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Three Degrees of Success in International Mediation

Article in Millennium Journal of International Studies · June 2014

DOI: 10.1177/0305829814536945

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Three Degrees of Success in International Mediation

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Vuković, S. (2014). Three degrees of Success in International Mediation. Millennium-Journal

of International Studies, 42(3), 966-976.

Siniša Vuković
Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM),
Radboud University Nijmegen, NL

School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),

Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.

Kyle Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011, 240
pp., £ 26.23 hbk).

Michael J. Grieg and Paul F. Diehl, International Mediation (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2012, 224 pp., £13.99 pbk).

Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen, The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of
Mediation (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010, 171 pp., £ 12.50
pbk).

One of the most challenging tasks in the field of international mediation is

understanding what constitutes a successful outcome. Mediation occurs when conflicting
parties are unable or unwilling to find a peaceful solution to their dispute on their own. Since
mediation is often applied to the toughest cases of international crises, should the mere fact
that mediators managed to move the parties from the battlefield to the negotiating table be
considered a success? Or should mediation efforts be considered successful only if the parties
reach a formal agreement, be it a cease-fire, or a partial or even a full settlement? But even
with a signed peace agreement, mediated conflicts often relapse into violence. Therefore,
should mediation be considered successful only if the peaceful relations between the
(formerly) conflicting parties endure for a certain period of time? With all this in mind, when
should an outcome be deemed successful? This review aims to tackle this apparent analytical
conundrum. Reflecting on the findings of the three books here under review, it will demarcate
three distinct yet highly interrelated degrees of success in international mediation: getting the
parties to commit to mediation, achievement of a formal agreement, and ensuring the
endurance of the agreement in the long term. Although neither of the three selected books
deal specifically with the question of mediation success, the books were chosen for the
present review as they represent highly valuable examples of different analytical approaches
not only to the issue of mediation success, but to the study of international mediation in
general. On the one hand, in their Go-Between Wallensteen and Svensson follow the tradition
of qualitative studies, while on the other Beardsley's Mediation Dilemma relies primarily on
quantitative scrutiny additionally supported by a few selected case studies. Finally, Grieg and
Diehl’s International Mediation is a noteworthy attempt to summarize the existing
knowledge of international mediation based on the most significant empirical findings.
While the three books differ in scope, they also complement each other and provide
information that goes a long way toward clarifying the mechanisms by which the
aforementioned degrees of success can be achieved. International Mediation is structured
around five broad topics: what is mediation, why does mediation occur, who conducts
mediation (and how), and what are the short-term and long-term effects of mediation.
Mediation Dilemma also touches upon most of these themes, however, the core aim of the
volume is to indicate an ontological ‘dilemma’ about the effectiveness of mediation, namely
that while producing effective results in the short-term (achievement of an agreement and
reduction of violence) the mediation process also generates unstable results in the long run
(higher likelihood of relapse into violence of conflicts that experienced a mediated
agreement). While Beardsley’s quantitative study uses mediated agreements as a reference
point from which he measures both short-term and long-term effectiveness of mediation,
Svensson and Wallensteen’s Go-Between emphasizes the importance of the process that
precedes the achievement of a mediated agreement. Reflecting on the experience of world-
renowned mediator, Jan Eliasson1, the two authors provide a study that appeals to both
academics and practitioners of international mediation. The book challenges the traditional

                                                                                                                       
1
The book draws insights from six cases of international conflits in which Jan Eliasson acted as a mediator:
twice related to the Iraq-Iran conflict (1980-86 and 1988-91), Myanmar/Burma-Bangladesh conflict (1992),
Sudan (1992), Nagorno-Karabakh (1994), and Darfur (2007-8).
outlook of mediator behaviour that indicates three distinct forms of mediation strategy2,
develops a novel taxonomy of mediation styles, and observes their impact through various
stages of the mediation process. Clearly the insights from Go-Between deepen our
understanding of the first degree of success (getting the parties to commit to mediation),
while the other two volumes provide a more structured set of findings that could be used to
measure the remaining two degrees of mediation success (reaching the agreement and making
it ‘stick’).

The elusive nature of success

Despite an impressive body of literature on the topic of international mediation, thus
far the academic community has been unable to reach consensus regarding a comprehensive
definition that would unequivocally delineate how to recognize success in international
mediation. Even when scholars use somewhat similar definitions, their analyses seem to
discuss essentially quite different aspects of success. Academic conceptualizations of success
suffer from definitions that appear to be quite arbitrary, developed on a case-to-case basis,
and not based upon a solid theoretical foundation3. This conceptual confusion regarding
success in international mediation should not come as a surprise. On the one hand,
international mediation processes are not uniform and, as such, it is quite difficult to establish
a one-size-fits-all set of criteria with which to assess achievement of the various objectives of
mediation. Parties’ objectives and goals tend to change throughout the process, so measuring
mediation success in terms of parties’ goals might make it impossible to formulate a
consistent conceptualization of mediation success.4 On the other hand (and more
importantly), so far empirical studies have overwhelmingly treated mediation outcomes –
both success and failure – as dependent variables. The focus has rarely been on how to
measure success, but rather on which factors have the ability to affect the mediation outcome.
In line with this approach, numerous studies have relied on analytical frameworks5 in which
mediation outcomes are represented as a function of large sets of factors related to the context
(e.g. nature of the mediator, nature of the parties, and nature of the dispute) and to the
                                                                                                                       
2
I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in Managing
Global Chaos, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1996), 445-461.
3
Jacob Bercovitch, 'Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for the Elusive Criteria', Cardozo Journal of
Conflict Resolution 7, No. 2 (2006): 289-302.
4
 Marieke Kleiboer, ‘Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1996): 360-389;  
5
Jacob Bercovitch and Leah Simpson, ‘International Mediation and the Question of Failed Peace Agreements:
 
Improving Conflict Management and Implementation’, Peace & Change, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2010), 68-103.
mediation process (mediator behaviour). While such approaches denote the complex
interactions of a large number of factors, they still fail to provide a comprehensive set of tools
with which to define and measure success. With all these analytical shortcomings in mind,
how can we be certain that an outcome is a success? In other words, how do we evaluate
success?
The bulk of existing studies – especially those that have explored correlation between
a variety of factors and mediation outcomes – have treated success as a dichotomous
phenomenon, usually linked to the existence of a signed agreement. In other words,
mediation was successful only if parties reached a formal agreement. The fact that parties
accepted mediation in the first place and issues related to agreement implementation were not
part of their understanding of mediation success.6 In International Mediation Grieg and Diehl
challenge this analytical oversimplification and suggest that the definition of success should
correspond to different stages of the mediation process.7 The first stage focuses on getting the
disputing parties to accept mediation, which they refer to as ‘getting to the table’8. The
second stage of mediation is related to the achievement of a formal agreement, regardless of
its scope: whether it is a simple cease-fire or a comprehensive agreement it just needs to be a
product of a mediation process. The final stage of mediation is the implementation phase. In
this phase mediation success is directly linked to the durability of mediated settlements.
According to Grieg and Diehl, the stages are not identical and are only partly linked because
“some of the same factors and processes that encourage actors to seek mediation also
influence their willingness to come to an agreement”.9 As such, each stage of mediation and
consequent degree of success deserves a separate conceptualization.

Getting the parties to the table

Making the parties amenable to mediation is not an easy task. In order for mediation
to take place, parties need to perceive it as a reasonable alternative to their belligerent
activities. Parties could use mediation as a convenient political cover for making unpopular
decisions, such as making necessary concessions to the other side, which would be
unimaginable without the presence of a third party. Nevertheless, accepting mediation also
generates reputational costs (both domestic and international) for the conflicting parties. The

                                                                                                                       
6
Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds.), International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and
Findings (London: Routledge, 2010).
7
Michael J. Grieg and Paul F. Diehl, International Mediation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 104-145.
8
 Ibid. 106.
9
Ibid. 106.
parties may be apprehensive that their willingness to negotiate with ‘the enemy’ might be
perceived as a sign of weakness and even labelled as treason by their constituencies. In light
of such costs, Grieg ad Diehl argue that “the willingness of parties to negotiate with one
another and accept mediation can develop as the costs of conflict between two sides mount
(“pain”) and diplomatic approaches to settle the conflict grow more appealing than continued
violence (“promise”)”.10 The notions of ‘pain’ and ‘promise’ come from Zartman’s ripeness
theory.11 ‘Pain’ refers to the perceptual condition of ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), in
which the parties are at an impasse and neither one is able to escalate the conflict to victory,
making the continuation of the existing conflict both harmful and costly to each side. The
second element – ‘the promise’ – is also perceptual and highlights the attractiveness of
mediation as a ‘way out’ of the impasse. According to ripeness theory, both ‘pain’ and
‘promise’ are “necessary yet insufficient”12 conditions for a successful peacemaking process.
In order to ripen the conflict for resolution, mediators need to help parties perceive and
understand how unbearable their stalemate is. Therefore, success at this stage also depends on
the mediators’ willingness and ability to push the parties to commit to the peacemaking
process and reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
As stated previously, conflicting parties may accept mediation without any interest in
reaching a peaceful settlement to their dispute. According to Grieg and Diehl, when
mediators face these “devious objectives”, “unless the third party can provide sufficient
incentives to the two sides once they get to the bargaining table to make them more amenable
to a settlement, the mediation effort will fail”.13 Incentives may take the form of tangible
carrots and sticks as well as different intangible inducements such as improved international
reputation or enhanced relations with the third-party. Mediation of international conflicts may
be conducted by a variety of actors – states, international and regional organizations, NGOs –
either individually or through an ad hoc multiparty effort and providing the necessary
incentives is certainly a costly endeavour for all of them. Grieg and Diehl, highlight three
general reasons why third-parties are willing to get engaged in managing an international
dispute: humanitarian concerns, national interests, and third-party’s organizational
predisposition.14 According to their analysis, in the post-World War II period mediation
efforts were “at least partially motivated by humanitarian concerns”, as slightly more than
                                                                                                                       
10
Ibid. 107.
11
I. William Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’, The Global
Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2001): 8-18.    
12
Ibid, 9.
13
Grieg and Diehl, International Mediation, 117.
14
Ibid, 78.
13% of all mediation efforts occurred in conflicts that witnessed a genocide.15 They find that
“many of the conflicts with the worst humanitarian emergencies are ignored by major-power
mediators, leaving their mediations to non-major powers and non-state actors, if those
conflicts are mediated at all”.16
Addressing humanitarian concerns may not generate direct payoffs for third-parties.
Therefore, it is plausible to presume that mediators are driven by their self-interests just as
much as by humanitarian impulses. The list of self-interested reasons that motivate third-
parties to act as mediators is long. Mediation is a useful, cost-efficient foreign policy tool that
can be used to advance state’s interests on the international level. Major-powers may use it to
expand their sphere of influence, at the same time reducing the influence of other rival states.
Non-major power states may use mediation to contain and reduce negative externalities from
neighbouring conflicts or to improve their reputation and credibility on the international
level. The reputational incentive is also a strong motivator for international organizations,
whose founding charters might describe peacemaking as their raison d'être.
Since mediators might use mediation to promote their interests, it is not a surprise that
conflicting parties are inclined to resist mediation by specific mediators. Mediation is a
voluntary and non-binding process after all and, as such, third parties need to be perceived as
acceptable by conflicting parties. In fact, Beardsley finds that:
When neighbouring and powerful states in the international system have
strong interests in a crisis, the disputants actually resist mediation… this is
understandable because many disputants prefer to limit meddling by external
actors wishing to shape the regional and global orders in their favor.17
Reflecting on this finding, Beardsley develops his core argument regarding the long
term effects of mediation (as will be discussed later in this article). He argues that highly
intrusive mediation activities conducted by powerful mediators are likely to generate highly
unstable results in the long run and, therefore, disputants tend to be hesitant about allowing
“very eager third-parties” to mediate their conflict.18
Parties’ willingness to accept mediation and consequently to commit to the process is
strongly related to mediator’s characteristics. Grieg and Diehl note that “disputants desire a
mediator that is perceived to be “even-handed,” that is willing to broker an agreement
fairly”.19 Although related, the concept of fairness should not be mistaken for mediator

                                                                                                                       
15
Ibid, 79.
16
Ibid, 81.  
17
Kyle Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011), 55.
18
Ibid. 55.
19
Grieg and Diehl, International Mediation, 91.
neutrality. Since international actors may have a vested interest in being involved in
managing a conflict, their role will inevitably be affected by their bias. A biased mediator is
useful insomuch as it is able to move the party to accept an agreement that it would never
accept unilaterally.20 In order to produce such a move, mediators need to possess particular
leverage that could create the necessary incentives aimed at altering parties’ conflictual
behaviour. In one of his earlier works, Beardsley argued that weak mediators are more likely
to be requested by disputants that want to use mediation insincerely, when they are actually
not interested in reaching an agreement.21 Parties that select weak mediators might be more
inclined to stall the process to buy time for rearming or regrouping on the battlefield or to
enable them to resist making concessions that, although necessary, might be quite unpopular
at the domestic level.
In Mediation Dilemma, Beardsley contrasts mediation with and without leverage in
order to understand their relative impact on the bargaining environment. On the one hand,
mediation with leverage or ‘heavy mediation’, “tries to maximize the cost of nonagreement
and thereby expand the set of mutually acceptable alternatives”.22 According to this
perspective, leverage can take the forms of positive inducements for reaching an agreement
and negative inducements against belligerent activities. On the other hand, mediation without
leverage or ‘light mediation’, “primarily involves enabling the actors to find an agreement
within the existing set of alternatives that are mutually preferable to conflict”.23 In such
circumstances, mediators are more focused on reducing parties’ bargaining uncertainties by
facilitating information exchange, helping them formulate potential alternatives, and by
providing the necessary political cover for unpopular decisions. In his differentiation of light
and heavy mediation, Beardsley treats the concept of leverage as being essentially resource-
based. This reductionist take leads him to overlook all other types of social power that could
still be used to leverage the parties toward a mutually acceptable agreement. According to
Carnevale, power in mediation – the ability or willingness to influence another party to
achieve a goal – is a much broader concept that encompasses two distinct forms: resource-
based (‘strategic’) and behavioural (‘tactical’)24. Resource-based strategic strength is what a
party brings to the table, while tactical strength is what a party does at the table. So in
                                                                                                                       
20
Zartman and Touval, ‘International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era', 447.
21
Kyle Beardsley, 'Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators', International
Interactions, Vol. 35, No. 3, (2009): 272-297.  
22
Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma, 31.
23
Ibid, 31.
24
Peter J. Carnevale, ‘Mediating from Strength’, in Studies of International Mediation, ed. Jacob Bercovitch
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 25-40.
addition to ‘reward’ and ‘coercive’ powers or ‘carrots and sticks’ (types that Beardsley
equates with power), there are also other forms of resource-based power that a mediator
might possess, including legitimacy, expertise, or prestige. Even ‘information power’ can be
treated as a form of resource-based leverage because “the mediator may provide information
that makes compliance with the mediator’s request seem rational”.25 Beardsley’s reductionist
conceptualization of power strongly conditions his main argument about the long-term effects
of mediation, both with and without leverage.
Beardsley’s argument is directly related to the standard classification of mediation
strategies – communication-facilitator, procedural-formulator, and directive-manipulator,26
the later also referred to as ‘heavy’ or ‘mediation with muscle’ – based on mediator’s
assertiveness and level of intrusiveness in the process. Quantitative studies, such as
Beardsley’s, provide important insights regarding the correlation between such strategies and
mediation outcomes. However, they do not tell us much about the complexities of potential
causal mechanisms that exist throughout the mediation process. They do not account as much
for various forms of ‘tactical strength’27 that a mediator might use throughout the process,
such as developing momentum between the parties and using ‘relational power’ (i.e. bias)
with one of the parties to induce a change in its behaviour.
Svensson and Wallensteen recognize the importance of such forms of leverage, and
consequently develop a completely new taxonomy of four mediation styles which allows
them to observe the changes throughout various stages of the process, from the onset of
mediation until an agreement has been signed. While not refuting the significance of the
existing notions of mediation strategies – which in their taxonomy of styles are referred to as
‘methods’ of mediation; others being the ‘scope’ (inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the
process), the ‘mode’ (processes’ level of transparency), and the ‘focus’ (short-term end of
hostilities or a comprehensive peace that also upholds the principles of justice and human
rights) – the authors also highlight three main ways in which mediation can move forward:
mandates, resources, and outcomes of mediation.28
Every mediation process starts with a mandate – an aspect of this topic that has been
surprisingly overlooked by the academic community. Regardless of the fact of whether a
mandate derived from the belligerents or from an international actor, “[the] mandate directs
                                                                                                                       
25
Ibid, 29.  
26
Bercovitch and Gartner, International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings; Zartman and
Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era".
27
Carnevale, Mediating from Strength, 31.
28
Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen, The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 105.
the way a third party enters a conflict, affects the mediation process, involves the
international community, and finishes the assignment”.29 More importantly, mandates are the
first indicator of a mediator’s objectives. Insights from Jan Eliasson’s experience show how
practitioners and academics have somewhat different expectations in terms of what the
purpose of mediation is. Svensson and Wallensteen note that “mediation does not always
result in complete and durable peace agreements between the parties, [as] such an outcome
may not even be the purpose of mediation”.30 In fact, Eliasson’s objectives generally included
goals such as improvement and maintenance of communication channels between conflicting
sides, alleviation of humanitarian crisis, and exploration of elements that could be used for a
final agreement.
According to the authors, “bringing the parties to the table is an achievement in itself.
The mediator then has to keep them there”.31 In order to keep parties committed to the
process, mediators may employ not only tangible (and intangible) incentives, but also
particular tactical moves to preserve the momentum. For instance, Eliasson used to “wear-
down” the parties by keeping them at the table for many hours.32 At the same time, a
mediator may examine how credible a party’s threat to walk away from the negotiations is
and emphasize the benefits of a negotiated deal. Mediators may also help the parties reframe
the issues and persuade them to believe that they are close to achieving an agreement.33
Nevertheless, since mediation is an inherently voluntary and non-binding process, “a
mediator cannot force the parties to end a conflict when one or other does not want to end
it”.34 Therefore, according to Svensson and Wallensteen, in order to determine how best to
measure outcomes and success, it is not enough to “narrowly focus” on cease-fires and peace
agreements, but “it may be necessary to incorporate more nuanced understandings of the
operational objectives of international mediators, and particularly, those of the parties to the
conflict”.35 The present discrepancy between practitioners’ experiences and academic
knowledge of the mediation process is evidently a result of different perspectives and
expectations of what a mediator is supposed (or even able) to achieve throughout the process.
A more careful categorization of mediator’s objectives – which may be related to their direct
mandates – could be a suitable starting point from which to better understand how to
                                                                                                                       
29
Ibid, 105.
30
Ibid, 109.
31
Ibid, 67.    
32
Ibid, 67.
33
Ibid, 68.
34
Ibid, 109.
35
Ibid, 111.
operationalize the first degree of success in mediation: ‘getting the parties to the table’ and
making them commit to the process.

Reaching an agreement and making it ‘stick’

Reaching an agreement is nothing short of a true accomplishment for any mediator.
For Grieg and Diehl, while “the assistance of a willing mediator and the consent of the
conflicting sides to sit down and talk is an important initial step toward peace, it is by no
means a guarantee that a settlement can be reached and peace established”.36 Their scepticism
toward the relevance of the first degree of success is based upon the presence of “devious
objectives” the parties might have when entering the mediation process. Therefore, for them
“the ultimate value of an agreement is manifest only if the settlement is actually implemented
and endures for a significant period of time”.37 In other words, the true challenge of any
mediation activity is to prevent the conflict from relapsing into violence. Mediators may use
agreements to create specific provisions that deter defection and reduce uncertainties between
belligerents. According to Beardsley, the formalized nature of the agreement is relevant both
theoretically and practically. They are easily identifiable and are able to “better indicate a
successful bargaining outcome because of the effort needed to negotiate the specific terms,
define that compliance looks like, and decide on any enforcement provisions”.38
Beardsley finds that mediated conflicts are more likely to achieve formal agreements
than those that are not mediated.39 Depending on their primary scope and ability to address
the conflict’s underlying issues, agreements may take different forms. The least
comprehensive form is cease-fire agreements. As their primary aim is to stop the violence,
they represent the first step in creating the momentum required to produce a more
comprehensive settlement. However, while they are the simplest form of agreement to
achieve, they are also the easiest to break. Due to the fragility of cease-fire agreements, Grieg
and Diehl argue that it is quite difficult to label their achievement as successful,40 especially
when they are not followed by more far-reaching settlements. Partial or robust agreements
contain provisions that reflect a greater degree of convergence between the parties. With
them, the parties indicate at least a formal willingness to alter their belligerent behaviour and
agree on specific measures that could solidify peaceful relations.

                                                                                                                       
36
Grieg and Diehl, International Mediation, 116.
37
Ibid, 159.    
38
Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma, 75.
39
Ibid, 75.
40
Grieg and Diehl, International Mediation, 105.
 In order to achieve these agreements, mediators often face the challenges of inducing
concessions from the parties. While the presence of a mediator increases the likelihood of
concessions, Beardsley also finds that despite the useful political cover they might offer,
mediators still fail to induce major concessions from belligerents. According to him, this
finding supports the notion that “mediators can interfere with the natural trajectory of
settlement and promote outcomes that are not self-enforcing”.41 Therefore, the true
‘mediation dilemma’ is not whether mediation should be conducted, but how involved the
mediators should be throughout the process.42 Beardsley finds that mediated agreements are
more stable in the short run – which in his analysis are treated both as a period of two years
and five years – than agreements that are reached without the presence of a mediator.43
However, mediation may produce negative effects on the long term for three reasons: the
artificiality of external leverage, the obfuscation of the future bargaining environment, and
parties’ insincere motives.44 For Beardsley, this is especially true when the process is
conducted by a powerful mediator, as “the increased use of third-party leverage will lead to
ever-stronger short-term outcomes – more formal agreements, concessions, and lulls in
hostilities – and ever-weaker long-term stability”.45 Accordingly, ‘heavy mediation’ produces
better pay-offs in the short run, but generates long-term instability, while less intrusive
strategies (facilitation and formulation) are less risky in the long run, but are still less
effective in the short-term46. Although extremely insightful, Beardsley’s quantitative analysis
is unquestionably conditioned by three empirical oversimplifications. On the one hand, there
is the aforementioned reductionist categorization of leverage (or power) that includes only
resource-based forms of social power. On the other hand, quantitative analyses rely on data
sets that treat mediation strategies as uniform behaviour and, as such, do not account for
possibility that a mediator actually employs two (or even all) mediation strategies at the same
time. Consequently, while we might gain important insights as to the correlation between a
dominant strategy and an outcome, we are still short of any understanding about the actual
causal mechanism by which a specific form of behaviour yields a particular outcome. Lastly,
and perhaps most importantly, in the ten year period – which is used as the time span in
which the long-term effects of mediation are measured – the context may change so
drastically so as to induce the (formerly) conflicting parties to develop new disagreements
                                                                                                                       
41
Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma, 79.
42
Ibid, 7.
43
Ibid, 81.
44
Ibid, 106.    
45
Ibid, 115.
46
Ibid, 127.
that have nothing to do with the prior mediation effort. As such, it is reasonable to assume
that linking the mediation efforts with these new conflictual dynamics even between the same
parties might be overly simplistic.
Nevertheless Beardsley also explains a potential mechanism by which a settlement
may endure over time. Using insights from a number of illustrative cases, such as Kissinger’s
and Carter’s involvement in the Middle East, Carter’s engagement in the Korean dispute, and
Roosevelt’s mediation of the Russo-Japanese war, Beardsley concludes that “leverage itself is
thus not bad for a self-enforcing peace as long as the impact of that leverage does not wane
and leave the actors with time inconsistency problems”.47 In fact, the third parties may
employ a number of tactics in order to address the “credible commitment problem”.48 In
order to encourage a settlement to endure over time, mediators may prescribe detailed sets of
guarantees as to the implementation of the agreement that help reduce the level of uncertainty
between the disputing sides, such as setting up demilitarized zones, drafting disarmament
provisions and/or employing cease-fire and election-monitoring missions.49 More
importantly, as Beardsley points out, mediators may commit themselves to stay longer in the
zone and thus contribute to the agreements’ longevity. Nevertheless, the durability of
settlements should not only be naively associated with a mediator’s will and skill. Conflict
intensity and issues at stake are often the primary reasons why some conflicts relapse into
violence.50 Although mediators might be called in to help improve communication between
the parties and assist them in reframing the issues thereby ripening the conflict for resolution
through the creation of various inducements, their impact is highly dependent upon the
parties’ willingness to compromise.

Conclusion
International mediation is a goal-oriented process. While formal agreements are
certainly a useful, albeit abstract, measure of mediation success, exclusive reliance on them
remains an oversimplification of the complex nature of mediation. Just as mediators come in
different forms, their goals inevitably differ in scope and nature. They may be mandated to
reduce the level of hostilities and to bring the parties to the negotiating table, or to produce a
robust settlement that deals with all the underlying issues of the conflict. Taking into account
                                                                                                                       
47
Ibid, 151.
48
Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002).
49
Page V. Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008).    
50
Grieg and Diehl, International Mediation, 161.
 the varying nature of a mediator’s objectives (i.e. mandate) is the first step in deciding upon
how to go about measuring or defining mediation success. At the same time, mediation
should be understood as a process that is characterized by a sequence of events. As each stage
is aimed at achieving a certain outcome, mediation success is best understood as a sequential
phenomenon as well. This article identified three distinct, yet highly interrelated degrees of
success: getting the parties to the table, reaching an agreement, and making the agreement
endure over time. Each one of these stages is affected by a number of factors (such as parties’
and mediators’ characteristics, interests, and resources) and almost all of them tend to be
influential across all three stages.
The three books here under review are not only noteworthy for their general
contributions to the growing field of international mediation. They are also highly valuable in
understanding the particular the mechanisms by which the aforementioned degrees of success
can be achieved. The identification of three general degrees of success and factors that affect
them is just the starting point from which any analysis should begin. Instead of resorting to
arbitrary, over-simplified, and case-to-case conceptualizations of mediation success, future
studies need to accept that mediation success is as complex as the mediation process
itself. Accordingly, within each one of the mediation stages, there could be potential sub-
stages that also follow a cause-and-effect (or even a chronological) pattern. While keeping a
keen eye on the mediators’ actual goals (or mandates), the juxtaposition of various sub-
degrees of mediation success in the form of a causal chain would unquestionably reduce the
elusiveness of a definition of success as an analytical concept.

 
 
Siniša Vuković is a Professorial Lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University and Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Conflict
Analysis and Management, Radboud University Nijmegen.
 

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