cause shutdown in accordance with Table 7, detector voting shall
be applied. A failed detector shall be considered as an active detection.
Guidance note:
A common voting principle is 2oo2 (meaning two out of two) where both units should detect gas to activate shutdown.
8.1.3 Emergency stop

Fuel cell power installations shall be arranged for manual remote emergency stop from the following locations
as applicable:
— navigation bridge;
— onboard safety centre;
— engine control room;
— fire control station; and
— adjacent to the exit and inside of fuel cell space.
DNV AS
8.1.4 Risk analysis

A risk analysis examining all possible faults affecting the fuel cell operation and safety shall be carried out.
Based on the outcome of the analysis the extent of the monitoring and control shall be decided.
Guidance note:
Typical monitoring that should be considered:
— cell voltage
— cell voltage deviations
— temperature exhaust gas
— temperature in FC stack
— electric current
— process air flow
— process air pressure
— cooling medium flow, level, pressure, temperature
— fuel flow
— fuel temperature
— fuel pressure
— gas detection in exhaust gas
— process water system level, pressure, purity
— parameters necessary to monitor lifetime/ deterioration.
8.2 Fuel cell power installation - control and monitoring

8.2.1 Gas or vapour detection
8.2.1.1 A permanently installed gas/vapour detection system shall be provided for:

— fuel cell spaces
— air locks
— expansion tanks/degassing vessels in heating/cooling circuits in contact with fuel
— other enclosed spaces where primary/reformed fuel may accumulate.
8.2.1.2 The detection systems shall continuously monitor for gas/vapour.
8.2.1.3 Detection systems for flammable products capable of measuring gas/vapour concentrations in the
range 0-100% LEL are acceptable.
8.2.1.4 The number of detectors in each space shall be considered taking size, layout and ventilation of the
space into account, and each space shall be covered by sufficient number of detectors to allow for voting in
accordance with Table 6.
8.2.1.5 The detectors shall be located where gas/vapour may accumulate and/or in the ventilation outlets.
Gas dispersal analysis or a physical smoke test shall be used to find the best arrangement.
8.2.2 Ventilation
8.2.2.1 Reduced ventilation below the required capacity shall be alarmed.
8.2.2.2 In order to verify the performance of ventilation systems, a detection system of the ventilation
flow and a monitoring system of the negative fuel cell space pressure is required. A running signal from the
ventilation fan motor is not sufficient to verify performance.
DNV AS
8.2.3 Bilge wells

Bilge wells in fuel cell spaces shall be provided with level sensors. Alarm shall be given at high-level in bilge
well.
Table 6 Alarm and monitoring
Alarm conditions
Gas detection
Fuel cell spaces 20% LEL HA
Expansion tanks/degassing vessels in systems for heating/

HA
cooling
Air locks HA
Other enclosed spaces where primary/reformed fuel may

HA
accumulate
Bilge
Fuel cell space HA
Ventilation
Reduced ventilation in fuel cell spaces LA
Other alarm conditions
Air lock,more than one door moved from closed position A
Air lock, door open at loss of ventilation A
A = Alarm activated for logical value

LA = Alarm for low value
HA = Alarm for high value
8.3 Fuel cell power installation - safety

8.3.1 Safety upon gas, vapour or liquid detection
8.3.1.1 Arrangement shall be provided to detect rapidly liquid primary fuel leakages inside fuel cell spaces.
Detection of liquid shall shut down the affected fuel cell power system and disconnect ignition sources.
8.3.1.2 Gas/vapour detection in a fuel cell space when two self-monitored detectors indicate a gas or vapour
concentration of 40% LEL shall shut-down the affected fuel cell power system and disconnect ignition sources
and shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the leakage. This will require that valves
in the primary fuel system supplying liquid or gaseous fuel to the fuel cell space shall close automatically.
8.3.1.3 Gas detection in the secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel shall be designed in accordance
with Sec.5 [9.3.2].
8.3.2 Safety upon loss of ventilation
8.3.2.1 Loss of ventilation in a fuel cell space shall result in an automatically shut down of the fuel cell by
process control within a limited period of time. The period for the shut down by process control shall be
considered on a case by case basis based on the risk analysis.
DNV AS
8.3.2.2 After the period has expired a safety shut down shall be carried out.

8.3.2.3 Loss of ventilation in secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel shall be designed in accordance
with Sec.5 [9.3.5].
8.3.3 Manual shutdown push buttons

Means of manual emergency shutdown of fuel supply to the fuel cell space and de-energizing the ignition
sources shall be provided inside a fuel cell space, in the engine control room and from the navigation
bridge. The activation device shall be arranged as a physical button, duly marked and protected against
inadvertent operation. The manual shutdown shall be handled by the safety system and be arranged with
loop monitoring.
8.3.4.1 The requirements in [8.3.1] to [8.3.3] and Table 7 specify fuel cell power installations safety actions
required to limit the consequences of system failures.
8.3.4.2 Safety actions additional to the ones required by Table 7 may be required for unconventional or
complex fuel cell power installations.
Table 7 Safety actions
Signal to other control/

Shutdown of fuel Shutdown of
Alarm safety systems for
cell space valve ignition source
additional action
Liquid detection inside fuel cell

X X X
space
40 % LEL inside fuel cell space at

X X X
2 detectors
Gas detection in the secondary

X X
enclosure of pipes
Loss of ventilation or loss of The fuel cell shall be

negative pressure in a fuel cell X automatically shut down
space by process control
Loss of ventilation in secondary The fuel cell shall be

enclosure of pipes X automatically shut down
by process control
Fire detection Shutdown of ventilation,

X X X release of fire
extinguishing system
Emergency release button X X X
DNV AS
9 Manufacture, workmanship and testing
9.1 FC fuel piping systems

9.1.1 FC fuel pipes and ducting
9.1.1.1 Reformed fuel piping systems, as specified in [4.1], shall be tightness tested with hydrogen or an
appropriate test gas to show that there is no leakage.
9.1.1.2 Valves in the FC piping system shall be leakage tested for the FC fuel used.
9.1.1.3 Valves for use in reformed fuel pipes, as specified in [4.1], shall be tightness tested (internally,
externally) with hydrogen or an appropriate test gas to show that there is no leakage.
9.1.1.4 Expansion bellows intended for use in FC fuel systems shall be prototype tested as given in Pt.5 Ch.7
Sec.5 [13.2].
9.2 On board testing of FC plant

9.2.1 General
9.2.1.1 Testing after installation on board of the whole system shall be performed in different relevant load
conditions (typically: 'start up'; 'normal running';' full load'; 'load changes up/down').
9.2.1.2 It shall be verified for the following events that the FC power installation triggers an alarm and / or
is automatically transferred into a safe condition:
— fire detection
— gas detection
— loss of ventilation flow
— loss of negative pressure in fuel cell space
— failure of the power supply
— failure of the programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
— triggering of the protective devices
— failure in the protective system.
Further tests may be required based on the approved risk analysis and related test programs.
9.2.1.3 The interaction of the FC power installation with the ship systems shall be tested as applicable:
— power generation by the FC power installation system alone
— FC power installation together with conventional shipboard generation of electrical power
— FC power installation together with batteries
— change-over to the emergency source of electrical power
— switching the FC power installation online or offline
— testing of sudden load variations and load rejection.
9.2.1.4 If the FC power installation constitutes the main propulsion system of the ship, it shall be verified
that the ship has adequate propulsion power in all maneuvering situations.
9.2.1.5 For fuel cell spaces and ventilated ducts it shall be examined and tested that underpressure and
ventilation can be fully accomplished. Ventilation rate at minimum flow shall be documented. Required
shutdowns and / or alarms upon ventilation falling below prescribed values shall be tested.
DNV AS
9.3 Survey and testing of electrical equipment in hazardous area
For equipment for which safety in hazardous areas depends upon correct operation of protective devices (for
example overload protection relays) and / or operation of an alarm (for example loss of pressurization for
an Ex(p) control panel) it shall be verified that the devices have correct settings and/or correct operation of
alarms.
DNV AS
SECTION 4 FUEL TREATMENT AND CONDITIONING SYSTEMS - FUEL

1 General
1.1 Introduction
The additional class notation Fuel applies to systems and equipment utilised for the treatment of residual
fuel for use in diesel engines. Residual fuel oil is so viscous that it has to be handled by a special fuel
treatment system before use, and it may contain relatively high amounts of pollutants, particularly sulphur,
which forms sulphur dioxide upon combustion.
1.2 Scope
The scope of additional class notation Fuel ensures that the fuel treatment system will reduce the content of
undesired impurities to a level safe for diesel engine use, and that the fuel is delivered to the engine with the
correct viscosity and pressure throughout the full operating range of engine power.
1.3 Application
Vessels with fuel systems and equipment complying with the rules in this section may be assigned the
additional class notation Fuel (ⱱ, ρ, T). The numbers in brackets indicate the maximum viscosity in cSt at
3
50°C, the maximum density in kg/m at 15°C of the fuel oil and the minimum outside air temperature for
which the installations are approved. Redundancy requirements are included in this section of the rules, as
is the possibility of having two different bunker batches that may be stored and handled without need for
mixing.
1.4 Environmental conditions

For determining heating capacity the following minimum temperatures apply:
— sea: 0°C
— outside air temperature: 0°C, if a lower temperature is not defined in the class notation.
1.5 Definitions
Term Definition
booster system pressurised system of pumps, heaters, valves, filters and other equipment permanently installed
to provide the transfer of fuel from the day tank to the engine high pressure fuel pumps
fuel as used in this context is an organic liquid hydrocarbon oil derived from petroleum refining. This
does not preclude the incorporation of small amounts of additives intended to improve some
aspects of performance
fuel additives chemical substances used to improve the fuel treatment efficiency and or fuel performance in
diesel engines as well as minimising harmful effects
fuel quality determined with reference to values of parameters describing chemical and physical properties.
It is assumed that fuels containing contamination in excess of that specified in ISO 8217/latest
version/grade RMH55 are not bunkered
DNV AS
Term Definition

fuel storage system incorporates tanks for fuel storage which are not intended to influence the cleaning process
(settling and drainage of contaminants)
separator permanently fitted centrifuge for fuel cleaning
transfer system incorporate the system of pipes, valves, filters and pumps intended for the transfer of fuel
between storage tanks and from storage tanks to the treatment system
treatment system incorporates the system of tanks, pipes, valves heaters, filters, pumps, separators and other
permanently installed components intended for cleaning and conditioning of the fuel. It also
comprises arrangements for chemical treatment of the fuel by the use of fuel additives
1.6 Certification
Table 2 Certification required
Certificate Issued Certification

type by standard
Separators TA Society Fuel oil
1) Unless otherwise specified the certification standard is DNV rules.

TA = type approval
1.7 Documentation
Additional to the documentation required by other relevant rules, the plans and particulars listed in Table 3
shall be submitted for approval:
Table 3 Documentation requirements class notation Fuel
Fuel oil system S010 – Piping diagram (PD) Fuel oil transfer pipes with heat tracing (including any
low sulphur fuel change over system for SOx emission AP
control area -SECA).
Z100 – Specification Pipes with heat tracing and heated tanks with insulation. AP
Z030 – Arrangement plan Heating coils in fuel tank. AP
S120 – Heat balance calculation Comprising heated fuel tanks, fuel pre-heaters and heat
AP
losses, throughout the system.
Z253 – Test procedure for quay Including log of temperatures, viscosity, alarms, etc.
FI
and sea trial
Z161 – Operation manual Including bunkering procedures. AP
Z250 – Procedure Fuel oil samples handling and records in connection with
FI
MARPOL Annex VI.
DNV AS

Fuel oil control I200 – Control and monitoring Fuel pre-treatment system.
and monitoring system documentation AP
system
1.7.2 For general requirements for documentation, including definition of the info codes, see DNV-CG-0550
Sec.6.
1.7.3 For a full definition of the documentation types, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.5.
1.8 General requirements

1.8.1 System design principles
1.8.1.1 The fuel treatment plant shall be designed and installed in accordance with relevant parts of the rules
unless otherwise stated in this section.
1.8.1.2 The fuel system shall ensure that:

— the content of undesired impurities is reduced to a level safe for diesel engine use
— the fuel is delivered to the engine with the correct viscosity and pressure throughout the full operating
range of engine power
— the system provides redundancy as required in relevant rules
— two different bunker batches may be stored and handled without need for mixing.
1.8.2 Fuel operation manual

A manual describing systems, equipment and guidance for bunkering, handling of fuel and operation of
systems shall be provided.
The fuel operation manual shall emphasize measures and procedures in order to minimize the mixing of old
and or new or incompatible fuel oils during bunkering and change over operations.
2 System arrangements and components
2.1 System for storage and transfer of fuel

2.1.1 Bunker manifolds
2.1.1.1 An adequate bunker manifold shall be provided on each side equipped with spill tray with a volume of
at least 160 litre capacity to prevent oil pollution during bunkering operations.
2.1.1.2 An approved arrangement for sampling of fuel shall be provided at each of the bunker manifolds or in
the fuel bunkering line.
2.1.2 Fuel storage tanks
2.1.2.1 At least two storage tanks shall be provided. If only two tanks are installed, the smallest tank shall
not to be less than one third of the total tank capacity.
2.1.2.2 Arrangement enabling representative fuel sampling shall be provided.
DNV AS
2.1.2.3 All tanks shall be provided with sufficient heating capacity to keep the bulk temperature of the oil on

at least 45°C.
2.1.2.4 Isolating valves for heating coils in each tank shall be provided. Sampling cocks in condensate return
lines to be provided.
2.1.2.5 The storage tanks shall be provided with monitoring equipment for temperature and level.
2.1.3 Fuel transfer system
2.1.3.1 The transfer pumps shall be located as low as possible.
2.1.3.2 As far as practical, long suction lines shall be avoided.
2.1.3.3 Transfer lines shall be provided with heat tracing and insulation.
2.2 Fuel oil settling and daily service tanks

2.2.1 Tank arrangement
2.2.1.1 At least two settling and two daily service tanks shall be provided.
2.2.1.2 Settling and daily service tanks shall not be located adjacent to the ship's side.
Guidance note:
Minimum distance between hull and tank bulkhead should be 760 mm for inspection access.
2.2.2 Settling tanks
2.2.2.1 The usable capacity of each settling tank shall be sufficient for 24 hours operation at maximum fuel
consumption.
2.2.2.2 Heating capacity, sufficient to increase the temperature of the oil from 45°C to at least 70°C within
12 hours, shall be provided.
2.2.2.3 The tanks shall be provided with suitable openings for access and ventilation to allow effective tank
cleaning.
2.2.2.4 The tank bottom shall be so designed that precipitated material may be drained to the sludge tank by
opening an easily accessible drain valve. Tank bottom shall be sloped towards the drain outlet.
2.2.2.5 Suction outlets for separators shall be placed above bottom to avoid precipitated material to escape.
Minimum distance from the bottom to the suction shall be 500 mm.
2.2.2.6 For sludge removal by use of separator, a bottom suction is required.
2.2.3 Daily service tanks
2.2.3.1 The usable capacity of each daily service tank shall be sufficient for 12 hours operation at maximum
fuel consumption.
2.2.3.2 Heating capacity, sufficient to increase the temperature of the oil from 70°C to at least 90°C within 6
hours, shall be provided.
DNV AS
2.2.3.3 The tanks shall be provided with suitable openings for access and ventilation to allow effective tank

cleaning
2.2.3.4 The tank bottom shall be constructed with smooth bottom and with slope towards the drain outlet.
2.2.3.5 The suction to the booster system shall be placed minimum 500 mm above bottom to avoid
precipitated material to escape.
2.2.3.6 The arrangement of the tanks and interconnected piping shall be such that unintentional ingress of
fuel from one tank to another is avoided.
2.2.3.7 Overflow pipe to run from the bottom of the service tank to the top of the settling tank (above the
overflow discharge from the settling tank).
2.3 Fuel treatment system

2.3.1 General
The fuel treatment system shall at least consist of:
— centrifugal separators
— fuel heaters
— automatic filters
— booster system including pressurised mixing tank
— automatic viscosity control equipment
— automatic temperature control.
2.3.2 Centrifugal separators
2.3.2.1 The capacity of separators, their number and configuration shall be such that with any unit out of
operation, the system shall maintain an adequate performance at the maximum fuel consumption.
Guidance note:
Capacity of separators will be considered equal to certified flow rate (for the viscosity class in question) as determined by the type
approval programme for fuel oil separators.
2.3.2.2 Heaters, control systems, pumps and other auxiliary equipment for the cleaning process shall be so
designed that the fuel is kept at the condition necessary for the separators to function as required.
2.3.2.3 Fuel feed rate to separators shall be controlled by means of rpm (frequency) of feed pump. (Or other
equal means to control flow rate approved by the Society in each case.)
2.3.2.4 Fuel heaters for separators shall have automatic temperature control. Controller shall have
proportional and integral function (PI-controller). Possibility for manual control shall be arranged.
DNV AS
2.3.2.5 For steam heating arrangements condensate drain from heaters shall be controlled by float operated

drain traps (or other equal means approved by the Society in each case). Drain traps discharge shall be by
gravity.
Guidance note:
If the pressure of the heating medium inside the heater is sufficient to displace the condensate to the condensate tank located at a
higher level, this is considered equivalent to gravity drain.
2.3.2.6 The discharge pipe to the sludge tank shall be made as short and vertical as possible. The pipe
diameter shall not be less than the separator sludge outlet stud.
2.3.2.7 Centrifugal separators shall preferably be positioned on top of the sludge tank.
2.3.2.8 A fixed arrangement for sampling fuel before and after the separator(s) shall be provided.
2.3.3 Fuel heaters and viscosity control equipment
2.3.3.1 The system of fuel heaters shall be designed with built in redundancy.
2.3.3.2 With any one heater out of service, the remaining heaters shall have the capacity of raising the fuel
temperature sufficiently to achieve a viscosity required for the correct injection of fuel into the diesel engine
at a flow rate corresponding to 120% of the maximum fuel consumption.
2.3.3.3 Heaters shall be designed with a maximum surface temperature of the heating elements of 170°C for
steam and 200°C for thermal oil heating systems.
Guidance note:
2
170°C surface temperature normally corresponds to a heat load of 10 kW/m .
2.3.3.4 Fuel heaters in the booster system shall be provided with control equipment maintaining the desired
viscosity.
2.3.3.5 The viscosity controller shall have proportional and integral action (PI controller).
2.3.3.6 Means for manual temperature control of the heaters shall be arranged.
2.3.3.7 For steam heating arrangements condensate drains from heaters to be controlled by float operated
drain traps (or other equal means approved by the Society in each case). Drain trap discharge shall be by
gravity.
DNV AS
SECTION 5 GAS FUELLED SHIP INSTALLATIONS - GAS FUELLED LNG

1 General
1.1 Objective
The additional class notation Gas fuelled LNG provides criteria for the safe and environmentally friendly
arrangement and installation of machinery for propulsion and auxiliary purposes, using natural gas as fuel.
1.2 Scope
The scope for additional class notation Gas fuelled LNG includes requirements for the ship's gas fuel
system, covering all aspects of the installation, from the ship's gas fuel bunkering connection up to and
including the gas consumers. This section has requirements for arrangement and location of gas fuel tanks
and all spaces with fuel gas piping and installations, including requirements for the entrances to such
spaces. Hazardous areas and spaces, due to the fuel gas installations, are defined. Requirements for control,
monitoring and safety systems for the fuel gas installations are included. For tank design and gas piping
detail design, see also Pt.5 Ch.7. Requirements for manufacture, workmanship and testing are included,
also referring to details given in Pt.5 Ch.7. Bunkering procedures are required for approval as part of the
operation manual. The bunkering processes and crew training are not part of the scope for this section of the
rules.
1.3 Application
The additional class notation Gas fuelled LNG applies to installations using gas as fuel in ships. This includes
internal combustion engines, boilers and gas turbines. The installations may run on gas only or be dual fuel
installations. Gas may be stored in a gaseous or liquefied state. Collision and grounding protection for fuel
tanks are covered by statutory requirements (IGF Code). The rules are applicable for installations where
natural gas is used as fuel. If other gases are used as fuel, then special consideration will need to be taken,
and additional requirements may be relevant. These rules are not applicable to gas carriers. Ships built
with machinery satisfying the requirements of the rules in this section, will be assigned the additional class
notation Gas fuelled LNG.
1.4 Classification
1.4.1 Survey extent
Survey requirements for ships with the class notation Gas fuelled LNG are given in Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 [1], Pt.7
Ch.1 Sec.2 [3], Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.3 [3] and Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.4 [3].
DNV AS
1.5 Definitions
1.5.1 Terms
The terms defined in Sec.4 Table 1 are used in this document.
Terms Definition
accommodation spaces those spaces used for public spaces, corridors, lavatories, cabins, offices, hospitals, cinemas,
game and hobby rooms barber shops, pantries containing no cooking appliances and similar
spaces
breadth (B) greatest moulded breadth of the ship at or below the deepest draught (summer load line
draught). See SOLAS regulation II-1/2.8
bunkering transfer of liquefied or gaseous fuel from land based or floating facilities into a ships'
permanent tanks or connection of portable tanks to the fuel supply system
CNG compressed natural gas
certified safe type electrical equipment that is certified safe by the relevant authorities recognized by the
administration or its recognized organization acting on its behalf for operation in a flammable
atmosphere based on a recognized standard
control station those spaces defined in SOLAS chapter II-2 and in the context of these rules, also the engine
control room
design temperature for selection of materials, the minimum temperature at which liquefied gas fuel may be loaded
or transported in the liquefied gas fuel tanks
design vapour pressure maximum gauge pressure, at the top of the tank, used as a parameter for the design of the
'P0' tank
double block and bleed set of two valves in series in a pipe, and a third valve enabling the pressure release from the
valve pipe between those two valves
The arrangement may also consist of a two-way valve and a closing valve instead of three
separate valves
dual fuel engines in this context engines that can burn gaseous and liquefied fuel simultaneously and in a wide
variety of proportions, or can operate successively on oil fuel and gas
ESD emergency shutdown
enclosed space any space which, in the absence of artificial ventilation, the ventilation will be limited and any
explosive atmosphere will not be dispersed naturally
Guidance note:
See also definition in IEC 60092-502:1999.
explosion deflagration event of uncontrolled combustion
explosion pressure measures provided to prevent the explosion pressure in a container or an enclosed space
relief exceeding the maximum overpressure the container or space is designed for, by releasing the
overpressure through designated openings
filling limit (FL) maximum liquid volume in a fuel tank relative to the total tank volume when the liquid fuel has
reached the reference temperature
DNV AS
Terms Definition

fuel natural gas, either in its liquefied or gaseous state
fuel containment arrangement for the storage of fuel including tank connections
system It includes where fitted, a primary and secondary barrier, associated insulation and any
intervening spaces, and adjacent structure if necessary for the support of these elements. If
the secondary barrier is part of the hull structure it may be a boundary of the fuel storage hold
space
The spaces around the fuel tank are defined as follows:
1) Fuel storage hold space is the space enclosed by the ship's structure in which a fuel
containment system is situated. If tank connections are located in the fuel storage hold
space, it will also be a tank connection space;
2) Interbarrier space is the space between a primary and a secondary barrier, whether or not
completely or partially occupied by insulation or other material; and
3) Tank connection space is a space surrounding all tank connections and tank valves that is
required for tanks with such connections in enclosed spaces.
Guidance note:
A tank connection space may also contain equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers.
Such equipment is considered to only contain potential sources of release, but not sources of
ignition.
fuel preparation room any space containing pumps, compressors and/or vaporizers for fuel preparation purposes
Guidance note:
A tank connection space which has equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers installed
inside is not regarded as a fuel preparation room. Such equipment is considered to only contain
potential sources of release, but not sources of ignition.
gas defined as a fluid having a vapour pressure exceeding 2.8 bar absolute at a temperature of
37.8°C
gas consumer any unit within the ship using gas as a fuel
gas control systems providing control and monitoring for bunkering, gas storage and gas supply to machinery
gas only engine engine capable of operating on gas only, and not able to switch over to operation on any other
type of fuel
gas safety systems safety systems for bunkering, gas storage and gas supply to machinery
gas valve unit spaces spaces or boxes containing valves for control and regulation of gas supply before the consumer
Guidance note:
The gas valve unit is by different suppliers also called for instance GVU, gas regulating unit, GRU or
gas train.
DNV AS
Terms Definition

hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is or may be expected to be present, in quantities
such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of equipment.
classification specified in [8]
zone 0 Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or is

present for long periods.
zone 1 Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal
operations.
zone 2 Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal
operation and, if it does occur, is likely to do so only infrequently and will
exist for a short period only.
Guidance note:
high pressure maximum working pressure greater than 10 bar
independent tanks self-supporting, do not form part of the ship's hull and are not essential to the hull strength
LNG liquefied natural gas
length (L) length as defined in the international convention on load lines in force
loading limit (LL) maximum allowable liquid volume relative to the tank volume to which the tank may be loaded
MARVS maximum allowable relief valves setting
master gas fuel valve automatic valve in the gas supply line to each engine located outside the machinery space
membrane tanks non-self-supporting tanks that consist of a thin liquid and gas tight layer (membrane)
supported through insulation by the adjacent hull structure
non-hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not expected to be present in quantities such as
to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of equipment
north Atlantic shall be in accordance with the definitions specified in IACS Recommendation 034
environment
open deck deck that is open at one or both ends and equipped with adequate natural ventilation that is
effective over the entire length of the deck through permanent openings distributed in the side
panels or in the deck above
reference temperature temperature corresponding to the vapour pressure of the fuel in a fuel tank at the set pressure
of the PRVs
secondary barrier outer element of a fuel containment system, designed to afford temporary containment of
any envisaged leakage of liquefied fuel through the primary barrier, and to prevent that the
temperature of the ship's structure is lowered to an unsafe level
secondary enclosure enclosure around fuel piping designed to prevent liquefied and/or gaseous fuel leaking from the
fuel piping system
DNV AS
Terms Definition

semi-enclosed space space where the natural conditions of ventilation are notably different from those on open deck,
due to the presence of structures such as roofs, windbreaks and bulkheads, and which are so
arranged that dispersion of gas may not occur
service spaces spaces outside the cargo area used for galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances, lockers,
mail and specie rooms, store rooms, workshops other than those forming part of the machinery
spaces and similar spaces and trunks to such spaces
source of release point or location from which a gas, vapour, mist or liquid may be released into the atmosphere
so that an explosive atmosphere could be formed
unacceptable loss of that it is not possible to sustain or restore normal operation of the propulsion machinery in
vapour pressure equilibrium pressure of the saturated vapour above the liquid, expressed in bar absolute at a
specified temperature
DNV AS
1.6.1.1 Documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 2
Table 2 Documentation requirements
Propulsion Z050 – Design Including information on the machinery configuration, machinery

and steering philosophy space arrangements, fuel arrangements, shut down philosophy,
arrangements, redundancy considerations, boil off handling, etc. FI
general Shall be submitted before other documentation, to give support for
approval of these.
Z071 – Failure mode For non-conventional gas fuelled propulsion machinery

and effect analysis arrangements, covering single failure in active components or AP
(FMEA) systems, see [5.1.2.4].
Z253 – Test procedure For non-conventional gas fuelled propulsion machinery

AP
for quay and sea trial arrangements: redundancy and failure modes based on FMEA.
Fuel gas system Z030 – Arrangement Including:

plan
— machinery and boiler spaces, accommodation, service and
control station spaces
— fuel containment systems
— fuel preparation rooms
— fuel bunkering pipes with shore connections AP
— tank hatches, vent pipes and any other openings to the fuel
tanks
— ventilating pipes, doors and openings to fuel preparation
rooms, and other hazardous areas
— entrances, air inlets and openings to accommodation, service
and control station spaces.
Z030 – Arrangement Location of fuel tank(s) with distances related to:

plan AP
— fire protection
— inspection.
Z265 – Calculation Probabilistic calculation when used to determine acceptable fuel

FI
report tank location.
Z030 – Arrangement Arrangement of fuel preparation rooms and tank connection spaces
plan with regard to cryogenic protection of the ship structure [3.3.2] AP
and [3.3.4].
Z161 – Operation See [1.8.1.1].

AP
manual
Z245 – Calculation Explosion analysis (ESD protected machinery spaces).

FI
report
DNV AS

Fuel gas tanks Z030 – Arrangement General arrangement including:
(general plan
— complete tank with support arrangement and anti-float/roll
requirements for all
1) — secondary barrier, if fitted
tanks)
— access for inspection FI
— tank insulation
— overview of tanks with all tank connections and tank connection
space.
M010 – Material Including internal structures and piping.

AP
specifications, metals
M060 – Welding
AP
procedures (WPS)
M150 – Non-
destructive testing AP
(NDT) plan
M151 - Non-
destructive testing AP
(NDT) procedure
Z251 – Test procedure Strength and tightness testing procedure. AP
Z265 – Calculation Holding time calculation when pressure accumulation is used as

FI
report boil off gas handling method.
Z265 – Calculation Boil off gas rate when pressure accumulation is not used as boil off
FI
report gas handling method.
Z265 – Calculation Filling limit curves.

FI
report
C030 – Detailed Safety relief valves and associated vent piping.

AP
drawing
S030 – Capacity Safety relief valves and associated vent piping. Including back
FI
analysis pressure.
Z100 – Specification Safety relief valves and associated vent piping. FI
S060 – Pipe routing Including location of tank valves.

AP
sketch
Z164 – Inspection Inspection/survey plan for the liquefied gas fuel containment
AP
manual system.
Fuel gas independent C030 – Detailed Including as applicable:

tank of type A drawing
— tanks
— supports
— insulation and liquid barrier for protection of hold space
structure as applicable AP
— marking plates
— tank hatches, pipes and any openings to the gas tanks
— pump arrangement including supporting structures
— inspection access arrangement.
DNV AS

H050 – Structural Tank hold space detailed drawings, including hull support structure
AP
drawing and anti-flotation arrangement.
C040 – Design Design loads and structural analysis of fuel tanks, including:
analysis
— interaction between hull and tanks, including thermal effects
FI
— partial filling including sloshing assessment
— cooling-down load case when fuel temperature is below -55°C.
H130 – Fabrication Including:

specification
— building and welding imperfection tolerances AP
— specification of stress relieving procedures (thermal or
mechanical) as required.
S080 – Thermal stress When design temperature is below -110°C.

FI
analysis Calculations according to recognized standard e.g ASME.
P030 – Temperature Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10°C.
FI
calculations
Z161 – Operation Including:

manual AP
— cooling-down procedure
— handling of tank leakage.

tank of type B drawing
— tanks
— supports
— secondary barriers
— insulation
AP
— marking plates
— tank connection space
H050 – Structural Tank hold space detailed drawings, including hull support structure
AP
drawing and anti-flotation arrangement.
analysis
— fatigue assessment of tank boundary and internal structures
(SN curves based)
FI
— fatigue assessment leak before failure (fracture mechanics
based)

specification
DNV AS

FI
FI
calculations

manual
— inspection of small leak protection system with respect to
functionality AP
— handling of tank leakage
— inspection of functionality of secondary barrier between tank
and first closing valve on liquid lines.
Z100 – Specification Small leak protection system, including arrangement. AP
S010 – Piping diagram Inert gas purging system for insulation spaces.
AP
(PD)

tank of type C drawing
— tanks
— supports
— insulation AP
— marking plates
— pump arrangement including supporting structures as
applicable.
analysis
— thermal effects between tank and supports
— fatigue assessment as required FI
— partial filling including sloshing assessment as applicable
— cooling-down load case when fuel temperature is below -55°C,
as required.

specification
— building and welding imperfection tolerances
— forming procedure of dished ends AP
S070 – Pipe strength Strength analysis of piping inside outer tank (vacuum insulated
FI
analysis tank).

analysis FI
Calculations according to recognized standard e.g ASME.
P030 – Temperature Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10°C:
calculations
— leakage into primary or secondary barrier (e.g. outer jacket of FI
vacuum insulated C type tank, tank connection space, drip tray
etc).
DNV AS

manual
— cooling-down procedure AP
— inspection of functionality of secondary barrier between tank
and first closing valve on liquid lines.
Fuel gas membrane C030 – Detailed Including:

tank drawing
— pump tower and its upper and lower supports
— tank dome cover structure AP
— sump well structure
— building principle including location of load bearing insulation of
different strength rating.
C040 – Design Including:

analysis
— strength and fatigue assessment of pump towers and its upper
and lower supports
— strength and fatigue assessment of sump well
— strength assessment of containment system for sloshing impact FI
loads
— strength analysis of dome cover structure
— stress analyses of load bearing insulation
— vibration analysis of pump tower and other vibration critical
components, as applicable.
FI
calculations
S010 – Piping diagram Inert gas purging system for insulation spaces.
AP
(PD)
S010 – Piping diagram Water drainage arrangement for secondary insulation space.
AP
(PD)
Z100 – Specification Hull scantlings requirements for containment system. FI
Z100 – Specification Insulation including load bearing capacities. AP
Z100 – Specification Load bearing components. AP
Z100 – Specification Materials for membranes and insulation. AP
Z251 – Test procedure Tightness test of primary and secondary membranes. AP
Z251 – Test procedure Strength and tightness test of adjacent compartments, as relevant. AP
Z250 – Procedure Bonding handbook, if secondary barrier is bonded. AP
Z250 – Procedure Repair procedures for membranes and main components. AP
Z250 – Procedure Erection handbook. FI
Z100 – Specification Reference list of generic approved documents, if applicable. FI
Z030 – Arrangement Temperature indication system in insulation spaces and

AP
plan cofferdams.
DNV AS

I200 – Control and Temperature indication system in insulation spaces and
monitoring system cofferdams. AP
documentation
Z265 – Calculation Required relief valve capacity for fuel tank and insulation spaces.
FI
report
Fuel gas portable C030 – Detailed Including as applicable:

tank drawing
— tanks
— supports
— insulation AP
— marking plates
— pump arrangement including supporting structures as
applicable.
analysis
— cooling-down load case when fuel temperature is below -55°C,
as required.

specification
S070 – Pipe strength Strength analysis of piping inside outer tank (vacuum insulated
FI
analysis tank).

FI
P030 – Temperature Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10°C:
calculations FI
— leakage into primary or secondary barrier (e.g. outer jacket of
vacuum insulated tank, tank connection space, drip tray etc).

manual
— inspection of functionality of secondary barrier between tank AP
and first closing valve on liquid lines
— procedure of connection/disconnection of the tank to the ship.
Fuel gas control and I200 – Control and Functionality as required by [9].
monitoring system monitoring system AP
documentation
DNV AS

I260 – Field See [1.8.1.2].
instruments periodic AP
test plan
Fuel gas safety I200 – Control and Functionality as required by Table 10

system monitoring system AP
documentation
G130 – Cause and — shall cover the safety functions as required by Table 10
effect diagram AP
— interfaces to other safety and control systems shall be included.
Fuel gas piping S011 – Piping and Including

system instrumentation
— vent lines for safety relief valves
diagram (P&ID)
— secondary enclosures for fuel pipes including pressure relief
arrangements
AP
— boil off system
— bunkering lines
— gas supply system
— gas freeing and purging system.
S060 – Pipe routing Showing the location of pipes in the ship, incl. distance from ship's
FI
sketch side, location of pipe ducts etc.

FI
analysis
Z265 – Calculation Stress analysis for high pressure fuel piping.

FI
report
S090 – Specification Including offsets, loops, bends, expansion elements such as

of valves, flanges and bellows and slip joints (only inside tanks). For valves intended for
fittings service with a design temperature below -55°C, documentation of FI
leak test and functional test at design temperature (type test) shall
be included.
Z100 – Specification Closing time of shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel lines operated FI
by the safety system.
Z030 – Arrangement Vent masts, including location and details of outlets from fuel tanks
AP
plan safety relief valves.
Fuel gas drip trays Z030 – Arrangement Hull protection beneath piping for liquefied fuel where leakages
plan may be anticipated, such as at shore connections and at pump AP
seals. Including specification.
Fuel gas cooling S011 – Piping and

system instrumentation AP
diagram (P&ID)
Fuel gas heating S011 – Piping and

system instrumentation AP
diagram (P&ID)
Exhaust gas system S010 – Piping diagram Including arrangement of explosion relief or verification of strength
AP
(PD) of piping system, see [5.5].
DNV AS

Water curtain S010 - Piping diagram Including actual arrangement in bunker station.
FI
(PD)
Hazardous area G080 – Hazardous

classification area classification AP
drawing
Air lock Z030 – Arrangement Location and construction details, including alarm equipment.
AP
arrangements plan
Ventilation systems S012 – Ducting Including capacity and location of fans and their motors.
for gas fuel system diagram (DD) AP
spaces
Ventilation control I200 – Control and Including detection of ventilation function, safety actions and
and monitoring monitoring system sequences, arrangement of powering of fans, etc. AP
Explosion (Ex) Z030 – Arrangement Where relevant, based on an approved 'hazardous area
protection plan classification drawing' where location of electric equipment in
FI
hazardous area is added (except battery room, paint stores and
gas bottle store).
E170 – Electrical Single line diagrams for all intrinsically safe circuits, for each circuit
schematic drawing including data for verification of the compatibility between the AP
barrier and the field components.
Z100 – Specification List of non-certified safe electrical equipment that shall be

disconnected (ESD protected machinery spaces, spaces protected FI
by air lock).
Z071 – Failure mode If required by [8.1.1].

and effect analysis AP
(FMEA)
E250 - Maintenance Electrical equipment in hazardous areas.

FI
manual
Hydrocarbon gas I200 – Control and

detection and alarm monitoring system AP
system, fixed documentation
Z030 – Arrangement
AP
plan
Structural fire G060 – Structural fire

protection protection drawing AP
arrangements
External surface G200 – Fixed fire

protection water extinguishing system AP
spraying system documentation
Bunkering G200 – Fixed fire

station and fuel extinguishing system
AP
preparation room fire documentation
extinguishing system
DNV AS

Fire detection and I200 – Control and
alarm system monitoring system AP
documentation
Z030 – Arrangement
AP
plan
Fire extinguishing Z030 – Arrangement

AP
equipment, mobile plan
Inert gas system I200 – Control and

monitoring system AP
documentation
S010 - Piping diagram

AP
(PD)

1)
For generic tank type (novel design) and semi-membrane tank additional documentation requirements shall be agreed
on a case-by-case basis.
1.6.1.2 For general requirements for documentation, including definition of the Info codes, see DNV-CG-0550
Sec.6.

1.7.1 Compliance documents
1.7.1.1 Compliance documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 3.
Gas/Dual Fuel Engines PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.3.
Independent fuel tanks PC In accordance with [4].
Process pressure vessels Shall be certified as class I pressure vessels in accordance

PC
with Pt.4 Ch.7.
Pumps PC In accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7.
Compressors PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.5.
Pressure relief valves For valves with design temperature below 0°C.
PC
In accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 (irrespective of size).
Valves in fuel system For valves with design temperature below 0°C.
PC
Valves in fuel system For valves with design pressure above 10 bar.
PC
DNV AS

Valves in fuel system For valves with design pressure equal to or lower than 10
PD
bar, and design temperature equal to or above 0°C.
Expansion bellows In accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5. Product certificate

TAC
issued by Society may also be accepted in lieu of TA.
Flexible hoses with In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.6.

TAC
couplings
Fuel gas control and Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.
PC
monitoring systems
Fuel gas safety system PC Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.
Hydrocarbon gas Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.

detection and alarm PC
system, fixed
Electric motors Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used
PC
in gas supply systems and ventilation systems.
Nitrogen generators Acc. to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9 and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.13. Only
PC
applicable when redundancy is required in [5.4.3].
Nitrogen system, control Acc. to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9. Only applicable when redundancy
PC
and monitoring system is required in [5.4.4].
Nitrogen system, PD issued by manufacturer will be accepted where PxD <

membrane separation PC 1500 bar ltr.
vessel
Nitrogen systems, PD issued by manufacturer will be accepted where effect

air compressors for PC < 100 kW.
nitrogen plant
Electric motor starters Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used
PC
in gas supply systems and ventilation systems.
Energy storage devices Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used
PC
in gas supply systems.
PC = product certificate, PD = product declaration, TAC = type approval certificate

1)
Unless otherwise specified the compliance standard is the rules.
1.7.1.2 The materials used in fuel gas piping systems shall be delivered with documentation in accordance
with Table 4.
DNV AS
Table 4 Compliance documents of material quality and testing

Additional description
Compliance
Compliance Design
Object document 1) Piping Nom. Design temp.
standard Material pressure
type system Dia [°C]
[bar]
Pipes MC Pressure > 25 > 10 or < 0

(including
MD Pressure ≤ 25
secondary
enclosures) MD Open ended <0
MD Pressure ≤ 10 and ≥ 0
TR Open ended ≥0
Flanges MD Pressure
TR Open ended
Bodies of valves and MC <0

2) Steel
fittings , pump
housings, other MD
pressure containing
components not Copper
considered as MD
alloys
pressure vessels
Nuts and bolts TR Steel
MC = material certificate, MD = material declaration, TR = test report

1)
Unless otherwise specified, the compliance standard is the rules.
2)
When fittings are made from plates or pipes, the certification requirements for pipes shall be applied also for the pipe
fittings.
1.7.1.3 For general compliance documentation requirements, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.4.
1.7.1.4 For a definition of the compliance document types, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.3.
1.8 Onboard documentation

1.8.1 Contents
1.8.1.1 An operational manual shall be prepared as required by the IGF Code Ch.18.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The operation manual should include the following information:
1) Arrangement and lay-out of the gas fuel supply system, including:
— description of main components in the gas fuel supply system

— a general description of how the fuel system is intended to work
— a description of the boil off handling system if installed.
2) Description of the safety shutdown system for the gas fuel supply system, including:
— how to respond to gas leakages in:
— the fuel system

— tank connection spaces
— ESD protected machinery spaces
— how to respond to cryogenic leakages in:
— the fuel system

— how to respond to loss of ventilation in:
— the secondary enclosures in the gas fuel system

— how to respond to fire in:
— the machinery space

— on deck
— fuel preparation rooms.
3) Description of hazards in connection with inerted spaces and use of inert gas.
4) Description of bunkering operations, including:
— how to prevent overfilling of tanks

— how to control the tank pressure when bunkering
— how to prevent release of fuel gases to atmosphere
— how to gas free the bunkering system at termination of bunkering operation
— safety precautions
— cool down procedure of fuel tank.
5) Description of entry procedures for:

— GVU enclosures
— hold spaces
— other spaces where entry may constitute a hazard to the ship or personnel.
6) Procedure for emptying and gas freeing of fuel gas tanks.
7) Relevant drawings of the gas fuel installation, including:
— fuel gas piping diagram

— fuel gas system arrangement plan
— ventilation systems.
DNV AS

1.8.1.2 A plan for periodic test of all field instruments specified in these rules shall be kept on board. The
plan shall include test intervals, description of how to perform the tests and description of what to observe
during the tests.
Test intervals for shutdown inputs and outputs (as required by Table 10) shall not exceed 6 months. For other
signals the test intervals shall not exceed 12 months.
The plan may be included in the plan required for the class notation E0.
Guidance note:
See Sec.2 [1.6] for information about plan for periodic test.
1.9 Signboards
1.9.1 General
1.9.1.1 If the gas supply is shut off due to activation of an automatic valve, the gas supply shall not be
opened until the reason for the disconnection is ascertained and the necessary precautions taken. A readily
visible notice giving instruction to this effect shall be placed at the operating station for the shut-off valves in
the gas supply lines.
1.9.1.2 If a gas leak leading to a gas supply shutdown occurs, the gas fuel supply shall not be operated until
the leak has been found and dealt with. Instructions to this effect shall be placed in a prominent position in
the machinery space.
1.9.1.3 A caution placard or signboard shall be permanently fitted in the machinery space stating that heavy
lifting, implying danger of damage to the gas pipes, shall not be done when the engine(s) is running on gas.
1.9.1.4 A signboard shall be permanently fitted on hatches to gas valve unit spaces in machinery spaces
stating that the hatch shall only be opened after the gas supply system is shut down and gas free.
1.9.1.5 A signboard shall be permanently fitted on access openings to inerted spaces, warning of hazards
related to entry.
2 Materials
2.1 General
2.1.1.1 Materials shall be in accordance with the requirements in Pt.2, unless otherwise stated.
2.1.1.2 Materials used in fuel containment and fuel piping systems shall comply with the requirements in Pt.5
Ch.7 Sec.6 [1], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [2], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [3] and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [4].
For tanks containing compressed natural gas (CNG), the use of materials other than those covered by Pt.5
Ch.7 Sec.6 may be specially considered and approved by the Society.
2.1.1.3 High pressure gaseous fuel pipes shall as a minimum fulfil the requirements for pipe materials with
design temperature down to -55°C in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 4.
2.1.1.4 The secondary enclosure around high pressure gaseous fuel pipes shall as a minimum fulfil the
material requirements for pipe materials with design temperature down to -55°C Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 4.
DNV AS
2.1.1.5 The secondary enclosure around liquefied fuel pipes shall as a minimum fulfil the material

requirements for pipe materials with design temperature down to minus 165°C in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 4.
3 Ship arrangement
3.1 Ship arrangement principles

3.1.1 General principles
3.1.1.1 The fuel containment system installed in the ship shall be able to contain cryogenic leakages without
damaging other structures due to the low temperature, and to prevent gas spreading to non-hazardous
spaces.
3.1.1.2 Areas with piping systems for liquefied gas fuel shall be arranged to contain leakages without
damaging other structures due to the low temperature, and to prevent gas spreading to non-hazardous
spaces.
3.1.1.3 Areas with piping systems for gaseous fuel shall be arranged to prevent gas spreading to non-
hazardous spaces.
3.1.1.4 Where maximum probable leakage is defined in the rules, the following leakage rates shall be
considered:
Component Leakage size to be considered

2 2
0,01D² (mm ) for D ≤ 100 mm, 100 mm for D >100
Pipe
mm
Flange Blow out of gasket: π Dt/4
Bonnet failure when bolts are used for fastening: bonnet

Valve area = π DBt/4 Valve flanges to be considered under
flanges
2
Bellow Full-bore rupture: π D /4
2
Flexible hose Full-bore rupture: π D /4
D = pipe diameter, t = thickness of gasket, DB = flow diameter through bonnet
3.1.2 Location and separation of spaces, arrangement of entrances and other openings
3.1.2.1 Direct access shall not be permitted from a non-hazardous area to a hazardous area. Where such
access is necessary, an air lock shall be provided.
3.1.2.2 Mustering stations and lifesaving equipment shall not be located in hazardous areas.
3.2 Arrangement of machinery spaces

3.2.1 General
3.2.1.1 A machinery space containing gas engines shall have at least two completely independent exits. This
requirement may be waived after special consideration by the Society if the machinery space is very small.
3.2.1.2 Access to machinery spaces shall not be arranged from hazardous spaces.
DNV AS
3.2.2 ESD protected machinery spaces

3.2.2.1 In machinery spaces protected by emergency shutdown systems (ESD-protected machinery spaces),
a single failure may result in a gas release into the space. These machinery spaces are considered non-
hazardous under normal conditions, but shall have safety measures to prevent ignition if a failure in the gas
supply line leads to release of gas.
In the event of conditions involving gas hazards, the gas supply shall be automatically shut down. Shutdown
of non-safe equipment and machinery shall be automatically executed while equipment or machinery in use
or active during these conditions shall be of a certified safe type.
The ventilation of the space is designed to dilute a probable maximum gas leakage to concentrations below
the lower explosion limit of the gas and to rapidly ventilate any leaked gas out of the machinery space.
Guidance note:
Premixed engines using fuel gas mixed with air before the turbocharger shall be located in ESD protected machinery spaces.
3.2.2.2 ESD protected machinery spaces shall be designed to provide a geometrical shape that will minimize
the accumulation of gases or formation of gas pockets.
3.2.2.3 Engines used for generation of propulsion power and electric power shall be distributed in two or
more machinery spaces.
3.2.2.4 An explosion in an ESD protected machinery space shall not:

— cause damage to or disrupt the proper functioning of equipment/systems located in any space other than
that in which the incident occurs
— damage the ship in such a way that flooding of water below the main deck or any progressive flooding
occur
— damage work areas or accommodation in such a way that persons who stay in such areas under normal
operating conditions are injured
— disrupt the proper functioning of control stations and switchboard rooms necessary for power distribution
— damage life-saving equipment or associated launching arrangements
— disrupt the proper functioning of fire-fighting equipment located outside the explosion-damaged space
— affect other areas of the ship in such a way that chain reactions involving, inter alia, cargo, gas and
bunker oil may arise
— prevent persons access to life saving appliances or impede escape routes.
Unless calculations show that the strength of the room is sufficient to withstand a worst case explosion,
explosion pressure relief devices shall be arranged.
3.2.2.5 When a single bulkhead separates ESD protected machinery spaces, the bulkhead shall have
sufficient strength to withstand a gas explosion in one of the rooms. A strength standard of the bulkhead
corresponding to that of a watertight bulkhead is considered adequate.
3.2.2.6 Distribution of engines between the different machinery spaces shall be such that shutdown of fuel
supply to any one machinery space does not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
3.2.2.7 Incinerators, inert gas generators or oil fired boilers shall not be located within the ESD protected
machinery space. This space shall only contain a minimum of equipment and systems required to ensure that
the gas machinery maintains its function.
3.2.2.8 Gas detection systems shall be arranged in ESD protected machinery spaces. Upon gas detection
the safety system shall automatically shut down the gas supply (and the oil fuel supply in case of dual fuel
engines) and de-energize all non-explosion protected equipment or installations in the machinery space.
DNV AS
3.2.2.9 Unless the access to a machinery space of ESD protected type is from open deck, the entrances

shall be arranged with air lock access. Disconnection of electrical equipment upon loss of ventilation in the
ESD protected machinery space need not be arranged in the space where the access to the ESD protected
machinery space is located.
3.2.2.10 ESD protected machinery spaces shall not contain gas supply systems where the design pressure
exceeds 10 bar.
3.2.2.11 ESD protected machinery spaces shall be designed for periodically unattended operation. See Sec.2
for class notations E0 and ECO.
3.2.3 Gas safe machinery spaces

Arrangements in gas safe machinery spaces are such that the spaces are considered gas safe under all
conditions. In a gas safe machinery space a single failure will not lead to release of fuel gas into the
machinery space because all leakage sources are protected by a secondary enclosure. A gas safe machinery
space can be arranged as a conventional machinery space.
3.3 Arrangement of other spaces containing fuel systems

3.3.1 Fuel preparation rooms - General
3.3.1.1 Fuel preparation rooms shall in general be located on open deck. When an open deck location is
difficult to arrange, a location below deck may be accepted.
3.3.1.2 Where fuel preparation rooms are accepted below deck, their access shall be independent and direct
from the open deck. Where a separate access from deck is not possible, access shall be provided through an
air lock which complies with [3.4].
3.3.1.3 Unless located on open deck, fuel preparation rooms shall not be located directly above or adjacent
to machinery spaces of category A or other high fire risk areas. If cofferdams are used to obtain segregation
between fuel preparation rooms and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance of 900 mm
between bulkheads or decks. Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with such spaces shall be kept to
a minimum.
Guidance note:
Fuel preparation rooms on open deck located directly above machinery spaces of category A or other rooms with high fire risk are
expected to be specially considered in the risk assessment required by the IGF Code.
3.3.1.4 The fuel preparation room boundaries shall be gas tight towards other enclosed spaces in the ship.
3.3.1.5 Where pumps or compressors are driven by shafting passing through a bulkhead or deck for
separation purposes, gastight seals with efficient lubrication or other means of ensuring the permanence of
the gas seal shall be fitted in way of the bulkhead or deck.
3.3.2 Fuel preparation rooms containing liquefied gas
3.3.2.1 Fuel preparation rooms containing liquefied gas shall be designed to safely contain leakages of
cryogenic liquids.
3.3.2.2 The material of the boundaries of the fuel preparation room shall have a design temperature
corresponding with the lowest temperature it can be subjected to in a probable maximum leakage scenario
unless the boundaries of the space, i.e. bulkheads and decks, are provided with suitable thermal protection.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

For fuel preparation spaces on cargo vessels, alternative solutions to full cryogenic boundary protection may be accepted based on
assessments of maximum probable leakage and assessments of the safety consequences of such alternative solutions.
3.3.2.3 The fuel preparation room shall be fitted with ventilation arrangements or pressure relief devices
ensuring that the space can withstand any pressure build up caused by vaporization of the liquefied gas fuel.
These pressure relief systems shall be constructed with materials suitable for the lowest temperatures that
may arise.
3.3.2.4 The fuel preparation room shall be arranged to prevent surrounding hull structure from being
exposed to unacceptable cooling, in case of leakage of cryogenic liquids.
3.3.2.5 The fuel preparation room entrance shall be arranged with a sill height exceeding the liquid level
resulting from a calculated maximum leakage, but in no case lower than 300 mm.
3.3.2.6 A cryogenic leakage in the fuel preparation room shall not render necessary safety functions out of
order due to low temperatures.
3.3.3 Fuel preparation rooms not containing liquefied gas
3.3.3.1 Structure and supports shall be suitably shielded from leakage from flanges and valves and other
possible leakage sources in high pressure gas systems, unless the cool down effect can be shown to be
negligible.
3.3.3.2 Fuel preparation rooms for high pressure systems shall be provided with overpressure protection
to account for high pressure leakages, unless it can be demonstrated that the integrity of the space can be
maintained without such protection.
3.3.4 Tank connection spaces
3.3.4.1 Tank connection spaces shall not be located directly adjacent to machinery spaces of category
A or other rooms with high fire risk, except for fuel preparation rooms. If cofferdams are used to obtain
segregation between tank connection spaces and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance
of 900 mm between bulkheads or decks. Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with such spaces shall
be kept to a minimum. If tank connection spaces are located directly adjacent to a fuel preparation room,
A60 insulation shall be arranged for the common boundaries.
3.3.4.2 Tank connection spaces shall be able to safely contain leakages of cryogenic liquids, and arranged to
prevent the surrounding hull structure from being exposed to unacceptable cooling.
3.3.4.3 The material of the bulkheads of the tank connection space shall have a design temperature
corresponding with the lowest temperature it can be subject to in a probable maximum leakage scenario.
3.3.4.4 The tank connection space shall be fitted with ventilation arrangements or pressure relief
arrangements ensuring that the space can withstand any pressure build up caused by vaporization of the
liquefied gas fuel. These pressure relief systems shall be constructed with materials suitable for the lowest
temperatures that may arise.
3.3.4.5 Tank connection space boundaries shall be gas tight towards other enclosed spaces in the ship.
3.3.4.6 The tank connection space entrance shall be arranged with a sill height exceeding the liquid level
3.3.4.7 Unless the access to the tank connection space is independent and direct from open deck, it shall be
arranged as a bolted hatch.
DNV AS
3.3.4.8 A cryogenic leakage in the tank connection space shall not render necessary safety functions out of

order due to low temperatures.
3.3.5 Fuel storage hold spaces
3.3.5.1 Interbarrier spaces and fuel storage hold spaces associated with fuel containment systems, requiring
full or partial secondary barriers, shall be inerted with a suitable dry inert gas and kept inerted with make-up
gas provided by a shipboard inert gas generation system, or by shipboard storage, which shall be sufficient
for normal consumption for at least 30 days. Shorter periods may be considered, depending on the ship’s
service.
3.3.5.2 Alternatively, the spaces referred to in [3.3.5.1] requiring only a partial secondary barrier may be
filled with dry air provided that the ship maintains a stored charge of inert gas or is fitted with an inert gas
generation system sufficient to inert the largest of these spaces, and provided that the configuration of the
spaces and the relevant gas detection systems, together with the capability of the inerting arrangements,
ensures that any leakage from the fuel tanks will be rapidly detected and inerting effected before a
dangerous condition can develop. Equipment for the provision of sufficient dry air of suitable quality to satisfy
the expected demand shall be provided.
3.3.5.3 Spaces surrounding type C independent fuel tanks shall be filled with suitable dry air and be
maintained in this condition with dry air provided by suitable air drying equipment. This is only applicable for
fuel tanks where condensation and icing due to cold surfaces is an issue.
3.3.5.4 Unless the access to interbarrier spaces and hold spaces, associated with fuel containment systems
requiring full or partial secondary barriers is independent and direct from open deck, it shall be arranged as a
bolted hatch. The access shall be from the top of the tank hold space.
3.3.5.5 Access to inerted spaces shall be through a bolted hatch. Alternative arrangements giving equivalent
protection against unintended entry by personnel may be accepted. It shall be ensured that leakages of inert
gas to adjacent spaces from access openings, bulkhead penetrations or other potential leakage sources are
prevented.
3.3.5.6 Fuel storage hold spaces shall not be used for other purposes.
3.3.6 Fuel bunkering stations
3.3.6.1 The bunkering station shall be so located that sufficient natural ventilation is provided. Closed or
semi-enclosed bunkering stations will be subject to special consideration. Depending on the arrangement this
may include:
— segregation towards other areas on the ship
— hazardous area plans for the ship
— requirements for forced ventilation
— requirements for leakage detection (gas detection, low temperature detection)
— safety actions related to leakage detection (gas detection, low temperature detection)
— access to bunkering station from non-hazardous areas through air locks
— monitoring of bunkering station by direct line of sight or closed circuit television (CCTV).
3.3.6.2 Drip trays shall be fitted below bunkering connections and where leakage may occur which can cause
damage to the ship structure or where limitation of the area which is effected from a spill is necessary. Each
drip tray shall be:
— made of suitable material to hold spills (e.g. stainless steel)
— thermally insulated from the ship’s structure
— fitted with a drain valve to enable rain water to be drained over the ship’s side
— of sufficient capacity to handle reasonably foreseeable spills.
DNV AS
3.3.6.3 For CNG bunkering stations, low temperature steel shielding shall be provided to prevent the possible

escape of cold jets impinging on surrounding hull structure.
3.3.7 Gas valve unit spaces
3.3.7.1 A gas valve unit space located in the machinery space is considered to be part of the secondary
enclosure for gas supply pipes. When such a space is arranged as a room, the access shall be via a bolted
hatch.
3.3.7.2 The gas valve unit space shall only be entered after the gas supply system is shut down and gas free.
The hatch shall be fitted with a signboard to this effect.
3.3.7.3 Gas valve unit spaces for high pressure systems shall be provided with overpressure protection to
account for high pressure leakages, unless it can be demonstrated that the integrity of the space can be
3.4 Arrangement of air locks

3.4.1 General
3.4.1.1 An air lock is a space enclosed by gastight bulkheads with two substantially gastight doors spaced
at least 1.5 m and not more than 2.5 m apart. The doors shall be self-closing without any holding back
arrangements.
3.4.1.2 Air locks shall be mechanically ventilated at an overpressure relative to the adjacent hazardous area
or space. The ventilation inlets and outlets for air locks shall be located in open air.
3.4.1.3 Air locks shall have a simple geometrical form. They shall provide free and easy passage, and shall
2
have a deck area not less than about 1.5 m . Air locks shall not be used for other purposes, for instance as
store rooms.
3.4.2 Air lock monitoring and safety action
3.4.2.1 An audible and visual alarm system to give a warning on both sides of the air lock shall be provided
to indicate if more than one door is moved from the closed position.
3.4.2.2 The air lock space shall be monitored for flammable gas.
3.4.2.3 For non-hazardous spaces with access from hazardous open deck where the access is protected by
an air lock, electrical equipment which is not of the certified safe type shall be de-energized upon loss of
overpressure in the space.
3.4.2.4 For non-hazardous spaces with access from hazardous spaces, where the access is protected by an
air lock, electrical equipment which is not of the certified safe type shall be de-energized upon loss of under-
pressure in the hazardous space.
3.4.2.5 Access to the hazardous space shall be restricted until the ventilation has been reinstated. Audible
and visual alarms shall be given at a manned location to indicate both, loss of pressure and opening of the air
lock doors when pressure is lost.
3.4.2.6 Electrical equipment of the certified safe type need not to be de-energized.
3.4.2.7 Electrical equipment needed for maintaining ship main functions or safety functions shall not be
located in spaces protected by air locks, unless the equipment is of certified safe type.
DNV AS
4 Fuel containment systems
4.1 General
4.1.1 Design principles
4.1.1.1 Fuel containment systems shall be located in such a way that the risk of excessive heat input from a
fire is minimized.
4.1.1.2 Fuel containment systems shall be located and arranged in such a way that the risk of mechanical
damage from ship operations, cargo operations and green seas is minimized, either by locating the fuel tanks
away from such hazards, or by providing mechanical protection.
4.1.1.3 Fuel containment systems shall be located in such a way that the risk of mechanical damage from
explosions is minimized, either by locating the fuel tanks away from areas of explosion risks by providing
mechanical protection, or by reducing the risk of explosions.
4.1.1.4 Fuel containment systems shall be designed and arranged not to cause damage to other structures
due to low temperature leakages.
4.1.1.5 Fuel containment systems on open deck shall be designed and arranged to minimize, as far as
practicable, the extent of hazardous areas and potential sources of release.
4.1.1.6 When fuel is carried in a fuel containment system requiring a complete or partial secondary barrier:
— fuel storage hold spaces shall be segregated from the sea by a double bottom; and
— the ship shall also have a longitudinal bulkhead forming side tanks.
4.1.2 Tank access
4.1.2.1 It shall be possible to empty, inert and gas free fuel tanks and associated fuel piping systems.
Procedures shall be developed in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9.
4.1.2.2 Access for external inspection of fuel tanks shall be provided in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.3 [5].
4.1.2.3 Access for internal inspection of fuel tanks shall be provided, except for vacuum insulated type C
tanks which may be accepted without access openings.
4.2 Location of fuel containment system

4.2.1 The fuel tank(s) shall be protected from external damage caused by collision or grounding in the
following way:
1) The fuel tanks shall be located at a minimum distance of B/5 or 11.5 m, whichever is less, measured
inboard from the ship side at right angles to the centerline at the level of the summer load line draught
where:
B is the greatest moulded breadth of the ship at or below the deepest draught (summer load line
draught), see SOLAS regulation II-1/2.8.
2) The boundaries of each fuel tank shall be taken as the extreme outer longitudinal, transverse and
vertical limits of the tank structure including its tank valves.
3) For independent tanks the protective distance shall be measured to the tank shell (the primary barrier
of the tank containment system). For membrane tanks the distance shall be measured to the bulkheads
surrounding the tank insulation.
DNV AS
4) In no case shall the boundary of the fuel tank be located closer to the shell plating or aft terminal of the

ship than as follows:
1) For passenger ships: B/10, but in no case less than 0.8 m. However, this distance need not be
greater than B/15 or 2 m whichever is less where the shell plating is located inboard of B/5 or 11.5
m, whichever is less, as required by Sec.14 [4.2.1.1] 1).
2) For cargo ships:
3
1) for VC below or equal 1000 m , 0.8 m
3 3
2) for 1,000 m VC 5,000 m , 0.75 + VC x 0.2/4,000 m
3 3
3) for 5,000 m VC 30,000 m , 0.8 + VC/25,000 m
3
4) for VC 30,000 m , 2 m
where:
VC corresponds to 100% of the gross design volume of the individual fuel tank at 20°C,
including domes and appendages.
5) The lowermost boundary of the fuel tank(s) shall be located above the minimum distance of B/15 or 2.0
m, whichever is less, measured from the moulded line of the bottom shell plating at the centerline.
6) For multihull ships the value of B may be specially considered.
7) The fuel tank(s) shall be abaft a transverse plane at 0.08L measured from the forward perpendicular
in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-1/8.1 for passenger ships, and abaft the collision bulkhead for
cargo ships
where:
L is the length as defined in the International Convention on Load Lines, see SOLAS regulation II-1/2.5.
4.2.2 As an alternative to [4.2.1], the following calculation method may be used to determine the acceptable
location of the fuel tanks:
1) The value fCN calculated as described in the following shall be less than 0.02 for passenger ships and
0.04 for cargo ships.
Guidance note:
The value fCN accounts for collision damages that may occur within a zone limited by the longitudinal projected boundaries
of the fuel tank only, and may not be considered or used as the probability for the fuel tank to become damaged given a
collision. The real probability will be higher when accounting for longer damages that include zones forward and aft of the
fuel tank.
2) The fCN is calculated by the following formulation:
fCN = fI x ft x fV
where:
fI is calculated by use of the formulations for factor p contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-1.1.1.1.
ft is calculated by use of the formulations for factor r contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-1.1.2, and
reflects the probability that the damage penetrates beyond the outer boundary of the fuel tank. The
value of x1 shall correspond to the distance from the aft terminal to the aftmost boundary of the fuel
DNV AS
tank and the value of x2 shall correspond to the distance from the aft terminal to the foremost boundary

of the fuel tank. The formulation is:
ft = 1 - r(x1,x2,b)
Guidance note:
When the outermost boundary of the fuel tank is outside the boundary given by the deepest subdivision waterline the value
of b should be taken as 0.
fV is calculated by use of the formulations for factor v contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-2.6.1.1 and
reflects the probability that the damage is not extending vertically above the lowermost boundary of the
fuel tank. The formulations to be used are:
fV = 1.0 - 0.8 · ((H - d)/7.8), if (H - d) is less than or equal to 7.8 m. fV shall not be taken greater than
1,
fV = 0.2 · ((H - d) - 7.8)/4.7, in all other cases fV shall not be taken less than 0
where:
H is the distance from baseline, in metre, to the lowermost boundary of the fuel tank and
d is the deepest draught (summer load line draught).
1) For passenger ships: B/10 but in no case less than 0.8 m. However, this distance need not be
m, whichever is less, as required by Sec.14 [4.2.1.1].
2) For cargo ships:
3
1) for VC below or equal 1000 m , 0.8 m
3 3
2) for 1000 m VC 5000 m , 0.75 + VC x 0.2/4000 m
3 3
3) for 5000 m VC 30 000 m , 0.8 + VC/25 000 m
3
4) for VC 30 000 m , 2 m
where:
6) In case of more than one non-overlapping fuel tank located in the longitudinal direction, fCN shall be
calculated in accordance with paragraph Sec.14 [4.2.1.2] 2) for each fuel tank separately. The value
used for the complete fuel tank arrangement is the sum of all values for fCN obtained for each separate
tank.
7) In case the fuel tank arrangement is unsymmetrical about the centerline of the ship, the calculations
of fCN shall be calculated on both starboard and port side and the average value shall be used for the
assessment. The minimum distance as set forth in paragraph Sec.14 [4.2.1.2] 5) shall be met on both
sides.
4.3 Liquefied gas fuel tanks

4.3.1 General
4.3.1.1 Fuel tanks for liquefied gas shall be fitted with efficient insulation.
DNV AS
4.3.1.2 Natural gas in a liquefied state may be stored with a maximum allowable relief valve setting (MARVS)

of up to 10 barg. The maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of the gas tank shall not exceed 90 per
cent of the MARVS.
4.3.1.3 Fuel tanks for liquefied gas shall be independent tanks or membrane tanks designed in accordance
with applicable parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4, Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.20 to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.24, unless covered by this section.
Guidance note:
References given to the international certificate of fitness for the carriage of liquefied gases in bulk in Pt.5 Ch.7 are not applicable
for fuel containment systems
4.3.1.4 The design life of fixed liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall not be less than the design life of
the ship or 25 years, whichever is greater.
4.3.1.5 Liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall be designed in accordance with North Atlantic
environmental conditions and relevant long-term sea state scatter diagrams for unrestricted navigation.
Less demanding environmental conditions, consistent with the expected usage, may be accepted by the
Society for liquefied gas fuel containment systems used exclusively for restricted navigation. More demanding
environmental conditions may be required for liquefied gas fuel containment systems operated in conditions
more severe than the North Atlantic environment.
4.3.1.6 The liquefied gas fuel containment system structural strength shall be assessed against failure
modes, including but not limited to plastic deformation, buckling and fatigue. The specific design conditions
that shall be considered for the design of each liquefied gas fuel containment system are given in Pt.5 Ch.7
Sec.20 to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.24.
4.3.1.7 There are three main categories of design conditions:

a) Ultimate design conditions – the liquefied gas fuel containment system structure and its structural
components shall withstand loads liable to occur during its construction, testing and anticipated use in
service, without loss of structural integrity. The design shall take into account proper combinations of the
following loads:
— internal pressure
— external pressure
— dynamic loads due to the motion of the ship in all loading conditions
— thermal loads
— sloshing loads
— loads corresponding to ship deflections
— tank and liquefied gas fuel weight with the corresponding reaction in way of supports
— insulation weight
— loads in way of towers and other attachments
— test loads.
b) Fatigue design conditions – the liquefied gas fuel containment system structure and its structural
components shall not fail under accumulated cyclic loading.
DNV AS
c) Accidental design conditions – the liquefied gas fuel containment system shall meet each of the following

accident design conditions (accidental or abnormal events), addressed in these rules:
— collision – the liquefied gas fuel containment system shall withstand the collision loads specified in
[4.3.9.3] without deformation of the supports, or the tank structure in way of the supports likely to
endanger the tank and its supporting structure.
— fire – the liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall sustain without rupture the rise in internal
pressure specified in [5.2.3] under the fire scenarios envisaged therein.
— flooded compartment causing buoyancy on tank – the anti-flotation arrangements shall sustain the
upward force, specified in [4.3.9.3] and there shall be no endangering plastic deformation to the hull.
Plastic deformation may occur in the fuel containment system provided it does not endanger the safe
evacuation of the ship.
4.3.1.8 Measures shall be applied to ensure that scantlings required meet the structural strength provisions
and are maintained throughout the design life. Measures may include, but are not limited to, material
selection, coatings, corrosion additions, cathodic protection and inerting.
4.3.1.9 An inspection/survey plan for the liquefied gas fuel containment system shall be developed and
approved by the Society. The inspection/survey plan shall identify aspects to be examined and/or validated
during surveys throughout the liquefied gas fuel containment system's life and, in particular, any necessary
in-service survey, maintenance and testing that was assumed when selecting liquefied gas fuel containment
system design parameters. The inspection/survey plan may include specific critical locations as per Pt.5 Ch.7
Sec.4 [4.3.3].
4.3.1.10 Liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall be designed, constructed and equipped to provide
adequate means of access to areas that need inspection as specified in the inspection/survey plan. Liquefied
gas fuel containment systems, including all associated internal equipment shall be designed and built to
ensure safety during operations, inspection and maintenance.
4.3.2 Liquefied gas fuel containment safety principles
4.3.2.1 The containment systems shall be provided with a complete secondary liquid-tight barrier capable
of safely containing all potential leakages through the primary barrier and, in conjunction with the thermal
insulation system, also capable of preventing lowering of the temperature of the ship structure to an unsafe
level.
4.3.2.2 The size and configuration or arrangement of the secondary barrier may be reduced or omitted where
an equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated in accordance with [4.3.2.3] and [4.3.2.4], as applicable.
4.3.2.3 Liquefied gas fuel containment systems, for which the probability for structural failures to develop
into a critical state has been determined to be extremely low, but where the possibility of leakages through
the primary barrier cannot be excluded, shall be equipped with a partial secondary barrier and small leak
protection system capable of safely handling and disposing of the leakages (a critical state means that the
crack develops into unstable condition).
The arrangements shall comply with the following:
1) failure developments that can be reliably detected before reaching a critical state (e.g. by gas detection
or inspection) shall have a sufficiently long development time for remedial actions to be taken
2) failure developments that cannot be safely detected before reaching a critical state shall have a predicted
development time that is much longer than the expected lifetime of the tank.
4.3.2.4 No secondary barrier is required for liquefied gas fuel containment systems, e.g. type C independent
tanks, where the probability for structural failures and leakages through the primary barrier is extremely low
and can be neglected.
DNV AS
4.3.2.5 For independent tanks requiring full or partial secondary barrier, means for safely disposing of

leakages from the tank shall be arranged.
4.3.3 Secondary barriers in relation to tank types

Secondary barriers in relation to the tank types defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.20 to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.23 shall be
provided in accordance with Table 5.
Table 5 Secondary barrier requirements for tanks
Basic tank type Secondary barrier requirements
Membrane tank Complete secondary barrier
Type A Complete secondary barrier
Type B Partial secondary barrier
Type C No secondary barrier required
4.3.4 Design of secondary barriers
4.3.4.1 The location of a containment system using hull structure as secondary barrier shall be specially
considered in conjunction with surrounding spaces.
4.3.4.2 The design of the secondary barrier, including spray shield if fitted, shall be such that:
1) it is capable of containing any envisaged leakage of liquefied gas fuel for a period of 15 days unless
different criteria apply for particular voyages, taking into account the load spectrum referred to in Pt.5
Ch.7 Sec.4 [4.3.3]
2) physical, mechanical or operational events within the liquefied gas fuel tank that could cause failure of
the primary barrier shall not impair the due function of the secondary barrier, or vice versa
3) failure of a support or an attachment to the hull structure will not lead to loss of liquid tightness of both
the primary and secondary barriers
4) it is capable of being periodically checked for its effectiveness by means of a visual inspection or other
suitable means acceptable to the Society
5) the methods required in [4.3.4.2] 4) shall be approved by the Society and shall include, as a minimum:
— details on the size of defect acceptable and the location within the secondary barrier, before its liquid
tight effectiveness is compromised
— accuracy and range of values of the proposed method for detecting defects in 4) above
— scaling factors to be used in determining the acceptance criteria if full scale model testing is not
undertaken
— effects of thermal and mechanical cyclic loading on the effectiveness of the proposed test
6) the secondary barrier shall fulfil its functional requirements at a static angle of heel of 30°.
4.3.5 Partial secondary barriers and primary barrier small leak protection system
4.3.5.1 Partial secondary barriers as permitted in [4.3.2.3] shall be used with a small leak protection system
and meet all the regulations in [4.3.4].
The small leak protection system shall include means to detect a leak in the primary barrier, provision such
as a spray shield to deflect any liquefied gas fuel down into the partial secondary barrier, and means to
dispose of the liquid, which may be by natural evaporation.
4.3.5.2 The capacity of the partial secondary barrier shall be determined, based on the liquefied gas fuel
leakage corresponding to the extent of failure resulting from the load spectrum referred to in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4
[4.3.3], after the initial detection of a primary leak. Due account may be taken of liquid evaporation, rate of
leakage, pumping capacity and other relevant factors.
DNV AS
4.3.5.3 The required liquid leakage detection shall be by means of liquid sensors, or by an effective use of

pressure, temperature or gas detection systems, or any combination thereof.
4.3.5.4 For independent tanks for which the geometry does not present obvious locations for leakage to
collect, the partial secondary barrier shall also fulfil its functional requirements at a nominal static angle of
trim.
4.3.6 Supporting arrangements
4.3.6.1 Supporting arrangements are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.6].
4.3.7 Associated structure and equipment
4.3.7.1 Associated structure and equipment are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.7].
4.3.8 Thermal insulation
4.3.8.1 Thermal insulation is defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.8].
4.3.9 Design loads
4.3.9.1 Design loads are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [3.1] to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [3.5], except as indicated in
[4.3.9.2] and [4.3.9.3].
4.3.9.2 Environmental loads are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [3.4]; in addition the following loads shall be
considered:
— Green sea loading - account shall be taken to loads due to water on deck.
— Wind loads - account shall be taken to wind generated loads as relevant.
4.3.9.3 Accidental loads are defined as loads that are imposed on a liquefied gas fuel containment system
and it's supporting arrangements under abnormal and unplanned conditions.
a) Collision loads
The collision load shall be determined based on the fuel containment system under fully loaded condition
with an inertial force corresponding to the design accelerationa in Table 6 in forward direction and a/2 in
the aft direction, where g is gravitational acceleration.
Table 6 Design acceleration
Ship length (L) Design acceleration (a)
L > 100 m 0.5 g
60 < L ≤ 100 m
L ≤ 60 m 2g
Special consideration should be given to ships with Froude number (Fn) > 0.4.
b) Loads due to flooding on ship
For independent tanks, loads caused by the buoyancy of a fully submerged empty tank shall be
considered in the design of anti-flotation chocks and the supporting hull structure in both the adjacent
hull and tank structure.

Structural integrity is defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [4.1].
DNV AS
4.3.11 Structural analyses

Structural analyses are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [4.2].
4.3.12 Design conditions

Design conditions are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [4.3].
4.3.13 Materials and construction
4.3.13.1 To determine the material grade of plate and sections used in the hull structure, a temperature
calculation shall be performed for all tank types. The following assumptions shall be made in this calculation:
1) The primary barrier of all tanks shall be assumed to be at the liquefied gas fuel temperature.
2) In addition to 1) above, where a complete or partial secondary barrier is required it shall be assumed to
be at the liquefied gas fuel temperature at atmospheric pressure for any one tank only.
3) For worldwide service, ambient temperatures shall be taken as 5°C for air and 0°C for seawater. Higher
values may be accepted for ships operating in restricted areas and conversely, lower values may be
imposed by the Society for ships trading to areas where lower temperatures are expected during the
winter months.
4) Still air and sea water conditions shall be assumed, i.e. no adjustment for forced convection.
5) Degradation of the thermal insulation properties over the life of the ship due to factors such as thermal
and mechanical ageing, compaction, ship motions and tank vibrations as defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4
[5.1.4] .6 and .7 shall be assumed.
6) The cooling effect of the rising boil-off vapour from the leaked liquefied gas fuel shall be taken into
account where applicable.
7) No credit shall be given for any means of heating, unless specially considered by the Society.
8) For members connecting inner and outer hulls, the mean temperature may be taken for determining the
steel grade.
9) Vacuum insulated tanks and their supporting structures shall be designed to withstand the temperatures
that may arise as a result of loss of insulating vacuum between the inner and outer tank.
4.3.13.2 The materials of all hull structures for which the calculated temperature in the design condition is
below 0°C, due to the influence of liquefied gas fuel temperature, shall be in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6
Table 5 (footnote 3 covering deck and shell plating and all stiffeners attached thereto is not applicable). This
includes hull structure supporting the liquefied gas fuel tanks, inner bottom plating, longitudinal bulkhead
plating, transverse bulkhead plating, floors, webs, stringers and all attached stiffening members.
4.3.13.3 Materials of primary and secondary barriers are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [5.1.3].
4.3.13.4 Thermal insulation and other materials used in liquefied gas fuel containment systems are defined in
Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [5.1.4].
4.3.14 Construction processes

Construction processes are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [5.2].
4.3.15 Tank types
4.3.15.1 Type A independent tanks are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.20.
4.3.15.2 Type B independent tanks are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.20 and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.21.
4.3.15.3 Type C independent tanks are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.22.

In addition, requirements below for fatigue design condition apply:
— For type C independent tanks where the liquefied gas fuel at atmospheric pressure is below minus 55°C,
the Society may require additional verification to check compliance with design basis for C type tanks as
DNV AS
defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.22 [1.1.1], regarding static and dynamic stress depending on the configuration of

the tank and arrangement of its supports and attachments.
— For vacuum insulated tanks special attention shall be made to the fatigue strength of the support design
and special considerations shall also be made to the limited inspection possibilities between the inside and
outer shell.
The fatigue strength assessment shall be carried out in accordance with DNV-CG-0129 and/or DNV-RP-C203.
4.3.15.4 Membrane tanks are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.23.
4.3.16 Additional requirements for vacuum insulated tanks
4.3.16.1 Vacuum insulated type C independent tanks shall have an outer shell that is able to function as
a secondary barrier against leakages from pipes releasing gaseous fuel in case of leakage, to compensate
for not having closable tank valves at the tank boundary. The outer shell shall be able to withstand the
temperatures and the pressure build-up due to gaseous pipe leakages.
4.3.16.2 Pipes releasing liquefied fuel in case of leakage shall be protected by a secondary enclosure up to
the first valve. The secondary enclosure shall be able to withstand the pressure build-up due to evaporating
liquefied fuel, but the design pressure shall be not less than the design pressure of the inner tank. Leakage
detection shall be provided for both the inner pipe and the secondary enclosure.
4.3.16.3 Pipes in the vacuum space shall have no branch connections.
4.3.16.4 Pipes and secondary enclosures in the vacuum space shall be fully welded.
4.3.16.5 A pipe stress analysis is required for the pipes and the secondary enclosures in the vacuum space.
4.3.16.6 Pipe routing shall compensate for expansion and contractions due to changes in temperature. The
use of expansion elements is not accepted for this purpose.
4.3.16.7 Vacuum insulated type C independent tanks shall have their vacuum space protected by a pressure
relief device connected to a vent system discharging to a safe location in open air. For tanks on open deck, a
direct release into the atmosphere may be accepted.
4.3.16.8 Alternatives to having an outer shell secondary barrier as required by [4.3.16.1] might be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Alternative solutions shall as a minimum provide the following:
— Secondary enclosures as required by [4.3.16.2] shall be provided also for pipes in the vacuum space
releasing gaseous fuel in case of leakage.
— The outer shell and the support structure shall be made from material with a design temperature
corresponding to the equilibrium temperature resulting from a loss of vacuum between inner and outer
tank.
— Any part of the outer tank shell having common boundaries with a tank connection space shall be made of
material resistant to cryogenic temperatures.
4.3.17 Limit state design for novel concepts

Limit state design for novel concepts is defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.24.
4.4 Compressed gas fuel tanks

4.4.1 General
4.4.1.1 Tanks for compressed natural gas (CNG) shall be certified as class I pressure vessels in accordance
with Pt.4 Ch.7. Alternatively, they may be certified based on relevant requirements in Pt.5 Ch.8.
DNV AS
4.4.1.2 Tanks for CNG shall be fitted with pressure relief valves with a set point below the design pressure of

the tank and with outlet located as required in [5.2].
4.4.1.3 Adequate means shall be provided to depressurize the tank in case of a fire which can affect the
tank.
4.5 Portable liquefied gas fuel tanks

4.5.1 General
4.5.1.1 Portable fuel tanks shall be certified by the Society and comply with the requirements for type C
tanks in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.22. The tank support (container frame or truck chassis) shall be designed for the
intended purpose.
4.5.1.2 The design life of portable fuel tanks shall not be less than 20 years.
4.5.1.3 Fuel systems utilising portable fuel tanks shall have equivalent safety compared to permanent fuel
tanks.
4.5.1.4 Portable fuel tanks shall be located in dedicated areas fitted with:
— mechanical protection of the tanks depending on location and cargo operations
— spill protection and water spray systems for cooling if located on open deck.
If the tanks are located in an enclosed space, the space shall be considered as a tank connection space.
4.5.1.5 Portable fuel tanks shall be secured to the deck while connected to the ship systems. The
arrangement for supporting and fixing the tanks shall be designed for the maximum expected static and
dynamic inclinations, as well as the maximum expected values of acceleration, taking into account the ship
characteristics and the position of the tanks.
4.5.1.6 Connections to the ship piping systems shall be made by means of approved flexible hoses or other
suitable means designed to provide sufficient flexibility.
4.5.1.7 Arrangements shall be provided to limit the quantity of fuel spilled in case of inadvertent
disconnection or rupture of the non-permanent connections.
4.5.1.8 The pressure relief system of portable tanks for liquefied gas shall be connected to a fixed venting
system.
4.5.1.9 Control and monitoring systems for portable gas fuel tanks shall be integrated in the ship's gas
control and monitoring system. Safety system for portable gas fuel tanks shall be integrated in the ship's gas
safety system (e.g. shutdown systems for tank valves, leak/gas detection systems).
4.5.1.10 Safe access to tank connections for the purpose of inspection and maintenance shall be ensured.
4.5.1.11 After connection to the ship’s fuel piping system:

— each portable tank shall be capable of being isolated at any time, with the exception of the pressure relief
system
— isolation of one tank shall not impair the availability of the remaining portable tanks
— the tank shall not exceed its maximum filling limits
— the tank shall not exceed its maximum filling limits.
DNV AS
4.6 Loading limit for liquefied gas fuel tanks
4.6.1 Loading limit curve
4.6.1.1 Fuel tanks for liquefied gas shall not be filled to more than a volume equivalent to 98% full at the
reference temperature as defined in [1.5.1].
A loading limit curve for actual fuel loading temperatures shall be prepared from the following formula:
LL = FL ρR/ρL
where:
LL = loading limit as defined in [1.5.1], expressed in per cent

FL = filling limit as defined in [1.5.1] expressed in per cent, here 98%
ρR = relative density of fuel at the reference temperature
ρL = relative density of fuel at the loading temperature.
4.6.1.2 In cases where the tank insulation and tank location make the probability very small for the tank
contents to be heated up, due to an external fire, special considerations may be made to allow a higher
loading limit than calculated using the reference temperature, but never above 95%.
Guidance note:
The higher loading limit option is understood to be an alternative to [4.6.1.1] and should only be applicable when the calculated
loading limit using the formulae in [4.6.1.1] gives a lower value than 95%.
4.7 Maintenance of fuel storage condition

4.7.1 Control of tank pressure and temperature
4.7.1.1 Means shall be provided to keep the fuel tank pressure and temperature within their design range at
all times including after activation of the safety system required by these rules. Systems and arrangements
to be used for this purpose may include one, or a combination of, the following:
— energy consumption by the ship (engines, gas turbines, boilers, etc.)
— re-liquefaction
— thermal oxidation of vapours (gas combustion unit)
— pressure accumulation.
4.7.1.2 The method chosen shall be capable of maintaining tank pressure below the set pressure of the tank
for a period of 15 days, assuming full tank at normal service pressure and the ship in idle condition, i.e. only
power for domestic load is generated.
4.7.1.3 The overall capacity of the system shall be such that it can control the pressure within the design
conditions without venting to atmosphere. Venting of fuel vapour for control of the tank pressure is not
acceptable, except in emergency situations.
Guidance note:
The activation of the safety system alone is not deemed as an emergency situation.
DNV AS
4.7.1.4 If a re-liquefaction system produces a waste stream containing methane during pressure control

operations within the design conditions, these waste gases shall, as far as reasonably practicable, be
disposed of without venting to atmosphere.
4.7.1.5 Refrigerants or auxiliary agents used for refrigeration or cooling of fuel shall be compatible with
the fuel they may come in contact with (i.e. not causing any hazardous reaction or excessively corrosive
products). In addition, when several refrigerants or agents are used, these shall be compatible with each
other.
4.7.1.6 The availability of the system and its supporting auxiliary services shall be such that in case of a
single failure, the fuel tank pressure and temperature can be maintained within the design range.
4.7.1.7 Heat exchangers that are solely necessary for maintaining the pressure and temperature of the
gas fuel tanks, within their design ranges, shall have a standby heat exchanger, unless the installed heat
exchangers have a capacity in excess of 25% of the largest required capacity for pressure control, and they
can be repaired on board without external resources.
4.8 Requirements depending on fuel tank location

4.8.1 Fuel tanks located in enclosed spaces
4.8.1.1 Tanks for liquefied fuel with a design pressure of 10 bar or less may be stored in enclosed spaces in
accordance with these rules. Compressed gas shall not be stored below deck, but this may be accepted on
case-by-case basis.
4.8.1.2 A fuel gas containment system located in enclosed spaces shall be gas tight towards adjacent
spaces. For fuel gas containment systems where leakage through the primary barrier is part of the design
assumptions, the gas tight barrier will be the secondary barrier, or in case of partial secondary barriers, be
the fuel storage hold space.
4.8.1.3 Fuel tank connections, flanges and tank valves shall be located in a tank connection space designed
to safely contain leakages of cryogenic liquids.
4.8.1.4 The space containing fuel containment systems shall be separated from the machinery spaces of
category A or other rooms with high fire risks. The separation shall be done by a cofferdam of at least 900
mm with fire insulation as required in [7].
4.8.1.5 For type C fuel tanks, the fuel storage hold space may act as the protective cofferdam if the bulkhead
is at least 900 mm from the outer shell of the tank. This can however not be applied to tanks located directly
above machinery spaces of category A or other rooms with high fire risk.
4.8.1.6 Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with engine rooms or high fire risk areas shall kept to a
minimum.
4.8.2 Fuel tanks not located in enclosed spaces
4.8.2.1 For fuel tanks not located in enclosed spaces, tank connection spaces need not be arranged if other
measures are in place to fulfil the functional requirements in [4.1.1] and [5.1.1].
Guidance note:
A tank connection space may be required also for tanks on open deck. This may apply for ships were restriction of hazardous areas
is safety critical. A tank connection space may also be necessary in order to provide environmental protection for essential safety
equipment related to the gas fuel system like tank valves, safety valves and instrumentation.
DNV AS
4.8.2.2 If drip trays are used to protect the ship structure from leakages at the tank connections, the

material of drip trays shall have a design temperature corresponding to the temperature of the fuel carried
at atmospheric pressure. Drip trays shall be thermally insulated from the ship’s structure to prevent
unacceptable cooling in case of leakage of liquefied gas.
5 Piping systems
5.1 General
5.1.1.1 Fuel piping systems shall be located in such a way that the risk of mechanical damage from ship
operations, cargo operations and green seas is minimized, either by locating the fuel piping systems away
from such hazards, or by providing mechanical protection.
5.1.1.2 Leakages in the fuel piping system shall not cause damage to other structures due to the low
temperature, and the design shall prevent gas spreading to non-hazardous spaces.
5.1.1.3 Fuel piping systems shall be designed and arranged to minimize as far as practicable the extent of
hazardous areas and potential sources of release.
5.1.1.4 It shall be possible to detect leakages in a fuel piping system, and automatically isolate the leakage
from the source.
5.1.1.5 It shall be possible to automatically isolate the piping systems for fuel at the tank boundary.
5.1.2 Fuel piping system configuration
5.1.2.1 The propulsion and fuel supply system shall be so designed that any safety actions required by these
rules do not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
5.1.2.2 For engines using gas as the only fuel, the fuel supply system shall be arranged with redundancy and
segregation all the way from the gas tank to the consumer. A leakage in the fuel supply system with following
necessary safety actions shall not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
5.1.2.3 For engines using gas as the only fuel, the fuel storage shall be divided between two or more tanks,
including separate secondary barriers when required. If fuel tanks of type C are used, one tank may be
accepted if two completely separate tank connection spaces are installed for the one tank.
5.1.2.4 For non-conventional gas fuelled propulsion machinery arrangements, an FMEA shall be made
covering any single failure in active components or systems, see Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.3 [3.2].
Guidance note:
Non-conventional in this respect implies machinery arrangement where the propulsion machinery is based on other redundancy
principles than duplication of the propulsion line with separate gas supply systems.
The requirement does in general not apply to dual-fuel engines.
5.1.3 Piping design and arrangement
5.1.3.1 Piping in the fuel system shall comply with the applicable parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [11] unless
covered by this section.
DNV AS
5.1.3.2 ESD valves for tank connections and their actuators located on open deck without being installed

inside a tank connection space, shall be made of materials with melting point above 925°C.
5.1.3.3 Gas supply systems shall have a design pressure not less than 10 bar.
5.1.3.4 Bunkering lines shall have a design pressure not less than 20 bar.
Guidance note:
Lower design pressures may be accepted if delivery facilities are equipped with means which can guarantee a lower maximum
possible delivery pressure, which will be put forth as a requirement in the bunkering procedures.
5.1.3.5 Tank connections shall be located above the highest liquid level in the tank. Connections below the
highest liquid level may be accepted for fuel tanks of type C.
5.1.3.6 Low temperature piping shall be thermally insulated from the adjacent hull structure, where
necessary, to prevent the temperature of the hull from falling below the design temperature of the hull
material.
5.1.3.7 Piping in the fuel system shall not be located less than 800 mm from the ship's side.
5.1.3.8 Fuel piping including vent lines shall not be routed through tanks.
5.1.3.9 Fuel piping shall not be led directly through accommodation spaces, service spaces, electrical
equipment rooms or control stations as defined in the SOLAS Convention.
5.1.3.10 Gas fuel piping in ESD protected machinery spaces shall be located as far as practicable from the
electrical installations and tanks containing flammable liquids.
5.1.3.11 Gas fuel piping in ESD protected machinery spaces shall be protected against mechanical damage.
5.1.3.12 Fuel piping shall be capable of absorbing thermal expansion or contraction caused by extreme
temperatures of the fuel without developing substantial stresses.
5.1.3.13 Provision shall be made to protect the piping, piping system and components and fuel tanks from
excessive stresses due to thermal movement and from movements of the tank and hull structure.
5.1.3.14 The arrangement and installation of fuel piping shall provide the necessary flexibility to maintain the
integrity of the piping system in the actual service situations, taking potential for fatigue into account.
5.1.3.15 If the fuel gas contains heavier constituents that may condense in the system, means for safely
removing the liquid shall be fitted.
5.1.3.16 High pressure gas piping systems shall have sufficient constructive strength. This shall be confirmed
by carrying out stress analysis and taking into account:
— stresses due to the weight of the piping system
— acceleration loads when significant
— internal pressure and loads induced by hog and sag of the ship.
Guidance note:
Significant acceleration loads is in this context acceleration loads that give a stress equal to more than 20% of the stress from the
internal pressure in the pipe.
DNV AS
5.1.3.17 When the design temperature is minus 110°C or colder, a complete stress analysis, taking into

account all the stresses due to weight of pipes, including acceleration loads if significant, internal pressure,
thermal contraction and loads induced by hog and sag of the ship shall be carried out for each branch of the
piping system.
5.1.3.18 High-pressure gas lines shall be installed and protected so as to minimise the risk of injury to
personnel in case of rupture.
5.1.3.19 Where tanks or piping are separated from the ship’s structure by thermal insulation, provision shall
be made for electrically bonding to the ship’s structure both the piping and the tanks. All gasketed pipe joints
and hose connections shall be electrically bonded.
5.1.3.20 Fuel pipes and all the other piping needed for a safe and reliable operation and maintenance shall
be colour marked in accordance with a recognized standard.
Guidance note:
See EN ISO 14726:2008 Ships and marine technology – Identification colours for the content of piping systems.
5.1.3.21 Components in the fuel containment systems and piping systems with low surface temperatures
shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board, and to
prevent operational problems due to icing.
5.1.4 Fuel piping systems containing cryogenic liquids
5.1.4.1 Piping systems for liquefied fuel shall be protected by a secondary enclosure able to contain
leakages. If the piping system is located in a space that is able to contain leakages of cryogenic liquids, this
requirement may be waived.
5.1.4.2 The requirement in [5.1.4.1] need not be applied for fully welded liquefied fuel pipes without fittings
or valves on open deck.
5.1.4.3 The piping systems and corresponding secondary enclosures shall be able to withstand the maximum
pressure that may build up in the system. For this purpose, the secondary enclosure may need to be
arranged with a pressure relief system that prevents the enclosure from being subjected to pressures above
their design pressures.
5.1.4.4 The secondary enclosure shall be made of a material that can withstand cryogenic temperatures.
5.1.4.5 The arrangement for the flexible hoses for portable gas tanks described in [4.5.1.6] shall be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The following shall, as a minimum, be provided:
— ESD valves shall be provided at both sides of the flexible hose
— suitable drip tray shall be provided below the hose connections
— the drip tray shall be provided with leakage detection
— detection of leakage shall lead to automatic closing of the ESD tank valve on the portable tank and the
ESD valve downstream of the flexible hose
— hazardous zones will be generated for the connections for the flexible hoses as per [8.2.2.2].
5.1.5 Fuel piping systems containing gaseous fuels
5.1.5.1 Piping systems containing gaseous fuel in enclosed spaces shall be arranged with a secondary
enclosure able to contain gas leakages. If the piping system is located in a space that is arranged to contain
leakages of gas, or arranged in an ESD protected machinery space, this requirement can be waived.
DNV AS
5.1.5.2 The requirement in [5.1.5.1] need not be applied for fully welded fuel gas vent pipes led through

mechanically ventilated spaces.
5.1.5.3 Fully welded gaseous fuel pipes need not be arranged with secondary enclosure on open deck. If
flanges or pipe couplings are used in the piping, hazardous zones will be generated as per [8.2.2.2].
5.1.5.4 The secondary enclosure shall be provided with a ventilation arrangement providing at least 30 air
changes per hour. Other solutions providing an equivalent safety level will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.
Where other solutions are utilised, permanently installed means for venting the secondary enclosure after a
leak shall be arranged.
5.1.5.5 For fuel gas systems where the design pressure exceeds 10 bar, the design pressure of the secondary
enclosure shall be taken as the higher of the following:
— the maximum built up pressure: static pressure in way of the rupture resulting from the gas flowing in the
annular space
— local instantaneous peak pressure in way of the rupture p: this pressure shall be taken as the critical
pressure and is given by the following expression:
where:
p0 = maximum working pressure of the inner pipe

k = Cp/Cv - constant pressure specific heat divided by constant volume specific heat
k = 1.31 for methane.
The tangential membrane stress of a straight pipe shall not exceed the tensile strength divided by 1.5
(Rm/1.5) when subjected to the above pressure. The pressure ratings of all other piping components shall
reflect the same level of strength as straight pipes.
As an alternative to using the peak pressure from the above formula, the peak pressure found from
representative tests can be used. Test reports shall then be submitted.
5.1.5.6 For fuel systems where the design pressure does not exceed 10 bar, the secondary enclosure shall be
dimensioned for a design pressure not less than the maximum working pressure of the gas pipes.
5.1.5.7 Parts of the secondary enclosure extending to air inlets and outlets on open deck shall be
dimensioned for a design pressure corresponding to the requirements in [5.1.5.5] and [5.1.5.6] unless a
lower design pressure may be justified by back pressure calculations.
5.1.6 Valve arrangements
5.1.6.1 Fuel tank inlets and outlets shall be provided with valves located as close to the tank as possible.
5.1.6.2 If the opening of a pipe is connected below the highest liquid level of the tank, the pipe shall be
protected by a secondary barrier up to the first valve.
The requirement may be achieved by one of the following means:
1) double pipe until the first valve
2) TCS may act as secondary barrier
3) single walled pipe.
Option 1 requires arrangement with leakage detection and venting of any leakage, see [5.2.2.7].
DNV AS
Option 2 requires calculation of full cool down of TCS and subsequent evaluation of cold radiation towards

adjacent ship structures.
Option 3 requires the following:
a) First tank valves are directly welded to tank nozzles removing leakage point between tank and first
valve.
b) First tank valves are not directly welded to tank nozzles: make breathing hole at vapour space inside
tank (near top of the lines).
i) pump discharge: first tank valve is directly fitted to the deepwell pump housing with flange
connection
ii) liquid filling line / cool down spray line and similarly pipes leading below the liquid level of the tank
iii) if i ) and ii) are not provided, the acceptance is subject to pipe strength evaluation (documented
strength calculations with surveys).
Option 3 survey requirements:

— The below is a minimum of surveys for welding of the first pipe connection on the tank and installation
of the pipes in the system. In addition to the points below, the requirements in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [5], Pt.5
Ch.7 Sec.6 [6] and [11] apply and shall be followed by the attending surveyor. NDT requirements shall
as a minimum be in accordance with the aforementioned rules. The survey hold points shall be adjusted
based on the welding procedures used.
— Verification of WPS, WPQ, NDT Plan. The NDT plan shall include both scope of NDT as well as timing (NDT
of root thread, final NDT, fit-up verification, etc.).
— Fit-up survey before first welding and fit-up of any backing rings.
— Survey of root weld/first pass.
— Final survey of welding and witnessing of NDT after welding. Witnessing of all NDT shall be witnessed by
DNV's own NDT experts.
— Structural and leak testing to be carried out.
— Survey to confirm that the piping system after the first valve is as specified in the calculations for the
connection to tank. It is therefore recommended that in addition to survey after installation, the surveyor
goes through the planned installation, 3D models/ISO drawings, etc. prior to piping fabrication starts to
avoid discussions later on.
Guidance note:
It is vital that the piping installation is planned to be carried out to reduce the stresses below the levels that were used to accept
this design.
5.1.6.3 Valves that are not easily accessible shall be remotely operated. This requirement does not apply to
normally closed valves or which are not operated during normal service.
5.1.6.4 Tank valves shall be automatically operated when the safety system required in Table 10 is activated.
5.1.6.5 The requirements in [5.1.6.3] and [5.1.6.4] may be waived for the following pipes, which will be
accepted with manual tank valves:
- outer diameter of maximum 25 mm
and
- inlet of pipe located in vapor phase
and
- installed for tanks with MARVS up to 0.07 Mpa for tanks connections located in enclosed TCS, no pressure
limit on open deck installations.
5.1.6.6 All automatic and remotely operated valves shall be provided with indications for open and closed
valve positions at the location where the valves are remotely operated.
DNV AS
5.1.6.7 Emergency shut down valves (as provided for safety functions) shall fail to a safe position upon loss

of actuation power or control signals.
Guidance note:
'Fail to close' is generally considered to be the safe mode. For double-block-and-bleed arrangements, for the bleed valve 'fail to
open' is considered to be the safe mode.
5.1.6.8 Pipe segments and components that may be isolated in a liquid full condition shall be provided with
pressure relief valves. For pressure relief valves in the bunkering lines, the set pressure shall be equal to the
design pressure.
5.1.6.9 The main gas supply line to each gas consumer or set of consumers shall be equipped with a
manually operated stop valve and an automatically operated master gas fuel valve coupled in series or
a combined manually and automatically operated valve. The valves shall be situated in the part of the
piping that is outside the machinery space containing gas consumers, and placed as near as possible to the
installation for heating the gas, if fitted. The master gas fuel valve shall automatically cut off the gas supply
when activated by the safety system required in Table 10. For high pressure gas supply lines, the master gas
fuel valve shall be arranged as two shut-off valves in series with a venting valve in between, which shall be
automatically operated as required in Table 10.
5.1.6.10 The gas supply line to each consumer shall be provided with double-block-and-bleed valves. These
valves shall be arranged for automatic shutdown as given in Table 10, and for normal stop and shutdown of
the engine. For high pressure gas supply lines, the master gas fuel valve may perform this function. An alarm
for faulty operation of the valves shall be provided.
Guidance note:
Block valves open and bleed valve open is an alarm condition. Similarly engine stopped and block valves open is an alarm
condition.
5.1.6.11 Other vents in the gas supply line shall be arranged in such a way that they do not compromise the
double-block-and-bleed function.
5.1.6.12 An arrangement that automatically vents the pipe between the master gas valve and the double
block and bleed valve when these are closed after a shutdown as required in Table 10, shall be fitted. The
pipe between the double block and bleed valve and the gas injection valves, shall also be automatically
vented.
5.1.6.13 Each gas supply line entering an ESD protected machinery space, and each gas supply line to high-
pressure installations, shall be provided with means for rapid detection of a rupture in the piping system
inside the machinery space.
5.1.6.14 Each gas supply line entering an ESD protected machinery space, and each gas supply line to high-
pressure installations, shall be provided with a valve that will automatically close upon detection of a gas pipe
rupture in the machinery space. This valve shall be located outside the machinery space, or at the machinery
space bulkhead at the point of entry inside the machinery space. It can be a separate valve or combined with
other functions, e.g. the master valve.
Guidance note:
If a differential pressure measurement is used to detect a pipe rupture, the shutdown should be time delayed to prevent shutdown
due to transient load variations.
5.1.6.15 There shall be one manually operated shutdown valve in the gas supply line to each engine
upstream of the double block and bleed valves to assure safe isolation during maintenance on the engine.
DNV AS
5.1.6.16 Shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems operated by the safety system shall close fully

and smoothly within 30 seconds of actuation. Information about the closure time of the valves and their
operating characteristics shall be available on board, and the closing time shall be verifiable and repeatable.
5.1.7 Expansion bellows
5.1.7.1 Expansion bellows shall normally not be installed in enclosed spaces.
5.1.7.2 Expansion bellows shall only be installed where they are readily accessible for inspection.
5.1.7.3 Slip joints shall not be used, except within the liquefied gas fuel storage tanks.
5.1.7.4 If accepted, expansion bellows in pipes containing gaseous fuel shall only be installed in fuel
preparation rooms or tank connection spaces.
5.1.7.5 If accepted, expansion bellows in systems for cryogenic liquids shall only be installed in spaces
designed to withstand cryogenic leakages.
5.1.7.6 Expansion bellows shall be protected against icing where necessary.
5.2 Pressure relief systems

5.2.1 General
5.2.1.1 All fuel tanks shall be provided with a pressure relief system appropriate to the design of the
fuel containment system and the fuel being carried. Fuel storage hold spaces, interbarrier spaces, tank
connection spaces and tank cofferdams, which may be subject to pressures beyond their design capabilities,
shall also be provided with a suitable pressure relief system. Pressure control systems specified in [4.7.1]
shall be independent of the pressure relief systems.
5.2.1.2 Fuel tanks which may be subject to external pressures above their design pressure shall be fitted
with vacuum protection systems in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [3].
5.2.1.3 All vent piping shall be designed and arranged not to be damaged by the temperature variations to
which it may be exposed, or forces due to flow or the ship's motions.
5.2.2 Pressure relief valves
5.2.2.1 Fuel tanks shall have at least two completely independent pressure relief valves.
5.2.2.2 Pressure relief valves shall comply with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [2.1] and be tested in accordance with
applicable parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [2.1.5].
5.2.2.3 In the event of a failure of a fuel tank PRV a safe means of emergency isolation shall be available:
— procedures shall be provided and included in the operation manual required in [1.8.1.1].
— the procedures shall allow only one of the installed PRVs for the liquefied gas fuel tanks to be isolated.
Guidance note:
To safely isolate a fuel tank PRV, stop valves may be fitted before and after the pressure relief valve. In case the pressure relief
valves are located in open air, stop valve only at the inlet of the pressure relief valve is needed. The outlet of the pressure relief
valve may then be fitted with a blind flange.
5.2.2.4 The stop valves shall be arranged to minimize the possibility that all pressure relief valves for one
tank are isolated simultaneously. Physical interlocks shall be included to this effect.
DNV AS
5.2.2.5 The outlet from the pressure relief valves shall be located at least B/3 or 6 m, whichever is greater,

above the weather deck and 6 m above the working area and gangways, where B is the greatest moulded
breadth of the ship in meters. The outlets shall be located at least 10 m from the nearest:
— air intake, air outlet or opening to accommodation, service and control spaces, or other non-hazardous
area
— exhaust outlet from machinery or from furnace installation.
For small ships and ship types where the operation limits the possible location of the outlet, lesser heights
than given above may be accepted.
5.2.2.6 The outlet from the pressure relief valves shall be so constructed that the discharge will be
unimpeded and be directed vertically upwards at the exit. The outlets shall also be arranged to minimize the
possibility of water or snow entering the vent system.
5.2.2.7 All other fuel gas vent and relief outlets shall be arranged in accordance with [5.2.2.5] and [5.2.2.6].
Means shall be provided to prevent liquid overflow from gas vent outlets, due to hydrostatic pressure from
spaces to which they are connected. For relief lines as mentioned in [5.1.6.8] may be led to fuel gas tank
with a non-return valve fitted at the tank inlet and with a spectacle flange. If relief lines are routed to tank,
the operation manual shall specify that during maintenance of any relief valve, the remaining part of the gas
fuel system shall not be in operation.
5.2.2.8 In the vent piping system, means for draining water from places where it may accumulate shall be
provided. The PRVs and piping shall be arranged so that water under no circumstances can accumulate in or
near the PRVs.
5.2.2.9 Suitable protection screens of not more than 13 mm square mesh shall be fitted on vent outlets to
prevent the ingress of foreign objects without adversely affecting the flow.
5.2.2.10 PRVs shall be connected to the highest part of the liquefied fuel tank. PRVs shall be positioned on
the liquefied fuel tank so that they will remain in the vapour phase at the filling limit (FL) under conditions of
15° list and 0.015 L trim.
5.2.2.11 Independent tanks protected by a secondary barrier shall follow requirements for pressure relief for
the space between the primary and secondary barrier in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [5.1].
5.2.3 Sizing of pressure relieving system
5.2.3.1 The sizing of pressure relief valves shall comply with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [4.1].
5.2.3.2 For vacuum insulated tanks in fuel storage hold spaces and for tanks in fuel storage hold spaces
separated from potential fire loads by cofferdams or surrounded by spaces with no fire load, the fire factors
may be reduced to the following values:
F=0.5 to F=0.25
F=0.2 to F=0.1
The minimum fire factor is F=0.1.
5.2.4 Sizing of vent pipe system

The sizing of the vent pipe system shall comply with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [4.2].
DNV AS
5.3 Fuel bunkering system
5.3.1 General
5.3.1.1 The bunkering system shall be so arranged that no gas will be discharged to air during filling of the
fuel tanks.
5.3.1.2 A water distribution system shall be fitted in way of the hull under the shore connections to provide a
low-pressure water curtain for additional protection of the hull steel and the ship's side structure. This system
shall be operated when fuel transfer is in progress. Alternative means, providing equivalent protection, will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
5.3.2 Arrangement of bunkering lines
5.3.2.1 Bunkering lines shall in general be arranged as self-draining towards the tank. If the bunkering
station need to be located lower than the fuel tanks, and bunkering lines cannot be made self-draining
towards the tank, other suitable means should be provided to relieve the pressure and remove liquid
contents from the bunker lines.
5.3.2.2 Bunkering lines shall be arranged for inerting and gas freeing. When not engaged in bunkering the
bunkering pipes shall be free of gas, unless the consequences of not gas freeing is evaluated and approved.
5.3.2.3 In cases where it is possible to bunker the ship from two sides through a common bunkering line,
suitable isolation arrangements shall be arranged to prevent fuel being inadvertently transferred to the side
not in use for bunkering.
5.3.2.4 Bunkering connections and bunkering lines shall be supported and arranged in such a way that in
case of mechanical damage to the piping on open deck, the risk of damage to the ship's fuel containment
system and tank valves are minimized.
5.3.2.5 The bunkering manifold shall be designed to withstand the external loads it is subjected to during
bunkering. This shall include the forces on the manifold in a scenario where the bunkering line is released by
a breakaway coupling.
5.3.3 Bunkering valve arrangements
5.3.3.1 A manually operated stop valve and a remote operated shutdown valve in series, or a combined
manually operated and remote valve shall be fitted in every bunkering line close to the shore connecting
point.
5.3.3.2 The closing time of the shutdown valve shall not be more than 5 seconds from the trigger of
the alarm to full closure of the valve, unless pressure surge considerations makes a longer closing time
necessary. The closing time of the shutdown valve shall also be sufficient to prevent overfilling of the tank
when automatic shutdown is initiated by high tank level.
5.3.3.3 The requirement in [5.3.3.2] also applies to tank filling valves if automatic operation is initiated by
high tank level during transfer operation between LNG fuel tanks (see Table 10).
5.3.3.4 The connections at the bunkering station shall be of dry-disconnect type. The couplings shall be of a
standard type.
Guidance note:
The IGF Code is requiring an additional safety dry breakaway coupling/self-sealing quick release in the bunkering arrangement.
DNV AS
5.4 Nitrogen installations
5.4.1 Nitrogen piping systems
5.4.1.1 An arrangement for purging fuel bunkering lines and supply lines with nitrogen shall be provided.
5.4.1.2 Where the inert gas supply line is connected to the fuel system, it shall be fitted with a double-
block-and-bleed valve arrangement to prevent the return of flammable gas to any non-hazardous spaces. In
addition, a closable non-return valve shall be installed between the double block and bleed arrangement and
the fuel system.
5.4.1.3 The double block and bleed valves shall be located outside non-hazardous spaces and comply with
the following requirements:
— The operation of the valves shall be automatically executed. Signals for opening and closing shall be taken
from the process directly, e.g. differential pressure.
— An alarm for faulty operation of the valves shall be provided.
5.4.1.4 Where connections to the gas piping systems are non-permanent, two non-return valves in series
may substitute the non-return devices required in [5.4.1.2], one of the non-return valves shall be installed
on the gas side (downstream of connection). Connections shall only be non-permanent for maintenance- and
bunker line purging purposes.
5.4.1.5 Where insulation spaces are continually supplied with an inert gas as part of a leak detection system,
means shall be provided to monitor the quantity of gas being supplied to individual spaces.
5.4.1.6 The inert gas system shall be such that each space being inerted can be isolated and the necessary
arrangements shall be provided for controlling pressure in these spaces.
5.4.2 Spaces containing nitrogen installation
5.4.2.1 Where a nitrogen generator or nitrogen storage facilities are installed in a separate compartment
outside of the machinery space, the separate compartment shall be fitted with an independent mechanical
extraction ventilation system, providing 6 air changes per hour. A low oxygen alarm shall be fitted. Such
separate compartments shall be treated as one of other machinery spaces, with respect to fire protection.
5.4.2.2 Nitrogen pipes shall only be led through well-ventilated spaces. Nitrogen pipes in enclosed spaces
shall:
— be fully welded
— have only a minimum of flange connections as needed for fitting of valves
— be as short as possible.
The need for other precautions to prevent suffocation of personnel in case of leakage should be considered in
each case.
5.4.3 Atmospheric control within the fuel containment system
5.4.3.1 A piping system shall be arranged to enable each fuel tank to be safely gas-freed, and to be safely
filled with fuel from a gas-free condition. The system shall be arranged to minimize the possibility of pockets
of gas or air remaining after changing the atmosphere.
5.4.3.2 The system shall be designed to eliminate the possibility of a flammable mixture existing in the fuel
tank during any part of the atmosphere change operation, by utilizing an inerting medium as an intermediate
step.
DNV AS
5.4.3.3 Gas sampling points shall be provided for each fuel tank to monitor the progress of atmosphere

change.
5.4.3.4 Inert gas utilized for gas freeing of tanks may be provided externally to the ship.
5.4.4 Inert gas production and storage on board
5.4.4.1 If inert gas generators are provided, they shall be capable of producing inert gas with oxygen content
less than 5% by volume. A continuous-reading oxygen content meter shall be fitted to the inert gas supply
from the equipment and shall be fitted with an alarm set at a maximum of 5% oxygen content by volume.
5.4.4.2 Inert gas system shall have pressure controls and monitoring arrangements appropriate to the fuel
containment system. Inert gas systems shall comply with the requirements in Pt.5 Ch.7.
5.4.4.3 Nitrogen generation system redundancy shall be provided where the containment system relies on
continuous nitrogen supply for containment and/or gas detection.
Guidance note:
Two (2) nitrogen generators (with one (1) buffer tank if necessary), alternatively one (1) generator and one tank with 30 day
consumption is generally considered to comply with the redundancy requirement.
5.5 Exhaust system

5.5.1 General
5.5.1.1 Unless exhaust systems are designed with the strength to withstand the worst case over pressure
due to ignited gas leaks, explosion relief systems shall be suitably designed and fitted.
5.5.1.2 The explosion venting shall be led away from where personnel may be present. Bursting discs shall
not open into machinery spaces, but may be located inside the engine room casing.
Guidance note:
Both explosion impact and amount of potentially suffocating combustion gases shall be taken into account when deciding where
explosion relief valves can be located. The distance from a relief valve to gangways and working areas should generally be at least
3 meters, unless efficient shielding is provided.
5.5.1.3 Bursting discs shall only be used as a means for explosion relief ventilation where any event, where a
bursting disc has compromised the exhaust system, does not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
5.5.1.4 Exhaust gas piping shall be arranged to avoid possibility for accumulation of unburned gas.
5.5.1.5 Machinery using gas as fuel shall have separate exhaust systems.
5.6 Other ship systems

5.6.1 Gas heating systems
5.6.1.1 Circulation pumps for the heating fluid shall be arranged with redundancy. If circulation is necessary
to prevent freezing in the heating circuit, power supply shall then be from an uninterruptible power supply
(UPS), or alternative means for maintaining circulation for a sufficiently long period in case of loss of electric
power supply.
DNV AS
5.6.1.2 The heating circuit expansion tank shall be fitted with a gas detector, and shall be vented to open air.

5.6.1.3 To prevent freezing of the heating medium, the following arrangement shall be provided:
— alarm for low temperature at heating medium outlet
— automatic stop of liquefied gas feed pump (if fitted) and closing of tank valve at stop of circulation of
heating fluid.
5.6.2 Drainage systems
5.6.2.1 Bilge systems serving hazardous spaces shall be segregated from other bilge systems.
5.6.2.2 Where fuel is carried in a fuel containment system requiring a secondary barrier, suitable drainage
arrangements for dealing with any leakage into the hold or insulation spaces through the adjacent ship
structure shall be provided. The bilge system shall not lead to pumps in safe spaces. Means of detecting such
leakage shall be provided.
5.6.2.3 The hold or interbarrier spaces of type A independent tanks for liquefied gas shall be provided with a
drainage system suitable for handling liquefied fuel in the event of fuel tank leakage or rupture.
5.6.3 Cooling water
5.6.3.1 Expansion tanks for fresh water cooling systems serving gas fuelled consumers shall be equipped
with a gas detector and be vented to open air.
Guidance note:
Cooling system in this respect is a system where an internal leak can result in gas ingress into the cooling water system.
5.6.3.2 In freshwater cooling systems also serving gas fuelled equipment, arrangements shall be provided
to automatically isolate the cooling system connections to the gas fuelled equipment in the event of gas
detection in the expansion tanks mentioned in [5.6.3.1]. Activation of the automatic isolation arrangement
shall not result in loss of fresh cooling water to other machinery or equipment.
Guidance note:
Cooling system in this respect is a system where an internal leak can result in gas ingress into the cooling water system.
Where the cooling water connections to gas fuelled equipment are located on exposed weather deck or are exposed to potential
mechanical damage, the arrangement for automatic isolation should be activated also in the event of loss of differential pressure in
that part of the cooling water system.
6 Ventilation systems
6.1 Ventilation of spaces

6.1.1 General
6.1.1.1 Any ducting used for the ventilation of hazardous spaces shall be separate from that used for the
ventilation of non-hazardous spaces.
6.1.1.2 Ventilation fans serving hazardous spaces shall comply with requirements in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 [2.6].
6.1.1.3 Where a ventilation duct passes through a space with a different hazardous zone classification,
possible leakages to the less hazardous zone shall be prevented. This shall be obtained by ensuring that
DNV AS
the less hazardous space or duct incuding fan housing has an over-pressure relative to the more hazardous

space or duct. Such ventilation ducts shall have a mechanical integrity equivalent to that required for general
piping systems in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 Table 2.
6.1.1.4 Air inlets for hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from areas, which in the absence of the
considered inlet would be non-hazardous.
Air outlets from hazardous enclosed spaces shall be located in an open area, which in the absence of the
considered outlet would be of the same or lesser hazard than the ventilated space.
6.1.1.5 Air inlets for non-hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from non-hazardous areas at least 1.5 m
away from the boundaries of any hazardous area.
Air outlets from non-hazardous spaces shall be located outside hazardous areas.
6.1.1.6 The required capacity of the ventilation plant shall be based on the total volume of the room. An
increase in ventilation capacity may be required for rooms having a complicated form.
6.1.1.7 Hazardous spaces shall be continuously ventilated. Consequently, ventilation inlets and outlets for
such spaces shall be located sufficiently high above deck to not require closing appliances according to the
international load line convention.
6.1.1.8 Ventilation ducts from spaces containing liquefied gas fuel leakage sources shall be constructed of
materials having a design temperature corresponding to the minimum temperature that may arise when cold
gas is ventilated out through the ducts.
6.1.1.9 The number and capacity of the ventilation fans serving:

— secondary enclosure ventilation systems
shall be such that the capacity is not reduced by more than 50%, after a failure of an active component or a
failure in the power supply system to the fans.
6.1.2.1 Tank connection spaces shall be provided with an effective mechanical ventilation system of the
extraction type, providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air changes per hour. The ventilation system
shall be arranged to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. Other solutions, providing an
equivalent level of safety, may be considered on a case-by-case basis.
6.1.2.2 Spaces containing access openings for tank connection spaces shall be arranged with separate
ventilation, providing at least 8 air changes per hour.
6.1.3 Fuel preparation rooms

Fuel preparation rooms shall be fitted with effective mechanical ventilation system of the extraction type,
providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air changes per hour. The ventilation system shall be arranged
to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. For spaces where the ventilation may cause
condensation and icing due to cold surfaces, other solutions providing an equivalent level of safety, may be
6.1.4 Secondary enclosures for gas pipes
6.1.4.1 Secondary enclosures containing gas piping shall be fitted with effective mechanical ventilation
system of the extraction type, providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air changes per hour. The
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ventilation system shall be arranged to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. Other

solutions providing an equivalent safety level will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
6.1.4.2 The ventilation system for the secondary enclosure of the gas supply system shall be independent of
ventilation systems in tank connection spaces and other spaces where there is a potential for liquefied gas
fuel leakages.
6.1.4.3 When located in gas safe machinery spaces, the ventilation system for the secondary enclosure
of the gas supply system and the ventilation of the gas valve unit spaces shall be independent of all other
ventilation systems.
Guidance note:
Double piping and gas valve unit spaces in gas safe engine rooms are considered an integral part of the fuel supply systems and,
therefore, their ventilation system does not need to be independent of other fuel supply ventilation systems provided such fuel
supply systems contain only gaseous fuel.
6.1.4.4 Ventilation openings for the secondary enclosures shall be located in open air, away from ignition
sources. The inlet opening shall be fitted with a suitable wire mesh guard and protected from ingress of
water.
6.1.5 Machinery spaces
6.1.5.1 The ventilation system for machinery spaces containing gas-fuelled consumers shall be independent
of all other ventilation systems.
Guidance note:
Spaces enclosed in the boundaries of machinery spaces (such as purifier's room, engine room workshops and stores) are
considered an integral part of machinery spaces containing gas fuelled consumers and, therefore, their ventilation system does not
need to be independent of the one of machinery spaces.
6.1.5.2 ESD protected machinery spaces shall be ventilated with at least 30 air changes per hour. The
ventilation system shall ensure a good air circulation in all parts of the machinery space, and prevent any
formation of gas pockets.
Arrangements where the ventilation system provides at least 15 air changes per hour in normal operation,
but automatically increases the ventilation rate to 30 air changes per hour upon gas detection may also be
accepted.
The power supply to fans serving an ESD protected machinery space shall be so arranged that ventilation can
be maintained independent of the power generating machinery in the space.
6.1.6 Spaces protected by air locks
6.1.6.1 Non-hazardous spaces with access to a hazardous enclosed space shall be arranged with an air-lock
and the hazardous space shall be maintained at under-pressure relative to the non- hazardous space.
6.1.6.2 Non-hazardous spaces with access to hazardous open deck shall be arranged with an air-lock and be
maintained at overpressure relative to the external hazardous area.
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7 Fire safety
7.1 General
7.1.1 General
The requirements in this section are additional to those given in SOLAS Ch.II-2.
7.2 Fire protection

7.2.1 General
A fuel preparation room shall be regarded as a machinery space of category A for fire protection purposes.
7.2.2 Construction
7.2.2.1 Any boundary of accommodation spaces, service spaces, control stations, escape routes and
machinery spaces, facing fuel tanks on open deck, shall be shielded by A-60 class divisions. The A-60 class
divisions shall extend up to the underside of the deck of the navigation bridge. In addition, fuel tanks shall
be segregated from cargo in accordance with the requirements of the international maritime dangerous
goods (IMDG) code where the tanks are regarded as bulk packaging. For the purposes of the stowage and
segregation requirements of the IMDG code, a gas fuel tank on the open deck shall be considered a class 2.1
package.
7.2.2.2 The space containing fuel containment system and fuel preparation rooms unless located on open
deck shall be separated from the machinery spaces of category A or other rooms with high fire risks. The
separation shall be done by a cofferdam of at least 900 mm with insulation of A-60 class. When determining
the insulation of the space containing fuel containment system from other spaces with lower fire risks, the
fuel containment system shall be considered as a machinery space of category A, in accordance with SOLAS
regulation II-2/9. The boundary between spaces containing fuel containment systems shall be either a
cofferdam of at least 900 mm or A-60 class division. For type C tanks, the fuel storage hold space may be
considered as a cofferdam. This can however not be applied to tanks located directly above machinery spaces
of category A or other rooms with high fire risk.
Guidance note 1:
The following other rooms with high fire risk should as a minimum be considered, but not be restricted to:
1) Cargo spaces except cargo tanks for liquids with flashpoint above 60°C and except cargo spaces exempted in accordance
with SOLAS regulations II-2/10.7.1.2 or II-2/10.7.1.4.
2) Vehicle, ro-ro and special category spaces.
3) Service spaces (high risk): galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances, saunas, paint lockers and store-rooms having
2
areas of 4 m or more, spaces for the storage of flammable liquids and workshops other than those forming part of the
machinery space, as provided in SOLAS regulations II-2/9.2.2.4, II-2/9.2.3.3 and II-2/9.2.4.
4) Accommodation spaces of greater fire risk: saunas, sale shops, barber shops and beauty parlours and public spaces
2
containing furniture and furnishing of other than restricted fire risk and having deck area of 50 m or more, as provided in
SOLAS regulation II-2/9.2.2.3.
Guidance note 2:
7.2.2.3 The fire protection of fuel pipes led through ro-ro spaces shall be subject to special consideration by
the Society depending on the use and expected pressure in the pipes.
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7.2.2.4 The bunkering station shall be separated by A-60 class divisions towards machinery spaces of

category A, accommodation, control stations and high fire risk spaces, except for spaces such as tanks,
voids, auxiliary machinery spaces of little or no fire risk, sanitary and similar spaces where the insulation
standard may be reduced to class A-0.
7.2.2.5 When one single bulkhead separates ESD protected machinery spaces, the bulkhead shall be fire
insulated to class A-60 standard.
7.3 Fire extinction

7.3.1 Fire main
7.3.1.1 The water spray system required in [7.3.2] may be part of the fire main system provided that
the required fire pump capacity and working pressure are sufficient for the operation of both the required
numbers of hydrants and hoses and the water spray system simultaneously.
7.3.1.2 When a fuel tank is located on the open deck, isolating valves shall be fitted in the fire main in order
to isolate damaged sections of the fire main. Isolation of a section of fire main shall not deprive the fire line
ahead of the isolated section from the supply of water.
7.3.2 Water spray systems
7.3.2.1 A water spray system shall be installed for cooling and fire prevention to cover exposed parts of fuel
tanks located on open deck.
7.3.2.2 The water spray system shall also provide coverage for boundaries of the superstructures,
compressor rooms, pump rooms, cargo control rooms, bunkering control stations, bunkering stations and any
other normally occupied deck houses that face fuel tanks on open deck, unless tanks are located 10 metres
or more from the boundaries.
7.3.2.3 The system shall be designed to cover all areas as specified above with an application rate of 10 l/
2 2
min/m for horizontal projected surfaces and 4 l/min/m for vertical surfaces.
7.3.2.4 Stop valves shall be fitted in the spray water application main supply line(s), at intervals not
exceeding 40 metres, for the purpose of isolating damaged sections. Alternatively, the system may be
divided into two or more sections that may be operated independently, provided the necessary controls
are located together in a readily accessible position, not likely to be inaccessible in case of fire in the areas
protected.
7.3.2.5 The capacity of the water spray pump shall be sufficient to deliver the required amount of water to
the hydraulically most demanding area as specified above in the areas protected.
7.3.2.6 If the water spray system is not part of the fire main system, a connection to the ships fire main
through a stop valve shall be provided.
7.3.2.7 Remote start of pumps supplying the water spray system and remote operation of any normally
closed valves to the system shall be located in a readily accessible position, which is not likely to be
inaccessible in case of fire in the areas protected. Remote operation of valves shall be possible from the
control location for bunkering.
7.3.2.8 The nozzles shall be of an approved full bore type and they shall be arranged to ensure an effective
distribution of water throughout the space being protected.
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Guidance note:

Alternatives to full bore may be accepted if data sheets for nozzles confirm correct application rate at the working pressure and
area coverage.
7.3.2.9 An equivalent system to the water spray system may be fitted provided it has been tested for its on-
deck cooling capability to the satisfaction of the Society.
7.3.3 Dry chemical powder fire extinguishing system
7.3.3.1 In the bunkering station area a permanently installed dry chemical powder extinguishing system shall
cover all possible leak points. The capacity shall be at least 3.5 kg/s for a minimum of 45 seconds discharge.
The system shall be arranged for easy manual release from a safe location outside the protected area.
7.3.3.2 In addition to any other portable fire extinguishers that may be required, one portable dry powder
extinguisher of at least 5 kg capacity shall be located near the bunkering station.
7.3.4 Fuel preparation room

Fuel preparation rooms shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the
provisions of the FSS code and taking into account the necessary concentrations/application rate required for
extinguishing gas fires.
7.3.5 Fire dampers

Approved automatic fail-safe fire dampers shall be fitted in the ventilation trunk for tank connection spaces
and fuel preparation rooms.

7.4.1 Detection
7.4.1.1 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the fire safety systems code shall be
provided for the fuel storage hold spaces and the ventilation trunk to the tank connection space and in the
tank connection space, and for all other rooms of the fuel gas system where fire cannot be excluded.
7.4.1.2 Smoke detectors alone shall not be considered sufficient for rapid detection of a fire.
Guidance note:
Smoke detectors may be combined with either temperature or flame detectors to increase possibility for detection of a fire. It
should be noted that flame detectors will normally activate before temperature detectors.
8.1 General
8.1.1 General
8.1.1.2 Electrical generation and distribution systems, and associated control systems, shall be designed
such that a single fault will not result in the loss of ability to maintain fuel tank pressures and hull structure
temperature within normal operating limits.
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8.1.1.3 Failure modes and effects of single failure for electrical generation and distribution systems in

[8.1.1.2] shall be analysed and documented.
Guidance note 1:
See IEC 60812.
Guidance note 2:
The FMEA is only required when electrical systems are used for purposes as mentioned in [8.1.1.2]
8.1.1.4 Electrical equipment and wiring shall in general not to be installed in hazardous areas unless essential
8.1.1.5 With reference to IEC 60079-20, temperature class and equipment groups listed in Table 7 can be
used for potential ship fuels:
Natural gas T1 IIA
DME (dimethylether) T3 IIB
8.1.1.6 The lighting system in hazardous areas shall be divided between at least two branch circuits. All
switches and protective devices shall interrupt all poles or phases and shall be located in a non-hazardous
area.
8.1.1.7 Electrical equipment fitted in an ESD protected machinery space shall fulfill the following:
— In addition to fire and hydrocarbon detectors and fire and gas alarms, lighting and ventilation fans shall be
certified safe for hazardous area zone 1.
— all electrical equipment in the machinery space, not certified for zone 1, shall be automatically
disconnected if gas concentrations above 40% LEL is detected on two detectors in the machinery space.
8.1.1.8 Submerged fuel pump motors and their supply cables may be fitted in fuel containment systems. Fuel
pump motors shall be capable of being isolated from their electrical supply during gas-freeing operations.
8.1.1.9 Instrumentation and electrical apparatus in contact with the fuel should be of a type suitable for zone
0. Temperature sensors shall be installed in thermo wells, and pressure sensors without additional separating
chamber should be suitable for installation in zone 0.

8.2.1 General
electrical installations, hazardous areas shall be divided into zones 0, 1 and 2 according to the principles
of the standards IEC 60079-10-1; 2008 Explosive atmospheres Part 10-1: Classification of areas –
Explosive gas atmospheres and guidance and informative examples given in IEC 60092-502:1999, Electrical
Installations in Ships – Tankers – Special features for tankers. Main features of the guidance are given in
[8.2.2].
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8.2.1.2 Areas and spaces other than those classified in [8.2.2] shall be subject to special consideration. The

8.2.2.1 Hazardous areas zone 0 includes, but is not limited to:

1) The interiors of fuel tanks, pipes and equipment containing fuel, any pipework of pressure-relief or other
venting systems for fuel tanks.

1) Tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms arranged with ventilation according to [6.1.3], fuel
storage hold spaces and interbarrier spaces.
Guidance note:
Fuel storage hold spaces for type C tanks without any leakage sources in the hold space are not considered as zone 1.
2) Areas on open deck, or semi- enclosed spaces on deck, within 3 m of any fuel tank outlet, gas or
vapour outlet, bunker manifold valve, fuel tank hatches, other gas valve, gas pipe flange, coupling for
flexible hoses used for portable gas tank, ventilation outlets from zone 1 hazardous spaces and gas tank
openings for pressure release provided to permit the flow of small volumes of gas or vapour mixtures
caused by thermal variation.
3) Areas on open deck or semi-enclosed spaces on deck, within 1.5 m of fuel preparation room entrances,
fuel preparation room ventilation inlets and other openings into zone 1 spaces.
4) Areas on the open deck within spillage coamings surrounding gas bunker manifold valves and 3 m
beyond these, up to a height of 2.4 m above the deck.
5) Enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces in which pipes containing fuel are located, e.g. secondary enclosures
around fuel pipes, semi-enclosed bunkering stations.
6) The ESD-protected machinery space is considered as non-hazardous area during normal operation, but
will require equipment required to operate following detection of gas leakage to be certified as suitable
for zone 1.
7) A space protected by an airlock is considered as non-hazardous area during normal operation, but will
require equipment required to operate following loss of differential pressure between the protected space
and the hazardous area to be certified as suitable for zone 1.
8) Except for type C tanks, an area within 2.4 m of the outer surface of a fuel containment system where
such surface is exposed to the weather.

1) areas within 1.5 m surrounding open or semi-enclosed spaces of zone 1 as specified in [8.2.2.2], if not
otherwise specified in this standard
2) air locks
3) space containing bolted hatch to tank connection space
4) space containing fans serving hazardous spaces.
8.3 Inspection and testing

8.3.1 General
8.3.1.1 Verification of the physical installation shall be documented by the yard. Verification documentation
shall be available for the Society's surveyor at the site.
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8.3.1.2 Before the electrical installations in hazardous areas are put into service or considered ready for use,

they shall be inspected and tested. All equipment, including cables, shall be verified as having been installed
in accordance with installation procedures and guidelines issued by the manufacturer of the equipment and
cables, and that the installations have been carried out in accordance to Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.11.
8.3.1.3 For spaces protected by pressurisation, it shall be examined and tested that purging can be fully
accomplished. Purge time at minimum flow rate shall be documented. Required shutdowns and / or alarms
upon ventilation overpressure falling below prescribed values shall be tested.
For other spaces where area classification depends on mechanical ventilation, it shall be tested that
ventilation flow rate is sufficient, and that required ventilation failure alarm operates correctly.
8.3.1.4 For equipment for which safety in hazardous areas depends upon correct operation of protective
devices (for example overload protection relays) and / or operation of an alarm (for example loss of
pressurisation for an Ex(p) control panel), it shall be verified that the devices have correct settings and / or
correct operation of alarms.
8.3.1.5 Intrinsically safe circuits shall be verified to ensure that the equipment and wiring are correctly
installed.
8.4 Maintenance
8.4.1 General
IEC 60079-17 and IEC 60092-502 and shall contain necessary information on:
— records sufficient to enable the certified safe equipment to be maintained in accordance with its type of
protection (list and location of equipment, technical information, manufacturer's instructions, spares etc.)
— register of inspections, with information about date of inspections and name(s) of person(s) who carried
instruction on the various types of protection of apparatus and installation practices to be found on the ship.
Appropriate refresher training shall be given to such personnel on a regular basis.
9.1 General
9.1.1 Functional requirement
The control, monitoring and safety systems applied to a fuel installation shall be arranged to fulfil the
following functional requirements:
— Control, monitoring and safety systems shall be arranged to ensure safe and reliable operation of the fuel
installation.
— Leakages of cryogenic and gaseous fuel shall be detected and alarmed.
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— Propulsion shall be maintained upon single failure in control, monitoring or safety system, and the
remaining propulsion power shall be in accordance with [5.1.2].
— Propulsion shall be restored within 30 seconds (redundancy type 1) upon a fuel safety action and the
restored propulsion power shall be in accordance with [5.1.2].
system.
9.1.2.1 Each fuel supply installation shall be fitted with dedicated gas detection system, fuel safety system
and fuel control and monitoring system. Gas detection system and fuel safety system are considered to be
protective safety systems, see Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3 [1.4].
Guidance note:
The gas detection function, the gas safety function and the fuel control and monitoring function may be part of the same
redundant network if arranged in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9. Note that the protective safety systems shall, if part of an integrated
network, be arranged in a separate network segment in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.2 [1.3.5] and Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.4 [3].
9.1.2.2 Monitoring requirements for the fuel installation are given in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10. Table 8
gives alarm requirements for gas detection, Table 9 gives alarm and indication requirements to be handled
by the gas control and monitoring system. Table 10 and [9.3.1] to [9.3.7] give requirements to protective
safety functions with alarm to be handled by the fuel safety system. For alarm conditions found in both Table
9 and Table 10, separate sensors shall be arranged for the gas control and monitoring system and for the fuel
safety system.
9.1.2.3 For alarm handling the fuel installation shall follow the principles as for machinery space equipment.
9.1.2.4 The gas detection system shall present the gas alarms as required by [9.2.4] on a dedicated panel on
bridge, at the control location for bunkering and locally. If alarming depends on network communication, the
functionality shall be handled by separate network segment arranged for the fuel installation safety functions.
9.1.2.5 The fuel gas safety system shall present the gas safety alarms as specified in Table 10 on a dedicated
panel on bridge. If alarming depends on network communication, the functionality shall be handled by the
separate network segment arranged for the fuel installation safety functions.
9.1.2.6 For ESD protected machinery spaces, a gas detector system of redundant design shall be arranged
for each machinery space.
9.1.2.7 The gas detection system and fuel safety system for a fuel supply installation can be implemented in
a common system unit if the system is redundant.
9.1.2.8 For each fuel supply system independent power supplies shall be arranged for the controllers of
[9.1.2.1], in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [6.3.3]. In addition each fuel safety system and each fuel
control system shall be arranged with uninterruptible power supply (UPS) in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2
[6.3.5].
arranged with loop monitoring.
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Guidance note:

Table 10.
independent of the gas control system.
Guidance note:
terminals/coils.
9.1.2.11 Where voting is applied for gas detection shutdown, a failed detector shall be considered as an
active detection.
Guidance note:

Compressors and pumps shall be arranged for manual remote emergency stop from the following locations as
applicable:
— onboard safety centre
— engine control room
— fire control station
— adjacent to the exit of fuel preparation rooms.
9.2 Fuel installation control and monitoring

9.2.1 Bunkering and tank monitoring
9.2.1.1 Each fuel tank shall be fitted with at least one liquid level gauging device, designed to operate within
the allowable tank pressure and temperature range. Where only one liquid level gauge is fitted, it shall be
arranged so that any necessary maintenance can be carried out while the cargo tank is in service.
9.2.1.2 Each fuel tank shall be equipped with high-level alarm, which is released when the tank is filled up to
about 95% of the tank volume.
9.2.1.3 Each fuel tank shall be monitored for pressure and also fitted with local indicating instrument. The
indicators shall be clearly marked with the highest and lowest pressure permitted in the tank. High-pressure
alarm and, if vacuum protection is required, low pressure alarm shall be provided. Pressure indication and
alarms shall also be indicated on the bridge. The alarms shall be activated before the set pressures of the
safety valves are reached.
9.2.1.4 A local reading pressure gauge shall be fitted between the stop valve and the connection to shore at
each bunker pipe.
9.2.1.5 Pressure gauges shall be fitted to fuel pump discharge lines and to the bunkering and vapour return
lines.
9.2.1.6 Each fuel pump discharge shall be monitored for pressure.
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9.2.1.7 Control of bunkering shall be possible from a safe location in regard to bunkering operations. At this

location tank pressure, tank temperature if required by [9.2.1], and tank level shall be available. Overfill
alarm shall also to be indicated at this location, as well as leakage detection alarms for the secondary
enclosure for the bunkering pipes where secondary enclosure is required by [5.1.4].
9.2.1.8 For tanks where submerged fuel pump motors are installed, arrangements shall be made to alarm at
low liquid level.
9.2.1.9 Fuel storage hold spaces and inter-barrier spaces without open connection to the atmosphere shall be
provided with pressure indication.
9.2.1.10 Except for independent tanks of type C supplied with vacuum insulation system and pressure build-
up fuel discharge unit, each fuel tank shall be provided with devices to measure and indicate the temperature
of the fuel in at least three locations; at the bottom and middle of the tank as well as the top of the tank
below the highest allowable liquid level.
9.2.2 Bilge wells

Bilge wells in tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms or other spaces containing cryogenic systems
without secondary enclosures shall be provided with level sensors. Alarm shall be given at high level in bilge
well.
9.2.3 Fuel heating
9.2.3.1 The heating medium for the liquefied gas vaporizer shall be provided with temperature monitoring at
the heat exchanger outlet. Alarm shall be given at low temperature.
9.2.3.2 The heated fuel in supply lines to consumers shall be provided with temperature monitoring at the
heat exchanger outlet. Alarm shall be given at low temperature.
9.2.4 Gas detection
9.2.4.1 A permanently installed gas detection system shall be provided for:

— motor rooms for machinery in fuel preparation rooms
— secondary enclosures around pipes containing gaseous fuels
— gas safe machinery spaces above engine
— in way of boiler fan supply inlets in machinery spaces
— air locks
— expansion tanks in systems for heating of fuel gas
— other enclosed spaces where fuel vapour may accumulate.
9.2.4.2 Where fuel gas containment systems other than type C tanks are used, hold spaces and/or
interbarrier spaces shall be provided with a permanently installed system of gas detection capable of
measuring gas concentrations from 0% to 100% by volume. Alarms shall be activated before the gas
concentration reaches the equivalent of 30% of the lower explosion limit (LEL) in air.
9.2.4.3 Gas detection systems shall continuously monitor for gas.
9.2.4.4 Except for spaces as specified in [9.2.4.2], gas detection instruments for flammable products capable
of measuring gas concentrations below the lower flammable limit may be accepted.
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space into account.
9.2.4.6 The detectors shall be located where gas may accumulate and/or in the ventilation outlets. Gas
dispersal analysis or a physical smoke test shall be used to find the best arrangement.
Table 8 Gas detection alarms
Alarm conditions
Gas detection
Interbarrier space of fuel tank, 30% LEL HA
Fuel tank hold space, 30% LEL HA
Tank connection space, 20% LEL HA
Fuel preparation room, 20% LEL HA
Secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel outside the machinery space, 20%
HA
LEL
Secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel in the machinery space, 30% LEL HA
ESD Protected machinery spaces 20% LEL HA
Expansion tanks in systems for heating of fuel gas HA
Air locks HA
Above engine in gas safe machinery spaces HA
In way of boiler fan supply inlets in machinery spaces HA
Motor rooms for machinery in fuel preparation rooms HA
Other enclosed spaces where fuel vapour may accumulate HA
Bunkering station if required HA
9.2.5 Ventilation
Reduced ventilation below required capacity shall be alarmed. In order to verify the performance of
ventilation systems, a flow detection system or a pressure monitoring system is required. A running signal
from the ventilation fan motor is required in combination with pressure monitoring systems, but is not
sufficient to verify performance.
9.2.6 Gas compressors

Gas compressors shall be fitted with audible and visual alarms both on the navigation bridge and in the
engine-room. As a minimum the alarms shall include low gas input pressure, low gas output pressure, high
gas output pressure and compressor operation.
9.2.7 Shafts passing through bulkheads

Where bulkhead penetrations are used to separate the drive from a hazardous space, temperature
monitoring for bulkhead shaft glands and bearings shall be provided. An alarm shall be initiated at high
temperature.
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Table 9 Monitoring of fuel installations

Alarm conditions Comment
Fuel containment system
Level in tank IL, IR, HA alarm at 95% of tank volume
1) 1) alarm level below opening pressure of

IL, IR , HA
Tank pressure relief devices
1)
LA if vacuum protection is required
Submerged fuel pump, low level in tank LA dry running protection
without open connection to the

Hold spaces and interbarrier spaces, pressure IR
atmosphere
Fuel supply system
Fuel pump discharge lines, pressure IL, IR
Bunkering and vapour return lines, pressure IL
Gas compressor
1)
Fuel gas inlet pressure LA
1)
Fuel gas outlet pressure LA
1)
Fuel gas outlet pressure HA
1)
Compressor operation A
Bilge
Tank connection space, level in bilge well HA
Fuel preparation room, level in bilge well HA
Other spaces containing cryogenic systems, level in bilge well HA systems without secondary enclosures
Fuel heating
Heating medium temperature, at vaporizer outlet IR, LA
Loss of heating medium circulation A
Fuel supply, temperature IR, LA at the heat exchanger outlet
Ventilation
Reduced ventilation in ESD protected machinery space LA
Reduced ventilation in tank connection space LA
Reduced ventilation in fuel preparation room LA
Reduced ventilation in secondary enclosure of pipes for

LA
gaseous fuel
local alarm on both sides of air lock,

Air lock, more than one door moved from closed position A
[3.4.2.1]
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Air lock, door open at loss of ventilation A [3.4.2.5]
Malfunction of double-block-and-bleed valves A [5.1.6.10] and [5.4.1.3]
Temperature monitoring bulkhead shaft glands and bearings IR, HA
Low oxygen alarm in N2 spaces A local alarm, [5.4.2.1]

1)
Also to be indicated on bridge.
IL = local indication (presentation of values)
IR = remote indication (presentation of values) in engine control room or control location for bunkering when
specified
9.3 Fuel installation safety

9.3.1 Tank overflow protection
9.3.1.1 A level sensing device shall be provided which automatically actuates the shut-off of the flow of fuel
to the tank in a manner which will both, avoid excessive liquid pressure in the loading line and prevent the
tank from becoming liquid full. This level sensing device shall be independent of the level sensing devices
required by [9.2.1.2].
Guidance note:
The tank overflow protection shall be based on a direct reading of the level and not be based on indirect measurement of a value
that varies for each bunkering (e.g. density used for dp-cell).
9.3.1.2 Where arrangements are provided for overriding the overflow control system, they shall be such that
inadvertent operation is prevented, i.e. by interlocking the override function with the bunker valve. When
this override is operated continuous visual indication shall be provided at the navigation bridge, continuously
manned central control station or onboard safety centre. Overriding of the overflow control system when
more than one LNG fuel tank is installed will be subject to special consideration.
9.3.1.3 For tanks where submerged fuel pump motors are installed, arrangements shall be made to
automatically shut down the motors in the event of low-low liquid level. The automatic shutdown may be
accomplished by sensing low pump discharge pressure, low motor current, or low liquid level. This shutdown
shall be alarmed.
9.3.2 Safety upon gas detection
9.3.2.1
When two gas detectors in a in a tank connection space where the voting principle is applied for the gas
detection indicate a vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to
isolate the leakage.
When one gas detector in a tank connection space where self-monitoring gas detectors is used indicate a
vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the leakage.
This will in most cases require that all tank valves shall close automatically. Depending on the system
arrangement, it may also be necessary to close other valves. Any pump for cryogenic liquids located in the
tank connection space shall also be automatically shut down.
DNV AS
9.3.2.2 When two gas detectors in a in a fuel preparation room where the voting principle is applied for

the gas detection indicate a vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall result in automatic closing of all valves
required to isolate the leakage.
When one gas detector in a fuel preparation room where self-monitoring gas detectors is used indicate a
This will require that valves in the fuel system supplying liquefied or gaseous fuel to the fuel preparation
room shall close automatically. Depending on the system arrangement, it may also be necessary to close
other valves. All machinery in the space, such as compressors and pumps, shall be automatically shut down.
9.3.2.3 When two gas detectors in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel outside the machinery space
where the voting principle is applied for the gas detection indicate a vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall
result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the leakage.
When one gas detector in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel outside the machinery space where self-
monitoring gas detectors is used indicate a vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall result in automatic closing
of all valves required to isolate the leakage.
Depending on the system arrangement, this may require automatic closing of the tank valve and the master
gas fuel valve.
9.3.2.4 When two gas detectors in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel in a gas safe machinery space
When one gas detector in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel in a gas safe machinery space where self-
This will require automatic closing of the master gas fuel valve and the double-block-and-bleed valves, and
automatic opening of vent valve in fuel supply system between these valves. The pipe between the double
block and bleed valve and the gas injection valves shall also be automatically vented.
9.3.2.5 When two gas detectors in ESD protected machinery spaces where the voting principle is applied for
required to isolate the leakage without delay.
When one gas detector ESD protected machinery spaces where self-monitoring gas detectors is used indicate
a vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the
leakage without delay.
automatic opening of vent valve in fuel supply system between these valves. In addition, the safety system
shall automatically shut down the oil fuel supply for dual fuel engines and de-energize all non-explosion
protected equipment or installations in the machinery spaces.
The isolation of ignition sources shall be performed by the gas safety system via dedicated signals to the
relevant electrical circuit breakers.
9.3.3 Safety upon cryogenic leakage detection
9.3.3.1 Low temperature detection in bilge wells of tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms or other
spaces containing cryogenic systems without secondary enclosures shall result in automatic closing of all
valves necessary to isolate the leakage.
9.3.3.2 Piping in the fuel system containing cryogenic liquids shall be provided with means for detection of
leakages into the secondary enclosure. Detection of leakages shall result in automatic closing of all valves
required to isolate the leakage. Leakage detection in the secondary enclosure of the bunkering line shall
immediately result in automatic closing of the bunkering valve.
DNV AS
9.3.4 Safety fuel heating

The heated fuel in supply lines to consumers shall be provided with temperature sensors at the heat
exchanger outlet. Detection of low-low temperature shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to
stop the fuel supply to the vaporizer.
9.3.5.1 Loss of ventilation in ESD protected machinery spaces shall result in isolation of all fuel supply to the
machinery space. This will require automatic closing of the master gas fuel valve and the double-block-and-
bleed valves, and automatic opening of vent valve in fuel supply system between these valves.
9.3.5.2 Loss of ventilation in tank connection spaces shall result in automatic closing of all valves required
to isolate the fuel system from the tank. This will require that all tank valves shall close automatically, and
automatic stop of liquefied gas pumps.
9.3.5.3 Loss of ventilation in a fuel preparation room shall result in automatic closing of all valves required
to isolate the fuel system from the fuel preparation room. This will require that valves in the fuel system,
supplying liquefied or gaseous fuel to the fuel preparation room, shall close automatically. All machinery in
the space, like compressors and pumps, shall be automatically shut down.
9.3.5.4 Loss of ventilation in secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel in the machinery space shall
result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the affected fuel system from the fuel source.
automatic opening of vent valve in fuel supply system between these valves.
9.3.5.5 Loss of ventilation in the secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel outside the machinery space
shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the affected fuel system from the fuel source.
gas fuel valve.
9.3.5.6 Loss of ventilation in a non-hazardous space with air lock entrance from hazardous area on open
deck, or loss of ventilation in hazardous space with air lock entrance from a safe space, shall lead to
automatic shutdown of electrical equipment not certified for operation in zone 1 in the non-hazardous space.
9.3.6 Safety upon rupture detection

Each gas supply line entering an ESD protected machinery space, and each gas supply line to high-pressure
installations, shall be provided with means for rapid detection of a rupture in the gas line in the machinery
space. When a pipe rupture is detected, the gas supply shall be isolated from the machinery space by
automatically closing the shut-off valve located outside the machinery space.
9.3.7.1 Means of manual emergency shutdown of fuel supply to the engine room shall be provided at safe
locations on escape routes inside a machinery space containing a gas consumer, in the engine control room,
outside the machinery space, and from the navigation bridge. The activation device shall be arranged as a
physical button, duly marked and protected against inadvertent operation. The manual shutdown shall be
handled by the gas safety system, and be arranged with loop monitoring.
9.3.7.2 Closing of the bunkering shutdown valve shall be possible from the control location for bunkering.
9.3.8.1 The requirements in [9.3.1] to [9.3.7] and Table 10 specify fuel installation safety actions required to
limit the consequences of system failures.
DNV AS

complex fuel installations.
Table 10 Gas safety functions
Automatic safety action with corresponding alarm
Shutdown Shutdown Isolate Signal to other control/

Conditions Shutdown of of master of bunker ignition safety systems for
Alarm additional action
tank valves gas fuel connection sources in
1)
valve valve the space
Tank safety
Level in tank, bunkering HA X

overfill
transfer HA X
Submerged fuel pump, low- Stop fuel pumps.

LA
low level in tank
Gas detection
Tank connection space, 2 x Stop machinery in the

5) HA X
40% LEL space.
Fuel preparation room, 2 x Stop machinery in the

5) HA X
40% LEL space.
Secondary enclosure of pipes Open vent valve

for gaseous fuel outside the between master gas
HA X X
machinery space, 2 x 40% valve and DDB valves.
5)
LEL
Secondary enclosure of Open vent valve

pipes for gaseous fuel in the between master gas
HA X
machinery space, 2 x 60% valve and DDB valves.
5)
LEL
ESD protected machinery Open vent valve

5)
spaces. 2 x 40% LEL HA X X between master gas
valve and DDB valves.
Cryogenic liquid leakage detection
Tank connection space,

LA X
temperature in bilge well
Fuel preparation room,

LA X
Leakage detection in
secondary enclosure of pipes A X
2)
for cryogenic liquids
Leakage detection bunkering 3)

A X
line
Fuel heating
DNV AS

1)
Stop fuel pumps

open vent valve
Fuel supply, temperature LA X X
between master gas
Ventilation
4)
ESD protected machinery, Open vent valve

loss of ventilation A X between master gas
Tank connection space, loss Stop fuel pumps in the

of ventilation space. ESD valves for
A X pressure, temperature
or level measurement
need not close.
Fuel preparation room, loss Stop machinery in the

of ventilation space. ESD valves for
A X pressure, temperature
or level measurement
need not close.
Secondary enclosure of pipes Open vent valve

for gaseous fuel outside the between master gas
A X X
machinery space, loss of valve and DDB valves.
ventilation
Secondary enclosure of Open vent valve

pipes for gaseous fuel in the between master gas
A X
machinery space, loss of valve and DDB valves.
ventilation
Loss of ventilation in
hazardous space with air lock A X
entrance from a safe space
Loss of ventilation in non-

hazardous space with air lock
A X
entrance from hazardous
area on open deck
Rupture detection of gas pipe
Pipe in ESD protected Open vent valve

machinery space A X between master gas
High pressure pipe in gas Open vent valve

safe machinery space A X between master gas
DNV AS

1)
Manual shutdown buttons
Emergency shutdown of Open vent valve

supply to the machinery X between master gas
space valve and DDB valves.
Emergency shutdown of
X
bunkering
1) upon closure of master gas fuel valve, a signal shall be sent to the gas consumers safety system to shut down the
double block and bleed valves
2) all valves required to isolate the leakage shall close
3) alarm also to be indicated in the bunkering control location
4) safety actions upon loss of ventilation may be based on loss of running signal from ventilation fan motors
5) two independent gas detectors located close to each other are required for redundancy reasons. If the gas detector
is of self-monitoring type the installation of a single gas detector may be permitted, as long as number of detectors
as required per [9.2.4.5] is fulfilled. Self-monitoring of the gas detectors shall as minimum (but not limited to)
include earth fault, short circuit, loop failure, degraded performance etc.
10 Gas turbines and boilers
10.1 Gas fuelled boiler installations

10.1.1 General
10.1.1.1 Boiler plants built for gas operation shall satisfy the requirements as given in Pt.4 Ch.7 and shall in
addition satisfy the requirements in this section.
10.1.1.2 Alarm and safety systems shall comply with the requirements in Pt.4 Ch.9 and shall in addition
satisfy the requirements in this section.
10.1.2 Gas fuelled boilers
10.1.2.1 Each boiler shall have a dedicated forced draught system. A crossover between boiler force draught
systems may be fitted for emergency use, providing that any relevant safety functions are maintained.
10.1.2.2 Combustion chambers and uptakes of boilers shall be designed to prevent any accumulation of
gaseous fuel.
10.1.2.3 Burners shall be designed to maintain stable combustion under all firing conditions.
10.1.2.4 On main/propulsion boilers an automatic system shall be provided to change from gas fuel operation
to oil fuel operation without interruption of boiler firing.
DNV AS
10.1.2.5 Gas nozzles and the burner control system shall be configured such that gas fuel can only be ignited

by an established oil fuel flame, unless the boiler and combustion equipment is designed and approved by
the Society to light on gas fuel.
10.1.2.6 There shall be arrangements to ensure that gas fuel flow to the burner is automatically cut off
unless satisfactory ignition has been established and maintained.
10.1.2.7 On the pipe of each gas burner, a manually operated shut-off valve shall be fitted.
10.1.2.8 Provisions shall be made for automatically purging the gas supply piping to the burners, by means
of an inert gas, after the extinguishing of these burners.
10.1.2.9 The automatic fuel changeover system required by [10.1.2.4] shall be monitored with alarms to
ensure continuous availability.
10.1.2.10 Arrangements shall be made that, in case of flame failure of all operating burners, the combustion
chambers of the boilers are automatically purged before relighting.
10.1.2.11 Arrangements shall be made to enable the boilers purging sequence to be manually activated.
10.2 Gas fuelled turbines

10.2.1 General
Gas turbines shall comply with the requirements in Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.2.
10.2.2 Gas turbine arrangement
10.2.2.1 Gas turbines shall be fitted in gas-tight enclosures which are arranged in accordance with the
requirements for ESD protected machinery spaces.
10.2.2.2 For gas turbines requiring a supply of gas with pressures above 10 bar, gas piping shall be protected
with a secondary enclosure in accordance with the requirements in [5.1.5] to the extent possible.
10.2.2.3 Ventilation for the enclosure shall be as outlined in in these rules for ESD protected machinery
spaces, but shall in addition be arranged with 2 x 100% capacity fans from different electrical circuits.
10.2.2.4 Gas detection systems, disconnection and shut down functions shall be as outlined for ESD
protected machinery spaces.
10.2.2.5 For other than single fuel gas turbines, an automatic system shall be fitted to change over easily
and quickly from fuel gas operation to fuel oil operation and vice-versa with minimum fluctuation of the
engine power.
10.2.2.6 Means shall be provided to monitor and detect poor combustion that may lead to unburnt fuel gas in
the exhaust system during operation. In the event that it is detected, the fuel gas supply shall be shut down.
10.2.2.7 Unless designed with the strength to withstand the worst case over-pressure due to ignited gas
leaks, pressure relief systems shall be suitably designed and fitted to the exhaust system. Pressure relief
systems within the exhaust uptakes shall be lead to a safe location, away from personnel.
10.2.2.8 Each turbine shall be fitted with an automatic shutdown device for high exhaust temperatures.
DNV AS
11.1 Fuel containment system

11.1.1 Welding, post-weld heat treatment and NDT
Welding, post-weld heat treatment and non-destructive testing shall be in accordance with the rules in Pt.5
Ch.7 Sec.6 [5] and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [6].
11.1.2 Testing
Fuel containment system testing shall be in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [5.2.3] and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4
[5.2.4].
11.2 Fuel piping systems

11.2.1 Piping fabrication and joining details
11.2.1.1 The requirements apply to piping that contains fuel in gaseous and liquefied state.
The piping system shall be joined by welding with a minimum of flange connections. Gaskets shall be of a
type designed to prevent blow-out.
11.2.1.2 The following types of connections may be considered for direct connection of pipe lengths (without
flanges):
1) Butt-welded joints with complete penetration at the root may be used in all applications. For design
temperatures colder than -10°C, butt welds shall be either double welded or equivalent to a double
welded butt joint. This may be accomplished by use of a backing ring, consumable insert or inert gas
back-up on the first pass. For design pressures in excess of 10 bar and design temperatures of -10°C or
colder, backing rings shall be removed.
2) Slip-on welded joints with sleeves and related welding, having dimensions in accordance with recognized
standards, shall only be used for instrument lines and open-ended lines with an external diameter of 50
mm or less and design temperatures not colder than -55°C.
3) Screwed couplings complying with recognized standards shall only be used for accessory lines and
instrumentation lines with external diameters of 25 mm or less.
Guidance note:
Slip-on welded joints may be accepted for open ended piping above 50 mm diameter, given that the strength of the piping with
such a joint is sufficient for the maximum pressure it will be subjected to, and that NDT is carried out to verify the integrity.
11.2.1.3 Flanges in fuel piping shall be of the welding neck, slip-on or socket welding type. For all piping
(except open ended lines), the following restrictions apply:
1) For design temperatures < -55°C only welding neck flanges shall be used.
2) For design pressure above 10 bar, only welding neck flanges shall be used.
3) For design temperatures < -10°C slip-on flanges shall not be used in nominal sizes above 100 mm and
socket welding flanges shall not be used in nominal sizes above 50 mm.
11.2.1.4 Flanges in secondary enclosures for fuel piping shall be of the welding neck, slip-on or socket
welding type.
11.2.2.1 Welding of fuel piping shall be carried out in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [5].
DNV AS
11.2.2.2 Post-weld heat treatment shall be required for all butt welds of pipes made with carbon, carbon-

manganese and low alloy steels. The Society may waive the regulations for thermal stress relieving of pipes
with wall thickness less than 10 mm in relation to the design temperature and pressure of the piping system
concerned.
11.2.2.3 In addition to normal controls before and during the welding, and to the visual inspection of the
finished welds, as necessary for proving that the welding has been carried out correctly and according to the
regulations in this paragraph, the following tests shall be required:
Butt welds:
1) 100% radiographic or ultrasonic inspection of butt-welded joints for piping systems with
— design temperatures colder than –10°C or
— design pressure greater than 10 bar or
— gas supply pipes in ESD protected machinery spaces or
— inside diameters of more than 75 mm or
— wall thicknesses greater than 10 mm.
2) When such butt welded joints of piping sections are made by automatic welding procedures approved
by the Society, then a progressive reduction in the extent of radiographic or ultrasonic inspection can be
agreed, but in no case to less than 10% of each joint. If defects are revealed, the extent of examination
shall be increased to 100% and shall include inspection of previously accepted welds. This approval can
only be granted if well documented quality assurance procedures and records are available to assess the
ability of the manufacturer to produce satisfactory welds consistently.
3) The radiographic or ultrasonic inspection regulation may be reduced to 10% for butt-welded joints in the
outer pipe of double-walled fuel piping.
4) For secondary enclosures located inside the vacuum space of vacuum insulated tanks, the requirements
in 1) applies. The extent of examination may be reduced based on special consideration.
5) For other butt-welded joints of pipes, spot radiographic or ultrasonic inspection or other non-destructive
tests shall be carried out, depending upon service, position and materials. In general, at least 10% of
butt-welded joints of pipes shall be subjected to radiographic or ultrasonic inspection.
Fillet welds:
1) Welds for gas fuel pipes shall be subjected to 100% radiographic or ultrasonic testing.
2) For other welded joints of pipes, spot radiographic or ultrasonic inspection or other non-destructive tests
shall be carried out, depending upon service, position and materials. At least 10% of welded joints of
pipes shall be subjected to radiographic or ultrasonic inspection.
11.2.2.4 The radiographs shall be assessed according to ISO 10675 and shall at least meet the criteria for
level 1 . Ultrasonic testing shall be assessed according to ISO 11666 and shall at least meet the criteria for
level 2.
11.2.3 Hydrostatic testing
11.2.3.1 The requirements for testing in this section apply to fuel piping inside and outside the fuel tanks.
However, relaxation from these requirements for piping inside fuel tanks and open ended piping may be
accepted by the Society.
11.2.3.2 After completion of manufacture, but before insulation and coating, fuel piping shall be subjected to
a hydrostatic test to at least 1.5 times the design pressure in presence of the surveyor.
11.2.3.3 Joints welded on board shall be hydrostatically tested to at least 1.5 times the design pressure.
11.2.3.4 After assembly on board, the fuel piping system shall be subjected to a leak test using air, or other
suitable medium to a pressure depending on the leak detection method applied.
DNV AS
11.2.3.5 Secondary enclosures for high-pressure fuel piping shall be pressure tested to the expected

maximum pressure at pipe rupture, but minimum 10 bar. Secondary enclosures for low pressure fuel piping
shall be tightness tested.
11.2.3.6 Secondary enclosures located inside the vacuum space of vacuum insulated tanks shall be pressure
tested to 1.5 times the design pressure. Pneumatic testing may be accepted based on a safety assessment of
the test procedure.
11.2.4 Functional testing

Fuel piping systems, including valves, fittings and associated equipment, shall be function tested under
normal operating conditions.
11.3 Valves
11.3.1 Testing
11.3.1.1 Each type of valve intended to be used at a working temperature below -55°C shall be subject to
prototype testing as given in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.1].
11.3.1.2 All valves shall be subject to production testing as given in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.1.2].
11.4 Expansion bellows

11.4.1 Testing
Expansion bellows intended for use in fuel systems shall be prototype tested as given in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5
[13.2], with the following modification of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.2.1]: elements of the bellows, not pre-
compressed, but axially restrained shall be pressure tested at not less than five times the design pressure
without bursting. The duration of the test shall not be less than five minutes.
11.5 Pumps
11.5.1 Testing
Pumps shall be tested in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.5].
11.6 Shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems

11.6.1 Testing
The closing characteristics of shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems operated by the safety
system shall be tested to demonstrate compliance with [5.1.6.16]. The shutdown valves with actuators shall
be function tested when the valve is subjected to full working pressure. The testing may be carried out on
board after installation.
11.7 Onboard testing

11.7.1 General
11.7.1.1 Control, monitoring and safety systems required by these rules, shall be tested on board in
accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.1 [4.4].
11.7.1.2 The functionality of the cause and effect diagram required by Table 2 shall be tested on board.
DNV AS
SECTION 6 LOW FLASHPOINT LIQUID FUELLED ENGINES -

LFL FUELLED AND GASOLINE REFUELLING AND STORAGE
INSTALLATIONS - GASOLINE INST
1 General
1.1 Objective
The additional class notation LFL fuelled provides criteria for the arrangement and installation of machinery
for propulsion and auxiliary purposes, using low flash point liquids (LFLs) as fuel, which will have an
equivalent level of integrity in terms of safety and availability as that which can be achieved with new and
comparable conventional oil-fuelled main and auxiliary machinery.
The additional class notation Gasoline INST defines the conditions for arrangement of the separate spaces
for the refuelling and storage installations for gasoline used to fuel crafts stored on board DNV classed
vessels.
1.2 Scope
The scope for additional class notation LFL fuelled includes requirements from the vessel's LFL fuel
bunkering connection up to and including the consumers. The rules in this section have requirements
for arrangement and location of fuel tanks and all spaces with fuel piping and installations, including
requirements for entrances to such spaces. Hazardous areas and spaces due to the fuel installations are
defined. Requirements for control, monitoring and safety systems for the fuel installations are included,
also additional monitoring requirements for engines and pumps. For tank design and piping detail, design
reference is in general made to Pt.5 Ch.6. Requirements for manufacture, workmanship and testing are
included, mainly referring to details given in Pt.5 Ch.6. Bunkering procedures are required to be approved,
however, bunkering processes are not part of the scope for this section of the rules.
The scope for class notation Gasoline INST includes requirements for the design and arrangements of
storage tanks for gasoline not intended for use for the vessel’s propulsion and power generation, the
arrangement of piping systems for transfer and filling of gasoline and spaces where such tanks and piping
systems are installed.
1.3 Application
The additional class notation LFL fuelled is applicable for installations where methyl alcohol or ethyl alcohol
is used as fuel. Methyl alcohol is a chemical within the formula CH3OH, also known as methanol. Ethyl alcohol
is a chemical within the formula C2H5OH, also known as ethanol. If other low flash point fuel types are
used, then special consideration will need to be taken, and additional requirements may be relevant. Special
applications depending on ship type are covered in [12]. Vessels built in accordance with the requirements
in this section will be assigned the class notation LFL fuelled. The use of other low flash point liquid fuels
is covered by the IGF-code /SOLAS II-1/G/56 and 57. However, alcohols are covered by the guidelines
developed as a supplement to the code.
The class notation Gasoline INST is applicable to vessels where gasoline is stored for the intention of
refuelling work boats, pleasure crafts or other devices carried on board or served from the vessel.
1.4 Class notations

Ships complying with the requirements as specified in this section may be assigned the class notations as
listed in Table 1.
DNV AS
Table 1 Class notations

LFL fuelled <None> Application of low flashpoint Mandatory when installed.

Mandatory: liquids as fuel..
yes
These rules
FIS requirements:
Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 and Pt.7
Ch.1 Sec.4
Gasoline INST <None> Low flashpoint liquid fuel

Mandatory: storage and bunkering
installations.
no
These rules
FIS requirements:
NA

1.5.1 Definition of terms
Term Definition
accommodation spaces spaces used for public spaces, corridors, lavatories, cabins, offices, hospitals, cinemas,
game and hobby rooms, barber shops, pantries containing no cooking appliances and
similar spaces
control stations spaces in which the ship's radio or main navigating equipment or the emergency source
of power is located or where the fire recording or fire control equipment is centralized
Spaces where the fire recording or fire control equipment is centralized are also
considered to be a fire control station
Guidance note:
This does not include special fire control equipment that can be most practically located in
the cargo area (if the vessel is a cargo ship).
control systems systems providing control and monitoring for bunkering, LFL storage and LFL supply to
machinery
dual fuel engines engines that can burn LFL fuel and fuel oil simultaneously and in a wide variety of
proportions, or can operate either on oil fuel or LFL
DNV AS
Term Definition

enclosed hazardous space any space within which, in the absence of artificial ventilation, the ventilation will be
limited and any explosive atmosphere will not be dispersed naturally
Guidance note:
engine room means any machinery spaces containing LFL fuelled engines
fuel can in this section be read as LFL fuel
fuel containment system arrangement for the storage of fuel, including cofferdams around storage tanks
fuel preparation room any space containing equipment for fuel preparation purposes, such as fuel pumps, fuel
valve train, heat exchangers or filters
hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is or may be expected to be present, in
quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use
of electrical apparatus
Hazardous areas are divided into zone 0, 1 and 2 as defined below and according to the
area classification specified in [6.2]
Zone 0 = Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously

or is present for long periods.
Zone 1 = Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in
normal operation.
Zone 2 = Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur
in normal operation and, if it does occur, is likely to do so only
infrequently and will exist for a short period only.
Guidance note:
The definition of hazardous area is only related to the risk of explosion. In this context,
health, safety and environmental issues, i.e. toxicity, is not considered.
high risk fire areas cargo areas for carriage of dangerous goods and cargo decks for cars with fuel in the
tanks
machinery spaces machinery spaces of category A and other spaces containing propulsion machinery,
boilers, oil fuel units, steam and internal combustion engines, generators and major
electrical machinery, oil filling stations, refrigerating, stabilizing, ventilation and air
conditioning machinery, and similar spaces, and trunks to such spaces
non-hazardous area area not considered to be hazardous, i.e. gas safe, provided certain conditions are being
met
open deck means a weather deck or a deck that is open at one or both ends and equipped with
adequate natural ventilation that is effective over the entire length of the deck through
permanent openings distributed in the side panels or in the deck above
safety systems for bunkering, LFL storage and LFL supply to machinery
service spaces spaces outside the cargo area used for galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances,
lockers, mail and specie rooms, store rooms, workshops other than those forming part of
the machinery spaces and similar spaces and trunks to such spaces
DNV AS
Term Definition

low flashpoint liquid liquid with a vapour pressure of less than 2.8 bar absolute at a temperature of 38.7°C
and having a flashpoint less than 60°C
1.5.2 Abbreviations
The abbreviations described in Table 3 are used in this document.
Abbreviation Description
LFL low flashpoint liquid

1.6.1.1 Documentation for LFL fuelled shall be submitted as required by Table 4.
Propulsion Z050 – Design philosophy Including information on the machinery configuration, engine
and steering room arrangements, fuel arrangements, shut down philosophy,
FI
arrangements, redundancy considerations, etc.
general
LFL system Z030 – Arrangement plan Arrangement plan to be in profile and plan views including:
— machinery and boiler spaces, accommodation, service and
control station spaces
— fuel tanks and containment systems
— fuel bunkering pipes with shore connections
— tank hatches, ventilation pipes and any other openings to the AP
fuel tanks
— ventilating pipes, door and opening to fuel preparation rooms,
double walled piping and other hazardous areas
— entrances, air inlets and openings to accommodation, service
and control station spaces
— WT divisions.
Z253 - Test procedure for Including testing of safety shutdowns in accordance with the cause
AP
quay and sea trial and effect diagram.
Z161 – Operation manual See [10]. AP
DNV AS

LFL tanks C030 - Detailed drawing Including:
— tanks
— LFL fuel design density
— design vapour pressure, Ppv
— cofferdam design purpose (e.g filling with water) AP
— supports and stays
— insulation
— tank hatches, pipes and any opening to the tanks
— secondary barriers.
C040 - Design analysis

Independent tanks: specification of design loads and structural
AP
analysis of fuel tanks.
Integral tanks: covered by hull structures analyses.
S011 - Piping and Purging and gas freeing system including safety relief valves and
instrumentation diagram (P associated piping. AP
& ID)
Z030 - Arrangement plan Overview of tanks with all tank connections and tank connection
FI
space.
Z110 - Data sheet Pressure/vacuum relief valves and associated piping. FI
H132 - Tank testing plan AP
M150 - Non-destructive
AP
testing (NDT) plan
LFL control I200 - Control and Control and monitoring of fuel system, including:
and monitoring system
— tank level monitoring
monitoring documentation
— tank system control and monitoring AP
system
— bunkering control
— fuel supply control and monitoring.
I260 - Field instruments

AP
periodic test plan
LFL safety G130 - Cause and effect Covering the safety function given by Table 8. Including interfaces
AP
system diagram to other safety and control systems.
I200 - Control and Safety system covering the requirements given Table 8.
documentation
I260 - Field instruments

AP
periodic test plan
LFL piping S011 - Piping and Including ventilation lines for pressure/vacuum relief valves or
system instrumentation diagram (P similar piping, and ducts for fuel pipes. AP
& ID)
S060 - Pipe routing sketch FI
DNV AS

S090 - Specification of Including expansion elements.
pipes, valves, flanges and FI
fittings
Z100 - Specification Electrical bonding of piping. AP
Z265 - Calculation report Stress analysis for piping with operating pressure above 300 bar.
LFL drip trays Z030 - Arrangement plan Fuel system drip trays and coamings where leakages may be
AP
anticipated.
LFL Cooling S011 - Piping and

system instrumentation diagram (P AP
& ID)
LFL Heating S011- Piping and

system instrumentation diagram (P AP
& ID)
Hazardous G080 - Hazardous area

areas classification drawing AP
classification
Air lock Z030 - Arrangement plan Location and construction details, including alarm equipment.
AP
arrangement
Ventilation S012 - Ducting diagram For spaces containing LFL installations, like LFL pipe ducts and fuel
systems preparation rooms. Including capacity and location of fans and
for gas fuel their motors. AP
system
spaces
Ventilation I200 - Control and Including detection of ventilation function, safety actions and
control and monitoring sequences, arrangement of powering of fans, etc.
AP
monitoring
system
Explosion Z030 - Arrangement plan An approved hazardous area classification drawing where location
(Ex) of electric equipment is added (except battery room, paint stores FI
protection and gas bottle store).
E090 - Table of Ex- Based on approved area classification.

AP
installation
E250 - Explosion protected Electrical equipment in hazardous areas.

equipment maintenance FI
manual
Hydrocarbon I200 - Control and Including fixed liquid leakage detection system.
gas detection monitoring system AP
and alarm documentation
system, fixed
Z030 - Arrangement plan Detectors, call points and alarm devices. Including fixed liquid
AP
leakage detection.
Structural fire G060 - Structural fire

protection protection drawing AP
arrangements
DNV AS

Bunkering G200 - Fixed fire Not applicable for tankers.
station fire extinguishing system
AP
extinguishing documentation
system
Fire detection I200 - Control and

and alarm monitoring system AP
Z030 - Arrangement plan AP
Fire Z030 - Arrangement plan At bunkering stations and entrance to engine rooms.
extinguishing
AP
equipment,
mobile
Inert gas/ S011 - Piping and

nitrogen instrumentation diagram (P AP
system & ID)
Inert gas I200 - Control and

control and monitoring system
AP
system
AP = for approval
FI = for information
ACO = as carried out
L = local handling
R = on request
TA = covered by type approval
VS = vessel specific.
1.6.1.2 Documentation for Gasoline INST notation shall be submitted as required by Table 5.
Gasoline S010 - Piping diagram Including piping for supply and filling.
AP
piping system
Gasoline Storage of gasoline fuel in tank.

AP
storage tank
Gasoline Storage and safety measures including procedures during

storage operations. AP
arrangement
Gasoline room
hazardous AP
zones
Ventilation S012 - Ducting diagram AP
Drainage S010 - Piping diagram AP
DNV AS

Air pipes S010 - Piping diagram Tank ventilation. AP
Sounding S010 - Piping diagram

AP
system
Operation Gasoline filling, storage, transfer and handling.

AP
manual
Pump G200 - Fixed fire For pump room, as installed. For approval when DNV issues the
room fire extinguishing system safety certificates.
AP
system
AP = for approval
Sec.6.
1.6.1.5 An operation manual as described in [10] shall be kept on board.
during the tests. Test intervals for shutdown inputs and outputs (as required by Table 8) shall not exceed
6 months. For other signals the test intervals shall not exceed 12 months. The plan shall be included in the
vessel’s maintenance plan required by Pt.7.
Guidance note:
1.6.2.1 Components in the LFL fuel and gasoline installation systems shall have compliance documents
according to Pt.4 Ch.6 as applicable for fuel oil systems. Components in the nitrogen system shall have
compliance documents as specified in Pt.5 Ch.6 Sec.16. Engines shall have compliance documents according
to Pt.4 Ch.3. For other items, see Table 6.
1.6.2.2 For a definition of the compliance document types, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.3.
1)
Object Compliance Compliance standard Additional description
document
type
Electric motors and PC Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.

motor starters
TAC
LFL control and

monitoring safety PC
system
LFL safety system PC
DNV AS
1)
Object Compliance Compliance standard Additional description

document
type
Pumps PC Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.6.
Pressure/vacuum
TAC
valves
Portable fuel tanks Rule application for certification will be decided

PC
upon type of tank chosen.
Process pressure Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.7.

PC
vessels
Valves in fuel For valves with design pressure higher than 10 bar.
PC
system
Valves in fuel For valves with design pressure equal to or lower

PD
system than 10 bar.
Expansion bellows Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.6.

TAC Product certificate issued by Society may also be
accepted in lieu of TAC.
Flexible hoses with Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.6.

TAC
couplings
Gas detection and Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9.

alarm system, PC
fixed
1)
Unless otherwise stated the compliance standard is the rules.
Table 7 Compliance documents of material quality and testing
Compliance Compliance Nominal

document type standard diameter [mm]
Pipes MC Pressure
MD Open ended
MD Secondary enclosures
Flanges and bolts MTR
Bodies of valves and MD Pressure >100

2)
fittings , pump housings, Steel, nodular
other pressure containing MTR cast-iron Pressure <100
components not considered grade 1 and 2
MTR Open ended
as pressure vessels
MD Pressure >50
MTR Copper alloys Pressure <50
MTR Open ended
DNV AS
Compliance Compliance Nominal

document type standard diameter [mm]
MC = material certificate, MD = material declaration, MTR = material test report

1)
Unless otherwise specified, the compliance standard is the rules.
2)
When fittings are made from plates or pipes, the certification requirements for pipes shall be applied also for the pipe
fittings.
2 Materials
2.1 General
2.1.1 General
2.1.1.1 Metallic materials shall be in accordance with the requirements in Pt.2.
2.1.1.2 Materials other than those covered by Pt.2 may be accepted subject to approval in each separate
case.
2.1.1.3 When selecting construction materials in detachable equipment units in tanks and cofferdams, due
consideration should be paid to the contact spark-producing properties.
2.1.2 Fuel tanks
2.1.2.1 Materials for integral tanks and independent tanks shall be selected in accordance with ordinary
practice as given in Pt.3 Ch.3 Sec.1 for hull materials.
2.1.2.2 Materials for pressure vessels containing LFL shall be as given in Pt.2 Ch.2 Sec.3.
2.1.3 Fuel piping
2.1.3.1 Materials for fuel pipes shall be as given in Pt.2 Ch.2 Sec.5.
2.1.3.2 Materials in LFL piping systems shall be provided with documentation as required for cargo piping in
accordance with Pt.5 Ch.6.
2.1.4 Gasoline installation

Gasoline installations shall comply with the materials requirements described in [2].
3 Arrangement and design
3.1 General
3.1.1 General
3.1.1.1 The propulsion and fuel supply system shall be so designed that the remaining power after any
safety actions required by Table 8 shall be sufficient to maintain propulsion, power generation and other main
functions as defined in Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1 [1.2].
DNV AS
3.1.1.2 Drip trays shall be installed below all possible leakage points in the fuel system. Each tray shall

have a sufficient capacity to ensure that the maximum amount of spill expected can be handled. Means for
preventing backflow into the trays shall be provided.
3.1.1.3 All fuel piping, hoses and tanks shall be electrically bonded to the ship's hull. Bonding straps across
stainless steel flanges with bolts and nuts of stainless steel are not required. If carbon-manganese steel
is not fitted with bonding straps across the flanges, it shall be checked for electric bonding. The electrical
6
bonding is sufficient, when the electrical resistance between piping and the hull does not exceed 10 Ohm.
LFL piping components which are not permanently connected to the hull by permanent piping connections,
shall be electrically bonded to the hull by special bonding straps.
Guidance note:
6
The value of resistance 10 Ohm may be achieved without the use of bonding straps where LFL piping systems and equipment are
directly, or via their supports, either welded or bolted to the hull of the ship. It will be generally necessary initially to achieve a
6
resistance value below 10 Ohm, to allow for deterioration in service.
3.1.1.4 Bilge systems installed in spaces with LFL fuel installations shall be segregated from other bilge
systems. The system shall be remotely operated from outside the space.
3.1.1.5 Minimum one holding tank shall be provided for collecting drainage and any possible leakage of
methyl/ethyl alcohol from fuel pumps, valves or from double walled inner pipes, located in enclosed spaces.
Means shall be provided for safely transferring such contaminated liquids to onshore reception facilities.
3.1.1.6 Redundancy requirements apply as follows:

— redundancy requirements as given in Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.3 [2.3] and SOLAS II-1 Reg. 26.3 apply.

Gasoline installations shall comply with the general arrangement and design requirements described in
[3.1.1.3], [3.1.1.4] and [3.1.1.5].
3.2 Fuel storage

3.2.1 Location of fuel tanks
3.2.1.1 Fuel tanks shall not be located within machinery spaces of category A, accommodation spaces or
spaces which are not defined and arranged as hazardous zone 1, see [6.2.2.2].
3.2.1.2 Location of other tanks containing LFL-fuel, e.g. drain tanks, shall follow requirements defined in
[3.2.1.1].
3.2.1.3 Minimum distance between the fuel tank and fuel pipes and the ship's side shell shall be at least 800
mm when situated above lowest possible waterline.
3.2.1.4 The spaces forward of the collision bulkhead (forepeak) and aft of the aftermost bulkhead (afterpeak)
shall not be used as fuel tanks or cofferdams.
3.2.1.5 For vessels operating only on LFL fuel, at least two LFL fuel tanks shall be provided. Each tank shall
have a capacity sufficient for continuous rating of the propulsion plant and normal operating load at sea of
the generator plant for a period of not less than eight (8) hours.
3.2.1.6 Fuel tanks shall not be accepted in the double bottom on chemical tankers.
DNV AS
3.2.2 Segregation of fuel tanks

3.2.2.1 Integral fuel tanks shall be surrounded by protective cofferdams, except on those surfaces bound
by shell plating below the lowest possible waterline, other fuel tanks containing methyl/ethyl alcohol, or fuel
preparation space.
Guidance note:
MSC.1/Circ. 1621 is currently not aligned with the IBC code requirements pertaining to the toxicity of methyl alcohol. Therefore,
for oil and chemical tankers certified for the carriage of low-flashpoint cargo, it may be accepted that boundaries bound by cargo
tanks are not provided with protective cofferdams. Such an arrangement will however require the approval of the relevant flag
state.
3.2.2.2 Cofferdams shall be arranged with vapour and liquid leakage detection and a possibility for water
filling or inert gas purging upon detection of leakage. Water filling of cofferdams shall be arranged without
permanent connections to water systems. Emptying shall be done with a separate system. If bilge ejectors
are used for this purpose, they shall not be permanently connected to the drive water system.
3.2.3 Gas freeing, inerting and venting of fuel tanks
3.2.3.1 Fuel tanks shall be provided with an arrangement for inert gas purging and gas freeing.
3.2.3.2 Fuel tanks shall have a sufficient number of ventilation inlets and outlets to ensure complete gas-
freeing. Outlets for ventilation and purging shall be fitted with flame screens of approved type, see IMO MSC/
Circ.677.
3.2.3.3 The tanks shall have controlled venting, i.e. be fitted with pressure/vacuum (p/v) relief valves. If p/
v valves are fitted to the end of the vent pipes they shall be of the high velocity type certified for endurance
burning in accordance with IMO MSC/Circ.677. If p/v valves are fitted in the ventline, the vent outlet shall be
fitted with a flame arrestor certified for endurance burning in accordance with IMO MSC/Circ.677.
3.2.3.4 The set pressure of the p/v-valves shall be minimum 0.2 bar.
3.2.3.5 Vent outlets from p/v valves and outlets for purging shall be led to open air and located so that the
hazardous zone associated with the outlets does not conflict with ventilation inlets or outlets for gas safe
spaces or equipment representing sources of ignition.
The venting system shall be connected to the highest point of each fuel tank and vent lines shall be self-
draining under all normal operating conditions of list and trim.
Guidance note:
An alternative arrangement where inline PV-valves with outlets routed below waterline will be accepted.
Such venting arrangements will not require the PV-valves to be located on open deck.
3.2.3.6 Shut-off valves shall not be fitted above or below pressure/vacuum safety valves, but by-pass valves
with interlocks may be provided.
3.2.3.7 The venting system shall be designed with redundancy for the relief of full flow overpressure and
vacuum. In lieu of duplicating p/v valves, pressure sensors fitted in each fuel tank, and connected to an
alarm system, may be accepted. The opening pressure of the vacuum relief valves shall not be lower than
0.07 bar below atmospheric pressure.
3.2.3.8 Pressure/vacuum safety valves shall be located on open deck and shall be of a type which allows the
functioning of the valve to be easily checked.
DNV AS
3.2.3.9 Intake openings of pressure/vacuum relief valves shall be located at least 1.5 m above weather deck,

and shall be protected against the sea.
3.2.3.10 Fuel tank vent outlets shall be situated not less than 3 m above the deck or gangway if located
within 4 m from such gangways. The fuel tank vent outlets are also to be arranged at a distance of at least
15 m from the nearest air intake or opening to accommodation and service spaces. The vapour discharge
shall be directed upwards in the form of unimpeded jets.
3.2.3.11 The vent system shall be sized, allowing for flame arrestors, if fitted, to permit filling at 125% of the
design rate without overpressurising the tank.
3.2.3.12 The arrangement for gas freeing fuel tanks shall be such as to minimize the hazards due to the
dispersal of flammable vapours in the atmosphere and to flammable vapour mixtures in a fuel tank. The
ventilating system used for gas freeing of fuel tanks shall be used exclusively for ventilating purposes.
Connection between fuel tank and fuel preparation room ventilation will not be accepted. Ventilation fans
may be fixed or portable.
Guidance note:
Other equivalent methods and arrangement for gas freeing will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
3.2.3.13 Gas freeing of fuel tanks shall be carried out in a way that flammable atmosphere in the tank
is avoided, i.e. by purging tank with inert gas until gas content is below 2% before ventilation with air is
started.
Purging and gas freeing operations shall be carried out such that vapour is initially discharged in one of the
following ways:
.1 through outlets at least 3 m above the deck level with a vertical efflux velocity of at least 30 m/s
maintained during the gas freeing operation
.2 through outlets at least 3 m above the deck level with a vertical efflux velocity of at least 20 m/s which are
protected by suitable devices to prevent the passage of flame, or
.3 through outlets underwater.
Guidance note:
When the flammable vapour concentration at the outlets has been reduced to 30% of the lower flammable limit, gas freeing may
thereafter be continued at deck level.
3.2.4 Nitrogen piping system

Nitrogen pipes shall only be led through well ventilated spaces. Nitrogen pipes in enclosed spaces should:
.1 have only a minimum of flange connections as needed for fitting of valves and be fully welded; and
.2 be as short as possible.
3.2.5 Fuel tanks on weather deck
3.2.5.1 LFL fuel tanks on open deck shall be protected against mechanical damage.
3.2.5.2 LFL fuel tanks on open deck shall be surrounded by coamings.
3.2.5.3 Special considerations shall be taken to minimize any fire hazards adjacent to the fuel tanks on
weather deck. Protection of the LFL fuel tanks from possible fires on board may be subject to a fire safety
assessment in each particular case.
DNV AS
3.2.6 Portable fuel tanks

3.2.6.1 Fuel systems utilising portable storage tanks will be specially considered, and shall have equivalent
safety as permanent fuel tanks.
3.2.6.2 Portable fuel tanks shall be certified by the Society.
3.2.6.3 The tank support (container frame or truck chassis) shall be designed for the intended purpose.
3.2.6.4 The tank hold space shall be arranged in accordance with requirements for fuel preparation rooms.
3.2.6.8 The pressure/vacuum relief system of portable tanks shall be connected to a fixed venting system.
3.2.6.9 Control and monitoring systems for portable fuel tanks shall be integrated in the ship's control and
monitoring system. Safety system for portable fuel tanks shall be integrated in the ship's gas safety system
(e.g. shutdown systems for tank valves, leak/gas detection systems).
When connected to the ship's fuel piping system:
1) each portable tank shall be capable of being isolated at any time
2) isolation of one tank shall not impair the availability of the remaining portable tanks and
3) the tank shall not exceed its filling limits.

Gasoline installations shall comply with fuel storage arrangement described in [3.2.1.1], [3.2.1.3], [3.2.2],
[3.2.3] and [3.2.6].
3.3 Fuel transfer and supply

3.3.1 Piping systems
3.3.1.1 The fuel system shall be entirely separate from all other piping systems on board.
3.3.1.2 The piping shall be located no less than 800 mm from the ship side.
3.3.1.3 An arrangement for purging and gas freeing of fuel bunkering-, supply-, return- and vent lines with
nitrogen shall be provided.
3.3.1.4 The fuel piping system shall be dimensioned as given in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9. The design pressure p is the
maximum working pressure to which the system may be subjected. The design pressure for fuel piping is as
a minimum to be taken as 10 bar.
DNV AS
3.3.1.5 It shall be possible to drain all fuel pipes to suitable fuel or collecting tanks by gravity in normal

condition of trim and list of the ship.
Guidance note:
Alternative arrangements for draining the piping requires acceptance by the administration.
3.3.1.6 Filling lines to fuel tanks shall be so arranged that the generation of static electricity is reduced, e.g.
by reducing the free fall into the tank to a minimum.
3.3.1.7 Fuel pipes shall be colour marked based on a recognized standard.

Guidance note:
See EN ISO 14726:2008 Ships and marine technology - Identification colours for the content of piping systems.
3.3.1.8 All pumps in the fuel system shall be protected against running dry (i.e. protected against operation
in the absence of fuel or service fluid). All pumps capable of developing a pressure exceeding the design
pressure of the system shall be provided with relief valves. Each relief valve shall be in closed circuit, i.e.
arranged to discharge back to the piping upstream of the suction side of the pump and to effectively limit the
pump discharge pressure to the design pressure of the system.
3.3.2 Protection of fuel piping system
3.3.2.1 Fuel piping shall be protected against mechanical damage.

Fuel pipes lead through ro-ro spaces on open deck shall be provided with guards or bollards to prevent
vehicle collision damage. Fuel pipes in other types of cargo areas with risk of damage from cargo operations
shall be similarly protected. Fuel pipes in double ducts in other areas are regarded as sufficiently protected.
3.3.2.2 All piping containing LFL that pass through enclosed spaces in the ship shall be enclosed in a pipe
that is gas tight and water tight towards the surrounding spaces with the LFL contained in the inner pipe.
Such double walled piping is not required in cofferdams surrounding fuel tanks, fuel preparation rooms, fuel
tank hold spaces or other hazardous fuel treatment spaces as the boundaries for these spaces will serve as a
second barrier.
3.3.2.3 Fuel piping shall not be lead through accommodation spaces, service spaces or control stations. In
cases where fuel piping shall be led through accommodation spaces, the double walled fuel piping shall be led
through a dedicated duct. The duct shall be of substantial construction and be gas tight and water tight.
3.3.2.4 The annular space in the double walled fuel pipe shall have mechanical ventilation of underpressure
type with a capacity of minimum 30 air changes per hour. Ventilation inlets and outlets shall be located in
open air. The annular space shall be equipped with vapour detection and shall be connected to a suitable
draining tank allowing the collection and the detection of any possible leakage.
Guidance note:
Other arrangements may be accepted by the Flag administration.
3.3.2.5 Inerting of the annular space may be accepted as an alternative to ventilation as required in
[3.3.2.4]. Appropriate means of detecting leakage into the annular space shall be provided. Suitable alarms
shall be provided to indicate a loss of inert gas pressure between the pipes.
3.3.2.6 The outer pipe in the double walled fuel pipes shall be dimensioned for a design pressure not less
than the maximum working pressure of the fuel pipes. As an alternative the calculated maximum built up
pressure in the duct in the case of a pipe rupture may be used for dimensioning of the duct.
DNV AS
3.3.2.7 The annular space in the double walled fuel piping shall be segregated at the engine room bulkhead.

This means that there shall be no common ducting between the engine room and other spaces.
3.3.2.8 There shall be no openings between the annular space in the double walled fuel piping and enclosed
spaces in the ship.
Guidance note:
Fuel valves in such spaces may be accessible through a bolted opening that is both gas tight and water tight when sealed.
3.3.3 Valves
3.3.3.1 Valves that are required to be operated during normal operation and which are not readily accessible
shall be remotely operated. Regarding automatic operation of tank valves, see Table 8.
3.3.3.2 . Each fuel supply line to engine rooms shall be equipped with an automatically operated master LFL
fuel valve. The valve shall be situated outside the engine room. The master LFL fuel valve shall automatically
stop the fuel supply to the engine room as specified in Table 8. The valve arrangement mentioned in
[3.3.3.6] may be used to perform the function of the master valve.
3.3.3.3 There shall be one manually operated shutdown valve in the LFL supply line to each engine to assure
safe isolation during maintenance on the engine.
3.3.3.5 The fuel supply line to each consumer shall be provided with double-block-and-bleed valves. These
the engine. An alarm for faulty operation of the valves shall be provided.
Guidance note:
Block valves open and bleed valve open is an alarm condition. Similarly, engine stopped and block valves open is an alarm
condition.
3.3.3.6 Valves shall fail to a safe position.

Guidance note:
'Fail to close' is generally considered to be the safe mode.
3.3.4 Pipe connections
3.3.4.1 Piping systems in fuel tanks and their cofferdams shall have no connections with piping systems in
the rest of the ship, apart from fuel pipes which shall be arranged as specified in other parts of this section.
3.3.4.2 Fuel piping shall not penetrate fuel tank boundaries below the top of the tank. However, penetrations
below the top of the tank may be accepted provided that a remotely operated shut-off valve is fitted within
the fuel tank served. Where a fuel tank is adjacent to a preparation room, the remotely operated stop valve
may be fitted on the fuel tank bulkhead on the preparation room side.
3.3.4.3 Fuel piping system shall be installed with sufficient flexibility. Expansion bellows shall not be used in
the inner pipe.
DNV AS
3.3.5 LFL fuel preparation rooms

3.3.5.1 Any fuel preparation room shall be located outside the engine room, be gas tight and water tight to
surrounding enclosed spaces.
3.3.5.2 The preparation room shall be provided with leakage detection, both for gases and liquids.
3.3.5.3 LFL preparation rooms shall be provided with a dedicated bilge system, operable from outside the
preparation room. Bilge ejectors serving hazardous spaces shall not be permanently connected to the drive
water system. The bilge system may have possibilities for discharge to a suitable cargo tank, slop tank or
similar, however taking into account hazards related to incompatibility.
3.3.6 LFL fuel heating or cooling
3.3.6.1 The heating or cooling medium shall be compatible with the fuel and the temperature of the heating
medium shall not exceed 220°C.
3.3.6.2 The heating or cooling system shall be arranged as a secondary system independent of other ship's
services.
3.3.6.3 The heating or cooling system expansion tank shall be fitted with a gas detector and low level alarm
and be vented to open air.
Guidance note:
Other equivalent methods and arrangement for gas detection will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Gasoline INST shall comply with fuel transfer and supply requirements described in [3.3.1], [3.3.2.1]
through [3.3.2.6] and , [3.3.2.8], , [3.3.3.1], [3.3.3.4], [3.3.3.6], [3.3.4] and [3.3.5].
3.4 Access
3.4.1 Access to fuel tanks and cofferdams
3.4.1.1 For safe access, horizontal hatches or openings to or within fuel tanks or cofferdams shall have a
minimum clear opening of 600 × 600 mm that also facilitates the hoisting of an injured person from the
bottom of the tank/cofferdam. For access through vertical openings providing main passage through the
length and breadth within cargo tanks and cofferdams, the minimum clear opening shall not be less than
600 × 800 mm at a height of not more than 600 mm from bottom plating unless gratings or footholds are
provided. Smaller openings may be accepted provided evacuation of an injured person from the bottom of
the tank/cofferdam can be demonstrated.
3.4.1.2 Tanks shall be arranged for closed portable gas detection prior to opening.
3.4.1.3 Fuel tanks and surrounding cofferdams shall have suitable access from open deck for cleaning and
gas-freeing, except as given in [3.4.1.4] and [3.4.1.5] below.
3.4.1.4 For fuel tanks without direct access from open deck, the arrangement shall be such that before
opening any tank access located in enclosed spaces, the tanks shall be completely free of flammable gas or
other gases that represent a hazard to the crew.
3.4.1.5 For fuel tanks and cofferdams without direct access from open deck, the entry space shall comply
with the following:
— The entry space shall be well ventilated (minimum six air changes/hour).
DNV AS
— The entry space shall be fitted with a low oxygen alarm and a gas detection alarm.

— The entry space shall have sufficient open area around the fuel tank hatch for efficient evacuation and
rescue operations.
— Entry from accommodation spaces, service spaces, control stations and machinery spaces of category A
will not be accepted.
— Entry from cargo areas may be accepted if the area is cleared of cargo and cargo operations may be
suspended during tank entry.
3.4.2 Access to fuel preparation rooms

Entrance to the preparation rooms shall be from open deck. Access from an enclosed space through an air
lock may be accepted upon special considerations. If accepted, airlocks shall comply with the requirements
as given in Sec.5 [3.4].

Gasoline installations shall comply with access requirements described in [3.4.1] and [3.4.2].
3.5 Ventilation of hazardous spaces containing LFL fuel installations

3.5.1 General
3.5.1.3 The required capacity of the ventilation plant is based on the total volume of the room. An increase in
required ventilation capacity may be necessary for rooms having a complicated form.
3.5.2 Hazardous spaces
3.5.2.1 Air inlets for hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from areas which, in the absence of the
considered inlet, would be non-hazardous. Air inlets for non-hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from
non-hazardous areas at least 1.5 m away from the boundaries of any hazardous area. Where the inlet duct
passes through a more hazardous space, the duct shall have over-pressure relative to this space, unless
mechanical integrity and gas-tightness of the duct will ensure that gases will not leak into it.
3.5.2.2 Air outlets from hazardous enclosed spaces shall be located in an open area which, in the absence of
the considered outlet, would be of the same or lesser hazard than the ventilated space.
3.5.2.3 Fuel preparation rooms and hold spaces for fuel tanks shall be provided with an effective mechanical
ventilation system of the extraction type, providing a ventilation capacity of at least 45 air changes per hour.
Guidance note:
A cofferdam surrounding integral fuel tanks is not considered as a hold space.
3.5.2.4 The number and power of the ventilation fans in the fuel preparation room and for double walled fuel
pipes shall be such that the capacity is not reduced by more than 50% if a fan is out of action.
DNV AS
3.5.2.5 Ventilation systems for preparation rooms and other fuel handling spaces shall be in continuous

operation with minimum 30 air changes/hour. Increased ventilation complying with [3.5.2.3] shall
automatically start upon leakage detection.

Gasoline installations shall comply with ventilation requirements described in [3.5.1] and [3.5.2].
3.6 Fuel bunkering in ships other than tankers

3.6.1 Fuel bunkering station
semi-enclosed bunkering stations will be subject to special considerations, with respect to:
a) segregation towards other areas of the vessel
b) requirements for forced ventilation
c) requirements for leakage detection
d) safety actions related to leakage detection
e) access to bunkering station from non-hazardous spaces through air locks
f) monitoring of bunkering station by direct line of sight or closed-circuit television (CCTV).
3.6.1.2 Coamings or drip trays shall be arranged around the bunkering manifold to limit the extent of
accidental spills.
3.6.1.3 Control of the bunkering shall be possible from a safe location in regard to bunkering operations. At
this location the tank level shall be monitored. Overfill alarm and automatic shutdown is also to be indicated
at this location.
3.6.1.4 Showers and eye wash stations for emergency usage shall be located in close proximity to areas
where the possibility for accidental contact with fuel exists. The emergency showers and eye wash stations
shall be operable under all ambient conditions.
3.6.1.5 The bunkering manifold shall be designed to withstand the external loads during bunkering, also
taking into account the forces required to activate the dry break-away connection.
3.6.2 Fuel bunkering system
point.
3.6.2.2 The connections at the bunkering station shall be of dry-disconnect type equipped with additional
safety dry break-away coupling/self-sealing quick release. The dry break-away coupling is allowed to be
installed on the bunkering hose.
3.6.2.3 Bunkering lines shall be arranged for inerting and gas freeing. When not engaged in bunkering, the
bunkering lines shall be free of gas, unless the consequences of not gas freeing is evaluated and approved by
flag administration.
3.6.2.4 A ship-shore link (SSL) or an equivalent means for automatic and manual ESD communication to the
bunkering source shall be arranged.
3.6.2.5 Where bunkering lines are arranged with a cross-over, suitable isolation arrangements shall be
provided to ensure that fuel cannot be transferred inadvertently to the ship side not in use for bunkering.
DNV AS
3.6.3 Ships' bunker hoses

3.6.3.1 Bunker hoses carried on board shall be suitable for methyl/ethyl alcohol. Each type of bunker hose,
complete with end-fittings, shall be prototype-tested at a normal ambient temperature, with 200 pressure
cycles from zero to at least twice the specified maximum working pressure. After this cycle pressure test has
been carried out, the prototype test shall demonstrate a bursting pressure of at least 5 times its specified
maximum working pressure at the upper and lower extreme service temperature. Hoses used for prototype
testing shall not be used for bunker service.
3.6.3.2 Before being placed in service, each new length of bunker hose produced shall be hydrostatically
tested at ambient temperature to a pressure not less than 1.5 times its specified maximum working
pressure, but not more than two fifths of its bursting pressure. The hose shall be stencilled, or otherwise
marked, with the date of testing, its specified maximum working pressure and, if used in services other than
ambient temperature services, its maximum and minimum service temperature, as applicable. The specified
maximum working pressure shall not be less than 1 MPa gauge.
3.6.3.3 Means shall be provided for draining any fuel from the bunkering hoses upon completion of
operation.
3.6.3.4 Where fuel hoses are carried on board, arrangements shall be made for safe storage of the hoses.
Hoses shall be stored on the open deck or in a storage room with an independent mechanical extraction
ventilation system, providing a minimum of six air changes per hour.

Gasoline installations shall comply with fuel bunkering requirements described above at [3.6.1], [3.6.2] and
[3.6.3].
3.7 Inert gas/nitrogen installations

3.7.1 General
3.7.1.1 Unless nitrogen can be generated onboard, the ship shall have sufficient storage capacity of nitrogen
to keep the fuel tanks safely inerted for the longest voyage foreseen and during two weeks in harbour with
minimum port consumption.
3.7.1.2 All tanks containing LFL shall be inerted regardless of size.

Guidance note:
As opposed to a methanol tanker, a LFL fuel tank will continuously be emptied, implying that unless IG is provided, there will be a
continuous explosive atmosphere in the tank. i.e. the frequency of occurrence of an explosive atmosphere is 100% as opposed to
a tanker which will experience this during unloading and on the ballast voyage (50%). The consequence of an explosion on a non-
tanker with LFL-fuel tanks is higher than on a tanker and as such the total risk increases accordingly.
3.7.1.3 To prevent the return of fuel vapour from the fuel system to any gas safe spaces, the inert gas supply
lines shall be fitted with two shut-off valves in series with a venting valve in between (double block and
bleed valves). In addition a closable non-return valve shall be installed between the double block and bleed
arrangements and the fuel tanks. These valves shall be located outside non-hazardous spaces and shall
function under all normal conditions of trim, list and motion of the ship. The following conditions apply:
The operation of the valves shall be automatically executed. Signals for opening and closing shall be taken
from the process directly, e.g. inert gas flow or differential pressure.
An alarm for faulty operation of the valves shall be provided.
3.7.1.4 Where the connections to the fuel tanks or to the fuel piping are non-permanent, two non-return
valves may substitute the non-return devices required in [3.7.1.3] above.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Fuel tank connections for inert gas padding are considered as permanent for the purpose of this requirement.
3.7.1.5 Low-pressure alarm shall be provided in the nitrogen supply line on the fuel tank side of any double
block and bleed valves and pressure reduction units. If pressure/vacuum alarms are fitted in each fuel tank
as means to comply with redundant venting requirements, a separate low-pressure alarm is not required.
3.7.1.6 A high oxygen content alarm shall be provided in the engine control room. The alarm shall be
activated when the oxygen content in the inert gas supply exceeds 5%.
3.7.1.7 Where a nitrogen generator or nitrogen storage facilities are installed in a separate compartment,
outside of the engine room, the separate compartment shall be fitted with an independent mechanical
extraction ventilation system, providing six (6) air changes per hour. A minimum of two oxygen sensors
which will give audible and visual alarm both inside and outside the door shall be fitted. Such separate
compartments shall be treated as one of other machinery spaces, with respect to fire protection.
3.7.1.8 After an ESD manual push button shutdown as described in [7.3.6], the fuel supply- and return lines
in the engine room shall automatically be purged with nitrogen. The nitrogen systems shall be documented to
have sufficient capacity for this purpose in addition to fuel tank padding operations.
3.7.1.9 Blanking arrangements should be fitted in the inert gas supply line to individual tanks. The position
of the blanking arrangements shall be visible to personnel entering the tank. Blanking should be via
removable spool piece.
3.8 Exhaust system

3.8.1 General
3.8.1.1 The exhaust system shall be designed to prevent any accumulation of unburnt fuel.
due to ignited gas or fuel leaks, explosion relief systems shall be suitably designed and fitted.
3.8.1.3 The explosion venting shall be led away from where personnel may be present.
Guidance note:
Both explosion impact and amount of potentially suffocating combustion gases should be taken into account when deciding where
3 meters, unless efficient shielding is provided. It will in any case be specially considered for each installation.
3.8.1.4 All consumers of LFL fuel shall have a separate exhaust system.
4 Strength of LFL fuel tanks
4.1 General
Scantlings of integral or independent LFL fuel tank shall meet the requirements of Pt.3 and requirements
given in this subsection.
DNV AS
4.2 Corrosion addition
Corrosion addition of the inner boundary and internal structure of the LFL fuel tank shall be:
4.3 LFL fuel design density

3
LFL fuel design density, ρL, shall not be less than 0.8 t/m .
4.4 Design loads

3
4.4.1 When LFL fuel design density is less than 1.025 t/m , a flooding loading scenario, FD-1, shall be
applied to LFL fuel tank in addition to load sets applicable for tank design as given in Pt.3 Ch.6 Sec.2 Table 1
and Pt.3 Ch.6 Sec.2 Table 2 for local scantlings and PSM's. The flooding loading scenario shall be considered
with acceptance criteria AC-III.
4.4.2 When the fuel tank cofferdams are designed for filling with water, accidental design load scenario with
tank pressure, , shall be applied to the cofferdam boundaries. The additional loading scenario shall be
considered with acceptance criteria AC-III. In any other case flooding loading scenario, shall be considered
where applicable.
5 Fire safety
5.1 General
5.2 Containment of fire

5.2.1 The fire integrity of LFL fuel tank cofferdam boundaries facing machinery spaces of category A or other
high fire risk spaces shall not be less than A-60.
Guidance note:
High fire risk spaces are for instance cargo areas for carriage of dangerous goods and cargo decks for cars with fuel in the tanks.
5.2.2 For the purposes of fire protection, fuel preparation spaces shall be regarded as machinery
space of category A. Should the space have boundaries towards other machinery spaces of category A,
accommodation, control station or cargo areas, these boundaries shall not be less than A-60.
5.2.3 The bunkering station shall be separated by A-60 class divisions towards machinery spaces of
5.2.4 Means of escape shall be shielded from possible fire hazards from the fuel arrangement.
5.2.5 Any boundary of accommodation up to navigation bridge windows, service spaces, control stations,
machinery spaces and escape routes, facing fuel tanks on open deck shall have A-60 fire integrity.
DNV AS
5.3 Fire fighting
5.3.1 Fire extinguishing of the LFL preparation room and engine room
5.3.1.1 Fuel preparation rooms and engine rooms shall be protected by an approved fixed fire extinguishing
system in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-2 and the FSS-code. The medium shall be suitable for the
extinguishing of methyl/ethyl alcohol fires.
Guidance note:
System chosen for protection is subject to approval by the flag administration.
Gas based fixed fire extinguishing system with design concentration adjusted for methyl/ethyl alcohol fires may be applied.
Fixed water-based fire extinguishing system approved as per IMO FSS Code with addition documentation which proves that they
can extinguish all relevant methyl/ethyl alcohol fires may be applied.
5.3.1.2 An approved alcohol-resistant foam system covering the tank top and bilge area under the floor
plates shall be arranged for machinery space category A and fuel preparation space containing methyl/ethyl
alcohol.
5.3.2 Provision for fire main

When the fuel storage tank is located on the open deck, isolating valves shall be fitted in the fire main to
isolate damaged sections of the fire main. Isolation of a section of fire main shall not deprive the fire line
5.3.3 Fire extinguishing on open deck
5.3.3.1 Where fuel tanks are located on open deck, there shall be a fixed fire-fighting system of alcohol
resistant foam (ARAFFF-type). This shall be operated from a safe position.
5.3.3.2 The foam system shall cover the area below the fuel tank where a large spill of fuel can be expected
to spread.
5.3.3.3 The bunker station shall have a fixed fire-fighting system of alcohol resistant foam (ARAFFF-type).
5.3.3.4 Where fuel tanks are located on open deck, there shall be a fixed water spray system for diluting
eventual large spills, cooling and fire prevention. The system shall cover exposed parts of the fuel tank.
5.3.3.5 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with Fire Safety System Code shall be
provided for all compartments containing the methyl/ethyl alcohol fuel system.
5.3.3.6 Suitable detectors shall be selected based on the fire characteristics of the fuel. Smoke detectors
shall be used in combination with detectors which can more effectively detect methyl/ethyl alcohol fires.
5.3.4 Portable fire fighting equipment and fire fighter’s outfits
5.3.4.1 Any vessel with LFL fuelled engines shall be provided with not less than 4 sets of foam applicators
arranged in strategic positions for coverage of any LFL leaks or fires.
5.3.4.2 Not less than two additional fire fighter’s outfit (in addition to those otherwise required in SOLAS Reg.
II-2/10 and 18) shall be provided and stored in two separated fire lockers/stations.
5.3.4.3 Fire extinguishers shall be arranged within weather tight enclosures adjacent to bunkering station
and at entrance to engine rooms.
DNV AS
5.3.4.4 A portable dry chemical powder extinguisher, or an equivalent type, shall be located near the

entrance to the bunker station.
5.3.4.5 Means to ease detection and recognition of methyl and/or ethyl alcohol fires in machinery spaces
shall be provided for vessels where fire patrols are required, such as portable heat-detection devices.
5.4 Gasoline installation

5.4.1 General fire safety
The rules are intended for vessel built to SOLAS Ch. II-2 and the IMO HSC Code. For vessels built according
to other standards than SOLAS Ch. II-2 and the IMO HSC Code, the fire safety arrangement shall provide an
equivalent protection and safety level for the spaces and installations in question.
The society will carry out plan approval and surveyors of fire safety systems according to these rules when
we issue safety certificates. When safety certificates are issued by other (flag administration or dual class
society or other), the responsibility of a compliant safety level is assumed taken care of by the organisation
issuing the safety certificate.
5.4.2 Structural fire protection

LFL preparation rooms handling gasoline shall be assigned fire category 14 on passenger ships and fire
category 8 on cargo ships.
Doors in the boundary of the LFL preparation rooms shall be self-closing. However, self-closing is not required
if door face open deck.
5.4.3 Fire detection

LFL preparation rooms handling gasoline shall be provided with a fixed fire detection system.
The arrangement shall comply with the IMO FSS Code.
The components of the fire detection system installed inside LFL preparation rooms handling gasoline shall be
of a certified safe type for use in explosive atmosphere.
5.4.4 Fixed fire extinguishing system

LFL preparation rooms handling gasoline shall be protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system in accordance
with SOLAS regulation Ch. II-2/Reg.10.5 and the IMO FSS Code.
6.1 General
6.1.1 General
6.1.1.2 Electrical equipment and wiring shall in general not to be installed in hazardous areas unless essential
DNV AS
Guidance note:

As given in IEC 60079-20, the following temperature class and equipment groups may be used for potential ship fuels:
Methyl alcohol T2 IIA
Ethyl alcohol T2 IIB

6.2.1 General
Areas and spaces other than those classified in [6.2.2] shall be subject to special consideration. The

The interiors of fuel tanks, pipes and equipment containing LFL, any pipework of pressure-relief or other
Guidance note:
Instrumentation and electrical apparatus in contact with the LFL or gas should be of a type suitable for zone 0. Temperature
sensors installed in thermo wells, and pressure sensors without additional separating chamber should be of intrinsically safe type
Ex-ia.

1) Cofferdams and other protective spaces surrounding the LFL fuel tanks.
2) Fuel preparation rooms.
3) Areas on open deck, or semi-enclosed spaces on deck, within 3 m of any fuel tank outlet, gas or vapour
outlet, manifold valve, valve, pipe flange and fuel preparation rooms ventilation outlets.
4) Areas in the vicinity of fuel tank P/V vent outlets, within a vertical cylinder of unlimited height and 6 m
radius cantered upon the centre of the outlet, and within a hemisphere of 6 m radius below the outlet.
6) Areas on the open deck within spillage coamings surrounding LFL bunker manifold valves and 3 m
beyond the coamings, up to a height of 2.4 m above the deck.
7) Enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces in which pipes containing fuel are located, e.g. ducts around fuel
pipes, semi-enclosed bunkering stations.
Guidance note:
Areas on open deck within 3 m of cargo tank access openings for ships with cofferdams towards deck are not defined as hazardous
zones. Safety precautions related to the use of such access openings in connection with gas freeing should be covered in the
operation manual.

2) Spaces 4 m beyond the cylinder and 4 m beyond the sphere defined in [6.2.2.2] 4).
3) Air locks.
DNV AS
4) Spaces containing fans serving hazardous space.

6.3.1 General
cables, and that the installations have been carried out in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.11.
devices (for example overload protection relays) and/or operation of an alarm (for example loss of
pressurisation for an Ex(p) control panel) it shall be verified that the devices have correct settings and/or
installed.
6.4 Maintenance
6.4.1 General
6.4.1.1 The maintenance manual referred to in [10] shall be in accordance with the recommendations in IEC
60079-17 and 60092-502 and shall contain necessary information on:
— information sufficient to enable the certified safe equipment to be maintained in accordance with its type
of protection (list and location of equipment, technical information, manufacturer's instructions, spares,
etc.)
— records of inspections, with information about date of inspections and name(s) of person(s) who carried
6.4.1.2 Updated documentation and maintenance manual, shall be kept on board, with records of date
instruction on the various types of protection of apparatus and installation practices to be found on the
vessel.

6.5.1 General
Gasoline installations shall comply with all electrical system requirements described in [6].
DNV AS
7.1 General
7.1.1 System arrangement
7.1.1.1 For ships with class notation E0 (unmanned machinery spaces) the requirements in Ch.6 apply in full
also for the LFL fuel system.
7.1.1.2 A dedicated safety system, independent of the control system, shall be arranged in accordance with
the general principles in Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.3.
7.1.1.3 The control system shall be so arranged that the remaining power after single failure shall be
sufficient to maintain propulsion and other main functions defined in Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1.
7.1.1.4 The safety system shall be so arranged that the remaining power after single failure shall be
sufficient to maintain propulsion and other main functions defined in Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1 [1.2].
7.1.1.6 The gas detection system shall present the gas alarms as required by [7.3.3] on bridge, at the
control location for bunkering, control location for the fuel system and locally. If alarming depends on
network communication, the functionality shall be handled by separate network segment arranged for the
fuel installation safety functions.
7.1.2 Engine shutdown prevention system

Measures shall be taken to prevent that shutdown of one LFL engine causes shutdown of other engines.
Guidance note:
For LFL engine driven generators operating in parallel, a control system may be installed preventing consequential trip of an engine
caused by sudden overload in case one engine is shutdown.
7.2 Control system

7.2.1 General
7.2.1.1 An independent LFL control system shall be fitted for each required LFL fuel supply system. The
fuel supply system shall be fitted with a control and monitoring system to assure safe operation. Special
considerations will be taken for high pressure systems.
7.2.1.2 Independent power supplies to LFL control systems shall be arranged as given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2
[6.3.3] for each required LFL system. This supply shall in addition be arranged as an uninterruptible power
supply (UPS) as given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [6.3.5].
7.2.2 Field instrumentation
each bunker pipe.
7.2.2.2 Pressure gauges shall be fitted to LFL pump discharge lines and to the bunkering lines.
DNV AS

7.2.3.1 Monitoring related to bunkering shall be available at the control location for bunkering.
— tank level shall be capable of being monitored
— the remote control valves if fitted in relation to a ship-shore link (SSL) shall be capable of being operated
from this location. Closing of the bunkering shutdown valve shall be possible from the control location for
bunkering and from another safe location
— overfill alarms and automatic shutdown shall also be indicated at this location.
7.2.3.2 Each fuel tank shall be fitted with at least one closed level gauging device. Unless necessary
maintenance can be carried out while the fuel tank is in service, two devices shall be installed.
7.2.3.3 Each fuel tank shall be fitted with:

1) a visual and audible high-level alarm. This shall be able to be function tested from the outside of
the tank and can be common with the level gauging system (configured as an alarm on the gauging
transmitter), but shall be independent of the high-high level alarm
2) an additional sensor (high-high level) operating independently of the high liquid level alarm shall
automatically actuate a shut-off valve to avoid excessive liquid pressure in the bunkering line and
prevent the tank from becoming liquid full
3) the high and high-high level alarm for the fuel tanks shall be visual and audible at the location at which
gas-freeing by water filling of the fuel tanks is controlled, given that water filling is the preferred method
for gas-freeing.
7.3 Safety system

7.3.1 General
7.3.1.1 An independent safety system shall be fitted for each required LFL fuel supply system.
7.3.1.2 The safety functions given in Table 8 shall be implemented in the LFL safety system.
7.3.1.3 The signals required to activate the safety functions given in Table 8 shall be hardwired.
7.3.1.4 The signals required to activate the safety functions given in Table 8 shall be arranged with loop
monitoring.
7.3.1.5 Independent power supplies to LFL safety systems shall be arranged as given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2
[6.3.3] for each required LFL system. This supply shall in addition be arranged as an uninterruptible power
supply (UPS) as given in Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [6.3.5].
7.3.2 LFL fuel tank safety
7.3.2.1 In ships other than tankers, indications and means for safety activation related to bunkering shall be
available at the control location for bunkering.
Guidance note:
Tank pressure and tank level shall be monitored. Overfill alarm and automatic shutdown should be indicated at this location, as
well as monitoring of ventilation and gas/leakage detection for the duct containing bunkering pipes.
7.3.2.2 In addition to the high level alarm, a high-high level alarm shall be fitted. The high-high level alarm
shall be independent of the high level alarm and the level gauging device.
DNV AS
7.3.2.3 Closing of the bunkering shutdown valve shall be possible from the control location for bunkering and

from another safe location.
7.3.3 Gas detection
7.3.3.1 Fixed gas detectors shall be installed in:

1) all ventilated annular spaces of the double walled fuel pipes
2) machinery spaces containing fuel equipment or consumers
3) fuel preparation spaces
4) other enclosed spaces containing fuel piping or other fuel equipment without ducting
5) other enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces where fuel vapours may accumulate
6) cofferdams and fuel storage hold spaces surrounding fuel tanks
7) airlocks
8) in way of boiler fan supply inlets in machinery spaces
9) ventilation inlets to accommodation and machinery spaces, if required, based on the risk assessment
required by IMO, see Table 8.
7.3.3.2 Gas detectors are in general not required in spaces where fuel piping is completely ducted.
7.3.3.3 Where gas detection shall cause shutdown in accordance with Table 8, detector voting shall be
applied.
Guidance note:
A common voting principle is 2oo2 (meaning two out of two) where both units should detect gas to activate shutdown. A failed
detector shall be considered as being active.
7.3.3.4 Independent gas detector systems shall be fitted for each required LFL fuel supply system.
space into account.
7.3.3.6 The detectors shall be located where gas may accumulate and/or in the ventilation outlets.
Guidance note:
Vapours from Methanol (MeOH) and Ethanol (EtOH) are heavier than air.
7.3.3.7 Gas detection shall be alarmed on the bridge, in the engine control room and at the control location
for bunkering, as well as locally.
7.3.3.8 Gas detection shall be continuous.
7.3.3.9 At least one portable gas detector shall be available for checking of atmosphere inside fuel tanks.
7.3.4 Liquid leakage detection
7.3.4.1 Liquid leakage detection shall be installed in the protective cofferdams surrounding the fuel tanks, in
all ducts around fuel pipes, in preparation rooms, and in other enclosed spaces containing fuel piping or other
LFL equipment.
7.3.4.2 The leakage detection system shall trigger the alarm in the safety system, see Table 8.
DNV AS
7.3.5 Ventilation monitoring

7.3.5.1 Loss of ventilation shall cause alarm and/or shutdown as given in Table 8. A running signal from the
ventilation fan motor is not sufficient to verify the performance of the ventilation; a flow- or overpressure
detection or an equivalent detection principle is required.
7.3.5.2 Full stop of ventilation in the double pipe supplying LFL to single fuel LFL engine(s) shall, additionally
to what is given Table 8, lead to one of the following actions:
If another LFL supply system is arranged, the one with defect ventilation shall shutdown as soon as the other
supply system is ready to deliver.
For a LFL electric propulsion system: Another engine supplied by a different fuel system shall start. When the
second engine is connected to bus-bar the first engine shall be shut down automatically.
7.3.5.3 Reduced ventilation from what is required per area in [3.5] shall be alarmed.
7.3.5.4 Reduced ventilation in the ducting around the LFL bunkering lines during bunkering operations shall
also be alarmed at the control location for bunkering.
7.3.6 Manual shutdown buttons

Means of manual emergency shutdown of fuel supply to the engine room shall be arranged for manual
remote emergency stop from the following locations as applicable:
1) navigation bridge
2) cargo control room
3) onboard safety centre
4) engine control room
5) fire control station
6) adjacent to the exit of fuel preparation spaces.
7.3.7 Alarms and safety actions
7.3.7.1 The output signals as given in Table 8 shall be electrically independent of the LFL control system.
Table 8 Safety functions
Parameter Alarm Automatic Automatic Automatic Comment

shutdown shutdown shutdown of
of tank of master bunkering
valves fuel connection
1)
valve valve
Fuel storage and bunkering system
Tank overfilling protection, high level 3) See [7.2.3.3].

x x
alarm
Tank overfilling protection, high-high See [7.3.2.2].

x x
level alarm
Loss of ventilation in annular space in Additional alarm at the control

x x
double walled bunkering lines location for bunkering.
Gas detection in annular space in Additional alarm at the control

x x
double walled bunkering lines location for bunkering.
Liquid leakage detection annular space Additional alarm at the control

x x
in double walled bunkering lines location for bunkering.
DNV AS

1)
valve valve
Manual shutdown x See [7.3.2.3].
Gas detection in protective cofferdam

around fuel tank. One detector above x
20% LEL
Gas detection in protective cofferdam

around fuel tank. Two detectors above x x x
40% LEL
Liquid leakage detection in protective 2)

x x x
cofferdam around fuel tank
Gas detection in air locks x
Fuel supply system between tank and engine room bulkhead
LFL heating circuit, gas detection or

x
level alarm in expansion tank
Gas detection in annular space in

double walled fuel pipes, outside
x
engine room, one detector above 20%
LEL

double walled fuel pipes, outside
x x
engine room, two detectors above
40% LEL
Gas detection in preparation room,

x
one detector above 200 ppm.
Gas detection in preparation room,

x x
two detectors above 40% LEL
Manual shutdown in preparation room x
Loss of ventilation in annular space * See [7.3.5].

in double walled fuel pipes, outside x x*
engine room
Loss of ventilation in preparation

x
rooms
Liquid leakage detection in annular

space in double walled fuel pipes, x x
outside engine room
Liquid leakage detection in preparation

x x
rooms
Engine room
DNV AS

1)
valve valve

double walled fuel pipes, inside engine x
room, one detector above 20% LEL

double walled fuel pipes, inside engine x x
room, two detectors above 40% LEL
Liquid leakage detection in annular

space in double walled fuel pipes, x x
inside engine room
Loss of ventilation in annular space in This parameter shall only lead

double walled fuel pipes, inside engine to LFL supply shutdown for
x x
room dual fuel engines. However, see
[7.3.5].
Manual shutdown x See also [3.7.1.8].
General
Manual shutdown at bridge x x See also [3.7.1.8].
1) Automatic or remote closing of master valve shall also stop LFL supply pumps.
2) For cofferdams around fuel tanks.
3) For fuel tanks and other tanks which can be filled by transfer pumps.
7.4 Engine monitoring

7.4.1 General
7.4.1.1 In addition to the requirements given in Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.1 [5], control and monitoring as given in Table
9 is required for LFL engines.
Indicators shall be fitted on the navigation bridge, the engine control room and the manoeuvring platform
for:
1) operation of methyl/ethyl alcohol fuel engines and
2) operation and mode of operation of the engine in the case of dual fuel engines.
Table 9 Monitoring of dual fuel diesel or LFL-only engines
System Item Gr.1 Gr.2 Gr.3 Comments

Indication Automatic start Shutdown
alarm load of standby with alarm
reduction pump with
1)
alarm
1.0 Ignition system Ignition failure each Automatic stop of fuel

2) A 3)
cylinder supply .
DNV AS
System Item Gr.1 Gr.2 Gr.3 Comments

Indication Automatic start Shutdown
alarm load of standby with alarm
reduction pump with
1)
alarm
2.0 Lubricating oil Cylinder lubrication

4) LA
system flow
3.0 Fuel injection Fuel injection valve Automatic start of standby

valve cooling system cooling medium pump is not required if
HA AS
pressure main pump is engine
driven.
Fuel injection valve

cooling medium LA
temperature
4.0 LFL injection valve LFL injection valve For high-pressure injection
LA
sealing oil system sealing oil pressure only.
5.0 Combustion Knocking Only relevant for Otto

A
process.
6.0 LFL supply Low pressure LA AS
Gr 1 = common sensor for indication, alarm, load reduction

Gr 3 = sensor for shutdown
A = alarm activated
SH = shutdown.
1) only for propulsion engines

2) exhaust temperature deviation may be accepted as means of detecting ignition failure, individually on each cylinder
3) fuel shutdown to the specific cylinder or the engine can be accepted
4) at least one measuring point for each lubricator unit.
8 Engines, pumps and boilers
8.1 Pumps
8.1.1 General
8.1.1.1 The fuel pumps shall be fitted with accessories and instrumentation necessary for efficient and
reliable function.
8.1.1.2 The fuel supply pumps shall be arranged for manual remote emergency stop from the following
locations:
— engine control room.
DNV AS
8.1.1.3 Hydraulically powered pumps that are submerged in fuel tanks (e.g. deep well pumps) shall be

arranged with double barriers preventing the hydraulic system serving the pumps from being directly
exposed to the fuel. The double barrier shall be arranged for detection and drainage of possible fuel leakages.
8.2 Engines
8.2.1 General
8.2.1.1 These paragraphs apply to both LFL fuel only engines and dual fuel engines running in LFL fuel mode.
8.2.1.2 All engine components and engine related systems shall be designed in such a way that fire and
explosion risks are minimized.
8.2.1.3 Measures shall be taken to ensure effective sealing of injection or admission equipment that could
potentially leak fuel into the engine room.
8.2.1.4 Measures shall be taken to ensure that LFL fuel injection pumps and injection devices are efficiently
lubricated.
8.2.1.5 The starting sequence shall be such that LFL fuel is not injected or admitted to the cylinders until
ignition is activated and the engine has reached a minimum rotational speed.
8.2.2 Functional requirements for dual fuel engines
8.2.2.1 LFL dual fuel engines shall be arranged for start, normal stop and low power operation in fuel oil
mode. In case of shut-off of the LFL fuel supply, the engine shall automatically transfer to operation on oil
fuel only.
8.2.2.2 Changeover to and from LFL fuel operation is only to be possible at a power level where it can
be done with acceptable reliability as demonstrated through testing. On completion of preparations for
changeover to LFL operation including checks of all essential conditions for changeover, the changeover
process itself shall be automatic.
8.2.2.3 On normal shutdown as well as emergency shutdown, LFL fuel supply shall be shut off not later than
simultaneously switching to oil fuel mode.
8.2.2.4 Ignition of the LFL-air mixture in the cylinders shall be initiated by sufficient energy It shall not be
possible to shut off the ignition source without first or simultaneously closing the LFL fuel supply to each
cylinder or to the complete engine.
8.2.3 Functional requirements LFL-only engines
8.2.3.1 One single failure in the LFL fuel supply system shall not lead to total loss of fuel supply.
Guidance note:
May be waived in case of multi-engine installation.
8.2.3.2 The starting sequence shall be such that LFL fuel is not injected or admitted to the cylinders until
ignition is activated and the engine has reached a minimum rotational speed.
8.2.3.3 If ignition has not been detected by the engine monitoring system within the expected time after
activation of fuel admission or injection valve, the LFL fuel supply shall be automatically shut off and the
starting sequence terminated.
DNV AS
8.2.3.4 In case of a normal stop or an emergency shutdown, the methyl/ethyl alcohol fuel supply shall be

shut off not later than the ignition source. It shall not be possible to shut off the ignition source without first
or simultaneously closing the fuel supply to each cylinder or to the complete engine.
8.2.3.5 Measures for detected knocking shall be fitted.
8.3 Boilers
8.3.1 Each boiler shall have a dedicated forced draught system. A crossover between boiler force draught
8.3.2 Combustion chambers and uptakes of boilers shall be designed to prevent any accumulation of
gaseous fuel.
8.3.3 Burners shall be designed to maintain stable combustion under all firing conditions.
8.3.4 On main/propulsion boilers an automatic system shall be provided to change from LFL fuel operation to
oil fuel operation without interruption of boiler firing.
8.3.5 Fuel nozzles and the burner control system shall be configured such that LFL fuel can only be ignited
by an established oil fuel flame, unless the boiler and combustion equipment is designed and approved by
the Society to light on LFL fuel.
8.3.6 There shall be arrangements to ensure that LFL fuel flow to the burner is automatically cut off unless
satisfactory ignition has been established and maintained.
8.3.7 On the pipe of each LFL burner, a manually operated shut-off valve shall be fitted.
8.3.8 Provisions shall be made for automatically purging the LFL supply piping to the burners, by means of
an inert gas, after the extinguishing of these burners.
8.3.9 The automatic fuel changeover system required by [8.3.4] shall be monitored with alarms to ensure
continuous availability.
8.3.10 Arrangements shall be made that, in case of flame failure of all operating burners, the combustion
8.3.11 Arrangements shall be made to enable the boilers purging sequence to be manually activated.
8.3.12 It shall be proven that the LFL limits at the exhaust outlet after a misfiring does not constitute a risk
to human health.
9.1 General
Fabrication and testing of the fuel system shall be in compliance with Pt.2 Ch.4, unless more strict
requirements are given in this section.
DNV AS
9.2 Fuel tanks
9.2.1 Manufacture and testing
9.2.1.1 Testing of welds and non-destructive testing shall be carried out as specified for cargo tanks in
chemical tankers in Pt.5 Ch.6 Sec.5 Table 1.
9.2.1.2 For tanks defined as pressure vessels (above 0.7 bar), testing shall be carried out as specified in Pt.5
Ch.7 Sec.22.
9.2.1.3 Strength and tightness testing shall be carried out as specified in Pt.2 Ch.4 Sec.8.
9.3 Piping system
9.3.1 Manufacture and testing
9.3.1.1 The LFL piping (inner pipe) shall be joined by butt welding with a minimum of flange connections.
9.3.1.2 The following direct connections of pipe length without flanges may be considered:
1) butt-welded joints with complete penetrations at the root
2) slip-on welded joints with sleeves, socket welding and related welding having dimensions in accordance
with recognized standards shall only be used in pipes having an external diameter of 50 mm or less; the
designer/builder shall assess the risk of crevice corrosion and
3) screwed connections, in accordance with recognized standards, shall only be used for piping with an
external diameter of max. 25 mm.
9.3.1.3 Flanges in secondary enclosures for fuel piping shall be of the welding neck, slip-on or socket welding
type.
finished welds, as necessary for proving that the welding has been carried out correctly, the LFL pipe shall be
subject to 100% radiographic or ultrasonic inspection of butt-welded joints.
suitable medium to a pressure depending on the leak detection method applied. Secondary enclosures for
low pressure gas piping shall be tightness tested.
9.3.1.6 In addition, the outer pipe welding connections shall be subject to at least 10% random magnetic
particle testing (MT) or dye-penetrant testing (PT). The results from surface examination (e.g. MT, PT) shall
satisfy the requirements of level B of ISO 5817.
9.3.1.7 If the outer pipe of the LFL-piping contains pipes with design pressure above 10 bar, it shall be tested
to the expected maximum pressure at pipe rupture, but minimum 10 bar.
9.3.1.8 All piping systems, including valves, fittings and associated equipment for handling of LFL-fuel shall
be function tested under normal operating conditions.
9.3.1.9 Non-destructive testing shall be performed as stated in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.10 [1.5].
DNV AS
9.4 Onboard testing
9.4.1 General

Gasoline installations shall comply with all manufacture, workmanship and testing requirements described
above at [9].
10 Operation manual
10.1 General
10.1.1 General
10.1.1.1 An operation manual describing all essential procedures for handling of LFL fuel shall be prepared.
The manual is subject to approval and shall be kept on board.
10.1.1.2 The operation manual is in general to include the following items:

1) Ship particulars
2) Fuel system particulars:
— fuel properties
— fuel tank capacities
— fuel handling system
— inert gas N2
— fuel tank venting
— fuel preparation rooms safety if applicable
— fuel tank instrumentation
— fire safety
— gas detection
— liquid leakage detection
— emergency water filling of cofferdams.
DNV AS
3) Operations:

— assumptions
— bunkering
— fuel transfer between tanks
— normal operation of the fuel system
— cleaning, purging and gas freeing
— tank entry procedures
— cofferdam safety
— gas detection
— fuel preparation rooms safety
— emergency operations related to LFL fuel hazards
— medical treatment procedures for exposure to the LFL fuel
— gasoline jerry cans safe handling procedure for Gasoline INST class notation.
4) Reference documents:
— general arrangement
— LFL fuel system
— pressure/vacuum valves flow curves
— nitrogen system
— fuel tank venting
— hazardous zones
— fire extinguishing
— procedure and arrangement manual (if applicable)
— bilge system for cofferdam and preparation rooms.
10.1.1.3 The following instructions shall be included in the operation manual as applicable:
— the fuel tanks shall be filled with inert gas and the O2-content in the tanks shall not exceed 5% by volume
— the control and safety systems shall be function tested.

Vessels with gasoline installations shall have an operation manual as described in the requirements above
at [10]. Additionally a risk analysis covering the gasoline installation and operating procedures shall be
provided.
11 Personnel protection
11.1 General
Personnel protection shall be in compliance with Pt.5 Ch.6 Sec.17. It is sufficient with two complete sets of
safety equipment instead of three as required in Pt.5 Ch.6 Sec.17 [2.1.1].
12 Ship type considerations
12.1 Chemical tankers

12.1.1 General
This section covers special considerations for LFL cargo used as fuel on chemical tankers certified for the
carriage of the relevant LFL fuel, based on the following:
— the risk of a fire/explosion in the cargo area spreading to the fuel supply system
DNV AS
— the risk of inadvertent transfer of incompatible or contaminating cargo to the fuel system

— the risk of fire/explosion associated with increased frequency of use of piping systems for transfer of LFL
fuel/cargo from service tank to engine room and transfer from a cargo tank to service tank (when a cargo
tank is dedicated as a LFL fuel storage tank).
12.1.2 Arrangement
12.1.2.1 A dedicated LFL fuel service tank shall be provided. The piping system serving this tank shall be
separated from cargo handling piping systems, except for the fuel transfer pipes from tanks for fuel storage.
12.1.2.2 The LFL fuel service tank(s) and fuel preparation rooms shall be located in cargo area.
Guidance note:
The aft peak tank is not accepted due to conflicting and cumbersome issues with;
— hazardous zones
— A 60 insulation and openings to accommodation
— foam monitor
— pipe routing
— life boat arrangement.
12.1.3 Fire safety
12.1.3.1 Measures shall be implemented to reduce the consequences of fire and explosions in cargo tanks
and in the cargo area for the dedicated LFL fuelservice tanks and LFL fuel supply systems.
12.1.3.2 Inerting of cargo tanksduring cargo tank cleaning operations and inert gas purging prior to gas-
freeing would be considered an acceptable measure to reduce the consequence of in-tank explosion. Such
inerting shall be performed for all cargo tanks and LFL fuel tanks regardless of size of ship.
12.1.3.3 The LFL fuel tanks shall be covered by the cargo deck fire/foam extinguishing system. Additional
foam monitors/foam sprinklers shall be fitted, if necessary.
12.1.3.4 The exterior boundaries of the LFL fuel service tank(s) and the fuel preparation rooms shall be
protected by a water spray system for cooling and fire prevention. The spraying capacity shall not be less
2 2
than 10 l/min/m for horizontal projected surfaces and 4 l/min/m for vertical surfaces.
12.1.3.5 The system shall be served by a separate water spray pump with capacity sufficient to deliver the
required amount of water as specified in Sec.4.
12.1.3.6 A connection to the ships fire main through a stop valve shall be provided.
12.1.4 Segregation of cargo- and fuel system
12.1.4.1 Measures shall be provided to prevent inadvertent transfer of incompatible or contaminating cargo
to the fuel system, after the fuel storage tanks have been loaded.
12.1.4.2 If cargo tanks located within the cargo area are used as LFL fuel storage tanks, these cargo tanks
shall be dedicated as LFL fuel tanks when the ship is operating on LFL fuel.
12.1.4.3 Any cargo liquid line for dedicated LFL fuel storage tanks shall be separated from liquid cargo piping
serving other cargo tanks, including common liquid cargo piping.
12.1.4.4 Cross-connections to cargo liquid piping serving common systems or other tanks may be accepted
provided the connections are arranged with spool pieces. The arrangement of spool pieces shall be such that
DNV AS
even if a spool piece is unintentionally left in place, inadvertent transfer of incompatible or contaminating

cargo from or to the dedicated LFL fuel storage tank is not possible.
Guidance note:
An arrangement with swing bends would normally be the preferred spool piece arrangement to prevent unintentional transfer to or
from LFL fuel storage tanks.
12.1.4.5 The cargo tank venting system for the dedicated LFL fuel tanks shall be separated from venting
systems from other cargo tanks when operating on LFL fuel.
12.1.4.6 Other cargo handling systems serving other cargo tanks such as tank washing, inert gas and vapour
return shall be separated when used as LFL fuel storage tanks. Inert gas systems may be accepted connected
to a common system when used as LFL fuel storage tanks, provided the system is under continuous
pressure.
12.1.4.7 LFL fuel tank location shall take into account compatibility with other cargoes. When carrying LFL
fuel in the storage tanks, these tanks cannot be located adjacent to cargo tanks intended for cargoes that are
not compatible with the LFL fuel.
12.1.4.8 For tankers arranged for operation on LFL fuel only, the following additional requirements apply:
— the fuel storage tanks and piping system shall be independent of cargo handling systems serving cargo
tanks
— if the LFL service tank is located within the cargo area, in case of shutdown of LFL fuel supply, the ship
shall be provided with sufficient alternative power supply for operating the safety functions onboard (e.g.
fire and foam extinguishing, fire and gas detection and alarm, ballast, bilge drainage, LFL fuel safety
systems).
12.2 Passenger vessels

12.2.1 General
Methanol vapours and subsequent risk of exposure to passengers should be evaluated during the hazid
required by IMO MSC. Circ. 1621.
DNV AS
SECTION 7 REDUNDANT- AND ALTERNATIVE PROPULSION

1 General
1.1 Introduction
The additional class notations for redundant- and alternative propulsion, RP and AP respectively, give
requirements for enhanced robustness and fault tolerance in the design and arrangement of propulsion, and
for the higher level of the notations, also for steering functions.
The overall goal is to ensure that after a failure, the propulsion and steering function will either remain in
operation, or be possible to restore within a specified time, to a specified level of performance.
1.2 Objective
The main objective of the RP and AP notations is to enhance the reliability of the propulsion and steering
functions and thereby reduce the operational risk. The notations include a range of qualifiers denoting
different levels of fault tolerance and capabilities of the propulsion and steering functions, characterized by
the following key aspects:
— failure modes to be considered
— restoration time for propulsion and steering
— level of performance after restoration.
1.3 Scope
The enhanced reliability of the propulsion and steering system is achieved through requirements to:
— technical design and system arrangement
— analysis, test and verification.
The technical design requirements apply to the propulsion, steering and power functions including auxiliaries,
power supplies and control systems needed to support these functions. The enhanced test and verification
include extended failure mode analysis supplemented by extended testing on board.
The RP and AP notations do not include requirements to the vessel operation, and do generally not ensure
full compliance with main class rules when the propulsion and steering function is restored with reduced
capabilities after the occurrence of a failure as specified for the notations.
1.4 Application
The different notations with associated qualifiers apply to vessels with propulsion and steering arrangements
designed with properties beyond main class and SOLAS minimum requirements. The additional fault
tolerance and capabilities of the arrangement is determined by the different qualifiers.
The RP notation with qualifiers apply to vessels with redundant propulsion and steering arrangements where
both (all) propulsors are designed for parallel operation.
The RP notation with qualifiers is given as RP(n, x, +) where:
— n denotes the level of the notation according to Table 1
— x denotes the remaining propulsion capacity after a failure, given in % of the maximum propulsion power
— + denotes continuous availability, i.e. a failure shall not cause even a temporary loss of propulsion or
steering capabilities. The + qualifier is only available for the higher levels of the RP notation (RP(2, x, +)
and RP(3, x, +)).
The RP rules are applicable for vessels with duplicated propulsion systems. Arrangements with more than
two propulsion lines are subject to special considerations.
DNV AS
The AP notation with qualifiers apply to vessels with a main propulsion and steering arrangement built in

compliance with main class and SOLAS, and in addition, with alternative means to provide propulsion and,
for qualifier P also steering. The alternative means to provide propulsion and steering may be passive during
normal operation.
The AP notation with qualifiers is given as AP(m, x) where:
— m denotes the principle of the alternative means for propulsion and steering, either prime mover PM or -
propulsor P.
— x denotes the propulsion capacity provided by the alternative means, given in % of the maximum
propulsion power provided by the main propulsion system.
1.5 Class notations

The overall propulsion and steering arrangements required by the notations with qualifiers are given in
Table 1, supported by the illustrations in Table 2. Table 3 gives an overview and comparison of the key
requirements and characteristics of the different notations and qualifiers while the detailed requirements are
given in the subsequent subchapters.
Table 1 RP and AP class notations
AP PM Enhanced reliability of Single propulsion systems

Mandatory: No propulsion and associated steering
fulfilling main class
Design requirements: this
requirements: in addition,
section
an alternative prime mover
FIS requirements: No capable of providing power
to the propulsion system
(e.g via a clutch and
gearbox, or a power-take-in
unit)
Upon a failure (see [2.1.2])
causing loss of the main
prime mover, the alternative
prime mover shall be
capable of providing at
least x% of the maximum
propulsion power. The
restoration of propulsion
provided by the alternative
prime mover shall be
possible to complete within
30 minutes.
DNV AS

P Enhanced reliability of Single propulsion systems
propulsion and steering with associated steering
fulfilling main class
requirements. In addition,
an alternative propulsor with
steering capabilities.
causing loss of main
propulsion system, the
alternative propulsor shall
be capable of providing at
least x% of the maximum
propulsion power with
steering capabilities. The
restoration of the alternative
propulsor shall be possible
to complete within 30
minutes.
x Alternative propulsion power Denoting alternative

propulsion power in % of
the maximum propulsion
power, mandatory for all AP
notations.
RP B Enhanced reliability of Duplicated propulsion

Mandatory: No propulsion and steering system with associated
steering forming two
Design requirements: this
redundancy groups:
section
common auxiliary systems
FIS requirements: No (except lubrication oil
systems which shall be
separate).
Upon a failure (see [3.1.2]),
one redundancy group
providing x% of the
maximum propulsion
power and steering shall be
possible to restore before
the vessel has lost steering
speed.
The remaining propulsion
power shall provide a speed
of at least 7 knots at calm
weather conditions.
DNV AS

2 Enhanced reliability of Duplicated propulsion
propulsion and steering system with associated
redundancy groups,
redundant steering
actuators within each
group: dedicated systems
for fuel oil, lubrication oil,
freshwater cooling and
control air for each group.
Upon a failure (see [4.1.2]),
one redundancy group
providing x% of the
maximum propulsion
speed.
power shall provide a
speed of at least 6 knots
while heading into BF 8
conditions.
3 Enhanced reliability of Duplicated propulsion

propulsion and steering system with associated
redundancy groups
segregated by A60-class
and watertight bulkheads,
redundant steering actuators
and dedicated auxiliary
systems within each group.
including incidents of fire or
flooding, one redundancy
group providing x% of
speed.
power shall provide a
speed of at least 6 knots
while heading into BF 8
conditions.
x Remaining propulsion power Denoting the remaining

propulsion power in % of
power, mandatory for all RP
notations.
DNV AS

+ Continuous availability Optional for RP(2, x)
and RP(3, x), denoting
continuous availability
of propulsion and
steering; after failure, one
redundancy group shall
remain in operation without
disruption, see [4.1.1.9].
Note: the above descriptions are the main principles. For detailed comparison and contents of the notations, see Table 3
and subsequent chapters.
Guidance note:
If a vessel is designed with different operational modes (e.g. different fuel types and associated piping systems) and the response
to failure in the different modes comply with different qualifiers, the vessel may upon agreement be assigned with more than one
RP notation.
Table 2 Examples of principal arrangements for the AP and RP notations
Notation Examples of principal arrangements for steering and propulsion
AP(PM, x)
AP(P, x)
DNV AS

RP(B, x)
RP(2, x)
DNV AS

RP(3, x)
Note 1: The illustrations show the general design intent for the auxiliary systems, other arrangements may be accepted.
Note 2: The capacity of the auxiliary systems shall be sufficient to serve maximum propulsion power even after failure of
any active component, see [4.3.2.1].
Table 3 Key contents of the RP and AP class notations
Notation /
AP(PM, x) AP(P, x) RP(B, x) RP(2, x) RP(3, x)
Qualifier
Arrangement - single propulsion - single propulsion two propulsion - two propulsion - two propulsion
and associated and associated systems and systems and systems and
steering with steering with associated steering associated steering associated steering
redundant redundant (main class), (main class), (main class),
actuators (main actuators (main forming two forming two forming two
class) class) redundancy groups redundancy groups redundancy groups
- alternative prime - alternative designed for designed for arranged with
mover. propulsor parallel operation. parallel operation separation and
with steering - redundant designed for parallel
capabilities. steering actuators operation
within each group. - redundant steering
actuators within
each group
Redundancy after failure of after failure of the after single failure, after single failure, after single failure,
concept the prime mover, main propulsor, one redundancy one redundancy one redundancy
the alternative the alternative group can be group can be group can be
prime mover propulsor restored and restored and restored and provide
can be engaged with steering provide x% of provide x% of x% of the maximum
and provide x capabilities can the maximum the maximum propulsion power.
% of maximum be engaged propulsion power. propulsion power.
propulsion power. and provide x%
of maximum
propulsion power.
DNV AS
Notation /

Qualifier
Failure modes component/system component/system component/ component/ - component/system

breakdown or breakdown or system breakdown system breakdown breakdown or
malfunction (with malfunction. or malfunction or malfunction malfunction with
exceptions). with extended with extended extended application
application. application. - incidents of fire
and flooding.
Restoration 30 minutes. 30 minutes. before loss of - before loss of - before loss of

time steering speed. steering speed steering speed
(maximum) - for qualifier - for qualifier
1
after failure +, continuous +, continuous
availability. availability.
Capacity (min) 7 kn at calm 7 kn at calm 7 kn at calm 6 kn at BF 8. 6 kn at BF 8.

after failure weather. weather. weather.
Endurance 72 hrs (unless 72 hrs (unless 72 hrs (unless 72 hrs (unless 72 hrs (unless
after failure otherwise agreed). otherwise agreed). otherwise agreed). otherwise agreed). otherwise agreed).
Auxiliary the alternative the alternative common auxiliary separate systems separate and
systems prime mover may propulsor may systems (except for lub oil, fuel oil, segregated piping
be served by the be served by the lub oil). freshwater cooling systems for the
same auxiliaries as same auxiliaries as and control air. redundancy groups.
main (except lub main (except lub
oil). oil).
Electrical as for main class - as for main class - as for main class
power and arranged and arranged and arranged
generation according to according to with segregation
and redundancy group redundancy group according to
distribution concept. concept redundancy group
- for qualifier concept
+, additional - for qualifier +,
protective additional protective
measures for measures for
integrity between integrity between
redundancy redundancy groups.
groups.
Control independent independent independent independent independent remote

systems remote control remote control remote control remote control control systems
systems for main systems for main systems for each systems for each with segregation
and alternative and alternative redundancy group. redundancy group. according to
prime mover. propulsor. redundancy group
concept.
Maintenance any active any active

flexibility component can component can be
be taken out of taken out of service
service without without affecting
affecting maximum maximum propulsion
propulsion power. power.
DNV AS
Notation /

Qualifier
For further details, see subsection [2], [3] and [4].

Note 1: See also the general main class requirements for redundancy types, see Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.1 Table 1 and Pt.4 Ch.1
Sec.3 [2.3.6].
1.6 References
Table 4 lists DNV references used in this section
Table 4 DNV references
Document code Title
DNV-CG-0004 Safe return to port
DNV-RP-D102 Failure mode and effect analysis of redundant systems
DNV-RP-0591 Redundant dynamic positioning systems with closed bus-ties
Table 5 lists other references used in this section
Table 5 Other references
Document code Title
IEC 60812 Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
IMO HSC Code,

Procedures for FMEA
Annex 4

Term Definition
active components components for mechanical transfer of energy, e.g. pumps, fans, electric motors, generators,
combustion engines and turbines
bulkhead deck see Pt.3 Ch.1 Sec.4 Table 7 for definition
maximum maximum power that may be provided to the main propulsion propeller(s)
propulsion power
mutually system B is independent of system A when any single system failure occurring in system A has no
independent effect on the maintained operation of system B
A single system failure occurring in system B may have an effect on the maintained operation of
system A. Two systems are mutually independent when a single system failure occurring in either
of the systems has no consequences for the maintained operation of the other system according to
above
DNV AS
Term Definition

redundancy the ability of a component or system to maintain its function when one failure has occurred
Redundancy can be achieved, for instance, by installation of multiple components, systems or
alternative means of performing a function
redundancy group all components and systems that is subject to a single failure as specified in [2.1.2], [3.1.2] and
[4.1.2] for the specific notations
Guidance note:
The redundancy groups will emerge as a consequence of the worst case single failure within each group.
The rules do not give requirements to the number of (beyond 2) or ratio between the defined groups. The
groups shall be identified in the FMEA and verified by testing.
remaining vessels available propulsion power after the occurrence of a failure

propulsion power
worst case failure failure modes which cause the largest reduction of the propulsion and steering capacity
This means loss of the most significant redundancy group, given the prevailing operation. Failure
modes related to the different class notations are given in [2.1.2], [3.1.2] and [4.1.2].
1.7.2 Abbreviations
AC alternating current
AVR automatic voltage regulator
BF Beaufort
CT current transformer
DC direct current
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
HVAC heating, ventilation and air conditioning
I/O input/output
kn knot
MSB main switchboard
PMS power management system
UPS uninterruptible power supply

The propulsion, power generation and steering systems with their auxiliaries and remote control shall
be documented according to main class. In addition, the documentation as required by Table 8 shall be
submitted for approval.
DNV AS
Table 8 Documentation required

System Documentation type Additional description Info Notation
Propulsion Z050 - Design For the RP notations, the document shall include:
and steering philosophy
— the redundancy design intent for propulsion and steering
arrangement
including all auxiliaries and supporting systems
— intended technical system configuration (mode) on
which the RP notation shall be based (set up of auxiliary
systems and electrical power plant)
— intended fuel configuration for operation in accordance
with the notation
— for the + qualifier, description of additional means for
AP All
switchboard protection and integrity.
For the AP notations, the document shall as applicable
describe the design intent for main and alternative
propulsion and steering including all auxiliaries and
supporting systems.
For both the RP and AP notations, the following shall be
included:
— maximum propulsion power for all propulsors and
determination of the x qualifier.
Z071 - Failure mode Covering failure modes in accordance with the relevant
and effect analysis notation and qualifier(s). The report shall be conclusive on
(FMEA) compliance with applicable requirements for restoration
time, remaining propulsion capabilities (denoted by the AP All
qualifier x), steering capabilities and fuel capacities to
support the required endurance. For detailed description of
the required contents, see [1.8.2].
Z253 - Test An FMEA test procedure for failure testing at quay and sea
procedure for quay trials to verify assumptions and conclusions in the FMEA.
AP All
and sea trial The technical system configuration (mode) shall be clearly
identified, see [1.8.3].
I060 - Principal cable All relevant cables for all systems required to restore and RP(3,
AP
routing sketch maintain propulsion and steering. x)
Z030 - Arrangement Fire and flooding separation: also indicating the different fire
RP(3,
plan zones in which the redundant equipment and systems are AP
x)
installed.
Z265 - Calculation Documenting compliance with requirements for remaining

report propulsion capacity in applicable environmental conditions
after worst case failure scenario:
— for AP see [2.1.1.3]
FI All
— for RP(B, x) see [3.1.1.4]
— for RP(2, x) and RP(3, x) see [4.1.1.5].
The method of hydrodynamic calculation shall be according
to DNV-CG-0004 App.E.
For general requirements to documentation, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.6.
DNV AS
For a full definition of the documentation types, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.5.

1.8.2 Failure mode and effect analysis
1.8.2.1 A failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) for the complete propulsion and steering functions
including auxiliaries and supporting systems shall be conducted and the FMEA report shall be submitted for
approval.
1.8.2.2 The overall goals of the analysis are to:

— identify the failure modes that may affect propulsion and steering - as applicable for the notation
— analyse the possible effects of the failures
— evaluate if the remaining capabilities of propulsion and steering comply with the requirements of the
applicable notation
— conclude on compliance
— identify applicable tests to demonstrate the validity of assumptions and conclusions.
1.8.2.3 The FMEA report shall:

a) identify the vessel, provide general vessel information including applicable class notations
b) give overall vessel design information, describe the redundancy groups and -design intent, give
acceptance criteria for propulsion and steering including auxiliaries and supporting systems
c) describe the technical system configuration(s)/mode(s) on which the analysis is made, i.e the set-up of
propulsion and steering including all auxiliary systems, fuel supplies, power plant and other supporting
system that determine the effects of the failures
Guidance note:
The technical system configuration(s) is the conditions on which the analysis is made, the pre-requisite for achieving the
system response to failure. This may include e.g. control modes, switchboard configuration, auxiliary pump status and cross-
over valve positions.
d) identify and describe systems and functions needed for the propulsion and steering functions and other
systems that may affect the propulsion and steering system (e.g. emergency stop system, system for
quick-closing valves, ventilation control and shutdown)
e) identify all relevant failure modes
f) for the systems and functions in d), evaluate the effects of failure modes in e) and describe the effects
on the served function and on propulsion and steering
g) be conclusive on compliance with the design intent and class notations' acceptance criteria for
restoration time and remaining propulsion and steering capability
h) for RP(3,x), be extended to describe the physical arrangement and separation of the redundancy groups
in fire-insulated and watertight compartments as applicable; including components, cabling and piping
i) for the + qualifier, be extended to cover additional failure modes applicable for the technical system
configuration(s) of the power plant, see [4.2.3.5]
j) identify relevant FMEA tests to demonstrate validity of assumptions and conclusions, including worst case
failure scenarios (forming the basis for the FMEA test programme)
DNV AS
k) be a self-contained document including all necessary descriptions, supporting documents and drawings

documenting the analysis and conclusions
Guidance note 1:
Description of FMEA systematics may be found in DNV-CG-0004 FMEA of Redundant Systems, IEC 60812 and IMO HSC Code,
Annex 4.
Guidance note 2:
Separate FMEAs covering control systems (made by manufacturers) should be incorporated in the overall system FMEA
(made by the yard).
l) include a list and identification of the documentation used as basis for the analysis, including revision
numbers
m) be updated as applicable to reflect the actual installation after final testing, also including possible
mistakes in the report and possible system modifications during commissioning and test
n) be kept on board and at all times be updated to cover changes and alterations.
1.8.3 Test programme for quay-and sea trials (FMEA test programme)
An FMEA test programme shall be made and submitted for approval. The test programme shall:
a) be used for the final quay- and sea trial of the complete propulsion and steering systems
b) be based on the FMEA containing a selection of representative tests and be used to demonstrate the
validity of the key assumptions and conclusions from the analysis, including worst case failure scenarios
c) for each test item, describe the initial technical system configuration/mode, test method and actions to
be performed, method for recovery of the propulsion and steering systems, expected result, references
to the FMEA report. To facilitate the practical testing, give detailed locations where the physical and
practical actions should be carried out
d) be kept on board and at all times be updated to cover changes and alterations.
1.9 Survey and test upon completion

1.9.1 General
1.9.1.1 Upon completion, propulsion and steering with auxiliaries and supporting systems shall be tested at
quay- and sea trials according to the approved FMEA test programme for the subject AP or RP notation with
qualifiers, see [1.8.3].
1.9.1.2 Testing of the various scenarios shall be based on simulation of the failures and be performed under
as realistic conditions as practicable.
1.9.1.3 When deemed necessary by the Society, tests additional to those specified by the test programme
may be required.
1.9.2 Quay- and sea trials
1.9.2.1 The worst case failure scenarios shall be tested at sea to demonstrate compliance with the key
requirements of the applicable notation:
a) restoration time for propulsion and steering
b) thermal stability and performance of the machinery plant including necessary auxiliaries corresponding
to the power required by the x qualifier
c) remaining steering capability (not applicable for AP(PM, x))
d) means of remote control for the remaining propulsion and steering.
DNV AS
1.9.2.2 The worst case failure scenarios for the different notations are, unless otherwise concluded in the

FMEA:
a) for AP(PM, x) - complete loss of main prime mover
b) for AP(P, x) - complete loss of main propulsion and steering
c) for RP(B, x) - complete loss of either propulsion line (both shall be tested)
d) for RP(2, x) - complete loss of either propulsion line (both shall be tested)
e) for RP(3, x) - complete loss of either propulsion line (both shall be tested).
1.9.2.3 FMEA tests that do not require high engine load or verification of vessel performance may if deemed
safe be conducted at quay.
1.9.2.4 It is not required that the built-in endurance as required by [2.1.1.4], [3.1.1.7] and [4.1.1.8]
is demonstrated for the respective notations. However, time-critical resources shall be substantiated by
adequate tests of rate of consumption and depletion.
1.9.2.5 For AP(m, x), a speed trial shall be performed with the alternative propulsion system consisting of at
least two legs in opposite direction, to compensate influence of wind and current. For the P qualifier, also the
steering capability of the unit shall be demonstrated and documented.
2 Technical requirements for AP(m, x)

2.1.1 Redundancy concept
2.1.1.1 The design shall ensure that alternative propulsion providing at least x% of the maximum propulsion
power can be restored and remain in operation after the occurrence of a failure (see [2.1.2]) causing loss of
main propulsion.
2.1.1.2 The alternative propulsion shall be designed for continuous operation.

Guidance note:
Generally no restrictions should be put on the starting intervals of electrical machines. If arranged, the arrangement is subject to
approval in each case.
2.1.1.3 The power capacity of the alternative propulsion shall enable the vessel to maintain a speed of not
less than 7 knots in calm weather.
Guidance note:
The calculation as required by table 5 should be based on even keel, zero heel and summer load line draught conditions, see DNV-
CG-0004 App.E.
2.1.1.4 After a failure (see [2.1.2]) causing loss of main propulsion, the vessel shall be able to proceed with
the propulsion power as indicated by the qualifier x for a period of at least 72 hours.
For vessels built for a specific service where the duration of a sea voyage is less than 72 hours, lower
endurance may be accepted in agreement with the owner. The endurance may be limited to the maximum
crossing time but not to less than 12 hours.
Guidance note:
The agreed duration will in such cases be specified in the appendix to the classification certificate.
DNV AS
2.1.1.5 It shall be possible to activate the alternative propulsion within 30 minutes after failure of the main

propulsion.
Guidance note:
Activation of the alternative propulsion may involve manual mechanical work provided that procedures and equipment necessary
for activation is kept on-board the vessel, and that activation of the alternative propulsion (with the required capacity) within 30
minutes can be demonstrated at sea trials.
2.1.1.6 For notation AP(P, x) the alternative propulsor shall have its own steering system being independent
of the steering system for main propulsion. The alternative propulsor steering system shall comply with
capacity requirements for steering gear, as specified in Pt.4 Ch.5 Sec.3 [2.3.3], at maximum speed achieved
by the alternative propulsor only.
2.1.2 Failure modes

For AP(PM, x), the failure modes to be considered are single failures in active component or system, except
for failures in propeller, shaft and gear.
For AP(P, x), the failure modes to be considered are single failures in active component or system.
2.2 System configuration

The basic arrangement for complying with the AP notation is a main propulsion and steering arrangement in
compliance with main class requirements, and in addition an additional prime mover or propulsor for qualifier
PM or P respectively, see Table 1 and Table 2.
2.3 Auxiliary systems

2.3.1 General
Auxiliary systems serving main propulsion may generally also serve the alternative propulsion. For additional
requirements to specific auxiliary functions see [2.3.2] to [2.3.3].
2.3.2 Fuel Oil

The fuel oil tank, transfer and pre-treatment systems shall be designed to support alternative propulsion
operating with power capacity indicated by x for the period specified in [2.1.1.4] unless sufficient volume of
ready to use fuel is arranged for. Fuel pre-treatment shall be understood as all equipment for purification,
filtering, heating, and measuring fuel oil.
2.3.3 Lubrication oil system
2.3.3.1 Main- and alternative propulsion shall have independent lubrication oil systems.
2.3.3.2 The lubrication oil storage and purification system shall be able to support alternative propulsion
operating with power capacity indicated by x for the period specified in [2.1.1.4], and may be common for
main and alternative propulsion.
2.4 Propulsion- and steering control systems

2.4.1 Propulsion control system
2.4.1.1 Means of local control shall be arranged for alternative propulsion, independent of the control
systems for the main propulsion.
2.4.1.2 Reliable means of communication, also operable during black-out, between the navigating bridge and
the local control stations shall be arranged for main and for alternative propulsion.
DNV AS
2.4.1.3 Remote control from bridge shall be arranged for main and alternative propulsion. Either by two

independent control system or by a common control system arranged with redundancy.
Guidance note:
Mechanical levers are not required to be duplicated.
2.4.2 Steering control system

For AP(P, x), necessary means for local and remote steering control shall be arranged for the alternative
propulsor. This control system shall be independent of the steering control systems for main propulsion.
Failure in remote control system shall not affect the means for local control.
3 Technical requirements for RP(B, x)
3.1 System design

3.1.1.1 The propulsion and steering system, forming two redundancy groups, shall be arranged with the
ability to be restored and remain in operation in accordance with the objectives of the RP(B,x) specific
notation. The notation covers the following main aspects:
— propulsion arrangement and capacity
— steering arrangement and capacity
— restoration time
— endurance.
3.1.1.2 Both redundancy groups shall be intended to provide propulsion during normal operation and be
designed for parallel operation.
3.1.1.3 The vessel's propulsion and steering system shall be of a redundant design such that after a failure,
see [3.1.2], one redundancy group providing x% of the propulsion power and steering can be restored before
the vessel has lost steering speed.
To determine the maximum allowed restoration time, normal service speed shall be considered as the initial
condition.
Guidance note 1:
The restoration time will normally be between the time associated with redundancy type 1 (30 sec) and type 2 (10 min), see Pt.4
Ch.1 Sec.1 Table 1. This would normally allow for manual intervention from permanently manned locations, but not local operation
of components in the machinery space.
Guidance note 2:
The remaining propulsion power after loss of one propulsion line may in practice be less than x% due to hydro-dynamical
properties of the vessel when operating at lower speed.
Guidance note 3:
Vessels designed and built with more than two propulsors will be subject to special evaluation.
3.1.1.4 The remaining propulsion power capacity indicated by x shall enable the vessel to maintain a speed
of not less than 7 knots in calm weather.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The calculation as required by Table 8 should be based on even keel, zero heel and summer load line draught conditions, see DNV-
CG-0004 App.E.
3.1.1.5 Steering
The redundancy in the steering function shall be realized by two mutually independent steering systems, e.g.
two rudders or two propulsion thrusters.
Guidance note:
Vessels designed with more than two (2) propulsion and/or steering systems will be subject to special evaluation.
3.1.1.6 The vessel shall be fully manoeuvrable with one redundancy group in operation.
Guidance note:
This implies that each steering system should comply with capacity requirement for steering gear as specified in Pt.4 Ch.10 Sec.2
[1.4] for rudders and in Pt.4 Ch.5 Sec.3 [2.3.3] for propulsion thrusters.
3.1.1.7 After a failure (see [3.1.2]) the vessel shall be able to proceed with the propulsion power as
indicated by the qualifier x for a period of at least 72 hours.
Guidance note:
3.1.2 Failure modes

For RP(B, x), a single failure of the following components/systems shall be considered:
— any active component or system
— coolers and heat exchangers
— filters
— motorized valves
— boilers
— electrical and electronic equipment (this includes all on-board equipment and systems), including short-
circuit of bus-bars
— cables.

3.2.1 General
3.2.1.1 The basic system arrangement for complying with the RP(B, x) notation is duplicated propulsion
system with associated steering, forming two redundancy groups designed for parallel operation, see Table 1
and 2.
3.2.1.2 The remaining propulsion power after a failure (see [3.1.2]) shall be minimum x% of the maximum
propulsion power.
DNV AS
3.2.2 Electrical power

3.2.2.1 The bus-bars of the main switchboard shall be arranged for automatic separation into at least two(2)
sections, with the redundancy groups distributed between the sections. Automatic separation shall take
place when short circuit currents are detected on the main bus-bars. The bus-tie breaker(s) shall be capable
of breaking the maximum short circuit current in the system, and shall provide discrimination towards the
generator breakers for short circuit. In addition bus-tie breaker(s) shall be provided with under voltage trip.
3.2.2.2 Power supply to control and auxiliary systems shall be arranged so that at least one of the propulsion
and steering systems are capable of being operated after failure of any one switchboard section. The
remaining capacity shall be so that the requirements in [3.1.1] are fulfilled. This applies for all electrical (AC
and DC) distribution systems.
3.2.2.3 Bus-bar control and protection systems shall be designed for operation with both open and closed
bus-tie breaker.
3.3 Auxiliary system

3.3.1 General
3.3.1.1 Auxiliary system shall be so arranged that they after a single failure are able to support the required
remaining propulsion and steering capacity in accordance with [3.1.1] for the period specified in [3.1.1.7].
Guidance note:
Typical system included:
— ventilation systems
— cooling systems
— fuel oil transfer system
— fuel pre-treatment system, i.e. all equipment for purification, filtering heating and measuring fuel oil
— lubrication oil systems
— compressed air
— other system when relevant.
3.3.1.2 Fixed piping may be shared by redundant components for the RP(B, x) notation, except as specified
in [3.3.2].
3.3.2.1 Each propulsion system shall have a separate lubrication oil system.
3.3.2.2 The lubrication oil storage and purification system shall be able to support remaining propulsion
system operating with power capacity indicated by x for the period specified in [3.1.1.7], and may be
common for the redundancy groups.
3.4 Propulsion, steering and auxiliary control system

3.4.1.1 Independent local control for each propulsion line shall be arranged according to main class.
3.4.1.2 Reliable means of communication, also operable during black-out, between the navigating bridge
and the local control stations shall be arranged.
DNV AS
3.4.1.3 The bridge propulsion control system shall be independent for each propulsion line so that a single

failure does not affect more than one, and that operation of the remaining system can continue on the
normal means of operation (e.g. levers). Alternatively, a system arranged with redundancy may be accepted
if in addition independent back-up control system for each propulsion system is arranged. The redundant
system shall be so arranged that a single failure will not prevent continued normal control of the complete
propulsion system. The independent back-up control system shall be based upon similar input devices as the
normal means of operation (e.g. levers).
3.4.1.4 Local control shall be available after a single failure of equipment or cabling on the bridge or between
the bridge and the location for local control.
3.4.1.5 Both normal bridge control and back-up control if arranged according to [3.4.1.3] shall be arranged
so that the operator can control the systems from (or adjacent to) the main navigation stand, in order to
maintain the normal view to the outside and to the required feedback and heading indicators.
Guidance note:

The requirements in [3.4.1.4] and [3.4.1.5] also apply to the bridge steering control systems.
3.4.3 Control system for auxiliary services

Control systems for auxiliary systems shall be arranged in accordance with the redundancy concept for
propulsion and steering, so that a single failure within any control system does not affect the required
remaining propulsion and steering capabilities, as specified in [3.1.1].
4 Technical requirements for RP(2, x) and RP(3, x)
4.1 System design

4.1.1.1 The propulsion and steering system, forming two redundancy groups, shall be arranged with the
ability to be restored and remain in operation in accordance with the objectives of the specific notation. The
notation covers the following main aspects:
— propulsion arrangement and capacity
— steering arrangement and capacity
— restoration time
— endurance.
4.1.1.2 The redundancy groups shall be intended to provide propulsion during normal operation and be
designed for parallel operation.
4.1.1.3 For RP(2, x), the vessel's propulsion and steering system shall be of a redundant design such that
after a failure (see [4.1.2]), one redundancy group providing x% of the propulsion power and steering can be
restored before the vessel has lost steering speed.
To determine the maximum allowed restoration time, normal service speed shall be considered as the initial
condition.
DNV AS
Guidance note 1:

The restoration time will normally be between the time associated with redundancy type 1 (30 sec) and type 2 (10 min), see Pt.4
Ch.1 Sec.1 Table 1. This would normally allow for manual intervention from permanently manned locations, but not local operation
of components in the machinery space.
Guidance note 2:
The remaining propulsion power after loss of one propulsion line may in practice be less than x% due to hydro-dynamical
properties of the vessel when operating at lower speed.
Guidance note 3:
Vessels designed with more than two (2) propulsion and/or steering systems will be subject to special evaluation.
4.1.1.4 For RP(3, x), the requirement as specified in [4.1.1.3] also includes single failure of one
compartment caused by fire or flooding incident. For definition of failure modes see [4.1.2].
4.1.1.5 The remaining propulsion power capacity (as described in [4.1.1.3]) shall enable the vessel to
maintain a speed of not less than 6 knots while heading into BF 8 weather conditions with corresponding
wave conditions. The capacity shall be documented in the required calculation report, see Table 8. BF 8
conditions shall be characterized by the environmental parameters specified in Sec.11 [3.1.2.6].
Guidance note 1:
The calculation as required by Table 8 should be performed at even keel, zero heel and summer load line draught, see DNV-
CG-0004 App.E.
Guidance note 2:
For vessels engaged in specialized operations, e.g. seismical exploration, pipe layers or vessels engaged in confined waters, lower
propulsion capacity may be accepted if in agreement with the owner. The agreed capacity will in such cases be specified in the
appendix to the classification certificate.
4.1.1.6 The redundancy in the steering function shall be realized by two mutually independent steering
systems, e.g. two rudders or two propulsion thrusters.
Guidance note:
Vessels designed with more than 2 propulsion and/or steering systems will be subject to special evaluation.
4.1.1.7 The vessel shall be fully manoeuvrable with one redundancy group in operation.
Guidance note:
This implies that each steering system should comply with capacity requirement for steering gear as specified in Pt.4 Ch.10 Sec.2
[1.4] for rudders and in Pt.4 Ch.5 Sec.3 [2.3.3] for propulsion thrusters.
4.1.1.8 After single failure the vessel shall be able to proceed with the propulsion power as indicated by the
qualifier x for a period of at least 72 hours.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

4.1.1.9 For qualifier +, the vessel's propulsion and steering system shall be of a redundant design such that
after a failure (see [4.1.2]), one redundancy group shall remain in operation without disruption.
Redundancy shall be based on running machinery. Full stop and subsequent start of equipment is not
acceptable. Additional requirements for qualifier + are given for certain systems.
Guidance note:
The redundancy requirements will not be considered as complied with if based upon manual or automatic start or restart of
generators or pumps, or if based upon automatic or manual reconfiguration of auxiliary systems e.g. by use of valves. Automatic
activation of equipment may be accepted as contributing to redundancy only if their reliability and simplicity of operation is
satisfactory so that they can be brought into operation before propulsion power decreases below x%.
4.1.2 Failure modes
4.1.2.1 For RP(2, x), a single failure of the following components/systems shall be considered:
— any active component or system
— coolers and heat exchangers
— filters
— motorized valves
— boilers
— electrical and electronic equipment (this includes all on-board equipment and systems), including short-
circuit of bus-bars
— cables.
See [4.3] for additional requirements for auxiliary systems.
4.1.2.2 For RP(3, x), the failure modes include all those defined for RP(2, x) and in addition any incident of
fire or flooding of a single compartment that may affect propulsion or steering:
— fire in single compartment up to nearest A60-class boundary
— flooding of single watertight compartment below bulkhead deck.
Incidents of fire need not be considered for the bridge.
Guidance note:
Possible impact for vessel stability is not within the scope of the RP rules.
4.1.2.3 For the + qualifier, additional failure modes as specified in Table 9 shall be considered for the
electrical systems.

4.2.1 General
4.2.1.1 The basic system arrangement for complying with the RP(2, x) and RP(3, x)notation is duplicated
propulsion system with associated steering, forming two redundancy groups designed for parallel operation,
see Table 1 and Table 2.
4.2.1.2 The remaining propulsion power after a failure, see [4.1.2] shall be minimum x% of the maximum
propulsion power.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

It is acceptable that the remaining propulsion power after loss of one propulsor in practice may be less than x% of the maximum
propulsion power due to hydrodynamical properties of the vessel when operating at a lower speed.
4.2.1.3 When vessel steering as required by [4.1.1.6] is based on rudders, the steering system for each
rudder, including it's steering control and actuators, shall comply with main the class rules. This implies that
each steering system shall be provided with a main- and auxiliary steering gear.
Guidance note:
In a typical installation with two independent (i.e. main and auxiliary) steering gear systems for each rudder, one pump in each
system is fed from the emergency switchboard and the other pumps according to the redundancy groups. In such an arrangement
one single failure may initially cause stop of three pumps, which is accepted.
4.2.1.4 When vessel steering as required by [4.1.1.6] is based on propulsion thrusters, the steering system
for each thruster, including it's steering controls and power actuators shall be arranged with redundancy.
Each power actuator shall have dedicated power supply.
Guidance note:
This implies that each steering system has single fault tolerance towards i.a failures in electrical components, control system units,
control system power, cabling, signalling and communication buses and also rupture in hydraulic pipes.
4.2.2 Electrical power
4.2.2.1 The electrical power required for propulsion, steering and auxiliary systems shall be generated by
a power plant complying with main class requirements and the additional requirements to redundancy,
capacity, separation and single failure integrity as specified for the given notation.
4.2.2.2 The bus-bars of the main switchboard shall be arranged for automatic separation into at least two
(2) sections, with the redundancy groups distributed between the sections. Automatic separation shall take
place when short circuit currents are detected on the main bus-bars. The bus-tie breaker(s) shall be capable
of breaking the maximum short circuit current in the system, and shall provide discrimination towards the
generator breakers for short circuit. In addition bus-tiebreaker(s) shall be provided with under voltage trip.
4.2.2.3 Power supply to control and auxiliary systems shall be arranged so that at least one of the propulsion
and steering systems are capable of being operated after failure of any one switchboard section. The
remaining capacity shall be so that the requirements in [4.1.1] are fulfilled. This applies for all electrical (AC
and DC) distribution systems.
4.2.2.4 Bus-bar control and protection systems shall be designed to work with both open and closed bus-tie
breakers.
4.2.2.5 For RP(3, x), the switchboard sections as described in [4.2.2.2] shall be separated by A60-class
boundaries, and in addition, watertight if below the bulkhead deck. If the sections are connected, there shall
be a bus-tie breaker on each side of the partition. Power distribution for the redundancy groups shall be
arranged in compliance with the separation requirements given in [4.5].
4.2.2.6 For qualifier +, the online power reserve, i.e. the difference between online generator capacity and
generated power at any time, shall be displayed at the main navigation workstation. The indication shall be
continuously available. For split bus power arrangements, indications shall be provided for individual bus
sections.
DNV AS
4.2.3 Power management requirements for qualifier +

4.2.3.1 A power management system is required providing the following functions for both open and closed
bus-tie operation:
— load dependent starting of additional generators
— block starting of large consumers when there is inadequate running generator capacity, and to start up
generators as required, and hence to permit requested consumer start to proceed
— possibility to set the minimum number of connected generators sets in each redundancy group
— if load dependent stop of running generators is provided, facilities for disconnection of this function shall
be arranged.
4.2.3.2 A failure in a power management system shall not affect the generated power and shall initiate an
alarm at the main navigation workstation.
Guidance note:
Special attention should be paid to ensure redundant distribution (for RP(3, x) also separation) of input/output (I/O) signals so
that effects of single failures in the PMS system do not impair the overall redundancy philosophy.
4.2.3.3 It shall be possible to operate the switchboards in manual as required for the main class, with the
power management system disconnected.
4.2.3.4 Overload, caused by the stopping of one or more generators, shall not create a black-out.
Guidance note:
Reduction in thrusters load, i.e. pitch or speed reductions, should be introduced to prevent blackout and enable standby generators
to come online. If this function is taken care of by the propulsion control system, the function shall be coordinated with the power
management system.
Load reductions should preferably be achieved through the tripping of unimportant consumers, and the requirement does not
exempt such means. It is however common that the relative load proportions will require thruster load reduction, in order to
effectively reduce overload situations.
4.2.3.5 When generators in different redundancy groups are running in parallel, a single failure may
propagate between systems. In such cases it is required that protective measures are implemented in the
system in order to ensure the required integrity between the redundancy groups. Analysis of relevant failure
modes shall be addressed in the FMEA.
Guidance note:
Examples of failure modes that will be relevant are given in Table 9*). The analysis and test requirements may be part of the RP
FMEA and FMEA test programme or other documentation. In case such verification is documented in other documentation the
FMEA should give reference to this documentation and refer/state conclusions based on this.
Table 9 Failure modes, analysis and testing
Failure mode Minimum analysis and test requirement
Short circuits, Selectivity between generator breakers and bus-tie on short circuit and earth failures, in form of a
earth failures discrimination analysis.
Overload Overload required to be handled by functionality in control systems (PMS, switchboard logic), control
system documentation, FMEA and functional testing at PMS/FMEA trials.
Governor failures Power failure, speed pick-up failure, over-fuel, isochronous load sharing lines. Analyse and test all
these.
DNV AS
Failure mode Minimum analysis and test requirement

Overvoltage Over excitation/excitation break-down/under excitation, to be analysed in the FMEA analysis. FMEA
and AVR, failure test requirement: loss of excitation (power or no output), loss of sense or over excitation (disconnect
scenarios CT feedback or increase excitation).
Failures related Analysis, functional testing. FMEA test: power failure, network failure (disconnect), PMS I/O failure
to PMS and active testing required as found necessary in FMEA analysis, load sharing line failure (disconnect).
load sharing
Transient under The FMEA must analyse the effect of transient voltage dips in the system and identify measures
voltage (short necessary to avoid problems with:
circuit ride
— unintended tripping of frequency converters
through): (In
— unintended tripping of motors and other important components, like auxiliary system pumps
electrical systems
(tripping of motor starters and/or contactors)
transient voltage
dips may occur, — unintended activation of under voltage protection systems
e.g. due to — DC control power systems, e.g. dual feeding through diodes or automatic change-over.
short circuits In relation with the above items, functionality must be checked in order to verify the potential effect
and subsequent of this failure mode. The requirement is that the equipment not belonging to the propulsion/steering
intended opening system directly affected by the failure shall ride through the transient period and be immediately
of feeder or bus- available, without operator intervention, when the system voltage is re-established. It should also
tie breakers for be evaluated if re-establishment of system voltage could cause unacceptable high voltages (voltage
disconnection over-shoot).
of the faulty
Measures must be implemented as found necessary through analysis.
equipment. In
connection with No short circuit test-requirements to verify the conclusions.
operation with For auxiliary functions which will not affect the propulsion and steering within a long time period
closed bus-tie after failure and which are starting and stopping regularly as part of their normal operation, typically
such transients systems for control of ambient room temperature, the ride through may be based upon stop and
will affect the automatic restart/standby start.
whole connected
Additionally, or as an alternative, verification of the above mentioned items may also be required to
distribution
be supported by testing. Such testing should be based upon non-destructive methods for simulating
system.)
the transient low voltage period in the system, e.g. so called 'bang-bang' tests where the supply
voltage is removed for a short duration in order to simulate a voltage dip.
* It should be understood that this is not an exhaustive list of failure modes relevant for closed bus-tie systems. See
DNV-RP-0591 and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) of redundant systems, Appendix D, for explanation of
acceptance criteria, discussion on the subject, and other examples of relevant failure modes. For higher level of integrity
in power system, see DNV-RP-0591.
4.3 Auxiliary systems

4.3.1 General
4.3.1.1 Auxiliary systems shall be so arranged that they after single failure are able to support the required
remaining propulsion and steering capacity in accordance with [4.1.1].
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Typical systems included:
— ventilation systems
— cooling systems
— fuel oil transfer system
— fuel pre-treatment systems, i.e. all equipment for purification, filtering, heating, and measuring fuel oil
— lubrication oil systems
— compressed air
— other systems when relevant.
4.3.1.2 In addition to the redundancy and separation required by [4.3.1.1] each auxiliary system shall be
arranged to ensure that after failure of any active component, the remaining system has capacity to support
normal full propulsion power.
Guidance note:
The intention is that duplicated propulsion plants shall not have lower availability of normal full propulsion power than single
engine propulsion plants.
4.3.1.3 For RP(2, x), fixed piping may be shared by redundant components, except as specified in
[4.3.2.1], [4.3.3], [4.3.4.1] and [4.3.5.2].
4.3.1.4 For RP(3, x), separate piping systems shall be arranged for the redundancy groups as specified in
[4.5]. Cross-over pipes are accepted provided these can be closed from both sides of separating bulkheads,
with one valve on each side of the bulkhead(s) fitted directly or as close as possible to it. Crossover valves
shall be easy to reach and clearly marked. Ventilation ducts shall not have cross-over facilities.
4.3.1.5 If equipment depend on air ventilation or another cooling media for control of ambient temperature
to avoid excessive heat increase, the cooling system shall be designed with redundancy.
4.3.1.6 For RP(3, x), the capacity of the bilge system in each engine room shall be in accordance with the
main class rules.
4.3.2 Fuel oil
4.3.2.1 Each redundancy group shall have a dedicated fuel oil service tank with associated piping.
4.3.2.2 For RP(3, x), the fuel oil service tanks and associated piping shall be installed one in each engine
room.
4.3.2.3 If the fuel system requires heating, the heating system shall comply with the redundancy
requirements and in addition, the separation requirements as applicable for the RP(3, x) notation.

Each redundancy group shall have an independent lubrication oil system. The system shall comply with the
redundancy requirements and in addition for RP(3, x), the separation requirements as applicable notation.
4.3.4 Cooling water
4.3.4.1 Each redundancy group shall have an independent freshwater cooling system. The system shall
comply with the redundancy requirements and in addition for RP(3, x), the separation requirements as
applicable for the notation.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Redundant systems for air conditioning and control of ambient temperature, e.g. air condition units, chillers and HVAC, may share
common piping for notation RP(2, x). See also [4.3.1.5].
4.3.4.2 For vessels with class notation Passenger ship or Ferry notation, sea water suction shall be
arranged from separate sea chests located in the bottom of the vessel, in addition to a high sea chest located
at one side. The two low sea chests shall have separate ventilation arrangements.
4.3.5 Compressed air system
4.3.5.1 The starting air system shall comply with main class. For RP(3, x), the compressors and air receivers
shall also be separated as specified in [4.5].
4.3.5.2 If control air is needed for propulsion and steering, independent control air systems shall be arranged
for each redundancy group. For RP(3, x), the system shall also be separated as specified in [4.5].
4.3.6 Ventilation systems

For RP(3, x), ventilation systems for the redundancy groups shall not have any common units or cross-over
ducts.
4.4 Propulsion, steering and auxiliary control system

4.4.1.1 Independent local control systems for each propulsion line shall be arranged according to main class.
4.4.1.2 Reliable means of communication, also operable during black-out, between the navigating bridge and
the local control stations shall be arranged.
4.4.1.3 The bridge propulsion control system shall be independent for each propulsion line so that a single
failure will not affect both and that operation of the remaining system can continue on the normal means
of operation (e.g. levers). Alternatively, a system arranged with redundancy can be accepted if in addition
independent back-up control system for each propulsion system is arranged. The redundant system shall be
so arranged that a single failure will not prevent continued normal control of the complete propulsion system.
The independent back-up control system shall be based upon similar input devices as the normal means of
operation (e.g. levers).
4.4.1.4 Local control shall be available after failure of equipment or cabling on the bridge or between the
bridge and the location for local control. For RP(3, x) notation, and associated cabling and equipment
installed outside of the bridge shall follow the separation requirements in [4.5].
4.4.1.5 Both normal bridge control and back-up control if arranged according to [4.4.1.3] shall be arranged
so that the operator can control the systems from (or adjacent to) the main navigation stand, in order to
maintain the normal view to the outside and to the required feedback and heading indicators.
Guidance note:
4.4.2.1 The requirements in [4.4.1.4] and [4.4.1.5] also apply to the bridge steering control systems.
DNV AS
4.4.2.2 For redundant thruster control system as required by [4.2.1.4], a single input device may be

accepted provided that the signals to the two control units are electrically separated.
4.4.3 Control system for auxiliary services

Control systems for auxiliary services shall be arranged in accordance with the redundancy and separation
concept for the propulsion and steering, so that a failure within any control system does not affect the
required remaining propulsion and steering capabilities, as given for the specific notations.
4.5 Separation requirements for RP(3, x)

4.5.1 General
4.5.1.1 Redundancy groups (including systems, components, cabling, and piping) shall be separated by
bulkheads and decks, fire insulated by A60-class division, and in addition, watertight if below the bulkhead
deck.
Guidance note 1:
If two A0-class bulkheads are arranged in areas with low fire risk, this may be accepted as equivalent to A60-class division on
case-by-case basis.
Guidance note 2:
If cables are separated by use of A60-class cable ducts, means should be provided to keep the temperature inside the duct within
the specified temperature limits for the cables. This alternative is not accepted in high fire risk areas, e.g. engine rooms and fuel
treatment rooms.
This principle may also be used for piping.
4.5.1.2 On the bridge, the systems belonging to different redundancy groups need not fulfil [4.5.1.1] but
should be separated as far as possible.
DNV AS
SECTION 8 ALTERNATIVE FUELS - FUEL READY

1 General
1.1 Objective
The objective of this section is to provide requirements related to later conversion to one or several
alternative fuels other than the fuel the vessel is originally designed for.
Alternative fuels means fuels for which the vessel is constructed to convert to after newbuilding.
1.2 Scope
The fuels covered in this section are LPG, LNG, ammonia and LFL fuels. The additional class notation Fuel
ready provides the basis for compliance with the rules in force at the time of contract for construction for the
newbuilding. The additional class notation Fuel ready with its qualifiers has supplementary attributes with
corresponding requirements.
The Fuel ready class notation does not include survey requirements for follow up of the ship when in
operation. At time of conversion a survey and evaluation of the condition of the equipment or systems
installed from newbuilding stage will be done. The test scope will depend on time elapsed from newbuilding,
and the condition of its systems and components
1.3 Application
1.3.1 The additional class notation Fuel ready is applicable to all vessels where the vessel is prepared for a
later conversion to an alternative fuel.
1.3.2 The Fuel ready notation may be applied to gas carriers. In such case, relevant parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 shall
be complied with, and will replace references to Sec.5, Sec.6, Sec.13 and Sec.14, as applicable.
1.3.3 At the time of conversion, documentation shall be submitted for approval as required by the relevant
notation it shall be converted to. The design documentation from the newbuilding stage will be used to
support the approval.
1.4 Definitions
Definitions for terms used in this section are found in Sec.5, Sec.6, Sec.13 and Sec.14 as applicable.
1.5 Class notation - Fuel ready

1.5.1 Qualifiers and attributes
A ship complying with the relevant parts of this section may be given the additional class notation, Fuel
ready, with qualifiers as outlined in Table 1, and attributes as defined in Table 2.
Each of the attributes in Table 2 may be applied to multiple fuels.
DNV AS
Table 1 Class notation Fuel ready with relevant qualifiers

Class
Qualifier Purpose Application
notation
Fuel Ammonia Ships designed for future conversion to an Minimum one of the fuel specific
ready alternative fuel. qualifiers are mandatory.
LFL
LNG
LPG
Table 2 Attributes to Fuel ready qualifiers
Attributes Purpose Application
D To document and verify that the design for the ship with Mandatory for all qualifiers.
ammonia, LFL, LNG and/or LPG as fuel is found to be in Ti or Tc may be used as an
compliance with the Gas fuelled ammonia, LFL fuelled, alternative.
Gas fuelled LNG and/or Gas fuelled LPG notation rules Range of the vessel after conversion
applicable for the newbuilding, see Sec.14, Sec.6, Sec.5 shall be documented.
and/or Sec.13 as applicable for the fuel(s) chosen.
Structural modifications required to be done during
the future conversion to support the fuel containment
system shall be documented. This includes structural
reinforcements and use of materials suitable for the
relevant temperatures.
Tc To document and verify that the fuel tanks are installed Mandatory for all qualifiers.
that can be converted to use for the applicable alternative D or Ti may be used as an alternative.
fuel. Range of the vessel after conversion
shall be documented.
Ti To document and verify that the fuel tanks are installed Mandatory for all qualifiers.
that can be used for the applicable alternative fuel. D or Tc may be used as an alternative.
Range of the vessel after conversion
shall be documented.
S To document and verify that the structural preparations

required to support the future fuel containment system are
carried out. This includes structural reinforcements and use
of materials suitable for the relevant temperatures.
P To document and verify that the ship is prepared for

future fuel system installations: pipe routing, structural
arrangements for bunkering station, and gas valve unit
space.
MEc To document and verify that the main engine(s) installed Mandatory for qualifiers LNG, LFL and
can be converted to alternative fuel or dual fuel. The engine LPG.
is not yet approved for the applicable fuel, see [2.4]. MEi or MEca may be used as an
alternative.
DNV AS
Attributes Purpose Application

MEca To document and verify that the main engine(s) installed Mandatory for qualifiers LNG, LFL and
can be converted to alternative fuel or dual fuel. The design LPG.
of the converted engine is approved for the applicable fuel. MEi or MEc may be used as an
alternative.
MEi To document and verify that the main engine(s) installed

can be operated on the applicable alternative fuel or dual
fuel. The engine is tested with the applicable alternative
fuel and certified.
AEc To document and verify that the auxiliary engines installed

can be converted to the applicable alternative or dual fuel.
The engine is not yet approved for the applicable fuel, see
[2.4].
AEca To document and verify that the auxiliary engines installed

can be converted to the applicable alternative or dual fuel.
The design of the converted engine is approved for the
applicable fuel.
AEi To document and verify that the auxiliary engines installed

can be operated on the applicable alternative fuel or dual
fuel. The engine is tested with the applicable alternative
fuel and certified.
Bc To document and verify that the boilers installed can be

converted to applicable alternative fuel or dual fuel. The
boiler is not yet approved for the applicable fuel, see [2.4].
Bca To document and verify that the boiler installed can be

converted to the applicable alternative or dual fuel. The
design of the converted boiler is approved for the applicable
fuel.
Bi To document and verify that the boilers installed are

capable of burning the applicable alternative fuel or dual
fuel. The boiler is tested with the applicable alternative fuel
and certified.
Misc To document what additional systems and equipment are Based on agreement between owner
installed at newbuilding stage. and yard, and a detailed list shall be
provided to the Society for acceptance.
Guidance note:
Examples of notation:
Fuel ready(Ammonia[D; MEca; S], LPG[D; MEi; S]) means that the future alternative fuel design is examined and found to
be in compliance with rules for ammonia and LPG in force at time of newbuilding, and the ship main engine is of a type that is
approved to be convertible to ammonia or ammonia dual fuel and can be operated on LPG or LPG dual fuel. Structural preparations
required to support the future ammonia and LPG containment system are carried out.
Fuel ready(Ammonia[Tc]) means that fuel tank(s) are installed that can be converted for ammonia use by later upgrades of
tank components, tank systems or tank structural arrangements. Structural preparations for later conversion to ammonia storage
are not carried out. Design verification outside scope of fuel tank(s) has not been performed.
Fuel ready(Ammonia[Ti; S]) means that fuel tank(s) are installed that can be used for ammonia. Structural preparations for
storage of ammonia are carried out. Design verification outside scope of fuel tank(s) has not been performed.
DNV AS
1.5.2 Class notation upon conversion to alternative fuel

1.5.2.1 Applicable rules
The rules in force at the time of conversion to the applicable fuel shall be complied with regardless of when
the Fuel ready notation was originally assigned.
1.5.2.2 Change of class notation

Upon successful conversion to the alternative fuel, the Fuel ready notation with applicable qualifier will be
replaced with the corresponding fuel notation, i.e. Gas fuelled ammonia, Gas fuelled LNG, Gas fuelled
LPG or LFL fuelled.
1.6 Documentation
1.6.1 Documentation requirements for attribute D
1.6.1.1 Documentation for design verification shall be submitted as required in Table 3 for all qualifiers and
Table 4 for the qualifier Ammonia.
1.6.1.2 The following is required to separate the design verification documentation in Table 3 from the normal
newbuilding documentation:
— The documentation shall be marked 'Fuel ready' at the beginning of the drawing title.
— The documentation will be given status examined (EX) instead of approved.
Table 3 Documentation requirements for all qualifiers and attribute D
Propulsion and steering Z050 - Design philosophy Including information on the machinery
arrangements, general configuration, machinery space
arrangements, fuel system arrangements,
boil off gas handling, ammonia release
FI
mitigation systems, shut down philosophy,
redundancy considerations, etc. Shall be
submitted before other documentation, to
give support for approval of these.
Fuel system Z010 - General arrangement Vessel general arrangement showing fuel
ready installation, including:
— fuel tank(s) with distance from ship
side
— location of bunkering station EX
— location of spaces containing fuel
equipment
— air locks
— pipe routing.
Z030 - Arrangement plan Engine room arrangement, only if not

FI
included in general arrangement.
Hazardous area G080 - Hazardous area

EX
classification classification drawing
DNV AS

Ventilation systems for fuel S012 - Ducting diagram (DD) For fuel equipment spaces including:
system spaces
— ventilation capacity
— location of inlets and outlets EX
— segregation from other ventilation
systems.
Fuel tanks Z030 - Arrangement plan Fuel tank arrangements including:

— fuel preparation rooms EX
— details for structural strength and
thermal exposure calculations.
Z265 - Calculation report Calculation of vessel operating range after

FI
conversion to the applicable fuel.
Fuel tanks supporting H050 - Structural drawing Fuel tank support and antiflotation
EX
structure structure, as applicable.
Ship hull structure H080 - Strength analysis Fuel tank arrangements:

FI
— structural strength evaluation.
C040 - Design analysis Fuel tank arrangements:

— temperature calculations in way of fuel FI
tank for determination of hull material
grade selection.
Z260 - Report Summary report including description of:

— required modifications to the ship hull
structure at future conversion to an
alternative fuel
FI
— assumptions and limitations in the
design
— reference to documentation provided
for Fuel ready notation.
Fuel piping system S010 - Piping diagram (PD) Fuel piping including:
— secondary enclosures for fuel pipes
— arrangement of vent mast/vent
outlet(s) for pressure relief valves and
EX
purging.
If piping details are not available, as a
minimum the main components in the
system shall be shown.
Z265 - Calculation report Boil off gas capacity estimates and system
FI
description, as applicable.
Inert gas system S010 - Piping diagram (PD) If applicable, the amount of inert gas and
type of system needed will among other
EX
things depend on fuel type and type of
tank to be used.
DNV AS

Structural fire protection G060 - Structural fire protection For the fuel ready installation.
EX
arrangements drawing
External surface G200 - Fixed fire extinguishing For the fuel ready installation.
protection, water spraying system documentation EX
system
Bunkering station fire G200 - Fixed fire extinguishing

EX
extinguishing system system documentation
Fuel preparation room fire G200 - Fixed fire extinguishing

EX
extinguishing system system documentation
Bilge system S010 - Piping diagram (PD) Bilge system fitted in spaces containing
EX
fuel equipment.
Stability calculations Z265 - Calculation report Report including:

— estimated new lightship
— description of the changes in buoyancy
of the hull, wind profile, openings,
watertight integrity and other EX
modifications influencing stability as
applicable
— loading conditions checked for the
compliance with intact and damage
stability criteria.
Fi = for information, EX = examined
For the qualifier Ammonia, in addition to the documentation requirements in Table 3, the documentation for
design verification found in Table 4 shall be submitted.
Table 4 Additional documentation requirements for qualifier Ammonia and attribute D
Toxic zone classification Z030 - Arrangement plan When document is submitted for attribute EX
D, safety distances from vent masts,
ventilation systems for spaces to contain
ammonia leaks and ammonia bunkering
station shall be documented in relation to
openings to enclosed spaces.
When document is submitted for attributes
Ti and Tc without attribute D, the position
of future vent mast for ammonia after
conversion in relation to openings to
enclosed spaces shall be documented.
Water safety systems Z030 - Arrangement plan Including: EX

— location of access water screen/spray/
mist systems and control positions of
such equipment
— location of eye washers and
decontamination showers.
DNV AS

S010 - Piping Diagram (PD) With water supply and arrangement to EX
prevent freezing.
EX = examined
1.6.2 Documentation requirements for attribute S

Documentation shall be submitted as required in Table 5 for attribute S for all qualifiers.
Table 5 Documentation requirements for attribute S
Ship hull structures H080 - Strength analysis Fuel tank arrangements:

FI
— structural strength evaluation.
C040 - Design analysis Fuel tank arrangements:

— temperature calculations in way of fuel tank FI
for determination of hull material grade
selection.
Z260 - Report Summary report including description of:

— required modifications to the ship hull
structure at future conversion to an
alternative fuel FI
— assumptions and limitations in the design
— reference to documentation provided for
Fuel ready notation.
FI = for information
1.6.3 Documentation requirements for other attributes
1.6.3.1 When attributes in addition to D and S are included in the class notation, documentation for
the relevant parts that shall be installed on board is subject to class approval as part of the newbuilding
documentation. Details of documentation requirements are found for qualifiers LNG, LFL, LPG and
Ammonia in Sec.5, Sec.6, Sec.13 and Sec.14, as applicable. When physical installations are included, the
class approved ship documentation (general arrangement, structural drawings, stability documentation, etc.)
shall also reflect these installations as relevant. The documentation for the actual ship installations shall not
have the wording 'Fuel ready' in the start of the drawing title, and will be given approval status as outlined in
relevant parts of the rules for the applicable fuel and e.g. stability rules, structural rules.
1.6.3.2 When systems or equipment are installed on board as part of the Fuel ready class notation, a plan
for how to preserve these systems or equipment shall be submitted for information.
Guidance note:
For piping systems, pressure vessels or tanks, preservation may typically include keeping them dry, by keeping them filled
with inert gas or dry air, and also to have a dry or inert gas atmosphere around them if possible. If tanks, tank hold spaces or
systems are filled with inert gas, procedures for gas freeing before safe opening up should also be covered by the plan (taking the
suffocation risk into account).
DNV AS
1.6.4 Documentation requirements for attribute Ti

1.6.4.1 For the qualifiers LNG, LPG and ammonia, the fuel tank installation shall be documented for the
applicable tank type pertaining to documentation requirements found in respectively Sec.5 Table 2, Sec.13
Table 2 and Sec.14 Table 4. The documentation for the actual ship installations shall not have the wording
'Fuel ready' in the start of the drawing title, and will be given approval status as outlined in relevant parts of
the rules.
1.6.4.2 Documentation shall be submitted as required in Table 6 for attribute Ti and qualifier LFL. The
documentation for the actual ship installations shall not have the wording 'Fuel ready' in the start of the
drawing title, and will be given approval status as outlined in relevant parts of the rules.
Table 6 Documentation requirements for qualifier LFL and attribute Ti
LFL Tanks C030 - Detailed drawing Including:

— tanks
— cofferdam design purpose (e.g filling with AP
water)
— tank hatches and any openings to tanks
— secondary barrier
AP = for approval
Guidance note:
Tank piping connections and tank insulation for the future LFL fuel system are not required to be physically included for the LFL
qualifier and attribute Ti. If included, this may be documented under the attribute Misc.
1.6.4.3 When systems or equipment are installed on board as part of the Ti attribute, a plan for how to
preserve these systems or equipment shall be submitted for information.
Guidance note:
1.6.5 Documentation requirements for attribute Tc
1.6.5.1 For the qualifiers LNG, LPG and Ammonia for attribute Tc, documentation for the convertible
fuel tank installation will be evaluated on a case by case basis. Modifications to be carried out at later tank
conversion shall be documented.
1.6.5.2 Documentation shall be submitted as required in Table 7 for attribute Tc and qualifier LFL.
Modifications to be carried out at later tank conversion shall be documented.
DNV AS
Table 7 Documentation requirements for qualifier LFL and attribute Tc

LFL Tanks C030 - Detailed drawing Including:

— tanks
— cofferdam design purpose (e.g filling with EX
water)
— tank hatches and any openings to tanks
— secondary barrier
EX = for examination
1.6.5.3 When systems or equipment are installed on board as part of the Tc attribute, a plan for how to
preserve these systems or equipment shall be submitted for information.
Guidance note:
1.6.6 Documentation requirements for attribute P

Documentation shall be submitted as required in Table 8 for attribute P for all qualifiers.
Table 8 Documentation requirements for attribute P
Ducting and bulkheads Z030 - Arrangement plan — structural ducts for bunkering piping (if
going through the ship)
— routing for other fuel piping systems for the
alternative fuel (as a minimum space for
the future installation of pipe ducting shall
be available, the physical installation of the FI
pipe ducting is optional)
— bunkering station structural space
— gas valve unit room, as applicable, and if
designed as a structural space
— fuel preparation space, as applicable
FI = For information
1.6.7 Documentation requirements for attribute MEc, AEc and Bc

Documentation shall be submitted as required in Table 9 for attributes MEc, AEc and Bc for all qualifiers.
DNV AS
Table 9 Documentation requirements for attribute MEc, AEc and Bc

A statement containing as a minimum:

— a confirmation of intention to provide a
solution for conversion of the applicable
machinery to the alternative fuel
— the machinery type that will be convertible
— information on existing development
programme for the machinery with the
alternative fuel, with specification of
milestones and expected availability on the
Fuel consumer Z260 - Report market FI
— a rough description of the machinery
design principle for the alternative fuel
(scope of modified machinery components,
fuel supply principle, general combustion
process, main safety principles to face
the additional risks introduced by the
alternative fuel)
— an acknowledgement that the machinery
will pertain to the applicable rules and
regulations.
FI = For information
1.6.8 Documentation requirements for attribute Misc

For all qualifiers for attribute Misc, documentation requirements will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
When systems or equipment are installed on board as part of the Misc attribute, a plan for how to preserve
these systems or equipment shall be submitted for information.
Guidance note:
2 Requirements for attributes
2.1 Requirements for attribute D

2.1.1 General
The ship design for the applicable alternative fuel shall comply with the requirements for the corresponding
class notation at the time of newbuilding. See Sec.5, Sec.6, Sec.13 and Sec.14, as applicable.
2.1.2 Future structural modifications
2.1.2.1 For attribute D, the structural modifications required to be done during the future conversion to
support the fuel containment system (fuel tank) shall be documented. This includes structural reinforcements
and use of materials suitable for the relevant temperatures.
DNV AS
2.1.2.2 Documentation of structural modifications directly related to the installation of the fuel containment

system, e.g. cut out in deck, does not need to be included.
2.1.2.3 A summary report shall describe the required structural modifications for the future conversion
including assumptions and limitations in the calculations.
2.1.2.4 The tank design shall have a technical documentation level confirming that the design is feasible.
The review shall be based on at least a minimum scope of documentation agreed with the Society where all
safety related aspects shall be covered.
Guidance note:
For conventional tank types and designs this may be confirmed by the track record of existing tanks. If the tank type, design or its
application is novel, further documentation of the feasibility may be required as defined above. In such cases the review will be a
separate scope of work and not covered by the Fuel ready notation.
2.2 Requirements for attribute S

2.2.1 Structural preparations
2.2.1.1 For attribute S, the structural preparations required to support the future fuel containment system
(fuel tank) shall be carried out at newbuilding stage. This includes structural reinforcements and use of
materials suitable for the relevant temperatures and density of the alternative fuel.
2.2.1.2 Local reinforcements considered more practical to carry out at the future conversion will not
be required to be carried out (i.e. structures that will need to be cut out for the installation of the fuel
containment system, local insert plates around supports, as well as supports).
2.2.1.3 The tank design shall have a technical documentation level confirming that the design is feasible. The
review shall be based on a minimum scope of documentation agreed with the Society where all safety related
aspects shall be covered.
Guidance note:
For conventional tank types and designs this may be confirmed by the track record of existing tanks. If the tank type, design or its
application is novel, further documentation of the feasibility may be required as defined above. In such cases the review will be a
separate scope of work and not covered by the Fuel ready notation.
2.3 Requirements for attribute P

For the attribute P, the following shall be prepared for and installed on board:
— structural ducts for bunkering piping (if going through the ship)
— routing for other piping systems for the alternative fuel (as a minimum space for the future installation of
pipe ducting shall be available, the physical installation of the pipe ducting is optional)
— bunkering station structural space
— gas valve unit room, as applicable, and if designed as a structural space
— fuel preparation space may be included if relevant and as agreed between yard, owner and Society.
A list of what is prepared on board for the individual ship will be included in the appendix to the class
certificate.
DNV AS
2.4 Requirements for attributes MEc, AEc or Bc
For the attributes MEc, AEc and/or Bc, the installed machinery shall be of a type that may be converted
to the alternative fuel or dual fuel operation. The conversion shall not degrade the performance of the
machinery beyond the requirements of the intended service.
The machinery is not yet approved for the alternative fuel or dual fuel operation. A written statement shall
be submitted for information, confirming that the machinery designer intends to provide a solution for
converting the existing machinery to the alternative fuel or dual fuel operation in the future. A detailed
verification and approval of the design is not required when the attribute MEc, AEc and/or Bc is assigned
to a Fuel ready class notation for the vessel. The statement shall be issued by the machinery designer. The
statement shall as a minimum contain:
— a confirmation of intention to provide a solution for conversion of the applicable machinery to the
alternative fuel
— the machinery type that will be convertible
— information on existing development programme for the machinery with the alternative fuel, with
specification of milestones and expected availability on the market
— a rough description of the machinery design principle for the alternative fuel (scope of modified machinery
components, fuel supply principle, general combustion process, main safety principles to face the
additional risks introduced by the alternative fuel)
— an acknowledgement that the machinery will pertain to the applicable rules and regulations.
2.5 Requirements for attributes MEca, AEca or Bca

For the attributes AEca and/or Bca, the installed machinery shall be of a type that may be converted to
the applicable alternative fuel or dual fuel operation. The conversion shall not degrade the performance of
the machinery beyond the requirements of the intended service. The design of the converted machinery is
approved for the use of the applicable alternative fuel or dual fuel application.
2.6 Requirements for attributes MEi, AEi or Bi

For the attributes MEi, AEi and/or Bi, the installed machinery shall be of a type that can be operated on the
applicable alternative fuel or dual fuel. The installed machinery has been tested in workshop and certified for
the alternative fuel.
2.7 Requirements for attribute Tc

For the attribute Tc, the fuel tanks on board shall be of a type that may be converted for storage of the
applicable fuel. Upgrades needed to the tank during conversion to the applicable fuel shall be documented. If
combined with the qualifier Ammonia, a toxic zone plan shall be submitted in accordance with Table 4.
Guidance note:
For use with the qualifier Ammonia and LPG, vacuum insulated C-tanks designed in accordance with the requirements of Sec.5
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
2.8 Requirements for attribute Ti

For the attribute Ti, the fuel tanks on board shall be of a type that may be used for storage of the applicable
fuel. If combined with the qualifier Ammonia, a toxic zone plan shall be submitted in accordance with Table
4.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

For use with the qualifier Ammonia and LPG, vacuum insulated C-tanks designed in accordance with the requirements of Sec.5
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
2.9 Requirements for attribute Misc

For the attribute Misc, a list of additional systems and components included at the newbuilding stage, not
covered by the other qualifiers and attributes, shall be agreed between owner and yard and provided to
the Society for acceptance. Only systems and components covered by the applicable fuel notation in Sec.5,
Sec.6, Sec.13 and Sec.14 may be included in the list. The design, manufacturing and installation of these
systems and components will be followed up by the Society as required in the related rules, and the list will
be included in the appendix to the class certificate.

Installations on board for Fuel ready attributes S and P shall be handled in accordance with normal
newbuilding procedures by the Society. Compliance documentation requirements, material requirements,
NDT and testing requirements for the alternative fuel related components and systems are outlined in Sec.5,
Sec.6, Sec.13 and Sec.14. If the installations have impact on other disciplines like hull and stability, the
requirements and scope given in the rules for those disciplines apply.
DNV AS
SECTION 9 SCRUBBER READY

1 General
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Objective
The rules apply to ships which, during the new building phase, are planned – and partly prepared – for later
installation of an exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS) for the removal of SOx.
1.1.2 Scope
The notation is divided into a list of qualifiers, to identify the type and category of scrubber system that may
be installed. Definition of scrubber category (D, C, H or O) and type (IL or MI) is the mandatory minimum
level and includes:
— verification of main class rule compliance for connections to sea (if applicable)
— verification of space availability and arrangement for future scrubber installation with respect to class and
statutory requirements
— verification of preliminary stability analysis.
Optional additional levels may be included, wherein further preparations of the ship for a later conversion can
be included, up to full review of the scrubber documentation according to main class rules and certification
and installation of piping and sub-systems.
1.1.3 Application
1.1.3.1 The Scrubber ready notation provides the basis for compliance with the requirements at the time
of contract for construction of the new-building and verifies the vessel’s suitability for the future scrubber
installation. The scrubber system shall comply with rules in force at time of installation, regardless of
Scrubber ready notation.
Guidance note:
For qualifier R, the scrubber ready documentation will serve as basis for the approval of conversion documentation if the retrofit
system is the same as reviewed scrubber ready system.
1.1.3.2 The notation requires pre-selection of a SOx scrubber manufacturer, based on agreement between
owner and yard. This system may however be substituted with a similar system at time of conversion, under
special considerations. The scrubber manufacture used as basis for the notation should not be a prototype or
in other ways be of a novel design, unless the design has been qualified by a competent third party.
Guidance note:
The choice of scrubber category and type will affect the range of options to the pre-selected system at time of conversion.
Scrubber ready with qualifiers H and MI yields the most flexibility, as these are typically the largest and most complex systems.
1.1.3.3 The Scrubber ready class notation does not include survey requirements for follow up of the ship
when in operation (beyond normal follow up of the additional overboard connections for qualifier H and O).
Guidance note:
At time of conversion a survey and evaluation of the condition of the equipment or systems installed from new building stage will
be done. The test scope will depend on time elapsed from new building, number and type of installed equipment and in what way
the systems and components have been preserved/ maintained.
DNV AS
1.1.4 Definitions

Term Definition
dry scrubber scrubber system using pellets or similar dry substances through which the exhaust stream is directed
to remove SOx form the exhaust. The dry substance is removed and delivered ashore after depletion
wet scrubber scrubber system using water to remove SOx from the exhaust by spraying the water into specially
designed chambers in the exhaust system. Water may be discharged overboard and/or treated after
use, depending on system category
EGCS exhaust gas cleaning system
open loop wet scrubber systems using seawater for SOx removal and subsequently treating the wash-water
before discharging back overboard
closed loop wet scrubber system using water for SOx removal and subsequently treating and reusing the same
water. System is replenished as water evaporates
USCG United States Coast Guard
1.2 Class notation – Scrubber ready

A ship complying with the relevant parts of this section may be assigned a Scrubber ready notation, with a
number of possible qualifier combinations as outlined in Table 2.
Table 2 Scrubber ready
Qualifier Description Application
Scrubber D Dry scrubber system. Mandatory mutually exclusive qualifiers.

ready
C Wet- closed loop.
H Wet- hybrid (open and closed loop).
O Wet- open loop.
In-line scrubber reactor system; individual linear Mandatory mutually exclusive qualifiers.
IL
scrubber unit per consumer.
Multi-inlet scrubber reactor; multiple inlets to

MI
one or more scrubber units.
Structural verification. Includes review and follow up of structural

HS
support for equipment.
Full class review of scrubber system Complete review according to main class rules.
documentation (except control and monitoring). Includes piping and electrical systems. Control
R
and monitoring verification is limited according
to [2.5.3].
Scrubber systems and equipment are installed Certification and installation of parts of the
on board at new building stage. scrubber systems before delivery based on
MISC
agreement between owner and yard, with
detailed list provided to Society for acceptance.
DNV AS
Qualifier Description Application

Review of documentation for compliance with If the Society is authorized by flag to issue
S statutory requirements. the IAPP certificate. Review according to IMO
resolution MEPC.259(68).
Guidance note:
Examples:
— Scrubber ready(H, IL, R) indicates vessel is evaluated and found suitable for installation of a hybrid inline scrubber system,
including full class review of the scrubber system to be installed.
— Scrubber ready(O, MI, HS, S) indicates vessel is evaluated and found suitable for installation of an open multi-inlet scrubber
system, including review of structural supports and statutory documentation package for the pre-selected system.
1.3 Documentation
1.3.1 General
Documentation for design verification shall be submitted as required in the following tables for selected
qualifiers.
The following is required to separate the design verification documentation in Table 3 to Table 7 from the
normal new-building documentation:
— The documentation shall be marked scrubber ready in the start of the each drawing title.
— The documentation will be given status examined (EX) instead of approved/for information.
All documentation for other main class systems related to Scrubber ready notation shall be handled
according to normal approval procedure as per main class rules for ships (i.e. shall not be marked according
to above).
1.3.2 Documentation requirements for qualifiers D, C, H, O, IL and MI
Object Documentation type Additional description Info App.
Scrubber ready general Z010 – General Including treatment fluid bunkering station
arrangement drawing arrangement plan location, engine room arrangement and location EX All
of major scrubber equipment.
Scrubber ready tank plan H030 – Tank and Including free-standing tanks, if applicable,
EX O, H, C
capacity plan including volume, content, density.
Scrubber ready engine Z030 – Arrangement All future scrubber equipment shall be clearly
room arrangement and plan marked. The list shall include component
EX All
equipment list Z090 – Equipment list weight. It shall also include the casing
arrangement.
Scrubber ready fire G040 and G050 – Fire If modifications are necessary for future
control and safety plan control and safety plan scrubber equipment installation and the Society EX All
is authorized by flag.
Scrubber ready P&ID for S010 – Piping diagram Including scrubbing water supply/circulation
scrubber system systems, treatment fluid systems, discharge
systems, wash-water treatment system. EX O, H, C
Penetrations of watertight divisions shall be
clearly indicated.
DNV AS

Scrubber ready exhaust S010 – Piping diagram
EX All
P&ID
Scrubber ready Principle Z050 – Design General arrangement showing all major pipe/
EGCS arrangement and philosophy or Z060 – cable routing and equipment, and a description
description Functional description of scrubber system covering max total water/
treatment fluid consumption and specification,
tank capacities, and total working weight of EX All
scrubber unit (including water). It also include
a description of other equipment to be moved,
if applicable, and the effects on the electrical
installation and other ship systems.
Scrubber ready pressure S020 – Pressure drop

According to Ch.7 Sec.7 [4.1.4]. EX All
drop analysis analysis
Scrubber ready B030 – Internal A separate version of the internal watertight

watertight integrity watertight integrity plan integrity plan where the planned changes
affecting watertight integrity are highlighted. FI All
Applicable if changes to watertight integrity are
required.
Scrubber ready lightship Including list of added/removed weights for

EX All
particulars future scrubber conversion.
Scrubber ready impact

It shall show the impact of the scrubber
evaluation for stability EX All
installation on the vessel stability and load line.
and load line
EX = examined, FI = for information
All relevant main class documentation for electrical systems shall reflect the future scrubber system electrical
consumers.
Guidance note:
For the referenced qualifiers this includes, but is not limited to; single line diagram, load balance, and short circuit calculation.
1.3.3 Documentation requirements for qualifiers H and O
Scrubber ready outlet Z210 – Design basis Description of the design criteria and basis for
description selected outlet arrangement with respect to pH
limit requirements as specified in IMO resolution
EX H,O
MEPC.259(68) §10.1.2. Shall also cover outlet
location relative to other ship system inlets and
corrosion protection specifications.
EX = examined
The inlet (sea chest) and overboard arrangement (dimensions, structural details etc) for the future scrubber
installation shall be part of the main class documentation for the vessel. These drawings shall not have the
«Scrubber ready» wording at the start of the drawing title as these will be installed at new-building stage.
DNV AS
1.3.4 Documentation requirements for qualifier HS

Scrubber ready H050 – Structural Applicable for static loads >50kN.

foundations for scrubber drawing EX All
tanks
Scrubber ready H050 – Structural Including pumps, heat exchangers, wash water
foundations for drawing treatment skids, etc. applicable for static loads EX All
equipment >50kN.
Scrubber ready H050 – Structural Applicable for static loads >50kN.

EX All
foundation for EGC unit drawing
EX = examined
1.3.5 Documentation requirements for qualifier R

The complete future scrubber system installation shall be documented according to documentation list
defined in Pt.4 Ch.6 and other relevant rule sets. All documentation for systems not to be installed at the
new-building stage shall be marked with the initial “Scrubber ready” wording. For statutory requirements and
documentation, see qualifier S.
Scrubber ready system I030 and I110 – Shall include: Operating station, data logger,
block diagram System block diagrams safety system, GPS interface, IAS Interface,
EX All
emergency stop, SO2/CO2 monitoring and wash-
water monitoring.
EX = examined
1.3.6 Documentation requirements for qualifier Misc
1.3.6.1 Any systems or components to be installed on board at new-building stage are subject to class
approval according to relevant parts of the rules (Pt.4 Ch.6, Pt.4 Ch.9, stability rules, structural rules, etc.).
The documentation for the actual ship installations shall not have the 'Scrubber ready' wording in the start of
the drawing title.
1.3.6.2 When systems or equipment are installed on board as part of the Scrubber ready class notation, a
plan for how to preserve these systems or equipment shall be submitted for information.
Guidance note:
For piping systems or tanks, preservation may typically include keeping them dry, by keeping them heated and/or filled with dry
air, and also to have a dry atmosphere around them if possible. Tanks to be re-purposed and overboard connections are covered by
normal class follow-up. If scrubber unit is installed, manufacturer specifications for preserving and inspection should be observed.
1.3.7 Documentation requirements for qualifier S

If the Society is authorized by flag to issue the IAPP certificate, the following documents shall be examined
for compliance with IMO resolution MEPC.259(68).
DNV AS

Scrubber ready SECP Z160 - Operation SOx Emission compliance plan (SECP).
EX All
manual
Scrubber ready ETM Z160 - Operation Exhaust gas cleaning system technical manual
EX All
manual (ETM). Scheme A or B as applicable.
Scrubber ready OMM Z160 - Operation Onboard monitoring manual (OMM).

EX All
manual
Scrubber ready EGC Z290 - Record EGC Record book or electronic logging system.
EX All
record book
Scrubber ready EGC Z140 - Survey According to the requirements of IMO resolution
Marpol verification procedure MEPC.259(68) (for sea trial/Marpol verification FI All
survey plan survey).
Scrubber ready wash- For systems which make use of chemicals,

water treatment additives, preparations or create relevant FI O, H
assessment chemicals in situ.
EX = examined, FI = for information
2 Ship arrangement and installation
2.1 Scrubber ready with qualifier D

2.1.1 General
To achieve Scrubber ready notation with qualifier D, the vessel shall be evaluated for installation of a dry
scrubber system according to the following specifications.
2.1.2 Space allocation
2.1.2.1 Engine room casing shall be arranged with sufficient extra space for future scrubber unit, bypass (if
applicable), and installation work.
2.1.2.2 Space for scrubber granulate handling systems (including storage space before and after use) shall
be allocated.
2.1.3 Exhaust gas systems

See [2.2.3].
2.1.4 Supporting systems

See [2.2.5].
2.1.5 Electrical systems

See [2.2.6].
2.1.6 Fire safety and life saving

See [2.2.7].
2.1.7 Stability
See [2.2.8].
DNV AS
2.2 Scrubber ready with qualifier C
2.2.1 General
To achieve Scrubber ready notation with qualifier C the ship shall be evaluated for installation of a wet
closed scrubber system according to the following specifications.
2.2.2 Space allocation
2.2.2.1 Engine room casing shall be arranged with sufficient extra space for future scrubber unit, bypass (if
applicable), and installation work.
2.2.2.2 Space for future scrubber system equipment and tanks shall be arranged.
2.2.2.3 Pipe and cabling routes shall be planned, taking into account good planning practices considering pipe
size, materials, installation, etc.
2.2.2.4 The location of the treatment fluid bunkering station shall be defined and space made available. The
location shall be suitable for the intended service.
Guidance note:
Spray from leakages shall not endanger personnel or passengers. Visibility from passenger embarkation area should be considered.
2.2.2.5 Tanks planned for repurposing to use in scrubber system (e.g. holding tanks) shall be suitable for the
use and shall be isolable from the existing system.
Guidance note:
Certain tanks may not be available for repurposing due to the impact on vessel performance and safety, e.g. tanks connected by
cross flooding devices, sewage holding tanks, etc.
2.2.3 Exhaust gas systems
2.2.3.1 The casing arrangement shall take into account the required minimum distances for the
instrumentation locations after unit, particularly regarding the requirements for monitoring at exhaust outlet.
Guidance note:
Minimum exhaust pipe length before and after scrubber unit are applicable, dependent on pipe diameter, according to IMO
resolution MEPC.259(68).
2.2.3.2 For ships designed to comply with redundant propulsion or dynamic positioning, the proposed
interconnection for MI scrubber systems shall not interfere with the principles of the relevant notations.
2.2.3.3 The pressure drop analysis for the future scrubber installation shall document that the new pressure
drop does not exceed maximum allowable back pressure according to engine and component specifications.
2.2.4 Overboard connections
2.2.4.1 If the system is designed for discharge overboard, the arrangement is subject to special
consideration, but shall in general comply with the requirements under qualifier H and O.
2.2.4.2 Cooling water supply and discharge overboard connections shall be according to main class rules for
overboard connections.
DNV AS
2.2.5 Supporting systems

2.2.5.1 Connections to supporting systems (technical water systems, compressed air, cooling water, tank
vents etc.) are to comply with the requirements under Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.8. The supporting systems shall be
readied as far as practicable for scrubber installation.
2.2.5.2 Interfaces to main alarm system and GPS systems shall be available for the future EGCS control and
monitoring system installation.
2.2.6.1 The generator capacity shall be dimensioned to sustain the added load from the future scrubber
system.
Guidance note:
Electric loads to consider: pumping sea water, sludge removal, alkaline dosing, sea water cooling, induced draft fans, and process
control.
2.2.6.2 Space for the future scrubber system switchboards shall be available in switchboard room.
2.2.6.3 Bus bar in main switchboard room or distribution board where future scrubber consumers will be
installed shall have sufficient current carrying capacity for the added consumers.
2.2.6.4 The short circuit calculation shall include all future scrubber consumers.
2.2.7 Fire safety and life saving
2.2.7.1 If authorized by flag, DNV will follow up statutory requirements for fire safety and life-saving. If not
authorized, the flag state shall be contacted to verify compliance with SOLAS Ch.II-2.
2.2.7.2 The future scrubber installation shall not interfere with the escape route arrangement.
2.2.7.3 The scrubber ready system installation shall not require major changes to fire safety related systems
at the time of conversion (e.g. redefining space, modification of fire divisions, fire detection and extinguishing
system coverage).
2.2.7.4 The calculation for fixed fire extinguishing installation media (e.g. CO2) shall be based on the
increased engine room volume.
2.2.7.5 Location and number of additional fire-fighting equipment like hydrants, portable/mobile fire
extinguishers shall be considered and shown in the arrangement plan.
2.2.8 Stability
2.2.8.1 The impact from the added weights of the future scrubber system on the vessel stability shall be
within acceptable limits. The amount of liquids in the system at normal operating levels shall be included in
the total weight.
2.2.8.2 If the total change in lightship particulars will require a new inclining test after installation of future
scrubber system, this shall be noted in appendix to class certificate. If other vessel modifications have
occurred before the time of conversion, a new evaluation will be required.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

According to the requirements of SOLAS 74 as amended, a ship must be re-inclined if the anticipated deviations in comparison
with the approved lightship particulars exceed one of the following threshold values: 2% change in lightship displacement or 1%
of LS’ change in longitudinal center of gravity. If a periodical lightweight survey as required by SOLAS-74 has been conducted,
or if calculated values of lightship particulars have been accepted in accordance with MSC/Circ.1158, between the latest inclining
experiment and the modifications, the outcome of such must be included in the evaluation as well.
Penetrations of watertight divisions (bulkheads or decks) for future scrubber installations shall be arranged
such as not to change the internal watertight integrity of the vessel after the future scrubber installation
is completed, unless changes to the internal watertight integrity are found acceptable by damage stability
calculations.
2.2.8.3 At time of conversion for future scrubber system installation, the scope of stability approval will be
dependent on whether the future scrubber installation is considered a minor or an extensive modification.
Guidance note:
The following shall be submitted for a minor modification: Calculation showing the estimated change in lightship particulars,
endorsed by attending surveyor. DNV may require update of the damage control plan and damage control booklet, to be concluded
after review of the system arrangement. The loading computer shall be updated with the additional weight and corresponding
center of gravity, both of which may be added as a constant. No re-approval of the loading computer software will be required.
The following shall be submitted for a major modification: Inclining test procedure (if water ballast is used to incline the ship),
inclining test report, preliminary/final stability manual, preliminary/final damage stability manual (may not be required, based on
case-by-case evaluation of vessel type, applicable regulations, watertight integrity and existing damage stability calculations),
damage control plan, damage control booklet, internal watertight integrity plan, and loading computer software shall be updated
based on the intact and damage stability documentation and submitted for approval.
2.3 Scrubber ready with qualifiers H or O

2.3.1 General
In addition to the requirements for qualifier C, the following requirements apply to achieve Scrubber ready
notation with qualifiers H or O, wherein the vessel is evaluated for future installation of a wet hybrid- or open
scrubber system.
2.3.2 Water systems
2.3.2.1 General
Connections to the shell and sea chests shall be completed before delivery according to the following
requirements.
2.3.2.2 Inlets
a) The inlets shall be sized according to required flow for the future scrubber installation.
b) Inlets shall be arranged with redundancy according to Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.5 [2].
c) The added inlet area for the future scrubber system shall be included in sea chest grid area calculation if
connected to existing sea chests.
d) For ships for navigation in ice, minimum one future scrubber system inlet shall be connected to the ice
sea chest.
e) The inlet valves shall be installed, locked closed, and blind flange shall be fitted inboard of the valve with
signboard stating that the valve shall not be operated. The valve shall be remote operable, but not be
connected to the control system.
f) Dedicated sea chests for future scrubber installation shall, if applicable, be designed according to
relevant main class requirements for sea chests.
DNV AS
2.3.2.3 Outlets

a) Distance piece between overboard valve and shell plating shall be of substantial thickness not less than
15 mm for mild steel and 12 mm for appropriate stainless steel. Requirements for steel grades are given
in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.2 [1.1]
b) Special attention shall be paid to the coating in the scrubber outlet distance piece and surrounding shell
area with respect to the acidic discharge from future scrubber system. Standard coating is generally
considered insufficient.
c) Discharge outlets shall be arranged such that future scrubber discharge water is not drawn into sea
suctions for other ship systems. The discharges shall be placed at minimum 4 m aft of any sea suction
for other systems. Placing the outlet forward of such a sea suction may be accepted if it is demonstrated
that the discharged water is diluted sufficiently to raise the pH to 7 or above the specified minimum pH
for the affected system. The discharge outlet shall be located well below the waterline for any operational
loading condition. The distance shall be minimum 4 m or may be established by the calculation in point
d)
d) The overboard arrangement shall be based on a detailed analysis or proven designs, with respect to
compliance with statutory requirements (MARPOL Annex VI, Reg.4 & MEPC.259(68)) to pH-level at
certain distances from the outlet(s). The analysis shall in such case be submitted for review.
e) The discharge valve(s) shall be installed, locked closed, and blind flange shall be fitted inboard of the
valve with signboard stating that the valve shall not be operated. The valve shall be remote operable,
but not be connected to the control system.
2.4 Scrubber ready with qualifier HS

2.4.1 To achieve Scrubber ready notation with qualifier HS, structural supports (e.g. for unit, tanks,
pumps, cutouts, etc.) and general ship structures shall be prepared at the new-building stage according to
the following specifications.
2.4.2 Ship structures shall as far as practicable be prepared for the required penetrations and cut-outs for
the future scrubber installation. At minimum the necessary reservations shall be indicated where required for
piping and equipment.
2.4.3 Structural supports for the future scrubber equipment shall be readied at new-building stage. For
heavy equipment where the static forces exceed 50 kN, the structural supports are subject for approval.
2.5 Scrubber ready with qualifier R

2.5.1 General
To achieve Scrubber ready notation with qualifier R, a review of the future scrubber installation system for
compliance according to relevant class rules, taking into account limitations to control and monitoring scope,
is required (Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.8, electrical rules, etc.).

All relevant main class documentation for electrical systems shall reflect the future scrubber system electrical
consumers.
Guidance note:
This includes, but is not limited to, selectivity analysis showing selectivity between incoming feeder and largest outgoing consumer,
making/breaking capacity of all cirquit breakers vs short circuit at location, emergency stop schematic, list of ex equipment, etc.
DNV AS
2.5.3 Control and monitoring

2.5.3.1 The scope for instrumentation review is limited to an assessment of the system block diagram,
verifying the future system’s ability to comply with the class and statutory requirements, and a review of the
monitoring scope as specified in the system P&ID.
2.5.3.2 A full review of all required detail documentation and subsequent certification of equipment shall be
carried out at the time of conversion, prior to installation on board.
2.5.3.3 If detail approval and certification of parts of the future scrubber system shall be carried out at the
new-building stage, the equipment shall also be installed on board at this time. In such case the additional
qualifier Misc is required.
2.6 Scrubber ready with qualifier S

2.6.1 To achieve Scrubber ready notation with qualifier S the future scrubber installation shall comply
with Marpol annex 6 regulation 4 and 14, and the therein referenced guidelines given in IMO resolution
MEPC.259(68).
2.6.2 The statutory documentation may be based on DNV pre-qualified standard document templates. In
such case the documentation shall be updated with the required vessel specific data.
2.6.3 For EU/EFTA flagged vessels the future scrubber installation shall comply with EU directive 2012/33/
EU.
2.6.4 If specified by owner, the future scrubber system shall comply with the requirements for USCG vessel
general permits (VGP).
2.7 Scrubber ready with qualifier Misc

To achieve the class notation Scrubber ready with Misc included as qualifier, a list of systems to be
installed or equipment to be certified and installed shall be agreed between owner and yard, and provided
to the Society for acceptance. Only scrubber related systems or equipment may be included in this list.
Instrumentation equipment shall be certified according to Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.2.
The list shall give details of which systems and or components to be included from new building stage and
followed up by the Society throughout the new building process as part of the Scrubber ready notation. The
design, manufacturing and installation of these systems and components will be followed up as required in
related rules, and the list will be included in the appendix to class certificate.

Installations on board for Scrubber ready notation with qualifiers H, O, HS and Misc, shall be handled in
accordance with normal new building procedures by the Society surveyor. Certification requirements, material
requirements, NDT and testing requirements for the scrubber related components and systems are outlined
in Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.9. When the installations have impact on other disciplines like hull and stability, the
requirements and scope given in the class rules for those disciplines apply.
DNV AS
SECTION 10 SHAFT ALIGNMENT - SHAFT ALIGN

1 Objectives
This section provides a set of requirements with the objective of enhancing the design, installation and
operating margin of the propulsion shaft bearings beyond the main class requirements for shaft alignment,
see Pt.4 Ch.2 Sec.4.
2 Scope
The objectives are met by the following scope additional to that of main class:
— increased range of applied hydrodynamic propeller loads
— mandatory use of oil film criterion in alignment calculations irrespective of shaft dimensions
— introduction of multi sloped aft bearing
— stricter requirements to bearing sighting
— additional monitoring requirements
— utilization of more advanced calculation methods (CFD & FEM) for Shaft align(2).
3 Application
The additional class notation Shaft align applies to main propulsion shafting installations using oil as the
lubricant medium for white metal propeller shaft bearings, complying with the design, installation and testing
requirements included in this section. For geared installations, the requirement applies to the low speed shaft
line.
4 Class notations
Ships complying with the requirements given in this section may be assigned the additional class notation
Shaft align as specified in Table 1.
Table 1 Additional class notations - Shaft align(1) and Shaft align(2)
Shaft align 1 Intended for propulsion

Mandatory: systems installed on vessels
with conventional hull forms
No
and incorporates enhanced
Design requirements: aft bearing performance
Sec.10 during normal and turning
operating conditions.
FiS requirements:
Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2, 3 and 4 2 Intended for propulsion
systems requiring additional
calculations to estimate
hydrodynamic propeller
loads during turning
conditions. Typical
installations are vessels with
non-conventional hull forms
such as asymmetric stern,
twin skeg, etc.
DNV AS
5 References
Table 2 lists DNV references used in this document.
Document code Title
Pt.4 Ch.2 Sec.4 Shaft alignment
Pt.4 Ch.4 Sec.1 Shafting
DNV-CG-0283 Calculation methods for shaft alignment
6 Documentation requirements
Documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 3 and Table 4.
Object Document type Description Info
Propeller C040 - Design analysis Shaft alignment calculations considering additional

AP
shaft aft most requirements herein.
bearing
Z100 - Design specification Alignment procedure including all details for the Class
AP
notation.
Propeller shaft aft most bearing running in procedure. FI
I200 - Control and monitoring Details of means of warning for high temperature of
system documentation tank space, if first inboard bearing is installed on top AP
of heated tanks.
Propeller C030 - Detailed drawing of aft Bearing drawing indicating details of multi slope.
AP
shaft aft most propeller shaft bearing
bearing
M010 - Material specification Material composition of the bearing. AP
C020 - Bearing assembly Push fit calculations with respective bearing

arrangement interference fit tolerances, housing dimensions and FI
temperature compensation.
I200 - Control and monitoring Bearing temperature alarm.

AP
Stern tube C020 - Stern tube assembly Stern tube assembly including dimensional tolerances
FI
of bearing housing.
S010 - Piping drawing Provisions to take representative lubricant samples

FI
under running conditions.
Lubricant system.
AP
Piping and Instrumentation drawing.
Propeller I200 - Control and monitoring Details of the means of warning at all operating
system documentation locations for incomplete propeller immersion (from AP
draft gauge or equivalent).
DNV AS

Table 4 - Additional documentation requirement for Shaft align(2)

1)
Shafting C040 - Design analysis Shaft alignment calculations including CFD aided
hydrodynamic propeller loads including:
— influence of propulsion improvement devices (PID)
where fitted AP
— details of propeller immersion
— FE analysis of bearing contact pressure in transient
conditions.
Shaft alignment calculations including hull deflections

R
in all loading conditions.
AP = for approval, R = on request

1) Please see DNV-CG-0283.
DNV AS
7 Design requirements
7.1 Shaft align(1)

7.1.1 General
Shaft alignment calculation shall be approved in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.2 Sec.4 irrespective of shaft
diameter.
7.1.2 Lubrication criteria

The design shall comply with aft bearing lubrication criteria defined in Pt.4 Ch.2 Sec.4 [2.1.6] irrespective of
shaft diameter.
Hydrodynamically induced downward bending moment from the propeller shall be extended to 30% MCR
Torque for aft bearing lubrication criterion in hot running condition.
Guidance note:
The above mentioned 30 % downward acting bending moment is considered as a criterion only for aft bearing lubrication. Impact
on adjacent bearings is not required to be considered for this condition i.e. unloading of the adjacent bearing is acceptable.
7.1.3 Aft most propeller shaft bearing design

Aft propeller shaft bearing shall be of a multi sloped design and manufactured using a white metal alloy
material with tin as the major constituent.
For installations with shaft diameter less than 400 mm (single screw)/300 mm (twin screw), single sloped
bearing design may be accepted provided that compliance with the aft bearing lubrication criteria is
documented for the same range of hydrodynamic propeller loads defined in [7.1.2].
Guidance note:
Use of tin based white metal bearings is intended to provide superior fatigue strength. However, for installations with shaft
diameter less than 400 mm (single screw)/300 mm (twin screw), white metal bearings with alternative major constituents (e.g.
Lead based bearings) is acceptable.
7.1.4 Propeller immersion

Vessel's design shall ensure complete propeller immersion under normal continuous operating conditions
unless additional requirements according to [7.2.4] are complied with.
Means of warning against incomplete propeller immersion shall be provided in the wheel house and the
central alarm panel. Suitable signboards shall be posted at operating locations.
Guidance note:
Alarm initiated by the aft draught gauge may be considered as a means of warning.
7.1.5 Single stern tube bearing installations extended criteria

For single stern tube bearing installations, the design, including the maximum bearing load specified in the
jack load test tolerance for the first inboard bearing, shall comply with the aft bearing lubrication criteria.
Guidance note:
A raised intermediate bearing increases the relative slope in way of the aft bearing and consequently reduces the contact area.
DNV AS
7.1.6 Inboard shaft bearings on top of heated tanks

Where inboard shaft bearings are installed on top of heated tanks, the tank space shall be provided with a
high temperature alarm. The alarm shall be set at the maximum temperature allowed for thermal expansion
in the shaft alignment calculations.
Guidance note:
Alarm may be omitted with if shaft alignment calculations allow for thermal expansion with a minimum value of 100 °C in the tank
spaces.
7.1.7 Lubrication system

The stern tube shall be provided with a forced lubrication system fitted with a heat exchanger.
The lubrication system shall be designed to ensure satisfactory circulation of oil.
Forced lubrication may be omitted in case of retrofits, unless deemed necessary based on damage history.
7.1.8 Stern tube aft bearing temperature monitoring and alarm

Aft most bearing temperature shall be monitored and alarms shall be provided in accordance with Table 5.
7.1.9 Stern tube oil condition monitoring

Lubrication system shall be designed to make it possible to take representative oil samples under running
conditions.
7.2 Shaft align(2)
7.2.1 In addition to the requirements for Shaft align(1) class notation, the following requirements shall be
met:
7.2.2 Influence of propeller induced forces and bending moments

Shaft alignment calculations shall take into account hydrodynamically induced propeller forces and moments
based on CFD aided calculations for the following conditions:
— Straight ahead running at MCR at design draught.
— Transient turning conditions, as a minimum including 'hard over' turn with rudder angles of 35 deg. to
both port and starboard. Turn shall be initiated from MCR straight ahead condition at design draught.
— In case normal operating conditions include partially immersed propeller, the condition expected to
result in 'worst case' propeller loads in terms of local bearing pressures shall be incorporated (e.g. least
allowable propeller submersion combined with maximum allowed propeller RPM).
— Other critical conditions as found relevant, when motivated by experience of the designer, ship yard or the
Society such as ballast condition, crash stop manoeuvers, etc.
The CFD model shall include the actual geometry of hull and propeller as well as relevant appendixes,
such as struts, ducts or PID’s.
Guidance note:
Guidelines for how to carry out CFD calculations are given in DNV-CG-0283.
7.2.3 Lubrication criteria

For the straight ahead running condition, the aftmost bearing lubrication criterion for 'hot running condition
2' defined in Pt.4 Ch.2 Sec.4 [2.1.6] shall be complied with, applying resulting propeller loads as derived
from the CFD calculations. However, an additional margin of 10% MCR torque shall be added to the predicted
upward bending moment. These loads supersede the default values applicable for main class and Shaft
align(1).
DNV AS
For the 'hot running condition 1' compliance with the aftmost bearing lubrication criterion shall be

documented applying a propeller load similar to as for Shaft align(1) i.e. corresponding to a downward
bending moment of at least 30% MCR torque.
The lubrication criterion shall also consider operation with a partly immersed propeller when relevant.
7.2.4 Evaluation of aftmost bearing pressures

Contact area and pressure distribution in the aftmost bearing shall be calculated by means of finite element
analysis. As a minimum, results for the following conditions shall be presented:
— Conditions defined in [7.2.2] above.
— Hot static condition (no hydrodynamic propeller loads).
Guidance note:
FE analysis need not include effect of an oil film. Respective criteria for pressure/contact area are defined in DNV-CG-0283.
7.2.5 Hull deflections

Upon request, hull deflections including all relevant loading conditions shall be considered in the shaft
alignment calculations.
Guidance note:
Predictions of hull deflections should be submitted upon request by the Society. This may typically be applicable for vessels with
long shaft lines or on installations where hull deflections are expected to have a significant influence on the shaft line offsets or the
aft propeller shaft bearing lubrication criteria.
8 Alarm and monitoring

Table 5 Alarm and monitoring requirements
Grade 1
Item indication Grade 2 Grade 3 Comments
alarm
Propeller immersion LA [7.1.4]
Propeller shaft aftmost bearing HA and rate of 1)

[7.1.8]
temperature rise
Heated tank space temperature

below first inboard shaft bearing HA [7.1.6]
(if installed)
LA = alarm for low value, HA = alarm for high value

1) Rate of rise alarm may be omitted for retrofits.
9 Installation inspection
9.1 Survey
Unless otherwise specified, all the steps included in the alignment procedure shall be witnessed by the
surveyor.
DNV AS
9.2 Procedure
The alignment procedure shall include the following details and methods, as a minimum, in addition to the
main class requirements.
9.2.1 Stern tube bearing housing

Records of measurements of the housing inner diameter in way of the bearings shall be submitted for review
by the surveyor.
Laser aided sighting of vertical and horizontal offsets of the stern tube housing in way of the bearings shall
be submitted for review by the attending surveyor. A minimum of 5 reference points shall be used covering
the aft most bearing housing and 3 reference points for the forward bearing housing. The laser reference line
shall be made concentric with the stern tube and independent of the bearings.
For pre-fabricated stern tubes delivered to the Yard with bearings assembled, records of the same from the
manufacturer shall be submitted to the surveyor.
Alternative means of measurement with equivalent accuracy may be considered upon special consideration
by the Society.
Guidance note:
Spigots (recess) of aft and forward seal flanges are normally concentric with the stern tube bore unless machined at an offset for
adjustment of seal tolerances.
9.2.2 Aft bearing push fitting procedure

Aft bearing push fitting procedure shall be carried out in accordance with a pre-defined procedure and
verified within calculated design limits.
9.2.3 Sighting of stern tube bearings after installation

Laser aided sighting of the stern tube bearings including offsets and slopes shall be carried out.
A minimum of two bearings shall be included in the laser aided sighting process, alternatively this may be a
combination of the aft bearing and the first inboard support.
For the aft bearing, a minimum of 5 measurement points shall be included covering the effective length
of the bearing including one at the knuckle point(s) for multiple slopes. There shall be a minimum of 3
measurement points in each of the slope segments. The laser reference line shall be the same as in [9.2.1]
above.
For the forward stern tube bearing, a minimum of 2 measurement points apply.
In addition, measurements of the inner diameter of the bearings shall be submitted for review by the
surveyor.
9.2.4 Gap/sag process

Gap and sag process shall be done afloat using a dial gauge or laser or any method of equivalent accuracy.
Feeler gauges are not permitted.
9.2.5 Jack loads

Cold static jack loads shall be carried out in floating condition for:
— inboard shaft line bearings including forward stern tube bearing, if installed
— 3 aft most engine bearings for directly coupled two stroke engines
— the aft main gear bearing for geared propulsion plants.
Hot static jack loads may be required for alignment sensitive designs.
— If any hull deflections are incorporated in shaft alignment calculations, representative jack load tests shall
be carried out as defined in the approved alignment procedure. The applicable loading conditions shall be
specified for consideration and acceptance by the Society.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Load cells or equivalent devices are recommended to eliminate internal friction of the jacking device used for jack load tests.
9.3 Oil sampling points

Verification of specified oil sampling point shall be carried out.
9.4 Lubricant viscosity

Approved lubricant viscosity shall be confirmed before the sea trials and recorded. Suitable signboards shall
be posted at operating locations in machinery spaces and on the stern tube system tanks reflecting the
minimum approved viscosity of the oil.
9.5 Oil type compatibility

Where environmentally acceptable lubricants are used, documentation of confirmation of seal compatibility
with the oil grade shall be verified by surveyor.
10 Shipboard testing
10.1 Partial propeller immersion

Operation of the shaft with incomplete propeller immersion condition is not allowed unless designed for and
approved.
10.2 Running in of aft bearing

Running in of aft bearing shall be carried out in accordance with a pre-defined procedure.
10.3 Minimum RPM

It shall be verified that the minimum continuous RPM of the propeller shaft is greater than the minimum
approved RPM for the low speed criterion (aft most bearing lubrication criteria). Suitable signboards shall be
posted at operating locations displaying the minimum approved shaft RPM.
10.4 Rate of bearing temperature rise

Trending of aft most bearing temperature shall be carried out and documented during sea trials.
Corresponding sea water temperature shall be documented.
Guidance note:
Maximum hydrodynamic propeller loads may be induced during turning conditions at maximum vessel speed, typically during a
turning circle. Therefore trending of aft bearing temperature should include turning circle conditions.
10.5 Oil analysis

Representative stern tube oil samples collected before and after the sea trials shall be landed for lab analysis,
as a minimum for examination of wear elements and water content. Results shall be submitted for review by
DNV.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

Oil samples are expected to be taken during running condition soon after commencement and prior to conclusion of trials.
10.6 Test of alarms

All functions and set points of alarms as per Table 5 shall be tested.
DNV AS
SECTION 11 SAFE RETURN TO PORT, ORDERLY EVACUATION AND

ABANDONMENT
1 General
1.1 Introduction
The overall intention of the safe return to port regulations is to increase the safety level of passenger ships
through more redundant system arrangements, providing increased robustness and fault tolerance.
The regulations are given as a goal based standard in SOLAS and apply to passenger ships above a certain
size. The SRtP scheme has a substantial impact on the vessel design and system arrangements and is closely
linked to the operation of the vessel.
The regulations necessitate changes in the traditional work process and the scope of work for the key parties
involved in a newbuilding project. It is necessary to apply a life-cycle approach to ensure that the necessary
basis is developed prior to the detail design and reflected in the project specifications, and also that a
sufficient basis for operations is ready for hand-over at ship delivery.
The early phase activities should involve the owner, yard/designer, flag administration and Society; and
a multi-disciplinary / system-engineering based approach should be applied throughout the newbuilding
project.
Guidance note:
Supporting guidance to the SRtP regulations and class notation is given in DNV-CG-0004 Safe return to port.
1.2 Objective
The purpose of the additional class notation SRTP is to frame the relevant goal based regulations of SOLAS
in a systematic and structured class-context by:
— addressing the various implications of the regulations
— describing the key activities, work process and responsibilities
— providing requirements and acceptance criteria for system design to support the functional requirements
of the goal based standard.
The objective of the SRTP notation is to provide a complete set of requirements applicable for any vessel
that are subject to the SOLAS regulations for safe return to port (SRtP). The requirements of the notation
thereby constitute the DNV way of implementing the goal based SRtP regulations and the basis for the
issuance of the PSSC (passenger ship safety certificate) or SPS (special purpose ship) certificate.
Guidance note 1:
This implies that in the DNV statutory interpretation (DNV-SI-0364), the only interpretation of the SRtP regulations is a reference
to this notation, thereby making the notation mandatory for the applicable vessels.
Guidance note 2:
The requirements of this section are based on best practices and generally acceptable solutions to comply with the referred
statutory regulations. Certain flag administrations may, however, have specific SRtP requirements additional to those of the SRTP
notation.
1.3 Scope
The additional class notation SRTP covers the scope of the SOLAS regulations for safe return to port (SRtP)
and orderly evacuation and abandonment (OEA). The contents of the applicable IMO circulars are also
DNV AS
incorporated in the rules, and the general approach of the class notation is based on the primary IMO

guidance on SRtP.
Guidance note 1:
The regulations for SRtP and OEA are given in SOLAS II-1/Reg.8-1.2, II-2/Reg.21 and 22.
The primary IMO guidance document for SRtP is MSC.1/Circ.1369 Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ships
capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty.
Guidance note 2:
While the mandatory SRtP regulations covered in the SRTP notation (see Table 1) largely cover design aspects, the optional class
notation OR - operational reliability, is intended to specifically address operational aspects of passenger ships built to the SRtP
regulations. The OR - notation is covered in Sec.15 and contains the following main areas:
1) enhanced reliability of propulsion, steering and electrical power

2) enhanced maneuvering reliability
3) operational flexibility and predictability.
1.4 Application
1.4.1
Passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 2010 having length, as defined in regulation II-1/2.5, of 120 m or
more or having three or more main vertical zones shall comply with the provisions of this regulation.
(SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.2 and Reg.22.1)
1.4.2 Ship types

The SRtP regulations are mandatory for:
— Passenger ships required to be issued with a PSSC – passenger ship safety certificate in accordance with
the above referred SOLAS regulations.
— Special purpose ships (SPS certificate/notation according to 2008 SPS code) intended to carry more than
240 persons in total.
— Naval vessels that shall be constructed in compliance with the Naval ship code ANEP 77 - unless otherwise
explicitly agreed in the project.
Guidance note:
The regulations of the ANEP scheme are equivalent to the SRtP regulations. However the casualty scenarios covered in ANEP 77 do
not include flooding casualties. For such vessels, the flooding-related requirements of this notation are therefore not applicable.
1.4.3 Recognized Organisation - RO

The SRTP notation is mandatory for passenger ships according to [1.4.2] for newbuilding projects where
DNV are authorized to issue the applicable statutory certificates on behalf of the flag administration.
Guidance note:
The notation may also be offered in other newbuilding projects where compliance with the regulations is not mandatory.
1.4.4 Application criteria - main vertical zones
1.4.4.1 Since a main vertical zone (MVZ) may be up to 48 m long, any vessel above 96 m normally has 3 or
more MVZs, and the SRtP regulations apply. If, however, the extreme forward and/or aft zone(s) of the ship
contain only appendages/voids/tanks without equipment, systems or storage, these zones may be considered
to be of low risk and hence exempted from the MVZ criteria.
DNV AS
Guidance note 1:

See SOLAS II-2/Reg.9.2.2.1.2 - Containment of fire.
Guidance note 2:
A space or appendage complying with the following:
— the space is of limited size

— the space contains only tank, void or clean open deck
— the space has only restricted access (for space below open deck)
may upon special considerations be accepted not to constitute a main vertical zone for the purposes of SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.1 and
22.1. An eventual exclusion from the SRtP regulations for a ship above 96 m shall be endorsed by the flag administration and the
owner.
1.4.4.2 Horizontal fire zones (special category- and ro-ro spaces) should not be included in the number of
MVZs in the context of the application criteria for SRtP.
Guidance note:
See SOLAS II-2/Reg.20.2.2 Protection of vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces.
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 1.
1.5 Class notation

Vessels built and tested in accordance with the requirements of these rules will be assigned the class notation
SRTP as outlined in Table 1.
Table 1 Class notation for safe return to port
SRTP Increased safety level of Mandatory for passengers ships, SPS ships and
Mandatory: passenger ships through naval vessels in accordance with [1.4].
more redundant system
yes
arrangements, providing
Design requirements: increased robustness and fault
This section tolerance.
FIS survey
requirements: NA
1.6 Structure of the SRtP rules and approach for the goal based standard
1.6.1 Structure of the SRtP rules
The SRtP rules are structured with the following subsections and contents:
— This subsection: background and introduction, overall requirements
— [2]: context of the life-cycle approach, work process and responsibilities
— [3]: general requirements and implications of SRtP
— [4]: requirements for each of the systems covered by SRtP
— [5]: general requirements and implications of OEA
— [6]: requirements for each of the systems covered by OEA.
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1.6.2 Approach for the goal based standard

1.6.2.1 The SRtP regulations in SOLAS are generally given on an overall/superior goal based level. In the
SRTP notation, the goals of SOLAS are supported with functional requirements and to some extent also
prescriptive requirements.
1.6.2.2 The SRTP notation adopts a three tiered approach based on the following principles:
a) Goals: on the top level, the SRtP goals provide the fundamental rationale and intent behind a particular
rule. The goals of the class notation are basically the regulations as given in SOLAS.
b) Functional requirements: on the mid level, the goals are supported by one or more functional or
performance requirements. These explain in greater detail the type of functions or performance a system
shall achieve in order to fulfil the intent of the goal, either in part or in whole.
c) Detailed requirements: on the lower level, functional and performance requirements are supported by
detailed rules and guidance notes. These provide a set of generally acceptable solutions to meet the
goals, functional and performance requirements, either in part or in whole.
This three tiered approach is applied only in the subsections containing requirements to the SRtP and OEA
systems, see [4] and [6] respectively.
1.6.2.3 Detailed requirements do not preclude the use of alternative solutions. Such solutions will be
considered by their ability to meet the goal and fulfil the relevant functional and performance requirements.
1.6.2.4 In the SRTP class notation, each SOLAS regulation within the scope of the notation is included in
the relevant subsection, thus giving the overall goal and functional requirement followed by performance
requirements and/or detailed requirements as applicable. Where additional interpretations are given in
IMO (MSC) circulars, these are in general incorporated in the rule requirements and the reference to the
interpretation number are, where applicable, given as guidance notes.
Guidance note:
In the SRTP notation the basic SOLAS paragraphs are generally referred to as 'regulations' while the specific contents of the class
notation is referred to as 'requirements'.
1.7 SRtP in service

The operational implications of the SRtP and OEA regulations depend largely on the design and arrangement
of all the SRtP systems. The owner and yard should in the early phase of the newbuilding project agree
on the design intent and approach for the SRtP and OEA systems, with due consideration of the possible
implications this may have for the planned operation.
Guidance note 1:
This include in particular the chosen design approach for system restoration after a casualty, i.e. to what extent system restoration
is based on manual actions by the crew or automatic/remote restoration and operation.
Guidance note 2:
The overall ship SRtP capabilities will be included in the 'List of operational limitations' together with the PSSC, see SOLAS
Reg.V/30. These capabilities may include:
— the range, environmental conditions, speed, duration and fuel demands of the dimensioning SRtP voyage
— eventual operational restrictions, e.g. restricted area of operation
— eventual environmental limitations (e.g. ambient temperatures) for the capabilities of the safe areas.
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Guidance note 3:

The SRTP notation is for fleet in service followed up through the scheme for renewal of the statutory certificates (PSSC or SPS).
1.8 Rebuild and refurbishment

All future repairs, alterations, rebuilds and modifications that may impair the design and/or arrangement of
the systems covered by the SRtP requirements, or may impair the designated casualty thresholds, should be
done with due regards to the SRtP requirements and design intent to ensure continued compliance with the
regulations.
Guidance note:
This implies i.a. that the relevant design documentation (typically design philosophies, arrangement drawings, casualty threshold
plan etc) should be duly considered in connection with repairs, alterations, rebuilds and modifications, and that the assessment
report(s) and relevant operational documentation are updated as applicable.

Documentation shall be submitted as required by the following tables:
— Table 2 contains the requirements for overall SRtP documentation.
— Table 3 contains documentation requirements related to each individual SRtP and OEA system including
electric power systems and integrated control and safety systems.
— Table 4 contains documentation that shall be submitted only for shafted propulsion arrangements where
both shafts pass through a common space (i.e within the same casualty threshold).
— Table 5 contains SRtP documentation that shall be available on board.
Guidance note 1:
Guidance to the work process, documentation sequence and expected content of specific SRtP documentation is given in class
guideline DNV-CG-0004.
Guidance note 2:
The various documentation requirements cover information elements, and the information elements may be combined in common
documents where appropriate.
DNV AS
Table 2 Overall documentation requirements for SRtP and OEA

Object Document type Additional description Info
Safe return to port capability Z053 - Design philosophy SRtP design philosophy/ship's description.
This is the top SRtP document, defining the basic
design intent and operational criteria for the project,
referring to SOLAS Reg. II-1/8-1.2, Reg.II-2/21 and
22:
— main characteristics of the vessel (basic layout,
number of PAX, machinery configuration)
— operation (intended area of operation, planned
operation, safe return to port range/distance,
design ambient temperatures, intended catering
level)
— approach for SRtP system restoration, i.e. level of
automation and/or manual actions
AP
— preliminary SRtP capabilities (speed and SRtP
speed, duration of SRtP voyage, SRtP power
balance, SRtP fuel supply needs, OEA power
balance)
— identification of all systems within the scope of the
SRtP regulations
— documentation strategy, which documents will
be made, how will the various systems and sub-
systems be covered, documentation sequence
— approach for SRtP testing.
Further guidance on the expected contents of the
SRtP design philosophy is given in class guideline
DNV-CG-0004.
Z030 - Arrangement plan A zone/redundancy plan showing the separated areas

dedicated for the duplicated machinery systems (in
particular propulsion, steering and power generation),
including also any area and deck containing auxiliary AP
or support systems/components/cables.
The alternative location for navigational equipment
(SRtP bridge) shall also be identified on the plan.
Z012 - Casualty threshold A general arrangement plan identifying the extent of

plan the various casualty thresholds throughout the ship:
— spaces which are provided with a fixed fire
extinguishing system AP
— spaces which are of negligible fire risk, see [3.2.4]
— including all A-class and MVZ boundaries
— including watertight boundaries.
Z140 - Test procedure for Identifying final tests deemed necessary for
quay and sea trial demonstrating SRtP compliance at quay and during AP
sea trials, see [1.10].
DNV AS

Z265 - Calculation report Documenting the vessel hydrodynamical capabilities
in the worst case SRtP scenario - and the basis for
the SRtP capacity requirements:
— compliance with the requirements for vessel speed
at dimensioning environmental conditions
— calculation of the duration of the dimensioning
FI
SRtP voyage.
The worst case scenario is normally considered to
be loss of one engine room and the appurtenant
propulsion line, see [4.2].
Further guidance on the hydrodynamical calculations
is given in DNV-CG-0004.
E040 - Electrical load A document stating the calculated design values for
balance power consumption and available power covering
AP
both the dimensioning SRtP scenario and OEA
scenario.
Safe areas Z013 - Safe area plan Identifying safe areas, spaces for medical care and
AP
location of provisions for the safe areas.
Z050 - Design philosophy Describing the arrangement, design intent and

approach for system restoration covering all basic
services for the safe areas:
— sanitation
— potable water
— food
— alternate space for medical care AP
— shelter from the weather
— means of preventing stress and hypothermia
— light
— ventilation.
The document shall also contain relevant calculations,
i.a. necessary space for the safe areas.
DNV AS
Table 3 Documentation requirements for each of the SRtP and OEA systems including electric

power system and integrated control and safety system
SRtP systems: Z050 - Design philosophy SRtP system design philosophy/concept

— propulsion Description of the intended system design and
— steering capabilities to remain operational upon casualties
as specified in SOLAS II-1/Reg. 8-1.2, SOLAS
— navigation
II-2/Reg.21.3 and 22. The main contents are the
— fuel oil
following:
— internal communication
— design intent - how the system shall be arranged
— external communication
(e.g. redundancy/duplication/segregation/
— fire water
protection) to meet the requirements
— fixed fire-extinguishing
— principle arrangement with location of main
— fire detection and alarm equipment AP
— bilge and ballast — intended system capabilities after a casualty -
— internal watertight doors criteria for remain operational
— flooding detection — intended level of automation / manual
— lighting intervention needed for system recovery
— electric power generation — system dependencies, auxiliary and supporting
1)
and distribution systems
— integrated control and — intended power supply/distribution.
1)
safety
system design philosophy is given in class guideline
DNV-CG-0004.
Z030 - Arrangement plan Documentation of location and arrangement of

system components including routing of pipes (unless AP
sufficiently indicated on P&IDs).
Z011 - Cable routing A drawing based on a general arrangement plan

2
drawing (Z010) that shows physical routing of:
— power cables, from the source of power to the AP
consumer, including location of equipment
— control and communication cables supporting the
system or function.
Z268 - Assessment report SRtP assessment report (FMEA - failure mode and
effect analysis)
Structured assessment of the effects of fire and
flooding scenarios for the systems listed in SOLAS
II-2/Reg. 21.4 and Reg. 22.3.1 in addition to electric
power system and control and safety systems. The
fire and flooding scenarios are specified in SOLAS
II-1/Reg.8-1.2, SOLAS II-2/21.3 and 22. AP
The report shall be conclusive on compliance with
the SRtP regulations for the actual system design
and remaining system capabilities, identify necessary
manual actions needed for system recovery and
identify tests to demonstrate compliance.
assessment report is given in DNV-CG-0004.
DNV AS

Systems intended to support Z030 - Arrangement plan Documentation of arrangement and location of
safe areas: system components including routing of pipes (unless AP
sufficiently indicated on P&IDs).
— sanitation
— water Z011 - Cable routing A drawing based on a general arrangement plan
2
— ventilation drawing (Z010) that shows physical routing of:
— lighting systems — power cables, from the source of power to the AP
consumer, including location of equipment
— control and communication cables supporting the
system or function.
Z010 - Piping diagram Applicable for:

— air conditioning chilled water system
AP
— potable water supply system
— grey and black water.
Z268 - Assessment report Structured assessment of the effects of fire and

flooding scenarios for the safe area systems.
The report shall be conclusive on compliance with
the SRtP regulations for the actual system design AP
and remaining system capabilities, identify necessary
manual actions needed for system recovery and
identify tests to demonstrate compliance. See also
[1.9.2].
1) For supporting functions, such as electric power distribution and integrated control and safety system, the
documents may, depending on the context, be taken for information FI.
2) If a system is arranged so that SRtP compliance does not depend on physical routing of cables, cable routing
drawings need not be submitted (e.g for cables routed exclusively within the zone dedicated to either of two
redundant systems in accordance with the zone plan, or fire resistant cables in accordance with [3.2.5]).
AP = for approval
Guidance note:
The required documentation that concern physical location and arrangement of the SRtP systems may preferably be shown as
different information layers on general arrangement drawings.
Table 4 Documentation required only for shafted propulsion arrangements where both shafts pass
through a common space (i.e within the same casualty threshold), see [4.2.3.3].
Propulsion shaft Z030 - Arrangement plan Arrangement and specification of means of

AP
arrangement protection.
Z261 - Test report Hydrostatic test report including reported leakage

volume and statement of effect on lub oil (applicable AP
for bearings operating under water).
AP = for approval
DNV AS
Table 5 SRtP On board documentation

SRtP capabilities SRtP On board documentation The contents of Table 2 and Table 3. N/A
Z161 - Operational manual Including details of any manual action required to

ensure operation of the SRtP systems after a SRtP N/A
casualty.
Z163 - Maintenance manual Including specific instructions to the maintenance of

N/A
SRtP systems, if applicable.
Guidance note:
The onboard documentation normally consist of the contents of Table 2 and Table 3, i.e. the complete set of SRtP design
documentation, in addition to the SRtP operational manual and, if applicable, a maintenance manual.
The SRtP operational manual is normally the basis for the development of the SRtP operational procedures. The SRtP operational
manual may, depending on the SRtP design approach and agreement between the owner and yard, consist of specific design
documents, assessment reports or other documents or tools identifying the manual actions required for system restoration and
operation following a SRtP casualty.
The onboard documentation package in itself is not subject to approval by the Society, though the package largely consist of
documents that are part of the approval scope.
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 7.4.
1.9.2 Assessment report
1.9.2.1 A systematic assessment shall be performed for each of the SRtP and OEA systems where the
effects of the casualty scenarios described in [1.9.2.2] are analysed. The result of the assessment shall be
documented in an assessment report (s). The report shall be conclusive on compliance for each of the SRtP
systems/functions, i.e. if the systems/functions remain operational as required.
Guidance note:
The assessment and subsequent assessment report is equivalent to a failure mode and effect analysis resulting in an FMEA report,
though the failure modes in the SRtP assessment include fire and flooding scenarios only.
A separate report for each of the SRtP systems/functions is recommended, covering also all sub-systems and auxiliaries needed for
the specific system/function to remain operational, e.g. for propulsion where all sub-systems and auxiliaries should be included.
It is recommended that the assessment is performed by other parties/units than those responsible for the design.
Further guidance to the expected structure and contents of the assessment report is given in DNV-CG-0004.
1.9.2.2 The assessment report(s) shall be self-contained / stand-alone document(s) providing the reader
with adequate system information to support the understanding of the analysis and conclusions.
If the assessment is based on software models/computer based tools, the approach for the software model
and also the format of the report shall be documented and agreed upon by the owner, yard and Society.
The assessment report shall list and identify the design basis/documentation basis on which the analysis
is made (covering also document revision numbers the eventual computer model with appropriate
identification).
1.9.2.3 The assessment report shall cover the following casualty scenarios (failure modes):
— for each SRtP system, casualties within any casualty threshold that may affect the system:
— fire in any casualty threshold, see [3.2.1]
— flooding in any casualty threshold, see [3.2.6]
— for each OEA system, all OEA casualties covering the complete loss of any MVZ.
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1.9.2.4 The main purpose of the assessment is to confirm that the actual detail design complies with the

design intention and the rules and regulations. The assessment shall therefore be based on i.a.:
— the SRtP rules and regulations (the rules of this section, SOLAS II-1/Reg.8-1.2, II-2/Reg.21 and 22,
applicable MSC circulars)
— the SRtP documentation as required in Table 2 and Table 3 (and Table 4, if applicable)
— design drawings, documentation an model information to the necessary level of detail including physical
location of components, routing of pipes and cables, etc.
Since the report shall conclude on compliance, the assessment and the report shall be completed after the
detail design has reached the necessary level of completion to ensure that all aspects are covered.
Guidance note:
The assessment may be an iterative process, the first part may be an initial assessment of the early phase design philosophies/
intentions and arrangement plans, the last part may be the final, conclusive assessment taking detailed design information
and physical arrangement into account. In this way, findings from the initial steps may be used to rectify or improve system
arrangements during the design phase.
Note that only the final version is required for approval.
1.9.2.5 For SRtP systems that depend on multiple auxiliary systems or services to function, the assessment
report shall focus on simultaneous availability of the auxiliary systems or services needed to support the SRtP
systems.
Guidance note 1:
'Simultaneous availability' implies that the various auxiliary systems and services are designed and arranged coherently relative to
the casualty thresholds that may otherwise impair the SRtP systems ability to remain operational.
Example 1: a propulsion system depends on several auxiliary systems, and in case of a SRtP casualty, all auxiliaries for the
remaining propulsion line shall be simultaneously available to support the propulsion function.
Example 2: a bilge system may depend on i.a. available electrical power, control systems, technical water, ventilation etc. to
remain operational outside the casualty threshold.
Guidance note 2:
For duplicated systems that are arranged within the physical boundaries of different casualty thresholds, the assessment should
focus on possible common mode failures, dependencies of auxiliary services provided from other spaces and possible cross-
connections between the duplicated systems.
1.9.2.6 The assessment shall to the extent necessary take into account the design and system arrangements
developed and documented by sub-suppliers and makers.
1.9.2.7 The assessment report shall for each SRtP casualty include identification of the eventual manual
actions needed for restoration of the system capabilities and eventual manual actions needed to maintain the
system functionality during the SRtP voyage.
Guidance note:
The manual actions needed for system restoration and operation include actions that must be done both locally or remotely.
The list of manual actions from the assessment report may form the basis for the SRtP operational manual.
1.9.2.8 The assessment shall identify relevant test scenarios of the subject system to verify compliance with
rules and regulations as well as the design intention.
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Guidance note:

This normally includes simulation of the casualty thresholds in which the key components of the system are located, or locations
where a fire- or flooding casualty may have the most severe impact on the system functionality; where the manual actions needed
for system recovery are most extensive.
1.9.3 SRtP onboard documentation

The onboard documentation shall include the contents of Table 2 and Table 3 and in addition SRtP operational
manual and maintenance plan as given in Table 5.
Restoration and operation of the SRtP systems after a casualty may depend on manual actions by the
crew, and this shall be described in the operational manual that is part of the onboard documentation.
The operational manual and the approach for SRtP system recovery should be aligned with the owner's
operational organisation, manning and procedures, and the owner and yard should agree on both the
approach, form and content of the yard's deliverables that shall form the basis for the owner's' SRtP
operational procedure.
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 7.4.
1.9.4 Certification requirements

The systems and components covered by the SRtP requirements shall be certified according to main class
requirements and applicable statutory interpretations.
Guidance note:
This implies that the SRtP notation in general does not impose additional certification requirements beyond what is already covered
by main class or applicable statutory interpretations - unless additional systems or components are installed as an alternative way
for systems to remain operational, e.g. communication equipment that due to it's function require certification.
1.10 Survey, inspection, test and verification

1.10.1 Verification
The capabilities of the SRtP and OEA systems shall be surveyed, demonstrated and verified for the three
categories of casualty cases (SRtP fire casualty, SRtP flooding casualty and OEA casualty) i.a. as follows:
1) Basic testing of the SRtP- and OEA systems if not already covered by main class.
2) Verification/test of relevant assumptions and findings from the SRtP assessment report(s).
3) If system restoration and operation after a casualty depends on manual actions, these shall for each
SRtP system be demonstrated in accordance with the SRtP requirements for selected casualty scenarios.
This applies to each individual SRtP system where selected casualty scenarios shall be tested to
demonstrate that the system remains operational as specified in the SRtP requirements. The test shall
include verification of the manual actions that may be needed for the system recovery.
Guidance note 1:
The selected scenarios should be the worst case scenarios as identified in the assessment report for the system, normally the
scenarios that demand the highest number of manual actions for the specific system.
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4) Testing of a representative OEA scenario, i.e. loss of a complete main vertical zone, to demonstrate

availability of the OEA systems in all other main vertical zones.
Guidance note 2:
For this test, a main vertical zone containing one (or both) engine rooms is normally selected, to verify the fire scenario
where the potential loss of a complete MVZ may have the most severe consequence for the systems.
5) The dimensioning failure scenarios shall be tested to demonstrate that the SRtP systems remain
operational in a return to port mode. This includes simulated loss of the most critical spaces, normally:
a) each engine room (ER)
b) engine control room (ECR)
c) main switchboard rooms (if not covered by the engine room test case)
d) wheel house
e) the SRtP casualty scenario that include the highest number of manual actions (unless this coincide
with the above tests)
f) eventual other critical spaces if identified in the SRtP assessment report.
Guidance note 3:
These tests should be conducted as realistic as possible where the effects of the simulated casualty on all SRtP systems may
be observed and verified as opposed to the individual systems tests described above.
1.10.2 Sea trials

The basic dimensioning failure scenarios as specified in item [1.10.1] 5.a) (loss of each ER) shall be tested
during sea trials to:
— demonstrate that all systems required to remain operational are simultaneously available
— verify the ability for one engine room and corresponding propulsion- and steering systems to operate at
the specified SRtP power demand with thermal stability and stable service of all supporting systems.
1.11 Installation
The components (e.g. valves, breakers) that must be operated manually/locally ('manual action') in order to
restore or maintain the system functionality in a SRtP scenario shall be clearly marked.
For any component subject to a manual action in the context of SRtP, the means of operation shall be easily
accessible.
Guidance note:
A component that requires to be operated locally/manually ('manual action') in a SRtP scenario can normally not be installed inside
a space of negligible fire risk if the means for manual operation requires access to the space, see [3.2.4.3] and [3.2.4.4].
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1.12 Definition and abbreviations
Term Definition
administration government of the state whose flag the vessel is entitled to fly
area of negligible fire risk area containing no or very limited components, pipes or cables so that it may be
considered not to constitute a potential origin of fire.
See also [3.2.4]
assessment structured analysis of the possible consequences any incident of fire or flooding may
have for the systems required to remain operational, covering all possible scenarios
within the casualty threshold
assessment report conclusive report on the assessment, covering all systems required to remain
operational, see [1.9.2]
casualty threshold maximum physical extent of a SRtP casualty where the ship shall be capable of
returning to port in accordance with SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.
For further definition of fire and flooding casualty threshold, see [3.2.1] and [3.2.6]
respectively
casualty threshold plan arrangement plan showing the extent of the casualty threshold for all decks, covering
both fire and flooding casualties (flooding only relevant below bulkhead deck)
For further guidance, see Table 2.
dimensioning SRtP casualty SRtP casualty with the biggest impact on the SRtP systems, normally a fire or flooding
casualty in one of the engine rooms
manual actions manual intervention by the crew that may be necessary to restore and maintain
functionality of the SRtP systems after a SRtP casualty, see [3.3.3]
OEA casualty fire exceeding the SRtP casualty threshold, potentially spreading to a complete MVZ
OEA power demand electrical power demand following the dimensioning OEA casualty; the necessary power
to the OEA systems listed in [5.1]
remain operational general term denoting the situation after an SRtP casualty where the SRtP systems
shall be able to continue it's function for the voyage back to port, outside the casualty
threshold.
Equivalent to the term 'maintain capabilities'
safe area areas designed to provide the services listed in [4.14] for all persons on board, to
support habitable conditions during the SRtP voyage
spaces outside the casualty all areas of the ship except the space inside/limited by the casualty threshold
threshold
the Society DNV
SRtP bridge alternative position from where the ship shall be manoeuvred in case of an SRtP
casualty impairing the main bridge
SRtP capabilities defined properties of an SRtP system following an SRtP casualty
SRtP casualty any incident of fire or flooding limited by the applicable casualty threshold
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Term Definition

SRtP duration calculated duration of the dimensioning SRtP voyage
SRtP failure scenarios equivalent to an SRtP casualty
SRtP power demand electrical power demand following the dimensioning SRtP casualty, at a vessel speed of
6 knots while heading into BF 8 and also providing the necessary power to all the SRtP
systems listed in SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.4
SRtP propulsion power demand power demand for the propulsion system to provide 6 knots while heading into BF 8
following the dimensioning SRtP casualty, i.e. normally with one engine room out of
operation
SRtP range designed maximum range of a SRtP voyage
SRtP voyage voyage back to port following an SRtP casualty
BWMC Ballast Water Management Convention
COLREG international regulations for preventing collisions at sea (navigation)
ECDIS electronic chart display and information system (navigation)
FiS fleet in ervice
FSS international code for fire safety systems
FW fresh water
GA general alarm (internal communication)
GHz gigahertz (communication)
GMDSS global maritime distress safety system (external communication)
GNSS global navigation satellite system (external communication)
IACS International Association of Class Societies
IMO International Maritime Organization
I/O input/output (control systems)
IP ingress protection
LSA life saving appliances
MARPOL The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MED Marine Equipment Directive (European Union)
MSC Maritime Safety Committee (IMO)
MVZ main vertical fire zone
OEA orderly evacuation and abandonment
PA public alarm (internal communication)
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PSSC passenger ship safety certificate
SOLAS Safety Of Life At Sea
SPS special purpose ship
SRtP safe return to port
STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
VHF very high frequency (external communication)
WHO World Health Organization
1.13 References
Table 8 DNV documents
Document code Title
DNV-SI-0364 SOLAS interpretations
Sec.15 Operational reliability
DNV-CG-0004 Guidance for safe return to port projects
Table 9 lists other references used in this document.
Table 9 Other documents
Document code Title
SOLAS II-1/Reg.8-1.2 System capabilities and operational information after a flooding casualty on passenger ships
SOLAS II-2/Reg.21 Casualty threshold, safe return to port and safe areas
SOLAS II-2/Reg.22 Design criteria for systems to remain operational after a fire casualty
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1369 Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire
or flooding casualty
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1368 Interim clarifications of SOLAS chapter II-2 requirements regarding interrelation between the
central control station, navigation bridge and safety centre
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1291 Guidelines for flooding detection systems on passenger ships
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1532 Revised guidelines on operational information for masters of passenger ships for safe return to
port
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1437 Unified interpretations of SOLAS regulation II-2/21. (capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty)
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1400 Guidelines on operational information for Masters of passenger ships for safe return to port by
own power or under tow
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1129 Guidance on the establishment of medical and sanitation related programmes for passenger ships
IACS UR E15 Electrical Services Required to be Operable Under Fire Conditions and Fire Resistant Cables
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Document code Title

IACS UR M69 Qualitative Failure Analysis for Propulsion and Steering on Passenger Ships
2 Life-cycle approach and newbuilding work process
2.1 Life cycle approach

2.1.1 Design versus operation
The SRtP regulations in SOLAS give design criteria for the SRtP systems. However, the key IMO guiding
document for SRtP (MSC.1/Circ.1369) includes operational aspects of the regulations, and the practical
feasability in restoration of the functions after an incident of fire or flooding. This implies that the planned
operation of the ship is decisive for the design and arrangement of the systems affected by the SRtP
regulations and consequently, that the design approach is decisive for a practical restoration of SRtP systems
after a casualty.
2.1.2 System restoration

The design approach for restoration of the SRtP systems is crucial for the operational impact of the SRtP
regulations, in particular the extent of manual actions needed for system recovery. It is therefore essential
that the owner and yard/designer agree on the design approach and in particular a deliberate decision on the
balancing between:
1) Highly redundant system arrangements with remote system restoration, high level of automation and
remote control for the operation after a casualty, limited manual intervention.
2) Simpler system arrangements, local system restoration, low level of automation, local operation and
operation based on manual actions after a casualty, extensive manual intervention.
Guidance note:
Both options (or anything in between) may be in compliance with the rules as long as the systems are designed to allow for system
restoration within one hour, but the two options may impose big differences in capex and opex.
2.1.3 Operational flexibility

The SRtP regulations require in general that the SRtP systems shall be arranged with redundancy. This
implies that when key components are unavailable (e.g. due to maintenance or damage), the redundancy
and SRtP capabilities of the ship may be impaired, and operational limitations may be imposed by the flag
administration.
Guidance note:
It is recommended that the the owner and yard agree on an approach for system redundancy and capacity taking probable
damage and maintenance scenarios into consideration.
2.1.4 Operational decisions

In the event of an SRtP casualty, the decision on whether or not to return to port, to start system restoration
and the eventual sequence of restoration, to move passengers and crew to safe areas etc. remains with the
master; as for the decision on whether or not to abandon the ship in the event that a fire exceeds the SRtP
casualty threshold.
Guidance note:
This implies e.g. that the one hour limit for system restoration as given in MSC.1/Circ.1369 is a design requirement and not related
to practical system recovery in a real operational scenario.
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2.2 Work process
2.2.1 System engineering
The scope of the SRtP rules cover many ship systems and many technical disciplines are involved with i.a.
system design, installation and verification. System arrangements and physical location of components,
piping and cabling is essential for SRtP compliance, and the systems shall be designed according to a
coherent design intention.
This necessitate a multi-disciplinary work process and early-phase development of philosophies and design
intentions, overall arrangement drawings defining casualty thresholds and zone plans. These documents form
the direction and basis for the detailed design of all SRtP systems in the subsequent project phases as well as
the operational implications.
Guidance note:
It is strongly recommended for the shipyard to assign a dedicated SRtP co-ordinator/responsible in the project organisation, at the
earliest possible stage.
2.2.2 Early phase

The sequence of project activities is essential to ensure that the design intentions are implemented
consistently in all relevant technical disciplines. As the system recovery and operation of the ship following a
possible SRtP casualty largely depend on the design approach, the owner and designer/yard must in the early
phase of the project agree on i.a.:
— the intended SRtP capabilities of the vessel, i.e. the designed SRtP operational limitations
— the approach for recovery of the SRtP systems and dependency of manual actions
— the system capabilities in a SRtP scenario, i.e. level of automation after a casualty
— the approach for SRtP compliance in cases of damage/maintenance of key components (redundancy
concept)
— the approach for SRtP operational manuals and incorporation in operational procedures.
Guidance note:
It is strongly recommended to run early phase meetings and workshops between all the stakeholders to ensure that the above
aspects are duly addressed as early as possible in the project.
2.2.3 Documentation sequence

The documentation required for the SRTP notation shall be developed and submitted for approval in the
following sequence, see Table 2 and Table 3:
Early phase: - ship description/design philosophy

- overall arrangement plans (casualty threshold plan, zone plan, safe area plan)
- system design philosophies
- safe area design philosophy
- hydrodynamical calculation report.
Detail design - system arrangement plans
phase: - cable routing drawings.
Late phase: - assessment reports
- test procedure for quay and sea trials.
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Guidance note:

The sequence of the documentation reflects the work process, which is essential for the project. The description of the above
sequence with identification of the relevant systems and appurtenant documents should be included in the ship description/design
philosophy document.
3 Safe return to port - SRtP
3.1 General
3.1.1 Purpose
3.1.1.1
The purpose of this regulation is to establish design criteria for a ship' s safe return to port under its own
propulsion after a casualty that does not exceed the casualty threshold stipulated in paragraph 3 and also provides
functional requirements and performance standards for safe areas.
(SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.2)
Guidance note:
In the above referred SOLAS text, paragraph 3 refers to the definition of the casualty threshold, see [3.2].
3.1.1.2 The SRtP regulations aim to ensure that the systems deemed necessary to support a safe return to
port voyage after a casualty are robust and fault-tolerant with respect to incidents of fire or flooding, beyond
traditional SOLAS regulations. This implies that the SRtP regulations are not intended to substitute or lower
other SOLAS regulations at any point. Furthermore, the regulations aim to ensure the health and safety of
passengers and crew in safe areas during a safe return to port voyage.
3.1.1.3 The SOLAS regulations for SRtP give design criteria for all the affected systems, and the primary
IMO guidance document, MSC.1/Circ.1369, includes the operational aspects of the regulations. The intention
is to ensure that, in case of a casualty within the defined threshold, restoration and operation of all the
required systems is practicable and feasible for the crew for the duration of the voyage back to port.
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3.1.2 Scope

3.1.2.1
When fire damage does not exceed the casualty threshold indicated in paragraph 3, the ship shall be capable of
returning to port while providing a safe area as defined in regulation 3.5.1. To be deemed capable of returning to
port, the following systems shall remain operational in the remaining part of the ship not affected by fire:
.1 propulsion;
.2 steering systems and steering-control systems;
.3 navigational systems;
.4 systems for fill, transfer and service of fuel oil;
.5 internal communication between the bridge, engineering spaces, safety centre, fire fighting and damage control
teams, and as required for passenger and crew notification and mustering;
.6 external communication;
.7 fire main system;
.8 fixed fire-extinguishing systems;
.9 fire and smoke detection system;
.10 bilge and ballast system;
.11 power-operated watertight and semi-watertight doors;
.12 systems intended to support 'safe areas' as indicated in paragraph 5.1.2;
.13 flooding detection systems; and
.14 other systems determined by the administration to be vital to damage control efforts.
Guidance note:
In the above referred SOLAS text, paragraph 3 refers to the definition of the casualty threshold, see [3.2], paragraph 3.5.1 refers
to the requirements of safe areas, see [4.14].
3.1.2.2 The primary scope of the SRtP requirements is related to system recovery and subsequent
operation, not the emergency response and ability to fight and mitigate the initial incident of fire or flooding.
3.1.2.3 The SRtP systems shall be designed to enable recovery of the intended functionality after any SRtP
casualty within one hour.
Guidance note:
The intention of this requirement is to ensure a redundant and robust design arranged so that the extent of manual actions needed
for system recovery after a SRtP casualty is limited, see [2.1.4] and [3.3.3].
3.1.2.4 Requirements for the arrangement of each individual SRtP system are given in [4]. The system
requirements are given in a 3-tiered approach:
1) goals
2) functional requirements
3) detailed requirements; as applicable.
3.1.2.5 The requirements for safe areas are given in [4.14].
3.1.2.6 The duration of the dimensioning voyage back to port shall be calculated under the following
environmental conditions:
— 3 hours of the voyage under BF 8 conditions (see [4.2.2] for details of BF 8 conditions)
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— the remaining part of the voyage heading into BF 4 conditions as follows:

- wind speed: 7 m/s
- significant wave height: 1m
- spectrum peak period: 10 s.
Guidance note 1:
The environmental conditions given for BF 8 and BF 4 are considered to be representative middle values of the defined BF 8 and BF
4 range respectively, based on calculations and meteorological statistics.
For further guidance on the calculation method, see DNV-CG-0004.
Guidance note 2:
The environmental conditions assumed for the SRtP voyage determine the achievable speed with one propulsion line in operation
at the SRtP load balance, and hence the duration of the dimensioning SRtP voyage.
This in turn define the basis for dimensioning the capabilities of certain systems required to remain operational, i.a. the fuel
capacity to be available for each engine room after respective SRtP casualties, the provisions for the safe areas, etc.
Guidance note 3:
In a flooding scenario the vessel may have a less favourable loading condition which may impair the hydrodynamical performance
and the capabilities of the vessel. Hence, even though the general requirements for systems to remain operational are the same
for the fire- and the flooding scenario defined in the context of SRtP, the speed and operational capabilities of the vessel may in
flooding scenarios be reduced below the designed SRtP range.
Guidance note 4:
A safe port in the context of SRtP is assumed to be a community/port of call with a basic minimum of public services to handle the
possible reception of the passengers and crew:
— basic medical services

— housing and supplies
— transportation.
3.1.2.7 Most of the SRtP systems depend on sub-systems, auxiliary systems or other services to function.
All such systems and services, shall be designed to remain operational to the extent needed to support the
intended capabilities of the served SRtP system after a casualty.
3.2 SRtP casualty threshold (failure modes)

3.2.1 Casualty threshold - fire
3.2.1.1 The term 'casualty threshold' defines the maximum extent of an incident of a casualty (fire or
flooding) where the ship shall remain operational according to SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.3:
The casualty threshold, in the context of a fire, includes:
.1 loss of space of origin up to the nearest A-class boundaries, which may be a part of the space of origin, if the
space of origin is protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system; or
.2 loss of the space of origin and adjacent spaces up to the nearest A-class boundaries, which are not part of the
space of origin.
3.2.1.2 A-class boundaries refer to both bulkheads and decks.
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Guidance note:

3.2.1.3 The rating of the A-class boundaries does not affect the application of the regulation.
Guidance note:
The casualty threshold in the context of fire therefore represents the physical extent and exposure of a possible fire originating in
any space on board, limited by the arrangement of the surrounding A-class bulkheads and eventual fixed fire-fighting systems -
unless the space is considered to be of negligible fire risk.
The number of fire casualty thresholds on a ship is therefore decided by the number of spaces with risk of fire and the appurtenant
arrangement of A-class bulkheads and eventual fixed fire-fighting.
3.2.2 Fire risk

In the context of SRtP, any space is considered to constitute a fire risk unless deemed to be of negligible fire
risk in accordance with [3.2.4].
3.2.3 Spreading of fire
3.2.3.1 Where a space of fire origin is not protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system, the casualty
threshold extends beyond the nearest A-class boundaries to the next, including the adjacent compartment(s)
in the same casualty threshold. For determining the next A-class boundaries and hence the extent of the
casualty threshold, only spaces within the same MVZ shall be considered, and the casualty threshold includes
spaces sideways and upwards (not downwards). The principles are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Spreading of fire and casualty thresholds
Guidance note 1:
Guidance note 2:
A fire casualty in the context of SRtP and OEA is not assumed to spread to open decks except for balconies outside passenger
cabins and other particularly exposed areas like e.g. outside ventilation outlets.
3.2.3.2 Horizontal special category- and ro-ro spaces (see [1.4.4.2]) shall be arranged in compliance with
both SRtP and OEA requirements. This implies that a casualty in such a space shall not impair the ability for
neither the SRtP nor OEA systems to remain operational. This applies to both fire and flooding casualties, if
the space is below bulkhead deck.
3.2.4 Negligible fire risk
3.2.4.1 Spaces in which the risk of a fire break out is negligible shall not be considered as spaces of origin of
fire.
3.2.4.2 If a space shall be categorized as of negligible fire risk, it shall:

— be closed at all boundaries (restricted accessibility for inspection/maintenance only)
— not contain any equipment
— not be used for any storage.
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3.2.4.3 The space is allowed to contain the following equipment and still be considered as of negligible fire

risk:
— pipes passing through not containing flammable liquids
— cables passing through without connections (except serving the below listed services)
— light fittings (for safety reasons)
— fire detectors
— bilge sensors for the bilge and flooding detection system
— electrical anodes and/or reference cells for vessel hull corrosion protection systems
— sensors for speed log or echo sounding systems.
Examples of such spaces include but are not limited to:
— void spaces
— trunks closed at all boundaries only containing pipes and/or electrical cables
— cofferdams
— tanks
— chain lockers
— ventilation trunks except those containing ducts presenting fire hazard such as galley range exhaust
ducts, laundry exhaust ducts, category A machinery spaces ducts, special category and ro-ro spaces ducts
— cross flooding ducts connecting void spaces. In the case where connected spaces are not with a negligible
fire risk, ducts should be separated from those spaces by non-watertight fire resistant boundaries to be
considered as a space where fire risk is negligible
— vertical escape trunks from machinery spaces, service spaces, control stations and other crew
accommodation spaces
— store rooms for gaseous fixed fire-extinguishing systems
— bus-bars enclosed in A-class divisions
— A-class enclosures within spaces of category 1, 2 or 4 only containing isolation valves or section valves
forming part of the fixed fire extinguishing system for the protection of accommodation spaces, service
spaces and control stations
— shaft tunnels (only used for the shafting, i.e. no storage is allowed)
— a deluge station containing the section control valves may on certain conditions, be considered as space of
negligible fire risk, see [4.9.3].
3.2.4.4 Spaces other than those listed in [3.2.4.3] may, if duly justified in a fire/risk assessment, be
accepted to be of negligible fire risk.
Guidance note 1:
The fire/risk assessment should in such cases take i.a. the following aspects into account:
— presence of combustible material, flammable liquids and/or flammable gases

— presence of electrical switchboards/switchgear/control gear and relevant power, electrical
— statistics on fire within spaces having the same purpose
— intended service of equipment/machinery installed and
— other factors considered appropriate for the space under consideration.
Guidance note 2:
In the context of SRtP, the criteria for considering a space to be of 'negligible fire risk' are stricter than the general SOLAS
definition of category 10 ('spaces having little or no fire risk').
Guidance note 3:
See MSC.1/Circ. 1369 Int. 8.
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3.2.4.5 Trunks arranged as specified in [3.2.4.3], but containing valves, cable connections and joints shall

be considered spaces of fire origin. If insulated to class A-60, however, loss of adjacent spaces need not
be considered upon fire in such trunks and the trunks need not be considered lost upon fire in an adjacent
space.
3.2.5 Impact of fire casualty

Within the fire casualty threshold, all equipment, components, cables and pipes are in general considered
lost, with certain exemptions, see [3.3.4].
Cables exposed to a fire may loose the conductor insulation, and cause any kind of failure mode including
short circuit, open wire or earth fault.
Guidance note:
This should in the assessment report be carefully considered for ia. emergency stop signals that may latch upon a fire, and prevent
restarting and operation of units that are supposed to remain operational.
Valves shall be considered lost within the fire casualty threshold, thereby causing an open end to the piping
system.
Any fuel oil piping system located within a fire casualty threshold is considered lost upon a fire.
3.2.6 Casualty threshold - flooding

A passenger ship constructed on or after 1 July 2010 shall be designed so that the systems specified in regulation
II-2/21.4 remain operational when the ship is subject to flooding of any single watertight compartment.
(SOLAS II-1/Reg.8-1.2)
The casualty threshold in the context of flooding defines the maximum extent of an incident of a flooding
casualty where the ship shall remain operational according to SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.3.
The flooding scenario includes any single watertight compartment below bulkhead deck.
Guidance note:
The casualty threshold for flooding is not affected by the distance from the hull, the presence of pipes or possible sources of
leakage. Further, it is assumed that the cause of the flooding is internal, hence hull penetration with consequential damage and
subsequent flooding is not considered to be within the SRtP flooding casualty threshold.
3.2.7 Impact of flooding casualty

Within the flooding casualty threshold, all equipment and components are considered lost unless designed
with adequate IP (ingress protection) degree to withstand the expected water pressure at the location of the
unit.
3.3 Remain operational

3.3.1 General
The intention with the SRtP requirements is to ensure that the systems are designed and arranged so that:
— the system capabilities for all the SRtP systems can be restored after the initial casualty scenario has been
handled
and to:
— ensure that the SRtP systems maintain their capabilities to provide safe vessel operation during the
voyage back to port.
Guidance note 1:
Consequently, the SRtP requirements aim at the ability to recover and maintain operation, not the emergency response or ability to
fight and mitigate the initial casualty.
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Guidance note 2:

In the context of SRtP, the terms 'remain operational' and 'maintain capabilities' are considered as equivalent.
3.3.2 Design intention

The general intention of the SRtP regulations is to ensure that the SRtP systems are designed and arranged
with adequate redundancy and segregation so that the system remain operational with limited operator
intervention.
However, if such arrangements are not feasible, certain alternative measures may upon special
considerations be applied to fulfil the intention:
— manual actions for system restoration and operation during the SRtP voyage
— criteria for assuming survivability of components, cables and pipes within the casualty threshold.
3.3.3 Manual actions
3.3.3.1 Manual actions to provide system capabilities after a casualty are in the context of SRtP considered to
be the following:
— Manual actions to restore ship system capabilities:
— temporary restoration and manual operations beyond normal routines and procedures.
— Manual actions to maintain ship system capabilities:
— manual intervention beyond normal routines and procedures needed for the SRtP systems to remain
operational for the duration of the return to port voyage.
Manual actions in this context are primarily actions that must be performed locally at or near the equipment
(e.g. valves, pumps, breakers).
Guidance note:
Temporary repair or mechanical intervention depending on tools or equipment is normally considered to be beyond the acceptance
criteria for manual actions.
3.3.3.2 The systems shall be designed so that the manual actions needed for restoration of all SRtP systems
affected by a casualty are possible for the crew to complete within one hour.
Guidance note:
The one hour requirement is considered as a design criteria, to give direction and limitations to the design approach for the SRtP
systems; i.e to what degree the systems can be designed to depend on manual actions for system restoration. The one hour
limitation applies to the accumulated sum of all manual actions that are needed for restoring all SRtP systems that are affected by
an SRtP casualty.
In order to ensure that the SRtP systems are designed with a limited extent of manual actions that actually allow system
restoration within one hour, the theoretical number of crew members available for the system restoration is a parameter that
needs to be duly considered in the design phase.
The one hour criteria is considered as a pure design requirements and therefore irrelevant for the operational phase as the system
restoration and operational decision following a real operational casualty scenario is fully up to the master/crew.
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Ch.5.2.
3.3.3.3 Any manual action that may be required for the SRtP systems to remain operational following a
casualty shall be:
1) identified and considered as part of the assessment, see [1.9.2]
2) pre-planned, pre-set and instructions as well as necessary materials available on board
3) clearly described in the documentation
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4) emergency lighting and communication available at the location where the manual actions shall be

performed
5) demonstrated by tests or drills.
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Ch.5.2, 6.1, 7.3, 7.4.
3.3.3.4 If a system depend on manual actions for restoration, the physical location of the manual
intervention shall be outside the casualty threshold, i.e outside the space exposed to the fire or flooding.
3.3.4 Survivability after a fire
3.3.4.1 Pipes
a) Within the fire casualty threshold, all pipes are considered lost due to the fire exposure. However, if
segregated routing is practically unavoidable, the following exemptions are considered to survive a fire
and remain operational:
1)
— pipes routed through a trunk closed at all boundaries constructed to A 60
— steel pipes other than those carrying flammable liquids and passing through (not serving) spaces
affected by a fire casualty provided they are of:
2)
— substantial thickness
— adequately supported
3)
— joined by welding
Guidance note 1:
1): See MSC.1/Circ.1369 int 5.
2): See ICLL 66 regulation 22(3), as interpreted by IACS UI LL36/Rev. 2 paragraph (b) or "A-60" insulated ("A-60" class
insulation approved in accordance with resolution A.754(18) for bulkheads or decks may be used for this purpose).
3): Otherwise mechanical joints should be tested according to IACS UR P2.11.5.5.6 fire test or equivalent to the satisfaction
of the Society.
— plastic pipes if tested to resolution A.753(18), level 1

— metallic and non-metallic pipes tested with L1 test, as per Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.2 Table 2.
b) Temperature increase of liquids carried shall be considered, and measures taken where necessary, so
that the performance and purpose of the affected systems are maintained as intended after the casualty
has occurred.
Guidance note 2:
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3.3.4.2 Cables

a) Within the fire casualty threshold, all cables are considered lost due to the fire exposure. However, if
segregated routing is practically unavoidable, the following exemptions are considered to survive a fire
and remain operational:
1)
— a trunk closed at all boundaries constructed to A 60
— fire-resistant cables complying with standards IEC 60331-1 and -2 passing through (not serving)
spaces may be considered to remain operational after a fire casualty provided that
— they have no connections, joints and equipment connected to them within the space affected by
the casualty
2)
— installation of these cables is made to support their survival in a fire casualty and during fire
fighting efforts. Cables complying with both IEC 60331-1, -2 and in addition BS8491:2008
(or EN50200 for cables of smaller diameter) are accepted as an alternative way to fulfil this
requirement.
Guidance note 1:
1): See MSC.1/Circ.1369 int 5.
2): This implies e.g. that the cables are shielded to avoid exposure to the physical impact of direct water spray from e.g. fire
hoses or fixed installations.
See also IACS UR E15 Electrical Services Required to be Operable Under Fire Conditions and Fire Resistant Cables.
Guidance note 2:
3.3.5 Survivability after flooding
3.3.5.1 Cables type approved by the Society are considered to remain operational.
3.3.5.2 Pipes are considered to remain operational.
3.3.5.3 Piping systems complying with Pt.4 Ch.6 shall not be considered a source for progressive flooding.
3.3.5.4 Piping systems may be considered operational in a SRtP scenario when passing through flooded
compartments if:
— the piping system is designed to work in submerged condition at the maximum external pressure it may
be subjected to in a flooding scenario
— the seawater temperature does not influence the fluid behaviour in such a way that the system
functionality is lost.
4 System arrangement - SRtP
4.1 General
The following subsections give requirements for each of the SRtP systems as listed in [3.1.2]. The additional
requirements for the systems to remain operational in the OEA scenario are given in [6].
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Guidance note:

The requirements for each system are given at the three layers described in [1.6.2] with the headings:
1) goal
2) functional requirements
3) detailed requirements.
The sequence of systems in this subsection follow the order as given in SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.4.
4.2 Propulsion
4.2.1 Goal
The vessels propulsion system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational and be capable of propelling
the vessel safely back to port.

The propulsion function is considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty, at least one
propulsor with all necessary auxiliaries and supporting systems are operable for the duration of the voyage
back to port, and the remaining propulsion power capacity enable the ship to maintain a speed of 6 knots
while heading into BF 8 characterized by the following environmental conditions:
- wind speed: 19 m/s

- significant wave height: 5m
- spectrum peak period: 13 s
Guidance note:
These environmental conditions are considered to be a representative middle of the BF 8 range, based on calculations and
meteorological statistics.
For vessels operating in restricted areas less exposed to harsh weather, more lenient environmental conditions may be applied in
agreement with the administration and the owner. The SRtP capabilities will be specified in the 'List of operational limitations' as
required by SOLAS V/Reg.30.
4.2.3 Detailed requirements
4.2.3.1 The propulsion function shall be realized by installation of at least two independent and separated
propulsion systems. The duplicated propulsion systems shall be installed and located so that they are not
impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
4.2.3.2 Vessels designed and built with a higher degree of redundancy/separation than twoshall be subject to
special evaluation.
4.2.3.3 A shaft line, including relevant bearings, passing through a space affected by a fire or flooding
casualty may be considered operational if it is enclosed in a watertight and A-class tunnel or alternatively if:
1) in the flooding case it is documented that it can operate under water;
2) in the fire case it is protected by a dedicated water spray system capable of delivering not less than 5 l/
2
m /min on the protected area or equivalent.
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Guidance note:

This implies that both propulsion shafts may pass through the same casualty threshold if at least one shaft is arranged as
described in this paragraph.
For bearing arrangements according to 1) it shall be demonstrated by hydrostatic testing that the bearing
maintains satisfactory oil quality after being submerged as follows:
— to the maximum hydrostatic pressure that the bearing may be exposed to in a SRtP flooding casualty
— for a period of no less than 60 minutes.
— the lubrication oil volume shall have less than 2% water content after the test.
Where the propulsion shafts for both propulsion lines are arranged within the same casualty threshold, the
additional documentation listed in Table 4 shall be submitted for approval.
4.2.3.4 Both propulsion systems shall be designed to be continuously active during normal operation.
Guidance note:
Alternative propulsion arrangements may be approved upon special consideration, e.g. in connection to a specific trade or
appropriate operation, provided acceptance from the administration and the owner.
4.2.3.5 Manual intervention to regain and maintain propulsion functionality upon an SRtP casualty may be
accepted provided that the general conditions for manual intervention are fulfilled, see [3.3.3].
4.2.3.6 Auxiliary systems

1) All auxiliary systems serving each propulsion function shall be arranged to be independent and separate
for the duplicated propulsion systems. The auxiliary systems serving the separated propulsion systems
shall be located so that they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty, and arranged according to the
same zone plan, see Table 2.
Guidance note:
This applies to all auxiliary systems needed to support the propulsion function, ia. fuel oil, lub oil, cooling water, ventilation,
electrical power, control and safety systems, technical water, instrument air, etc.
The requirement does not apply to exhaust gas treatment systems, which is not required to remain operational in the context
of SRtP.
2) For piping systems, cross-over pipes between the segregated engine rooms are acceptable provided
these have isolation valves on both sides of the separating bulkheads. This applies also to cross over
facilities for ventilation ducts.
4.2.3.7 Control, monitoring and safety

The required means for safe local operation of the propulsion machinery shall be arranged so that no SRtP
casualty impair both propulsion engines/propulsion lines, and the location shall be provided with adequate
means of internal communication and lighting.
4.3 Steering
4.3.1 Goal
The vessels steering system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational and provide necessary steering
capabilities for the SRtP voyage.

The steering function is considered to remain operational when one steering system (rudder or azimuth
thruster) with its supporting components and systems is operable, after any SRtP casualty. The remaining
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steering system shall fulfil the capabilities that are required for the main steering gear at the maximum

achievable speed.
4.3.3.1 The steering function shall be designed with at least two independent and separated steering
systems, e.g two rudders or two azimuth thrusters. The duplicated steering systems shall be located so that
they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
4.3.3.2 Vessels designed and built with more than two steering arrangements are subject to special
evaluation.
4.3.3.3 Manual intervention to regain and maintain steering functionality upon an SRtP casualty may be
accepted provided that the general conditions for manual intervention are fulfilled, see [3.3.3].
4.3.3.4 Auxiliary systems

Auxiliary systems, serving either steering function, shall be arranged to be independent and separate for the
duplicated steering systems. The auxiliary systems serving the separated steering systems shall be located
so that they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty, and arranged according to the same zone plan, see
Table 2.
4.3.3.5 Control, monitoring and safety

The required means for safe local steering shall be arranged so that no SRtP casualty impair both steering
units, and the location shall be provided with adequate means of internal communication and lighting.
4.4 Navigational systems

4.4.1 Goal
The navigation systems shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational at the the navigation bridge or the
alternative location commonly denoted as the SRtP bridge.

The navigation systems are considered to remain operational when the following equipment and associated
functions are, after any SRtP casualty, available at either the main navigating bridge or at the SRtP bridge:
a) a properly adjusted standard magnetic compass
b) a receiver for a global navigation satellite system or a terrestrial radionavigation system
c) a 9 GHz radar
d) electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) or an appropriate folio of paper nautical charts
and publications
e) whistle
f) navigation lights
g) internal communications with engine control room and steering gear compartment
h) a pelorus or compass bearing device to take bearings
i) means of correcting heading and bearings to true at all times
j) means for communication with the eventual locations demanding local control
k) means for communication with proper look-out positions (if proper-look out is not provided from the
SRtP bridge).
Guidance note:
Proper look-out positions are required by COLREG Rule 5 and STCW Reg.VI/2.
The ship shall be capable of displaying the proper light configuration in compliance with the prevailing
COLREG (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea).
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Guidance note:

4.4.3.1 System duplication - general

The navigational systems required to remain operational shall be arranged with duplicated equipment
installed at the main navigational bridge and SRtP bridge respectively. The navigational equipment and
auxiliaries, associated cabling, power supplies etc. on the SRtP bridge shall be segregated from the
installations on the main navigational bridge so that the duplicated systems are not impaired by the same
SRtP casualty.
4.4.3.2 Whistle
The whistle system shall be arranged with two independent and segregated systems; controlled from the
main navigational bridge and SRtP bridge respectively. The duplicated whistle systems, including equipment
and cables, shall be located and arranged so that they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
4.4.3.3 Navigation lights

The control of all navigation lights required by COLREG shall be arranged with two independent and
segregated control systems, operated from the main navigational bridge and SRtP bridge respectively.
The duplicated light control systems, including equipment and cables, shall be located so that they are not
4.4.3.4 Compass
A separate gyro compass in lieu of a standard magnetic compass may be accepted, if approved by the
administration. This gyro compass shall (if provided) be interfaced to the radar and ECDIS (if provided).
4.4.3.5 GNSS
The required GNSS shall be interfaced to the radar, and ECDIS (if provided).
4.4.3.6 Performance standard

The required navigation equipment shall conform to appropriate performance standards not inferior to those
adopted by IMO.
4.5 Fuel oil

4.5.1 Goal
The fuel oil system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational to provide the necessary fuel to the
required propulsion- and power generation machinery; for the duration of the SRtP voyage back to port.

The fuel oil system is considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty, the system is capable
of supplying the fuel oil needed for all remaining combustion machinery required for the dimensioning SRtP
voyage.
The combustion machinery required to remain operational for the SRtP voyage is normally:
— the remaining propulsion line with its prime mover(s)
— the remaining power generation plant serving the SRtP power balance
— the emergency generator, if SRtP power balance depend on it
— eventual other machinery like e.g. boilers, if required for the SRtP voyage.
If the SRtP power balance depend on the emergency generator, the emergency generator shall be designed
for continuous service with necessary fuel supplies for the voyage back to port - without impairing the
capability and capacity required for the emergency power system.
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4.5.3.1 The fuel oil system shall be provided by either:
1) a dedicated fuel oil treatment and transfer system for each engine room arranged with segregation, or
2) dedicated and segregated fuel oil service tanks for each engine room with sufficient volume of ready to
use fuel.
Guidance note:
The fuel oil systems should be arranged according to the same zone plan as the systems it serves, see [4.2].
4.5.3.2 No single SRtP casualty shall impair the fuel supply to both redundant units in the machinery
systems required to remain operational.
4.5.3.3 The quantity of fuel that shall be available for the dimensioning SRtP voyage shall be calculated and
documented, i.a. based on the following parameters:
— the hydrodynamic report where the vessel speed, propulsion power demands, and duration of the SRtP
voyage is calculated for the dimensioning SRtP casualty scenario, under the required specified conditions,
see [3.1.2.6]
— the SRtP power demand including the total consumption of all combustion machinery required to remain
operational.
Guidance note:
For dual fuel arrangements, the fuel needed for the SRtP voyage may be based on any combination of the fuel types as long as the
quantity required for the dimensioning SRtP voyage is available.
4.5.3.4 Where one common fuel tank serves consumers in two segregated engine rooms and where the
tanks have boundaries to both engine rooms, quick closing valves shall be provided in both engine rooms.
4.5.3.5 The quick closing valves shall after any SRtP casualty remain operational in the fuel oil systems that
are required to remain operational.
4.6 Internal communication

4.6.1 Goal
The systems for internal communication shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational outside the
casualty threshold.
4.6.2.1 The systems for internal communication are considered to remain operational when two-way voice
communication addressing the following stations are available after any SRtP casualty:
— bridge
— SRtP bridge
— engineering spaces
— safety centre
— all fire-fighting and damage control teams
— emergency control stations, muster and embarkation stations and strategic positions on board (see SOLAS
III/6.4)
— all stations on board which require manual control or operation to sustain operation of essential SRtP
systems
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— look-out position(s) if required by [4.4].

Guidance note:
4.6.2.2 The PA systems, arranged as general alarm systems, are considered to remain operational when the
system is available and served by at least one PA loop in all other MVZs than the one exposed to the SRtP
casualty.
An emergency PA call station, and a general emergency alarm activation point (if combined PA/GA system)
shall be provided at the SRtP bridge.
Guidance note:
See SOLAS II-2/21.4.5 and MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 26.
4.6.3.1 Internal communication based on portable systems may be accepted provided that:
— repeaters or equivalent means remain operational outside the casualty threshold
— charging capability is available in more than one MVZ
— each space is covered by redundant repeaters' contributions.
Guidance note:
It is recommended to arrange one common two-way voice communication system for compliance with both SRtP and OEA
requirements. This communication system shall then be available on all defined location [4.6.2], [6.4.3] and provide two-way
communication to the fire-fighting and damage control teams.
4.6.3.2 The PA/GA system shall be designed with:

— two (or more) independent racks
— the cables from each rack routed within different casualty thresholds.
Guidance note:
The two independent racks should preferably be installed in the forward and aft MVZs, respectively.
4.6.3.3 The PA/GA call station, racks and loudspeakers, with cables (power and signals) shall be arranged
and protected so that it is operational in the remaining parts of the ship after a SRtP casualty or in all other
MVZs than the MVZ exposed to the casualty. All emergency call stations not affected by the SRtP casualty
shall be able to broadcast announcement directly to all not affected areas of the ship.
Guidance note:
See MSC/Circ.808 2.5 and 3.1.
4.7 External communication

4.7.1 Goal
The systems for external communication shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational at an alternative
location outside the casualty threshold.
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The systems for external communication are considered to remain operational when communication via the
GMDSS or the VHF marine and air band distress frequencies, are available at either the main bridge or SRtP
bridge, after any SRtP casualty.
The ship shall be capable of:
1) transmitting and receiving search and rescue co-ordinating communication by:
— portable or fixed VHF for on-scene (aeronautical) radio-communications
— portable or fixed VHF for on-scene (survival craft/ship) radio-communications.
2) providing two-way communication according to sea area aligned with the PSSC (GMDSS sea area).
Guidance note:
4.7.3.1 The additional external communication equipment, components and cables (power and signal) shall
be located so that they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualties as would affect the main external
communication equipment on bridge.
4.7.3.2 The external communication equipment shall be of a type approved by the administration; conform to
appropriate performance standards not inferior to those adopted by IMO and MED certified as applicable.
4.8 Fire water

4.8.1 Goal
The fire water system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational outside the casualty threshold.

The fire water system is considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty, SOLAS II-2/Reg.
10.2.1.5.1 is fulfilled in all MVZ other that the one exposed to the casualty. The remaining spaces outside the
casualty threshold within the same MVZ may be served by hydrants from adjacent MVZs.
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 28 and 53.
4.8.3.1
Fire fighting in spaces outside the casualty threshold within the same MVZ may be covered by hoses
connected to hydrants in the adjacent MVZs, provided that the fire water system in the MVZ containing
the casualty can be isolated from the adjacent MVZs. It shall be possible to reach all areas by two hoses
connected to different hydrants, and not more than two lengths of hoses may be connected. Protected
branch-off from the operational part of the fire water system in the adjacent zone, with A 60 protected
connection cabinet, may be arranged.
Guidance note 1:
This implies that the fire water system can be arranged so that a SRtP casualty scenario (where a casualty is limited by the
boundaries of the casualty threshold) may have the same impact on the system as the OEA casualty scenario (where a casualty
may impair a complete MVZ).
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Guidance note 2:

When establishing the necessary number of hoses, the eventual need for connecting two hoses must be taken into consideration.
This is particularly relevant in case the system is arranged so that the fire water function within the MVZ containing the fire shall
be served by hydrants in the adjacent MVZs. A water jet of 7 m may be taken into account.
4.8.3.2 If, after a casualty, the spaces within the same MVZ as the casualty are intended to be served by
hoses from the adjacent MVZs, the fire water system in each MVZ must be arranged with isolation valves on
both sides of the MVZ bulkheads.
4.8.3.3 If any casualty scenario may lead to a situation where all operational fire pumps are located on
either side of the MVZ exposed to fire, bypass lines with isolation valves shall be arranged in order to reach
eventual spaces on the far side of the lost MVZ.
Guidance note:
See also the OEA scenario described in [6.3].
4.9 Fixed fire extinguishing systems

4.9.1 Goal
The fixed fire extinguishing systems shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational outside the casualty
threshold.

The fixed fire extinguishing system is considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty, all
relevant regulations of SOLAS II-2 is fulfilled in all spaces outside the casualty threshold. Indication of
activated sections in all other MVZs than the one containing the casualty, shall continue to function.
Guidance note:
4.9.3.1 The regulations of this chapter apply to fixed fire extinguishing systems as required in SOLAS II-2/
Reg.10.4, 10.5, 10.6 and 20.6.1 and any fixed fire extinguishing installed to limit the casualty threshold.
This is not applicable for:
— local application systems in machinery spaces (SOLAS II-2/Reg.10.5.6) unless they form part of a total
flooding system to protect the machinery space
— galley duct extinguishing system (SOLAS II-2/Reg.9.7.5.1.1.3)
— deep fat cooking fire extinguishing (SOLAS II-2/Reg.10.6.4)
— paint locker fire extinguishing (SOLAS II-2/Reg.10.6.31).
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 29 to 36.
4.9.3.2 Machinery spaces category A

For fixed fire extinguishing protection according to SOLAS II-2/Reg.10.5, the extinguishing system may
be arranged as two completely segregated and different systems (e.g. a water based and gas based
extinguishing system), each system complying with SOLAS II-2/Reg.10.4 as applicable.
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Alternatively, one system may be accepted if arranged so that upon a SRtP casualty, the fixed fire

extinguishing system are still functional. For the latter option special considerationshall be given with regards
to arrangement of any dry pipe system.
4.9.3.3 Accommodation sprinkler system

Pump units for accommodation sprinkler systems may be segregated as 3 x 50% or 2 x 100% or equivalent.
4.9.3.4 Ro-ro and special category spaces

Guidance note:
A deluge station containing the section control valves serving the water based fixed fire extinguishing systems for ro-ro and special
category spaces can be considered a space of negligible fire risk if the following is implemented:
— the space is only used as a deluge station with associated safety equipment
— only deluge valves (manual or remotely operated) and associated equipment (limit switches, any actuators, operation instructions,
light, fire detectors, ventilation and any heating) are accepted inside the deluge station
— the deluge station shall be insulated to a standard of structural fire protection equivalent to that required for a control station
— all doors in the boundary of the deluge station shall be self-closing.
4.9.3.5 Indication/alarm system for actuated sensors

The indication/alarm system for activated sections shall be arranged with redundancy, arranged so that both
units are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
Two panels/indicating units located in continuously manned stations shall be arranged, each indicating unit
shall be connected to one or both system units so that they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
The signal cables from each section may be connected to:
— an I/O cabinet located within the same MVZ as the section or
— connected directly to the two system units.
4.10 Fire detection and alarm

4.10.1 Goal
The fire detection and alarm system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational in all required spaces
outside the casualty threshold.

The fire detection and alarm system is considered to remain operational when the system is arranged to fulfil
SOLAS II-2/Reg.7 in all spaces outside casualty threshold.

— Fire detection centrals shall be duplicated and segregated so that both units are not impaired by the same
casualty.
— Power source and cabling for fire detection centrals shall be arranged/segregated so that both units are
not impaired by the same casualty.
— Detector section arrangement/cabling shall be connected to different fire detection centrals, to provide
detection in all required spaces outside the casualty.
— Requirements for section arrangement and cabling in FSS – Code 9.2.1.6, 9.2.4.3.2 shall be complied with
also in the SRtP casualty scenarios.
Guidance note:
The referred paragraphs of the FSS code cover failure modes of component/cables and requirements to cable routing, which
must be observed in addition to the SRtP requirements.
DNV AS
4.11 Bilge
4.11.1 Goal
The bilge system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational in all spaces served by the bilge system
outside the casualty threshold.

The bilge system is considered to remain operational provided:
— After any SRtP flooding casualty:
— all spaces served by the bilge system can be drained
— all valves controlling the bilge suction can be operated from above the bulkhead deck (as required by
SOLAS II-1/Reg.35-1 3.11).
— After any SRtP fire casualty:
— all spaces served by the bilge system outside the casualty threshold can be drained
— all valves controlling the bilge suction can be operated. Local operation of the bilge valves serving
spaces outside the casualty threshold within the same MVZ shall be available; in all other MVZs the
valves shall be operable from above the bulkhead deck (as required by SOLAS II-1/Reg.35-1 3.11).
The bilge function in void spaces located within the same MVZ as the SRtP casualty need not remain
operational.
A principal bilge piping arrangement is shown in Figure 2.
4.11.3.1 Any casualty threshold containing main bilge line serving the casualty threshold and/or other
casualty thresholds shall be arranged with isolation valves on both sides of the bulkheads of the casualty
threshold.
Figure 2 Principal bilge arrangement
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4.11.3.2 Casualty thresholds served by the bilge systems and not containing main piping shall have

redundant branch-offs from pipe sections located within different casualty thresholds. This does not apply to
void spaces if served from piping systems located within the same MVZ.
4.11.3.3 If any casualty can lead to a situation where all operational bilge pumps are located on one side
of the isolated casualty threshold, bypass lines with isolation valves shall be arranged to serve the system
section that do not contain operational pumps.
4.11.3.4 The control system for valves controlling the bilge function shall be arranged with redundancy;
both controllers located above the bulkhead deck and arranged so that they are not impaired by the same
casualty. The control panels/user interface shall be connected to each of the system units.
Guidance note:
The bilge level detection and alarming functionality after a casualty is considered to be adequately covered through the flooding
detection system.
4.11.3.5 The signal cables to the bilge valves within in a MVZ shall either be:
— connected to an input/output (I/O) cabinet located above bulkhead deck within the same MVZ or
— connected directly to the two controllers.
If the valves are connected to an I/O cabinet located within the same MVZ, a casualty impairing the I/O
cabinet shall not impair the means for local control of the valves.
4.11.3.6 Power (electrical and pneumatic, if applicable) shall be arranged according to the same redundancy
principle as the remote control system.
4.11.3.7 Isolation valves that after an SRtP casualty must be operated in order to isolate the piping section
within the casualty threshold from the remaining system may be operated locally.
Guidance note:
Such local operation is considered to be manual actions which shall be identified in the assessment report in the list of manual
actions associated with the relevant casualties.
4.11.3.8 Actuated valves for the bilge system may be installed in a space categorized as an area of negligible
fire risk.
Guidance note:
Since a space of negligible fire risk shall have restricted access, the operation of eventual valves in a space of negligible fire risk
after a casualty cannot be based on manual local control. This implies that any valve located within a space of negligible fire risk
must be possible to operate remotely even after any SRtP casualty.
4.11.3.9 Bilge alarm sensors can be considered as being part of the flooding detection function.
4.11.3.10 In the event of an SRtP casualty, discharge of untreated bilge directly to sea may be acceptable
during the SRtP voyage, but only in cases where the safety of ship or lives at sea may otherwise be
threatened.
Guidance note:
See MARPOL, Annex I, Ch.1 Reg.4.
DNV AS
4.12 Ballast
4.12.1 Goal
The ballast system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational outside the casualty threshold.
Guidance note:
The ballast system may normally be exempted from the SRtP regulations if duly justified and accepted by the owner and
administration. The application for exemption to the administration should contain a substantiation of why the ballasting function is
not required after a casualty.
If the ballasting system is not exempted from the SRtP regulations, the requirements in this subsection apply.

The ballast system is considered to remain operational if, after any SRtP casualty, all ballast tanks outside
MVZ containing the casualty can be operated by the remaining ballast system.
Local manual control of the ballast system is acceptable after a SRtP casualty, on the general conditions for
manual actions, see [3.3.3].
4.12.3.1 All MVZs with main ballast piping serving the MVZ or other MVZs shall be arranged with isolation
valves on both sides of the MVZ bulkheads.
4.12.3.2 If a casualty lead to a situation where all operable ballast pumps are located at one side of the
impaired MVZ, a bypass line with isolation valves shall be arranged to serve the system piping section in the
MVZ that does not contain any operable pump.
4.12.3.3 In the event of an SRtP casualty, discharge of untreated ballast water directly to sea may be
acceptable during the SRtP voyage, but only in cases where the safety of ship or lives at sea may otherwise
be threatened.
Guidance note:
See IMO BWMC (Ballast Water Management Convention) Regulation A-3.1.
4.12.3.4 Actuated valves for the ballast system are accepted to be installed in a space categorized as an
area of negligible fire risk.
Guidance note:
Since a space of negligible fire risk shall have restricted access, the operation of eventual valves in a space of negligible fire risk
after a casualty cannot be based on local control. This implies that any valve located within a space of negligible fire risk must be
possible to operate remotely even after any SRtP casualty.
4.13 Internal watertight doors

4.13.1 Goal
The internal watertight doors system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational outside the casualty
threshold.

The internal watertight doors system is considered to remain operational when:
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— after a SRtP flooding casualty, the indication at bridge as required by SOLAS II-1/Reg.13.8.2 remain

operational for all doors
— after a fire casualty, the indication at bridge as required by SOLAS II-1/Reg.13.8.2 remain operational for
all doors outside the casualty threshold
— after casualty on bridge, the indication as required by SOLAS II-1/Reg.13.8.2 is available for all doors at
another manned location.
Guidance note 1:
The requirements apply to all watertight doors (power operated and non-power operated) where remote position indication at
bridge is required by SOLAS.
Guidance note 2:
Components for the indication system situated below bulkhead deck shall be protected against the ingress of water as described in
SOLAS II-1/Reg.13.7.6.
Guidance note 3:
4.13.3.1 The door indication system shall be arranged with redundancy.
4.13.3.2 The position indication for each door shall be implemented in two different system units. These units
shall be located so that they are not impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
4.13.3.3 The position indication sensors (open and closed) for a door shall be connected to both system
units. The connections shall be arranged/routed so that a SRtP casualty can only impair the connection to
one of the system units. If duplication of required sensors is arranged, the pair of sensors can be routed to
different system units.
4.13.3.4 The bridge panel presenting the door indication and the communication to the system units shall be
arranged so that a casualty can only impair one of the system units.
Guidance note:
The integrated alarm system panel at the bridge may be used as a backup means of indication.
4.13.3.5 The power supplies to system units shall be arranged so that both units don't loose power upon
a SRtP casualty. The bridge panel shall be arranged with two power supplies arranged so that they are not
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4.14 Safe areas
4.14.1 General
4.14.1.1
Safe areas
5.1 Functional requirements:
.1 the safe area(s) shall generally be internal space(s); however, the use of an external space as a safe area may
be allowed by the administration taking into account any restriction due to the area of operation and relevant
expected environmental conditions;
.2 the safe area(s) shall provide all occupants with the following basic services to ensure that the health of
passengers and crew is maintained:
.2.1 sanitation;
.2.2 water;
.2.3 food;
.2.4 alternate space for medical care;
.2.5 shelter from the weather;
.2.6 means of preventing heat stress and hypothermia;
.2.7 light; and
.2.8 ventilation;
.3 ventilation design shall reduce the risk that smoke and hot gases could affect the use of the safe area(s); and
.4 means of access to life-saving appliances shall be provided from each area identified or used as a safe area,
taking into account that a main vertical zone may not be available for internal transit.
4.14.1.2 The safe areas shall be designed to provide all passengers and crew with services listed in [4.14.1]
to ensure safe and habitable conditions for the duration of the SRtP voyage.
Guidance note:
The main intention is to ensure that the ship is designed to have these services available in the areas designated for the purpose
in the event of any casualty within the casualty threshold. Whether or not it is necessary to actually move people to the safe areas
in the event of a casualty and restore functionality in that area depend on the casualty and operational situation, and will be at the
masters' discretion.
4.14.2 Goal
The safe areas shall, after any SRtP casualty, provide all passengers and crew with necessary services to
ensure the health and habitability for the duration of the SRtP voyage.

The safe areas are considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty, all the services listed in
[4.14.1] are available in the dedicated safe area(s) in other MVZs than the one exposed to the casualty:
— at least 1 toilet per 50 persons
— minimum 3 l of water per person per day
— food and provisions with at least the WHO recommended level of 2000 kcal / 8000 kJ. per pshelter from
the weather
— the temperature kept within 10ºC and 30ºC
— light
— erson per day
DNV AS
— basic medical equipment and first aid provisions

3
— ventilation flow of minimum 4,5 m /h per person.
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 41-51.
4.14.4.1 The safe areas shall be arranged to accommodate all passengers and crew in other MVZ(s) than the
one containing the casualty.
Guidance note:
This implies that at there must be two or more safe areas in different MVZs. If there are two safe areas, each area must be able to
accommodate all passengers and crew, and provide the required services. If the safe areas are arranged in three or more MVZs,
the safe areas must be arranged so that the total areas in the other MVZs than the one containing the casualty accommodate all
passengers and crew, with the required services.
4.14.4.2 In the event of an SRtP fire casualty, only the spaces within the casualty threshold is considered lost
to the fire, but in the context of safe areas, the full MVZ containing the casualty is considered unsuited for
accommodating passengers and crew during the SRtP voyage.
4.14.4.3 The required services shall be provided for the duration of the SRtP voyage, which is defined by
the planned route and SRtP propulsion capabilities, see [3.1.2.6]. If the duration of the dimensioning SRtP
2
voyage is above 12 hours, the safe area shall provide at least 2 m space per person, if less than 12 hours,
2
minimum 1 m shall be provided.
4.14.4.4 The safe areas shall be provided with easy access to life saving appliances (LSA). External routes to
the LSA are considered accessible also within the MVZ exposed to the fire casualty.
4.14.4.5 Requirements to the arrangement for the specific systems are given in the following subsections.
4.14.5 Sanitation
Black and grey water systems shall after any SRtP casualty remain operational in the safe area(s) assigned to
the various casualties.
In the event of an SRtP casualty, discharge of untreated grey and black water directly to sea may be
acceptable during the SRtP voyage, but only in cases where the safety of ship or lives at sea may otherwise
be threatened, see MARPOL, Annex IV, Reg.3.
4.14.6 Water
Sanitary supply system shall after any SRtP casualty remain operational in the safe area(s) assigned to the
various casualties.
Fresh water production system should remain operational, or alternatively, sufficient quantities of fresh water
shall be preserved in fresh water storage tanks. For that purpose, low level alarms shall be provided for fresh
water tanks. Additional quantities for hygiene and food preparations shall be included.
4.14.7 Food
Food, water and equipment for the support of the basic services to the safe areas, stored in spaces outside
the relevant casualty threshold, are considered available even within the same MVZ as the casualty.
Guidance note 1:
This implies that even though the safe areas shall be arranged in other MVZs than the one containing the casualty, it is assumed
that all spaces outside the casualty threshold also within the same MVZ may be accessible for storage of the provisions - and
accessible from the safe areas even when located in different MVZs.
DNV AS
Guidance note 2:

The food and provisions provided for the safe areas may be of any kind as decided by the owner, from dry food and bottled water
to hot meals. If a galley is needed to prepare the food, the equipment and services needed shall be provided as part of the safe
area.
4.14.8 Alternate space for medical care
4.14.8.1
5.2 Alternate space for medical care
Alternate space for medical care shall conform to a standard acceptable to the administration.
(SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.5.2)
4.14.8.2 In addition to the ships' hospital or medical centre, an alternative, easily accessible location
equipped with basic medical equipment and first aid provisions shall be available in a different MVZ than the
primary medical centre, and provided with lighting and power supply from emergency power.
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 46 and MSC.1/Circ. 1129, GUIDANCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL AND SANITATION RELATED
PROGRAMMES FOR PASSENGER SHIPS.
4.14.9 Shelter from the weather

The use of external spaces as a safe area may upon special consideration be accepted by the administration,
on condition that the required system capabilities are provided for; that the area of operation, environmental
conditions and duration of the dimensioning SRtP voyage is taken into consideration.
4.14.10 Means of preventing stress and hypothermia

Means of preventing heat stress and hypothermia shall, after any SRtP casualty, be provided in the
designated safe area.
Air condition (heating/cooling) for the designated safe area shall remain operational if needed to keep the
temperature within this range.
4.14.11 Light
Portable rechargeable battery powered lighting may be acceptable in areas not covered by the emergency
lighting system, if adequate charging capabilities are provided, see [4.18].
4.14.12 Ventilation
3
The ventilation for the safe areas shall remain operational with a minimum capacity of 4,5 m /hour per
person.
4.15 Flooding detection system

4.15.1 Goal
The flooding detection system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational outside the casualty
threshold.

The flooding detection system is considered to remain operational when:
— after any flooding casualty, the flooding detection alarm system on bridge as required by MSC.1/Circ.
1291 remain operational for all watertight compartments
DNV AS
— after any fire casualty, the flooding detection alarm system on bridge as required by MSC.1/Circ. 1291

remain operational for all watertight compartments except the watertight compartment containing the fire
casualty
Guidance note 1:
See MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 40. This applies to eventual spaces below bulkhead deck where the extent of a fire casualty is less
than the flooding casualty threshold.
— after a casualty at the bridge, flooding detection alarms as required by MSC.1/Circ.1291 is operational for
all watertight compartments at another manned location.
Guidance note 2:
See MSC.1/Circ.1291: Guidelines for flooding detection system on passenger ship.
The functional requirements of the flooding detection system apply to both:
— flooding detection of water ingress in watertight compartments
— liquid level monitoring of tanks with means of indication at the bridge.
Guidance note 3:
This implies that the general requirement to remain operational also applies to the liquid level monitoring system for tanks (e.g.
fuel oil, lub oil, fresh water) with indication at the bridge, i.a. that the exemption given in MSC.1/Circ.1291 7 does not apply in the
context of SRtP.
4.15.3.1 The flooding detection and alarm system shall be arranged with redundancy.
4.15.3.2 Components installed below bulkhead deck shall be designed with adequate IP degree to withstand
the potential water head at the location of the unit.
Guidance note:
See MSC.1/Circ.1291 Item 13.
4.15.3.3 Flooding detection functionality for each watertight space must be implemented in two system units.
Redundant system units must be segregated so that both units are not impaired by the same casualty.
4.15.3.4 The flooding sensor in a space shall be connected to both system units, or if duplication of sensors
are arranged, one sensor shall be connected to each system units. The connections shall be arranged/routed
so that a casualty can only impair the connection to one of the system units.
Guidance note:
For spaces where two or more flooding detection sensors are required by MSC.1/Circ.1291 Item 8, it is acceptable that only one
sensor is available for the alarm system after a SRtP casualty.
---e-n-d---o-f---g-u-I-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e—
4.15.3.5 Bilge alarm sensors can be considered as being part of the flooding detection function.
4.15.3.6 The bridge alarm panel presenting the flooding alarms shall be connected to both system units. The
communication shall be arranged so that a SRtP casualty can only impair the connection to one of the system
units.
DNV AS
4.15.3.7 The power supplies to system units shall be arranged so that not both units loose power upon a

SRtP casualty. The bridge panel shall be arranged with two power supplies arranged so that both units are
not impaired by the same SRtP casualty.
4.16 Control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems

4.16.1 Goal
The control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems shall remain operational to the extent necessary to
support the intended level of automation and control for each of the SRtP systems, while also maintaining the
required safety functions.
Guidance note:
For each of the SRtP systems that is served by the an integrated or dedicated control, monitoring, alarm and safety system,
the intended level of performance after a SRtP casualty must be described in the SRtP system design philosophies. The control,
monitoring, alarm and safety systems shall then be designed to reflect the various needs of the SRtP systems which in turn define
what 'remain operational' entails for the control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems.

The control, monitoring, alarm and safety system is considered to remain operational when, after any
SRtP casualty, the system maintain the following functionality for each SRtP system required to remain
operational:
— maintain the safety functions as required by main class and SOLAS
— support the intended operation with necessary alarming, user interface and means of control
Guidance note 1:
This implies e.g. that:
— In case of a casualty in one engine room, the machinery in the remaining engine room should maintain the required control,
alarm, monitoring and safety functions to enable a safe operation during the SRtP voyage.
— In case of a casualty affecting the bilge system, the required bilge functionality should be maintained outside the casualty
threshold, e.g. that the bilge valves shall be operable from a position above bulkhead deck.
The control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems for each SRtP system shall be arranged to support the
intended method of system restoration and operation following a SRtP casualty.
Guidance note 2:
The intended level of automation and remote control versus dependency of local, manual intervention and manual actions
must be duly considered in this respect. If the system restoration and operation during the SRtP voyage depend on manual
intervention, supervision and safety actions that is normally handled in the control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems, the
manual intervention must be identified in the in the assessment reports/SRtP operation manual.
4.17 Electrical power generation and distribution

4.17.1 Goal
The electrical power supply system shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational to provide electrical
power to all the SRtP systems required for the voyage back to port, including the safe areas.

The electrical power supply system is considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty:
1)
— the power plant is capable of generating the SRtP power demand
DNV AS
— the power distribution system is capable of supplying necessary power to all the consumers that are

required to remain operational
for the duration of the SRtP voyage.
Guidance note:
1: The SRtP power demand is the electrical power demand following the dimensioning SRtP casualty, at a vessel spedd of 6 knot
while heading into BF 8 and also providing the necessary power to all the SRtP systems listed in [3.1.2].
4.17.3.1 The main power plant shall consist of minimum two main sources of electrical power (normally, the
generating sets, but also other sources of power may be considered), two main switchboards, two sets of
associated transforming equipment, converters and similar appliances constituting a part of the electrical
power supply system. The duplicated components shall be located in separate engine rooms/compartments
so that any SRtP casualty does not affect both systems.
4.17.3.2 After any SRtP casualty, it shall be possible to start and connect the remaining main sources of
electrical power to the appurtenant main switchboard(s). Each engine room/compartment shall be arranged
with stored energy and systems for starting the main source of power in a black out situation.
4.17.3.3 After a SRtP casualty, the remaining power generation and distribution system shall have sufficient
capacity to supply all systems required to be operational for the SRtP voyage. Due regard shall be paid
to systems that may have to be operated simultaneously. An automatic load reduction or load shedding
system shall be provided if there is a risk that the remaining power generation or distribution system may be
overloaded.
4.17.3.4 The emergency generator and the emergency power distribution system may be used to
supplement the remaining main power source to meet the SRtP power demand, provided its ability to supply
emergency consumers (Pt.5 Ch.4 Sec.3 [1.1]) is not impaired. The emergency generating set shall have
sufficient capacity to supply all required emergency consumers simultaneously in addition to the demands of
the SRtP systems. The requirement to emergency generators used in port Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [3.3.4] apply. If
operation in a SRtP scenario depend on the emergency generator, the fuel supply system shall be arranged to
support the required service for the duration of the SRtP voyage.
4.17.3.5 When systems required to remain operational in a SRtP casualty are supplied from distribution
switchboards, the switchboards shall be arranged in separate compartments so that any SRtP casualty does
not impair both switchboards.
4.17.3.6 In general, cables to duplicated consumers should be separated so that any SRtP casualty does not
impair both cables. If separated cable installation is not feasible, alternative methods to remain operational
may be acceptable, see [3.3.4.2].
4.17.3.7 SRtP systems shall in general be supplied from distribution boards located within the same MVZ as
the equipment, or directly from the main or emergency switchboard (see Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [9.1.2] g).
Guidance note:
Equipment in smaller MVZs may be supplied from distribution board located in another MVZ as long as [4.17.1] is fulfilled.
4.18 Lighting system

4.18.1 Goal
The lighting systems shall, after any SRtP casualty, remain operational in all
DNV AS
— areas where manning is required for SRtP system restoration, including positions where manual actions

are required
— areas where manning is required for system operation during the SRtP voyage
— the safe areas assigned to the casualty (outside the MVZ containing the casualty)
— areas where lighting is required to be supplied from the emergency source of power according to Pt.5
Ch.4 Sec.3 [1.1.4].

The lighting system is considered to remain operational when, after any SRtP casualty, the remaining lighting
provides sufficient illumination to support the tasks to be performed in the required areas for the duration of
the SRtP voyage.
4.18.3.1 Light fixtures shall in general be supplied from distribution switchboards located within the same
MVZ.
4.18.3.2 Power supply to the lighting fixtures in all areas requiring lighting in a SRtP casualty shall be
divided between at least two different switchboards. These switchboards shall be in separate compartments
so that any SRtP casualty does not impair both systems.
4.18.3.3 In areas where manual actions are necessary for system restoration or to maintain functionality
during the return to port voyage, either the fixed main- or the emergency lighting system shall remain
operational after any SRtP casualty.
4.18.3.4 The access way to areas where manual actions are taken for the ship to return to port should be
provided with fixed main and emergency lighting.
4.18.3.5 Portable rechargeable battery operated lighting may be acceptable for use in spaces which are not
covered by the ship’s emergency lighting system. Adequate charging capability shall be available for such
battery powered lighting.
4.19 Stability computer

Guidance note:
The stability computer is not among the systems that are required to remain operational following an SRtP casualty as given in
SOLAS II-2/Reg.21.4, and hence the requirements of the SRtP notation do not apply.
However, SOLAS II-1/Reg.8-1.3 give requirements to the stability computer to support the master during an SRtP voyage and
further guidance to the arrangement of the stability computer is given in MSC.1/Circ.1400 and 1532.
5 Orderly Evacuation and Abandonment - OEA
5.1 General
5.1.1 Purpose
5.1.1.1
The purpose of this regulation is to provide design criteria for systems required to remain operational for
supporting the orderly evacuation and abandonment of a ship, if the casualty threshold, as defined in regulation
21.3, is exceeded.
( SOLAS II-2/Reg.22.2)
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Guidance note:

Regulation 21.3 refer to the casualty threshold defined for SRtP, see [3.1.1.1].
5.1.1.2 The OEA requirements aim to ensure that, in case a fire exceeds the SRtP casualty threshold and
potentially propagate to the whole MVZ, the systems deemed necessary to support an orderly evacuation are
designed to remain operational for a minimum period of three hours, in all other MVZs than the one exposed
to the fire.
Guidance note:
The OEA requirements do not cover flooding scenarios that exceed the SRtP casualty threshold.
5.1.2 Scope
5.1.2.1
3.1 In case any one main vertical zone is unserviceable due to fire, the following systems shall be so arranged and
segregated as to remain operational:
.1 fire main;
.2 internal communications (in support of fire-fighting as required for passenger and crew notification and
evacuation);
.3 means of external communications;
.4 bilge systems for removal of fire-fighting water;
.5 lighting along escape routes, at assembly stations and at embarkation stations of life-saving appliances; and
.6 guidance systems for evacuation shall be available.
3.2 The above systems shall be capable of operation for at least 3 h based on the assumption of no damage
outside the unserviceable main vertical zone. These systems are not required to remain operational within the
unserviceable main vertical zones.
5.1.2.2 The scope of the OEA requirements is related to the ability for the listed functions to be restored and
remain operational in all other MVZs than the one exposed to the fire casualty; and not the ability to fight
and mitigate the fire situation in the affected MVZ.
Guidance note:
In an OEA scenario, a complete MVZ is considered unavailable, and access to life saving appliances should be arranged to ensure
availability also for any such scenario.
5.2 OEA - casualty scenario (failure modes)

5.2.1 Fire casualty exceeding the SRtP casualty threshold
The casualty scenarios for the OEA regulation is the loss of any complete MVZ, following a proliferation of an
initial fire beyond the SRtP casualty threshold. The fire is then assumed to spread and potentially affect the
whole MVZ in which the fire originated.
Guidance note:
In an OEA scenario, the fire is in general not assumed to spread to open decks, except balconies outside passenger cabins and
certain areas on open decks that may be specifically exposed, e.g. related to ventilation outlets.
DNV AS
5.2.2 Impact within the exposed MVZ

Within the lost MVZ, all components, pipes and cables are considered lost, unless arranged as described in
[5.3.2].
5.3 Remain operational

5.3.1 General
In the context of the OEA regulations, the listed functions shall remain operational in all other MVZs than the
one lost to the fire, for a period of minimum three hours.
This includes power supplies and other auxiliary systems necessary for the listed systems to remain
operational and addition to life saving appliances.
Local intervention and operation may be acceptable.
5.3.2 Survivability after an OEA casualty
5.3.2.1
3.3 Cabling and piping within a trunk constructed to an "A-60" standard shall be deemed to remain intact and
serviceable while passing through the unserviceable main vertical zone for the purposes of paragraph 3.1. An
equivalent degree of protection for cabling and piping may be approved by the administration.
(SOLAS II-2/Reg.22.3.3)
5.3.2.2 An equivalent degree of protection in the context of OEA casualty scenarios is considered to be as
follows:
Pipes
A 60 insulated steel pipes and couplings or steel pipes of substantial wall thickness with full welded
connections, see [3.3.4.1].
Cables
Cabling arranged with redundancy and segregation in such a way that the system remains operational after
failure/loss of either cable passing through the unserviceable main vertical zone. The redundant cables
shall be separated by minimum two A-class decks and have no connections, joints or connected equipment
within the unserviceable main vertical zone. At least one of the cables shall be fire resistant and installed in
accordance with [3.3.4.2].
6 System arrangement - OEA
6.1 General
This subsection contains the additional requirements for the specific systems required to remain operational
to support OEA in accordance with [5].
6.2 Electrical power generation and distribution

6.2.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, the electrical power supply system shall remain operational to provide electrical power
to all systems that are required to support an orderly evacuation and abandonment situation including life
saving appliances in all other MVZs than the one exposed to fire.

For the OEA scenario, the electrical power supply system is considered to remain operational when:
1)
— the remaining power generation plant is capable of generating the OEA power demand
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— the power distribution system is capable of supplying necessary power to all the consumers that are

required to remain operational in all other MVZs that the one exposed to the fire
for a period of three hours.
Guidance note:
1) The OEA power demand is defined as the electrical power demand following the dimensioning OEA casualty; the necessary
power to the OEA systems listed [5.1] (SOLAS II-2/Reg.22.3), see definitions in Table 6.

The electrical power sources shall be located in separate MVZs so that not all of them are impaired in any
OEA scenario. The remaining power sources shall have sufficient capacity to supply all systems required to be
operational in the unaffected MVZs for at least three hours.
Guidance note 1:
The power sources may be the main- and/or the emergency source of power, centralized battery systems, local battery systems
(e.g. battery systems or other power sources covering one MVZ, or battery systems dedicated to a single consumer or system).
Guidance note 2:
The cable routing and protection of cables against fire must be carefully considered when the power source and the consumers are
in different MVZs. See [5.3.2] for conditions to consider a cable passing an unserviceable MVZ to remain operational in an OEA
scenario.
6.3 Fire main

6.3.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, the fire main shall remain operational in all other MVZs than the one exposed to the
fire.
Guidance note:
If the fire main arrangement is according to [4.8.3.1] where spaces outside the casualty threshold shall be served by hoses
connected to hydrants in adjacent MVZs, the OEA scenario does in general not entail requirements beyond the SRtP scenario.
See also MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 28 and 53.
6.4 Internal communication

6.4.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, the systems for internal communication shall remain operational in all other MVZs than
the one exposed to the fire.

For the OEA scenario, the internal communication system is considered to remain operational when means
are available for communicating orders to fire-fighting and damage control teams; and personnel in charge of
evacuation and abandonment.
The PA systems, arranged as general alarm systems, are considered to remain operational when the system
is available and served by at least one PA loop in all other MVZs than the one exposed to the fire.
6.4.3.1 A two-way voice communication system shall be provided.
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Guidance note:

If portable equipment is used it shall comply with DNV-SI-0364 Sec.4 [3.3.1]. Not all hand-helds shall be located in one space;
sufficient units for all stations have to be provided and charging units to be stationed in more than one MVZ. The repeater system
needs to remain operational when required to provide direct communication between all areas of the vessel not affected by the
casualty to support communication as described in MSC.1/Circ.1369 Int. 54.
6.4.3.2 At least one loop of the PA/GA system shall remain operational for passenger and crew notification
within all MVZs not affected by the casualty. All not affected emergency call stations shall be able to
broadcast announcement directly to all not affected areas of the ship.
Guidance note:
See MSC/Circ.808 2.5 and 3.1.
6.4.3.3 The two-way voice communication system and the emergency PA call station shall be provided at
the SRtP bridge. If the SRtP bridge is located in the same MVZ as the navigating bridge, a third location in a
different MVZ shall be provided with the same means of communication.
Guidance note:
This communication system shall then be available on all defined location and provide 2-way voice communication to the fire-
fighting and damage control teams.
6.5 External communication

6.5.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, the systems for external communication shall remain operational in another MVZ than
the one exposed to the fire.

For the OEA scenario, the external communication system is considered to remain operational when the ship
is capable of communicating via the GMDSS or the VHF marine and air band distress frequencies even if the
main GMDSS equipment is lost.
The ship shall be capable of:
1) transmitting and receiving search- and rescue co-ordinating communication by
— portable or fixed VHF for on-scene (aeronautical) radio-communication, and
— portable or fixed on-scene (survival craft/ship) radio-communication, and
2) providing two-way communication according to sea area aligned with the PSC (GMDSS sea area).
Guidance note:

The external communication equipment shall be provided at the SRtP bridge. If the SRtP bridge is located in
the same MVZ as the navigating bridge, a third location in a different MVZ shall be provided with the same
means of communication.
The above equipment shall be of a type approved by the administration and shall conform to appropriate
performance standards not inferior to those adopted by IMO.
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6.6 Bilge system
6.6.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, the bilge system shall remain operational in all spaces served by the bilge system in
the other MVZs than the one exposed to the casualty.

For the OEA scenario, the bilge system is considered to remain operational if all spaces served by the system
in all other MVZs than the one exposed to the fire can be drained.
Bilge alarm functionality is not required in this mode of operation.
6.6.3.1 All MVZs with main bilge piping serving the MVZ or other MVZs shall be arranged with isolation valves
on both sides of the MVZ bulkheads.
6.6.3.2 If a casualty lead to a situation where all operable bilge pumps are located at one side of the lost
MVZ, by pass line with isolation valves must be arranged to serve the system piping section in the MVZ
without any operable pumps.
6.6.3.3 Local manual control of the bilge system is acceptable after a OEA casualty, on the general conditions
for manual actions, see [3.3.3].
6.7 Lighting system

6.7.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, lighting along escape routes, at assembly stations, at embarkation stations for life-
saving appliances and the area of water into which they shall be launched shall remain operational in all
other MVZs that the one exposed to fire.

For the OEA scenario lighting is considered to remain operational when the remaining lighting provides
sufficient illumination for orderly evacuation and embarkation of the vessel for a period of minimum three
hours.

The lighting fixtures shall be arranged with integrated batteries or supplied from power sources located within
the same MVZ as the lighting fixtures, and the power source shall have sufficient energy for minimum three
hours of operation.
If the lighting required for the OEA scenario is not supplied from power sources located within the same MVZ
as the lighting fixtures, power supply to this lighting shall be distributed between at least two power sources.
These power sources shall be located in accordance with [6.2.3].
External access routes to assembly and embarkation stations for life-saving appliances are considered to
remain available also in the MVZ exposed to the casualty. Lighting along these external access routes shall
either be provided with integrated batteries with capacity for minimum three hours of operation or the power
supply to the lighting shall be distributed between at least two power sources located in different MVZs.
6.8 Guidance system

6.8.1 Goal
For any OEA scenario, guidance systems for evacuation shall remain operational in all other MVZs than the
one exposed to the fire.
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For the OEA scenario guidance systems for evacuation is considered to remain operational when escape route
signage and low location lightning remain operational for at least 3 hours in all other MVZs than the one
exposed to the fire.

Both escape route signage and low location lightning system are considered as guidance systems for
evacuation under SOLAS II-2/Reg.22.3.6.
Any power source for guidance system to be duplicated and segregated to assure operation in case of
casualty scenario.
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SECTION 12 WIND ASSISTED PROPULSION SYSTEMS - WAPS

1 General
1.1 Introduction
Wind assisted propulsion systems (WAPS) like rotor sails, wing rigs or ventilated foils may be installed
on ships. The purpose of WAPS is to reduce emissions and the consumption of conventional (fossil) fuels.
WAPS shall not replace conventional propulsion but assist as an auxiliary propulsion in favourable operating
conditions. It may affect beneficially the EEDI/EEXI and CII, see DNV-ST-0511 App.B.
1.2 Objective
The objective of the class notation is to provide a regulatory framework for the use of wind assisted
propulsion systems on board of seagoing ships.
1.3 Scope
This section covers operational and technical safety aspects and requirements for the installation and use of
WAPS on-board ships.
Guidance note:
Since WAPS technology will be under constant development and future could reveal other or different systems than mentioned in
[1.1], the requirements of this section may need to be interpreted and supported by additional information and requirements on a
case-by-case basis.
The requirements defined in this section are divided into:
a) The WAPS:
the unit itself, including all of its integral parts, systems, machinery and safety aspects.
b) The technical safety aspects of the ship and its technical periphery associated with and affected by the
installation of a WAPS unit:
these are the technical installations integrated into the ships systems, such as electrical, control and
automation, machinery and the foundation as well as safety aspects such as ship stability, further
referred to as 'ships periphery'.
For definitions, see [1.7] and DNV-ST-0511 [1.6].
1.4 Application
WAPS notation applies to both new-building and ship alterations (retrofits), i.e. new system installed on an
existing vessel.
The WAPS notation provides the basis for compliance with the requirements at the time of contract for
construction. WAPS installation shall be considered as an auxiliary propulsion systems, thus the ship shall be
fully operable with the main propulsion only.
Guidance note:
Due to the increasingly stricter emission regime entering into force after 2023 and related to the CII index addressing annual
emissions for all large ships, retrofit is regarded relevant as a means to improve the CII rating.
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1.5 Class notation
Ships with WAPS installed on board shall comply with the requirements given in this section and will be
assigned the class notation WAPS as specified in Table 1.
Table 1 Additional class notation WAPS
WAPS <none> Wind assisted propulsion

Mandatory: Yes systems installed on
seagoing ships
Design requirements: This section
FIS survey requirements: Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2
and Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.4
1.6 References
Document code Title
DNV-CG-0156 Conversion of ships
DNV-CG-0157 Stability documentation for approval
DNV-CG-0550 Maritime services - terms and systematics
DNV-RP-C205 Environmental conditions and environmental loads
DNV-ST-0377 Shipboard lifting appliances
DNV-ST-0511 Wind assisted propulsion systems - WAPS

Term Definition
carbon intensity rating scheme addressing the operational efficiency, and the enhanced Ship Energy Efficiency
indicator Management Plan (SEEMP) addressing the management system
de-powering procedure to un-load a sail system from wind load

For different systems this is done e.g. by dropping or retracting sails or reducing the wind forces
by other means, e.g by reducing the angle of attack or completely feathering them into the
wind direction (wing sails) or to reduce or stop the revolutions (rotor sail) or reduce or stop the
boundary layer suction fan (ventilated foil).
energy efficiency addressing the technical efficiency of new-buildings

design index
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Term Definition

energy efficiency addressing the technical efficiency of existing ships
existing ship index
gust factor see definition in DNV-RP-C205 [2.2.1.5]
main class expression used in DNV rules classification concept, see Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1 [2], describing the scope
of functions and safety within classification
mean wind speed see definition in DNV-RP-C205 [2.1.2.1]
mode refers to different scenarios for the WAPS operational profile related to operational mode, i.e.
stand-by mode, de-powering mode, retracted mode, folded mode, survival mode or other modes
defined by the manufacturer which may depend on the WAPS` design and operation
reference deck deck limiting the heel in steady wind

In general, this shall be taken as the freeboard deck for cargo ships and gbulkhead decks for
passenger ships, unless otherwise agreed with the Society on a case-by-case basis.
rig log onboard document, kept by the ship´s crew/operators

It is a technical record of all issues related to the operation of the WAPS.
rotor sail rotating cylinder generating an aerodynamic lift force perpendicular to the apparent wind direction,
based on the 'Magnus'-effect
ventilated foil blunt section wing sail, where the aerodynamic flow is promoted by active boundary layer suction
wind heeling lever heeling lever due to wind moment, i.e. the distance between WAPS center of effort and the center
of hull underwater lateral area
WAPS control assembly of machinery, electrical and automation equipment designed to operate, control and/or
system monitor the WAPS
WAPS drive unit machinery and electrical installation designed to operate the WAPS
WAPS foundation ship-fixed foundation structure designed to transfer the occurring loads into the ship´s hull and hull
structure
WAPS structure constitutes from the structural members of the unit itself, adjacent to the WAPS foundation
wing rig a 3-dimensional structure equipped with an aerodynamic foil, as opposed to a conventional single
pane membrane sail
CII carbon intensity indicator
EEDI energy efficiency design index
EEXI energy efficiency existing ship index
TAD type approval design
TADC type approval design certificate
WAPS wind assisted propulsion system
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General documentation requirements for the integration of WAPS onboard ships are covered by the relevant
main class documentation requirements in Pt.2, Pt.3, Pt.4 and Pt.5.
Specific documentation requirements for the integration of the WAPS into the ship systems and ship structure
are defined in Table 5.
WAPS unit see DNV-ST-0511 Documentation according DNV-ST-0511 Table 5-1,

column "TADC".
Wind assisted Z010 - General arrangement plan FI

propulsion
arrangements Z030 - Arrangement plan WAPS. FI
C010 - Design criteria Load case combinations including assumptions,

AP
restrictions.
E170 - Electrical schematic drawing Including emergency stop system description;

AP
remote Start-Stop - Fail-Safe.
N060 - Manoeuvring booklet Case report manoeuverability including effects of

AP
WAPS. HAZID or FMEA on request.
Z161 - Operation manual FI
Z253 - Test procedure for quay and

FI
sea trial
Vessel foundation C020 - Assembly or arrangement

FI
for wind assisted drawing
propulsion system
Z051 - Design Basis FI
H053 - Foundation and supporting

AP
structure drawing
C030 - Detailed drawing AP
C040 - Design analysis AP
H085 - Fatigue analysis AP
M150 - Non destructive testing (NDT) Including NDT procedure.

AP
plan
1)
Ship global strength H081/082 - Design analysis If affected by installation of WAPS. AP
1)
Stability B050 - Preliminary stability manual Including effects from the WAPS that may affect
AP
the stability, including ice accretion if relevant.
B120 - Final stability manual Including effects from the WAPS that may affect
AP
the stability, including ice accretion if relevant.
Z265 - Calculation report Weight and center of gravity calculation of

FI
installation.
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B110 - Inclining test or light weight If applicable, according to weight and center of
AP
survey report gravity calculation.
1)
Navigational N020 - Vertical field of vision drawing AP
Z030 - Arrangement plan Navigational light arrangement, including details of

AP
lanterns and their horizontal and vertical locations.
N030 - Horizontal field of vision

AP
drawing
External T030 - Antennae arrangement plan Including possible blocking effects from the
communication WAPS, leading to blind sectors in reception and AP
1)
systems transmission.
1)
Explosion protection E090 - Table of Ex-Installation If applicable for the ship type or installation area. AP
Z030 - Arrangement plan For electrical installations; corresponding to G080 -

AP
hazardous area classification plan.
1)
Fire protection G040 - Fire control plan If applicable for installation area. AP
G060 - Structural fire protection If applicable for installation area.

AP
drawing
WAPS hydraulic power S010 - Piping diagram (PD)

AP
system
WAPS control and I200 - Control and monitoring system Including emergency procedures.
AP
monitoring system documentation
Mooring / Anchoring H100 - Equipment number

1) AP
Equipment calculations
Maintenance and Z163 - Maintenance Manual FI

Inspection
Z164 - Inspection Manual FI
Z270 - Record 'Rig log', see Table 3 and [1.8.2]. FI

1)
Load Line B220 - Freeboard Calculations If relevant. AP
B200 - Freeboard plan AP
Energy Efficiency Z100 - Specification EEDI technical file. AP
Ship Structure Access H200 - Ship Structure access manual If applicable for the ship type.
1) AP
1)
Cargo Z330 - Cargo list If applicable for hazardous zones; for the ship
FI
type.
Risk management G010 - Risk analysis If applicable, e.g. for counter ballasting. FI
AP = for approval, FI = for information, TA = type approval

1) Applicable to ship retrofits /ship alteration. For ship new-buildings, these items are part of the main class
requirements.
For general requirements to documentation, including definition of the info codes, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.6.
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1.8.2 Onboard documentation

Continuous recordings shall be made in the rig log about maintenance measures, inspections and
inspection results. The rig-log shall also include deficiencies found and repairs carried out, replacements or
modifications carried out, for both hardware and software. The technical depth of these records shall be in a
way that post-reconstructive calculations and evaluations may be made, including the appropriate technical
specifications. The rig-log provides a baseline for appropriate maintenance and necessary inspections. see
Table 5.
Guidance note:
The rig-log may be kept as an electronic file or be combined with the vessel´s planned maintenance system (PMS).
1.8.3 Required compliance documentation for a WAPS unit installed on board a ship
The compliance documentation for materials and equipment used for the integration of the WAPS into the
ship systems and ship structure are given in Pt.2, Pt.3 and Pt.4.
The WAPS shall be case-by-case approved or shall have a valid type approval design certificate (TADC),
issued by the Society.
The compliance documentation for WAPS units, installed on board a ship with the class notations WAPS are
given in Table 6.
Table 6 Compliance documentation
Compliance
Object Issued by Compliance standard Additional description
document type
WAPS unit PD Manufacturer DNV-ST-0511
PD = product declaration
The product declaration PD is a compliance document validated and signed by the manufacturer in
accordance with DNV-CG-0550 Sec.3.
Guidance note:
A required case-by-case approval for the WAPS unit in accordance with Table 5 (Object: WAPS unit) may be replaced by a
compliance document TADC for the WAPS unit, as per DNV-ST-0511 [5.3.3] (Item reference: TAD or case-by-case approval), if
that fulfills the conditions for the installation on a vessel for which the additional class notation is intended. (TAD implies a design
type approval of a WAPS unit design which may be used on different ships, while WAPS notation applies to approval of a WAPS
installation on a specific ship).
2 Requirements
2.1 Requirements for the design of WAPS units to be installed on a ship

The WAPS unit shall comply with the requirements for an installation on a particular ship. See
— design loads, as per DNV-ST-0511 Sec.3
— design considerations, as per DNV-ST-0511 [2.2]
— further considerations, as per DNV-ST-0511 App.A.
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2.2 Requirements for ship integration
2.2.1 General
Requirements for the installation of WAPS units on board of ships are covered by the main class requirements
(definition as per Table 3), except the following diverting requirements:
— ship stability, see [2.2.2]
— WAPS foundation, see [2.2.3].
2.2.2 Ship stability
2.2.2.1 Application
The stability criteria specified in this subsection shall be applied to all monohull ships with a WAPS installed
and operating.
2.2.2.2 General
The ship shall comply with the intact stability criteria for main class as specified in Pt.3 Ch.15.
The weather criterion specified in Pt.3 Ch.15 Sec.1 [4.2] shall be applied to the vessel with the WAPS in their
de-powered or retracted mode.
The reference deck for the stability calculation shall be taken as the freeboard deck for cargo ships and
bulkhead deck for passenger ships, unless otherwise agreed with the Society on a case-by-basis.
For ships which are not subject to any additional class or statutory damage stability requirements, the
metacentric height GM shall not be less than 0.30 m.
In accordance with safe operation of the ship a redundant de-powering system shall be in place.
In case of an emergency (e.g. damage to the hull) the WAPS shall be able to be de-powered immediately.
The de-powering process shall be completed in maximum 10 minutes.
The stability booklet shall contain all relevant instructions to the Master on the use of the WAPS.
2.2.2.3 Additional loads created by the WAPS

In the intact stability check in accordance with [2.2.2.4] the following wind heeling moments shall be
considered:
— Different types of WAPS are producing different magnitudes of aerodynamic forces (and thus heeling
moments) in different wind conditions. This is further influenced by the functionalities under the different
wind conditions, i.e., whether a WAPS is 'fully powered', 'partly depowered', 'fully depowered' , 'out of
service' or 'tilted', etc. For all those cases, calculations shall be provided, covering the pertinent wind
speed ranges to the most conservative degree.
— In the calculation of wind heeling moments, gusts shall be considered. For the purpose of intact stability
assessment, the vessel shall be capable of withstanding wind gusts equal to 1.5 times ('gust factor') the
mean wind speed.
— The maximum wind heeling moment over all relative headings to the wind shall be considered.
The wind heeling lever shall be calculated as the wind heeling moment divided by the actual displacement.
Guidance note:
See DNV-CG-0157 Sec.3 [7] regarding information to be included in the stability booklet.
2.2.2.4 Intact stability criteria

For all intact loading conditions where the WAPS is in use, the following criteria shall be complied with:
— With reference to Figure 1, the following formula shall be fulfilled:
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— Defined areas are limited by the down flooding angle or the second intercept of heeling and righting lever

curve, whichever is smaller.
— The righting lever at the maximum of righting lever curve shall be not less than 0.30 m.
— The maximum angle of heel under action of steady wind shall not exceed 12 degrees or 80% of the angle
of reference deck side immersion, whichever is less.
Figure 1 Lever arm curves
2.2.2.5 Counter ballasting

If it is intended to use counter ballast in order to reduce the heeling angle while sailing with wind assistance,
special considerations shall be made.
Upon request by the Society on a case-by-case basis, a separate risk assessment shall be conducted with the
Society in order to verify if and under which circumstances the use of counter ballast is acceptable.
Guidance note:
Environmental conditions may change rapidly which may result in a dangerous situation for vessel and crew (risk of capsizing).
Therefore it is highly recommended to perform a dedicated training for the crew for WAPS operation in connection with the use of
counter ballast.
2.2.3 WAPS foundation
2.2.3.1 General
The WAPS foundation is the stationary part of the installation which is designed to transfer the forces
excited from the WAPS to the supporting ship structure including structure above and below deck. It shall be
documented that the foundation and its integration in the ship structure comprises sufficient strength under
all operational and environmental design loads.
In general, rules given in Pt.3 apply, with ship type related requirements as per Pt.5.
Fatigue methodologies including fatigue strength assessments and requirements are given in DNV-ST-0511
[4.3].
2.2.3.2 Direct analysis for yield strength

The WAPS foundation including the supporting ship structure shall be assessed by direct finite element
calculations, in accordance with Pt.3 Ch.7 Sec.3 for partial ship structural analysis and Pt.3 Ch.7 Sec.4 for
local structural strength analysis.
Loads relevant to strength assessments are given in DNV-ST-0511 Sec.3. The following acceptance criteria
apply:
— AC-I for 'regular service loads'
— AC-II for 'extreme loads'.
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2.2.3.3 Buckling

The buckling check shall be carried out in accordance with Pt.3 Ch.8 Sec.4.
2.2.3.4 Fatigue
The fatigue assessment shall be carried out by FE analysis of local models for relevant details of the
foundation and adjacent members of the ship structure. General assumptions are given in Pt.3 Ch.9 Sec.4.
Additional methodologies, assumptions and requirements for combined environmental, ship and inertia loads
are given in DNV-ST-0511 [4.3] and detailed in DNV-CG-0129.
2.3 Focus areas

Further to the requirements given in [2.1] and [2.2], i.e. physical principles, safety considerations and WAPS
installation related aspects are given in DNV-ST-0511 App.A.
2.4 Operational manual

Operational instructions for the purpose of safe and reliable handling shall be issued in form of an operational
manual, which shall be available on board.
The operational manual shall include all relevant operational conditions, limitations and procedures for
operational modes, measures for emergency shut-off, and for harbour operation. It shall also include
information such as air draught in different modes.
2.5 Maintenance and inspection

A maintenance and inspection manual, see [1.8.1], shall be issued and shall be available on board. A 'rig-
log', as per definition given in Table 3, shall be kept and be available on board.
The condition of the WAPS and the affected periphery with the ship shall be monitored in accordance with the
maintenance and inspection manuals, using a rig log, see Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 and Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.4.
3 Testing
3.1 Quayside testing

The test procedure shall include:
1) functional testing of machinery and electrical units
2) demonstrating structural behaviour of the WAPS installation
3) demonstrating performance of weight balancing measures
4) control and automation system performance test.
Guidance note:
Weight balancing applies especially to rotating sails.
3.2 Sea trials

The WAPS and the drive system shall be tested at a true wind speed not less than 15 kn.
Measurements shall be made to confirm that load assumptions related to heeling wind moments made for
the design were appropriate/conservative.
Vibrations in the structural elements shall be verified within pre-defined limits, see DNV-ST-0511 [4.5].
It shall be demonstrated that the control system of the WAPS is designed to:
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— adapt to changing wind direction and wind speed in normal operating conditions

— handle emergency situations.
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SECTION 13 GAS FUELLED SHIP INSTALLATIONS - GAS FUELLED

LPG
1 General
1.1 Objective
The additional class notation Gas fuelled LPG provides criteria for the safe and environmentally friendly
arrangement and installation of machinery for propulsion and auxiliary purposes.
1.2 Scope
The scope for additional class notation Gas fuelled LPG includes requirements for the ship's gas fuel system,
covering all aspects of the installation, from the ship's gas fuel bunkering connection up to and including the
gas consumers. This section has requirements for arrangement and location of gas fuel tanks and all spaces
with fuel gas piping and installations, including requirements for the entrances to such spaces. Hazardous
areas and spaces, due to the fuel gas installations, are defined. Requirements for control, monitoring and
safety systems for the fuel gas installations are included. For tank design and gas piping detail design, see
also Pt.5 Ch.7. Requirements for manufacture, workmanship and testing are included, also referring to details
given in Pt.5 Ch.7. Bunkering procedures are required for approval as part of the operation manual. The
bunkering processes and crew training are not part of the scope for this section of the rules.
1.3 Application
The additional class notation Gas fuelled LPG applies to installations using LPG as fuel in ships. This includes
internal combustion engines, boilers and gas turbines. The installations may run on gas only or be dual fuel
installations. Gas may be stored in a gaseous or liquefied state. Ships built with gas fuelled ship installations
satisfying the requirements of the rules in this section, will be assigned the additional class notation Gas
fuelled LPG.
1.4 Classification
1.4.1 Survey extent
1.4.1.1 Survey requirements for ships with the class notation Gas fuelled LPG are given in Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2
[1], Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 [3], Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.3 [3], Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.4 [3].
1.5 Definitions
Terms Definition
accommodation spaces those spaces used for public spaces, corridors, lavatories, cabins, offices, hospitals, cinemas,
game and hobby rooms, barber shops, pantries containing no cooking appliances and similar
spaces
DNV AS
Terms Definition

breadth (B) greatest moulded breadth of the ship at or below the deepest draught (summer load line
draught)
see SOLAS regulation II-1/2.8.
bunkering transfer of liquefied or gaseous fuel from land based or floating facilities into a ships'
permanent tanks or connection of portable tanks to the fuel supply system
certified safe type electrical equipment that is certified safe by the relevant authorities recognized by
the Administration or its recognized organization acting on its behalf for operation in a
flammable atmosphere based on a recognized standard
control station those spaces defined in SOLAS chapter II-2 and in the context of these rules, the engine
control room
design temperature for selection of materials, the lowest temperature the materials in tank and fuel systems
may be subjected to
design vapour pressure P0 maximum gauge pressure, at the top of the tank, used as a parameter for the design of the
tank
double block and bleed set of two valves in series in a pipe, and a third valve enabling the pressure release from the
valve pipe between those two valves
The arrangement may also consist of a two-way valve and a closing valve instead of three
separate valves.
dual fuel engines in this context engines that can burn gaseous and liquefied fuel simultaneously and in a wide
variety of proportions, or can operate successively on oil fuel and gas
enclosed space any space which, in the absence of artificial ventilation, the ventilation will be limited and
any explosive atmosphere will not be dispersed naturally
Guidance note:
explosion pressure relief measures provided to prevent the explosion pressure in a container or an enclosed space
exceeding the maximum overpressure the container or space is designed for, by releasing
the overpressure through designated openings
filling limit (FL) maximum liquid volume in a fuel tank relative to the total tank volume when the liquid fuel
has reached the reference temperature
fuel petroleum gas, either in its liquefied or gaseous state
DNV AS
Terms Definition

fuel containment system arrangement for the storage of fuel including tank connections
It includes where fitted, a primary and secondary barrier, associated insulation and any
intervening spaces, and adjacent structure if necessary for the support of these elements.
If the secondary barrier is part of the hull structure it may be a boundary of the fuel storage
hold space.
containment system is situated. If tank connections are located in the fuel storage hold
space, it will also be a tank connection space.
2) Interbarrier space is the space between a primary and a secondary barrier, whether or
not completely or partially occupied by insulation or other material.
3) Tank connection space is a space surrounding all tank connections and tank valves that
is required for tanks with such connections in enclosed spaces.
Guidance note:
A tank connection space may also contain equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers.
Such equipment is considered to only contain potential sources of release, but not sources of
ignition.
fuel preparation room any space containing pumps, compressors and/or vaporizers for fuel preparation purposes
Guidance note:
A tank connection space which has equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers inside is
not regarded as a fuel preparation room. Such equipment is considered to only contain potential
sources of release, but not sources of ignition.
gas defined as a fluid having a vapour pressure exceeding 2.8 bar absolute at a temperature of
37.8 °C
gas consumer any unit within the vessel using gas as a fuel
gas only engine engine capable of operating on gas only, and not able to switch over to operation on any
other type of fuel
gas valve unit spaces spaces or boxes containing valves for control and regulation of gas supply before the
consumer
Guidance note:
The gas valve unit is by different suppliers also called for instance GVU, gas regulating unit, GRU
or gas train.
DNV AS
Terms Definition

hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is or may be expected to be present, in
quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of
equipment.
Zone 0:
Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or is present for long
periods.
Zone 1:
Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operations.
Zone 2:
Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if
it does occur, is likely to do so only infrequently and will exist for a short period only.
Guidance note:
high pressure maximum working pressure greater than 10 bar
length (L) length as defined in the international convention on load lines in force
LPG LPG is liquefied petroleum gas, through pressurisation or cooling
master gas fuel valve automatic valve in the gas supply line to each engine located outside the machinery space
membrane tanks non-self-supporting tanks that consist of a thin liquid and gas tight layer (membrane)
supported through insulation by the adjacent hull structure
non-hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not expected to be present in quantities such
as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of equipment
north Atlantic environment shall be in accordance with the definitions specified in IACS Recommendation 034
effective over the entire length of the deck through permanent openings distributed in the
side panels or in the deck above
reference temperature temperature corresponding to the vapour pressure of the fuel in a fuel tank at the set
pressure of the PRVs
secondary enclosure enclosure around fuel piping designed to prevent liquefied and/or gaseous fuel leaking from
the fuel piping system
DNV AS
Terms Definition

semi-enclosed space space where the natural conditions of ventilation are notably different from those on open
deck, due to the presence of structure such as roofs, windbreaks and bulkheads and which
are so arranged that dispersion of gas may not occur
service spaces spaces outside the cargo area used for galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances,
lockers, mail and specie rooms, store rooms, workshops other than those forming part of the
machinery spaces and similar spaces and trunks to such spaces
unacceptable loss of that it is not possible to sustain or restore normal operation of the propulsion machinery in
vapour pressure vapour pressure is the equilibrium pressure of the saturated vapour above the liquid,
expressed in bar absolute at a specified temperature

Documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 2.
Documentation
Object Additional description Info
type
Propulsion Z050 - Design Including information on the machinery configuration, machinery space
and steering philosophy arrangements, fuel arrangements, shut down philosophy, redundancy
arrangements, considerations etc. FI
general Shall be submitted before other documentation, to give support for
approval of these.
Z071 - Failure For non-conventional gas fuelled propulsion machinery arrangements,

mode and effect covering single failure in active components or systems. See Sec.5 1.5.4. AP
analysis (FMEA)
Z253 - Test Redundancy and failure modes based on FMEA.

procedure for quay AP
or sea trial
Fuel gas system Z030 - Including:

Arrangement plan
— machinery and boiler spaces, accommodation, service and control
station spaces
— tank hatches, vent pipes and any other openings to the fuel tanks
— ventilating pipes, doors and openings to fuel preparation rooms, and
other hazardous areas
— entrances, air inlets and openings to accommodation, service and
control station spaces.
DNV AS
Documentation

type
Z030 - Location of fuel tank(s) with distances related to:

Arrangement plan l
— collision
— grounding AP
— fire protection
— inspection.
Z265 - Calculation Probabilistic calculation when used to determine acceptable fuel tank
AP
report location.
Z161 - Operation See [1.7.1.1].

AP
manual
Fuel gas tanks Z030 – General arrangement including:

(general Arrangement plan
requirements
for all tanks)
— access for inspection FI
— tank insulation
— overview of tanks with all tank connections and tank connection
space.
M010 – Material Including internal structures and piping.

specifications, AP
metals
M060 – Welding
AP
procedures (WPS)
M150 – Non- A document specifying the methods, extent and criteria for the non-
destructive testing destructive testing that shall be performed upon an object. AP
(NDT) plan
M151 - Non- A description of all essential parameters and precautions that shall be
destructive testing applied for non-destructively testing of an object, including references to AP
(NDT) procedure applicable standards, codes and specifications.
Z251 – Test Strength and tightness testing procedure.

AP
procedure
Z265 - Calculation Holding time calculation when pressure accumulation is used as boil off
FI
report gas handling method.
Z265 - Calculation Filling limit curve.

FI
report
Z265 - Calculation Boil off gas rate when pressure accumulation is not used as boil off gas
FI
report handling method.
C030 - Detailed Safety relief valves and associated vent piping.

AP
drawing
S030 - Capacity Safety relief valves and associated vent piping. Including back pressure.
AP
analysis
Z100 - Safety relief valves and associated vent piping.

AP
Specification
DNV AS
Documentation

type
S060 - Pipe Location of tank valves as close as possible to tank.

AP
routing sketch
Z164 - Inspection Inspection/survey plan for the liquefied gas fuel containment system, see
AP
manual [4.2.1.9].
Fuel gas C030 – Detailed Including as applicable:

independent drawing
— tanks
tank of type A
— supports
— insulation and liquid barrier for protection of hold space structure as
applicable AP
— marking plates
H050 – Structural Tank hold space detailed drawings, including hull support structure and
AP
drawing anti-flotation arrangement.
analysis
FI

specification
— specification of stress relieving procedures (thermal or mechanical)
as required.
S080 – Thermal When design temperature is below -110°C.

FI
stress analysis Calculations according to recognized standard e.g ASME.
P030 – Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10°C.

Temperature FI
calculations

manual AP

independent drawing
— tanks
tank of type B
— supports
— insulation
AP
— marking plates
DNV AS
Documentation

type
H050 – Structural Tank hold space detailed drawings, including hull support structure and
AP
drawing anti-flotation arrangement.
analysis
FI

specification
as required.

FI

Temperature FI
calculations

manual
— inspection of small leak protection system with respect to
functionality AP
— inspection of functionality of secondary barrier between tank and first
closing valve on liquid lines.
Z100 – Small leak protection system, including arrangement.

AP
Specification
S010 – Piping Inert gas purging system for insulation spaces.

AP
diagram (PD)

independent drawing
— tanks
tank of type C
— supports
— insulation AP
— marking plates
— pump arrangement including supporting structures as applicable.
analysis
— cooling-down load case when fuel temperature is below -55°C, as
required.
DNV AS
Documentation

type

specification
as required.
S070 – Pipe Strength analysis of piping inside outer tank (vacuum insulated tank).
FI
strength analysis

FI
P030 – Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10°C:

Temperature FI
calculations
vacuum insulated C type tank, tank connection space, drip tray etc).

manual
— cooling-down procedure AP
Fuel gas C030 – Detailed Including:

membrane tank drawing
— building principle including location of load bearing insulation of
different strength rating.
C040 – Design Including:

analysis
— strength and fatigue assessment of pump towers and its upper and
lower supports
— strength assessment of containment system for sloshing impact loads FI
— strength analysis of dome cover structure
— stress analyses of load bearing insulation
— vibration analysis of pump tower and other vibration critical
components, as applicable.

Temperature FI
calculations
S010 – Piping Inert gas purging system for insulation spaces.

AP
diagram (PD)
S010 – Piping Water drainage arrangement for secondary insulation space.

AP
diagram (PD)
Z100 – Hull scantlings requirements for containment system.

FI
Specification
Z100 – Insulation including load bearing capacities.

AP
Specification
DNV AS
Documentation

type
Z100 – Load bearing components.

AP
Specification
Z100 – Materials for membranes and insulation.

AP
Specification
Z251 – Test Tightness test of primary and secondary membranes.

AP
procedure
Z251 – Test Strength and tightness test of adjacent compartments, as relevant.

AP
procedure
Z250 – Procedure Bonding handbook, if secondary barrier is bonded. AP
Z250 – Procedure Repair procedures for membranes and main components. FI
Z250 – Procedure Erection handbook. FI
Z100 – Reference list of generic approved documents, if applicable.

FI
Specification
Z030 – Temperature indication system in insulation spaces and cofferdams.

AP
Arrangement plan
I200 – Control and Temperature indication system in insulation spaces and cofferdams.
documentation
Z265 – Calculation Required relief valve capacity for fuel tank and insulation spaces.
FI
report

portable tank drawing
— tanks
— supports
— insulation AP
— marking plates
analysis
— cooling-down load case when fuel temperature is below -55°C, as
required.

specification
as required.
DNV AS
Documentation

type
S070 – Pipe Strength analysis of piping inside outer tank (vacuum insulated tank).
FI
strength analysis

FI
P030 – Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10°C:

Temperature FI
calculations
vacuum insulated tank, tank connection space, drip tray etc).

manual
— inspection of functionality of secondary barrier between tank and first AP
closing valve on liquid lines
— procedure of connection/disconnection of the tank to the ship.
Fuel gas control I200 - Control and Functionality as required by [9].

and monitoring monitoring system AP
I260 - Field See [1.7.1.2].

instruments AP
periodic test plan
Fuel gas safety I200 - Control and Functionality as required by Table 10.
documentation
G130 - Cause and — Shall cover the safety functions as required by Table 10.
effect diagram AP
— Interfaces to other safety and control systems shall be included.
Fuel gas piping S011 - Piping and Including

system instrumentation
diagram (P&ID)
— secondary enclosures for fuel pipes including pressure relief
arrangements
AP
— boil off system
— bunkering lines
— gas supply system
— gas freeing and purging system.

FI
stress analysis
Z265 – Calculation Stress analysis for high pressure fuel piping.

FI
report
Z100 – Closing time of shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel lines operated FI by
FI
Specification the safety system.
S060 - Pipe Showing the location of pipes in the ship, incl. distance from ship's side,
FI
routing sketch location of pipe ducts etc.
DNV AS
Documentation

type
S090 - Including offsets, loops, bends, expansion elements such as bellows and
Specification of slip joints.
FI
valves, flanges and
fittings
Z253 - Test Functional tests of all piping systems including valves, fittings and
procedure for quay associated equipment for handling fuel (liquefied or gaseous). AP
and sea trial
Z030 - Vent masts, including location and details of outlets from fuel tanks
AP
Arrangement plan safety relief valves.
Fuel gas drip Z030 - Hull protection beneath piping for liquefied fuel where leakages may be
trays Arrangement plan anticipated, such as at shore connections and at pump seals. Including AP
specification.
Fuel gas cooling S010 - Piping

AP
system diagram (PD)
Fuel gas heating S010 - Piping

AP
system diagram (PD)
Exhaust gas S010 - Piping Including arrangement of explosion relief or verification of strength of
AP
system diagram (PD) piping system, see [5.5].
Hazardous area G080 - Hazardous

classification area classification AP
drawing
Air lock Z030 - Location and construction details, including alarm equipment.
AP
arrangements Arrangement plan
Ventilation S012 - Ducting Including capacity and location of fans and their motors.
systems for diagram (DD)
AP
gas fuel system
spaces
Ventilation I200 - Control and Including detection of ventilation function, safety actions and sequences,
control and monitoring system arrangement of powering of fans etc.
AP
system
Explosion (Ex) Z030 - Where relevant, based on an approved 'Hazardous area classification
protection Arrangement plan drawing' where location of electric equipment in hazardous area is added FI
(except battery room, paint stores and gas bottle store).
E170 - Electrical Single line diagrams for all intrinsically safe circuits, for each circuit
schematic drawing including data for verification of the compatibility between the barrier AP
and the field components.
Z100 - List of "non-certified safe" electrical equipment that shall be

Specification disconnected (ESD protected machinery spaces, spaces protected by air FI
lock).
Z071 - Failure If required by [8.1.1].

mode and effect AP
analysis (FMEA)
DNV AS
Documentation

type
E250 - Electrical equipment in hazardous areas.

Maintenance FI
manual
Hydrocarbon I200 - Control and

gas detection monitoring system AP
and alarm documentation
system, fixed
Z030 -
AP
Arrangement plan
Structural fire G060 - Structural

protection fire protection AP
arrangements drawing
External surface G200 - Fixed fire

protection water extinguishing
AP
spraying system system
documentation
Bunkering G200 - Fixed fire

station and extinguishing
Fuel reparation system
AP
room fire documentation
extinguishing
system
Fire detection I200 - Control and

and alarm monitoring system AP
Z030 -
AP
Arrangement plan
Fire Z030 -
extinguishing Arrangement plan
AP
equipment,
mobile
Inert gas I200 - Control and

documentation
S010 - Piping
AP
diagram (PD)
AP = approved, FI = for information
For general requirements for documentation, including definition of the Info codes, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.6.

Compliance documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 3.
DNV AS
Table 3 Compliance documents for components

Compliance
Compliance
standard
type
Gas/dual fuel engines PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.3.
Process pressure vessels Shall be certified as class I pressure vessels in accordance with
PC
Pt.4 Ch.7.
Pressure relief valves For valves with design temperature below 0°C.
PC
Valves in fuel system For valves with design temperature below 0°C.
PC
Valves in fuel system For valves with design pressure above 10 bar.
PC
Valves in fuel system For valves with design pressure equal to or lower than 10 bar,
PD
and design temperature equal to or above 0°C.
Expansion bellows TAC In accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7.
Flexible hoses with In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.6.

TAC
couplings
Control and monitoring Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9:

systems
— gas control systems
— gas safety systems
PC
— ventilation control systems
— gas detection systems
— inert gas control and monitoring system.
Electric motors Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used in gas
PC
supply systems and ventilation systems.
Electric motor starters Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used in gas
PC
Nitrogen generators Acc. to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9 and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9. Only applicable
PC
when redundancy is required in [5.4.4].
Nitrogen system, control Acc. to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9 and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.9. Only applicable
PC
and monitoring system when redundancy is required in [5.4.4].
Nitrogen system, PD issued by manufacturer will be accepted where PxD < 1500
membrane separation PC bar ltr.
Vessel
Nitrogen systems, air PD issued by manufacturer will be accepted where effect < 100
compressors for nitrogen PC kW.
plant
DNV AS
Compliance

Compliance
standard
type
Energy storage devices Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used in gas
PC
supply systems.
1)
Materials shall be delivered with compliance documents as required with Table 4.
Table 4 Compliance documents for materials
Compliance
Compliance Nominal Design
Object document 1) Piping Design
standard Material diameter pressure
type system temp.[°C]
[mm] [bar]
Pipes MC Pressure > 25 > 10 or < 0

(including
secondary MD Pressure ≤ 25
MTR Open ended ≥0
Elbows, T- MD Steel Pressure

pieces etc.
fabricated by Open ended
MTR
welding
Flanges MD Pressure
MTR Open ended
Bodies of MC Steel <0

valves and
fittings, MD
pump Copper alloys
housings,
other
pressure
containing
components MD
not
considered
as pressure
vessels
Nuts and Steel

MTR
bolts
1)
For general compliance documentation requirements, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.4.
DNV AS
1.7.1 Contents
1.7.1.1 An operational manual shall be prepared as required by the IGF Code Ch.18.
Guidance note:
1) Arrangement and lay-out of the gas fuel supply system, including:
— description of main components in the gas fuel supply system

— a description of the boil off handling system if installed.
2) Description of the safety shutdown system for the gas fuel supply system, including:
— the fuel system

— the secondary enclosures in the gas fuel system

— the machinery spaces

— on deck
3) Description of hazards in connection with inerted spaces and use of inert gas.

— how to prevent release of fuel gases to atmosphere
— how to gas free the bunkering system at termination of bunkering operation
— safety precautions.
5) Description of entry procedures for:

— GVU enclosures
— hold spaces
6) Procedure for emptying and gas freeing of fuel gas tanks.
7) Relevant drawings of the gas fuel installation, including:
— fuel gas piping diagram

— fuel gas system arrangement plan
DNV AS

during the tests. Test intervals for shutdown inputs and outputs (as required by Table 10) shall not exceed 6
months. For other signals the test intervals shall not exceed 12 months. The plan may be included in the plan
required for the class notation E0.
Guidance note:
1.8 Signboards
1.8.1 General
1.8.1.1 If the gas supply is shut off due to activation of an automatic valve, the gas supply shall not be
the gas supply lines.
1.8.1.2 If a gas leak leading to a gas supply shutdown occurs, the gas fuel supply shall not be operated until
the leak has been found and dealt with. Instructions to this effect shall be placed in a prominent position in
the machinery space.
stating that the hatch shall only be opened after the gas supply system is shut down and gas free.
related to entry.
2 Materials
2.1 General
2.1.1.2 Materials used in fuel containment and fuel piping systems shall comply with the requirements in
Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [1], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [2], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [3], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [4].
2.1.1.3 Pipes for high pressure fuel and liquefied fuel and their secondary enclosures shall as a minimum
fulfil the requirements for pipe materials with design temperature down to -55°C in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 4.
2.1.1.4 The materials used in fuel gas piping systems shall be delivered with compliance documents as
required by Table 4.
DNV AS
3 Ship arrangement

3.1.1.1 The fuel containment system shall be located in such a way that the probability for the tank(s) to be
damaged following a collision or grounding is reduced to a minimum taking into account the safe operation of
the ship and other hazards that may be relevant to the ship.
3.1.1.2 Fuel storage tanks shall be protected against mechanical damage.
3.1.1.3 The fuel containment system installed in the ship shall be able to contain liquefied gas leakages
without damaging other structures due to low temperature effects, and to prevent gas spreading to non-
hazardous spaces.
3.1.1.4 Areas with piping systems for liquefied gas fuel shall be arranged to contain leakages without
damaging other structures due to low temperature effects, and to prevent gas spreading to non-hazardous
spaces.
3.1.1.5 Areas with piping systems for gaseous fuel shall be arranged to prevent gas spreading to
nonhazardous spaces.
3.1.2.2 Mustering stations and lifesaving equipment shall not be located in hazardous areas.

3.2.1 General
3.2.1.1 A machinery space containing gas engines shall have at least two completely independent exits. This
requirement may be waived after special consideration by the Society if the machinery space is very small.
3.2.1.3 Machinery spaces shall be arranged as gas safe machinery space as given in Sec.5 [3.2.3].

3.3.1.1 Fuel preparation rooms shall in general be located on open deck. When an open deck location is
difficult to arrange, a location below deck may be accepted.
3.3.1.2 Where fuel preparation rooms are accepted below deck, their access shall be independent and direct
from the open deck. Where a separate access from deck is not possible, access shall be provided through an
air lock which complies with [3.4].
DNV AS
3.3.1.3 Fuel preparation rooms shall not be located directly above or adjacent to machinery spaces

of category A or other high fire risk areas. If cofferdams are used to obtain segregation between fuel
preparation rooms and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance of 900 mm between
bulkheads or decks. Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with such spaces shall be kept to a
minimum.
3.3.1.4 The fuel preparation room boundaries shall be gas tight towards other enclosed spaces in the ship.
3.3.1.5 Where pumps or compressors are driven by shafting passing through a bulkhead or deck for
separation purposes, gastight seals with efficient lubrication or other means of ensuring the permanence of
the gas seal shall be fitted in way of the bulkhead or deck.
3.3.1.6 Fuel preparation rooms containing liquefied gas shall be designed to safely contain low temperature
leakages.
3.3.1.7 Fuel preparation room boundaries i.e. bulkheads and decks, shall be provided with suitable thermal
protection to the extent necessary for safely containing a maximum probable leakage scenario.
3.3.1.8 Other essential structures and supports shall be suitably shielded from leakage from flanges and
valves and other possible leakage sources in high pressure gas fuel systems, unless the cool down effect can
be shown to be negligible.
3.3.1.9 The fuel preparation room shall be fitted with ventilation arrangements or pressure relief devices
ensuring that the space can withstand any pressure build up caused by vaporization of liquefied gas fuel in
a maximum probable leakage scenario. These pressure relief systems shall be constructed with materials
suitable for the lowest temperatures that may arise.
3.3.1.11 A low temperature leakage in the fuel preparation room shall not render necessary safety functions
out of order due to low temperatures.
3.3.1.12 Fuel preparation rooms for high pressure systems shall be provided with overpressure protection
to account for high pressure leakages, unless it can be demonstrated that the integrity of the space can be
3.3.2.1 Tank connection spaces shall not be located directly adjacent to machinery spaces of category A or
other rooms with high fire risk. If cofferdams are used to obtain segregation between tank connection spaces
and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance of 900 mm between bulkheads or decks.
Common boundaries between protective cofferdams and high fire risk spaces shall be kept to a minimum.
3.3.2.2 Tank connection spaces shall be able to safely contain leakages of liquefied gas and be arranged to
prevent the surrounding hull structure from being exposed to unacceptable cooling.
3.3.2.4 The tank connection space shall be fitted with ventilation arrangements or pressure relief
arrangements ensuring that the space can withstand any pressure build up caused by vaporization of
liquefied gas fuel. These pressure relief systems shall be constructed with materials suitable for the lowest
temperatures that may arise.
3.3.2.5 Tank connection space boundaries shall be gas tight towards other enclosed spaces in the ship.
DNV AS
3.3.2.6 The tank connection space entrance shall be arranged with a sill height exceeding the liquid level

arranged as a bolted hatch.
3.3.2.8 A low temperature leakage in the tank connection space shall not render necessary safety functions
out of order due to low temperatures.
for normal consumption for at least 30 days. Shorter periods may be considered, depending on the ship's
service.
generation system sufficient to inert the largest of these spaces, and provided that the configuration of the
spaces and the relevant gas detection systems, together with the capability of the inerting arrangements,
ensures that any leakage from the fuel tanks will be rapidly detected and inerting effected before a
dangerous condition can develop. Equipment for the provision of sufficient dry air of suitable quality to satisfy
the expected demand shall be provided.
maintained in this condition with dry air provided by suitable air-drying equipment. This is only applicable for
3.3.3.4 Unless the access to interbarrier spaces and hold spaces, associated with fuel containment systems
prevented.
semi-enclosed bunkering stations will be subject to special consideration. Depending on the arrangement this
may include:
— segregation towards other areas on the ship
— hazardous area plans for the ship
— requirements for forced ventilation
— requirements for leakage detection
— safety actions related to leakage detection
— access to bunkering station from non-hazardous areas through air locks
— monitoring of bunkering station by direct line of sight or closed-circuit television (CCTV).
DNV AS
3.3.4.2 Drip trays shall be fitted below bunkering connections and where leakage may occur which can cause

damage to the ship structure or where limitation of the area which is affected by a spill is necessary. Each
drip tray shall be:
— made of suitable material to hold spills (e.g. stainless steel)
— thermally insulated from the ship's structure
— fitted with a drain valve to enable rain water to be drained over the ship's side
— of sufficient capacity to handle reasonably foreseeable spills.
hatch.
3.3.5.2 The gas valve unit space shall only be entered after the gas supply system is shut down and gas
free. The hatch shall be fitted with a signboard to this effect.
3.3.5.3 Gas valve unit spaces for high pressure systems shall be provided with overpressure protection to
account for high pressure leakages, unless it can be demonstrated that the integrity of the space can be

3.4.1 General
3.4.1.1 An air lock is a space enclosed by gastight bulkheads with two substantially gastight doors spaced
arrangements.
3.4.1.2 Air locks shall be mechanically ventilated at an overpressure relative to the adjacent hazardous area
or space. The ventilation inlets and outlets for air locks shall be located in open air.
3.4.1.3 Air locks shall have a simple geometrical form. They shall provide free and easy passage and shall
2
have a deck area not less than about 1.5 m . Air locks shall not be used for other purposes, for instance as
store rooms.
3.4.2.2 The air lock space shall be monitored for flammable gas.
3.4.2.3 For non-hazardous spaces with access from hazardous open deck where the access is protected by
an air lock, electrical equipment which is not of the certified safe type shall be de-energized upon loss of
overpressure in the space.
3.4.2.4 For non-hazardous spaces with access from hazardous spaces, where the access is protected by an
air lock, electrical equipment which is not of the certified safe type shall be de-energized upon loss of under-
pressure in the hazardous space.
3.4.2.5 Access to the hazardous space shall be restricted until the ventilation has been reinstated. Audible
and visual alarms shall be given at a manned location to indicate both, loss of pressure and opening of the air
lock doors when pressure is lost.
DNV AS
3.4.2.6 Electrical equipment of the certified safe type need not to be de-energized.

3.4.2.7 Electrical equipment needed for maintaining ship main functions or safety functions shall not be
located in spaces protected by air locks, unless the equipment is of certified safe type.
3.5 Location of fuel containment systems

3.5.1 General
3.5.1.1 The fuel tank(s) shall be protected from external damage caused by collision or grounding in the
following way:
inboard from the ship side at right angles to the centerline at the level of the summer load line draught
where:
draught) (refer to SOLAS regulation II-1/2.8 ).
m, whichever is less, as required by 1).
2) For cargo ships:
3
1) for Vc below or equal 1,000 m , 0.8 m
3 3
2) for 1,000 m < Vc < 5,000 m , 0.75 + Vc x 0.2/4,000 m
3 3
3) for 5,000 m ≤ Vc < 30,000 m , 0.8 + Vc/25,000 m
3
4) for Vc ≥ 30,000 m , 2 m
where:
Vc corresponds to 100% of the gross design volume of the individual fuel tank at 20°C, including
domes and appendages.
m, whichever is less, measured from the moulded line of the bottom shell plating at the centreline.
in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-1/8.1 for passenger ships, and abaft the collision bulkhead for
cargo ships
where:
L is the length as defined in the International Convention on Load Lines (see SOLAS regulation II-1/2.5).
DNV AS
3.5.1.2 As an alternative to [3.5.1.1] above, the following calculation method may be used to determine the

acceptable location of the fuel tanks:
1
fCN = fl × ft × fv
where:
fl is calculated by use of the formulations for factor p contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-1.1.1.1. The
of the fuel tank.
formulation is:
62
ft = 1 − r(x1,x2,b)
fv is calculated by use of the formulations for factor v contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-2.6.1.1 and
fv = 1.0 − 0.8 · ((H − d)/7.8), if (H−d) is less than or equal to 7.8 m. fv shall not be taken greater than
1.
fv = 0.2 − (0.2 · ((H − d) − 7.8)/4.7) , in all other cases fv shall not be taken less than 0
where:
H is the distance from baseline, in metres, to the lowermost boundary of the fuel tank; and
m, whichever is less, as required by [5.3.3.1].
2) For cargo ships:
3
1) for Vc below or equal 1,000 m , 0.8 m;
3 3
2) for 1,000 m < Vc < 5,000 m , 0.75+ Vc × 0.2/4,000 m;
3 3
3) for 5,000 m ≤ Vc < 30,000 m , 0.8 + Vc/25,000 m; and
3
4) for Vc ≥ 30,000 m , 2 m
where:
Vc corresponds to 100% of the gross design volume of the individual fuel tank at 20°C, including
domes and appendages.
1
The value fCN accounts for collision damages that may occur within a zone limited by the longitudinal
projected boundaries of the fuel tank only, and cannot be considered or used as the probability for the
fuel tank to become damaged given a collision. The real probability will be higher when accounting for
longer damages that include zones forward and aft of the fuel tank.
2
When the outermost boundary of the fuel tank is outside the boundary given by the deepest subdivision
waterline the value of b should be taken as 0.
DNV AS
6) In case of more than one non-overlapping fuel tank located in the longitudinal direction, fCN shall

be calculated in accordance with paragraph 2) for each fuel tank separately. The value used for the
complete fuel tank arrangement is the sum of all values for fCN obtained for each separate tank.
7) In case the fuel tank arrangement is unsymmetrical about the centerline of the ship, the calculations
assessment. The minimum distance as set forth in paragraph 5) shall be met on both sides.
4.1 General
fire is minimized.
4.1.2 Tank access
4.1.2.3 Access for internal inspection of fuel tanks shall be provided.
4.2 Liquefied gas fuel tanks

4.2.1 General
4.2.1.1 Fuel tanks for liquefied gas shall be fitted with efficient insulation.
with applicable parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4, Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.20, Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.24, unless covered by this section.
Guidance note:
for fuel containment systems.
DNV AS
4.2.1.3 The design life of fixed liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall not be less than the design life

of the ship or 25 years, whichever is greater.
Society for liquefied gas fuel containment systems used exclusively for restricted navigation. More demanding
environmental conditions may be required for liquefied gas fuel containment systems operated in conditions
more severe than the North Atlantic environment.

a) Ultimate design conditions: the liquefied gas fuel containment system structure and its structural
following loads:
— thermal loads
— sloshing loads
— test loads.
b) Fatigue design conditions: the liquefied gas fuel containment system structure and its structural
c) Accidental design conditions: the liquefied gas fuel containment system shall meet each of the following
— Collision: the liquefied gas fuel containment system shall withstand the collision loads specified in
— Fire: the liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall sustain without rupture the rise in internal
pressure specified in [5.2.3] under the fire scenarios envisaged therein.
— Flooded compartment causing buoyancy on tank: the anti-flotation arrangements shall sustain the
DNV AS

Sec.4 [4.3.3].
insulation system, also capable of preventing lowering of the temperature of the ship structure to an unsafe.
4.2.2.2 The size and configuration or arrangement of the secondary barrier may be reduced or omitted
where an equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated in accordance with [4.2.2.3] and [4.2.2.4], as
applicable.

Table 5 Secondary barriers in relation to tank types
Type C No secondary barrier required
DNV AS

Ch.7 Sec.4 [4.3.3] .6
5) the methods required in 4) shall be approved by the Society and shall include, as a minimum:
— accuracy and range of values of the proposed method for detecting defects in 4)
undertaken
— effects of thermal and mechanical cyclic loading on the effectiveness of the proposed test.
[4.3.3] .6, after the initial detection of a primary leak. Due account may be taken of liquid evaporation, rate
of leakage, pumping capacity and other relevant factors.
trim.

Supporting arrangements are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.6].

Associated structure and equipment are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.7].

Thermal insulation is defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.8].
DNV AS
4.2.9 Design loads

[4.2.9.2] and [4.2.9.3].
4.2.9.2 Environmental loads are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [3.4]; in addition the following loads shall be
considered:
a) Collision loads
with an inertial force corresponding to the design acceleration (a) in Table 6 in forward direction and a/2
in the aft direction, where g is gravitational acceleration.
L > 100 m 0.5g
60 < L ≤ 100 m [2 - 3(L-60)/80] x g
L ≤ 60 m 2g

4.2.11 Structural analyses


2) In addition to 1), where a complete or partial secondary barrier is required it shall be assumed to be at
the liquefied gas fuel temperature at atmospheric pressure for any one tank only.
winter months.
DNV AS

steel grade.
9) Vacuum insulated tanks and their supporting structures shall be designed to withstand the temperatures
that may arise as a result of loss of insulating vacuum between the inner and outer tank.
4.2.13.4 Thermal insulation and other materials used in liquefied gas fuel containment systems are defined
in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [5.1.4].
4.2.14 Construction processes

4.2.15 Tank types

In addition, the following requirements for fatigue design condition apply:
— For type C independent tanks where the liquefied gas fuel at atmospheric pressure is below minus 55°C,
the Society may require additional verification to check compliance with design basis for C type tanks as
defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.22 [1.1.1], regarding static and dynamic stress depending on the configuration of
the tank and arrangement of its supports and attachments.
— For vacuum insulated tanks special attention shall be made to the fatigue strength of the support design
and special considerations shall also be made to the limited inspection possibilities between the inside and
outer shell.
The fatigue strength assessment shall be carried out in accordance with DNV-CG-0129 and/or DNV-RP-C203.
4.2.16 Additional requirements for vacuum insulated tanks
4.2.16.1 Vacuum insulated type C independent tanks shall have an outer shell that is able to function as
a secondary barrier against pipe leakages, to compensate for not having closable tank valves at the tank
boundary. The outer shell shall be able to withstand cryogenic temperatures and the pressure build-up due
to evaporating liquids. A pipe stress analysis is required for the piping in the vacuum space. The piping in the
vacuum space shall have no branch connections.
4.2.16.2 Vacuum insulated type C independent tanks shall have their vacuum space protected by a pressure
relief device connected to a vent system discharging to a safe location in open air. For tanks on open deck, a
direct release into the atmosphere may be accepted.
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4.2.16.3 Alternatives to having an outer shell secondary barrier as required by [4.2.16.1] might be

considered on a case-by-case basis. Alternative solutions shall as a minimum provide the following:
— Secondary barriers shall be provided for every pipe in the vacuum space. The secondary barriers shall be
able to safely contain leakages of liquefied and gaseous fuel, taking into account cryogenic temperatures,
pressure build-up, relative movements between inner and outer tank and expansion/contractions due to
temperature differences.
— The outer shell and the support structure shall be made from material with a design temperature
corresponding to the equilibrium temperature resulting from a loss of vacuum between inner and outer
tank.
— Any part of the outer tank shell having common boundaries with a tank connection space shall be made of
material resistant to cryogenic temperatures.
— All pipes and secondary enclosures in the vacuum space shall be fully welded. Pipe routing shall
compensate for expansion and contractions due to changes in temperature. The use of expansion
elements is not accepted for this purpose.


4.3.1 General
intended purpose.
4.3.1.3 Fuel systems utilizing portable fuel tanks shall have equivalent safety compared to permanent fuel
tanks.
— spill protection and water spray systems for cooling if located on open deck. If the tanks are located in an
enclosed space, the space shall be considered as a tank connection space.
system.
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4.3.1.11 After connection to the ship's fuel piping system:
system

reference temperature as defined in [1.5.1]. A loading limit curve for actual fuel loading temperatures shall
be prepared from the following formula:
LL = FL ρ R / ρ L
where:
FL = filling limit as defined in [1.5.1] expressed in per cent, here 98%
ρ R = relative density of fuel at the reference temperature
ρ L = relative density of fuel at the loading temperature.
loading limit than calculated using the reference temperature, but never above 95%. This also applies in
cases where a second system for pressure maintenance is installed. However, if the pressure can only be
maintained/controlled by fuel consumers, the loading limit as calculated in [4.4.1.1] shall be used.

4.5.1 Control of tank pressure and temperature
— re-liquefaction
for a period of 15 days, assuming full tank at normal service pressure and the ship in idle condition, i.e. only
power for domestic load is generated.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

4.5.1.4 Refrigerants or auxiliary agents used for refrigeration or cooling of fuel shall be compatible with the
fuel they may come in contact with (not causing any hazardous reaction or excessively corrosive products) In
addition, when several refrigerants or agents are used, these shall be compatible with each other.

to safely contain low temperature leakages.
4.6.1.4 For type C fuel tanks, the fuel storage hold space may act as the protective cofferdam if the
bulkhead is at least 900 mm from the outer shell of the tank. This can however not be applied to tanks
located directly above machinery spaces of category A or other high fire risk areas.
4.6.1.5 Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with engine rooms or high fire risk areas shall kept to
a minimum.
Guidance note:
A tank connection space may be required also for tanks on open deck. This may apply for ships were restriction of hazardous areas
is safety critical. A tank connection space may also be necessary in order to provide environmental protection for essential safety
equipment related to the gas fuel system like tank valves, safety valves and instrumentation.
at atmospheric pressure. Drip trays shall be thermally insulated from the ship's structure to prevent
DNV AS
4.6.2.3 Fuel tanks not located in enclosed spaces shall not be located directly above or adjacent to

machinery spaces of category A or other high fire risk areas. If cofferdams are used to obtain segregation
between fuel tanks and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance of 900 mm between
bulkheads or decks with fire insulation as required in [7].
5 Piping systems
5.1 General
5.1.1.4 It shall be possible to detect leakages in a fuel piping system, and to automatically isolate the
leakage from the source.
5.1.2.2 For engines using gas as the only fuel, the fuel supply system shall be arranged with redundancy
and segregation all the way from the gas tank to the consumer. A leakage in the fuel supply system with
following necessary safety actions shall not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
5.1.2.3 For engines using gas as the only fuel, the fuel storage shall be divided between two or more tanks,
including separate secondary barriers when required. If fuel tanks of type C are used, one tank may be
accepted if two completely separate tank connection spaces are installed for the one tank.
covering any single failure in active components or systems (see Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.3 [3.2]).
Guidance note:
principles than duplication of the propulsion line with separate gas supply systems. The requirement does in general not apply to
dual-fuel engines.
5.1.3.2 Gas supply systems shall have a design pressure not less than 10 bar.
DNV AS

highest liquid level may be accepted for fuel tanks of type C.
5.1.3.4 If piping is connected below the liquid level of the tank it shall be protected by a secondary barrier
up to the first valve.
equipment rooms or control stations as defined in the SOLAS Convention.
5.1.3.11 Where LPG fuel is intended to be used in the gaseous state and has a dew point higher than
ambient temperature at the maximum expected pressure at the consumer inlet, the fuelshall be sufficiently
heated and the fuel lines shall be properly heat traced.
5.1.3.12 Where LPG fuel is intended to be used in the liquid state, the pressure in the fuel manifold shall be
sufficient to maintain the fuel in the liquid state.
5.1.3.13 High pressure gas piping systems shall have sufficient constructive strength. This shall be
confirmed by carrying out stress analysis and taking into account:
Guidance note:
5.1.3.14 High-pressure fuel lines shall be installed and protected so as to minimize the risk of injury to
personnel in case of rupture.
5.1.3.15 Where tanks or piping are separated from the ship's structure by thermal insulation, provision shall
be made for electrically bonding to the ship's structure both the piping and the tanks. All gasketed pipe joints
Guidance note:
DNV AS

5.1.4 Fuel piping systems containing liquefied fuels
5.1.4.1 Piping systems for liquefied fuel shall be protected by a secondary enclosure able to contain
leakages. If the piping system is located in a space that is able to contain liquid leakages, this requirement
can be waived.
5.1.4.2 The requirement in [5.1.4.1] need not be applied for fully welded liquefied fuel pipes without fittings
or valves on open deck.
5.1.4.3 The piping systems and corresponding secondary enclosures shall be able to withstand the
maximum pressure that may build up in the system. For this purpose, the secondary enclosure may need
to be arranged with a pressure relief system that prevents the enclosure from being subjected to pressures
above their design pressures.
5.1.4.4 The secondary enclosure shall be made of a material that can withstand the lowest temperature it
may be exposed to.
5.1.4.5 The arrangement for the flexible hoses for portable gas tanks described in [4.3.1.6] shall be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The following shall, as a minimum, be provided:
— ESD valves shall be provided at both sides of the flexible hose
— suitable drip tray shall be provided below the hose connections
— the drip tray shall be provided with leakage detection
— detection of leakage shall lead to automatic closing of the ESD tank valve on the portable tank and the
ESD valve downstream of the flexible hose
— hazardous zones will be generated for the connections for the flexible hoses as per [8.2.2.2].
5.1.5 Fuel piping systems containing gaseous fuels
5.1.5.1 Piping systems containing gaseous fuel in enclosed spaces shall be arranged with a secondary
enclosure able to contain gas leakages. If the piping system is located in a space that is arranged to contain
leakages of gas, this requirement can be waived.
5.1.5.2 The requirement in [5.1.5.1] need not be applied for fully welded fuel gas vent pipes led through
mechanically ventilated spaces.
5.1.5.3 Fully welded gaseous fuel pipes need not be arranged with secondary enclosure on open deck. If
flanges or pipe couplings are used in the piping, hazardous zones will be generated as per [8.2.2.2].
5.1.5.4 The secondary enclosure shall be provided with a ventilation arrangement providing at least 30 air
changes per hour. Other solutions providing an equivalent safety level will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.
5.1.5.5 For fuel gas systems where the design pressure exceeds 10 bar, the design pressure of the
secondary enclosure shall be taken as the higher of the following:
— the maximum built up pressure: static pressure in way of the rupture resulting from the gas flowing in the
annular space
— local instantaneous peak pressure in way of the rupture p: this pressure shall be taken as the critical
pressure and is given by the following expression:
p = p0(2/(k+1))k/(k‐1)
where:
DNV AS
p0 = maximum working pressure of the inner pipe

k = Cp/Cv - constant pressure specific heat divided by constant volume specific heat.
The tangential membrane stress of a straight pipe shall not exceed the tensile strength divided by 1.5 (R
m /1.5) when subjected to the above pressure. The pressure ratings of all other piping components shall
reflect the same level of strength as straight pipes. As an alternative to using the peak pressure from the
above formula, the peak pressure found from representative tests can be used. Test reports shall then be
submitted.
5.1.5.6 For fuel systems where the design pressure does not exceed 10 bar, the secondary enclosure shall
be dimensioned for a design pressure not less than the maximum working pressure of the gas pipes.
5.1.5.7 The requirements in [5.1.5.5] and [5.1.5.6] are also applicable for parts of the secondary enclosure
extending to air inlets and outlets on open deck.
normally closed valves not operated during normal service.
5.1.6.5 Emergency shut down valves (as provided for safety functions) shall fail to a safe position upon loss
of actuation power or control signals.
Guidance note:
5.1.6.6 The main gas supply line to each gas consumer or set of consumers shall be equipped with a
manually operated stop valve and an automatically operated master gas fuel valve coupled in series or
a combined manually and automatically operated valve. The valves shall be situated in the part of the
piping that is outside the machinery space containing gas consumers, and placed as near as possible to the
installation for heating the gas, if fitted. The master gas fuel valve shall automatically cut off the gas supply
when activated by the safety system required in Table 10. For high pressure gas supply lines, the master gas
fuel valve shall be arranged as two shutoff valves in series with a venting valve in between.
5.1.6.7 The gas supply line to each consumer shall be provided with double-block-and-bleed valves. These
the engine. For high pressure gas supply lines, the master gas fuel valve may perform this function. An alarm
for faulty operation of the valves shall be provided.
Guidance note:
Block valves open and bleed valve open is an alarm condition. Similarly engine stopped and block valves open is an alarm
condition.
5.1.6.8 For piping systems containing gaseous fuel, an arrangement that automatically ventilates the
pipe between the master gas valve and the double block and bleed valve when a leakage is detected, shall
DNV AS
be fitted. The pipe between the double block and bleed valve and the gas injection valves, shall also be

automatically vented.
5.1.6.9 For piping systems containing liquefied fuel, an arrangement that automatically de-pressurizes the
fuel supply piping after the master gas valve when a leakage is detected, shall be fitted.
5.1.6.10 Each gas supply line to high pressure installations, shall be provided with means for rapid detection
of a rupture in the piping system inside the machinery space.
5.1.6.11 Each gas supply line to high pressure installations, shall be provided with a valve that will
automatically close upon detection of a gas pipe rupture in the machinery space. This valve shall be located
outside the machinery space, or at the machinery space bulkhead at the point of entry inside the machinery
space. It can be a separate valve or combined with other functions, e.g. the master valve.
Guidance note:
If a differential pressure measurement is used to detect a pipe rupture, the shutdown should be time delayed to prevent shutdown
due to transient load variations.
5.1.6.12 There shall be one manually operated shutdown valve in the gas supply line to each engine
upstream of the double block and bleed valves to assure safe isolation during maintenance on the engine.
5.1.6.13 Shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems operated by the safety system shall close
fully and smoothly within 30 seconds of actuation. Information about the closure time of the valves and their
operating characteristics shall be available on board, and the closing time shall be verifiable and repeatable.
5.1.7 Expansion bellows
5.1.7.1 Expansion bellows shall normally not be installed in enclosed spaces.
5.1.7.2 Expansion bellows shall only be installed where they are readily accessible for inspection.
5.1.7.3 Slip joints shall not be used, except within the liquefied gas fuel storage tanks.
5.1.7.4 If accepted, expansion bellows in pipes containing gaseous fuel shall only be installed in fuel
preparation rooms or tank connection spaces.
5.1.7.5 If accepted, expansion bellows in systems for liquefied fuel shall only be installed in spaces designed
to contain liquefied fuel leakages.
5.1.7.6 Expansion bellows shall be protected against icing where necessary.

5.2.1 General
DNV AS

which it may be exposed, or forces due to flow or the ship's motions.
5.2.2 Pressure relief valves
5.2.2.2 Pressure relief valves shall comply with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [2.1] and be tested in accordance with
applicable parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [2.1.5].
5.2.2.3 In the event of a failure of a fuel tank PRV a safe means of emergency isolation shall be available:
— Procedures shall be provided and included in the operation manual required in Sec.5 [1.8.1.1].
— The procedures shall allow only one of the installed PRVs for the liquefied gas fuel tanks to be isolated,
physical interlocks shall be included to this effect.
Guidance note:
To safely isolate a fuel tank PRV, stop valves can be fitted before and after the pressure relief valve. In case the pressure relief
valves are located in open air, stop valve only at the inlet of the pressure relief valve is needed. The outlet of the pressure relief
valve can then be fitted with a blind flange.
5.2.2.5 The outlet from the pressure relief valves shall be located at least B/3 or 6 m, whichever is greater,
above the weather deck and 6 m above the working area and gangways, where B is the greatest moulded
breadth of the ship in meters. The outlets shall be located at least 25 m from the nearest:
— air intake, air outlet or opening to accommodation, service and control spaces, or other non-hazardous
area
— exhaust outlet from machinery or from furnace installation
as required by the IGC Code for gas tankers. Shorter distances may be justified by risk analysis including a
gas dispersion analysis applying the maximum tank venting scenario.
For small ships and ship types where the operation limits the possible location of the outlet, lesser heights
and than given above may be accepted.
5.2.2.6 The outlet from the pressure relief valves shall be so constructed that the discharge will be
5.2.2.7 All other fuel gas vent outlets shall be arranged in accordance with [5.2.2.5] and [5.2.2.6]. Means
shall be provided to prevent liquid overflow from gas vent outlets, due to hydrostatic pressure from spaces to
which they are connected.
near the PRVs.
5.2.2.10 PRVs shall be connected to the highest part of the liquefied fuel tank. PRVs shall be positioned on
the liquefied fuel tank so that they will remain in the vapour phase at the filling limit (FL) under conditions of
15° list and 0.015 L trim.
DNV AS

5.2.3.2 For vacuum insulated tanks in fuel storage hold spaces and for tanks in fuel storage hold spaces
separated from potential fire loads by cofferdams or surrounded by spaces with no fire load, the fire factors
may be reduced to the following values:
F=0.5 to F=0.25
F=0.2 to F=0.1
The minimum fire factor is F=0.1

The sizing of the vent pipe system shall comply with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [4.2].

5.3.1 General
The bunkering system shall be so arranged that no gas will be discharged to air during filling of the fuel
tanks.
bunkering pipes shall be free of gas, unless the consequences of not gas freeing is evaluated and approved.
not in use for bunkering.
point.
5.3.3.2 The closing time of the shutdown valve shall not be more than 5 seconds from the trigger of
the alarm to full closure of the valve, unless pressure surge considerations makes a longer closing time
DNV AS
necessary. The closing time of the shutdown valve shall also be sufficient to prevent overfilling of the tank

when automatic shutdown is initiated by high tank level.
high tank level during transfer operation between fuel tanks (see Table 10).
safety dry breakaway coupling/self-sealing quick release. The couplings shall be of a standard type.

5.4.1.1 An arrangement for purging fuel bunkering lines and supply lines with nitrogen shall be provided.
block-and-bleed valve arrangement to prevent the return of flammable gas to any non-hazardous spaces. In
addition, a closable non-return valve shall be installed between the double block and bleed arrangement and
the fuel system.
may substitute the non-return devices required in [5.4.1.2].
shall:
— be fully welded
each case.
DNV AS

step.
change.
5.4.3.4 Inert gas utilized for gas freeing of tanks may be provided externally to the ship.
5.4.4.1 If inert gas generators are provided, they shall be capable of producing inert gas with oxygen
content less than 5% by volume. A continuous-reading oxygen content meter shall be fitted to the inert gas
supply from the equipment and shall be fitted with an alarm set at a maximum of 5% oxygen content by
volume.
5.4.4.3 Nitrogen generation system redundancy shall be provided where the containment system relies on
continuous nitrogen supply for containment and/or gas detection.
Guidance note:
Two (2) nitrogen generators (with one (1) buffer tank if necessary), alternatively one (1) generator and one tank with 30 day
consumption is generally considered to comply with the redundancy requirement.
5.5 Exhaust system

5.5.1 General
Guidance note:
three meters, unless efficient shielding is provided.
5.5.1.3 Bursting discs shall only be used as a means for explosion relief ventilation where any event, where
a bursting disc has compromised the exhaust system, does not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
5.5.1.5 Machinery using gas as fuel shall have separate exhaust systems.
DNV AS
5.6.1 Gas heating systems
5.6.1.1 Circulation pumps for the heating fluid shall be arranged with redundancy.
5.6.1.2 The heating circuit expansion tank shall be fitted with a gas detector and shall be vented to open air.
5.6.2 Drainage systems

6.1.1 General
the less hazardous space or duct including fan housing has an over-pressure relative to the more hazardous
space or duct. Such ventilation ducts shall have a mechanical integrity equivalent to that required for general
piping systems in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 Table 2.
6.1.1.4 Air inlets for hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from areas, which in the absence of the
considered inlet would be non-hazardous. Air outlets from hazardous enclosed spaces shall be located in an
open area, which in the absence of the considered outlet would be of the same or lesser hazard than the
ventilated space.
6.1.1.5 Air inlets for non-hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from non-hazardous areas at least 1.5
m away from the boundaries of any hazardous area. Air outlets from non-hazardous spaces shall be located
outside hazardous areas.
DNV AS
6.1.1.8 The number and capacity of the ventilation fans serving:

— secondary enclosure ventilation systems
shall be such that the capacity is not reduced by more than 50%, after a failure of an active component or a
failure in the power supply system to the fans.
6.1.1.9 The ventilation system arrangement shall take into account that leaking gas is heavier than air. This
implies that spaces shall typically be arranged with extraction ventilation taking air from the low points in the
space, while inlet air is supplied at the top.
6.1.2.1 Tank connection spaces shall be provided with an effective mechanical ventilation system of the
extraction type, providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air changes per hour. The ventilation system
shall be arranged to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. Other solutions, providing an
equivalent level of safety, may be considered on a case-by-case basis.
6.1.2.2 Spaces containing access openings for tank connection spaces shall be arranged with separate
ventilation, providing at least 8 air changes per hour.

Fuel preparation rooms shall be fitted with effective mechanical ventilation system of the extraction type,
providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air changes per hour. The ventilation system shall be arranged
to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. For spaces where the ventilation may cause
condensation and icing due to cold surfaces, other solutions providing an equivalent level of safety, may be
6.1.4 Secondary enclosures for gas pipes
6.1.4.1 Secondary enclosures containing gas piping shall be fitted with effective mechanical ventilation
system of the extraction type, providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air changes per hour. The
ventilation system shall be arranged to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. Other
solutions providing an equivalent safety level will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
6.1.4.2 When located in machinery spaces, the ventilation system for the secondary enclosure of the gas
supply system and the ventilation of the gas valve unit spaces shall be independent of all other ventilation
systems.
6.1.4.3 Ventilation openings for the secondary enclosures shall be located in open air, away from ignition
sources. The inlet opening shall be fitted with a suitable wire mesh guard and protected from ingress of
water.
6.1.5 Machinery spaces

The ventilation system for machinery spaces containing gas-fuelled consumers shall be independent of all
other ventilation systems.
Guidance note:
Spaces enclosed in the boundaries of machinery spaces (such as purifier's room, engine room workshops and stores) are
considered an integral part of machinery spaces containing gas fuelled consumers and, therefore, their ventilation system does not
need to be independent of the one of machinery spaces.
DNV AS
6.1.6 Spaces protected by air locks

6.1.6.1 Non-hazardous spaces with access to a hazardous enclosed space shall be arranged with an air-lock
and the hazardous space shall be maintained at under-pressure relative to the non-hazardous space.
6.1.6.2 Non-hazardous spaces with access to hazardous open deck shall be arranged with an air-lock and be
maintained at overpressure relative to the external hazardous area.
7 Fire safety
7.1 General
7.2 Fire protection

7.2.1 Construction
7.2.1.1 Any boundary of accommodation spaces, service spaces, control stations, escape routes and
machinery spaces, facing fuel tanks on open deck, shall be shielded by A-60 class divisions. The A-60 class
divisions shall extend up to the underside of the deck of the navigation bridge. In addition, fuel tanks shall
be segregated from cargo in accordance with the requirements of the international maritime dangerous
goods (IMDG) code where the tanks are regarded as bulk packaging. For the purposes of the stowage and
segregation requirements of the IMDG code, a gas fuel tank on the open deck shall be considered a class 2.1
package.
7.2.1.2 The space containing fuel containment system and fuel preparation rooms shall be separated from
the machinery spaces of category A or other rooms with high fire risks. The separation shall be done by a
cofferdam of at least 900 mm with insulation of A-60 class. When determining the insulation of the space
containing fuel containment system from other spaces with lower fire risks, the fuel containment system
shall be considered as a machinery space of category A, in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-2/9. The
boundary between spaces containing fuel containment systems shall be either a cofferdam of at least 900
mm or A-60 class division. For type C tanks, the fuel storage hold space may be considered as a cofferdam.
This can however not be applied to tanks located directly above machinery spaces of category A or other
rooms with high fire risk.
7.3 Fire extinction

7.3.1 Fire main
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7.3.2.2 The water spray system shall also provide coverage for boundaries of the superstructures,
compressor rooms, pump rooms, cargo control rooms, bunkering control stations, bunkering stations and any
other normally occupied deck houses that face fuel tanks on open deck, unless tanks are located 10 meters
or more from the boundaries.
2 2
exceeding 40 meters, for the purpose of isolating damaged sections. Alternatively, the system may be
protected.
closed valves to the system shall be located in a readily accessible position, which is not likely to be
inaccessible in case of fire in the areas protected. Remote operation of valves shall be possible from the
control location for bunkering.
7.3.2.8 The nozzles shall be of an approved full-bore type and they shall be arranged to ensure an effective
Guidance note:
area coverage.
7.3.2.9 An equivalent system to the water spray system may be fitted provided it has been tested for its on-
deck cooling capability to the satisfaction of the Society.
7.3.3 Dry chemical powder fire extinguishing system
7.3.3.1 In the bunkering station area a permanently installed dry chemical powder extinguishing system
shall cover all possible leak points. The capacity shall be at least 3.5 kg/s for a minimum of 45 seconds
discharge. The system shall be arranged for easy manual release from a safe location outside the protected
area.
7.3.3.2 In addition to any other portable fire extinguishers that may be required, one portable dry powder
extinguisher of at least 5 kg capacity shall be located near the bunkering station.
DNV AS
7.3.4 Fuel preparation room

Fuel preparation rooms shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions
of the FSS code and taking into account the necessary concentrations and application rate required for
extinguishing gas fires.
7.3.5 Fire dampers


7.4.1 Detection
tank connection space, and for all other rooms of the fuel gas system where fire cannot be excluded.
Guidance note:
should be noted that flame detectors will normally activate before temperature detectors.
8.1 General
8.1.1 General
such that a single fault will not result in the loss of ability to maintain fuel tank pressures and hull structure
temperature within normal operating limits.
8.1.1.3 Failure modes and effects of single failure for electrical generation and distribution systems in
[8.1.1.2] shall be analyzed and documented.
Guidance note:
See IEC 60812.
8.1.1.4 Electrical equipment and wiring shall in general not be installed in hazardous areas unless essential
8.1.1.5 With reference to IEC 60079-20, temperature class and equipment groups listed in Table 7 may be
used for potential ship fuels:
DNV AS

area.
8.1.1.7 Submerged fuel pump motors and their supply cables may be fitted in fuel containment systems.
Fuel pump motors shall be capable of being isolated from their electrical supply during gas-freeing
operations.
8.1.1.8 Instrumentation and electrical apparatus in contact with the fuel should be of a type suitable for
zone 0. Temperature sensors shall be installed in thermo-wells, and pressure sensors without additional
separating chamber should be suitable for installation in zone 0.

8.2.1 General
electrical installations, hazardous areas shall be divided into zones 0, 1 and 2 according to the principles of
the standards IEC 60079-10-1; 2008 Explosive atmospheres Part 10-1: Classification of areas - Explosive gas
atmospheres and guidance and informative examples given in IEC 60092-502:1999, Electrical Installations in
Ships - Tankers - Special features for tankers. Main features of the guidance are given in [8.2.2].
8.2.1.2 Areas and spaces other than those classified in [8.2.2] shall be subject to special consideration. The


1) Tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms arranged with ventilation according to [6.1.6.1], fuel
storage hold spaces and interbarrier spaces.
Guidance note:
Fuel storage hold spaces for type C tanks without any leakage sources in the hold space are not considered as zone 1.
2) Areas on open deck, or semi- enclosed spaces on deck, within 3 m of any fuel tank outlet, gas or
vapour outlet, bunker manifold valve, fuel tank hatches, other gas valve, gas pipe flange, coupling for
flexible hoses used for portable gas tank, ventilation outlets from zone 1 hazardous spaces and gas tank
openings for pressure release provided to permit the flow of small volumes of gas or vapour mixtures
caused by thermal variation.
3) Areas on open deck, or semi-enclosed spaces on open deck above and in the vicinity of any gas outlet
intended for the passage of liquefied gas or large volumes of vapour mixture, within a vertical cylinder of
DNV AS
unlimited height and 6 m radius centered upon the center of the outlet, and within a hemisphere of 6 m

radius below the outlet.
5) Areas on the open deck within spillage coamings surrounding gas bunker manifold valves and 3 m
beyond these, up to a height of 2.4 m above the deck.
6) Enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces in which pipes containing fuel are located, e.g. secondary enclosures
around fuel pipes, semi-enclosed bunkering stations.
7) A space protected by an airlock is considered as non-hazardous area during normal operation but will
require electrical equipment suitable for zone 1 if such equipment is required to operate following loss of
differential pressure between the protected space and the hazardous area.
8) Except for type C tanks, an area within 2.4 m of the outer surface of a fuel containment system where
such surface is exposed to the weather.

2) Spaces 4 m beyond the cylinder and 4 m beyond the sphere defined in [8.2.2.2].
3) Air locks.
4) Space containing bolted hatch to tank connection space.
5) Space containing fans serving hazardous spaces.

8.3.1 General
cables, and that the installations have been carried out in accordance to Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.11.
8.3.1.3 For spaces protected by pressurization, it shall be examined and tested that purging can be fully
accomplished. Purge time at minimum flow rate shall be documented. Required shutdowns and / or alarms
upon ventilation overpressure falling below prescribed values shall be tested. For other spaces where area
classification depends on mechanical ventilation, it shall be tested that ventilation flow rate is sufficient, and
that required ventilation failure alarm operates correctly.
devices (for example overload protection relays) and/or operation of an alarm (for example loss of
pressurization for an Ex(p) control panel), it shall be verified that the devices have correct settings and/or
installed.
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8.4 Maintenance
8.4.1 General
— Overview of classification of hazardous areas, with information about gas groups and temperature class.
— Records sufficient to enable the certified safe equipment to be maintained in accordance with its type of
protection (list and location of equipment, technical information, manufacturer's instructions, spares etc.).
— Inspection routines with information about level of detail and time intervals between the inspections,
acceptance/rejection criteria.
— Register of inspections, with information about date of inspections and name(s) of person(s) who carried
9.1 General
9.1.1 Functional requirement
The control, monitoring and safety systems applied to a fuel installation shall be arranged to fulfil the
installation.
— Leakages of liquid and gaseous fuel shall be detected and alarmed.
remaining propulsion power shall be in accordance with [5.1.2]. Propulsion shall be restored within 30
seconds (redundancy type 1) upon a fuel safety action and the restored propulsion power shall be in
accordance with [5.1.2].
system.
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Guidance note:

redundant network if arranged in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9. Note that the protective safety systems shall, if part of an integrated
network, be arranged in a separate network segment in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.2 [1.3.5] and Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.4 [3].
9.1.2.2 Monitoring requirements for the fuel installation are given in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10. Table 8
gives alarm requirements for gas detection, Table 9 gives alarm and indication requirements to be handled
by the gas control and monitoring system. Table 10 and [9.3.1] to [9.3.7] give requirements to protective
safety functions with alarm to be handled by the fuel safety system. For alarm conditions found in both Table
9 and Table 10, separate sensors shall be arranged for the gas control and monitoring system and for the fuel
safety system.
9.1.2.4 The gas detection system shall present the gas alarms as required by [9.2.4] on a dedicated panel
on bridge, at the control location for bunkering and locally. If alarming depends on network communication,
the functionality shall be handled by separate network segment arranged for the fuel installation safety
functions.
9.1.2.5 The fuel gas safety system shall present the gas safety alarms as specified in Table 10 on a
dedicated panel on bridge. If alarming depends on network communication, the functionality shall be handled
by the separate network segment arranged for the fuel installation safety functions.
9.1.2.6 The gas detection system and fuel safety system for a fuel supply installation can be implemented in
a common system unit if the system is redundant.
9.1.2.7 For each fuel supply system independent power supplies shall be arranged for the controllers of
[6.3.5].
Guidance note:
Table 10.
Guidance note:
terminals/coils.
9.1.2.10 Where voting is applied for gas detection shutdown, a failed detector shall be considered as an
active detection.
Guidance note:
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applicable:
— onboard safety center

9.2.1.1 Each fuel tank shall be fitted with at least one liquid level gauging device, designed to operate within
the allowable tank pressure and temperature range. Where only one liquid level gauge is fitted, it shall be
arranged so that any necessary maintenance can be carried out while the cargo tank is in service.
9.2.1.2 Each fuel tank shall be equipped with high-level alarm, which is released when the tank is filled up to
about 95% of the tank volume.
each bunker pipe.
lines.
9.2.1.7 Control of bunkering shall be possible from a safe location in regard to bunkering operations. At this
location tank pressure, tank temperature if required by [9.2.1], and tank level shall be available. Overfill
alarm shall also to be indicated at this location, as well as leakage detection alarms for the secondary
enclosure for the bunkering pipes where secondary enclosure is required by [5.1.4].
9.2.1.8 For tanks where submerged fuel pump motors are installed, arrangements shall be made to alarm at
low liquid level.
9.2.1.9 Fuel storage hold spaces and inter-barrier spaces without open connection to the atmosphere shall
be provided with pressure indication.
9.2.1.10 Each fuel tank shall be provided with devices to measure and indicate the temperature of the fuel in
at least three locations; at the bottom and middle of the tank as well as the top of the tank below the highest
allowable liquid level.
9.2.2 Bilge wells

Bilge wells in tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms or other spaces containing liquefied fuel
systems without secondary enclosures shall be provided with level sensors. Alarm shall be given at high level
in bilge well.
DNV AS
9.2.3 Fuel heating

9.2.3.1 The heating medium for the liquefied gas vaporizer shall be provided with temperature monitoring at
the heat exchanger outlet. Alarm shall be given at low temperature.
9.2.4 Gas detection

— motor rooms for machinery in fuel preparation rooms
— machinery spaces above engine
— air locks
— expansion tanks in systems for heating of fuel gas
— other enclosed spaces where fuel vapour may accumulate.
9.2.4.4 Except for spaces as specified in [9.2.4.2], gas detection instruments for flammable products
capable of measuring gas concentrations below the lower flammable limit may be accepted.
9.2.4.5 In every installation, the number and the positions of detectors shall be determined with due regard
to the size and layout of the compartment, the composition and density of the fuel and the dilution from
compartment purging or ventilation and stagnant areas.
9.2.4.6 Gas detection equipment shall be designed, installed and tested in accordance with a recognized
standard.
Guidance note:
See IEC 60079-29-1 - Explosive atmospheres - Gas detectors - Performance requirements of detectors for flammable detectors.
9.2.4.7 The detectors shall generally be located at a low level where gas may accumulate and in
the ventilation outlets. Gas dispersal analysis or a physical smoke test shall be used to find the best
arrangement.
Alarm conditions Alarm
Gas detection
Interbarrier space of fuel tank, 30% LEL HA
Fuel tank hold space, 30% LEL HA
Tank connection space, 20% LEL HA
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Fuel preparation room, 20% LEL HA
Secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel outside the machinery space, 20% LEL HA
Secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel in the machinery space, 30% LEL HA
Air locks HA
Above engine in machinery spaces HA
Motor rooms for machinery in fuel preparation rooms HA
9.2.5 Ventilation
from the ventilation fan motor is not sufficient to verify performance.

engineroom. As a minimum the alarms shall include low gas input pressure, low gas output pressure, high
9.2.7 Shafts passing through bulkheads

Where bulkhead penetrations are used to separate the drive from a hazardous space, temperature
monitoring for bulkhead shaft glands and bearings shall be provided. An alarm shall be initiated at high
temperature.
Indication
Alarm
Fuel containtment system
Level in tank IL, IR, HA Alarm at 95% of tank volume.
Alarm level below opening pressure of

1) 1) 1)
Tank pressure IL, IR , HA , LA relief devices if vacuum protection is
required.
Submerged fuel pump, low level in tank LA Dry running protection.
Without open connection to the

Hold spaces and interbarrier spaces, pressure IR
atmosphere.
Fuel supply system
Fuel pump discharge lines, pressure IL, IR
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Indication

Alarm
Gas compressor
1)
1)
1)
1)
Compressor operation HA
Bilge
Other spaces containing liquefied fuel systems, level in

HA Systems without secondary enclosures.
bilge well
Fuel heating
Fuel supply, temperature IR, LA At the heat exchanger outlet.
Ventilation
Local alarm on both sides of air lock,

Air lock, more than one door moved from closed position A
Sec.3 [4.2.1].
Air lock, door open at loss of ventilation A Sec.3 [4.2]
Malfunction of double-block-and-bleed valves A Sec.5 [1.7] and Sec.5 [4.1.2].
Temperature monitoring bulkhead shaft glands and

IR, HA
bearings
Low oxygen alarm in N2 spaces A Local alarm, Sec.5 [4.3.3].

1)
IL = local indication (presentation of values).
IR = remote indication (presentation of values) in engine control room or control location for bunkering when specified.
A = alarm activated for logical value.
DNV AS
9.3.1.1 A level sensing device shall be provided which automatically actuates the shut-off of the flow of fuel
to the tank in a manner which will both, avoid excessive liquid pressure in the loading line and prevent the
tank from becoming liquid full. This level sensing device shall be independent of the level sensing devices
Guidance note:
The tank overflow protection shall be based on a direct reading of the level and not be based on indirect measurement of a value
that varies for each bunkering (e.g. density used for dp-cell).
9.3.1.2 Where arrangements are provided for overriding the overflow control system, they shall be such that
inadvertent operation is prevented, i.e. by interlocking the override function with the bunker valve. When
this override is operated continuous visual indication shall be provided at the navigation bridge, continuously
manned central control station or onboard safety centre. Overriding of the overflow control system when
more than one LNG fuel tank is installed will be subject to special consideration.
shall be alarmed.
9.3.2 Safety upon gas detection
9.3.2.1 When two gas detectors in a in a tank connection space where the voting principle is applied for
required to isolate the leakage.
When one gas detector in a tank connection space where self-monitoring gas detectors is used indicate a
This will in most cases require that all tank valves shall close automatically. Depending on the system
arrangement, it may also be necessary to close other valves. Any fuel pump located in the tank connection
space shall also be automatically shut down.
9.3.2.2
When two gas detectors in a in a fuel preparation room where the voting principle is applied for the gas
detection indicate a vapour concentration of 40% LEL shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to
isolate the leakage.
When one gas detector in a fuel preparation room where self-monitoring gas detectors is used indicate a
This will require that valves in the fuel system supplying liquefied or gaseous fuel to the fuel preparation
room shall close automatically. Depending on the system arrangement, it may also be necessary to close
other valves. All machinery in the space, such as compressors and pumps, shall be automatically shut down.
9.3.2.3 When two gas detectors in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel outside the machinery space
When one gas detector in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel outside the machinery space where self-
DNV AS

gas fuel valve.
9.3.2.4 When two gas detectors in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel in a gas safe machinery space
When one gas detector in a secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel in a gas safe machinery space where self-
For gaseous fuels this will require automatic closing of the master gas fuel valve and the double-block-and-
bleed valves, and automatic opening of vent valve in fuel supply system between these valves. The pipe
between the double block and bleed valve and the gas injection valves shall also be automatically vented.
For liquid fuels, the master gas fuel valve shall close, and the lines shall be automatically de-pressurized.
9.3.3 Safety upon liquefied fuel leakage detection
spaces containing liquefied fuel systems without secondary enclosures shall result in automatic closing of all
valves necessary to isolate the leakage.
9.3.3.2 Piping in the fuel system containing liquids shall be provided with means for detection of leakages
into the secondary enclosure. Detection of leakages shall result in automatic closing of all valves required
to isolate the leakage. Leakage detection in the secondary enclosure of the bunkering line shall immediately
result in automatic closing of the bunkering valve.

The supply lines to consumers containing shall be provided with temperature sensors at the heat exchanger
outlet. Detection of low-low temperature shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to stop the
fuel supply to the vaporizer.
supplying liquefied or gaseous fuel to the fuel preparation room, shall close automatically. All machinery in
the space, like compressors and pumps, shall be automatically shut down.
9.3.5.3 Loss of ventilation in secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel in the machinery space shall
result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the affected fuel system from the fuel source.
automatic opening of vent valve in fuel supply system between these valves.
9.3.5.4 Loss of ventilation in the secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel outside the machinery space
shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to isolate the affected fuel system from the fuel source.
gas fuel valve.
9.3.5.5 Loss of ventilation in a non-hazardous space with air lock entrance from hazardous area on open
deck, or loss of ventilation in hazardous space with air lock entrance from a safe space, shall lead to
automatic shutdown of electrical equipment not certified for operation in zone 1 in the non-hazardous space.
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9.3.6 Safety upon rupture detection

Each gas supply line to high pressure installations shall be provided with means for rapid detection of a
rupture in the gas line in the machinery space. When a pipe rupture is detected, the gas supply shall be
isolated from the machinery space by automatically closing the shut-off valve located outside the machinery
space.
9.3.8.1 The requirements in [9.3.1] to [9.3.7] and Table 10 specify fuel installation safety actions required
to limit the consequences of system failures.
Automatic safety action with corresponding alarm Signal

to other
Shutdown control/
Shutdown Shutdown Isolate
Conditions Shutdown of fuel safety
of master of bunker ignition
Alarm of tank preparation systems for
gas fuel connection sources in
valves room 1) additional
valves action
Tank safety
Level bunkering HA X
in tank,
overfill transfer HA X
Submerged fuel pump, low- Stop fuel

LA
low level in tank pumps.
Gas detection
Tank connection space, 2 x Stop

4)
40% LEL machinery
HA X
in the
space.
Fuel preparation room, 2 x Stop

4)
40% LEL machinery
HA X
in the
space.
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to other
Shutdown control/
valves action
Secondary enclosure of De-

pipes for fuel outside the pressurize
machinery space, 2x 40% as
4) HA X X X
LEL described
in
[9.3.2.4].
Secondary enclosure De-

of pipes for fuel in the pressurize
machinery space, 2x 60% as
4) HA X
LEL described
in
[9.3.2.4].
Liquid leakage detection

LA X

LA X
Leakage detection in
secondary enclosure of A X X X
pipes
Leakage detection
A3) X
bunkering line
Fuel heating
Loss of heating medium Stop fuel

A X X
circulation pumps.
Fuel supply, temperature Stop fuel

pumps
De-
pressurize
LA X X X
as
described
in
[9.3.2.4].
Ventilation
Tank connection space, loss Stop fuel

of ventilation A X pumps in
the space.
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to other
Shutdown control/
valves action
Fuel preparation room, loss Stop

of ventilation machinery
A X
in the
space.
Secondary enclosure of De-

pipes for fuel outside the pressurize
machinery space, loss of as
A X X X
ventilation described
in
[9.3.2.4].
Secondary enclosure De-

of pipes for fuel in the pressurize
machinery space, loss of as
A X
ventilation described
in
[9.3.2.4].
Loss of ventilation in
hazardous space with air
A X
lock entrance from a safe
space
Loss of ventilation in non-

hazardous space with
air lock entrance from A X
hazardous area on open
deck
Rupture detection of gas pipe
High pressure pipe in De-

machinery space pressurize
as
A X
described
in
[9.3.2.4].
Manual shutdown buttons
Emergency shutdown of De-

supply to the machinery pressurize
space as
X
described
in
[9.3.2.4].
X
bunkering
DNV AS

to other
Shutdown control/
valves action
1) Upon closure of master gas fuel valve, a signal shall be sent to the gas consumers safety system to shut down the
double block and bleed valves.
2) All valves required to isolate the leakage shall close
3) Alarm also to be indicated in the bunkering control location
4) If the gas detector is of self-monitoring type the installation of a single gas detector may be permitted, as long as
number of detectors as required per [9.2.4.5] is fulfilled. Self-monitoring of the gas detectors shall as minimum (but not
limited to) include earth fault, short circuit, loop failure, degraded performance etc.


10.1.1 General
gaseous fuel.
10.1.2.4 On main/propulsion boilers an automatic system shall be provided to change from gas fuel
operation to oil fuel operation without interruption of boiler firing.
10.1.2.5 Gas nozzles and the burner control system shall be configured such that gas fuel can only be
ignited by an established oil fuel flame, unless the boiler and combustion equipment is designed and
approved by the Society to light on gas fuel.
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10.2.1 General
Gas turbines shall comply with the requirements in Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.2.
requirements for ESD protected machinery spaces in Sec.5.
10.2.2.2 For gas turbines requiring a supply of gas with pressures above 10 bar, gas piping shall be
protected with a secondary enclosure in accordance with the requirements in [5.1.5] to the extent possible.
10.2.2.3 Ventilation for the enclosure shall be as outlined in Sec.5 for ESD protected machinery spaces, but
shall in addition be arranged with 2 x 100% capacity fans from different electrical circuits.
10.2.2.4 Ventilation for the enclosure shall be as outlined in Sec.5 for ESD protected machinery spaces, but
10.2.2.5 For other than single fuel gas turbines, an automatic system shall be fitted to change over easily
and quickly from fuel gas operation to fuel oil operation and vice-versa with minimum fluctuation of the
engine power.
10.2.2.6 Means shall be provided to monitor and detect poor combustion that may lead to unburnt fuel gas
in the exhaust system during operation. In the event that it is detected, the fuel gas supply shall be shut
down.
11.1 Fuel containment system

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11.1.2 Testing

[5.2.4].

11.2.1.1 The requirements apply to piping that contains fuel in gaseous and liquefied state. The piping
system shall be joined by welding with a minimum of flange connections. Gaskets shall be of a type designed
to prevent blow-out.
flanges):
back-up on the first pass. For design pressures in excess of 10 bar and design temperatures of -10°C or
colder, backing rings shall be removed.
mm or less and design temperatures not colder than -55°C.
11.2.1.3 Flanges in fuel piping shall be of the welding neck, slip-on or socket welding type. For all piping
(except open ended lines), the following restrictions apply:
1) For design temperatures < -55°C only welding neck flanges shall be used.
2) For design pressure above 10 bar, only welding neck flanges shall be used.
3) For design temperatures < -10°C slip-on flanges shall not be used in nominal sizes above 100 mm and
socket welding flanges shall not be used in nominal sizes above 50 mm.
welding type.
concerned.
1) 100% radiographic or ultrasonic inspection of butt-welded joints for piping systems with:
— design temperatures colder than -10°C or
DNV AS
2) When such butt welded joints of piping sections are made by automatic welding procedures approved

only be granted if well-documented quality assurance procedures and records are available to assess the
level 2 on general areas and level 1 on critical areas, as given in Pt.2 Ch.4 Sec.7 [6.1].
However, relaxation from these requirements for piping inside fuel tanks and open-ended piping may be
11.2.3.5 Secondary enclosures for high-pressure fuel piping shall be pressure tested to the expected
maximum pressure at pipe rupture, but minimum 10 bar. Secondary enclosures for low pressure fuel piping

11.3 Valves
11.3.1 Testing
11.3.1.1 Each type of valve intended to be used at a working temperature below -55°C shall be subject to
prototype testing as given in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.1].
11.4 Expansion
11.4.1 Testing
Expansion bellows intended for use in fuel systems shall be prototype tested as given in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5
[13.2].
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11.5 Pumps
11.5.1 Testing
Pumps shall be tested in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.5].
11.6 Shutdown valves in liquefied gas fuel piping systems

11.6.1 Testing

11.7.1 General
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SECTION 14 GAS FUELLED SHIP INSTALLATIONS - GAS FUELLED

AMMONIA
1 General
1.1 Objective
The additional class notation Gas fuelled ammonia provides criteria for the arrangement and installation of
machinery for propulsion and auxiliary purposes, using ammonia as fuel.
1.2 Scope
The scope for additional class notation Gas fuelled ammonia includes requirements for the ship's gas fuel
system, covering all aspects of the installation, from the ship's gas fuel bunkering connection up to, and
including, the gas consumers. This section provides requirements for arrangement and location of gas fuel
tanks and all spaces with fuel gas piping and installations, including requirements for the entrances to such
spaces. Hazardous areas and spaces, due to the gas fuel installations, are defined. Requirements for control,
monitoring and safety systems for the gas fuel installations are included. For tank design and gas piping
detail design, see also Pt.5 Ch.7. Requirements for manufacture, workmanship and testing are included,
also referring to details given in Pt.5 Ch.7. Bunkering procedures are required for approval as part of the
operation manual. The bunkering processes and crew training are not part of the scope for this section of the
rules.
1.3 Application
The additional class notation Gas fuelled ammonia applies to installations using ammonia as fuel on board
ships. This includes internal combustion engines, boilers, gas turbines and fuel cells. The installations may
run on gas only or be dual fuel installations. Gas may be stored in a gaseous or liquefied state. These rules
are not applicable to gas carriers. Ships built with machinery in compliance with the requirements of the rules
in this section, will be assigned the additional class notation Gas fuelled ammonia.
1.4 References
Table 1 lists references used in this section.
Table 1 Other references
Document code Title
IEC 60079-10-1; 2008 Explosive atmospheres - Part 10-1: Classification of areas
IEC 60079-17 Explosive Atmospheres - Part 17: Electrical installations inspection and maintenance
IEC 60092-502; 1999 Electrical installations in ships - Tankers - Special features for tankers
IGF Code International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low-flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code)

The terms defined in Table 2 are used in this section.
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Term Definition
accommodation those spaces used for public spaces, corridors, lavatories, cabins, offices, hospitals, cinemas, game
spaces and hobby rooms, barber shops, pantries containing no cooking appliances and similar spaces
ammonia release system intended for minimizing the amount of ammonia released to atmosphere as described in
mitigation system [5.1.1.6]
breadth greatest moulded breadth of the ship at or below the deepest draught (summer load line draught).
Refer to SOLAS regulation II-1/2.8
bunkering transfer of fuel from land based or floating facilities into a ships' permanent tanks or connection of
portable tanks to the fuel supply system
certified safe type electrical equipment that is certified safe by the relevant authorities recognized by the
administration or its recognized organization acting on its behalf for operation in a flammable
atmosphere based on a recognized standard
control station those spaces defined in SOLAS chapter II-2 and, in the context of these rules, the engine control
room
design temperature lowest temperature the materials in tank and fuel systems may be subjected to
design vapour maximum gauge pressure, at the top of the tank, used as a parameter for the design of the tank
pressure
double block and set of two valves in series in a pipe, and a third valve enabling the pressure release from the pipe
bleed valve between those two valves. The arrangement may also consist of a two-way valve and a closing
valve instead of three separate valves
dual fuel engines engines that can burn gaseous and liquefied fuel simultaneously and in a wide variety of
proportions, or can operate successively on oil fuel and gas
enclosed space any space which, in the absence of artificial ventilation, the ventilation will be limited and any
explosive atmosphere will not be dispersed naturally
Guidance note:
explosion pressure measures provided to prevent the explosion pressure in a container or an enclosed space exceeding
relief the maximum overpressure the container or space is designed for, by releasing the overpressure
through designated openings
filling limit maximum liquid volume in a fuel tank relative to the total tank volume when the liquid fuel has
reached the reference temperature
fuel ammonia, either in its liquefied or gaseous state
DNV AS
Term Definition

fuel containment arrangement for the storage of fuel including tank connections. It includes where fitted, a primary
system and secondary barrier, associated insulation and any intervening spaces, and adjacent structure if
necessary for the support of these elements. If the secondary barrier is part of the hull structure it
may be a boundary of the fuel storage hold space.
The spaces around the fuel tank are defined as follows:
containment system is situated. If tank connections are located in the fuel storage hold space,
it will also be a tank connection space
2) Interbarrier space is the space between a primary and a secondary barrier, whether or not
completely or partially occupied by insulation or other material
3) Tank connection space is a space surrounding all tank connections and tank valves that is
required for tanks with such connections in enclosed spaces.
Guidance note:
A tank connection space may also contain equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers. Such
equipment is considered to only contain potential sources of release, but not sources of ignition.
fuel preparation any space containing pumps, compressors and/or vaporizers for fuel preparation purposes
room Guidance note:
A tank connection space which has equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers inside is not
regarded as a fuel preparation room. Such equipment is considered to only contain potential sources of
release, but not sources of ignition.
gas fluid having a vapour pressure exceeding 2.8 bar absolute at a temperature of 37.8°C
gas consumer any unit within the vessel using gas as a fuel
gas only engine engine capable of operating on gas only, and not able to switch over to operation on any other type
of fuel
gas valve unit spaces or boxes containing valves for control and regulation of gas supply before the consumer
spaces Guidance note:
The gas valve unit is by different suppliers also called for instance GVU, gas regulating unit, GRU or gas
train.
DNV AS
Term Definition

hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is or may be expected to be present, in quantities such
as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of equipment.
zone 0
Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or is present for long periods
zone 1
Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operations
zone 2
Area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it does
occur, is likely to do so only infrequently and will exist for a short period only.
Guidance note:
The definition of hazardous area is only related to the risk of explosion. In this context, health, safety
and environmental issues, i.e. toxicity, is not considered.
length length as defined in the international convention on load lines in force
loading limit maximum allowable liquid volume relative to the tank volume to which the tank may be loaded
membrane tanks non-self-supporting tanks that consist of a thin liquid and gas tight layer (membrane) supported
through insulation by the adjacent hull structure.
non-hazardous area area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not expected to be present in quantities such as to
require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of equipment
North Atlantic shall be in accordance with the definitions specified in IACS Recommendation 034
environment
effective over the entire length of the deck through permanent openings distributed in the side
panels or in the deck above
reference temperature corresponding to the vapour pressure of the fuel in a fuel tank at the set pressure of
temperature the PRV's
secondary enclosure around fuel piping designed to prevent liquefied and/or gaseous fuel leaking from the fuel
enclosure piping system
semi-enclosed space where the natural conditions of ventilation are notably different from those on open deck,
space due to the presence of structure such as roofs, windbreaks and bulkheads and which are so
arranged that dispersion of gas may not occur
service spaces spaces outside the cargo area used for galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances, lockers,
mail and specie rooms, store rooms, workshops other than those forming part of the machinery
spaces and similar spaces and trunks to such spaces
DNV AS
Term Definition

toxic zones areas on open deck where the probability of having health-affecting concentrations of ammonia
vapor is high. Ventilation openings or other openings to enclosed spaces shall not be located in
such areas
unacceptable loss loss of function of essential auxiliaries resulting in failure to sustain or restore normal operation of
of power propulsion machinery (SOLAS II-I/26.3)
vapour pressure equilibrium pressure of the saturated vapour above the liquid, expressed in bar absolute at a
specified temperature
1.5.2 Abbreviations
The abbreviations described in Table 3 are used in this section.
ARMS ammonia release mitigation system
B breadth
FL filling limit
L length
LL loading limit
P0 design vapour pressure
1.6 Classification
1.6.1 Survey extent
Survey requirements for ships with the class notation Gas fuelled ammonia are given in Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2
[1], Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2 [3] and Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.4 [3].

Documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 4.
Documentation
type
Propulsion Z050 - Design Including information on the machinery configuration, machinery space
and steering philosophy arrangements, fuel arrangements, shut down philosophy, redundancy
arrangements, considerations, etc. FI
general Shall be submitted before other documentation, to give support for approval
of these.
DNV AS
Documentation

type
Z071 - Failure For non-conventional gas fuelled propulsion machinery arrangements,

mode and effect covering single failure in active components or systems. AP
analysis (FMEA)
Z253 - Test Redundancy and failure modes based on FMEA.

procedure for AP
quay or sea trial
Fuel systems Z030 - Location of fuel tank(s) with distances related to:
Arrangement
— collision
plan
— grounding
— fire protection
— inspection.
Z030 - Including:
Arrangement
— machinery and boiler spaces, accommodation, service and control station
plan
spaces
— tank hatches, vent pipes and any other openings to the fuel tanks
— ventilating pipes, doors and openings to fuel preparation rooms, and other
hazardous areas
— entrances, air inlets and openings to accommodation, service and control
station spaces.
Z253 - Test Including testing of safety shut downs in accordance with the documentation
procedure for type G130 - Cause and effect diagram.
AP
quay and sea
trial
Z161 - See [1.8.1.1].

Operation AP
manual
Fuel gas tanks Z030 - General arrangement including:

(general Arrangement
requirements plan
for all tanks FI
— access for inspection
— tank insulation
— overview of tanks with all tank connections and tank connection space.
M010 - Including internal structures and piping.

Materials
AP
specifications,
metals
M060 - Welding
procedures AP
(WPS)
DNV AS
Documentation

type
M150 - Non-
destructive
AP
testing (NDT)
plan
M151 - Non-
destructive
AP
testing (NDT)
procedure
Z251 - Test Strenght and tightness testing procedure.

AP
procedure
Z265 - Boil off gas rate when pressure accumulation is not used as boil off gas
Calculation handling method. FI
report
Z265 - Filling limit curves.

Calculation FI
report
C030 - Detailed Safety relief valves and associated vent piping.

AP
drawing
S030 - Capacity Safety relief valves and associated vent piping. Including back pressure.
FI
analysis
Z100 - Safety relief valves and associated vent piping.

AP
Specification
S060 - Pipe Including location of tank valves.

AP
routing sketch
Z164 - Inspection/survey plan for the liquefied gas fuel containment system.
Inspectional AP
manual
Fuel gas C030 - Detailed Including as applicable:

independent drawing
— tanks
tank of type A
— supports
— insulation and liquid barrier for protection of hold space structure as
applicable AP
— marking plates
— tank hatches, pipes and any openings to the fuel tanks
— inspection access arrangements.
H050 - Tank hold space detailed drawings, including hull support structure and anti-
Structural flotation arrangement. AP
drawing
C040 - Design Design loads and structural analysis of fuel tanks, including:
analysis FI
— partial filling including sloshing arrangement.
DNV AS
Documentation

type
H130 - Including:
Fabrication
specification
— specification of stress relieving procedures (thermal or mechanical) as
required.
P030 - Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10 C.

Temperature FI
calculations
Z161 - Including:
Operation AP
— cooling down procedure
manual

independent drawing
— tanks
tank of type B
— supports
— insulation
AP
— marking plates
— pump arrangement including support structures
— inspection access arrangements.
H050 - Tank hold space detailed drawings, including hull support structure and anti-
Structural flotation arrangement. AP
drawings
analysis
— fatigue assessment of tank boundary and internal structures (SN curves FI
based)
— fatigue assessment leak before failure (fracture mechanics based)
— partial filling including sloshing arrangement.
H130 - Including:
Fabrication
— building and imperfection tolerances AP
specification
required.

Temperature FI
calculations
Z161 - Including:
Operation
manual
— inspection of small leak protection system with respect to functionality AP
DNV AS
Documentation

type
Z100 - Small leak protection system, including arrangement.

AP
Specification
S010 - Piping Inert gas purging system for insulation spaces.

AP
diagram (PD)

independent drawing
— tanks
tank of type C
— supports
— insulation AP
— marking plates
— tank hatches, pipes and any openings to gas tanks
— pump arrangement including supporting structure as applicable.
analysis
FI
— fatigue assessment as required
— partial filling including sloshing assessment as applicable.
H130 - Including:
Fabrication
specification AP
— forming procedure of dished ends
required.

Temperature FI
calculations
Z161 - Including:
Operation
— cooling down procedure AP
manual
Fuel gas C030 - Detailed Including:

membrane tank drawing
— building principle including location of load bearing insulation of different
strength rating.
DNV AS
Documentation

type
C040 - Design Including:

analysis
— strength and fatigue assessment of pump towers and its upper and lower
supports
FI
— strength assessment of containment system for sloshing impact loads
— strength analysis of load bearing insulation
— vibration analysis of pump tower and other vibration critical components,
as applicable.

Temperature FI
calculations
S010 - Piping Inert gas purting system for insulation spaces.

AP
diagram (PD)
S010 - Piping Water drainage arrangement for insulation spaces.

AP
diagram (PD)
Z100 - Hull scantling requirements for containment system.

FI
Specification
Z100 - Insulation including load bearing capacities.

AP
Specification
Z100 - Load bearing components.

AP
Specification
Z100 - Materials for membrane and insulation.

AP
Specification
Z251 - Test Tightness of primary and secondary membranes.

AP
procedure
Z251 - Test Strength and tightness test of adjacent compartments, as relevant.

AP
procedure
Z250 - Bonding handbook, if secondary barrier is bonded.

AP
Procedure
Z250 - Repair procedures for membranes and main components.

AP
Procedure
Z250 - Erection handbook.

FI
Procedure
Z030 - Temperature indication system in insulation spaces and cofferdams.

Arrangement AP
plan
I200 - Control Temperature indication system in insulation spaces and cofferdams.

and monitoring AP
system
Z265 - Required relief valve capacity for fuel tank and insulation spaces.
Calculation FI
report
DNV AS
Documentation

type

portable tanks drawing
— tanks
— supports
— insulation AP
— marking plates
C040 - Design Design loads and structural analysis of fuel tanks, including
analysis FI
— thermal effects between tanks and supports
— fatigue assessment as required.
H130 - Including:
Fabrication
specification AP
— forming procedure of dished ends
required.
P030 - Hull steel temperature when fuel temperature is below -10 C:

Temperature FI
calculations — leakage into secondary barrier (e.g. tank connection space, drip tray).
Z161 - Including:
Operation
manual AP
closing valve on liquid lines
— procedure of connection/disconnection of tank to the ship.
Fuel control I200 - Control — functionality as required by [10].

and monitoring and monitoring
AP
system system
documentation
I260 - Field See [1.8.1.2].

instruments
AP
periodic test
plan
Fuel safety I200 - Control — functionality as required by Table 13.

system and monitoring
AP
system
documentation
G130 - Cause — shall cover the safety functions as required by Table 13

and effect — interfaces to other safety and control systems shall be included. AP
diagram
DNV AS
Documentation

type
Fuel piping S011 - Piping Including:

systems diagram (PD)
— secondary enclosures for fuel pipes including pressure relief arrangements
— boil off system
AP
— bunkering lines
— fuel supply and return system
— gas freeing and purging system
— ammonia release mitigation system.
S060 - Pipe
FI
routing sketch
S090 - Including offsets, loops and bends and expansion elements (bellows).
Specification of
FI
valves, flanges
and fittings
Z253 - Test Functional tests of all piping systems including valves, fittings and associated
procedure for equipment for handling fuel (liquefied or gaseous).
AP
quay and sea
trial
Z253 - Test Functional test of ammonia release mitigation system.

procedure for
AP
quay and sea
trial
Z030 - Vent masts, including location and details of outlets from fuel tanks safety
Arrangement relief valves. AP
plan
Z265 - Stress analysis for fuel supply and return pipes with design pressure 18.0
Calculation bar. FI
report
Z100 - Closing time of shutdown valves in fuel lines operated by the safety system.
FI
Specification
Fuel drip trays Z030 - Hull protection beneath piping for liquefied fuel where leakages may be
Arrangement anticipated, such as at shore connections and at pump seals. Including FI
plan specification.
Fuel cooling S010 - Piping

AP
system diagram (PD)
Fuel heating S010 - Piping

AP
system diagram (PD)
Exhaust gas S010 - Piping Including arrangement of explosion relief or verification of strength of piping
AP
system diagram (PD) system.
Hazardous area G080 -

classification Hazardous area
AP
classification
drawing
DNV AS
Documentation

type
Toxic zone plan Z030 - Safety distances from as required in [9.2.2] in relation to openings to
Arrangement enclosed spaces, air inlets and -outlets, escape ways and mustering station. AP
plan
Toxic zones Z265 - Dispersion analysis as required in [9.2.2].

Calculation FI
report
Air lock Z030 - Location and construction details, including alarm equipment.
arrangements Arrangement FI
plan
Ventilation S012 - Ducting Including capacity and location of fans and their motors.
systems for fuel diagram (DD) AP
system spaces
Ventilation I200 - Control Including detection of ventilation function, safety actions and sequences,
control and and monitoring arrangement of powering of fans, etc.
AP
monitoring system
Electrical Z030 - Where relevant, based on an approved 'Hazardous area classification drawing'
systems Arrangement where location of electric equipment in hazardous area is added (except FI
plan battery room, paint stores and gas bottle store).
E170 - Electrical Single line diagrams for all intrinsically safe circuits, for each circuit including
schematic data for verification of the compatibility between the barrier and the field AP
drawing components.
Z071 - Failure If required by [8.1.1.3].

mode and effect AP
analysis (FMEA)
E250 -
Explosion
protected
FI
equipment
maintenance
manual
Ammonia I200 - Control

gas and leak and monitoring
AP
detection and system
alarm system, documentation
fixed
Z030 -
Arrangement AP
plan
Structural fire G060 -

protection Structural fire
AP
arrangements protection
drawing
DNV AS
Documentation

type
External G200 -
surface Fixed fire
protection extinguishing AP
water spraying system
Fuel G200 - fixed fire

preparation extinguishing
room fire system AP
system
Water safety S010 - Piping With water supply and arrangement to prevent freezing.
AP
systems diagram (PD)
Z030 - Including:
Arrangement
— location of water spray/screen/mist systems and control positions of such AP
plan
equipment
— location of eye washers and decontamination showers.
Personell Z030 - Personnel protection appliances as specified in [3.3.6].

protective Arrangement AP
equipment plan
Bunkering G200 -
station fire Fixed fire
extinguishing extinguishing AP
system system
documentation
Fire detection I200 - Control

and alarm and monitoring
AP
system system
documentation
Z030 -
Arrangement AP
plan
Fire Z030 -
extinguishing Arrangement
AP
equipment, plan
mobile
Inert gas I200 - Control

system and monitoring
AP
system
documentation
S010 - Piping
AP
diagram (PD)

1) For generic tank type (novel design) and semi-membrane tank additional documentation requirements shall be
agreed on a case-by-case basis.
DNV AS
For general requirements for documentation, including definition of the Info codes, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.6.


Compliance documentation shall be submitted as required by Table 5.
Compliance
Compliance
standard
type
Gas/dual fuel engines PC In accordance with Pt.4 Ch.3.
Process pressure vessels PC Shall be certified as class I pressure vessels in accordance with
Pt.4 Ch.7.
Valves in fuel systems PC For valves with design temperature below 0°C
Valves in fuel systems PC For valves with design pressure above 10 bar
Valves in fuel systems PD For valves with design pressure equal to or lower than 10 bar,
and design temperature equal to or above 0°C.
Control and monitoring PC Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 for:
systems
— gas control systems
— gas safety systems
— gas detection systems
— inert gas control and monitoring systems.
Electric motors PC Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used in gas
Electric motor starters PC Shall be certified in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.8 when used in gas
1)
Unless otherwise specified the compliance standard is the Society's rules.
For a definition of the compliance document types, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.3.

For general compliance document requirements, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.4.

1.8.1 Contents
1.8.1.1 An operational manual shall be prepared as required by the IGF Code Ch.18, with additional
requirements specific to ammonia fuel.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

1) Arrangement and lay-out of the fuel supply system, including:
— description of main components in the fuel supply system

— a description of the boil off handling system if installed
— a description of the ammonia release mitigation system.
2) Description of the safety shutdown system for the fuel supply system, including:
— the fuel system


— the machinery spaces

— on deck
3) Description of hazards in connection with inerted spaces and use of inert gas

— how to prevent the release of fuel gases to atmosphere
— how to gas free the bunkering system at termination of the bunkering operation
— safety precautions.
5) Description of entry procedure for:

— GVU enclosures
— hold spaces
6) Procedure for emptying and gas freeing of fuel tanks.
7) Procedure for emptying and gas freeing of fuel pipes and process equipment using the ammonia release mitigation system.
8) Relevant drawings of the fuel installation, including:
— fuel piping diagram

— fuel system arrangement plan
during the tests.
Test intervals for shutdown inputs and outputs (as required by Table 13) shall not exceed 6 months. For other
signals the test intervals shall not exceed 12 months.
DNV AS
The plan may be included in the plan required for the class notation E0, see Sec.2 [1.6].

1.9 Signboards
1.9.1 General
1.9.1.1 If the fuel supply is shut off due to activation of an automatic valve, the fuel supply shall not be
the fuel supply lines.
1.9.1.2 If a gas leak leading to a fuel supply shutdown occurs, the supply shall not be operated until the
leak has been found and dealt with. Instructions to this effect shall be placed in a prominent position in the
machinery space.
stating that the hatch shall not be opened until after the gas supply system is shut down and gas free.
related to entry.
2 Materials
2.1 General
2.1.1.2 Materials used in fuel containment and fuel piping systems shall comply with the requirements in
Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [1], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [2], Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [3] and Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 [4].
2.1.1.3 Pipes for fuel and their secondary enclosures shall as a minimum fulfil the requirements for pipe
materials with design temperature down to -55°C in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.6 Table 4.
2.1.1.4 The materials used in fuel gas piping systems shall be furnished with documentation in accordance
with Table 6.
2.1.1.5 Where carbon-manganese steel is used, fuel tanks, process pressure vessels and fuel piping shall be
2
made of fine-grained steel with a specified minimum yield strength not exceeding 355 N/mm , and with an
2
actual yield strength not exceeding 440 N/mm . In addition, one of the following measures should be taken:
2
— lower strength material with a specified minimum tensile strength not exceeding 410 N/mm shall be
used, or
— fuel tanks, etc., shall be post-weld stress relief heat treated.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The following operational measures have been shown to reduce the risk of stress corrosion cracking:
— Maintaining the ammonia fuel temperature preferably at a temperature close to the product's boiling point of -33°C, but in no
case at a temperature above -20°C.
— Ensuring that the ammonia contain not less than 0.1% w/w water.
— Keeping the dissolved oxygen content below 2.5 ppm w/w. This can best be achieved by reducing the average oxygen content
in the tanks prior to the introduction of liquid ammonia to less than the values given as a function of the carriage temperature
T in the table below:
T [°C] O2 [% by volume]
-30 and below 0.90
-20 0.50
-10 0.28
0 0.16
10 0.10
20 0.05
30 0.03
Oxygen % for intermediate temperatures may be obtained by direct interpolation.
2.1.1.6 If carbon-manganese steels with higher yield properties are used other than those specified in
[2.1.1.5], the completed fuel tanks, piping, etc., shall be given a post-weld stress relief heat treatment.
2.1.1.7 Process pressure vessels and piping shall be given a post-weld stress relief heat treatment when
made of materials mentioned in [2.1.1.5].
2.1.1.8 The tensile and yield properties of the welding consumables shall exceed those of the tank or piping
material by the smallest practical amount.
2.1.1.9 Nickel steel containing more than 5% nickel and carbon-manganese steel, not complying with the
requirements of [2.1.1.5] and [2.1.1.6] are particularly susceptible to ammonia stress corrosion cracking and
shall not be used in containment and piping systems for ammonia fuel.
2.1.1.10 Copper, copper alloys, zinc and zinc alloys shall not be used for piping, fittings, valves, parts of fuel
containment system and any equipment which may be in contact with ammonia liquid or vapour in normal
operation.
2.1.1.11 For fuel containment systems not of type C, special consideration shall be made towards selection
of materials for secondary containment and insulation, as applicable.
Table 6 Compliance documents for material quality and testing
Compliance Compliance Nominal Design Design
Object Piping
document standard Material diameter pressure temperature
system
[mm] [bar] [°C]
DNV AS
Pipes MC Pressure >25 > 10 or < 0

(including
secondary MD Pressure ≤ 25
MTR Open ended ≥0
Flanges MD Pressure
MTR Open ended
Bodies of MC <0
valves and
fittings,
pump
housings,
other
1)
pressure Steel
containing MD
components
not
considered
as pressure
vessels
Nuts and
MTR Steel
bolts

Unless otherwise stated, the compliance standard is the rules.
1) When fittings are made from plates or pipes, the certification requirements for pipes shall be applied also for pipe
fittings.
2.1.1.12 For general requirements for compliance documents, see DNV-CG-0550 Sec.3.
3 Ship arrangements

3.1.1.1 The fuel containment system shall be located in such a way that the probability for the tank(s) to be
damaged following a collision or grounding is reduced to a minimum taking into account the safe operation of
the ship and other hazards that may be relevant to the ship.
3.1.1.2 Fuel storage tanks shall be protected against mechanical damage.
3.1.1.3 The fuel containment system installed in the ship shall be able to contain leakages without damaging
other structures due to the low temperature effects, and to prevent gas spreading to non-hazardous spaces.
3.1.1.4 Where maximum probable leakage is defined in the rules, the leakage areas described in Table 7
shall be considered.
DNV AS
Table 7 Leakage size to be considered per component

Component Leakage size to be considered
2 2 2
Pipe 0,01D (mm ) for D 100mm, 100mm for D > 100mm
Flange Blow out of gasket: Dt/4
Bonnet failure when bolts are used for fastening: bonnet

Valve area = DBt/4. Valve flanges to be considered under
flanges.
2
Flexible hose Full bore rupture: D /4
D = pipe diameter, t = thickness of gasket, DB = flow diameter through bonnet
3.1.1.5 Areas with piping systems for liquefied fuel shall be arranged to contain leakages without damaging
other structures due to the low temperature effects, and to prevent gas spreading to non-hazardous spaces.
3.1.1.6 Areas with piping systems for gaseous fuel shall be arranged to prevent gas spreading to non-
hazardous spaces.
3.1.2.2 Mustering stations and lifesaving equipment and access to such stations and equipment shall not be
located in toxic zones as specified in [9.2.2].

3.2.1 General
3.2.1.1 A machinery space containing ammonia fuelled engines shall have at least two completely
independent exits. This requirement may be waived after special consideration by the Society if the
machinery space is very small.
3.2.1.3 Machinery spaces containing parts of an ammonia fuel system shall be arranged such that the
spaces may be considered gas safe under all conditions. This implies that all leakage sources shall be
protected by a secondary enclosure in order to ensure that a single failure will not lead to release of fuel into
the machinery space. A gas safe machinery space may be arranged as a conventional machinery space.

3.3.1.1 Fuel process equipment shall be arranged in a fuel preparation room arranged in accordance with
the requirements in these rules. As an exemption to this requirement, fuel heaters and motors for pumps
submerged in tanks may be located in tank connection spaces, see [3.3.2].
3.3.1.2 When fuel preparation rooms cannot be located on open deck, or accessed from open deck, access
shall be provided through an air lock in compliance with [3.4].
DNV AS
3.3.1.3 Access from engine room is not permitted for fuel preparation rooms.

3.3.1.4 Fuel preparation rooms shall be designed to safely contain fuel leakages. The fuel preparation room
boundaries shall be gas tight towards other spaces in the ship.
3.3.1.5 Unless located on open deck, fuel preparation rooms shall not be located directly above or adjacent
to machinery spaces of category A or other high fire risk areas. If cofferdams are used to obtain segregation
between fuel preparation rooms and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance of 900 mm
between bulkheads or decks and A-60 class insulation. A-120 or H-120 class insulation may be used in lieu
of 900 mm cofferdam and A-60 class insulation. Common boundaries of protective cofferdams or bulkheads
with such spaces shall be kept to a minimum.
3.3.1.6 The material of the boundaries of the fuel preparation room shall have a design temperature
corresponding with the lowest temperature it can be subjected to in a probable maximum leakage scenario
unless the boundaries of the space, i.e. bulkheads and decks, are provided with suitable thermal protection.
3.3.1.7 The fuel preparation room shall be fitted with ventilation arrangements ensuring that the space can
withstand any pressure build up caused by vaporization of the liquefied fuel.
resulting from a calculated maximum leakage, but shall in no case be lower than 300 mm.
3.3.1.9 Fuel preparation room entrances shall be arranged with water screens having constantly available
water supply. The water screen shall be possible to activate from a safe location outside the fuel preparation
room toxic zone if an ammonia leak occurs. The water screens shall be arranged on the outside of the fuel
preparation room. The water screen system shall follow the requirements for water safety systems in [5.6.3].
3.3.1.10 A leakage in the fuel preparation room shall not render necessary safety functions out of order due
to low temperatures caused by evaporation of leaking fuel.
3.3.2.1 Fuel tank connections, flanges and tank valves shall be located in a tank connection space arranged
in accordance with the requirements in these rules. Apart from fuel process equipment allowed in tank
connection spaces as defined in [3.3.1.1], tank connection spaces and fuel preparation rooms shall not be
combined.
3.3.2.2 Tank connection spaces shall not be located directly adjacent to machinery spaces of category A or
other rooms with a high risk of fire. If cofferdams are used to obtain segregation between tank connection
spaces and high fire risk spaces, they shall have a minimum distance of 900 mm between bulkheads or
decks. Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with such spaces shall be kept to a minimum.
3.3.2.3 Tank connection spaces shall be designed to safely contain fuel leakages. The tank connection space
boundaries shall be gas tight towards other spaces in the ship.
3.3.2.5 Tank connection spaces shall be fitted with ventilation arrangements ensuring that the spaces can
withstand any pressure build up caused by vaporisation of the liquefied fuel.
3.3.2.6 Tank connection space entrances shall be arranged with a sill height exceeding the liquid level
3.3.2.7 Tank connection space entrances shall be arranged with water screens having constantly available
water supply. The water screen shall be possible to activate from a safe location outside the tank connection
DNV AS
space toxic zone if an ammonia leak occurs. The water screens shall be arranged on the outside of the

tank connection spaces. The water screen system shall follow the requirements for water safety systems in
[5.6.3].
provided through an air lock complying with [3.4].
Guidance note:
If an enclosure for structural protection of the ammonia fuel containment system following the requirements of [3.1.1.2] is
arranged, access to the tank connection space may be arranged without air lock if the enclosure:
1) is open at two ends, or

2) is open at one end and is provided with the adequate natural ventilation effective over the entire length through permanent
openings distributed in the side plating or deckhead or from above, the openings having a total area of at least 10% of the
total area of the space sides.
3.3.2.9 Access from engine room is not permitted for tank connection spaces.
3.3.2.10 A leakage in the tank connection space shall not render necessary safety functions out of order due
to low temperatures caused by evaporation of leaking fuel.
for normal consumption for at least 30 days. Shorter periods may be considered, depending on the ship's
service.
generation system sufficient to inert the largest of these spaces.
The applicable gas detection systems fitted in the spaces shall, together with the capability of the inerting
arrangements, ensure that any leakage from the fuel tanks will be rapidly detected and inerting effected
before a dangerous condition can develop.
Equipment for the provision of sufficient dry air of suitable quality to satisfy the expected demand shall be
provided.
maintained in this condition with dry air provided by suitable air-drying equipment. This is only applicable for
3.3.3.4 Unless the access to interbarrier spaces and hold spaces associated with fuel containment systems
prevented.
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3.3.4.1 The bunkering station shall be arranged in an enclosed compartment.
3.3.4.2 Open or semi-enclosed bunkering stations may be applied subject to special consideration.
Depending on the arrangement of open or semi-enclosed bunkering stations this may include:
— segregation towards other areas of the ship
— hazardous and toxic area plans for the ship
— requirements for leakage detection
— safety actions related to leakage detection
— monitoring of bunkering station by direct line of sight or closed circuit television (CCTV).
— water spray systems
— fire extinguishing systems.
3.3.4.3 When enclosed bunkering stations cannot be accessed from open deck, access shall be provided
through an air lock in compliance with [3.4].
3.3.4.4 Access from engine room is not permitted for enclosed bunkering stations.
3.3.4.5 Enclosed bunkering stations shall be designed to safely contain fuel leakages. The bunkering station
boundaries shall be gas tight towards other spaces on the ship.
3.3.4.6 The materials of the bulkheads of the enclosed bunkering station shall have a design temperature
corresponding with the lowest temperature it can be subject to in a maximum probable leakage scenario.
3.3.4.7 Enclosed bunkering station entrances shall be arranged with a sill height exceeding the liquid level
3.3.4.8 Enclosed bunkering station entrances shall be arranged with water screens having constantly
available water supply. The water screen shall be possible to activate from a safe location outside the
bunkering station toxic zone if an ammonia leak occurs. The water screens shall be arranged on the outside
of the bunkering station access. The water screen system shall follow the requirements for water safety
systems in [5.6.3].
3.3.4.9 A water spray system for the purpose of limiting the amount of toxic vapours in the enclosed
bunkering station in a leakage scenario shall be arranged above the bunker manifold and cover all possible
leakage points.
3.3.4.10 A water distribution system shall be fitted over the bulkhead opening for shore connections to
provide a low-pressure water curtain for additional protection of the hull steel and the ship's side structure
and for the purpose of limiting the amount of toxic vapours exiting the bunkering station opening in a
leakage scenario. This system shall be operated when fuel transfer is in progress. The water curtain system
shall follow the requirements for water safety systems in [5.6.3].
closed valves to the system shall be located in a readily accessible position, which likely to be accessible in
case of fire or leakage of toxic gases in the areas protected. Remote operation of valves shall be possible
from the control location for bunkering.
3.3.4.12 Drip trays shall be fitted below bunkering manifolds and other leakage points in the bunkering
station to limit the extent of a spill. Each drip tray shall be:
— made of suitable material to hold spills
— fitted with a drain valve to enable water to be drained over the ship's side
DNV AS
— of sufficient size and capacity to handle reasonably foreseeable spills and to collect water from any water

spray system arranged above it.
3.3.4.13 Mechanical spray shielding shall be arranged around potential leakage points from the ammonia
system in the bunkering station.
3.3.4.14 A ship-shore link (SSL) or an equivalent means for automatic and manual ESD communication to
the bunkering source shall be arranged.
hatch.
3.3.5.2 The gas valve unit space shall only be entered after the gas supply system is shut down and gas
free. See [1.9.1.4].
3.3.6 Personnel protective equipment
3.3.6.1 At least two sets of air breathing apparatuses with spare air bottles shall be available on board. The
breathing apparatuses may be the same as those required for other purposes, e.g. SOLAS, provided the ship
is equipped with an air compressor for recharging the air bottles.
3.3.6.2 Gas masks and hermetically sealed filters shall be available in a permanently marked, transparent
door case located immediately outside each entrance to fuel preparation rooms and tank connection spaces.
Additionally, at least two sets of suitable protective clothing shall be available on board and located in the
vicinity of these spaces. The two sets of protective clothing shall be gas tight suits with permanently attached
boots and gloves and suitable for use in combination with the air breathing apparatuses.
3.3.6.3 For the protection of crew members who are engaged in bunkering operations, the ship shall have
on board suitable protective equipment consisting of large aprons, special gloves with long sleeves, suitable
footwear, coveralls of chemical-resistant material, and face shields. The protective clothing and equipment
shall cover all skin so that no part of the body is unprotected.
3.3.6.4 Suitably marked decontamination showers and eyewashes shall be available in convenient locations:
— close to bunkering stations
— close to exit from tank connection spaces
— close to exit from fuel preparation rooms
— in engine rooms.
The shower and eyewasher system shall follow the requirements for water safety systems in [5.6.3]. Water
supply capacity shall be sufficient for simultaneous use of at least two units.
3.3.6.5 Suitable respiratory and eye protection for emergency escape purposes shall be provided for every
person on board, subject to the following:
— filter-type respiratory protection is unacceptable
— self-contained breathing apparatus shall have at least 15 minutes of service time
— emergency escape respiratoy protection shall not be used for firefighting or cargo-handling purposes and
shall be marked to that effect.
3.3.7 Survival crafts and muster stations

Arrangement of survival craft and muster stations shall be considered in the alternative design analysis as
required by the IGF Code Ch.2 2-3.
In connection with subject analysis, the following may be used as examples for items relevant to consider:
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— The need for life boats provided with a self-contained air support system complying with the requirements

of the international life-saving appliance (LSA) code.
— The need for enclosed and in other ways protected muster stations.
— Safe escape from accomodation/muster stations to survival craft.

3.4.1 General
3.4.1.1 An air lock is a space enclosed by gas tight bulkheads with two substantially gas tight doors spaced
arrangements.
3.4.1.2 Air locks shall be separately mechanically ventilated at an overpressure relative to the adjacent
hazardous area or space. The ventilation inlets and outlets for air locks shall be located in open air.
3.4.1.3 Air locks shall have a simple geometrical form. They shall provide free and easy passage, and shall
2
have a deck area not less than 1.5 m . Air locks shall not be used for other purposes, for instance as store
rooms.
3.4.2.2 The air lock space shall be monitored for ammonia.
3.4.2.3 Audible and visual alarms shall be given at a manned location to indicate
— loss of pressure in air lock
— if both air lock doors are open at the same time.
Access to the hazardous space shall be restricted until the ventilation has been reinstated.
4.1 General
fire is minimized.
DNV AS

— fuel storage hold spaces shall be segregated from the sea by a double bottom; and
— the ship shall also have a longitudinal bulkhead forming side tanks.
4.1.1.7 Means of safely discharging the fuel contained in the ammonia fuel containment system to a shore
reception facility in case of single pump failure in the fuel tank shall be provided.
4.1.2 Tank access
4.1.2.3 Access for internal inspection of fuel tanks shall be provided. Access arranged through horizontal
openings, hatches or manholes shall have dimensions sufficient to allow a person wearing a breathing
apparatus to ascend or descend any ladder without obstruction, and also to provide a clear opening to
facilitate the hoisting of an injured person from the bottom of the space. The minimum clear opening shall be
not less than 600 mm x 600 mm. Circular access openings to type C tanks shall have a diameter of not less
than 600 mm.
4.2 Location of fuel containment systems

4.2.1 General
4.2.1.1 The fuel tank(s) shall be protected from external damage caused by collision or grounding in the
following way:
inboard from the ship side at right angles to the centerline at the level of the summer load line draught;
where:
draught), see SOLAS regulation II-1/2.8.
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1) For passenger ships: B/10, but in no case less than 0.8 m. However, this distance need not be
m, whichever is less, as required by [4.2.1.1] 1).
2) For cargo ships:
3
1) for VC below or equal 1000 m , 0.8m;
3 3
2) for 1,000 m VC 5,000 m , 0.75 + VC x 0.2/4,000 m;
3 3
3) for 5,000 m VC 30,000 m , 0.8 + VC/25,000 m; and
3
4) for VC 30,000 m , 2 m
where:
m, whichever is less, measured from the moulded line of the bottom shell plating at the centerline.
in accordance with SOLAS¨regulation II-1/8.1 for passenger ships, and abaft the collision bulkhead for
cargo ships.
where:
L is the length as defined in the International Convention on Load Lines, see SOLAS regulation II-1/2.5.
4.2.1.2 As an alternative to [4.2.1.1] above, the following calculation method may be used to determine the
acceptable location of the fuel tanks:
3
fCN = fI x ft x fV
where:
fI is calculated by use of the formulations for factor p contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-1.1.1.1. The
3
The value fCN accounts for collision damages that may occur within a zone limited by the longitudinal
projected boundaries of the fuel tank only, and cannot be considered or used as the probability for the
fuel tank to become damaged given a collision. The real probability will be higher when accounting for
longer damages that include zones forward and aft of the fuel tank.
DNV AS

of the fuel tank.
formulation is:
4
ft = 1 - r(x1,x2,b)
fV is calculated by use of the formulations for factor v contained in SOLAS regulation II-1/7-2.6.1.1 and
fV = 1.0 - 0.8 · ((H - d)/7.8), if (H - d) is less than or equal to 7.8 m. fV shall not be taken greater than
1,
fV = 0.2 · ((H - d) - 7.8)/4.7, in all other cases fV shall not be taken less than 0.
where:
H is the distance from baseline, in meters, to the lowermost boundary of the fuel tank; and
m, whichever is less, as required by [4.2.1.1].
2) For cargo ships:
3
1) for VC below or equal 1000 m , 0.8 m;
3 3
2) for 1,000 m VC 5,000 m , 0.75 + VC x 0.2/4,000 m;
3 3
3) for 5,000 m VC 30,000 m , 0.8 + VC/25,000 m; and
3
4) for VC 30,000 m , 2 m
where:
6) In case of more than one non-overlapping fuel tank located in the longitudinal direction, fCN shall be
calculated in accordance with paragraph [4.2.1.2] 2) for each fuel tank separately. The value used for
the complete fuel tank arrangement is the sum of all values for fCN obtained for each separate tank.
7) 7 In case the fuel tank arrangement is unsymmetrical about the centerline of the ship, the calculations
assessment. The minimum distance as set forth in paragraph [4.2.1.2] 5) shall be met on both sides.
1) fuel storage hold spaces shall be segregated from the sea by a double bottom; and
2) the ship shall also have a longitudinal bulkhead forming side tanks.
4
When the outermost boundary of the fuel tank is outside the boundary given by the deepest subdivision
waterline the value of b should be taken as 0.
DNV AS
4.3 Liquid gas fuel tanks
4.3.1 General
4.3.1.1 For fuel tanks for liquefied fuel where insulation is part of the means to maintain the fuel storage
condition, liquefied gas tanks shall be fitted with efficient insulation.
with applicable parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4, Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.20, Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.24, unless covered by this section.
Guidance note:
for fuel contaiment systems.
4.3.1.3 The design life of fixed liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall not be less than the design life of
the ship or 25 years, whichever is greater.
Society for liquefied gas fuel containment systems used exclusively for restricted navigation.
More demanding environmental conditions may be required for liquefied gas fuel containment systems
operated in conditions more severe than the North Atlantic environment.

a) Ultimate design conditions - the liquefied gas fuel containment system structure and its structural
following loads:
— thermal loads
— sloshing loads
— test loads.
b) Fatigue design conditions - the liquefied gas fuel containment system structure and its structural
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c) Accidental design conditions - the liquefied gas fuel containment system shall meet each of the following

— collision - the liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall sustain the collision loads specified in
— fire - the liquefied gas fuel containment systems shall sustain without rupture the rise in internal
pressure specified in [5.2.3] under the fire scenarios envisaged there.
— flooded compartment causing buoyancy on tank - the anti-flotation arrangements shall sustain the
Sec.4 [4.3.3].
insulation system, also capable of preventing lowering of the temperature of the ship structure to an unsafe
level.
4.3.2.2 The size and configuration or arrangement of the secondary barrier may be reduced or omitted
where an equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated in accordance with [4.3.2.3] and [4.3.2.4], as
applicable.
DNV AS


Table 8 Secondary barrier requirements for tanks
Type C No secondary barrier
Ch.7 Sec.4 [4.3.3] .6
5) the methods required in 4) shall be approved by the Society and shall include, as a minimum:
— accuracy and range of values of the proposed method for detecting defects in 4) above
undertaken
— effects of thermal and mechanical cyclic loading on the effectiveness of the proposed test.
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[4.3.3] .6, after the initial detection of a primary leak. Due account may be taken of liquid evaporation, rate

of leakage, pumping capacity and other relevant factors.
trim.

Supporting arrangements are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.6].

Associated structure and equipment are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.7].

Thermal insulation is defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [2.8].
4.3.9 Design loads
[4.3.9.2] and [4.3.9.3].
4.3.9.2 Environmental loads are defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [3.4].In addition the following loads shall be
considered:
a) Collision loads
with an inertial force corresponding to the design accelerationa in Table 9 in forward direction and a/2 in
the aft direction, where g is gravitational acceleration.
L > 100 m 0.5 g
60 < L ≤ 100 m [2 - 3(L-60)/80] x g
L ≤ 60 m 2g

DNV AS
4.3.11 Structural analysis


2) In addition to 1) above, where a complete or partial secondary barrier is required it shall be assumed to
be at the liquefied gas fuel temperature at atmospheric pressure for any one tank only.
winter months.
steel grade.
4.3.13.4 Thermal insulation and other materials used in liquefied gas fuel containment systems are defined
in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.4 [5.1.4].
4.3.14 Construction process

4.3.15 Tank types

In addition, the following requirements for fatigue design condition apply:
— For type C independent tanks the Society may require additional verification to check compliance with
design basis for C type tanks as defined in Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.22 [1.1.1], regarding static and dynamic stress
depending on the configuration of the tank and arrangement of its supports and attachments.
DNV AS


4.4.1 General
intended purpose.
4.4.1.3 Fuel systems utilizing portable fuel tanks shall have equivalent safety compared to permanent fuel
tanks.
— spill protection and water spray systems for cooling if located on open deck.
If the tanks are located in an enclosed space, the space shall be considered as a tank connection space.
system.
4.4.1.11 After connection to the ship's fuel piping system:

system
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reference temperature as defined in [1.5.1]. A loading limit curve for actual fuel loading temperatures shall
be prepared from the following formula:
LL= FL
where:
FL = filling limit as defined in [1.5.1], expressed in per cent, here 98%
= relative density of fuel at the reference temperature
= relative density of fuel at the loading temperature.
loading limit than calculated using the reference temperature, but never above 95%. This also applies in
cases where a second system for pressure maintenance is installed. However, if the pressure can only be
maintained/controlled by fuel consumers, the loading limit as calculated in [4.5.1.1] shall be used.

4.6.1 Control tank pressure and temperature
— re-liquefaction
assuming that the ship is in idle condition, i.e. only power for domestic load is generated.
Guidance note:
Unless the storage tanks have a design pressure above the vapour pressure of ammonia at 45°C, a boil-off gas management
system needs to be arranged.
Guidance note:
DNV AS
4.6.1.4 If a re-liquefaction system produces a waste stream containing ammonia during pressure control

operations within the design conditions, these waste gases shall, as far as reasonably practicable, be
disposed of without venting to atmosphere.
4.6.1.5 Refrigerants or auxiliary agents used for refrigeration or cooling of fuel shall be compatible with
the fuel they may come in contact with (i.e. not causing any hazardous reaction or excessively corrosive
products). In addition, when several refrigerants or agents are used, these shall be compatible with each
other.

to safely contain fuel leakages.
4.7.1.4 For type C fuel tanks, the fuel storage hold space may act as the protective cofferdam if the
bulkhead is at least 900 mm from the outer shell of the tank.
4.7.1.5 Common boundaries of protective cofferdams with engine rooms or high fire risk areas shall kept to
a minimum.
Guidance note:
A tank connection space may be required also for tanks on open deck. This may apply for ships where the ability to control
the leakage of toxic gases is safety critical. A tank connection space may also be necessary in order to provide environmental
protection for essential safety equipment related to the gas fuel system like tank valves, safety valves and instrumentation.
at atmospheric pressure. Drip trays shall be thermally insulated from the ship's structure to prevent
DNV AS
5 Piping systems
5.1 General
5.1.1.4 It shall be possible to detect leakages in a fuel piping system, and to automatically isolate the
leakage from the source.
5.1.1.6 The fuel supply system shall include an ammonia release mitigation system (ARMS) capable of
collecting and handling ammonia from:
— purging or draining operations of fuel pipes
— bleeding operations from double block and bleed arrangements on the fuel piping systems
— releases from opening of pressure relief valves on the fuel piping system
— any other releases of ammonia occurring from normal operation of the system.
The ARMS shall be capable of reducing the amount of ammonia discharged to air from the above operations
to a concentration not exceeding 300 ppm. Discharges from the ARMS shall be led to a vent mast arranged
per [9.2.2.1].
5.1.2.2 For propulsion and power generation plants using ammonia as the only fuel, the fuel supply system
shall be arranged with redundancy and segregation all the way from the gas tank to the consumer. A leakage
in the fuel supply system with following necessary safety actions shall not lead to an unacceptable loss of
power.
5.1.2.3 For propulsion and power generation plants using ammonia as the only fuel, the fuel storage shall
be divided between two or more tanks, including separate secondary barriers when required. If fuel tanks of
type C are used, one tank may be accepted if two completely separate tank connection spaces are installed
for the one tank.
covering any single failure in active components or systems, see Pt.4 Ch.1 Sec.3 [3].
DNV AS
Guidance note:

principles than duplication of the propulsion line with separate gas supply systems.
The requirement does in general not apply to dual-fuel engines.
liquid level may be accepted for fuel tanks of type C.
5.1.3.3 Low temperature piping shall be thermally insulated from the adjacent hull structure, where
necessary, to prevent the temperature of the hull from falling below the design temperature of the hull
material.
equipment rooms or control stations as defined in the SOLAS convention.
5.1.3.7 Fuel piping shall be capable of absorbing thermal expansion or contraction caused by extreme
temperatures of the fuel without developing substantial stresses. Expansion bellows are not accepted used in
ammonia piping systems.
Guidance note:
Expansion bellows may be permitted along the ammonia gas manifold on engines where necessary to admit relative movement
between moving components.
5.1.3.11 Fuel piping systems shall have sufficient constructive strength. This shall be confirmed by carrying
out stress analysis and taking into account:
Guidance note:
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5.1.3.12 Fuel piping shall be installed and protected so as to minimise the risk of injury to personnel in case

of rupture.
5.1.3.13 Where tanks or piping are separated from the ship's structure by thermal insulation, provision shall
be made for electrically bonding to the ship's structure both the piping and the tanks. All gasketed pipe joints
Guidance note:
5.1.4 Fuel piping systems - general
5.1.4.1 Fuel piping systems shall be protected by a secondary enclosure able to contain leakages and lead
the leaked content to open air, see [5.1.4.6]. Ammonia vent piping that is subjected to a pressure above
ambient (for instance vent piping leading to the ARMS) shall also pertain to this requirement, while open
ended vent piping on open deck may be arranged without secondary enclosures. If the piping system is
located in a space designed to safely contain leakages, this requirement may be waived.
5.1.4.2 For fuel piping not protected by a secondary barrier, all leakage points shall be arranged with proper
mechanical screening to protected personnel from direct exposure to leaking ammonia. In order to avoid
accumulation of ammonia gas, the mechanical screening shall not be gas tight.
5.1.4.3 Fuel piping systems shall be designed to prevent discharge of ammonia to open air during normal
operation.
5.1.4.4 The piping systems and corresponding secondary enclosures shall be able to withstand the
maximum pressure that may build up in the system.
5.1.4.5 Fuel piping systems shall as a minimum have a design pressure of 10 bar.
5.1.4.6 The secondary enclosure around fuel piping shall be provided with a vent pipe led to open air,
sized to prevent overpressure in a maximum probable leakage scenario. To enable removal of any leaked
ammonia, an arrangement to purge the annular space with nitrogen shall be arranged. The vent pipe shall be
located at least 4 meters above deck or gangway and be designed to prevent ingress of water. The vent pipe
opening in open air shall be arranged with a water spray system having constantly available water supply.
The water spray system shall be automatically activated if an ammonia concentration exceeding 350 ppm is
detected in the annular space. The water spray system shall be arranged over the vent opening. The water
spray system shall follow the requirements for water safety systems in [5.6.3].
Guidance note:
It is acknowledged that the pipe segment serving the engine may require mechanical ventilation to prevent small operational leaks
from accumulating in the annular space and trigger a shut-down by the gas detection system.
5.1.4.7 The secondary enclosure shall be made of a material that can withstand the lowest temperature it
may be subjected to in a leakage scenario.
DNV AS
5.1.5 Fuel piping systems containing liquid ammonia fuel

5.1.5.1 Where ammonia fuel is intended to be used in the liquid state, the pressure in the fuel manifold shall
be sufficient for maintaining the fuel in the liquid state.
5.1.5.2 Fuel piping systems for liquid ammonia shall as a minimum have a design pressure of 18 bar,
corresponding to the vapour pressure of ammonia at 45 C, in order to prevent venting of ammonia in idle
conditions.
5.1.6 Fuel piping systems containing gaseous ammonia fuel
5.1.6.2 Where ammonia fuel is intended to be used in the gaseous state and has a dew point higher than
ambient temperature at the maximum expected pressure at the consumer inlet, the fuel shall be sufficiently
heated, the fuel lines shall be properly heat traced and provisions shall be made to prevent ammonia from
entering the engine by the following measures:
— monitoring of fuel pipe wall temperature
— monitoring of fuel pressure
— heat tracing of gas supply and gas vent piping
— drain pot fitted with level switch on fuel supply piping before consumer.
The control system shall be capable of calculating the dynamic dew point based on measurements of fuel
pressure and fuel pipe wall temperature. If fuel pipe wall temperature falls within 10 C of the calculated dew
point of the fuel, the fuel system shall shut down and fuel system shall be purged of ammonia fuel, see Table
13. Liquid or gaseous ammonia from purging of the fuel pipes shall be led to an ARMS system as defined in
[5.1.1.6].
5.1.7 Fuel piping systems containing gaseous ammonia fuel mixed with LNG fuel
5.1.7.1 Where ammonia fuel is intended to be used in a gaseous state in a mixed composition with gaseous
LNG fuel, in addition to measures taken in [5.1.6.2] the composition of the mixed fuel and resulting dew
point shall be monitored by means of monitoring fuel supply valve to fuel mixing manifold opening position
and flow meters on the fuel supply piping to fuel mixing manifold.
5.1.7.2 Where ammonia fuel is intended to be used in a gaseous state in a mixed composition with gaseous
LNG fuel, each fuel supply inlet to the mixing manifold shall be fitted with double block and bleed valve
arrangements to prevent ammonia entering the LNG fuel system and to prevent LNG fuel from entering the
ammonia fuel system.
5.1.7.3 Where ammonia fuel is intended to be used in a gaseous state in a mixed composition with another
fuel, the double block and bleed valve arrangement shall be automatically operated based on differential
pressure monitoring.
normally closed valves not operated during normal service.
5.1.8.4 Remotely operated valves involved in safety actions in Table 13 shall also be arranged for local
manual operation.
DNV AS

5.1.8.6 Remotely operated valves shall fail to a safe position upon loss of actuation power or control signals.
Guidance note:
5.1.8.7 The fuel supply lines to fuel preparation rooms shall be equipped with automatically operated shut-
off valves situated at the bulkhead inside the fuel preparation room.
5.1.8.8 Pipe segments and components that may be isolated in a liquid full condition shall be provided
with pressure relief valves if they can be subjected to pressures above their design pressure due to volume
expansion of liquid heating up. The set pressure of the pressure relief valves shall be minimum 18 bar. The
vent lines from these pressure relief valves shall be led to an ARMS as defined in [5.1.1.6].
5.1.8.9 The fuel supply and return lines line to each gas consumer shall be equipped with a manually
operated stop valve and an automatically operated master fuel valve coupled in series. The valves shall be
located outside the machinery space containing fuel consumers. The master fuel valve shall automatically cut
off the fuel supply to the engine room when activated by the safety system.
5.1.8.10 For maintenance purposes, an arrangement making it possible to gas-free the fuel piping with a
minimal discharge of ammonia to the atmosphere shall be arranged. Liquid or gaseous ammonia from gas-
freeing of the fuel pipes shall be led to an ARMS as defined in [5.1.1.6].
5.1.8.11 Where required by the safety functions in [10.3.2], if a leakage is detected in the fuel supply
system, the leaking pipe segment shall be automatically purged of ammonia with minimal discharge of
ammonia to the atmosphere. Liquid or gaseous ammonia resulting from purging of the fuel pipes shall be led
to an ARMS as defined in [5.1.1.6].
5.1.8.12 Shutdown valves in fuel piping systems operated by the safety system shall close fully and
smoothly within 5 seconds of actuation, or as low as possible taking pressure surges in the fuel piping system
into account. Information about the closure time of the valves and their operating characteristics shall be
available on board, and the closing time shall be verifiable and repeatable.

5.2.1 General
which it may be exposed or forces due to flow or the ship's motions.
DNV AS
5.2.2 Fuel tank pressure relief valves

5.2.2.2 Pressure relief valves shall comply Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [2.1] and be tested in accordance with applicable
parts of Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [2.1.5].
5.2.2.3 Stop valves shall be fitted before and after the fuel tank pressure relief valves. This shall enable in-
service maintenance to stop gas from escaping in case of a leaking pressure relief valve. In case the pressure
relief valves are located in open air, stop valve only at the inlet of the pressure relief valve is accepted. The
outlet of the pressure relief valve shall then be fitted with a blind flange.
5.2.2.4 To minimize risk of a leaking tank pressure relief valve causing accidental release of ammonia to
the vent mast, burst disks shall be fitted after the fuel tank pressure relief valves and before the second
stop valves required by [5.2.2.3], with equal opening pressure as the tank pressure relief valves. A pressure
sensor or an ammonia gas detector shall be fitted in the piping segment between the pressure relief valve
and the burst disk.
5.2.2.6 The outlet from the fuel tank pressure relief valves shall be located at least B/3 or 6 m, whichever
is greater, above the weather deck and 6 m above the working area and gangways, where B is the greatest
moulded breadth of the ship in meters.
5.2.2.7 The outlet from the fuel tank pressure relief valves shall be so constructed that the discharge will be
5.2.2.8 For the purpose of limiting the amount of toxic vapours spreading from the vent mast, the vent mast
outlet in open air shall be arranged with a water spray system having constantly available water supply. The
water spray system shall follow the requirements for water safety systems in [5.6.3].
near the PRVs.
5.2.2.11 Pressure relief valves shall be connected to the highest part of the liquefied fuel tank. PRVs shall be
positioned on the liquefied fuel tank so that they will remain in the vapour phase at the filling limit (FL) under
conditions of 15 list and 0.015 L trim.
5.2.3.2 For tanks in fuel storage hold spaces separated from potential fire loads by cofferdams or
surrounded by spaces with no fire load, the fire factors may be reduced to the following values:
F = 0.5 to F = 0.25
F = 0.2 to F = 0.1
DNV AS
The minimum fire factor is F=01.

5.2.4.1 The sizing of the vent pipe system shall comply with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.8 [4.2].

5.3.1 General
The bunkering system shall be so arranged that no gas will be discharged to air during filling of the fuel
tanks.
bunkering pipes shall be free of gas.
not in use for bunkering. A suitable isolation arrangement is also required for the vapour return system, if
fitted.
point.
5.3.3.2 The closing time of the shutdown valve shall not be more than 5 seconds from the trigger of the
alarm to full closure of the valve, unless pressure surge considerations make a longer closing time necessary.
The closing time of the shutdown valve shall also be sufficient to prevent overfilling of the tank when
automatic shutdown is initiated by high tank level.
high tank level during transfer operation between fuel tanks, see Table 13.
safety dry breakaway coupling/self-sealing quick release. The couplings shall be of a standard type.
DNV AS
5.4.1.1 An arrangement for purging fuel bunkering lines, supply lines and return lines with nitrogen shall be
provided. The nitrogen system shall be of sufficient capacity to purge fuel bunkering lines, supply lines and
return lines.
block-and-bleed valve arrangement to prevent back-flow of fuel to any non-hazardous spaces. In addition,
a closable non-return valve shall be installed between the double block and bleed arrangement and the fuel
system. The bleed line shall be led to an ARMS system as defined in [5.1.1.6].
may substitute the non-return devices required in [5.4.1.2].
shall:
— be fully welded
each case.
step.
DNV AS

change.
5.4.3.4 Inert gas utilised for gas freeing of tanks may be provided externally to the ship.
5.4.4.1 If inert gas generators are provided, they shall be capable of producing inert gas with oxygen
content less than 5% by volume. A continuous-reading oxygen content meter shall be fitted to the inert gas
supply from the equipment and shall be fitted with an alarm set at a maximum of 5% oxygen content by
volume.
5.5 Exhaust system

5.5.1 General
Guidance note:
3 meters, unless efficient shielding is provided.
5.5.1.3 Bursting discs shall only be used as a means for explosion relief ventilation where any event, where a
bursting disc has compromised the exhaust system, does not lead to an unacceptable loss of power.
5.5.1.5 Combustion machinery shall have separate exhaust systems.

5.6.1 Fuel heating systems
5.6.1.1 The circuit for heating of fuel shall be independent of other heating circuits.
5.6.1.2 Circulation pumps for the heating fluid shall be arranged with redundancy.
5.6.1.3 The heating circuit shall be arranged with a system to detect leakages of ammonia.
5.6.1.4 Expansion tanks in the heating circuit shall be vented to open air.
5.6.2 Bilge and drainage systems
DNV AS
5.6.2.2 Bilge wells shall be as small as practicable, not more than 25 liters.

5.6.2.3 As far as possible, the deck plating of fuel preparation rooms shall be arranged for easy cleaning and
drying. Separate floor plating above the deck plating shall not be fitted.
5.6.3 Water safety systems

Water safety systems for limiting spread of toxic ammonia gas in leakage scenario, eye washes and
decontamination showers shall be operable in all ambient conditions. A heating system with temperature
control is required if pipe routing of the water supply exposes the piping to freezing conditions.
Guidance note:
Thermal insulation is not considered as an alternative to a system with temperature control.

6.1.1 Spaces
6.1.1.1 Each space designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages shall have completely separate
ventilation systems to eliminate the possibility of toxic gases spreading to other spaces. Provided that the
arrangement does not impair redundancy requirements of main functions as defined in Pt.1 Ch.1 Sec.1 Table
2, ventilation systems may be shared between several spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia
leakages.
6.1.1.2 All spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages shall be continuously ventilated.
Consequently, ventilation inlets and outlets for such spaces shall be located at sufficient height above deck to
avoid closing appliances according to the International Load Line Convention.
6.1.1.3 All spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages shall be provided with an effective
mechanical ventilation system of the extraction type, providing a ventilation capacity of at least 30 air
changes per hour. The ventilation system shall be arranged to maintain a pressure lower than the pressure in
surrounding spaces.
6.1.1.5 The ventilation system arrangement shall take into account the density of gaseous ammonia.
Guidance note:
Anhydrous ammonia gas is lighter than air. However, in the presence of moisture (such as high relative humidity), the liquefied
anhydrous ammonia gas forms vapors that are heavier than air.
DNV AS
6.1.1.6 All spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages shall additionally be equipped

3 2
with effective mechanical catastrophe ventilation. The capacity shall be 300 m /h for each m deck area that
can be wetted in an ammonia leakage scenario, minimum 45 air-changes per hour. The normal ventilation
capacity required in [6.1.1.3] may be included in the ventilation capacity for catastrophe ventilation.
6.1.1.7 Regular and catastrophe ventilation shall be arranged such that a single failure cannot cause a
complete ventilation failure for the space.
6.1.1.8 For the purpose of limiting the amount of toxic vapours spreading from a space designed to
safely contain potential ammonia leakages, a water mist system shall be provided and located inside
the compartment at the suction inlet of the ventilation system outlet. The water mist system shall be
automatically activated if an ammonia concentration exceeding 350 ppm is detected in the ventilated space.
Due consideration shall be taken towards the vacuum generating effect upon combining ammonia gas and
water. Alternatively, the ventilation outlet in open air shall be arranged with a water spray system having
constantly available water supply. The water mist or spray system shall follow the requirements for water
safety systems in [5.6.3].
6.1.1.9 The number and capacity of the ventilation fans serving spaces designed to safely contain potential
ammonia leakages shall be such that the capacity is not reduced to less than 30 air changes per hour, after a
failure of an active component or a failure in the power supply system to the fans.
6.1.1.10 To reduce the differential pressure while opening exit doors, a push button for temporary stop of
ventilation shall be located close to the door(s) inside and outside the room.
6.1.2 Ducting
the less hazardous space or duct has an over-pressure relative to the more hazardous space or duct. Such
ventilation ducts shall have a mechanical integrity equivalent to that required for general piping systems in
Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 Table 2.
6.1.2.3 Where a ventilation duct serving a space designed to safely contain leaks of ammonia passes through
a space not designed to safely contain ammonia, possible leakages to the space not designed to safely
contain ammonia leaks shall be prevented. This shall be obtained by ensuring that the space not designed
to contain ammonia leaks has an over-pressure relative to the ventilation duct. Such ventilation ducts shall
have a mechanical integrity equivalent to that required for general piping systems in Pt.4 Ch.6 Sec.9 Table 2.
7 Fire safety
7.1 General
7.1.1 General
7.1.1.1 The requirements in this section are additional to those given in SOLAS Ch.II-2.
7.1.1.2 Each design shall be qualified by an alternative design case as required by the IGF Code Part A-2.3.
The alternative design shall include all topics being relevant for fire safety. The rules represent however
a minimum level for each fire safety system which shall be implemented even if the alternative design
concludes differently.
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7.2 Fire protection
7.2.1 General
7.2.2 Construction
7.2.2.1 The space containing fuel containment system and fuel preparation rooms unless located on open
deck shall be separated from the machinery spaces of category A or other rooms with high fire risks. The
separation shall be done by a cofferdam of at least 900 mm with insulation of A-60 class. A-120 or H-120
class insulation may be used in lieu of 900 mm cofferdam and A-60 class insulation. When determining the
insulation of the space containing fuel containment system from other spaces with lower fire risks, the fuel
containment system shall be considered as a machinery space of category A, in accordance with SOLAS
regulation II-2/9. The boundary between spaces containing fuel containment systems shall be either a
cofferdam of at least 900 mm or A-60 class division. For type C tanks, the fuel storage hold space may be
considered as a cofferdam. This may however not be applied to tanks located directly above machinery
spaces of category A or other rooms with high fire risk.
Guidance note 1:
The following other rooms with high fire risk should as a minimum be considered, but not be restricted to:
1) Cargo spaces except cargo tanks for liquids with flashpoint above 60°C and except cargo spaces exempted in accordance
with SOLAS regulations II-2/10.7.1.2 or II-2/10.7.1.4.
2) Vehicle, ro-ro and special category spaces.
3) Service spaces (high risk): galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances, saunas, paint lockers and store-rooms having
2
areas of 4 m or more, spaces for the storage of flammable liquids and workshops other than those forming part of the
machinery space, as provided in SOLAS regulations II-2/9.2.2.4, II-2/9.2.3.3 and II-2/9.2.4.
4) Accommodation spaces of greater fire risk: saunas, sale shops, barber shops and beauty parlours and public spaces
2
containing furniture and furnishing of other than restricted fire risk and having deck area of 50 m or more, as provided in
SOLAS regulation II-2/9.2.2.3.
Guidance note 2:
7.3 Fire extinction

7.3.1 Fire main
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2 2
exceeding 40 metres, for the purpose of isolating damaged sections. Alternatively, the system may be
protected.
closed valves to the system shall be located in a readily accessible position, which likely to be accessible in
case of fire or leakage of toxic gases in the areas protected. Remote operation of valves shall be possible
from the control location for bunkering.
7.3.2.7 The nozzles shall be of an approved full bore type and they shall be arranged to ensure an effective
Guidance note:
area coverage.
7.3.3 Fixed fire extinguishing systems

Bunkering station, engine rooms, fuel preparation rooms and tank connection spaces arranged with
motors for submerged pumps shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the
provisions of the FSS code and taking into account the necessary concentrations/application rate required for
extinguishing fires in spaces with ammonia. The fixed fire-extinguishing system, including the possible use of
local application systems as required by SOLAS Ch.II-2/10.5.6, shall be considered in the alternative design
process as required by the IGF Code Ch.2 2-3.
7.3.4 Fire dampers

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7.4.1 Detection
tank connection space, and for all other rooms of the fuel system where fire cannot be excluded.
Guidance note:
should be noted that flame detectors will normally activate before temperature detectors. The suitability of the various type of
detectors should be considered in the alternative design analysis as required by the IGF Code Ch.2 2-3.
8.1 General
8.1.1 General
such that a single fault will not result in the loss of ability to maintain fuel tank pressures within normal
operating limits.
8.1.1.3 Electrical equipment and wiring shall in general not to be installed in hazardous areas unless
essential for operational purposes. The type of equipment and installation requirements shall comply with
Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.11 according to the area classification as specified in [9.1].
8.1.1.4 With reference to IEC 60079-20, temperature class and equipment groups listed in Table 10 may be
used for potential ship fuels.
Ammonia T1 IIA
area.
8.1.1.6 Submerged fuel pump motors and their supply cables may be fitted in fuel containment systems.
Fuel pump motors shall be capable of being isolated from their electrical supply during gas-freeing
operations.
8.1.1.7 Instrumentation and electrical apparatus in contact with the fuel should be of a type suitable for
zone 0. Temperature sensors shall be installed in thermo wells, and pressure sensors without additional
separating chamber should be suitable for installation in zone 0.
DNV AS
9 Area classification and toxic zones

9.1.1 General
9.1.1.1 To facilitate the selection of appropriate electrical apparatus and the design of suitable electrical
installations, hazardous areas shall be divided into zones 0, 1 and 2 according to the principles of the
standards IEC 60079-10-1; 2008 Explosive atmospheres Part 10-1: Classification of areas - Explosive gas
atmospheres and guidance and informative examples given in IEC 60092-502:1999, Electrical Installations in
Ships - Tankers - Special features for tankers. Main features of the guidance are given in [9.1.2].


1) Tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms, fuel storage hold spaces, interbarrier spaces, enclosed
bunkering stations and other enclosed spaces where leakage of ammonia may occur.
Guidance note:
Fuel storage hold spaces for type C tanks without any leakage sources in the hold space are considered non-hazardous.
2) Enclosed spaces in which pipes containing fuel are located, e.g. secondary enclosures around fuel pipes.

1) Air locks.
9.1.3 Inspection and testing
shall be available to the Society on site.
9.1.3.2 For spaces protected by pressurization, it shall be calculated and tested that purging can be fully
accomplished. Purge time at minimum flow rate shall be documented.
9.1.4 Maintenance
— records sufficient to enable the certified safe equipment to be maintained in accordance with its type of
protection (list and location of equipment, technical information, manufacturer's instructions, spares, etc.)
— register of inspections, with information about date of inspections and name(s) of person(s) who carried
DNV AS

9.2 Discharge of toxic vapours

9.2.1 General
9.2.1.1 In order to prevent ammonia discharged from the fuel storage and piping system to reach other
spaces, ventilation openings and entrances to spaces shall be arranged to prevent this as far as possible.
9.2.1.2 All air intakes, outlets and other openings into the accommodation spaces, service spaces and
control stations shall be fitted with closing devices and be capable of being operated from inside the space.
This need not apply to spaces not normally manned, such as deck stores, forecastle stores, workshops.
9.2.2 Toxic zones - safety distances and dispersion analysis requirements
9.2.2.1 The outlet from the vent mast shall be located at least B (greatest moulded breadth) or 25 m,
whichever is less, from the nearest air intake, air outlet or opening to enclosed spaces on the vessel.
9.2.2.2 Safety distances for vent systems fitted with arrangements to reduce the amount of ammonia being
discharged to open air will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
9.2.2.3 Vent outlets from secondary enclosures around ammonia piping shall discharge at least 10 m away
from the nearest air intake, air outlet or opening to enclosed spaces on the vessel.
9.2.2.4 All ventilation outlets from spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages shall be at
safe locations considering:
— the toxicity hazards of leaked ammonia in the ventilation air
— intake of toxic gas into openings of accommodation, service and machinery spaces, control stations and
other non-hazardous spaces
— recycling between the ventilation outlets and intakes for the space served by the ventilation system.
The ventilation system exhaust ducts shall discharge at least 10 m away from the nearest air intake, air
outlet or opening to other enclosed spaces on the vessel. Air intakes to the same space shall be arranged to
prevent recycling of ventilation air. The ventilation system exhaust ducts shall discharge at least 4 m away
from decks and gangways.
For arrangements where mechanical ventilation of double wall pipe annular space is applied, the ventilation
inlet may be arranged within toxic zones from ventilation outlets from spaces designed to safely contain
potential ammonia leakages, vent mast and bunkering station.
9.2.2.5 Ventilation outlets from spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages may be
grouped together to limit hazardous area on open deck, on the assumption that the openings are protected
against back-flow by the air flow from continuous ventilation which entails redundant fans to be installed. If
single fans are used, the outlets shall be installed in an area which in the absence of considered outlet would
be non-hazardous. Ventilation outlets from spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages
may also be located within the toxic zones prescribed by [9.2.2.7] and [9.2.2.8], provided the outlets are
arranged pertaining to the above requirements.
9.2.2.6 If ventilation outlets from spaces designed to safely contain potential ammonia leakages are located
within the distance from the vent mast specified in [9.2.2.1], the ventilation outlet shall be fitted with a
mechanical backflow prevention device in addition to continuous ventilation, and be arranged as far as
practically possible away from the vent mast.
DNV AS
9.2.2.7 For ammonia fuel tanks arranged on open deck and not fitted with tank connection spaces, the drip

tray covering the tank valves and the tank hatch shall be at least 10 m away from the nearest air intake, air
outlet or opening to enclosed spaces on the vessel.
9.2.2.8 The bunker station bulkhead opening for shore connections shall be located at least 10 m away from
the nearest air intake, air outlet or opening to enclosed spaces on the vessel.
9.2.2.9 Fuel preparation room, tank connection space and bunkering station entrances on open deck shall be
located at least 5 m away from the nearest air intake, air outlet or opening to enclosed spaces on the vessel.
9.2.2.10 Fuel preparation room and tank connection space access on open deck may be located within toxic
zones as defined in [9.2.2] provided the access is fitted with an air lock and gas masks and hermetically
sealed filters are located inside the space.
9.2.2.11 The outlet of pressure relief arrangements from tank hold spaces of fuel containment systems of
type A shall discharge at least B (greatest mould breadth) or 25 m, whichever is less, from the nearest air
intake, air outlet or opening to enclosed spaces on the vessel.
9.2.2.12 The outlet of pressure relief arrangements from tank hold spaces of fuel containment systems of
type B or membrane tank shall discharge at least 10 m from the nearest air intake, air outlet or opening to
enclosed spaces on the vessel and be located at least 4 m above deck or gangway.
9.2.2.13 Openings to spaces not normally manned, such as deck stores, forecastle stores and workshops
may be allowed to be located within safety distances defined in [9.2.2] provided that the space is ventilated
at minimum 8 air changes per hour. The ventilation systems for such spaces shall be separate from other
ventilation systems on the ship. The ventilation inlet and outlet for such spaces may be located within the
safety distances as defined in [9.2.2].
9.2.2.14 In addition to the prescriptive toxic zone distance requirements in [9.2.2], dispersion analysis
studies shall be submitted for information per the requirements in [9.2.2.15] and [9.2.2.17].
9.2.2.15 A dispersion analysis shall be submitted to demonstrate that a maximum probable leakage scenario
in all spaces designed to contain leaks of ammonia does not result in ammonia gas concentrations in
locations where crew or passengers may be present that would not fulfill the functional requirements of the
IGF Code in Part A [3.2].
9.2.2.16 For fuel tanks not of Type C, a dispersion analysis shall be submitted to demonstrate that a
maximum probable leakage scenario into the space between the primary and secondary barrier does not
result in an ammonia gas concentration in locations where crew or passengers may be present that would not
fulfill the functional requirements of the IGF Code in Part A [3.2].
9.2.2.17 A dispersion analysis shall be submitted to demonstrate that opening of pressure relief valves due
to a fire load case per [5.2.3] does not result in an ammonia gas concentration in locations where crew or
passengers may be present that would not fulfill the functional requirements of the IGF Code in Part A [3.2].
10.1 General
The control, monitoring and safety systems applied to a fuel installation shall be arranged to fulfill the
installation.
DNV AS
— Leakages of fuel shall be detected and alarmed.

— A fuel safety system shall be arranged to automatically close down the fuel supply system upon fault
conditions which may develop too fast for manual intervention and upon system failures in accordance
with these rules and the installations safety philosophy.
remaining propulsion power shall be in accordance with [5.1.2].
— Propulsion shall be restored within 30 seconds (redundancy type 1) upon a fuel safety action and the
restored propulsion power shall be in accordance with [5.1.2].
system.
Guidance note:
redundant network. See Pt.4 Ch.9.
10.1.2.2 The protective safety systems shall, if part of an integrated network, be arranged in a separate
network segment in accordance with Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.2 [1.3.5] and Pt.4 Ch.9 Sec.4 [3].
10.1.2.3 Monitoring requirements for the fuel installation are given in Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13.
Table 11 gives alarm requirements for gas detection; Table 12 gives alarm and indication requirements to be
handled by the gas control and monitoring system. Table 13 and [10.3.1] to [10.3.5] give requirements to
protective safety functions with alarm to be handled by the fuel safety system. For alarm conditions found
in both Table 12 and Table 13, separate sensors shall be arranged for the gas control and monitoring system
and for the fuel safety system.
10.1.2.4 For alarm handling, the fuel installation shall follow the principles as for machinery space
equipment.
10.1.2.5 The gas detection system shall present the gas alarms as required by [10.2.4] on bridge, at the
control location for bunkering and locally. If alarming depends on network communication, the functionality
shall be handled by separate network segment arranged for the fuel installation safety functions.
Local acoustic and optical alarm signals shall be given at such locations that crew members attending to an
alarm shall not be led to entering a space possibly contaminated with ammonia. The gas detection system
shall also present audible alarm within the compartment.
When gas is detected at the vent mast outlet(s) or in spaces venting leaked gases to the open deck, a visual
and audible alarm shall be activated in the open deck area to warn personnel to stay away from the area
where the gas is discharged.
10.1.2.6 The fuel gas safety system shall present the gas safety alarms as specified in Table 13 on bridge.
If alarming depends on network communication, the functionality shall be handled by the separate network
segment arranged for the fuel installation safety functions.
10.1.2.7 The gas detection system and fuel safety system for a fuel supply installation can be implemented
in a common system unit if the system is redundant.
10.1.2.8 For each fuel supply system, independent power supplies shall be arranged for the controllers of
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[6.3.5].
10.1.2.9 The signals required to support the safety functions given in Table 13 shall be hardwired and
Guidance note:
The requirement for hardwired signals is not applicable for signals sent to other systems for additional safety actions a specified in
Table 13.
Guidance note:
Electrically independent implies that the output signal should be separate from any control loop and connected to e.g. separate
solenoids and and breaker terminals/coils.
10.1.2.11 Where gas detection shall cause shutdown in accordance with Table 13, detector voting shall be
applied. A failed detector shall be considered as an active detection.
Guidance note:

applicable:
— onboard safety center

10.2.1.1 Each fuel tank shall be fitted with at least one liquid level gauging device, designed to operate
within the allowable tank pressure and temperature range. Where only one liquid level gauge is fitted, it shall
be arranged so that any necessary maintenance can be carried out while the cargo tank is in service.
10.2.1.2 Each fuel tank shall be equipped with high-level alarm, which is released when the tank is filled up
to about 95% of the tank volume.
10.2.1.4 A local reading pressure gauge shall be fitted between the stop valve and the connection to shore
at each bunker pipe.
DNV AS

lines.
10.2.1.7 Control of bunkering shall be possible from a safe location in regard to bunkering operations.
At this location, tank pressure, tank level and overfill alarm shall be available. Where required, tank
temperature, see [10.2.1], and leakage detection alarm for the secondary enclosure for bunkering pipes, see
[5.1.4], shall be available.
10.2.1.8 For tanks where submerged fuel pump motors are installed, arrangements shall be made to alarm
at low liquid level.
10.2.1.9 Fuel storage hold spaces and inter-barrier spaces without open connection to the atmosphere shall
be provided with pressure indication.
10.2.1.10 Each fuel tank shall be provided with devices to measure and indicate the temperature of the
fuel in at least three locations, at the bottom and middle of the tank as well as the top of the tank below the
highest allowable liquid level.
10.2.2 Bilge wells
10.2.2.1 Bilge wells in tank connection spaces, fuel preparation rooms or other spaces containing fuel
systems without secondary enclosures shall be provided with level sensors. Alarm shall be given at high level
in bilge well.
10.2.3 Fuel heating
10.2.3.1 The heating medium for the liquefied gas vaporizer shall be provided with temperature monitoring
at the heat exchanger outlet. Alarm shall be given at low temperature.
10.2.4 Gas detection

— bunkering station
— secondary enclosures around pipes containing fuels
— gas safe machinery spaces above engine
— other enclosed spaces where fuel vapour may accumulate
— vent mast outlet
— spaces containing ventilation fans serving spaces designed to safely contain ammonia leaks.
Systems for heating of fuel gas shall be fitted with arrangements able to detect ingress of ammonia.
DNV AS
10.2.4.4 Except for spaces as specified in [10.2.4.2], gas detection instruments for flammable products

capable of measuring gas concentrations below the lower flammable limit may be accepted.
space into account, and each space shall be covered by sufficient number of detectors to allow for voting in
accordance with Table 13.
10.2.4.6 The detectors shall be located where gas may accumulate and/or in the ventilation outlets. Gas
dispersal analysis or a physical smoke test shall be used to find the best arrangement.
Gas detection
Interbarrier space of fuel tank, 150 ppm HA
Fuel tank hold space, 150 ppm HA
Tank connection space, 150 ppm HA
Fuel preparation room, 150 ppm HA
Secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel outside the machinery space, 150 ppm
1) HA
1)
Secondary enclosure of pipes for fuel in the machinery space, 150 ppm HA
Vent mast outlet, 300 ppm HA
Air locks HA
Above engine in machinery spaces HA

2)
Tank pressure relief system, before burst disk HA
Spaces containing ventilation fans serving spaces designed to safely contain

HA
ammonia leaks.

1) If the double wall pipe annular space is mechanically ventilated at underpressure relative to adjacent spaces
and the outlet is fitted with an ARMS system to reduce the amount of ammonia discharged to open air following
requirements in [10.3.2.7], the 150 ppm alarm condition setpoint may be increased on a case-by-case basis.
2) For fuel containment systems where ammonia is stored in a semi-refrigerated or pressurized condition, pressure
monitoring with alarm in the pipe segment between pressure relief valve and burst disk may be accepted in lieu of
gas detection.
10.2.5 Ventilation
from the ventilation fan motor is required in combination with pressure monitoring systems, but is not
sufficient to verify performance.
DNV AS

engine-room. As a minimum the alarms shall include low gas input pressure, low gas output pressure, high
Indication
Alarm
Fuel containment system
Level in tank IL, IR, HA Alarm at 95% of tank volume.
Tank pressure Alarm level below opening pressure of

IL, IR, HA
relief valves.
1)
LA If vacuum protection is required.
Submerged fuel pump, low level in tank LA Dry running protection.
Hold spaces and interbarrier spaces, pressure Without open connection to

IR
atmosphere.
Fuel supply system
Fuel pump discharge lines, pressure IL, IR, HA HA if required by [5.1.6.2].
Fuel supply system, drain pots level switch HA If required by [5.1.6.2].
Gas compressor
1)
1)
1)
1)
Compressor operation A
Bilge
Other spaces containing fuel systems, level in bilge well HA Systems without secondary enclosures.
Fuel heating
Fuel supply, temperature IR, LA At the heat exchanger outlet.
Fuel supply, temperature LA At pipe wall, if required by [5.1.6.2].
Ventilation
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Indication

Alarm
Air lock, more than one door moved from closed position A Local alarm on both sides of air lock.
Air lock, door open at lock of ventilation A
Low oxygen alarm in N2 spaces A Local alarm.

1)
IL = local indication (presentation of values).
IR = remote indication (presentation of values) in engine control room or control location for bunkering when specified.

10.3.1.1 A level sensing device shall be provided which automatically actuates the shut-off of the flow of
fuel to the tank in a manner which will both, avoid excessive liquid pressure in the loading line and prevent
the tank from becoming liquid full. This level sensing device shall be independent of the level sensing devices
10.3.1.2 The tank overflow protection shall be based on a direct reading of the level. Measurements based
on indirect measurement of a value that varies for each bunkering (e.g. density used for dp-cell) is not
permissible.
10.3.1.3 Where arrangements are provided for overriding the overflow control system, they shall be such
that inadvertent operation is prevented, i.e. by interlocking the override function with the bunker valve.
When this override is operated continuous visual indication shall be provided at the navigation bridge,
continuously manned central control station or onboard safety center. Overriding of the overflow control
system when more than one ammonia fuel tank is installed will be subject to special consideration.
shall be alarmed.
10.3.2 Safety upon leakage detection
10.3.2.1 Gas detection in a tank connection space

When two detectors indicate a vapour concentration of 350 ppm this shall result in automatic closing of
all valves required to isolate the leakage. This will in most cases require that all tank valves shall close
automatically. Depending on the system arrangement, it may also be necessary to close other valves.
Any fuel pump located in the tank connection space shall also be automatically shut down. Catastrophe
ventilation shall automatically start. The water mist system shall automatically start.
10.3.2.2 Gas detection in a fuel preparation room

When two detectors indicate a vapour concentration of 350 ppm this shall result in automatic closing of all
valves required to isolate the leakage. This will require that valves in the fuel system supplying liquefied or
DNV AS
gaseous fuel to the fuel preparation room shall close automatically. Depending on the system arrangement,

it may also be necessary to close other valves. All machinery in the space, such as compressors and pumps,
shall be automatically shut down. Catastrophe ventilation shall automatically start. The water mist system
shall automatically start.
10.3.2.3 Gas detection in the secondary enclosure of pipes for liquid fuel outside tank connection space and
fuel preparation room
When two detectors indicate a vapour concentration of 350 ppm, this shall result in automatic closing of all
valves required to isolate the leakage. Depending on the system arrangement, this may require automatic
closing of the tank valve and the master fuel valve. Gas detection shall result in automatic purging of the
leaking pipe segment of the fuel supply system. The purged fuel content of the fuel pipes shall be led to an
ARMS system as defined in [5.1.1.6]. The water spray system shall automatically start.
10.3.2.4 Gas detection in the bunkering station

When two detectors indicate a vapour concentration of 350 ppm, this shall result in automatic closing of the
bunkering valve. The bunkering pipes shall be drained towards tank. The bunkering pipes shall subsequently
be purged of ammonia. The purged fuel content of the fuel pipes shall be led to an ARMS system as defined
in [5.1.1.6]. The water mist system shall automatically start.
10.3.2.5 Gas detection in the secondary enclosure of pipes for gaseous fuel outside tank connection space
and fuel preparation room
When two detectors indicate a vapour concentration of 350 ppm, this shall result in automatic closing of all
valves required to isolate the leakage. Depending on the system arrangement, this may require automatic
closing of the tank valve and the master fuel valve. The water spray system shall automatically start.
10.3.2.6 Gas detection in the secondary enclosure of bunkering pipes

When two detectors indicate a vapour concentration of 350 ppm, this shall result in automatic closing of the
bunkering valve. The bunkering pipes shall be drained towards tank. The bunkering pipes shall subsequently
be purged of ammonia. The purged fuel content of the fuel pipes shall be led to an ARMS system as defined
in [5.1.1.6]. The water spray system shall automatically start.
10.3.2.7 If the double wall pipe annular space of fuel pipes is fitted with redundant mechanical ventilation at
underpressure relative to adjacent spaces and the outlet to open air is fitted with an ARMS system to reduce
the amount of ammonia discharged to open air, the alarm setpoint of 150 ppm and ESD setpoint of 350 ppm
may be allowed on a case-by-case basis to be increased in the double wall pipe annular space upstream of
the ARMS system. An additional set of gas detectors shall be fitted downstream of the ARMS system before
discharge to open air with alarm setpoint of 150 ppm and ESD setpoint of 350 ppm.
10.3.2.8 Piping for liquefied fuel shall also be arranged with detection of liquid leakages in the secondary
enclosure at the lowest point. Detection of leakages shall result in automatic closing of all valves required
to isolate the leakage. Leakage detection in the secondary enclosure of the bunkering line shall immediately
result in automatic closing of the bunkering valve. Leakage detection shall result in automatic purging of
the fuel supply system. Liquid or gaseous ammonia from purging of the fuel pipes shall be led to an ARMS
system as defined in [5.1.1.6]. The water spray system shall automatically start.
spaces containing fuel systems without secondary enclosures shall result in automatic closing of all valves
necessary to isolate the leakage.

The fuelsupply lines to consumers shall be provided with temperature sensors at the heat exchanger outlet.
Detection of low-low temperature shall result in automatic closing of all valves required to stop the fuel
supply to the vaporizer.
DNV AS

supplying fuel to the fuel preparation room, shall close automatically. All machinery in the space, like
compressors and pumps, shall be automatically shut down.
10.3.6.1 The requirements in [10.3.1] to [10.3.5] and Table 13 specify fuel installation safety actions
required to limit the consequences of system failures.
Automatic safety action with corresponding alarm Signal to

Shutdown other control/
Shutdown safety
Conditions of fuel Shutdown of
Shutdown of of bunker systems for
Alarm preparation master gas
tank valves 1) connection additional
room fuel valve
2) valve action
valves
Tank safety
Level in fuel Bunkering HA X

gas tank,
overfill Transfer HA X
Submerged fuel pump, low- Stop fuel

LA
low level in tank pumps.
Gas detection
DNV AS

Signal to
Shutdown safety
room fuel valve
2) valve action
valves
Tank connection space, 2 x Stop fuel

350 ppm pumps in the
space.
Automatic
HA X start of
catastrophe
ventilation.
Activate water
safety system.
Fuel preparation room, 2 x Stop

350 ppm machinery in
the space.
Automatic
HA X start of
catastrophe
ventilation.
Activate water
safety system.
Secondary enclosure of Purge, see

pipes for liquid fuel outside [10.3.2.3].
the tank connection space HA X X X Activate water
or fuel preparation room, 2 safety system.
4)
x 350 ppm
Secondary enclosure of Activate water

pipes for gaseous fuel safety system.
outside the tank connection HA X X X
space or fuel preparation
4)
room, 2 x 350 ppm
Enclosed bunkering station, Activate water

HA X
2 x 350 ppm safety system.

LA X

LA X
Liquid leakage detection Purge, see

in secondary enclosure of [10.3.2.3].
A X X X
pipes for fuel Activate water
safety system.
Leakage detection in 3)
A X
bunkering line
DNV AS

Signal to
Shutdown safety
room fuel valve
2) valve action
valves
Loss of heating medium Stop fuel

A X X
circulation pumps.
Liquid fuel supply, Stop fuel

LA X X X
temperature pumps.
Gaseous fuel supply, Stop fuel

temperature LA X X X pumps. Purge,
see [5.1.6.2].
Gaseous fuel supply, Stop fuel

pressure HA X X X pumps. Purge,
see [5.1.6.2].
Gaseous fuel supply, drain Stop fuel

pot level switch HA X X X pumps. Purge,
see [5.1.6.2].
Tank connection space, loss Stop fuel

of ventilation A X pumps in the
space.
Fuel preparation room, loss Stop

of ventilation A X machinery in
the space.
Emergency shutdown of Purge, see

supply to the machinery X [10.3.2.6].
space
X
bunkering
1) Upon closure of master gas fuel valve, a signal shall be sent to the gas consumers safety system to shut down the
double block and bleed valves.
2) All valves required to isolate the leakage shall close.
3) Alarms also to be indicated in the bunkering control station.
4) If double wall pipe annular space is mechanically ventilated and the outlet is fitted with an ARMS to reduce the
amount of ammonia discharged to open air, the 350 ppm ESD condition may be modified as described in [10.3.2.7].
DNV AS

11.1.1 General
gaseous fuel.
11.1.2.4 On main/propulsion boilers an automatic system shall be provided to change from gas fuel
operation to oil fuel operation without interruption of boiler firing.
11.1.2.5 Gas nozzles and the burner control system shall be configured such that gas fuel can only be
ignited by an established oil fuel flame, unless the boiler and combustion equipment is designed and
approved by the Society to light on gas fuel.

11.2.1 General
Gas turbines shall comply with requirements in Pt.4 Ch.3 Sec.2.
DNV AS

requirements for ESD protected machinery spaces in Sec.5.
11.2.2.2 For gas turbines requiring a supply of gas with pressures above 10 bar, gas piping shall be
protected with a secondary enclosure in accordance with the requirements in [5.1.4].
11.2.2.3 Ventilation for the enclosure shall be as outlined for ESD protected machinery spaces in Sec.5, but
11.2.2.4 Gas detection systems, disconnection and shut down functions shall be as outlined for ESD
protected machinery spaces in Sec.5.
11.2.2.5 For dual fuel turbines, an automatic system shall be fitted to change over easily and quickly from
ammonia to oil. operation to fuel oil operation and vice-versa with minimum fluctuation of the engine power.
11.2.2.6 Means shall be provided to monitor and detect poor combustion that may lead to unburnt fuel gas
in the exhaust system during operation. In the event that it is detected, the fuel gas supply shall be shut
down.
12.1 Fuel containment systems

12.1.2 Testing
[5.2.4].

12.2.1.1 The requirements apply to piping that contains fuel in gaseous and liquefied state.
The piping system shall be joined by welding with a minimum of flange connections. Gaskets shall be of a
type designed to prevent blow-out.
flanges):
DNV AS
back-up on the first pass. For design pressures in excess of 10 bar and design temperatures of minus

10°C or colder, backing rings shall be removed.
mm or less.
12.2.1.3 Flanges in fuel piping shall be of the welding neck type.
welding type.
concerned.
1) 100% radiographic or ultrasonic inspection of butt-welded joints for piping systems with
— design temperatures colder than -10°C or
2) When such butt-welded joints of piping sections are made by automatic welding procedures approved
only be granted if well documented quality assurance procedures and records are available to assess the
level 1. Ultrasonic testing shall be assessed according to ISO 11666 and shall at least meet the criteria for
level 2.
However, relaxation from these requirements for piping inside fuel tanks and open ended piping may be
DNV AS

12.2.3.5 Secondary enclosure for high-pressure fuel piping shall be pressure tested to the expected
maximum pressure at pipe rupture, but minimum 10 bar. Secondary enclosure for low pressure fuel piping

12.3 Valves
12.3.1 Testing
12.4 Pumps
12.4.1 Testing
12.4.1.1 Pumps shall be tested in accordance with Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.5 [13.5].
12.5 Shutdown valves in liqufied gas fuel piping systems

12.5.1 Testing

12.6.1 General
DNV AS
SECTION 15 OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY

1 General
1.1 Introduction
The SOLAS regulations for safe return to port (SRtP) were introduced in 2010. The overall intention
with the SRtP scheme is to increase the safety level of passenger ships through more redundant system
arrangements, providing increased robustness and fault tolerance. After a potential incident of fire or
flooding (within the defined extent), the ship shall be able to return to port by its own machinery while
providing a safe and habitable area for the passengers and crew; thereby reducing the likelihood and need
for evacuation. The SRtP regulations are mandatory for passenger ships having a length of 120 m or more or
having three or more main vertical zones.
The main focus in the SRtP regulations is related to the design and arrangement of ship systems and the
systems' ability to remain operational after isolating the compartments that may have been exposed to an
incident (fire or flooding). The SRtP regulations do however not specifically address the operational reliability
of propulsion, steering, manoeuvrability or electrical power. The restoration sequence needed to restore the
functions after a casualty may be a challenging operation involving numerous manual actions by the crew.
This implies that the SRtP regulations neither target exposed operational scenarios where even a temporary
loss of propulsion, steering, manoeuvrability or electrical power may be hazardous - nor the ability to
provide uninterrupted electrical power to serve the general needs of passenger and crew. Furthermore, when
machinery components are damaged or under maintenance, the redundancy required by the SRtP regulations
may be impaired, and the ship may be subject to operational limitations.
The additional class notation covered in this section targets the operational reliability and -flexibility of these
systems thereby supplementing the design requirements of the SRtP scheme with operational concerns.
The SRtP regulations are implemented as class notation SRTP which is mandatory for the applicable vessels,
see Sec.11 [1.4]. The additional class notation covered in this section is called OR-operational reliability. OR
is based on the general concepts and basic redundancy requirements of the SRtP scheme and compliance
with the SRTP-notation is therefore a pre-requisite.
The principles applied for increasing the reliability of the essential ship systems in the OR-notation are
largely based on well-known technologies and methods applied in other ship segments where a functional
loss may impose an immediate major risk.
1.2 Objective
The main objective of the OR-notation is to reduce the operational risk and facilitate a more flexible and
predictable operation of passenger ships; targeting the systems providing propulsion, steering, manoeuvring
and electrical power.
1.3 Scope
1.3.1 General
The OR class notation is arranged in three main areas with the following main scope:
1) enhanced reliability of propulsion, steering and electrical power
2) enhanced manoeuvring reliability
3) operational flexibility and predictability.
The scope of each area is described in [1.3.2] to [1.3.4].
Cyber security aspects are not covered by this notation, see Ch.5 Sec.21.
DNV AS
1.3.2 Enhanced reliability of propulsion, steering and electrical power

The enhanced reliability of the propulsion, steering and power systems are achieved through requirements
for:
— technical design and system arrangement
— enhanced test & verification, covering the new-building and operational phase
— operational guidance and support.
The technical design requirements apply to the propulsion-, steering- and power systems including all
auxiliaries, power supplies and control systems needed to support the intended reliability. The requirements
specifically target increased integrity and fault tolerance of the power system.
The enhanced test and verification include extended failure mode- and recovery analysis supplemented by
extended testing on board.
Operational guidance and support is provided by enhanced capabilities for remote and automatic control,
improved operator support through robust operational modes, visualization on operator stations and system
restoration without the need for manual, local intervention.
Compliance with the applicable requirements of this area will grant qualifier ER1 or ER2.
Guidance note 1:
The systems covered by the SRTP- and OR-notations are designed with a high degree of redundancy in robust system
arrangements. In order to utilize the capabilities of the system design and minimize the consequence of casualties, the crew
competence, training and knowledge of the ship systems is essential for safe operation of the ship.
Guidance note 2:
For vessels complying with ER1 or ER2, the class notation for redundant propulsion RP, see Sec.7, will be superfluous.
1.3.3 Enhanced manoeuvring reliability

The enhanced manoeuvring reliability is achieved through specific requirements to the dynamic positioning
control system and the manoeuvring thrusters. The scope of the requirements is based on a subset of the
rules for dynamic positioning (DYNPOS), adapted to the application on a passenger ship and the context of
the OR scheme.
Compliance with the applicable requirements of this area will grant qualifier EMR1 or EMR2.
For the assignment of EMR2, it is a pre-requisite that the vessel complies with ER2.
Guidance note 1:
Manoeuvring at low speed in exposed or congested waters often depend on the ability to provide and control thrust in all available
directions, also involving manoeuvring thrusters. The intention with the EMR-qualifiers is to also cover the reliability of the
manoeuvring thrusters and dynamic positioning control system.
Guidance note 2:
For vessels complying with EMR1 or EMR2, the class notation for dynamic positioning DYNPOS, see Ch.3 Sec.1, will be
superfluous.
1.3.4 Operational flexibility and predictability

The improved flexibility and predictability in the operation is achieved through ensuring that the various
systems needed to maintain the designed SRtP capabilities as far as practicable are provided with:
— enough capacity to allow for component damage or maintenance in active components in auxiliary
systems without impairing the operational capabilities
— that 'operational envelopes' are established for relevant key scenarios of degraded capabilities.
The above is covered in the qualifier OP.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The operational envelopes are established for key damage scenarios that have an impact on the ship's designed SRtP operational
range (as given in the 'List of Limitations and Exemptions in the operation of Passenger Ships' required by SOLAS V/Reg.30).
1.4 Application
The optional class notation and qualifiers of this section extend and supplement the scope of the SRTP-
notation and therefore apply to vessels built in compliance with the SRTP-notation, see Sec.11.
As the notation includes requirements for technical design and system arrangement, it is primarily intended
for newbuilding projects.
1.5 Class notations

Ships built in compliance with the requirements in this section may be assigned the additional class notation
OR with relevant qualifier(s).
The scope represented by the separate qualifiers are offered as modules, so a ship may be assigned one or
more qualifiers.
Guidance note:
Example of class notation with qualifiers: OR(ER2, EMR2, OP).
Table 1 Additional class notation - OR
Class notation Qualifier Purpose Description
OR ER1 Enhanced reliability — Propulsion, steering and power functions including all auxiliaries
of propulsion, designed for remote or semi-automatic restoration after a single
Mandatory:
steering and 1) 2)
failure from normal operating positions .
yes electric power — Quick restoration of (at least) one redundancy group after
Design
functional loss; propulsion, steering (and electrical power) shall be
requirements: 3)
restored within 2 minutes .
this section — Critical activity mode (CAM) - robust configuration
4)
of machinery
FIS survey and power system to ensure the designed fault tolerance and
requirements: restoration capabilities.
Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.2, — Continued operation of remaining redundancy group with normal
2)
Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.3 control functionality from the normal operating positions after
and Pt.7 Ch.1 restoration.
Sec.4 — Adequate redundancy and capacity in auxiliary systems serving
propulsion to ensure that a after failure of any active component,
the remaining systems have capacity to support normal full
propulsion power.
ER2 Covering the scope of ER1 and in addition

— Propulsion, steering and power functions designed for continuous
1)
availability of one redundancy group; a single failure shall not
cause full black-out or (temporary) loss of propulsion and steering.
EMR1 Enhanced 5)
— Single dynamic positioning control system .
manoeuvring- and — Single manoeuvring thruster arrangement including remote control
position keeping 5)
.
reliability
— Manoeuvring thruster(s) designed for continuous operation.
DNV AS
Class notation Qualifier Purpose Description

EMR2 — Redundant dynamic positioning control system arranged with
segregation.
— Redundant and segregated manoeuvring thruster arrangement
including remote control.
— Manoeuvring thruster(s) designed for continuous operation.
(ER2 is a pre-requisite for EMR2.)
OP Operational — Additional redundancy and capacity in auxiliary systems for

flexibility and propulsion, steering and electrical power; a failure or maintenance
predictability of an active component in any auxiliary system shall not impair
the designed SRtP capabilities for propulsion, steering and the
electrical power systems' ability to serve the SRtP power balance.
— Remaining SRtP capabilities and operational envelopes defined for
selected damage and maintenance scenarios in the propulsion,
steering and power systems.
1)
The extent of 'single failures' covered is defined in [2.2.5].
2)
'Normal operating positions' in this context are the permanently manned positions for remote control, i.e. normally
bridge and engine control room.
3)
Longer restoration time may be accepted upon special considerations.
4)
The 'robust configuration' - or the 'critical activity mode' denotes the set-up and configuration of the machinery- and
electrical system that provides the fault tolerance required by this notation.
5)
The dynamic positioning control system and the manoeuvring thruster may be of redundant design, beyond the
acceptance criteria of EMR1.
Guidance note:
For the ER- and EMR-qualifiers, the number 1 and 2 denotes different levels of reduction of the risk of functional failure in the
propulsion, steering and power systems; the vessel may be assigned to either level whereas the OP-qualifier is standalone.
1.6 References
Table 2 lists DNV references used in this section.
Document Title
Ch.3 Sec.1 Dynamic positioning systems - DP and DPS
DNV-CG-0004 Safe return to port
DNV-CG-0550 Maritime services - terms and systematics
DNV-OTG-10 DP-classed vessels with closed bus-ties
DNV-RP-D102 Failure mode and effect analysis of redundant systems
DNV-ST-0111 Assessment of station keeping capability of dynamic positioning vessels
DNV AS
1.7.1 Definitions of terms
The terms defined in Table 3 are used in this section.
Term Definition
active component components for mechanical transfer of energy, e.g. pumps, fans, electric motors, generators,
combustion engines and turbines
Heat exchangers, boilers, transformers, switchgear or cables are not considered to be active
components
black-out black-out situation occurs when there is a sudden loss of electric power in the main distribution
system and remains until the main source of power feeds the system. All means of starting by
stored energy are available.
Guidance note:
A full black-out denotes a situation where the complete main distribution system has lost it's
power; a partial black-out denotes a situation where one or more (but not all) redundancy groups
has lost its power.
casualty threshold maximum physical extent of a SRtP casualty where the ship shall be capable of returning to
port in accordance with SOLAS II-2/Reg.21. For further definition of fire and flooding casualty
threshold, see Sec.11
casualty threshold plan arrangement plan showing the extent of the casualty threshold for all decks, covering both fire
and flooding casualties. For further explanation, see Sec.11
critical activity mode set-up and configuration of the propulsion, steering and power system including necessary
auxiliaries to achieve the system capabilities are required by the applicable ER-qualifier
DP-control system all control systems and components, hardware and software necessary to dynamically position
the vessel. The DP-control system consists of the following:
— dynamic positioning control computer(s)
— sensor system
— display system
— operator panels
— positioning reference system
— associated cabling and cable routing
— UPS(s) as required by the relevant notation.
Guidance note:
The DP-control system will normally consist of one or more computers. This is often referred to as
the DP system, but is only a part of the DP system by rule terminology.
failure sudden event or deterioration causing loss of function
DNV AS
Term Definition

hidden failure failure that is not immediately evident to operations and maintenance personnel
Guidance note:
Equipment that fails to perform an 'on demand' function falls into this category. It is necessary that
such failures are detected by monitoring and/or revealed through periodical testing/verification
in order to ensure the availability of such functions. Protective functions, e.g. in power plants and
switchboards, are typical examples of on demand functions where possible hidden failures should
be considered.
joystick device for readily setting of vectoral thrust output including turning moment
operational envelope ships operational capabilities in a state of degraded performance, i.e. a specification of the SRtP
operational limitations for the applicable scenario
redundancy the ability to maintain or restore a function when one failure has occurred. Redundancy can
be achieved, for instance, by installation of more than one unit (component redundancy) or
by having two or more separate systems capable of performing the same function (system
redundancy).
redundancy group all components and systems that may be subject to a single failure for the specific notations
Guidance note:
The redundancy groups will emerge as a consequence of the worst case single failure within each
group. The rules do not give requirements to the number of (beyond 2) or ratio between the
defined groups.
worst case failure failure modes which results in the largest reduction of the functional capabilities, i.e. loss of the
most significant redundancy group, given the prevailing operation
1.7.2 Abbreviations
The abbreviations described in Table 4 are used in this section.
ANEP naval ship code (NATO)
ATEX EU directive for equipment used in explosive atmospheres
AVR automatic voltage regulator
CAM critical activity mode
DG diesel generator
DP dynamic positioning
ECR engine control room
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
GP generator protection
IMO international maritime organization
IP ingress protection
DNV AS

OOW officer on watch
PMS power management systems
SOLAS safety of life at sea
SRtP safe return to port (general abbreviation)
THD total harmonic distortion
UPS uninterruptible power supply

1.8.1 Documentation
Compliance with the requirements of these rules shall be incorporated in the documentation required by main
class and the SRTP-notation as applicable, see Sec.11 [1.9.1].
In addition, the documentation listed in Table 5 through Table 9 shall for the applicable qualifiers be
submitted for approval.
For general description of documentation requirements and -types, see DNV-CG-0550.
1.8.2 Documentation requirements for ER1 and ER2
Table 5 Overall documentation requirements for ER1 and ER2
Safe return to port Z253 - Test procedure for quay Applicable for ER1 and ER2.
capability and sea trial Redundancy- and failure mode tests based on the AP
FMEA.
AP = for approval
Table 6 System documentation requirements for ER1 and ER2
— Propulsion Z050 - Design philosophy Applicable for ER1 and ER2. See further description
— Steering in [1.8.5] and [1.8.6].
Z071 - Failure mode and effect
— Power generation analysis (FMEA) The CAM configuration for the systems shall be
AP
and distribution included, see [2.2.7].
Z253 - Test procedure for quay
and sea trial
Z260 - Report Applicable for ER1 and ER2. Start-up and recovery
FI
analysis, see [1.8.8].
Main electric Z071 - Failure mode and effect Applicable for ER1 and ER2. See further description
power control and analysis (FMEA) in [1.8.5]. AP
monitoring system
DNV AS

Power generation Z265 - Calculation report Applicable for ER2.
and distribution Dynamic computer simulation of the power system
AP
in normal operation and during all relevant failure
conditions, see [1.8.7].
AP = for approval , FI = for information
1.8.3 Documentation requirements for EMR1 and EMR2
Table 7 Overall documentation requirements for EMR1 and EMR2
Position keeping Z050 - Design philosophy Applicable for EMR1 and EMR2. The document shall
systems describe the main features of the design and, for AP
EMR2, identify the redundancy design intent.
Z071 - Failure mode and effect Applicable for EMR2.

AP
analysis (FMEA)
Z253 - Test procedure for quay Applicable for EMR2.

AP
and sea trial
Z200 - DP station keeping Applicable for EMR1 and EMR2. The report shall be
AP
capability assessment report according to DNV-ST-0111.
AP = for approval
Table 8 System documentation requirements for EMR1 and EMR2
— positioning For EMR1, documentation according to

control system DYNPOS(AUT)-notation, see Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 6.
— thruster control For EMR2, documentation according to
mode selection DYNPOS(AUTR)-notation, see Ch.3 Sec.1 Table 6.
system
— position
reference
systems
AP
— vertical reference
systems
— heading
measurement
systems
— environmental
measurement
systems
AP = for approval
DNV AS
1.8.4 Documentation requirements for OP

Table 9 Documentation requirements for OP
Object Documentation types Additional description Info
Operational flexibility Z163 - Maintenance manual For contents, see [4]. AP

and predictability
Z265 - Calculation report Documenting the vessel hydrodynamical
capabilities in the applicable states of degraded
performance, see [4]. AP
Further guidance on the hydrodynamical
calculations is given in DNV-CG-0004, appendix F.
Z260 - Report Analysis of operation in degraded state, see

FI
[4.1.3.2].
Z251 - Test program Test of capabilities in degraded state. May be

included in the test program for quay- and sea AP
trials required by the SRTP-notation.
1.8.5 Failure mode and effect analysis - FMEA
1.8.5.1 FMEA for propulsion, steering and power systems, applicable for the ER-qualifiers
1) The required failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) shall cover the relevant failure modes (see
[2.2.5]), system design intentions and acceptance criteria of the applicable ER-qualifier, covering at least
the information specified in 2) through 13) below.
Guidance note 1:
The FMEA for the propulsion, steering and power systems covered by the ER-qualifiers of this section is intended to provide
the reader with an introduction to the different systems' design intent and an analysis of the failure mode behaviour. The
FMEA report should therefore be a standalone document that provides the necessary information to serve its different
purposes:
— for verification, to document and conclude on compliance with the applicable rules and regulations
— for test, to identify relevant test scenarios and system recovery
— for operation, to support the crew in system understanding, practical operation and to increase the awareness of the
vulnerabilities in the system.
Necessary principle illustrations and descriptions should therefore be included rather than referred to while extensive
supporting analysis, detailed reports and failure mode tables should, if necessary, be given as attachments or references.
The FMEA may be combined with the assessment reports for the applicable systems required by the SRTP-notation.
Guidance note 2:
The FMEA and subsequent testing is an essential tool in the verification of the properties and failure responses in the
integrated, complex systems that normally constitute the propulsion, steering and power systems on a passenger ship. The
competence, approach and bias of the party performing the analysis is decisive for the quality of the FMEA. To ensure an
unbiased scrutiny of the system properties, it is therefore recommended that the FMEA is conducted by an organizational
party/unit that is independent of the party/unit responsible for the system design; in close co-operation with the designer to
provide necessary information.
2) The FMEA report shall identify the vessel, provide general vessel information and specify the overall
acceptance criteria, i.e. class notation(s) and qualifiers.
DNV AS
3) The FMEA report shall clearly describe the redundancy groups, redundancy design intent, worst case

failure design intent(s) and minimum time requirement(s) for system restoration.
Guidance note 3:
The design intents described in the FMEA should be based on the design philosophy documents, developed in co-operation
with the owner, see Sec.11 [2.2].
4) The FMEA report shall clearly describe the applicable modes of operation and the associated
configuration and set-up of the machinery and electrical systems, i.e. all pre-requisites for achieving
the required fault tolerance. A collected list of these prerequisites shall be presented in the report.
These operational configurations of the machinery and electrical system are denoted critical activity
modes (CAM). The CAM configurations shall be identified for all applicable ship operating modes (e.g.
manoeuvring and transit/open sea).
Guidance note 4:
The configuration and set-up of the machinery and electrical system is decisive for the systems' response to failure, and
therefore a pre-requisite for the conclusions in the FMEA. The intention of this requirement is to ensure that the operational
configurations (CAM) needed to achieve the system capabilities and failure mode behavior is clearly described and used both
as basis for the tests and trials and also as operational support by visualization/displays as required by [2.2.7].
5) A breakdown of the systems, into functional blocks shall be made. The functions of each block shall
be described. The breakdown shall be performed to such a level of detail that the design intent can be
documented.
6) A description of each functional block shall be made and all associated failure modes with their failure
causes shall be identified for normal operational modes.
7) A description of the effects of each failure mode on the functional block and on the overall propulsion,
steering and power system shall be made.
8) For ER2 where the failure mode analysis of CAM configurations is based on closed bus-tie operations, the
analysis shall specifically address the various failure modes in the power system as indicated in [2.6].
Guidance note 5:
For further guidance on the failure mode analysis for closed bus-tie configurations, see DNV-OTG-10 DP-classed vessels with
closed bus-tie(s) and DNV-RP-D102 Failure Mode and Effect analysis or redundant systems.
9) The FMEA shall as a minimum summarize and conclude on the following:
— for each subsystem analysed, the conclusions shall be stated
— for the total system, an overall summary covering the main findings from the most critical
subsystems
— a compliance statement referring to the acceptance criteria.
10) The FMEA report shall identify relevant test scenarios of the subject systems to verify compliance
with the applicable ER-qualifier. The test scenarios shall, where applicable, clearly indicate the CAM
configuration for the tests.
11) After FMEA testing is performed, the FMEA(s) shall be updated to reflect the actual design and the actual
test results. This updating shall as a minimum include possible modifications and correction of mistakes
done to the applicable systems resulting from findings during testing.
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12) The updated FMEA(s), including FMEA test program(s), shall be kept on board. The FMEA(s) and FMEA

test program(s) shall be kept updated to cover alterations to the applicable systems’ hardware and
software.
Guidance note 6:
It is generally not expected that the FMEA shall cover the application software; however, the FMEA (or other relevant
documentation) should include identification of the software version(s) installed, and documentation giving this information
should be updated when new versions are installed.
13) The FMEA shall also cover an analysis of the specific requirement related to maintaining full propulsion
power after the occurrence of any single failure in an active component, see [2.2.4].
Guidance note 7:
This part of the FMEA thereby has a different acceptance criteria than the rest of the analysis.
1.8.5.2 FMEA for dynamic positioning control system and manoeuvring thrusters, applicable for the EMR2-
qualifier
For EMR2, the FMEA required by the ER2-qualifier shall be extended to cover the DP control system and the
manoeuvring thrusters.
1.8.6 Test procedure for quay-and sea trials - FMEA tests, applicable for both ER- and EMR-
qualifiers
1) A test procedure for quay- and sea trials shall be submitted for approval, covering the test items
described in [1.10.2] and [1.10.3]. The procedure shall be based on the test procedure required by the
SRTP notation and extended as applicable to cover verification of the requirements of the applicable
qualifiers of this subsection.
2) The test procedure shall support verification of the FMEA analysis and conclusions made in the FMEA
including redundancy design intention(s), worst case failure design intention(s), single failure tolerance
within the given time requirement and acceptance criteria, barriers and other compensating measures,
independency and separation requirements when required.
3) The test program shall have an introduction which as a minimum shall include a reference to the specific
FMEA document (title, version and date) and specification of (or reference to) all specified operational
modes and CAM/technical system configurations that shall be verified by testing.
4) Each test shall in the test program as a minimum contain:
— test identification, e.g. test number
— test set-up/pre-requisites/conditions including CAM configuration
— test method
— actions to be performed (what/how to activate/simulate)
— expected results (system response, alarming)
— acceptance criteria, including time response requirements when relevant
— space/functionality for documenting actual observations, findings, test results and conclusions.
In order to facilitate the practical testing, description of the test method should preferably include
detailed locations where the physical and practical actions should be carried out. Preferably also the test
intention(s) and reference to the specific part in the FMEA to be verified should be included.
5) A set of separation tests shall be prepared and documented, i.e. specific tests to verify physical
segregation of redundancy groups. These can be supported by other verification activities such as
documentation of installation procedures and inspections, in order to support the conclusions of the
separation analysis in the FMEA.
6) After FMEA testing is performed the FMEA test program(s) shall be updated to reflect the actual
design and the actual test results. This updating shall as a minimum include correction of mistakes,
modifications done to the applicable system resulting from findings during testing and the actual test
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results, findings and conclusions. The updated FMEA(s) and FMEA test program(s) shall be compiled in a

FMEA report and submitted to the Society for information.
1.8.7 Computer simulations

For ER2, dynamic computer simulations of the power system in normal operation and during relevant failure
conditions shall also be used for documenting the dynamic response to failures. Simulations shall be detailed
enough to allow for documentation of transient conditions, e.g. failure modes like voltage dip ride through
resulting from a short circuit, synchronizing faults, etc. The result of the simulations shall be documented in a
report, see [1.8.2].
Guidance note:
The dynamic computer simulation and analysis should cover i.a.:
— short circuit and earth fault:
— the transient performance of the system should be simulated during short circuit/earth fault and after the failure has been
cleared, including over-voltages resulting from short circuit recovery
— ability of system to stay in synchronism during short circuit, both for equal load sharing and asymmetric load sharing, as
relevant
— voltage recovery including possible over-voltage, re-acceleration and restarts
— fault ride through capability of drives, generators, feeders, motors/LV consumers, etc.
— crash synchronisation of generators (generator breakers) and switchboards (bus-ties). The simulation must include mechanical
stress on generator, prime mover and coupling
— connection of stopped generator or generator with RPM lower than nominal
— load acceptance and rejection:
— trip of single generator, trip of generators with common mode failure

— trip of large consumer/switchboard, load reduction and load shedding
— start/connection of large consumers (motors, transformers, capacitors)
— pole slip, if relevant.
1.8.8 Start-up and recovery analysis

An analysis of the start-up and recovery sequences including logical permissions, interlocks, suppressions,
protective safety functions, system latches, etc., shall be made and documented in a report. The actions
needed for remote system recovery shall be described for the applicable failure modes.
Guidance note:
The intention of the analysis is to assess the integrity of the restart sequence of one redundancy group after a failure leading to
functional loss; to analyse potential properties or dependencies that may prevent a successful recovery of one redundancy group.
The document is also intended to provide operational guidance on system restoration.

Compliance documentation shall be submitted as required in Table 10.
Compliance
Compliance
standard
type
Dynamic positioning For EMR1 and EMR2

PC
control system
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Compliance

Compliance
standard
type
Manoeuvring thruster
PC
control system
Thruster control mode

PC
selection system
1) If not otherwise stated, the compliance standard is the rules.

Guidance note:
Required compliance documentation for the various control and monitoring systems serving the electrical power systems, e.g.
power management system, generator protection systems, switchboard surveillance systems, etc., are given in Pt.4 Ch.8.
1.10 Survey and test upon completion

1.10.1 General
Upon completion, the systems covered by the ER- and EMR-qualifiers shall be tested according to approved
test programs for quay and sea trials. The program shall contain test procedures and acceptance criteria.
Prior to the system tests, all systems, subsystems, auxiliaries and equipment needed to support the
functionality shall be successfully commissioned and tested.
1.10.2 Quay- and sea trials - propulsion, steering and electrical power system
The propulsion, steering and electrical power system shall be tested during quay- and sea trials to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the applicable ER-qualifier. The test items shall include:
1) A selection of tests within each system analyzed in the FMEA. Specific conclusions of the FMEA for
the different systems shall be verified by tests when redundancy, fail safe response, separation, or
independence is required. The tests shall include tests to verify proper functionality of the power
management system (PMS) generator protection system (GP), detection systems to prevent hidden
failures, stand-by start and change-over functionality and other systems that might affect the integrity of
the propulsion, steering and power system.
2) Verification of the indication and operation of the operational mode and the associated CAM configuration
including set up and configuration of all relevant machinery and power systems.
3) Remote restoration of propulsion, steering and power systems in accordance with the ER-qualifier.
1.10.3 Quay-and sea trials - dynamic positioning and manoeuvring thrusters
1.10.3.1 General
Upon completion, the DP system shall be subject to final tests according to approved test programs to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the applicable EMR-qualifier. Functional-, redundancy- and
failure response testing of the DP system shall be performed at sea trials. The program(s) shall contain test
procedures and acceptance criteria covering at least the test items given in the following subsections.
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Guidance note:

Prior to the DP system tests, all systems and equipment included in the DP system should be successfully commissioned and
tested, i.a. the following:
— load test according to main class

— power management system(s)
— switchboard control and protection
— thruster control and transfer of thruster control
— manual override of thruster control
— emergency stops
— communication systems
— main alarm system as for main class and E0 (if applicable)
— integrated automation systems (if applicable)
— other systems as applicable.
1.10.3.2 Measuring systems

1) All DP-control systems sensors, peripheral equipment, and position reference systems shall be tested as
part of the complete DP system.
2) Failures of DP-control system sensors and position reference systems shall be simulated to check the
alarm system and the switching function.
1.10.3.3 Manoeuvring thrusters

1) Functional tests of control and alarm systems of each thruster shall be carried out.
2) All signals within the thruster control systems and signals exchanged between each thruster and the DP-
control systems shall be checked.
3) The different modes of thruster control shall be tested. Proper operation of mode selection shall be
verified.
1.10.3.4 Complete DP system test

1) The complete DP system shall be tested in all operational modes, with simulation of different failure
conditions, in order to try out e.g. switching modes, back-up systems, fail to safe response (e.g. thruster
control system I/O) and alarm systems.
Guidance note:
Different operational modes apply to the DP-control system, the power system, thruster systems, etc.
2) Change of command between the automatic DP-control system, independent joystick (if fitted) and the
individual thruster lever systems shall be demonstrated.
3) Position and heading keeping function shall be demonstrated.
4) Thruster emergency stop function shall be demonstrated.
1.10.3.5 Redundancy and failure mode tests

1) The requirements in this subsection apply to EMR2.
2) A selection of tests within each system analysed in the FMEA shall be carried out. Specific conclusions
of the FMEA for the different systems shall be verified by tests when redundancy, fail safe response,
separation or independence is required. The test selection shall cover all specified technical system
configurations.
3) The test procedure for redundancy shall be based on the simulation of failures and shall be performed
under as realistic conditions as practicable.
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2 Enhanced reliability
2.1 Introduction
This subsection covers the requirements for enhanced reliability and the criteria for the two different levels of
the qualifier ER1 and ER2.
The general assumption in the phrasing of the requirements is that the propulsion, steering and power
systems are arranged with two redundancy groups. Ships arranged with more than two redundancy groups
will provide additional capabilities and will be subject to special considerations.
2.2 General
2.2.1 Functional intentions
The overall intention with the ER-qualifiers is to increase the reliability and availability of the propulsion-,
steering- and electrical power systems by:
— reducing the risk of functional loss after the occurrence of any single failure as defined in [2.2.5].
— in the event of a functional loss, simplifying the restoration and limiting the time needed for recovery of
the lost functions.
Guidance note:
The risk of functional loss after a failure is affected by the operational configuration of the systems. When operating in CAM
configuration, the consequence of a failure is normally minimized; when operating in other configurations, the consequence
of a failure may be more severe. The acceptance criteria for the restoration time generally covers the restoration of the other
redundancy group than the one exposed to the initial failure.
The requirements are related to design, verification, test and to operational support and guidance to the crew.
2.2.2 Acceptance criteria
2.2.2.1 ER1
For ER1, the propulsion, steering and electrical power system shall be designed and arranged so that if a
single failure as defined in [2.2.5] occur when the systems are set up in CAM configuration(s);
— if the failure leads to loss of one or more of the functions (propulsion, steering or electrical power),
restoration shall be possible within 2 minutes
— all operator actions needed for the restoration shall be possible to conduct remotely from the normal
operating positions (bridge and engine control room)
— the restored functions shall have the capabilities specified in [2.2.4].
Guidance note 1:
Longer restoration times than 2 minutes may upon special considerations be accepted if endorsed by the owner.
Guidance note 2:
Restoration of power on the main switchboard after loss of power shall in general be completed within 45 seconds, see Pt.4 Ch.8
Sec.2.
2.2.2.2 ER2
For ER2, the propulsion, steering and electrical power system shall be designed and arranged for
uninterrupted operation; when the systems are set up in CAM configuration(s), a single failure as defined in
[2.2.5] shall not lead to loss of both redundancy groups for any function (propulsion, steering or electrical
power). The remaining capabilities of the functions shall be according to [2.2.4]. In the event of a black-out,
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restoration of electrical power, propulsion and steering shall be possible within 2 minutes and all necessary

operator actions for the restoration shall be possible to conduct remotely from the normal operating positions
(bridge and engine control room).
Guidance note 1:
Longer restoration times than 2 minutes may upon special considerations be accepted if endorsed by the owner.
Guidance note 2:
For ER2, even though the systems are designed for uninterrupted operation and the risk of black-out is minimized, it is not
eliminated.

1) All systems and auxiliaries needed to support the basic design criteria shall be arranged with redundancy
and physical segregation in accordance with the casualty threshold plan and arranged in redundancy
groups to provide the required capabilities of the remaining systems after any single failure.
Guidance note 1:
The term redundancy group thereby denotes all systems and components needed to provide the required capabilities of
propulsion, power and steering - after any single failure that impair the other redundancy group, see Table 9. For propulsion
capacity, the required propulsion capability after loss of one redundancy group is 6kn in BF8.
2) The redundancy groups shall be arranged with physical segregation in accordance with the casualty
thresholds defined in the SRTP rules. Any cross-over or common arrangement in pipes and ducts
connecting the redundancy groups shall be provided with valves, or dampers as applicable, on both sides
of the separating bulkhead(s). All separating valves, dampers or other components needed to separate
the redundancy groups shall be arranged for remote operation.
3) Stand-by start or change-over of generators and its auxiliaries is accepted to provide the intended
availability of the power generation system, i.e. the required availability may not necessarily be based on
running machinery. The most probable failures that may prevent a successful stand-by start shall as far
as practicable be monitored.
Guidance note 2:
In CAM configuration(s), at least one generator is running in each redundancy group, and the above requirement implies that
if a failure causes shut-down of one redundancy group, it is assumed that necessary stand-by units will start, if needed, to
provide the required capacity (see [2.2.4]) in either the operational redundancy group - or by restoring the operation in the
stopped redundancy group. The monitoring requirements are intended to reduce the likelihood of a hidden failure preventing
a successful stand-by start. The most probable failures in this context may be latent failures like e.g. lack of available starting
energy at the unit, power failure to stand-by units, wrong mode of operation, heating/priming pumps not running, etc.
4) The propulsion, steering and power systems shall be designed so that it is possible to segregate the
redundancy groups and test failure mode behaviour and system restoration in each of the redundant
groups without impairing the continued operation of the other redundancy group.
2.2.4 Remaining capabilities after a failure

1) After occurrence of any single failure leading to the failure modes as specified in [2.2.5], the remaining
capabilities of propulsion, power and steering shall be as required by the SRTP-notation, i.e. the
capabilities required for the systems to remain operational after casualty, provided by the operational
redundancy group.
2) The general requirement is that after a failure, one redundancy group shall remain operational
(propulsion, steering and electrical power system with necessary auxiliaries) and maintain the same level
of automation, monitoring, alarm, protective safety and means of remote and local control as prior to the
casualty. A temporary reduction of the capacity in the intermediate period until stand-by unit(s) start is
acceptable.
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3) In addition to the general design principles of 1) and 2), the auxiliary systems shall within each

redundancy group be arranged with adequate capacity and redundancy to ensure that after a failure in
any active component, the remaining auxiliary systems has adequate capacity to support normal full
propulsion power.
Guidance note 1:
The intention of this requirement is to ensure that vessel operation can proceed with normal propulsion power after failure in
auxiliary systems that may otherwise cause degradation or loss of the complete redundancy group.
Guidance note 2:
The OP-qualifier, see [4], extends the requirement for the added capacity and redundancy in active components in auxiliary
systems to also ensure that the SRtP capabilities of the propulsion, steering and power systems ship are maintained even
when active components are unavailable, e.g. related to component maintenance.
2.2.5 Failure modes

1) The following failure modes shall be covered for compliance with the requirements of [2.2.4]:
— incidents of fire within casualty thresholds, see Sec.11 [3.2]. Fire on the navigating bridge is
exempted.
Guidance note 1:
Fire on the navigating bridge is a scenario that is covered by the general SRtP-rules; the exemption given here applies to
the additional requirements of the OR-notation.
— incidents of flooding within casualty thresholds, see Sec.11 [3.2], and possible other compartments
as specified in 3).
— short-circuit of switchboard bus-bars
— single inadvertent acts of operation, if reasonably probable
Guidance note 2:
In order to reduce the probability of inadvertent acts, the following means may e.g. be applied:
— double action (manual activation and confirmation or physical protection of means of activation)
— operation of two separate devices
— using screen-based pop-ups prompting confirmation.
2) For ER2, the failure modes to be covered include those listed in 1) and in addition failure modes in the
power system as identified in [2.6.4].
3) Eventual adjacent compartments above bulkhead deck, which contain equipment belonging to different
redundancy groups and where there is a risk of significant liquid leakage, shall be covered.
Guidance note 3:
The SRtP casualty threshold for flooding (as defined in the SRTP-notation) is limited to watertight compartments below
bulkhead deck. The intention of the requirement above is to extend the flooding casualty design criteria to also cover
other compartments that by definition are excluded from the 'below bulkhead deck' criteria in SRtP and not arranged with
watertight bulkheads, but where the risk and consequence of liquid leakage is significant as both redundancy groups may
otherwise be impaired. This may e.g. be compartments containing PODs or the associated electrical drives or compartments
that may be exposed to significant water leakage from rupture in scrubbers or associated piping systems.
Compliance may be achieved by e.g. arranging watertight bulkheads, or alternatively, by ensuring adequate bilging capacity
and appropriate sills to handle the maximum influx following an internal leakage caused by e.g. a pipe rupture or fire-fighting
efforts, to prevent that more than one redundancy group is affected by the leakage.
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4) For compliance with the requirements for added capacity in auxiliary systems, see [2.2.4] item 3, failure

of any active component shall be considered.
2.2.6 Impact of a fire casualty

After an incident of fire, all components, pipes and cables (supporting the propulsion, steering and power
system) within the associated casualty threshold are considered lost. If however, segregated routing is
practically unavoidable, a trunk constructed to A60 may be accepted as an alternative means of protection.
In such cases, means shall be provided to keep the temperature inside the duct within the specified range for
the cables (and pipes as applicable).
Guidance note:
This implies that the interpretations of the SRTP-notation regarding survivability of cables and pipes after a fire do not apply in
general; physical segregation in different casualty thresholds between cables serving different redundancy groups is required.
2.2.7 Critical activity modes (CAM)

1) For each of the vessels' normal operating modes in which the enhanced reliability as specified for the
ER-qualifier is applicable, a critical activity mode (CAM) shall be defined. This applies at minimum to
manoeuvring mode and transit/open sea mode.
2) The CAM shall determine the technical set-up and configuration of the propulsion, steering and
power system including all auxiliaries to provide the intended fault tolerance and system restoration
capabilities.
Guidance note:
The systems' response to failures depends on the operational mode and the configuration and set-up of the propulsion, steering
and power system. The intention of defining the CAM is to ensure that the configurations that provide the intended fault tolerance
and the intended restoration time after a functional loss:
— is clearly defined, documented and verified during the design phase, and
— is made readily available to support the crew in the practical operation.
This should be established for different operational scenarios where different operational modes apply, including manoeuvring
mode and transit/open sea mode.
The CAM configurations will for each of the vessels operational modes normally include appropriate segregation of the redundancy
groups - if a failure could otherwise lead to prolonged restoration time, i.a:
— starting necessary auxiliaries and generator sets in each redundancy group

— separating the redundancy groups by closing any cross-over connections in auxiliary piping systems
— separating the redundancy groups by closing any cross-over connections in the ventilation systems
— setting up the power generators, main switchboards and power distribution systems according to the design intent, including
configuration of the bus-tie breaker(s), possible cross feeders, ring distributions, etc.
The exact configuration of the CAM depends on the design intent.

2.3.1 General
The requirements of the ER1- and ER2-qualifiers of this subsection are additional to those of the SRTP-
notation as shown in Table 11. Supplementary requirements and details for the different systems are given in
consecutive subsections.
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Table 11 System arrangement for ER1- and ER2

System, sub-system, Basic requirement
function or component ER1 ER2
Propulsion Prime movers As for SRTP, redundancy and segregation.

system
Propulsion engines As for SRTP, redundancy and segregation.
Shafts Physically segregated arranged in different casualty thresholds.
Auxiliary systems Arranged for autonomous operation within each redundancy group, each
redundancy group arranged with additional capacity.
Steering system Steering gear As for SRTP, redundancy and segregation.
Steering gear control For rudder arrangements, each rudder arranged with main and auxiliary
and actuators steering (control and actuators).
For azimuth thruster arrangements, each thruster arranged with redundant
steering (control and actuators).
Power system Generators and prime As for SRTP, redundancy and segregation.
movers
Auxiliary systems Arranged for autonomous operation within each redundancy group, each
redundancy group arranged with additional capacity.
Main switchboard As for SRTP, redundancy and segregation.
Bus-tie breakers As for SRTP, one for each main switchboard.
Power management Redundancy and segregation.

system
Extended generator Not required. One for each redundancy group,

1)
protection system independent of other control and
monitoring systems.
Additional measures Not required. Depending on the design principles and

system arrangement
— Prevention of large inrush currents
through pre-magnetizing of
transformers.
— Fault ride through capability.
— Extended self-diagnostics and
2)
monitoring .
Control, alarm, For propulsion, Redundancy and segregation to serve each redundancy group with remote
monitoring, steering, power restoration and control after a single failure, maintaining the same level of
safety systems generation and alarm, monitoring, control and safety.
and operator distribution
stations
1)
An extended generator protection system in this context is assumed to be an advanced tool with the capability to
provide the functions required in [2.6.4], i.e. the ability to detect failures not addressed by traditional generator and
switchboard protection systems.
2)
The extended self-diagnosis and monitoring is intended to reduce the risk of a hidden failure preventing stand-by start
of a generator set, see [2.2.3].
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2.3.2 Critical activity mode - indication and operation

1) The configuration and status of all components and systems required for the power- and machinery
systems to enter and stay in the CAM configurations shall be visualized and presented on the navigating
bridge and in ECR.
Guidance note:
Note that these rules do not give guidance on the suitability of the different intended technical system configurations with
respect to the vessels' various operational scenarios.
2) All components (e.g. valves, pumps, fans, dampers, breakers) that must be operated for the systems
to enter the CAM configuration(s) shall be possible to operate remotely from the normal operating
positions, i.e. navigating bridge and ECR as appropriate.
2.4 Propulsion system

The propulsion system shall be arranged with redundancy and separation according to the requirements of
the SRTP notation with the additional requirements given in this section. The propulsion system shall consist
of at least two propulsion lines, each constituting a redundancy group.
1) The propulsion system within each redundancy group shall be arranged with all necessary auxiliaries and
supporting systems to provide autonomous operation independent of the other group.
2) The control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems shall be arranged with redundancy and segregation so
that a failure affects one redundancy group only thereby providing continued operation of the remaining
redundancy group from the normal operating positions after a failure.
3) The propulsion system shall be arranged so that no manual, local actions are needed for neither
restoration after a failure nor for the continued operation during a return to port voyage.
4) For shafted propulsion lines, the redundancy groups shall be arranged with physical segregation of the
shaft-lines within separate casualty thresholds.
Guidance note 1:
This implies that the mitigating interpretations of the SRTP-notation regarding survivability of a propulsion shaft after a fire
or flooding casualty do not apply, and that the redundant system shall be designed with physical segregation.
5) The control and safety functions for each propulsion line shall as far as possible be arranged as 'fail-
maintain', i.e. as for single propulsion engine installations.
Guidance note 2:
This implies i.a. that the relevant signals should be arranged to avoid spurious shutdowns, e.g. through
— 2oo2 voting principles and/or loop monitoring on signals that may cause shutdown
— that it is possible to override shut-down signals that do not immediately cause mechanical damage
— that failure of controller or a safety system does not cause shut-down where possible.
6) Detection principles for explosive conditions in the crankcase of combustion engines shall be arranged to
minimize the risk of spurious detection and shutdown.
Guidance note 3:
This may e.g. be achieved with two different detection principles in a 2oo2 voting mechanism, with due consideration on the
voting mechanism to ensure that true explosive conditions are detected even if one detector have failed.
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2.4.2 Auxiliary systems

1) All auxiliary- and supporting systems serving propulsion shall be arranged to support the redundancy
design intent of the propulsion system.
Guidance note 1:
See also [2.4].
2) It shall be possible to remotely isolate all cross-over piping systems and ventilation systems between the
redundancy groups (i.e. applicable valves and dampers).
3) The auxiliary systems shall as far as possible be arranged to allow for wind-milling of a passive propeller
shaft without power regeneration, see Pt.4 Ch.8 Sec.2 [2.2.6], or detrimental effects to the passive
propulsion arrangement, covering applicable failure modes in the passive redundancy group.
Guidance note 2:
The intention is to ensure that in case of a failure leading to loss of one propulsion line, the vessel can return to port with the
other propulsion line at intended speed without detrimental effects to the wind-milling propulsion drive. This may e.g. partly
be ensured through cross feeding of electrical power/ cross piping connections of the necessary lubrication oil pumps and
eventual other auxiliaries needed to support a non-detrimental propeller rotation.
Guidance note 3:
Shaft-locking capable of preventing wind-milling at the intended speed during a SRtP voyage is an alternative way to comply
with the requirement, if feasible.
2.5 Steering systems

The steering system shall be arranged with redundancy and separation according to the requirements of
the SRTP-notation, i.e. one steering system dedicated to each propulsion line as part of the appurtenant
redundancy group. The steering systems within each redundancy group shall in addition:
1) for rudder arrangements, be arranged with a main and auxiliary steering gear according to main class
requirements. This also includes two independent means of control from bridge.
Guidance note 1:
In a typical installation with two independent (i.e. main and auxiliary) steering gear systems for each rudder, one pump in
each system is fed from the emergency switchboard and the two other pumps (one in each system) are fed from each side of
the main switchboard.
2) for azimuth arrangements, be arranged with redundant actuators powered by dedicated supplies and a
redundant steering control system.
Guidance note 2:
This implies that each steering system has single failure tolerance towards i.a failures in electrical components, control
system units, control system power, cabling, signalling and communication buses and also rupture in hydraulic pipes.
3) The mechanical levers at the bridge do not have to be duplicated to serve the two independent means of
steering if the potentiometers/circuits/signals and electrical power supplies serving the two systems are
separate and independent.
4) be arranged with all necessary auxiliaries and supporting systems to provide autonomous operation
independent of the other group
5) be arranged to provide operation from the normal operating positions after a failure, with the same
means of control while maintaining the required monitoring, alarm and safety functions independent of
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the other redundancy group (i.a. continued control and monitoring from bridge with the same- or similar

levers)
Guidance note 3:
Depending on the failure scenario, local intervention may be necessary to bring a steering unit to neutral position and lock
the unit.
6) be arranged so that, after a failure, no manual local actions are required for restoration or continued
operation during a return to port voyage.
2.6 Power system

2.6.1 General
1) The power system shall be divisible into two or more redundancy groups (sub-systems) such that in the
event of failure of one redundancy group at least one other group will remain in operation. The power
system shall be prepared for operation with both open- and closed bus-ties between power systems
belonging to different redundancy groups. For operation with closed bus-ties, the bus-tie breakers shall
automatically open upon failures which could otherwise propagate from one redundancy group to the
other.
Guidance note 1:
In this context, failures are not limited to only overloading and short circuit but should include all possible system and
component failures. This means that for any system, all identified possible system and component failure should be analyzed
in the FMEA, and the consequence of all failures should be concluded with an acceptable integrity level.
Guidance note 2:
Typical actions in case of failure of generator sets could be:
— start all generator sets

— trip faulty generator (may be delayed as long as it is contributing with power)
— open bus-ties
— make sure healthy generator sets do not trip on reverse power.
2) When the integrity of different redundancy groups depend on systems that actively detect and effectuate
protective actions (e.g. when a component or system has two or more power supplies originating from
redundant systems and a failure could otherwise impair both redundancy groups), proper discrimination
shall ensure that relevant failure modes do not propagate to both redundancy groups.
Guidance note 3:
Examples of typical failure modes in this context are transient under voltages (e.g. as a result of a short circuit affecting both
power supplies) or other common failures like e.g. voltage spikes. Discrimination is important to maintain integrity between
redundant groups when power supplies are entering the same fire zone. The physical installation should as far as possible
limit the possibility for a failure to affect both systems.
3) For ER2, the electrical power system shall be designed to support the voltage transient ride-through
capabilities needed to maintain the required availability of the propulsion, steering and electrical power.
Guidance note 4:
Voltage transient ride through describes the ability of electrical consumers to continue in operation following a significant
voltage excursion. Voltage transients can be caused by short circuit faults, voltage regulator faults and excessive
regeneration from drives. Many consumers such as variable speed drives and motors are supplied through electromagnetic
contactors that are susceptible to voltage dips associated with clearing a fault elsewhere in the power system.
DNV AS
2.6.2 Electrical power system

1) The electrical power generators belonging to each redundancy group shall be arranged with all necessary
auxiliaries and supporting systems to provide autonomous operation independent of the other group.
Guidance note 1:
Particular attention should be paid to starting conditions of electrical propulsion drives and thruster motors, especially with
one redundancy group out of service. Such large electrical consumers should have arrangements to prevent large start
currents and voltage drop during the start sequence. The effect of voltage drop during starting periods may cause under-
voltage trips, and main class requirements should be observed. When starting large consumers on dedicated generators with
no other loads connected which would be affected by voltage deviations, voltage drop in excess of the limits of the rules may
be accepted.
Attention should also be paid to connection of large transformers where the inrush currents may give large voltage dips
and/or make it difficult to maintain discrimination in the power distribution system. Large transformers should have a pre-
magnetizing system or other equivalent arrangements that prevent large inrush currents and make an integrity check of the
transformer before it is connected.
The high reactive load demands that may occur during rapid load variations should be considered when selecting number
and type of generators, further, the dynamic load variations for generator prime movers should be taken into consideration;
including also that gas fuelled engines may be more susceptible for dynamic load variations than traditional combustion
engines.
2) Stand-by start or change-over of generators can be accepted as a means to provide the continuous
availability required by ER2 provided that:
1) start-up and connection/synchronization of stand-by generators is automatic
2) the available power in the intermediate period after a generator shut-down is specified and
documented
Guidance note 2:
This is the power available in the period following a shutdown of one generator set until the stand-by generator(s) are
connected and the SRtP power balance is re-established.
3) connection/synchronization of a generator is quick enough to avoid consequential effects (e.g.
full black-out) of rapid changes in power demand caused by start/stop/tripping of the heaviest
consumers in the operating redundancy group
4) power supplies to related control systems are continuously available
5) when operating in CAM-configuration, single failure does not cause full black-out
Guidance note 3:
This implies that minimum two generators must be running in CAM configuration; one in each redundancy group, and a
failure may affect one generator / redundancy group only, causing a temporary reduction in power generation.
6) ready for stand-by start and/or ready for change over status is indicated in the CAM operational
interface.
3) For closed bus-tie configurations, the potential transient under-voltage conditions following certain
failures (e.g. short-circuits) shall not cause unintended tripping of consumers in the other redundancy
DNV AS
group(s). The effect of transient voltage-dips and ride-through capabilities of the consumers shall be

analysed and documented in the FMEA.
Guidance note 4:
Typical examples of unintended tripping in the context of under-voltage ride-through capabilities are:
— unintended tripping of frequency converters

— unintended tripping of motors and other important components, like auxiliary system pumps (tripping of motor starters
and/or contactors);
— unintended activation of under-voltage protection systems;
— over-voltages resulting from fault clearance and voltage re-establishments.
See documents DNV OTG-10 DP-classed vessels with closed bus-tie(s) for further guidance.
4) In case cross feeding and change-over is arranged for certain consumers, the arrangement shall be so
that a single failure in neither:
— one redundancy group, nor
— the change-over arrangement itself, nor
— a common power or control system connection, nor
— the system or component being changed over
can cause failure in more than one redundancy group.
2.6.3 Power management

1) A redundant power management (PMS) system shall be provided; arranged with segregation.
Guidance note 1:
This may e.g. be arranged with a dedicated controller for each redundancy group, where two controllers constitute a
redundant PMS system. Each controller capable of controlling the both (all) redundancy group in a normal closed bus-tie
operations and the specific redundancy group in open bus-tie scenarios.
2) The PMS system shall, after any single failure, remain operational to provide the required functions for
the remaining power system / redundancy group.
3) The PMS system shall cover both open- and closed bus-tie operation with at least the following functions
(functional also in return to port mode operating with one ER / SWBD):
1) load dependent start of generators
2) start blocking of large consumers when the running capacity is limited; and subsequent start-up to
serve the power demand
3) preferential tripping
4) overload prevention
5) load prioritizing between propulsion and manoeuvring thrusters in applicable modes of operation (to
be aligned with dynamic positioning functions, if applicable)
6) automatic black-out recovery of individual sections of the main switchboard. The recovery time shall
support the restoration time for the applicable ER-qualifier.
4) A failure in the power management system shall not cause any changes in to the power generation and
shall initiate an alarm.
Guidance note 2:
Special attention should be paid to ensure that the distribution of I/O signals corresponds to the redundancy groups so that
effects of single failures in the PMS system will be in accordance with the overall redundancy requirements.
5) Means shall be implemented in order to prevent overloading of the power plant, e.g. by use of interlocks,
thrust limitations or other means.
DNV AS
6) When minimum one generator in each redundancy group is online in closed bus-tie operations, a failure

causing shut-down or stopping of one or more generators in one redundancy group shall not cause full
black-out.
Guidance note 3:
This may be achieved by rapid load reduction through tripping of unimportant consumers and automatic start and connection
of stand-by generators. However, it is common that the relative load proportions will require immediate load reduction of
propulsion engines and/or manoeuvring thrusters (speed, pitch) to effectively reduce overload situations until necessary
stand-by generators are started and connected.
For open bus-tie operations, a failure causing shut-down or stopping of one or more generators in one redundancy group may
cause partial black-out of the exposed redundancy group while the other group remains online.
7) After a full black-out, the MSB bus-ties shall automatically open and automatic restart of all available
gen-sets shall be initiated on all sections of the main switchboard.
2.6.4 Protective functions

1) For ER2, each redundancy group shall be provided with a dedicated generator protection (GP) system
that is independent of the automatic voltage regulators (AVRs) and engine governors.
2) The GP system shall be able to detect failures that are not addressed by traditional generator and
switchboard protection systems; take appropriate actions to prevent a full or partial black-out situation
and effectuate actions to minimize the consequence of a failure, e.g. when generators are operating in
parallel.
3) The protective systems shall cover the following failure modes:
— under-voltage e.g. as consequence of short circuit
— over-voltage, including transients
— short circuits and over-current
— earth failures
— negative sequence
— high harmonic distortion (THD)
— failures related to load sharing (active and reactive load, reverse power, communication, I/O)
— failures in the power management system.
Guidance note 1:
The above list of failure modes depends on the design principles and properties of the system and is not exhaustive; e.g.
for DC-systems, the list of failure modes should be adapted.
4) The GP system shall

— trip faulty generator(s) upon governor failure
— trip faulty generator(s) upon AVR failure.
5) When generators in different redundancy groups are running in parallel with closed bus-ties, certain
single failure may propagate between the power systems. Protective measures shall be in place to
ensure the required integrity between the redundancy groups, and an analysis of relevant failure modes
shall be addressed in the FMEA.
Guidance note 2:
The requirements of [2.6.4] are additional to main class requirements.
See documents DNV OTG-10 DP-classed vessels with closed bus-tie(s) and DNV-RP-D102 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) of Redundant Systems, Appendix D, for explanation of acceptance criteria, discussion on the subject, and other
examples of relevant failure modes that should be considered.
DNV AS
2.6.5 Electrical power distribution

1) For ER2, the switchboard arrangement shall be such that no single failure will result in full black-out.
2) For ER1 and ER2, there shall be at least two main switchboards located in separate spaces according
to SRTP requirements. Each section shall be provided with bus-tie breaker(s). These breakers shall be
circuit breakers that:
— are capable of breaking the maximum short circuit current in the system, and
— provide discrimination towards the generator breakers in case of short circuit, and
— shall be arranged to open automatically upon failures which could otherwise propagate from one
system to another.
Guidance note:
For DC systems with different failure modes and response to failures, the intended fault tolerance may be achieved by
different mechanisms.
3) For ER1 and ER2, the power distribution system shall be designed to operate with closed bus-tie
breakers in normal operating modes, and the control and protection systems shall be designed to work
with both open and closed bus-tie breakers.
4) For ER1 and ER2, cables from power systems in different redundancy groups supplying the same
consumer may enter a common space if discrimination is in place for both feeders so that the worst-case
failure design intent is not compromised, i.e. that failures in the common space cannot propagate into
the power systems in different redundancy groups.
3 Enhanced manoeuvring reliability
3.1 General
3.1.1 Functional intentions
The overall intention with the EMR-qualifiers is to increase the reliability and availability of the vessels
manoeuvring- and positioning capabilities. This is achieved through specific requirements to the manoeuvring
thrusters and a dynamic positioning control system.
Guidance note 1:
All passenger ships built to the SRtP regulations are equipped with manoeuvering thrusters, but manoeuvring thrusters are not
directly required by mandatory rules and regulations. This implies that the requirements and acceptance criteria for the design,
fault tolerance and arrangement of manoeuvring thrusters are limited in main class rules. The EMR-qualifiers provide a set of
requirements and acceptance criteria for the manoeuvring thrusters to enhance the reliability of manoeuvring operations.
Guidance note 2:
It is quite common that passenger ships are equipped with systems for dynamic positioning and the positioning capabilities may
be applied in exposed operations, e.g. turning the ship in congested waters / harbor, positioning on a reef or operation in narrow
channels. However, the ships do normally not hold any DYNPOS class notation and the class requirements and verification of the
positioning system are therefore very limited. The EMR-qualifiers provide a set of requirements and acceptance criteria for the
dynamic positioning control system that are adapted to the passenger ship segment.
Guidance note 3:
The SRTP-notation, which is a pre-requisite for the voluntary OR-notation, will ensure that the ship is designed with redundant
and segregated systems for propulsion, steering and power generation. The ER-qualifiers extend the requirements to address
the operational reliability of propulsion, steering and power systems while the EMR-qualifiers of this sub-section includes the
manoeuvring thrusters and the dynamic positioning control system.
DNV AS
Guidance note 4:

The scope of the EMR-qualifiers are largely based on the DYNPOS-notations, but with a reduced scope adapted to passenger
ships:
— EMR1 is an adaption of the DYNPOS AUT-notation

— EMR2 is an adaption of the DYNPOS AUTR-notation, which i.a. requires redundancy in design for the DP system. In the context of
the EMR2- qualifier, the redundant DP system shall be arranged with physical separation in accordance with the general principles
of the OR-notation. (Note that the selection of DYNPOS AUTR and not AUTRO is deliberate as the additional requirements of
the AUTRO notation is considered excessive in the context of the OR notation).
Guidance note 5:
For DP systems compliant with IMO DP guidelines IMO MSC/Circ.645 Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems or
IMO MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems, see the DP-notations in Ch.3 Sec.1.

For EMR1, the manouevring thruster(s) and dynamic positioning control system shall be designed and
arranged in compliance with the applicable requirements of this subsection. The systems may be arranged
without redundancy and the functions may therefore be lost upon a single failure.
For EMR2, the manouevring thrusters and the dynamic positioning control system shall be arranged with
redundancy and physical segregation. In the event of a single failure as described for ER2, see [2.2.5], one
redundancy group shall remain operational and provide uninterrupted operation.
Compliance with the ER2-qualifier is a pre-requisite for the EMR2-qualifier.
Guidance note:
The reliability of the positioning and manoeuvring capabilities fully depends on the propulsion, steering and power systems. To
achieve the highest level of manoeuvring reliability denoted by the EMR2-qualifier, compliance also with the requirements of the
ER2-qualifier is a pre-requisite. This will include an equivalent fault tolerance and reliability for all systems and functions required
to provide positioning and manoeuvring capabilities.

The redundancy concept for the EMR-qualifiers is described in Table 12.
Table 12 Redundancy concept for the EMR-qualifiers
Qualifier Description of the redundancy concept
EMR1 — single automatic dynamic positioning control system with independent manual thruster levers
back-up
— single manoeuvring thruster arrangement
EMR2 — redundant and separated automatic dynamic positioning control system with independent manual
thruster levers back-up, redundant workstations in the DP control centre
— redundant and separated manoeuvring thrusters arranged in redundancy groups
— all systems and auxiliaries arranged to support the redundancy groups
3.1.4 Failure modes

For EMR2, the DP system and manoeuvring thrusters shall be arranged with redundancy and segregation to
cover the same failure modes as for the ER2- qualifier as described in [2.2.4].
DNV AS
Table 13 System arrangement for EMR-qualifiers
System, sub-system, Basic requirements

function or component EMR1 EMR2
DP system DP control system Single installation in accordance with Redundant systems in accordance with
the DYNPOS(AUT)-notation - with the DYNPOS(AUTR)-notation, with
exemptions as described in [3.3.1] exemptions as described in [3.3.2] and
arranged with physical segregation in
accordance with the principles of ER2
Thruster control Single Redundant

mode selection
Independent Not required Not required

joystick
Position reference 2 3
system and
sensors
Manoeuvring Single arrangement Redundancy and segregation

thrusters
3.3 Dynamic positioning system

3.3.1 DP system requirements for EMR1
For EMR1, the requirements for the DP control system in the notation DYNPOS(AUT) apply, see Ch.3 Sec.1.
However, the following exemptions and additions apply:
1) at least one DP control center shall be arranged in accordance with the DYNPOS(AUT)-notation. In case
more workstations (e.g. bridge wings) are equipped with DP operator station(s) then these stations shall
also be equipped with mode change functionality (to change between automatic positioning, manual
levers and joystick (if installed))
2) an independent joystick need not be installed.
3.3.2 DP system requirements for EMR2

For EMR2, the requirements for the DP control system in the notation DYNPOS(AUTR) apply, see Ch.3
Sec.1. However, the following exemptions and additions apply:
1) at least one DP control center shall be arranged in accordance with the DYNPOS(AUTR)-notation. In
case more workstations (e.g. bridge wings) are equipped with DP operator station(s) then these stations
shall also be equipped with mode change functionality (to change between automatic positioning, manual
levers and joystick (if installed))
2) when more than one satellite-based system is installed, at least one system shall be able to utilize a
different satellite system than the others, e.g. one DGPS system is also able to utilize e.g. GLONASS
and/or Galileo, and in addition at least one shall be a dual frequency receiver
3) an independent joystick need not be installed.
Guidance note:
The additional DP workstations need not to be fitted with redundant operator stations.
DNV AS
3.4 Manoeuvring thrusters
3.4.1 Manoeuvring thrusters for EMR1
For EMR1, the manoeuvring thruster(s) shall:
1) be provided with remote control from the navigating bridge
2) be provided with indication of running and stop, pitch, rpm and azimuth as applicable at the navigating
bridge
3) be provided with means for emergency stop from the navigating bridge independent of the remote-
control system
4) comply with the applicable requirements in notation DYNPOS(AUT) for dynamic positioning thrusters
and be designed for continuous operation.
3.4.2 Manoeuvring thrusters for EMR2

For EMR2, the manoeuvring thrusters shall be designed with redundancy and segregation, and the thrusters
shall be arranged according to the redundancy group design intent in compliance with the ER2-qualifier. All
applicable auxiliaries and supporting systems shall be arranged accordingly. The manoeuvring thrusters shall:
1) be provided with remote control from the navigating bridge, with individual levers and feedback
indication for each thruster
2) be provided with indication of running and stop, pitch, rpm and azimuth as applicable at the navigating
bridge
3) be provided with means for individual emergency stop of each thruster from bridge independent of the
remote-control system
4) comply with the applicable requirements in notation DYNPOS(AUTR) for dynamic positioning thrusters
(see Ch.3 Sec.1) and be designed for continuous operation.
3.5 Power system

3.5.1 Functional intent
In vessel operating mode(s) where electrical propulsion and manoeuvring thrusters are manually operated
simultaneously, any load limitations and automatic prioritizing of electrical power between the propulsion
and manoeuvring thrusters shall be readily available for the operator. The operator shall be able to manually
change the prioritizing and limitations to pre-defined values without causing instabilities or black-out in the
electrical power system.
The requirements apply to both EMR1 and EMR2.
Guidance note 1:
This applies e.g. to situations where one generator trips, the available power is suddenly less than the demand and the system
immediately prioritize load to avoid black-out.
Guidance note 2:
The requirement does not apply to DP-modes with automatic/semi-automatic thrust allocation.

The prioritizing of available power and load limitations to the propulsion system and manoeuvring thruster
shall for the applicable modes of operation:
1) be continuously visualized and presented on the navigating bridge and in ECR
2) be possible to change by the operator without causing instability or black-out. The allowed range of
alterations to the prioritizing and load limitations shall be restricted
3) be clearly described in the design philosophy.
DNV AS
Guidance note:

The functions should be implemented in the power management system (PMS).
4 Operational flexibility and predictability
4.1 General
4.1.1 Intentions
The intention with the requirements of this subsection is to improve the operational flexibility related to
machinery damage or -maintenance.
Guidance note 1:
In situations where machinery systems or components are damaged or under maintenance, the redundancy and fault tolerance
required by the SRtP regulations may be impaired. In this state the vessel may no longer fulfil its SRTP design capabilities as listed
in the ship-specific 'List of Limitations and Exemptions in the operation of Passenger Ships' (see SOLAS V/Reg.30).
The administration may in such situations, depending on the damage/maintenance condition and the operational scenario, impose
additional operational limitations to the vessel, e.g. by not allowing the vessel to leave port until the SRtP capabilities are restored.
The OP-qualifier is intended to limit extent of such scenarios - and to ensure that the most likely scenarios that do entail additional
operational limitations are planned for (operational envelopes).
This is achieved through:
1) Design requirements:
— added capacity/redundancy in active components in auxiliary systems serving propulsion, steering
and power (within each redundancy group)
— each redundancy group designed and verified to provide normal operating capabilities also in the pre-
defined degraded states
Guidance note 2:
This may e.g. apply for a pre-defined maintenance scenario where one generator in redundancy group A is under
maintenance. If - in that situation - a casualty should impair redundancy group B, it shall be possible to perform normal
operation of the propulsion, steering and power system with the remaining machinery and power plant in redundancy
group A - though with a reduced power and reduced SRtP capabilities (as identified in the associated operational
envelope).
Guidance note 3:
Ships arranged with more than two redundancy groups may support full SRtP compliance even after loss of a complete
redundancy group.
2) Documented remaining capabilities for pre-defined scenarios:

— determining the remaining capabilities after pre-defined damage scenarios
— analysing the operating capabilities in the associated degraded states; and, if the designed SRtP
capabilities are impaired,
— establishing the associated operational envelopes
— establish a maintenance plan based on the above items.
Compliance with the requirements of this subsection is indicated with the qualifier OP.
DNV AS
4.1.2 System design

4.1.2.1 Active components
Within each redundancy group for propulsion, steering and electrical power, the auxiliary systems shall be
arranged with adequate capacity and redundancy to ensure that a failure of any active component does not
impair the required SRtP capabilities of the redundancy group.
Guidance note 1:
This implies e.g. that if one engine room is lost due to a fire, the other engine room shall be able to provide the required
capabilities to support the SRtP power demand even if an active component in any auxiliary systems in the remaining engine room
was initially unavailable (e.g. due to maintenance or damage).
The auxiliary systems within each redundancy group must therefore be arranged with additional capacity/redundancy in active
components beyond what is required by the SRTP rules; e.g. implemented by arranging 3 x 50 % pumping capacity in cooling
water systems for each redundancy group.
When arranged according to these requirements, any single failure of active components in the different auxiliary systems should
not affect the SRtP capabilities of the vessel.
For definition of 'active component', see [1.10].
Guidance note 2:
Note that the intentions of this requirement is slightly different from the related requirement of the ER-qualifier, see [2.2.4]. The
intention of the referred ER-requirement is to ensure normal propulsion power after a failure in an active components whereas
the intention of the OP-requirement is to ensure that failure (or maintenance) of any active component does not impair the SRtP
capabilities - and the designed operational limitations.
4.1.2.2 Degraded state

It shall be possible to start, stop and operate the propulsion, steering and electrical power systems within
each redundancy group also in the pre-defined states of degradations.
Guidance note:
This includes e.g
— the ability for each redundancy group to individually recover from black-out also in the pre-defined degraded state
— start and stop of the largest consumers in the redundancy group
— connection of applicable transformers for power distribution.
4.1.3 Documentation and procedures
4.1.3.1 Operational envelopes

For the most likely damage or maintenance scenarios where main components in the propulsion, steering and
power systems are unavailable and where the SRtP capabilities (as given in the required 'List of Limitations
and Exemptions in the operation of Passenger Ships') are impaired, the degraded capabilities of the systems
shall be determined.
For each of the applicable scenarios of degraded capabilities, the operational envelope of the vessel shall be
determined and documented.
DNV AS
Guidance note 1:

This applies to scenarios where the machinery or power system of a redundancy group is degraded e.g due to maintenance, and in
that state a casualty that expose the other redundancy group occurs. The reduced capabilities of the degraded redundancy group
may not be able to provide the SRtP power demand or the propulsion and steering capabilities required for the dimensioning SRtP
voyage back to port.
The operational envelope is determined by calculating the achievable vessel speed, range and duration of the SRtP voyage at
applicable sea states. These operational envelopes will hence represent the vessels new operational limitations that apply in the
period until the machinery maintenance / repair is completed and the vessel design capabilities is reinstated. The establishment of
the operational envelopes implies that necessary hydrodynamical calculations must be performed for the relevant scenarios where
the available power balance and propulsion power is applied. The same calculation method as for the main SRTP calculations
should be used, i.e. according to the description in DNV-CG-0004, appendix E.
The operational envelopes may be documented in the form 'Operational envelopes, see DNV-CG-0004, appendix F.
By establishing the operational envelopes as part of the maintenance plan, the vessel's capabilities in different possible states of
degradation is established, and the application of this maintenance plan should be clarified with the flag administration.
Guidance note 2:
The most likely damage scenarios to be included in this context are scenarios where the propulsion, power or steering capabilities
within a redundancy group are partly reduced, e.g.
1) Power plant with 4 or more DG’s, of similar or different power rating:
— any scenario leaving 1 DG unavailable, covering all DG sizes, if applicable

— scenarios where a crucial sub-distribution, transformer in the distribution, etc., is unavailable.
2) Propulsion plant:
— if electrical propulsion, scenarios affecting one electrical drive for either propulsor
— if shafted/geared, scenarios affecting the performance of either drive.
3) Steering system:
— scenarios affecting the redundancy in the steering gear for either propulsion line.
Scenarios where a full redundancy group is unavailable is generally considered beyond extent of the coverage of this section and
should be handled on a case-by-case basis involving the administration.
4.1.3.2 Analysis and test of operation in degraded state

An analysis shall be made to assess the feasibility of operation in the pre-defined scenarios when only one,
degraded redundancy group is available. Depending on the scenarios, this may include:
— safely starting, running and stopping the service (propulsion, steering and / or electric power)
Guidance note 1:
This implies e.g to verify that inrush-currents of large consumers do not exceed the capacity of the remaining generator(s) in
the redundancy group.
— black-out recovery
Guidance note 2:
E.g. to verify that black-out recovery is possible also in a state with less generators available within the redundancy group.
Representative tests shall be described in a test program and conducted at quay-or sea trials as appropriate.
Guidance note 3:
The test items should be included in the test program for quay- and sea trials required by the SRTP-notation.
DNV AS
4.1.3.3 Maintenance plan

A maintenance plan shall be made, containing the at minimum the following information:
1) identification of components and systems designed with additional capacity or redundancy in accordance
with [4.1.2], and the extent of damage or maintenance that can be undertaken in those systems without
impairing the SRtP capabilities
2) operational envelopes for the damage or maintenance scenarios in accordance with [4.1.3]
3) possible mitigating actions to reduce the operational risk associated with the operational envelopes.
DNV AS
CHANGES – HISTORIC
Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes – historic

July 2022 edition

Electrical energy storage - fire Sec.1 [2.3.1.2] Based on experience from existing installations, the
safety recommendation to run the ventilation system continuously has
been deleted.
Sec.1 [4.1.7] Based on experience from existing installations, the guidance

note for lower grade IP has been deleted.
Clarification of leakages Sec.5 Table 1 Added explanation to maximum probable leakage.
Pipe routing sketch Sec.5 Table 2 Added explanatory description in 'additional' in documentation
requirements.
Water curtain Sec.5 Table 2 Added documentation requirements for water curtain.
Certification of nitrogen Sec.5 Table 3 Added certification requirements.

generators and aux. systems
Pressure relief valves Sec.5 [1.7] Added requirement for certification of pressure relief valves.
Product certification for energy Sec.5 [1.7.1] Added requirement for product certification for energy storage
storage devices devices.
Cool down of tank Sec.5 [1.8.1] Added requirement to include procedure in operation manual.
Incorrect rule references Sec.5 [1.8.1.2] Corrected reference.
Maximum probable leakage Sec.5 [3.1.1.4] Introduced definitions of maximum probable leakage for piping
systems.
Segregation of tank connection Sec.5 [3.3.4.1] Clarified that TCS and FPR may be adjacent spaces.
space (TCS) and fuel
preparation room (FPR) spaces
Segregation of tank connection Sec.5 [3.3.4.1] Added clarification that A60 insulation is required for common
space (TCS) vs. Ffuel boundaries.
preparation room (FPR)PR
Tank location Sec.5 [4.2] Added IGF code requirements for tank location.
Valve actuator and materials Sec.5 [5.1.3.2] Added requirement to melting point of materials for valves and
actuators on open decks.
Design pressure bunkering line Sec.5 [5.1.3.3] Reduced required design pressure, if maximum possible
delivery pressure is lower.
Venting of double walled pipes Sec.5 [5.1.5.4] Added requirement for possibility of venting pipes in case of
leakages.
Remotely operated valves Sec.5 [5.1.6.2] Added clarification.
Double pipe to tank valve Sec.5 [5.1.6.2] Added requirement for double walled pipe.
DNV AS

Acceptance of manually Sec.5 [5.1.6.5] Added explanation on which pipes from tank that may be
operated tank valves accepted with manually operated valves.
Operation of double block and Sec.5 [5.1.6.9] Clarified that the operation shall be automatic.
bleed
Venting of lines after ESD Sec.5 [5.1.6.12] Clarified that venting of such lines is only required after an
emergency shutdown.
Pressure relief outlets Sec.5 [5.2.2.7] Clarified that a pressure relief outlets shall be routed to vent
mast.
Relief valves Sec.5 [5.2.2.7] Added clarification for temperature relief valves to be allowed to
be routed back to tank.
Non-permanent connections Sec.5 [5.4.1.4] Clarified allowable use of non-permanent connections.
Nitrogen generators Sec.5 [5.4.4.3] Added requirements to the rules regarding redundancy.
redundancy
Cooling water systems Sec.6 [6.3] Added requirement for such cooling systems.
Clarification of electrical Sec.5 [8.1.1.3] Added guidance note explaining for which electrical systems
systems FMEA and FMEA is required.
NDT for fillet welds Sec.5 [11.2.2.3] Added requirement for fillet welds.
Prototype testing of expansion Sec.5 [11.4.1] Aligned testing requirements to IGF code.
bellows
Specification on the term Sec.6 Added guidance note in order to clarify other possibilities for oil
'tankers' and chemical tankers.
Gasoline INST class notation Sec.6 [1] Introduced new gasoline installation class notation, Gasoline
INST, for storage and refuelling of gasoline fuel used in crafts
stored on board DNV vessels.
Deck foam systems Sec.6 Table 4 Removed 'not applicable for tankers' in additional description.
LFL fuel safety system Sec.6 Table 4 Added certification requirements.
Gasoline INST Sec.6 [1.6.1.2] Added documentation requirements for new gasoline
documentation requirements installation class notation.
Certification requirements Sec.6 Table 6 Created new certification requirements for piping system.
Gasoline INST material Sec.6 [2.1.4] Added material requirements for new Gasoline INST class
requirements notation.
Gasoline INST arrangement Sec.6 [3.1.2] Added arrangement and design requirements for new Gasoline
and design INST class notation.
Enclosures around pipes Previous Sec.6 Deleted [3.1.1.2] to align with IMO.
[3.1.1.2]
Distance to ship's side Sec.6 [3.2.1.3] Clarified that below waterline this requirement is not valid. See
IMO guidelines.
Service tanks Sec.6 [3.2.1.5] Added requirement for two service tanks if the vessel is only
operating on LFL fuel.
DNV AS

Service tanks Sec.6 [3.2.1.5], Sec.6 Clarified that service tanks are not required.
Table 8
Clarification on cofferdams Sec.6 [3.2.2] Clarified requirements.
Acceptance of alternative PV- Sec.6 [3.2.3.5] Added that inline PV-valves with routing below waterline will be
valve arrangements. accepted as equivalence to what is stated in IMO guidelines.
Gas freeing Sec.6 [3.2.3.12] Added statement of other arrangements to be evaluated on a

case-by-case basis.
Gas freeing Sec.6 [3.2.3.13] Updated rules to include underwater discharge for gas freeing.
Spill coaming for tanks Sec.6 [3.2.5] Added requirement for spill coamings.
Tanks in dedicated space Previous Sec.6 Deleted [3.2.6.4] to align with IMO.
[3.2.6.4]
Gasoline installation fuel Sec.6 [3.2.7] Added fuel storage requirements for new Gasoline INST class
storage notation.
Protection of tanks Deleted paragraph Deleted requirement for OSVs and added under general
requirements.
Purging and gas freeing Sec.6 [3.3.1.3] Removed term 'safe location'.
Draining of pipes Sec.6 [3.3.1.5] Added operational solution as well.
Master valves Sec.6 [3.3.3] Clarified the operation of master valves, also in combination
with double block and bleed valves.
Clarified that the master valves shall be required to each

consumer or consumer sets.
LFL service tank Previous Sec.6 Deletion of duplicated requirements on LFL service tank inlets
[3.3.3.1] and outlets.
Wrong wording Sec.6 [3.3.3.6] Updated the term 'gas' to correct term 'fuel'.
Wrong wording Sec.6 [3.3.5.1] Deleted 'vented to open air' since this requirement is already
covered in the rules.
Ventilation of fuel preparation Previous Sec.6 Deleted [3.3.5.2] since the requirement is already covered in
room [3.3.5.2] [3.3.2.4].
Leakage detection Sec.6 [3.3.6.3] Opened up for other solutions.
Gasoline installation fuel Sec.6 [3.3.7] Added fuel transfer and supply requirements for new Gasoline
transfer and supply INST class notation.
Machinery spaces of category Sec.6 [3.4.1.5], Changed the rules to be in line with IMO wrt segregation
A Sec.6 [5.2.1.1] towards machinery spaces other than cat. A.
Entry of tanks Sec.6 [3.4.1.5] Clarified that suspension of operations may be done before
entering the tanks.
Gasoline INST access Sec.6 [3.4.3] Access requirements for new Gasoline INST class notation.
Ventilation Sec.6 [3.5.1] Requirements to fans in hazardous areas are replaced by

reference to Pt.4 Ch.6
DNV AS

Ventilation fan motors Sec.6 [3.5.1.1] Deleted redundant parts in [3.5.1.1].
installation
Cofferdams and hold spaces Sec.6 [3.5.2.3] Clarified that cofferdams shall not be considered tank hold
spaces.
Ventilation arrangements Sec.6 [3.5.2.5] Added acceptance for reduced ventilation during normal
operation and full capacity after a leakage detection.
Gasoline INST ventilation Sec.6 [3.5.3] Added ventilation requirements for new Gasoline INST class
notation.
Bunkering system Sec.6 [3.6] Added requirements to ship shore link, manifold station,
inerting, draining.
Shower and eyewash Sec.6 [3.6.1] Added requirement for shower and eyewash station.
Bunker station arrangements Sec.6 [3.6.1.1] Clarified that on open deck, the A60 bulkheads are not
required. They shall only be arranged in order to prevent gas
leakages to adjacent enclosed, or semi enclosed spaces.
Bunker station coamings Sec.6 [3.6.1.2] Clarified text regarding extent of coaming around bunker
stations.
Bunkering lines Previous Sec.6 Deleted [3.6.2.2] and [3.6.2.3] since already covered in [3.3].
[3.6.2.2],
Sec.6 [3.6.2.3]
Bunker lines Previous Sec.6 Deleted paragraph stating double wall for all bunkering lines.
[3.6.2.4]
Gasoline INST fuel bunkering Sec.6 [3.6.4] Added fuel bunkering requirements for new Gasoline INST
class notation.
Nitrogen storage Sec.6 [3.7.1.1] Clarified that the requirements related to stored volume is not
valid if a nitrogen generator is installed.
Purging of lines in engine room Sec.6 [3.7.1.8] Added requirement that the lines in ER shall be purged after an
(ER) emergency shutdown system (ESD).
Automatically purging of fuel Sec.6 [3.7.1.8] Clarified that the fuel supply- and return lines in engine room
lines shall be purged after a manual push button shutdown.
Strength of LFL fuel tanks Sec.6 [4] Added new subsection.
Gasoline INST fire safety Sec.6 [5.4] Added fire safety requirements for new Gasoline INST class
notation.
Gasoline INST manufacture, Sec.6 [9.5] Added manufacture, workmanship and testing requirements for
workmanship and testing new Gasoline INST class notation.
Gasoline INST operation Sec.6 [10.1.2] Added operation manual for new Gasoline INST class notation.
manual
DNV AS

General update and alignment Sec.7 General update to:
of the RP rules
— anchor the new levels and structure of the notation
— clarify requirements and align with main class rules.
The technical requirements of the upper levels RP(2, x) and
RP(3, x) are generally unchanged, but the paragraphs are
updated.
Renaming and splitting the Sec.7 [2] The lowest level RP(1, x) is renamed to AP (alternative
lowest level of the RP notation propulsion). AP is split into two qualifiers to make the
intentions and distinction between main class and the notation
more apparent.
New level of the RP notation - Sec.7 [3] A new more lenient level of the RP(2, x) notation denoted
RP(B, x) RP(B, x) is developed to match market needs in certain ship
segments.
Documentation requirements Sec.8 [1.6.1] Clarified/adjusted documentation requirements.
New attributes Sec.8 Table 2, Adding new attributes for main engines, auxiliary engines and
Sec.8 [2.5] boilers, signifying it is convertible to an alternative fuel.
WAPS, mandatory class Sec.12 Table 1 Introduced requirement for additional class notation being now
notation mandatory.
WAPS, FIS requirements Sec.12 Table 1 Introduced ship in operation requirements.
Sec.12 [2.5] Introduced reference subsections to support new ship in

operation requirements defined in Pt.7 Ch.1 Sec.6.
WAPS, table of definitions and Sec.12 [1.7] Introduced definitions and abbreviations table.
abbreviations
WAPS, documentation Sec.12 [1.8.1] Sec.12 Updated/revised of documentation requirement table.

requirements Table 5
WAPS, case-by-case approval Sec.12 Table 6 Introduced new mandatory certification requirement: approval
of WAPS unit mandatory of WAPS unit for WAPS.
WAPS, stability criteria Sec.12 [2.2.2] Development and introduction of stability criteria.
WAPS, fatigue assessment Sec.12 [2.2.3] Introduced new reference for fatigue assessments suited
particularly for WAPS and their foundation and hull integration.
Documentation requirements - Sec.14 Table 4 Clarified documentation requirements.

general
Documentation requirements Sec.14 Table 4, Test procedure for ammonia release mitigation system included.
Sec.14 [1.9.1.1]
Materials Sec.14 [2.1.1.10] Rule reference clarified concerning use of copper and zinc in
ammonia fuel systems.
Tank materials Sec.14 [2.1.1.11] Added consideration of material requirements for secondary
containment and insulation of fuel tanks not of type C included.
Protection of fuel preparation Sec.14 [3.3.1.4], Added requirement protecting fuel preparation rooms from
rooms Sec.14 [7.2.2.1] areas of high fire risk.
DNV AS

Air locks access to hazardous Sec.14 [3.3.2.8] Added guidance note added for air lock requirements for fuel
spaces in semi-enclosed tanks located in semi-enclosed spaces for structural protection
spaces of tanks.
Insulation Sec.14 [4.3.1.1] Tank insulation not required for fuel tanks where insulation is
not part of means for maintenance of fuel storage condition.
Ammonia release mitigation Sec.14 [5.1.1.6] Introduced the term 'ARMS' for systems intended to reduce
system (ARMS) concentration of ammonia being released to atmosphere.
Bottom connections for fuel Sec.14 [5.1.3.2] Opened up for bottom connections on ammonia fuel tanks of
tanks of type C type C.
Bellows on ammonia fuelled Sec.14 [5.1.3.7] Allowed expansion bellows to be used on ammonia fuelled
engines engines.
Requirements for fuel systems Sec.14 [5.1.4], Introduced more specific requirements towards use of gaseous
for liquid and gaseous fuel Sec.14 [5.1.5], and liquid ammonia fuel. Requirement for automatic purging of
state fuel pipes at gas detection removed for gaseous fuel pipes.
Sec.14 [5.1.6],
Sec.14 [10.3.2]
Vent pipes Sec.14 [5.1.4.1] Clarified that vent pipes for ammonia shall be contained in
secondary enclosure, except open ended vent pipes in open air.
Requirements for fuel systems Sec.14 [5.1.7] Introduced requirements towards use of gaseous ammonia fuel
combining ammonia with LNG mixed with LNG fuel.
Nitrogen system Sec.14 [5.4.1.1] Added capacity requirements for nitrogen purging system.
Sec.14 [5.4.1.2] Clarified redundancy requirements for nitrogen system

compressors.
Ventilation arrangement Sec.14 [6.1.1.1] Clarified requirements for sharing ventilation systems between
spaces designed to safely contain ammonia leaks.
Ventilation inlet of Sec.14 [9.2.2.4] Allowed locating ventilation inlet of mechanically ventilated
mechanically ventilated double double wall pipe annular space within toxic zone.
wall pipe annular space
Grouping of toxic ventilation Sec.14 [9.2.2.5] Clarified rule concerning fan redundancy when grouping toxic
outlets ventilation outlets.
Openings within toxic zone Sec.14 [9.2.2.11] Allows locating spaces not normally entered within toxic zones,
provided room is ventilated per rule reference requirements.
Catastrophe ventilation Sec.14 [6.1.1.6] Clarified catastrophe ventilation capacity requirements.
FPR and TCS access in toxic Sec.14 [9.2.2.10] Updated rule requirement for access to TCS and FPR in toxic
zones zones.
Alarm and ESD setpoints for Sec.14 [10.3.2.6] Opened up for higher alarm and ESD setpoints at gas detection
mechanically ventilated double in double wall pipes annular space if ARMS is fitted before
wall pipe annular space fitted discharge to open air.
with ARMS
Hydrostatic testing Sec.14 [12.2.3.5] Added that pressure is testing required for secondary enclosure
for high pressure ammonia fuel piping.
Tank inspection access Sec.14 [4.1.2.3] Added requirements for inspection access to fuel tanks.
DNV AS
July 2021 edition

Update of the requirements Sec.3 [1.2] Update of the guidance note to cover fuel cell installation
for FC notation. rooms.
Sec.3 Table 1 Update of purpose and application of table 1 for the class
notation FC.
Sec.3 Table 2 Update of the definitions fuel cell power system and fuel cell
space.
Sec.3 [2.1.1.2] Specification of material requirements.
Sec.3 [2.1.1.3] Update of requirement to cover existing fuel cell technology.
Sec.3 [4.1.1] Modification of requirement to align with the fuel cell space
concepts added in Sec.3 [5].
Sec.3 [5.1.1] Requirement and guidance notes added to cover existing fuel
cell technology.
Sec.3 [5.1.9] Requirement added to cover all design scenarios for fuel cell
spaces.
Sec.3 [5.2.1] Update of requirement and guidance note added to specify the
location requirement for fuel cell power installations.
Sec.3 [5.3.1.2] Modification of ventilation requirement.
Sec.3 [6.2.1.1] Guidance note added to cover alternative fire protection

solutions.
Sec.3 [6.4.1.1] Guidance note added to cover alternative fire-extinguishing

solutions.
Sec.3 [7.2.2.3] Guidance note added with reference to IEC-60079-10.
Documentation requirements Sec.5 Table 2 Updated documentation requirements for fuel gas tanks.
for Gas fuelled LNG
notation
Alignment with IMO Sec.6 Table 1 Replaced definition of 'pump room' with definition of 'fuel
guidelines preparation room'.
Sec.6 [3.1.1.6] Added requirements to bilge residue holding tanks.
Sec.6 [3.2.6.11] Added requirements for portable tanks.
Sec.6 [3.3.1.3] Nitrogen purging requirements added.
Sec.6 [3.3.1.5] Self draining pipes required.
Sec.6 [3.3.2.4] Requirements for spill collecting of double pipe annular space
added.
Sec.6 [3.6.3] Requirement for ship's bunker hoses added.
DNV AS

Sec.6 [3.7] Added requirement for nitrogen pipes.
Sec.6 [3.7.1.1] Added requirement for nitrogen capacity.
Sec.6 [4.2.1.3] Added requirement for segregation with respect to fire.
Sec.6 [4.2.1.5] Added requirement for structural fire integrity.
Sec.6 [4.3.1.2] Added requirements for the foam system.
Sec.6 [4.3.2] Added requirements for the fire main.
Sec.6 [4.3.3] Added requirement to fire detection.
Sec.6 [6.2.3.1] Added requirements for monitoring and control system related
to bunkering.
Sec.6 [6.2.3.3] Added requirements to tank level monitoring.
Sec.6 [6.4.1.1] Added requirements to engine monitoring.
Sec.6 [8.3.1.2] Added requirements to pipe connections and welding.
PV-valve set pressure Sec.6 [3.2.3.4] PV-valve set pressure required to be 0.2 bar to align with
toxicity requirements for methanol.
Safety distance from Sec.6 [3.2.3.10] Increased safety distance to 15 m, based on IBC code defining
hazardous zones methanol as toxic.
Double block and bleed Sec.6 [3.3.3.7] Requirement for double block and bleed for each consumer
added to be aligned with the IGF code.
Fuel treatment room Sec.6 [3.5.2.3] Increased requirement for fuel treatment room ventilation
ventilation from 30 to 45 air changes/hour, based on IBC code defining
methanol as toxic.
Ship's bunker hoses Sec.6 [3.6.3] Added requirements to bunker hoses in line with IMO
guidelines.
Purging of pipes Sec.6 [3.7.1.8] Added requirements for automatic purging after ESD
shutdown.
ESD actions Sec.6 Table 5 Added requirements for gas detection in line with IMO
guidelines and IGF code philosophy.
Capacity calculations for Sec.7 Table 5 Specification of approach in the hydrodynamical calculation
propulsion - RP notation report.
Sec.7 [3.1.1.5] Specification of BF 8 characteristics.
Class notation Fuel ready Sec.8 The class notation Gas ready has been amended to also
include LPG, ammonia and LFL fuels, and the notation has
changed name to Fuel ready.
New Gas fuelled ammonia Sec.14 New class notation for vessels intending to use ammonia as
class notation fuel. Provides requirements to the ship's gas fuel system,
covering all aspects of the installation, from the ship's gas fuel
bunkering connection up to, and including, the gas consumers.
DNV AS

New class notation for Sec.15 Operational reliability.
operational reliability of
passenger ships - OR Sec.11 [1.3] Reference to the new OR notation in the safe return to port
rules.
Rebranding to DNV All This document has been revised due to the rebranding of DNV
GL to DNV. The following have been updated: the company
name, material and certificate designations, and references to
other documents in the DNV portfolio. Some of the documents
referred to may not yet have been rebranded. If so, please see
the relevant DNV GL document.
July 2020 edition

Arrangement of electric energy Sec.1 [2.2] Limiting equipment that can be installed in EES spaces.
storage (EES) spaces
Ventilation of EES spaces Sec.1 [2.3.1] Increased requirement for EES space ventilation rates for
battery system with integrated off-gas duct. Clarified ventilation
requirements including closing appliances in the ventilation
ducts.
Gas detection and monitoring Sec.1 [2.3.2] Introduced requirement for always gas detection and
of EES spaces monitoring in EES spaces.
Fire integrity of EES spaces Sec.1 [2.4.1] Strengthened requirements for fire integrity of EES spaces with
EES systems larger than 100 kWh.
Fire detection in EES spaces Sec.1 [2.4.2] Introduced requirement for combined smoke and temperature
fire detectors.
Fire extinguishing in EES Sec.1 [2.4.3] Limiting variants of fire extinguish system that can be used.
spaces Introduced requirements for two releases when using a gas
based extinguish system.
Safety philosophy for the EES Sec.1 [2.5] Reducing the documentation requirements for the EES space by
space changing the requirement from a safety assessment to a safety
philosophy for the EES space.
System design for EES Sec.1 [2.6] Added clarification including requirement for insulation
installations monitoring.
Instruction for emergency Sec.1 [2.8.1] Addressed that ventilation handling shall be included in the
operation instruction for emergency operation of the EES space.
EES capacity Sec.1 [3.2.2] Changed the requirements for calculation of EES capacity
such that the capacity is not any longer related to a specific
operation or route.
Energy management system Sec.1 [3.2.3] Introduced requirement for monitoring remaining time that the
vessel can operate on EES systems.
DNV AS

Battery system design Sec.1 [4.1.2] Clarified requirements for creepage and clearance distances,
earth faults, electrical insulations and cooling liquid leakage.
Ingress protection of battery Sec.1 [4.1.7] Clarified requirements for ingress protection of battery systems.
systems
List of alarm and monitoring Sec.1 [6.1] Updated list of alarm and monitoring parameters.
parameters
Speed tests during sea trials Sec.11 [1.10.1] Amended requirement for sea trials: the verification of
achievable speed during test of dimensioning damage scenario
Sec.11 [1.10.2] is no longer required.
July 2019 edition
Amendments October 2019, entering into force as from date of

publication
Alternative solutions to full Added guidance note to clarify expectations to alternative

Sec.5 [3.3.2.2]
cryogenic boundary protection solutions.
Fuel tanks located directly Removed limitation for location of type C tanks above category
Sec.5 [4.7.1.5]
above machinery space of A machinery spaces.
category A
Previous Sec.5 [4.7.2.3] deleted. Removed limitation for tanks
Sec.5 [4.7.2.3]
in non-enclosed locations above category A machinery spaces.
Pressure relief valves Removed requirement for pressure relief valves to discharge to
Sec.5 [5.1.6.6]
the vent mast.
Slip-on welded joints > 50 mm Added guidance note to clarify expectations to slip-on welded
Sec.5 [11.2.1.1]
joints > 50 mm.

Clarification and adjustment Sec.1 [1.3] Removed the requirement for notation Shore power when the
of some of the requirements EES charger is located on shore.
for battery systems and
installation of energy storage Sec.1 [1.4] Clarification of when the additional class notation
systems Battery(Power) is mandatory.
Sec.1 [1.7.2] Updated document requirements.
Sec.1 [2.3] Clarification of the requirements for ventilation and gas

detection in EES spaces.
Sec.1 [2.6.2] Included requirements for EES converters when EES converter
is located on shore.
Sec.1 [3.2.3.2], Sec.1 Addressing that the measurement and calculation of SOC and
[3.3.1] SOH do have some inaccuracy.
DNV AS

Sec.1 [4.1.5.2] Changed the requirements for independent temperature
protection to independent overcharge protection and by that
gives opening for independent overvoltage protection and
current interrupting device as an alternative.
Sec.1 [4] Included requirements for liquid cooled battery systems and
clarification of some battery system requirements
Sec.1 Table 4 Updated certification requirements.
Supercapacitors as energy Sec.1 [1.5.2] Introduced reference to the UL 810A standard for
storage system electrochemical capacitors.
Sec.1 [1.6] Updated definitions for electrochemical capacitors and electrical

energy storage systems.
Sec.1 [1.1] Restructured the text such that it is generic for the different
types of electrical energy storage (EES) solutions.
Sec.1 [1.1], Sec.1 [2], Change the name battery to EES (electrical energy storage).
Sec.1 [3], Sec.1 [6]
Sec.1 [5] Completely new subsection setting requirements for

electrochemical capacitors systems.
New Gas fuelled notation Sec.5 [1] Class notation name changed to Gas fuelled LNG.
Fire protection of fuel Sec.5 [3.3.1.3] and The following text is added to fuel preparation room: "unless
preparation rooms on open Sec.5 [7.2.2.2] located on open deck". Guidance note added that fuel
deck preparation rooms on open deck located directly above
machinery spaces of category A or other high fire risk
spaces are expected to be specifically considered in the risk
assessment required by the IGF Code.
Alternative loading limit option Sec.5 [4.5.1.2] Guidance note added reflecting IACS UI GF16 on alternative
loading limit option.
Design pressure for parts Sec.5 [5.1.5.7] Revised to include option of justifying a lower design pressure
of secondary enclosures for parts of the secondary enclosures extending to air inlets and
extending to air inlets and outlets on open deck by back pressure calculations.
outlets on open deck
Set pressure of pressure relief Sec.5 [5.1.6.6] The text following text is added: "For pressure relief valves
valves in bunkering lines in the bunkering lines, the set pressure shall be equal to the
design pressure."
Double-block-and-bleed Sec.5 [5.1.6.9] New requirement included related to arrangement preventing

function in gas valve unit other vents compromising the double-block-and-bleed function.
Dry breakaway coupling in Sec.5 [5.3.3.4] Requirement for dry breakaway coupling deleted. Guidance
bunkering arrangement note about IGF Code requirement for dry breakaway coupling in
bukering arrangement added.
Delete A-0 requirements for Sec.5 [7.2.2.1] The phrase ", and any boundaries above that, including
navigation bridge windows navigation bridge windows, shall have A-0 class divisions" and
related guidance note removed.
Other rooms with high fire risk Sec.5 [7.2.2.2] Guidance note added reflecting IACS UI GF17 on other rooms
with high fire risk.
DNV AS

Guidance note on fire Sec.5 [7.4.1.2] Guidance note added regarding combination of different types
detection of fire detectors to increase possibility of detection of a fire.
Alarm handling and Sec.5 [9.1.2.1], Rule text clarified with respect to required alarm handling and
presentation Sec.5 [9.1.2.4],Sec.5 presentation.
[9.1.2.5],
Sec.5 [9.1.2.7]
Loop monitoring for signals Sec.5 [9.1.2.9] The following part of the text is deleted "..unless they are
required to support safety inherently fail safe".
functions
Assessment of NDT Sec.5 [11.2.2.4] Acceptance criteria for assessment for RT clarified and
acceptance criteria for assessment of UT added.
Secondary enclosures for Sec.5 [4.2.16] Additional requirements for vacuum insulated tanks rewritten
pipes in the vacuum space to require secondary enclosures for pipes in the vacuum space
releasing liquefied fuel in case releasing liquefied fuel in case of leakage.
of leakage
Sec.5 [5.1.3.5] The text "If piping is connected below the liquid level of the
tank it shall be protected by a secondary barrier up to the
first valve" deleted as covered by the revised text in Sec.5
[4.5.1.2].
Sec.5 [11.2.2.3] NDT requirement for secondary enclosures located inside the
vacuum space of vacuum insulated tanks added.
Sec.5 [11.2.3.6] Hydrostatic testing requirement for secondary enclosures

located inside the vacuum space of vacuum insulated tanks
added.
Flow sensors in ventilation Sec.5 Table 10 Added footnote.

systems
Segregation of fuel tanks Sec.6 [3.2.2.1] Included other fuel tanks as acceptable boundary for methyl/
ethyl fuel tanks.
Tank vent outlets Sec.6 [3.2.3.12] Outlets for purging and gas freeing have been changed from 2
to 3 m above deck level. It has also been included that 20 m/
s is acceptable if the outlet is protected by a suitable device to
prevent the passage of flame.
Ventilation requirement Sec.6 [3.4.1.5] It has been detailed that the ventilation requirement for the
entry space is 6 air changes/hour.
Double walled fuel pipes Sec.6 [3.5.2.4] 2x50% capacity for fans serving double walled fuel pipes has
been introduced, as this space also is hazardous.
Fire Safety Sec.6 [4.3] Amended paragraph Sec.6 [4.3.1] and Sec.6 [4.3.1.1], while
new requirements for ships other than tankers have been
included based on the outcome of CCC5 (Technical provisions
for the safety of ships using low flashpoint fuels).
Loop monitoring Sec.6 [6.3.1.4] Sensor loops failure are normally occurring much more often
than for manual buttons which are often mounted in relatively
good environmental conditions. Safety signal availability is very
crucial to safety, and to be in line with Control systems (Pt.4
Ch.9), where loop monitoring is required for essential systems,
the option of inherently safe equipment has been removed.
DNV AS

Discharge depth Sec.9 [2.3.1.2] Added to requirement Sec.9 [2.3.1.2] C) that "The discharge
outlet shall be located well below the waterline for any
operational loading condition. The distance shall be minimum 4
m or may be established by the calculation in point d)".
Change in rule text Sec.10 [7.1.2] Guidance note added.
Sec.10 [7.1.6] Revised text.
New class notation SRTP Sec.11 New class notation covering safe return to port, orderly
evacuation and abandonment.
New class notation WAPS Sec.12 New class notation covering wind assisted propulsion systems.
New class notation Gas Sec.13 The requirements is based on Gas fuelled LNG notation
fuelled LPG and the functional requirements in the IGF Code Part A. The
requirements have been modified to account for the difference
in fuel properties between LNG and LPG, and the differences
in system requirements. LPG is stored at higher temperatures
than LNG and leaking gas has a higher density than air.
Consequently, the risk of damage to the ship structure from
low temperature leakages is reduced when LPG is used as a
fuel. Also, IMO has decided that the concept of ESD protected
machinery spaces cannot be used for gases where the density
of the fuel is higher than the density of air. The requirements in
the rule proposal reflects this.
July 2018 edition
Amendments July 2018

Clarification of closing time for Sec.5 [5.3.3.3] A description has been added with reference to Sec.5 Table
tank valves 9, to make the intention of the rule clear, hence that we only
require 5 seconds closing time for tank valves when triggered
by high alarm during transfer between LNG fuel tanks.
Rule alignment with IGF Code Sec.5 [1.8.1.1] A reference to the requirement in the IGF Code has been
added, and the detailed requirements for the operation manual
are moved to a new guidance note.
Sec.5 [5.1.6.5] The text regarding fail safe operation for remote operated
valves has been amended, from being applicable to all remotely
operated valves to only apply to emergency shutdown valves.
Sec.5 [5.1.6.7] The requirement for an automatically operated shut off valve on
liquid lines at the fuel gas preparation room entry is removed,
and related texts in Sec.5 [9.3.2.3], Sec.5 [9.3.5.5] and Sec.5
Table 9 are also amended.
Sec.5 [5.2.2.3] A relaxation has been added for the requirement for isolation
valve at outlet of the safety relief valve, for pressure relief
valves located in open air.
DNV AS

Sec.5 [5.2.2.5] Requirement for remaining relief capacity with one safety relief
valve out of operation is removed, hence we will accept 2 times
50% capacity for the safety relief valves, also without a spare
valve available on board.
Sec.5 [9.3.4.1] The requirement is deleted, as the low temperature monitoring

after the vaporizer, and corresponding shut down actions, will
also detect loss of heating medium flow.
January 2018 edition
Changes January 2018, entering into force 1 July 2018

Adapt requirements from Sec.3 [7.1.1.6] Added requirements to temperature class and equipment
recent industry development groups for fuel cell installations.
Alignment of rules for fuel Sec.3 [6] Removed requirements that is covered by the mandatory
cells with gas as fuel and low notations Gas fuelled and LFL fuelled.
flashpoint liquid rules
Amendment of the IGF Code Sec.5 [7.2.2.1] New guidance note.

wrt fire protection
Clarifications Sec.1 [1.1], Sec.1 Clarification of scope of Battery notation.

[1.2] & Sec.1 [1.3]
Sec.1 [1.4], Sec.1 Revised the tables.

[1.5]
Sec.1 [2.3.1.3] Revised the ventilation requirements when more than one
battery cell can go into thermal runaway.
Sec.1 [2.6.2.3] & Clarification of the independent voltage and current protection
Sec.1 [2.7.1] functions in the battery charger.
Sec.1 [4.1.2.1] Clarification of the content of the safety description for the
battery system.
Sec.1 [4.1.2.7], Sec.1 Clarification of requirements for HVIL, BMS, alarms and safety
[4.1.3], & Sec.1 functions for the battery system.
[4.1.5]
Sec.1 [5] Included an appendix summarizing all the alarm and monitoring
requirements that are given in the battery power rules.
NMA circular RSV 12 - 2016 Sec.1 [1.3.2] Changed the size from 50 kWh to 20 kWh of battery capacity
for requiring the Battery(Safety) notation.
Sec.1 [4.1.2.6] Revised the requirements for thermal runaway propagation

protection.
Sec.1 [4.2.2] Included detailed requirements for propagation testing.
DNV AS

Ventilation and fire safety Sec.1 [2.3] Updated the requirements for ventilation in battery spaces.
requirements of battery spaces
Sec.1 [2.4] Updated the requirements for fire safety of battery spaces.
IEC 62619 standard Sec.1 [4.2] Updated the test requirements to align with the IEC 62619
standard.
Alignment with IACS UR F32 Sec.2 [2.6.1.4] Guidance note regarding inhibition of fire detector alarms has
been changed into a requirement in accordance with UR F32.8.
Updates to reflect the IGF code Sec.3 [1.1] Text has been adjusted according to the new definition
with respect to fuel cells (according draft of the IGF-code for fuel cells).
Sec.3 [1.2] Clarification of scope including a description what is not covered

by this section.
Sec.3 [1.5] Terms have been added or modified.
Sec.3 [2] Aligned with IGF code material requirements.
Sec.3 [3] Aligned with IGF code with respect to 'unacceptable loss of
power'.
Sec.3 [4] Implementing proposed IGF code requirements for fuel cell
power systems with respect to increased safety of installations.
Sec.3 [6] Aligned the requirements with IGF code.
Sec.3 [8] Aligned the requirements with the IGF code.
Sec.3 [9] Aligned requirements to manufacture, workmanship and testing

with the IGF code.
Sec.3 Table 3 Documentation requirements have been aligned with the IGF
code and other changes made to the requirements to fuel cells.
Sec.3 Table 4 Introduced product certification as requirement for fans in the

ventilation system of fuel cell power system installations.
Implementation of results from Sec.3 [5] Revised with respect to design principles for fuel cell spaces.
research and development The subsection gives requirements for safe installation of the
activities in DNV GL fuel cell power installation on board.
Sec.3 [7.1.1.3] New requirement: It shall be ensured that the fuel cell can be
disconnected from the electrical load at any load condition.
Sec.3 [7.2.2.2] The definition of hazardous areas zone 1 and zone 2 has been
modified.
New docreq item for pipe Sec.5 Table 2 New document requirement.
routing sketch in fuel gas tanks
Secondary enclosure for LNG Sec.5 [5.1.4.2], Sec.5 Aligned requirements with the IGF Code.
pipes on open deck [5.1.5.3]
Sec.5 [9.2.1.7], Sec.5 Text amended to clarify that leakage detection in bunkering line
[9.3.3.2] is only required where secondary enclosure is required.
DNV AS

Fire extinguishing for fuel Sec.5 [7.3.4.1] Added new text: "Fuel preparation rooms shall be provided with
preparation room a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions
of the FSS Code and taking into account the necessary
concentrations/application rate required for extinguishing gas
fires."
LNG fuel tank level gauging/ Sec.5 [9.2.1.2] Guidance note deleted.
high alarm/overflow protection
Sec.5 [9.3.1.1] Reference to [9.2.1.1] deleted. New Guidance note added: "The
tank overflow protection shall be based on a direct reading of
the level and not be based on indirect measurement of a value
that varies for each bunkering (e.g. density used for dp-cell)."
Override of overflow control Sec.5 [9.3.1.2] Added new text: "Where arrangements are provided for
system overriding the overflow control system, they shall be such that
inadvertent operation is prevented, i.e. by interlocking the
override function with the bunker valve. When this override is
operated continuous visual indication is to be provided at the
navigation bridge, continuously manned central control station
or onboard safety centre. Overriding of the overflow control
system when more than one LNG fuel tank is installed will be
subject to special consideration."
New notation for shaft Sec.10 New section.

alignment
July 2017 edition

Design of bunkering Sec.5 [5.1.3.3] New requirement is added: "Bunkering lines shall have a design pressure
lines not less than 20 bar."
Alignment with changes Sec.5 [7.4.1.1] Amended text: "the ventilation trunk to the tank connection space and in
to the IGF Code the tank connection space" inserted instead of "the ventilation trunk for
fuel containment system below deck".
Implementation of IACS Sec.5 Table 2 New documentation requirement for inspection/survey plan added for
Res REC 148 fuel gas tanks.
UI IGF Code (MSC.1/ Sec.5 Table 1 Guidance note added: "A tank connection space may also contain
Circ.1558) equipment such as vaporizers or heat exchangers. Such equipment is
considered to only contain potential sources or release, but not sources
of ignition."
Sec.5 Table 1 Guidance note added: "A tank connection space which has equipment
such as vaporizers or heat exchangers installed inside is not regarded as
a fuel preparation room. Such equipment is considered to only contain
potential sources of release, but not sources of ignition."
Sec.5 [3.3.6.1] Amended list related to special considerations for semi-enclosed and
enclosed bunkering stations
DNV AS

Sec.5 [4.6.1.1] Added text: "including after activation of the safety system required by
these Rules."
Sec.5 [4.6.1.3] Added guidance note: "The activation of the safety system alone is not
deemed as an emergency situation."
Sec.5 [4.7.2.1] Guidance note added: "A tank connection space may be required also
for tanks on open deck. This may apply for ships were restrictions of
hazardous areas are safety critical. A tank connection space may also
be necessary in order to provide environmental protection for essential
safety equipment related to the gas fuel system like tank valves, safety
valves and instrumentation."
Sec.5 [6.1.4.3] Guidance note added: "Double piping and gas valve unit spaces in gas
safe engine rooms are considered an integral part of the fuel supply
systems and, therefore, their ventilation system does not need to be
independent of other fuel supply ventilation systems provided such fuel
supply systems contain only gaseous fuel."
Sec.5 [6.1.5.1] Guidance note added: "Spaces enclosed in the boundaries of machinery
spaces (such as purifier's room, engine room workshops and stores) are
considered an integral part of machinery spaces containing gas fuelled
consumers and, therefore, their ventilation system does not need to be
independent of the one of machinery spaces."
General maintenance Sec.5 Table 1 Definition for fuel containment system corrected to the exact wording of
the IGF Code.
Sec.5 Table 3 New certification requirement added for flexible hoses with couplings
with reference to Pt.4 Ch.6.
Sec.5 [5.5.1.2] Guidance note related to location of bursting disks lifted as rule text:
"Bursting discs shall not open into machinery spaces, but may be located
inside the casing."
Exhaust system Sec.6 [3.8] Requirements for exhaust system have been introduced
Aft peak tank Sec.6 [11.1.2.2] A guidance note giving a description of fuel tank location on tankers has
been included
Drain tanks Sec.6 [3.2.1.2] A requirement for location of tanks with LFL has been introduced
Alignment with IGF code Sec.6 [3.6.2.4] A clarification that bunkering pipes also have to be double walled has
- Bunkering pipes been introduced (already stated for fuel transfer and fuel supply)
Cargo area tankers Sec.6 [3.2.2.1] A guidance note introduced to specify that fuel tanks shall be located in
the double bottom on tankers
Distance Sec.6 [3.2.1.3] A clarification that the distance is regarding side shell has been included
Inert requirement Sec.6 [3.7.1.1] It has been specified that size is not relevant for the requirement
Engines Sec.6 [3.7.1.1] A requirement for engine design has been included
Inerting Sec.6 [3.7.1.1] A guidance note describing the issue with inerting has been introduced
Redundant propulsion Sec.7 [3.1.1.6] Clarification of the wording in both requirement and guidance note,
partially moved from the old paragraph in Sec.2 [3.2.1.2] - no intended
change in the content.
DNV AS

Sec.7 [3.1.1.7] Clarification of the wording in guidance note - no intended change in the
content.
Sec.7 [3.2.1.2] The old paragraph [3.2.1.2] is moved and merged with Sec.1 [3.1.1.6] -
no intended change in the content.
Sec.7 [3.2.1.3] New paragraph - to clarify the redundancy requirements when applied to
a vessel with traditional rudder - no intended change in the content.
Sec.7 [3.2.1.4] New paragraph - to clarify the redundancy requirements when applied
to a vessel with propulsion thrusters. The requirement is relaxed as
redundancy is now accepted as a design principle for the main-and
auxiliary steering for each thruster.
Sec.7 [3.2.1.5] New paragraph - to ensure that the two steering systems for each
thruster have a uniform operator interface. The requirement is
strengthened.
Sec.7 [3.3.1.2] Clarification of the wording in both requirement and guidance note, and
also a relaxation in the requirement for remaining capability after a
failure in active component.
Clarification of qualifier Sec.8 Table 1 Additional description for qualifier D regarding structural modifications
D and S regarding added. Description for qualifier S amended.
structural modifications
Sec.8 Table 2 Documentation requirements for qualifier D amended to make scope
more clear.
Sec.8 [1.6.2] Documentation requirements for qualifier S amended to make scope

more clear.
Sec.8 [2.1] Requirements for qualifier D included to make scope more clear.
Sec.8 [2.2] Requirements for qualifier S amended to make scope more clear.
Deletion of qualifier T Sec.8 Table 1 Qualifiers T and Misc deleted from the table.
and Misc
Sec.8 [2.2] Requirements related to qualifier T are deleted as this qualifier is
deleted.
Sec.8 [2.6] Requirements related to qualifier Misc are deleted as this qualifier is
deleted.
Sec.8 [3.1] Reference to qualifiers T and Misc deleted as these qualifiers are deleted.
Editorial corrections Sec.8
DNV AS
Main changes January 2017, entering into force 1 January 2017
• Sec.2 Periodically unattended machinery space - E0 and ECO

— References to SOLAS are standardized and updated.
— Sec.2 [2.3.3.1]: Requirement to indicate on the bridge when the audible alarm is silenced in the watch-
keeping engineer's cabin is deleted.
— Sec.2 Table 1: Definitions updated for clarification.
— Sec.2 [3]: Requirements to alarm systems updated for clarification.
— Sec.2 [4]: Sec.2 [3.4.1]: Deleted requirements which are covered by main class.
— Sec.2 [5]: Requirements to internal communication described in a dedicated subsection.
— Sec.2 [3.1.1]: Added reference to gas turbines.
— Sec.2 Table 4, Sec.2 Table 13: Updated according to IACS UR M35.
— Sec.2 Table 8, Sec.2 Table 13: Updated according to IACS M36.
• Sec.5 Gas fuelled ship installations - Gas fuelled

— Sec.5 [1.3]: The information related to lack of international conventions for the use of gas as fuel in ships
is deleted due to entry into force of IGF code.
— Sec.5 Table 2: The document requirements are updated.
— Sec.5 Table 3: The additional description is amended with a clarification related to prototype test of
expansion bellows.
— Sec.5 [1.8]: It has been added that the operation manual shall include a description of the boil-off system
when installed.
— Sec.5 [4.2.13]: The text in [4.2.13.2] and [4.2.13.3] is amended for compliance with the IGF code.
— Sec.5 [4.7.2]: A reference to the fire insulation requirement is added in [4.7.2.3].
— Sec.5 [5.1.3]: A requirement for thermal stress analysis is added in [5.1.3.15].
— Sec.5 [5.1.7]: The text in [5.1.7.1] is amended for compliance to the IGF code.
— Sec.5 [5.1.7]: A requirement is added in [5.1.7.4], related to where expansion bellows are allowed in
pipes containing gaseous fuel.
— Sec.5 [11.7]: Requirement for onboard testing is added.
July 2016 edition

This document supersedes the January 2016 edition.
Main changes July 2016, entering into force 1 January 2017
• Sec.6 Low flashpoint liquid fuelled engines - LFL Fuelled

— Sec.6 [3.2.1.2]: The minimum distance from fuel tank and piping to ship's shell has been amended
according to distance used in IGF code.
— Sec.6 [3.2.2.1]: Requirement regarding cofferdam around LFL tank towards bottom plating has been
relaxed in line with IGF code.
— Sec.6 [3.3.4.3]: The paragraph has been amended for clarification, to allow for expansion bellows in the
outer piping.
DNV AS
— Sec.6 [8.2.1.1]: The paragraph has been updated with reference to Pt.5 Ch.7 Sec.22 for testing of tanks

defined as pressure vessels.
— Sec.6 [8.3.1]: The sub-section has been updated with new paragraphs [8.3.1.5] to [8.3.1.8] containing
additional requirements to testing and inspection according to applicable requirements in Pt.4 Ch.6 and
based on experience from projects.
• Sec.9 Scrubber ready

— Sec.9 [1.3.5.1]: Requirement for a plan for how to preserve installed systems and equipment has been
included.
— Sec.9 [2.2.7.2]: The paragraph has been amended to include an exemption related to required
arrangement of watertight division penetrations.
— Sec.9 [2.2.7.3]: A Guidance note has been added to the paragraph regarding documentation for minor
and major modification.
— Sec.9 [2.3.1.2] d): The paragraph has been amended with reference to statutory requirements.

This document supersedes October 2015 edition.
Main changes January 2016, entering into force 1 July 2016
• Sec.2 Periodically unattended machinery space - E0 and ECO

— Table 6 and Table 10: Requirement for monitoring of temperature for uptakes of boilers has been added.
• Sec.8 Tentative rules for gas ready ships - Gas ready

— Table 2: Boil off gas capacity estimates and system description for the fuel gas piping system has been
included in the documentation requirements.
— [1.6.3.2]: Requirement for a plan for how to preserve systems and equipment installed on board as part
of the notation has been included.
October 2015 edition

This is a new document.
The rules enter into force 1 January 2016.
DNV AS
About DNV
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countries. Through its broad experience and deep expertise DNV advances safety and sustainable
performance, sets industry benchmarks, and inspires and invents solutions.
Whether assessing a new ship design, optimizing the performance of a wind farm, analyzing sensor
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WHEN TRUST MATTERS

DNV-RU-SHIP Pt.6 Ch.2

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DNV-RU-SHIP Pt.6 Ch.2

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RULES FOR CLASSIFICATION

Part 6 Additional class notations

© DNV AS July 2023

Any comments may be sent by e-mail to rules@dnv.com

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Changes July 2023, entering into force 1 January 2024

Topic Reference Description

Included Pt.4 Ch.6 and Pt.4 Ch.7 as certification standard for

Updated additional description for Z010 - Vessel arrangement,

Battery(Safety), Sec.1 [2], Restructured for improved readability.

Sec.1 [2.2.3.1] Updated requirement for space structural integrity in case of

Sec.1 [2.2.3.2], New requirements for gas- and watertight space.

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Sec.1 [2.2.4.3] Updated subsection for doors/hatches regarding indication and

Sec.1 [2.2.4.4] New requirement for escape way(s).

Sec.1 [2.2.4.5] New requirement for warning signboards.

Battery(Safety), drainage Sec.1 [2.2.7] New subsection for drainage.

Sec.1 [2.3.2.2], Updated requirements to the construction of the ventilation

Sec.1 [2.3.3.5] New requirement for wire mesh.

Sec.1 [2.3.3.6] Updated requirement to outside location.

Sec.1 [2.3.5.3] New requirement for stop of ventilation to enable opening of

Sec.1 [2.3.5.4] New requirement for signboard to run ventilation before

Sec.1 [2.3.5.5] Updated requirement to start space ventilation on high cell

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Sec.1 [2.5.3.1] Added general requirement to the fire extinguishing system.

Sec.1 [2.5.3.3] New subsection addressing vessels built of non-metallic

Sec.1 [2.5.3.4] Updated requirements to water based extinguishing systems.

Sec.1 [2.5.3.5] New subsection for combined systems.

Sec.1 [4.11] New subsection with requirements to liquid cooling system

Sec.1 [2.7.3] Updated requirement to insulation monitoring.

Sec.1 [2.7.4] Updated requirements for the controls for emergency

Battery, battery system Sec.1 [4.3.1] New requirement regarding accessibility.

Sec.1 [4.5.2] Updated requirements to control switchgear.

Battery c, insulation Sec.1 [4.7] Updated requirements for insulation monitoring.

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Sec.1 [4.13.4] Introduced a requirement for visual inspection.

Sec.1 [4.13.5] New subsection specifying applicable environmental tests.

Documentation requirement Sec.5 Table 2 Added requirement to do calculations according to recognized

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Drip trays Sec.6 [3.1.1.2] Clarified requirements to drip tray arrangements.

Location of manual ESD Sec.6 [7.3.6] Aligned with IMO requirements.

WAPS, WAPS foundation Sec.12 [2.2.3] Clarified foundation strength analysis.

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Required compliance Sec.13 Table 3 Added compliance documents.

Part 6 Chapter 2 Changes - current

Dispersion analysis Sec.14 [9.2.2.17] Introduced requirement for dispersion analysis.

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 1 Electrical energy storage.......................................................................25

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 2 Periodically unattended machinery space - E0 and ECO........................ 63

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 3 Fuel cell installations - FC..................................................................... 87

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 4 Fuel treatment and conditioning systems - Fuel.................................. 108

Section 5 Gas fuelled ship installations - Gas fuelled LNG.................................. 114

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 7 Redundant- and alternative propulsion............................................... 225

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 8 Alternative fuels - Fuel ready.............................................................. 252

Section 9 Scrubber ready.................................................................................... 265

Part 6 Chapter 2 Contents

Section 10 Shaft alignment - Shaft align............................................................ 276