IFP___Volume_1_lyst1688

T.
me/SleepyClasses
Political Science
& International
Relations
India’s Foreign Policy
www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 1

Call 1800 – 890 - 3043 and Play Store
T.me/SleepyClasses
India’s Foreign Policy- Determinants, Continuity and change and

Institutions
What is foreign policy and its objectives?
• As per C.C Rodee, Foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of
principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state while negotiating with (contacting) other
states to protect or further its vital interests”.
• Keith R. Legg and James Morrison define “foreign policy as a set of explicit objective with regards
to the world beyond the borders of a given social unit, and a set of strategies and tactics designed
to achieve these objectives”.
• Former National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon defines foreign
policy as 'Minimaxing' that is minimizing risk and maximizing benefits.
• As per Nirupama Rao, the foremost task of India’s foreign policy is to enable the domestic
transformation of India- making possible the transformation of India’s economy and society while
promoting our values of pluralism, democracy and secularism.
• MEA S. Jaishankar highlights the three points that Indian Foreign Policy seeks achieve to achieve
are:
o A focus on key challenges by broad engagement with many parties;
o Managing, if not leveraging, the global contradictions;
o Advancing our interests in the multiple-hour world and contributing to the global good.
Factors that influence Indian foreign policy

• A number of factors impact IFP
• Geography • History
• Public opinion • socio- cultural milieu
• Leadership • Economic considerations
• A key ingredient of foreign policy is diplomacy which involves using various instruments to
achieve foreign policy initiatives. These include:
• Negotiations • Public opinion
• Dialogues • Media
• Treaties • War
2 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

and Play Store Call 1800 – 890 - 3043
T.me/SleepyClasses
Role of Geography
• Leopold von Ranke emphasized the primacy of
geography and external threats in shaping
foreign policy.
• Kautilya’s conception of foreign policy was an

extension of geopolitics in the form of
mandalas.” One can change history, but not
geography.”
• As per Prof. Snehalata Panda, Himalayas in the

north and the Ocean surrounding its three sides
are major geographical determinants of its
foreign policy.
• Rajiv Sikri argues the very conception of India

as a nation-state historically was a product of its
geography- "Hindustan.”
• Sikri argues that India was never an aggressive power since it had nothing to gain by making
forays beyond its natural frontiers. Trade and cultural contacts across the Bay of Bengal and the
Arabian Sea were mostly peaceful interactions. The only threats and invasions India periodically
faced were from marauders from the northwest.
• As per C Raja Mohan, David Malone and Srinath Raghavan, although India is to a degree cut off
from its neighbours by the towering Himalayas and by its extensive coastline and the seas beyond,
its neighbourhood is a tough one, marked by competition and conflict.
• In today’s world, India’s geography poses three principal foreign policy challenges:
o One, whereas the modern Indian state requires fixed, determinable borders, the inhabitants
of these amorphous frontier zones have traditionally had, and do indeed need, flexible
borders. Trying to demarcate a historically non-existent border gives rise to border
disputes as, for example, with China.
o Two, today’s political borders of South Asia are artificial. India has been divided in the
past, but never so irrationally as it has been since 1947. India’s neighbours want to keep
their distance from India in order to assert and preserve their sovereignty.
o Three, India is boxed in – by Pakistan on the west and Bangladesh on the east. Without
their cooperation, India cannot meaningfully extend its overland reach and influence.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Role of history
• As per C. Raja Mohan, David Malone and Srinath Raghavan, in the case of India, history explains
a good deal of its foreign policy, not just in the immediate post-independence period, but even
today.
• Influence of ancient civilization and Ancient- India saw realist texts on foreign policy with
emphasis on expansion of National Interest such as Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Kamandaki’s
Nitisara (S. Jaishankar- The India Way).
• At the same time epics as Ramayana and Mahabharata emphasised on the idea of ‘Dharma’,
thereby imbibing the Indian foreign policy with a streak of idealism.
• Thus, the traditional socio-cultural values, such as ‘Vasudeva Kutumbakam’, dharmasastra etc,
have significantly shaped India’s foreign policy, which is evident in introduction of values, such as
tolerance, preference for the middle way (ati Sarvatra Varjayet), non-violence and universal
brother & peace, in India’s world view.
• This utopianism shaped Nehru’s foreign policy which in the first few decades after Independence
were non-alignment, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, disarmament, and peace making.
• According to Pratap Mehta, India is often viewed in international relations scholarship as an

example of what Kanti Bajpai, has called ‘modified structuralism’, a state that accepts the basic
Realist assumptions of an anarchical world of power-maximizing states but maintains that
cooperative structures can have a significant impact.
• Influence of India’s freedom struggle-India’s foreign policy provides a mirror to its historical legacy
of India’s struggle against British racialism having experienced the exploitation under British
rule, Indian foreign policy stands totally committed to fight against imperialism, colonialism and
racialism.
• As per C. Raja Mohan, India’s support and sympathy with struggle against colonialism in Asian-
African community is a consequence of historical influence of India’s national movement against
the colonial rule.
• Upinder Singh argues that by connecting the independence

movement with “the ancient Indian intellectual and
philosophic tradition, Gandhi created the impression that
non-violence was rooted in a unique way in the Indian
psyche”.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• However, scholars like Aakriti Tandon and Arul Louis point to the emergence of a ‘Modi
Doctrine’ in recent times which marks a decisive break from India’s Nehruvian past and focuses
on:
o replacing Cold War tactics with open

dialogue and engagement and;
o replacing vestiges of colonialism with

a focus on democratisation—by
building on the Indian tradition of
Vasudevya kutumbakam (the world
is one and hence stands to lose/gain
together).
• Sneh Mahajan underlines the impact of the ‘legacy of Raj’ on India’s foreign policy especially
considering the territorial demarcation and partition were a colonial enterprise as well as the
inheritance of foreign policy structure and institutions.
Role of economics
• Sanjaya Baru points towards the economic imperatives that shaped India’s foreign policy. Baru
points how in the post-independence era, the emphasis on self-reliance and development through
planning were a part of Nehruvian idealism. Baru writes that NAM was a tactical policy
responding to India’s developmental needs and political compulsions.
• The advent of liberalization era accompanied the collapse of Soviet Union and rise of USA as the
sole hegemon. It witnessed a change in the approach of India towards open trade and economy
with India becoming one of the founding members of the WTO.
• India’s new path was also impacted by the rise of China as an open economy and trading nation.
The increased openness also increased the “outward orientation” of Indian businesses with
organisations like FICCI and CII engaging in trade and economic diplomacy.
• The centrality of economics in Modi’s policy has

been pointed out by Schaffer and Schaffer.
Similarly, Prof Kuldeep Singh argues that With
Modi's rise to power there has emerged than
what a much larger umbrella of business
interests driven likelihood by the desire to
promote overseas economic interests making it
who are great supporter of the government as
they find it custodian of their business interests
within and arrival on outside the country.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Style of Leadership
• David Mitchell in his work analyses the Prime Ministerial leadership styles and its impact on
foreign policy.
• While geopolitical circumstances surrounding prime ministers like Nehru and Indira Gandhi have
changed and the political constraints have been altered, but all have consistently exhibited what
are termed “strategic” or “opportunistic” leadership styles.
• Harsh Pant in his book ‘India’s Foreign Policy: Modi Era’ argues that the advent of Modi’s
leadership marked a new style in foreign policy with greater assertiveness, with India shedding its
identity of non-aligned and building strong partnerships with U.S. allies in the region including
Japan, Australia and Vietnam while taking a strong stance against China and Pakistan.
• Sreeram Chaulia, in his book Modi Doctrine- The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister argues
that Modi has ushered fundamental changes in India’s foreign policy.
• The author goes on to praise Modi for running India like a CEO, for his spirit of competitive
federalism and notes how Modi as Prime Minister employs Indian democracy as a tool to spread
New Delhi’s influence in the global realm.
• As per Dr. Chanchal Kumar, Modi's foreign policy mantra is threefold:
o geo-economics,
o regional hegemony,
o global aspirations.
Domestic politics
• As per Paul Staniland and Vipin Narang, India’s domestic politics has important effects on India’s
foreign policy .
• Similarly, Schaffer and Schaffer point how domestic pressures can constrain foreign policy
through the examples of resolution on Sri Lanka adopted by UNHRC and the issue of enclaves
with Bangladesh as well as the water sharing of Teesta, image of aggressive China are all such past
incidents.
• Manoj Joshi argues how the expansion of media has also led to a close interplay between public
opinion and foreign policy making in India.
• Political scientist Rajesh Basrur in his book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India’s
Foreign Policy highlighted how India’s domestic politics have influenced its responses to foreign-
policy challenges using four case studies:
o the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement,

T.me/SleepyClasses
o India’s role in the Sri Lankan civil war and Tamil fisherman issue,
o its nuclear strategy, and
o its response to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.
Global and Regional Challenges

• According to Rajiv Sikri changing global power equations also lead to change in India’s foreign
policy.
• The relative weight of the US has diminished and it is less self-assured and more inward looking.
• Europe is grappling with Brexit, the rise of right-wing nationalism, and a flood of immigrants.
• China is the new pretender that relentlessly pursues its ‘China Dream’ of Asian, and eventually
global, domination. Russia has regained much of its self-confidence.
• As per Syed Akbarrudin, Indian diplomacy may seem to have following concerns that have the
potential to disrupt the best-made plans.
o Three neighbors will conduct difficult elections with outcomes uncertain.
o Three neighbours are engaged with the IMF to tide over financial distress.
o Afghanistan is an ungoverned space that can sprout unsavory elements.
o Myanmar is beset with domestic turmoil.
o China's border forays can never be discounted.
• The concept of Security is no longer isolated, no more a distinct silo. The weaponization of various
aspects of life has become the norm. India has skillfully pursued its national interests as a middle
power, expertly navigating the uncertain geopolitics of the current international order. The
challenge is to meaningfully shape the emerging new order.
• At the same time, regions of West Asia, North Africa as well as Asia are is in upheaval, with
rampaging terrorism, fundamentalism, sharp regional rivalries, as well as many so called ‘failed’
and ‘failing’ states.
• Then there is the rise of pandemic. All these international scenarios impact India’s foreign policy.
• As per Harsh V Pant- It has been rightly said that nations have no permanent friends or enemies,
only permanent interests. India’s relationships and priorities have changed over time with changes
in international trends to ensure both human and material resources to achieve its foreign policy
goals.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Constructivism and IFP
• Priya Chacko’s ‘Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004’
argues that India’s identity as a postcolonial nation-state strongly influences its foreign and
security policies. The author emphasizes India’s identity taking cognizance of it as a civilization-
state that brings to international politics a tradition of morality and ethical conduct.
• Arndt Michael in ‘India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism’ concedes that the grand
norm influencing India’s foreign policy and regional organizations is Nehruvian ‘Panchsheel
multilateralism’ of 1954, which enunciated the notion of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, non-
aggression and respect for sovereignty.
• Kate Sullivan Estrada and Rajesh Basrur’s ‘Rising India: Status and Power’ challenge the
traditional meanings and understandings of linear relationship between material power and status
focusing instead on India’s shifting status concerns and aspirations of being a major power. The
authors concede that acquiring material power is but one of the routes Indian leaders have adopted
to secure greater status in the global realm.
Role of public diplomacy

• Nicholas J. Cull argues that public diplomacy is an international actor’s attempt to conduct its
foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics. Public diplomacy is traditionally regarded as
government-to-people contact.
• Since the end of the Cold War, however, public diplomacy has entered into a new phase. For
instance, Gregory considers public diplomacy to be an “instrument used by states, associations of
states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior;
build and manage relationship; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their
interests and values.
• The instruments of public diplomacy include advocacy, broadcasting, public relations, cultural
diplomacy, exchange, and national branding.
• Jacques E. C. Hymans, in his work, “India’s Soft Power and Vulnerability,” held that India has a
long history of trying to use public diplomacy and other instruments of soft power to secure its
foreign policy objectives.
• After Independence, India invested considerable resources in high-level dialogues, intellectual and
cultural exchanges, and conferences of concerned parties, seeking to influence peoples as well as
governments by using open diplomacy and moral suasion.
• India’s new public diplomacy is actively seeking new audiences within India (notably, politically
engaged young people at home), in the West (Indian diaspora communities abroad), and in the
developing world (key opinion formers in India’s immediate region or resource-rich states in the
global South).

T.me/SleepyClasses
• India’s new public diplomacy is in part a response to recent efforts by other Asian states—
especially China—to build and leverage soft power.
• As per Sujit Datta, India’s new public diplomacy is part of a wider policy of strategic “hedging” in
response to China’s rise, involving emulation, balancing, and engagement.
• Five developments are especially significant in India’s Public Diplomacy:
o India’s effort to reach out to overseas Indians;
o its attempts to build connections with foreign business

interests;
o its nascent foreign aid and development program;
o its use of major events to showcase and “nation-brand”

India; and
o its use of new social media to reach out to younger, tech-

savvy audiences.
• In the words of Shashi Tharoor, in today’s world, you cannot meaningfully confine your public
diplomacy to foreign publics alone. In the current media environment, whatever message any
government puts out is also instantly available to its domestic audience on the internet.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Phases of evolution of IFP

• S. Jaishankar broadly divides India’s foreign policy:
o Phase 1 (1946-62)- Era of optimistic non-alignment: This era was marked by the advent of
Cold War that had divided the world into two parts. Veteran diplomat, Kunwar Natwar
Singh points that non-alignment for Nehru was an instrument to strengthen forces of peace,
disarmament, economic cooperation and to provide a platform for the Global South.
Michael Edwardes refers to non-alignment as Nehru’s ‘doctrine of defence by friendship’
o Phase 2 (1962-70)- Realism and Discovery: S. Gopal noted Nehru’s bonhomie attitude
towards China to be naïve and the 1962 war marked a new phase of IFP. Andrew Kennedy
argues that IFP under Nehru was a mix of both utopia and realpolitik. This realist edge is
underlined especially in Nehru’s nuclear policy. While he championed nuclear
disarmament, Nehru was not willing to sign any disarmament arrangement and supported
civilian nuclear energy.
o Phase 3 (1971-91)- Regional Assertion: Aparna Pande highlights how under Indira Gandhi,
“the Indian state became increasingly concerned about its security and defence leading to
the emergence of Indira Doctrine. Treaty with Soviets + Bangladesh war in 1971.
Continued Nehru’s dual policy wrt nuclear power- first nuclear test in 1974. Increasing
pragmatism under Rajiv Gandhi for a peaceful neighbourhood (S. Raghvan)- Lankan policy
a disaster. Followed by Gujral policy.
• Phase 4 (1991-99)- Quest for strategic

autonomy: Harsh Pant looks at the changes in 1991 as a redefining moment for India’s foreign policy.
After a spate of hung parliament, Congress was returned to power with majority under Narsimha Rao
due to the sympathy wave following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination.
• J.N. Dixit refers to Rao ‘as one of the most effective and creative influences’ on Indian foreign
policy.’ This period followed the disintegration of USSR and emergence of USA as a global
hegemon and economic reforms of India became a major strategy for IFP- Emergence of Look East,
re-engaging with West.
• The election of BJP in 1998 led to concentration on India’s military and economic needs while
invoking some strands of Nehruvianism as well. There was an emphasis on a closer relationship
with USA. The most important development underlining realism came in the form of 1998 tests
which made India a nuclear power.
• Phase 5 (2000-13)- Balancing power: 2004 saw UPA coming to power under Manmohan Singh, the
architect of the ‘91 LPG reforms. C. Raja Mohan, described as the Manmohan Singh doctrine as
guided by the need to “create a global environment conducive to her economic development and
the well-being of the people of India” through greater integration in world economy, energy
security and the same time maintaining a plural, secular and liberal democracy.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• A major development in foreign policy during this phase was US–India civil nuclear deal and
separated India’s civil and military nuclear programmes, allowed purchase of nuclear material
under IAEA safeguards by India for civilian purposes and opened the possibility of India’s
membership to nuclear clubs (Aparna Pande).
• Phase 6 (2014- )- Energetic diplomacy: The 2014 election brought the BJP riding the Modi wave. S.
Jaishankar views this phase of global politics as a phase of transitional geopolitics, marked by rise
of China, resurge of old empires like Russia and Turkey as well a flux in the middle east.
• He argues that India's policy of non-Alignment has turned into Multi Alignment wherein India is
now more aware of its own capabilities and the expectations that the world has of India including
its willingness to shape key global negotiations.
• Kishore Mahbubani postulates that Modi’s world view is made up of genuine non-alignment, an
emphasis on economic growth and the desire to rebuild ties in India’s ‘regional backyard. At the
same time, Aparna Pandey also views some elements of continuity such as emphasis on Global
South and expanding soft power through culture, ISRO and vaccine diplomacy.
• Continuation of the India Way:
o One of the bedrocks of India’s foreign policy, according to Jaishankar, has been the
emphasis on civilizational aspects of India.
o For Schaffer and Schaffer, the fulcrum of Indian foreign policy derives from its
civilizational and large-country sensibility, as well as ideas of hierarchy and moral
superiority.
• Indian Exceptionalism:
o Another continuing strand pointed out by Aparna Pande is that of Indian exceptionalism. It
rests on the uniqueness of India, which enabled it to gain independence without violence,
revolution or war.
• Respect for International Law and Order:
o India continues to underline its role as a responsible power deserving a seat on the high
table of global politics. Underlined in Article 51 of DPSPs.
• Leading the Global South
o While there may be a shift from NAM to multi-alignment, India continues to view itself as a
compatriot and leader of the global South be it in the domain of trade and WTO issues,
climate change negotiations or as ‘pharmacy of the world’.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Dealing with Neighbourhood
o The immediate neighbourhood has been especially at the core of IFP since Indira Gandhi’s
attempts at regional assertion which were further added to by the Gujral doctrine.
Immediately after his election in 2014, Modi’s focus was ‘neighbourhood first’.
• Emphasis on Soft Power
o Stephanie Lang-India’s soft power has been a major factor in its interaction with the world,
even before coined by Joseph Nye. Harsh Pant notes that under Modi, India is taking a
strategic approach towards using its soft-power resources to enhance the nation’s image
abroad. Sanjaya Baru underlines the use of ‘knowledge diplomacy’ through ISRO and as a
producer of generic drugs (Vaccine Maitri) as major thrust areas in soft power diplomacy.
• Despite such continuities, Schaffer and Schaffer find, there are many more competing visions of
India’s role in the world. They describe three diverse groups: ‘non-alignment firsters’, ‘broad
power realists’ and ‘hard power hawks’ jostling for primacy.
• Ashok Behuria- The PM Modi era has also tried to bring about symbolic changes in the core of
India’s stated foreign policy principles of Panchsheel which was rather proclamatory and
ideological wedded to universal values; towards Panchamrit (five nectars) which is aspirational,
rooted in local culture and values.
• From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment:
o MEA S. Jaishankar remarked non-alignment to be a concept of a bygone era. On the other

hand, he emphasizes the need for strategic autonomy and issue based alignment to push
forth India’s national interests such as QUAD grouping, signing defence and logistics
agreements with USA etc.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Increased risk taking:
o Jaishankar underlines the need for a more transactional ethos will promote ad hoc
groupings of disparate nations who have a shared interests on a particular issue. This
would be supported by requirements of working together and reaching out beyond
alliances. From a ‘balancing state’ to leading one. This has been especially important with
India taking a stand on issues like trade, climate change, terrorism etc.
• Geo-politics to Geoeconomics:
o Aakriti Tandon underlines that Modi’s foreign policy, along the lines of the Manmohan
doctrine, acknowledges the crucial role of economic considerations in shaping a nation’s
foreign policy. This has been carried further forward by the Modi era.
• Balancing Power to Great Power:
o Harsh Pant argues that India’s inability to think strategically in the past and its lack of
long-term planning, marginalisation of the military, inability to use force effectively,
discomfort with power, as well as lack of institutionalisation in foreign policy decision
making have together led to the lack of a coherent grand foreign policy strategy for India
required to be a great power.
• More realism and assertiveness:
o While recognising the need for regional interconnections, India has become more assertive
in its dealing with neighbours. De- hyphenation has also been an instrument of realism for
India allowing a deeper engagement with Israel. “This is a time to engage America, manage
China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play.”
• Dealing with PRC and USA:
o According to Sumit Ganguly, some of the choices including boosting the build- up and
modernization of India’s military capabilities along the Himalayan border signal important
diplomatic shifts in dealings with the PRC under the Modi doctrine. On the other hand, the
pragmatism has led to closer ties with USA, while maintaining its national interest.
• Look East to Act East:
o Narsimha Rao’s focus on East Asia was further asserted and ‘acted upon’ by building upon
existing commercial ties, but also includes a security component to manage an expansionist
PRC.
• Balancing Act in West Asia:
o Sumit Ganguli notes Modi has pursued a very deft balancing act in the region. He has
sought to improve India’s relationship with Israel while managing to improve existing
bonds with the critical states of the Persian Gulf, a legacy of past regimes since Narsimha
Rao.
T.me/SleepyClasses
• Diaspora diplomacy
o Latha Vardarajan notes that due to India’s colonial past there is a diverse emigrant
community that have continued to be a part of IFP. Be it Indians in East Asia, Middle East
or West Indies or the role of diaspora in the West especially USA (India-US deal, Howdy
Modi).
Institutions for making Foreign policy

• Foreign policy making is a highly complex and complicated process. Tanvi Madan argues that
with the expansion of India’s interests abroad, there has been a blurring of vertical and horizontal
policy making lines.
• M.C. Miller underlines the most important bodies involved in making of foreign policy as the
Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of External Affairs and the National Security Council.
• Apart from this, Rudra Chaudhary underlines the crucial role played by the Parliament and
various states in foreign policy.
• Rajiv Kumar underlines the growing role of private sector while Amitabh Mattoo and Rory
Metcalf analyse the role (however, limited) of universities and think tanks in the making of policy.
• Amb. (Retd.) Debnath Shaw argues that no single institution or personality can be attributed with
having exclusive rights or influence in area of foreign policy, but different institutions have
collectively built up what we tend to term as India’s Foreign Policy Consensus.
Ministry of External Affairs

• As per Pallavi Raghavan, MEA occupied a curious place in the heart of the post-colonial
government.
• The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is the ministry in the government that is expected to
provide intelligent, accurate answers to the questions above as it is supposed to be the storehouse
of expert knowledge on foreign affairs.
• The Minister of External Affairs (sometimes called Foreign Minister) is the head of the MEA. He is
the political appointee, member of the Cabinet, not necessarily an expert in foreign affairs decision-
making. But, all policy and decisions recommended by the experts in the Ministry are cleared, or
modified, by the Minister before their implementation.
• Several policy decisions cleared by the Minister require final approval of the Cabinet. The Indian
Foreign Service (IFS) officials, selected through the competitive examinations conducted by the
Union Public Service Commission, primarily man the MEA.
• The Foreign Secretary is a very senior and experienced IFS officer, and the permanent head of the
Ministry. He is an important adviser to the Foreign Minister. There are two other senior officials to
assist the Foreign Secretary known as Foreign Secretary (West), and Foreign Secretary (East).

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The working of the MEA is often shaped by the personality of the Minister of Ministry of External
Affairs as well. PM Nehru himself was India’s first foreign minister and infused it with building
long term relations with Global South.
• In recent times, former MEA, the late Sushma Swaraj offered a personal touch with her twitter
diplomacy while MEA S. Jaishankar as a career diplomat and foreign secretary ensured expertise to
the table.
• In line with issues that have become important in recent times, MEA has established specialized
divisions catering to Counter Terrorism, Cyber Diplomacy, E-Governance, etc.
• Since the late 1980s, MEA has been strengthening its economic diplomacy capabilities with
divisions dealing with investment and technology promotion, now subsumed into its Economic
Diplomacy Division, a division looking after Multilateral Economic Relations (MER) and
specialized centres for our ties with ASEAN and BIMSTEC, which are primarily focused on
strengthening economic ties
• A Development Partnership Administration (DPA) was created a few years ago, to bring together
all elements involved in India’s role as a preferred assistance partner to developing countries
particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
• The D&ISA Division has been in existence for over three decades dealing with nuclear
proliferation, disarmament and related issues, including India’s bid for membership of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) and related bodies.
• All Diaspora issues such as passport, visa and consular issues, including the safety and security of
Indian nationals residing abroad, are under the policy making purview of MEA.
Cabinet/Cabinet Committees
• The Cabinet being the top most decision making body of the government, determines the course of
India’s external relations by giving necessary directions.
• Cabinet decides on measures to strengthen India’s external security in consultation with MHA,
MoD and MEA. Regarding foreign trade and investment issues, the prime consultants are the
Ministries of Commerce and Industry, Finance and External Affairs.
• To gather foreign intelligence there is a special agency called Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
of the Cabinet Secretariat. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) gathers internal intelligence.

T.me/SleepyClasses
National Security Council
• J. Bandopadhyaya in his Making of India’s foreign Policy underlines the need felt for the creation
of a Foreign Policy Council on the American model. The NSC was finally formed in 1998 by PM
A.B. Vajpayee through a Parliamentary act with Brajesh Mishra as the first NSA.
• Although the final decisions rest with the PM and the Cabinet, NSC is the apex body of GOI which
advices on matters of on matters of India’s National Security, Foreign Policy and Defence.
• Chaired by the PM, the NSC consists of

the Ministers of External Affairs,
Defence, Home and Finance, the NSA
and the Deputy Chairman of Niti
Aayog (successor to Planning
Commission). The NSA is the Secretary
to the National Security Council.
Prime Minister’s Office

• Since India’s independence, the PMO under Nehru played a prominent role in the formulation of
India’s foreign policy. As per Tanvi Madan, over time, the PMO-has taken on a greater role in
foreign policy-making.
• The PMO includes officials on deputation from the MEA, who serve as working-level advisors on
foreign policy-especially on those issues in which the Prime Minister has a personal interest or
those considered to need the highest level of attention.
• In addition, the Prime Minister can appoint envoys on particular issues or regions of importance.
For example, in recent years there have been special envoys for climate change negotiations, the
India-US nuclear talks, Afghanistan-Pakistan issues, as well as disarmament and non-proliferation.
• In the past, Indira Gandhi used an envoy to conclude discussions on the India-Soviet Friendship
Treaty in 1971. Prime Ministers can also appoint task forces to focus on particular issues.
• There have been other mechanisms for Prime Ministers to exercise more control on foreign policy
as well. In a few cases, heads of policy planning in MEA were given minister of state rank and
reported directly to the Prime Minister (e.g. D. P. Dhar in the 1970s, G. Parthasarathy in the 1980s).
• According to P. Saksena this movement from MEA to PMO in crucial foreign policy decisions
started from the tenure of Indira Gandhi. With the formulation of the office of NSA this movement
has been further bolstered.
• Under the Modi regime as well the PMO has gained a huge relevance with the PM himself
involved in issues of personal importance and those which are of great relevance. Modi has also
emphasized his chemistry with various leaders in building external relations.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Within Modi administration, greater shaping of foreign policy decision is also coming from NSA
Ajit Doval with him leading the talks with China on boundary disputes and Sri Lanka and
Maldives over maritime security
Parliament
• On several foreign policy-related issues as listed in the Union List, the Parliament has exclusive
power to enact legislation. For instance, these include, diplomatic, consular and trade
representation, war and peace, the United Nations, citizenship, naturalisation etc.
o First, the Parliament has the power to approve treaties. But it is the Union Government,
which determines the basic contents of treaties and seeks final approval of the Parliament.
During Nehru’s time, A. Appadorai in Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy discusses
in detail how parliament was able to exercise its influence over India’s China policy.
o Second, Parliament has control over the money that is spent to run the foreign policy and
national security establishments in the country.
o The third area of parliamentary influence is through debate over the policy issues. All the
parliamentary devices of generating a discussion in the Parliament, like calling attention
notice, adjournment, questions etc.
Parliamentary Committees
• The Parliamentary Committees in the area of Foreign Affairs and Defence were established in 1991
and are known as select committees. These committees respectively, have the task of scrutinising
the budget of the concerned departments like the MEA and Defence.
• Equally important is the fact that the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and also
Defence, study issues which the Parliament considers important, submits its report to the
Parliament and Executive. The Executive branch is supposed to submit an action taken report to
the parliament.
• These committees are definitely improving the role of Parliament in foreign/security policy
making. But their role needs to be strengthened in foreign policy-making. Two brief suggestions
can be made in this regard.
o One, to increase the functions they perform, and
o second, give these committees a skeleton of permanent expert staff so that the MPs can
effectively perform their roles in these committees.
State governments
• Rudra Chaudhary points that while states may not play a definitive role in the shaping of foreign
policy, regional preferences over time have become important to the executive at the Centre.
• Happymon Jacob attributes the weakening of central control over foreign policy to the following
factors:
T.me/SleepyClasses
• Some states and regions enjoyed a special constitutional status that enhanced their political
leaders’ influence on foreign policy say J&K under the now abrogated article 370. Certain state
leaders have the political clout to informally shape foreign policy making such as the case of
Mamta Banerjee, when we talk of sharing of river waters with Bangladesh.
• Central coalition governments particularly till 2014 empowered state governments and leaders to
have a greater say on foreign policy because such coalitions are composed of regional parties,
many of them located in a single state.
• Finally, although the constitution has not undergone change, the forces of globalization have
created new practices and possibilities that have already given the states a greater role and will
continue to do so in the future- especially relevant as we see states organising events for economic
integration with world economy.
• H. Jacob further argues that the current government led by Prime Minister Modi has been more
accepting of states playing a role in foreign policy than past administrations.
• It seems to view such engagement not as a negative form of interference but as a useful asset for
pursuing the country’s national interests abroad. The creation of the States Division within the
Ministry of External Affairs is indicative of this new willingness to mainstream regional voices on
foreign policy matters.
• The States adjoining our neighbouring countries have a major say in cross border issues. For
example, the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty or exchange of enclaves with Bangladesh would not
have been possible without the support of the West Bengal Government.
• Water and land boundary issues with Pakistan have to take into account the views of the adjoining
states of J&K, Punjab and Gujarat. In our dealings with Nepal, UP and Bihar are key dialogue
partners. Tamil Nadu has had a disproportionate influence on India's policies towards Sri Lanka
due to the Tamil factor.
• Recognizing the importance of carrying States along as co-partners for success in foreign relations,
MEA has established a dedicated States Division, which acts as its interface with all state.
• Arvind Gupta suggested that “the involvement of the populations of border regions in the
formulation and implementation of a proper border management policy is of great significance.
Border regions need to be given special attention for a successful border management policy.”
• He went on to argue that “it is essential that the people of the North East should be involved in the
conceptualisation, formulation and implementation of the Look East Policy.”
• The central government should begin by taking steps to strengthen existing mechanisms such as
the inter-state council and National Development Council.
• The MEA should revive the practice, started by then foreign secretary Sujatha Singh in 2014, of
holding regular meetings of state chief secretaries to discuss foreign policy matters that concern
state interests.
T.me/SleepyClasses
• Kishan Rana has argued, New Delhi should think about establishing external affairs offices
manned by state-level officials in various state capitals.
• State governments may station their representatives abroad to promote their state’s interests,
perhaps within Indian embassies overseas. State governments could also consider creating an
international cell headed by a senior Indian Administrative Service officer with support from the
MEA’s States Division.
Universities and Think-Tanks

• Kanti Bajpai underlines the role of Nehru as an institutional builder who encouraged the founding
of Indian Council of World Affairs under Tej Bahadur Sapru, Indian School of International Studies
under DU which eventually became the School of International Studies in JNU.
• Defence Ministry supported Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA). There are also
important bodies like RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries), ICRIER
(Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations), Centre for Policy Research
(CPR), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and Vivekananda Foundation.
• One of the important contributions to issues of IR comes through the Raisina Dialogue which is a
multilateral conference held annually in New Delhi since 2016 organised by the ORF.
• Similarly, the ‘The Gateway of India Dialogue’ is a geo- economic conference held in Mumbai, co-
hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs.
• However, compared to the West (USA, EU), the role of universities and think tanks in concrete
foreign policy making remains limited.
• MEA’s growing interest in working with think tanks, as promoted by S. Jaishankar, has led the
ministry to collaborate with select organisations through, for example, organising events and
providing funding example ORF.
• As C. Raja Mohan, the director of Carnegie India has noted, “given the complexity of policy,
there’s scope for outside people contributing to it.”
• Problems faced by universities and think tanks (S. Haidar and K. Bhattacherjee)
o Rise of a number of new foreign policy think tanks in India closer to government and
certain business groups.
o Drastic reduction in external funding through use of FCRA and action against students and
faculty/ researchers.
o Promotion of worldviews that tend to be in agreement with a liberal international order

and by representing the interests of major corporate actors.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Importance of universities and think tanks: (Patrick Köllner)
• Provide expertise and assistance for designing specific policies. ORF, for example, helped to devise
India’s BRICS policy.
• Provide platforms for political dialogue among foreign policy actors from India and abroad, such
as governments, policymakers, the strategic community.
• Utilised and further expanded their networks for engaging in informal diplomacy.
• Provide experts and manpower for institutional centres of foreign policy including ministries.
• Enable dissemination of information.
Media and Private Sector

• Rajiv Kumar underlines the prominent role the private sector came to play since the 1980’s under
Rajiv Gandhi through the ‘Bombay Club’. The role of private sector has increased since the LPG
reforms in 1990’s.
• Manoj Joshi points to the prominent role played by media especially electronic and digital.
• Mattoo and Metcalf also point to important media analysts like C.Raja Mohan, Sidhartha
Vardarajan, Manoj Joshi who are influential opinion makers on foreign policy.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Challenges in formulation of Indian foreign policy

• C. Raja Mohan delves into the ‘relationship between international relations scholarship, Indian
public opinion and foreign policymaking in India’. He argues that unlike in other developed
countries, India still lags behind in having a ‘permanent establishment’ that constitutes of
policymakers, academicians, media persons and an active political class that churns out
constructive and effective foreign policy recommendations.
• At the moment mainly an ‘informal network’ of a small group of policy activists within and
outside the government. Three key reasons for the non-existence of this ‘establishment’ are:
o First, an elusive domestic foreign policy consensus.
o Second, the Indian strategic community’s conformism to a few leaders that gives
personalities dominance over processes.
o Third, changing institutional balance in which non-governmental institutions including

academics and media persons are more confident and aware about global politics and have
started making their opinions heard openly.
• Devesh Kapoor based on a survey study concludes that political elite dominates foreign
policymaking in India and mass public is poorly informed about the same marking the lack of
influence of public opinion.
• As per Tanvi Madan, Indian foreign policy formulation tends to be status quoist, with little policy
innovation.
• As per Saksena and Routray Indian foreign policy is too reactive.
• As per Ramdasi, there is the lack of coordination within and among ministries, as well as between
missions or delegations abroad and Delhi.
• As per Khilnani, there is less integration with little assessment of the impact of one's actions on the
other or on India's larger interests.
• Shashi Tharoor argues in effect that Indian foreign policymaking capacity is low: the institutions of
foreign policy making including MEA, the press, and interest groups as well as public opinion and
political leadership make for an under-developed system.
• Daniel Markey’s, “Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software’” went beyond an assessment of
the IFS and MEA to take a more systemic view of Indian capacities including in the private sector
and civil society.
• Markey argued that the IFS was too small due to its highly selective recruitment policy; mid- career
training was “inadequate”; outside expertise was not usually consulted, and India’s think tanks
and universities lacked information, access to government, or funding; and the media and private
business were not positioned to “undertake sustained foreign policy research or training”.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Kanti Bajpai also notes the urgent need to improve the training process of IFS.
• Mattoo and Metcalf point the need for greater contribution from academia and scholarship. Their
limited output is often blamed on limited access to data which is manned by bureaucracy.
• Kanwal and Routray have criticized the exclusion of actors in the decision-making process,
especially the military and its service chiefs.
• Dr. Gouri Sankar Nag has highlighted the following gap in the formulation of Indian foreign
policy
o Firstly, now a day it has become a fashion to identify foreign policy discourse with certain
predominant propensities related to talks on disputed borders or to woo foreign
investment for growth-management.
o Secondly, it seems India's approach lacks flexibility.
o Thirdly, the recent spate of hate speech does present well with the great power status
demand, rather it exposes inability to peacefully negotiate with the internal social
divisions.
o Last but not the least, it seems that India does not have a clear strategic threat perception
or a sound strategic plan.
Transformation of foreign policy from Modi 1.0 to Modi 2.0

• As per Happymon Jacob, there is today a visible transformation in India’s engagement of the
world. Switch in MEA’s foreign policy- preferring substance over style.
• A conciliatory policy towards neighbourhood: Modi 2.0 more open towards neighbourhood and
open to reaching out- Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka. The manner in which the Modi2.0
government reached out to the Taliban shedding its past reservations and its outreach to the West
Asian/Gulf states are noteworthy.
• Effective multilateralism through purposefulness: India’s multilateral engagements have also

become more result-driven and interest-based rather than rhetoric. Under Modi 2.0- India’s
framing of UNSC response to Afghanistan, deep engagement with QUAD, climate change
negotiations.
• Balancing contradictions: India faces issues of unfriendly neighbourhood+ increasing tensions in

global power politics. A lot of agility displayed in managing these issues- buying S-400 missiles, oil
from Russia while maintaining closeness with US; in SCO while also in QUAD, the West Asian
delicate balance- smart-balance systemic contradictions.
• Realities of geoeconomics: Modi 2.0 has also appeared to have realised the folly of resisting global
and regional economic integration- need FTAs to reach 5 trillion $ economy.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Conclusion
• Happymon Jacob argues that a rebooted Indian foreign policy must find ways of imagining a new
regionalism with or without the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and
must shed its obsession with Pakistan and terrorism.
• As per M.K.Narayan, as part of the ideational restructuring of India’s foreign policy, what is
urgently required, apart from competent statecraft, is the adoption of prudent policies, pursuit of
realistically achievable objectives, and, above all, a demonstration of continuity of policy,
irrespective of changes in the nature of the administration.

T.me/SleepyClasses
NAM- NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

What is NAM
• The term 'non-alignment' is used to describe the foreign policies of those states that refused to align
with either of the two blocs led by the two Superpowers i.e. the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, and instead,
opted to pursue an independent course of action in international politics.
• As per Irshad Ahmad Shah, Non-alignment emerged within the context of two simultaneous global
developments - Afro-Asian resurgence and bipolar world politics.

T.me/SleepyClasses
IS NAM equals Neutrality?
• John Foster Dulles, was vocal in his disdain for non-alignment, which he considered neutralism.
Dulles openly chided India’s policy in 1955, calling neutrality ‘an obsolete conception’, and as
being ‘except under very exceptional circumstances an immoral and short-sighted conception’.
• Non-alignment is not neutrality- Non-alignment is a political concept, whereas neutrality is a legal

concept.
• Neutrality is a permanent feature of state policy, while non-alignment is not.
• Further, unlike neutrality, non-alignment is not negative, but is a positive concept. It stands for:
o an active role in world affairs and
o friendship and cooperation with all countries.
• Instead, NAM consists of taking an independent position based on the merits of each issue, and,
on the requirements of national interest.
• Vinod Kumar argued that
o Non-alignment policy was about the autonomy of decision-making and flexibility of

choices in pursuit of national interest.
o It also demonstrates how visionary leadership seeking to influence international politics

could develop ideational frameworks to propel their grand strategy.
o NAM’s actual relevance was in determining the space

for India and the third world in the Cold War
spectrum.
• NAM as a foreign policy was based on Nehruvian vision:
o as a model of third world self-sufficiency bereft of

influence of imperialism or colonialism, and
o as a platform to safeguard the interests of those who

wished not to align with the superpowers in their
rivalry.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Evolution of the Non-aligned Movement

• The non-aligned movement evolved out of the concerted efforts of individual non-aligned states
to build a common front against the superpower and neo-imperialist domination. Jawaharlal
Nehru from India, Gamal Abdel Nassar from Egypt and Josip Broz Tito from Yugoslavia took the
first step in building this movement.
• Nehru believed that the countries of Asia and Africa, should build up an alliance of solidarity to
fight neo-imperialism. As a first step he tried to organize an Asian front in the forties. In 1947 he
called an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi.
• In the 1950’s as the states of Africa started gaining independence from colonial rule it became
necessary to expand the base of this front. In April 1955, therefore, Nehru together with leaders of
Indonesia, Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan convened an Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in
Indonesia. Both these Conferences highlight the political and economic insecurity that was
threatening the newly independent states at the time.
• However, Bandung Conference failed to build a homogenous Asian and African front as a number
of these States did not agree to conduct their foreign relations under the banner of anti-imperialism
and had joined either of the alliances.
• In the post-Bandung years, thus, it became necessary to build up an identity for the non-aligned
states on the basis of principles and not on the basis of region. The effort united these states with
Yugoslavia which was similarly looking for a political identity in international affairs.
• The embryo of the later non-aligned conferences first came into being a Brioni, in Yugoslavia, in
June 1956, where Tito conferred with Nehru and Nassar on the possibility of making real the
unspoken alliance which bound them together. The efforts finally resulted in the convening of the
first non-aligned conference at Belgrade in 1961.
• Five basis were determined and applied, for countries to be members of the Non-aligned
Movement. Only such countries as fulfilled these conditions were actually invited to the
conference.
• There were :
o independent foreign policy, particularly in the context of Cold War politics;
o opposition to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;
o should not be a member of any of the military blocs;
o should not have concluded any bilateral treaty with any of the two superpowers;
o should not have allowed military bases on its territory to a superpower.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Principles of NAM
• The principles that would govern relations among large and small nations, known as the "Ten
Principles of Bandung", were proclaimed at that Conference which formed objectives of non-
alignment. These were:
o Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations.
o Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
o Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations, both
large and small.
o Non-intervention or non-interference into the internal affairs of another - country.
o Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively, in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
o A Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great
powers and Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries
o Refraining from carrying out or threatening to carry out aggression, or from using force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country and
o Peaceful solution of all international conflicts in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations.
o Promotion of mutual interests and of cooperation.
o Respect of justice and of international obligations.
Achievements of NAM
• Anti colonialism: A major goal of .the Non-aligned Movement was to end colonialism. The
conferences of the NAM continuously supported the national liberation movements and the
organisations that led those movements were given the status of full members in these conferences.
This support greatly facilitated the decolonization process in Asia and Africa.
• Against Racism: It also condemned racial discrimination and injustice and lent full support to the
antiapartheid movement in South Africa and Namibia. Today in both countries this obnoxious
policy has ended with independence and majority rule.
• Peace and Disarmament: Another area in which the NAM made a significant contribution was
towards the preservation of peace and disarmament. Its espousal of peace, of peaceful co-existence
and of human brotherhood, opposition to wars of any kind contributed to the lowering of Cold
War tensions and expanded areas of peace in the world with less states joining military blocs.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Changes in UN: The non-aligned states succeeded in altering the composition of the U.N. and
consequently in changing the tenor of the interstate relation conducted through its organs which
had been dominated by the super powers. The emergence of NAM created a new voting majority
in the General Assembly and also common platform from where the third world can espouse its
cause.
• Global South Collaboration: NAM also provided a credible platform for South-South cooperation
which came to fruit at the Algiers Conference in 1973 of the concepts of a "new international
economic order.”
• S. Jaishankar in his book ‘The India Way’ writes NAM allowed India the leadership opportunity to
build its own constituency and brand.
Challenges faced by NAM

• According to C.R Mohan, NAM was irrelevant even before the end of the cold war because it
didn’t have any concrete achievement and it was extremely idealistic.
• One of the main weaknesses of NAM has been the lack of concrete agenda.
• Further, its membership rules are extremely vague and open ended.
• The Sino-India war of 1962 was one of the first situations in which the non-aligned countries faced
a situation that was not directly related to the two blocs or issues such as colonialism and the
responses ranged from ignoring the situation, making low-profile appeals and statements to
making attempts to mediate- inability to take concrete action.
• Moreover, the lack of regular summits and failure of NAM in resolving regional conflicts have also
dented the image of NAM as an organization
• S. Jaishankar quotes it to be a concept of a “particular geopolitical landscape” which no longer

exists after the end of Cold War.
• Hans Kochler points out that NAM was relevant only during the cold war era Bi-polar world. Now
there is only one dominant global power (US) and hence its objectives are redundant.
Is NAM relevant?
• In 2020, S. Jaishankar contented that multipolarity in the world necessitated that India would have
to take a definite stand, and even take “risks” on issues such as connectivity, maritime security,
terrorism and climate change.
• He argues that global shifts, including that of the United States and China, opening spaces for
middle powers like India, Japan, E.U. and others. Importantly recent world has seen the rise of
groupings like BRICS, G20, ASEAN, SCO etc which have overshadowed NAM.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• As per Lok Raj Baral, no single power can lead the present world, so new alliances and blocs are
emerging in changing scenarios and contexts. Even the United States of America is creating new
alliances, so how can we remain indifferent from the shift in global power and balance.
• With the emergence of China, the re-emergence of Russia and creation of several US-led security,
military and strategic alliances like NATO, Indo-Pacific Strategy, QUAD and recent alliance
between the US, UK and Australia (AUKUS) have resulted in a new kind of polarisation in the
world and new wave of cold war is in the offing. These developments have also questioned the
relevance of NAM.
• M.K. Bhadrakumar argues how India’s transition as a nuclear weapon state embroiled it in
strategic deterrence; its disinterest in South-South cooperation and its disengagement from the
struggle against inequalities and injustice in international economic relations reflected its retreat
from the centre stage to the shade to focus on self-interests by aligning with the West, especially
the US leading to NAM taking a backseat.
• Harsh V. Pant remarked how India’s rising global profile as well as the growing assertiveness of
China is reshaping New Delhi’s approach to its major partnerships in the changing global order-
move from non-alignment to strategic autonomy under Modi.
• The expansionism of a belligerent China with skirmishes at un-demarcated LAC at quite a few
points in the Ladakh and Sikkim sectors as well as growing geopolitical rivalry between US and
China has led to rethinking by India.
• M.K. Narayanan argues that while India professes to be non-aligned, it is increasingly perceived as
having shifted towards the American orbit of influence including being part of Quad (the U.S.,
Japan, Australia and India) which has a definite anti-China connotation.
• According to Vijay Keshav Gokhale, India has moved away from the NAM concept and has
adopted an approach of “issue-based alignment” allowing India to engage with multiple countries
by dehyphenation of issues such as Israel-Palestine crisis. There is a need for NAM to keep up with
the times.
Relevance of NAM
• As per Alvin Botes, the role of the nonaligned movement today is as relevant today as it is in 1961.
• Suhasini Haider highlighted following reasons for a new non-alignment initiative:
• The world is facing challenges from great power conflicts again- Mr. Jaishankar referred to
Afghanistan, Covid, Ukraine as examples where “big power rivalry” is having global
consequences.
• India maintains many of the NAM principles: political self-determination, mutual respect for
sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• NAM Members are admitted if they take independent policies on great power conflict, not be a
member of any defence alliance or host a foreign military base- all criteria India still adheres to.
• While more than 120 countries voted to censure Russia at the UN, no more than 40 have joined the
US and EU’s sanctions, indicating that many countries are unwilling to be drawn into the growing
battle-lines between Russia and the West and China and the West.
• The members are mostly from the global south, which ties with the Indian push for South-South
cooperation. Similar point is also highlighted by K Harikumar.
• All India’s neighbours- including Bhutan Bangladesh Nepal Maldives and Sri Lanka are members
of NAM today, and share the value of independent foreign policy with India.
• As per James Traub, Cold War 2.0 is ushering in non-alignment 2.0. Hence, Jorge Heine have called
for “active nonalignment” in response to global competition between the US and China.
• According to T.P Sreenivasan, NAM stood for freedom of judgement and action, hence it is still
valid whether there are one block or two. It will be premature to denounce the death of NAM.
• While NAM’s agenda of promotion of decolonisation may be done with, the grouping can mould
itself to counter forces of neo-colonialism and become a platform for further strengthening new
international order that highlights more egalitarian global economy and trade.
• As per Robert Rakove, Nonalignment was not simply a reactive exercise in continually rebalancing
between the blocs and finding a midpoint. “It involved an affirmative agenda, including the
pursuit of decolonization and economic justice.”
• “The existing order,” as former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon writes,
“does not address their security needs, their existential concerns about food and finances, or
transnational threats such as climate change.”
• During the pandemic, NAM leaders at an online summit (Uniting Against COVID19 Pandemic)
reiterated their commitment to founding principles.
• After the disintegration of the USSR, there have been attempts to revive the platform e.g. Havana
Declaration, 2006 reoriented NAM’s agenda. It sought to strengthen the UN system, reform
multilateralism, address the challenges of globalisation and implement HR objectively.
• S. Jaishankar at Baku Summit,2019 - "Multilateralism is undoubtedly under strain today. It is

important that our Movement continues to work together and take the lead in building multilateral
governance structures that are capable of meeting the 21st century challenge.”
• Azerbaijan in a 2023 NAM summit meeting discussed the issues of global importance including
post-pandemic recovery initiatives, international security, the institutional development of the
NAM, etc.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• A lot of the recent thinking and debates on non-alignment have occurred in Latin America and
South-east Asia too.
• Most Latin American countries have refused to align with any major power. They have also
ignored US’ warnings to avoid doing business with China. Many have embraced Chinese
infrastructure, 5G technology and digital connectivity.
• For ASEAN non-alignment has as much to do with geography as strategy. Many member of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations have historically championed “declaratory non-
alignment”. They have used the concept largely rhetorically while, in reality, practising a
promiscuous “multi-alignment”.
• Prof. A. Adebajo- Uganda’s chairmanship of NAM since December 2023 can help strengthen the
NAM in Africa as well. Beijing is Africa’s largest trading partner at $254 billion and builds a third
of the continent’s infrastructure.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Ways to Improve NAM
• As T.V. Paul remarks about NAM, there is space to resurrect the old movement as a soft balancing
mechanism against powerful states. highlights the need to develop a new ‘Bandung spirit’ which
takes into account the new realities of global politics. He remarks that NAM countries could
engage in soft balancing of this nature hoping to delegitimise the aggressive behaviour of the great
powers.
• One of the most important reforms required by NAM to maintain its relevance in contemporary
global politics is to develop a charter stating a specific vision and goals that go beyond the Cold
War bipolarity and holding regular summits.
• As global politics gets more technical and complicated with the emergence of issues like climate
change, nuclear proliferation, global and new terrorism, pandemic and health crisis, trade wars,
NAM requires a permanent secretariat as well as staff that can keep working on these issues and
produce credible data in between summits.
• As per Dr. Vasif Huseynov, the NAM must reform its membership rules to make them more strict,
develop a concrete workable agenda as well as set up a secretariat for long term planning and
coordination.
• Further as Dr. Jaishankar stated, there is need to revitalise the current arrangements and working
methods to pursue a positive and forward-looking agenda to move beyond just an ideological
grouping towards evolving a more pragmatic role.
• NAM needs to indulge in ‘norm entrepreneurship’ with concrete initiatives including engagement
with emerging states in the ASEAN grouping.
• As per Irshad Ahmad Shah , in order to bolster its potential the NAM has to redefine itself so that it
can play its role more effectively. Some of its foundational principles, mainly national
independence, territorial integrity, and the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, need to
be modified so that they are compatible with contemporary issues.
• M.K. Narayanan suggested that India must regain its moral leadership and revive the non-aligned
movement.
• As per Nonalignment 2.0 document, “the core objective of a strategic approach should be to give
India maximum options in its relations with the outside world—that is, to enhance India’s strategic
space and capacity for independent agency—which in turn will give it maximum options for its
own internal development”.
• According to Ashley J. Tellis, Nonalignment 2.0 see India as contemplating its external engagement
principally from the viewpoint of how it ought to maneuver in order to protect itself while it
remedies its infirmities.
• The objectives of NAM 2.0 are three-fold:

T.me/SleepyClasses
o To lay out the opportunities that India enjoys in international sphere
o To identify the challenges and threats it is likely to confront; and
o To define the broad perspective and approach that India should adopt as it works to
enhance its strategic autonomy in global circumstances.
• C. Raja Mohan points out rethinking of NAM’s role in Modi’s foreign policy. NAM remains a
critical diplomatic forum for the pursuit of India’s international interests. For example, reforming
global institutions (UNSC).

T.me/SleepyClasses
India and South Asia

• The region of South Asia is often used to describe India and most of its neighbors. Cohen argues
how while civilisationally, the subcontinent has a long history, in terms of IR, the region acquired
significance since the 1960’s.
• The region consists of physically and culturally contiguous countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). These are members of SAARC (the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, founded in the early 1980s). George Friedman
called it a ‘self-contained’ island.
• However, despite the existence of cultural and traditional ties, the World Bank and other sources
show that South Asia is the world’s politically and economically least integrated region, as well as
one of the most violent.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Kanti Bajpai has pointed out that since independence, India’s international relations displays the
hallmarks of not just one all-encompassing ‘grand strategy’, but three.
• In particular, Bajpai argues three dominant strands on strategic thinking in India are Nehruvian,
neo-liberal and hyper-real.
• What all three schools of grand strategy would agree upon, however, is the ultimate objective of
India’s foreign policy: India’s, as well as South Asia’s, prosperity, stability and international
political prowess lies in a stabilized neighborhood.
• As per David Malone, India has close historical, religious, economic, ethnic, and linguistic
relationships with all of these states. Unsurprisingly, the complex and dovetailing ties linking up
the South Asian subcontinent drive South Asian countries to speak—optimistically—of friendship
as a ‘geographical imperative’.
• C. Raja Mohan argues that without enduring primacy in one’s own neighborhood, no nation can
become a credible power on the global stage.
• Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated that ‘Friends can change but not neighbors who
have to live together.
What shapes India’s South Asia Policy

• Cohen writes that four factors shape India’s position in this region:
o the mixed imperial legacy,
o an interplay between geography, strategy, and technology,
o the regional ideological irruption, and,
o the role of outside powers.
Evolution of India’s South Asian policy

• Ever since independence, the broad strategy of India's foreign policy towards its neighbors has
been to have peaceful and friendly relations with all.
• In fact as early as in 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime architect of India's foreign policy in
reported to have said, "the neighbouring countries have the first place in our minds"
• However, during the Nehruvian era India's concept of neighbourhood covered the whole of Asia
it and was not confined to South Asia, thereby giving a low priority to India's immediate
neighbourhood.
• The peculiar geo-strategic location of India and other asymmetries, including the similarities led
the South Asian neighbours to assert their identity, view India as a big brother and seek external
assistance to offset any hegemonistic designs by India.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Though Indira Gandhi shared the Nehruvian vision, she believed that India's foreign policy should
be precisely related to the country's evolving security, political and economic interests. Upgrading
of India's military capabilities, pro-active role in Bangladesh's liberation, friendship treaty with
Soviet Union, integration of Sikkim into Indian Union have led scholars to describe it as a period of
high assertiveness.
• The Janata Government though for a brief spell of 2 years gave top priority to good
neighbourliness and followed a strict policy of non-interference in the affairs of the neighbours.
• After returning to power, Indira Gandhi observed, "India desired friendship with neighbors, but
not at the cost of its interests". Though the initial years of the Rajiv era made an attempt to improve
relations with neighbours, the Government's role in the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis led to problems.
• The emergence of the United From Government both under Devegowda and I.K. Gujral opened a
new chapter, especially with the ‘ The Gujral Doctrine' stressing on following:
o Firstly, India does not seek reciprocity, but offers as much trust and assistance as possible
to its neighbors – Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka;
o Secondly, no action should be permitted to be committed within the territory of any South
Asian State.
o Thirdly, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other;
o Fourthly, all South Asian countries value each other's territorial integrity and sovereign
independence; and
o Finally, all contentious issues should be resolved peacefully through bilateral agreements.
• The BJP led NDA Government from 1998. 2004 also tried to follow in the footsteps of the - previous
Government marked by Lahore Bus diplomacy, and Agra Summit.
• It also witnessed the nuclear explosions of India and Pak,

Kargil War, cross border infiltration etc.
• The UPA Government led by the Congress from 2004-2014

continued the NDA Governments policy of expecting the
neighbours to come down on terrorism operating against India
with a firm hand Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister
continued his policy of engagement with its neighbourhood
like better relations with Pakistan, trade concessions to
Bangladesh, massive aid and reconstruction in Afghanistan
and Sri Lanka thereby helping India's stand in the region.

T.me/SleepyClasses
PM Modi’s South Asian policy-Official adoption of Neighbourhood first policy
• As per Uttam Anand, this policy is mix of hybrid realism and constructivism pragmatism
diplomacy.
• First, the Modi government's high-level visits take the initiative of visiting South Asian
neighbours, which is entirely different from previous one-way visits by high-level South Asian
neighbors to India.
• Secondly, they actively engage in cultural diplomacy. Modi's speeches to Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
and Afghanistan parliaments have highlighted cultural and civilized ties, portraying religion as the
glue between India and its neighbours.
• Thirdly, granting aid and loans. After the Bangladesh and Nepal earthquakes, water crises in the
Maldives and floods and economic in Sri Lanka, Indian aid workers rushed to the scene and
provided loans for infrastructure and small development projects in those countries.
• India has deliberately proved to be the first respondent to the crisis in its South Asian neighbors
and a net regional security provider.
• Fourthly, with our South Asian neighbours, we need to address long-standing issues.
o This included completing an eight-year road project in Bhutan;
o meeting Nepal's nearly twenty years demand for opening cross-border air routes;
o completing an Afghan-Indian friendly dam project that had been delayed for years;
o settling a territorial dispute with Bangladesh;
o working with Maldives;
o resumption dialogue with Pakistan, etc.

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The Modi Government's strategies toward South Asian countries are both hereditary and
innovative, with similarities and differences. The Modi government's "neighborhood first" policy
can be summed up as follows:
• neighbors are close neighbors and distant neighbors, and
• South Asian neighbors are the core circle;
• national security interests‘ considerations are paramount in neighboring countries' diplomacy;
• neighboring countries' diplomacy is based on a common cultural heritage.
• Neighboring countries 'diplomacy is outcome-oriented and has priority and strategic importance.
Failures of neighbourhood policy

• As per S.D.Muni, A number of factors may be identified for expectations of the ‘neighbourhood
first’ initiative not being met.
• To begin with, the initiative lacked serious homework, a coherent strategy and a credible road-
map. It started as an idea and was allowed to evolve its own course. In other words this initiative is
laced with ad hoc and reactive moves. This was evident in many instances.
o Then Foreign Secretary Sujata Singh confessed that the Ministry of External Affairs was
given only three days to arrange for the visits of South Asian heads on Prime Minister’s
swearing-in ceremony.
o In relation to Pakistan, the last minute cancellation of foreign secretary level talks in August
2014 on the issue of Hurriyat leaders meeting Pakistani diplomats. India’s ‘red line’ vis-à-
vis the Hurriyat subsequently disappeared in India’s official policy. Modi organised a
surprise visit to Lahore to greet his counterpart Nawaz Sharif on a social occasion.
o In Nepal, the last minute rushing of foreign secretary Dr Jaishankar to Kathmandu in

September 2015 to delay the promulgation of the constitution after it had been voted finally
by the Constituent Assembly proved to be a highly undiplomatic move.
o The last minute cancellation of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Maldives in 2015.
• India’s chronic delivery deficit in foreign policy may be seen as the second factor hampering
smooth neighbourhood relations. Modi tried to streamline the implementation processes and
succeeded in some areas. But the pangs of delivery deficit persist in many areas of trade,
investments, and connectivity project.
• The problem arises from many sources. There are constraints on economic resources that India can
invest in its neighbourhood policy, especially in contrast to what China is willing and capable of
doing.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Then there were issues in coordination among various policy implementation bodies.
o This lack of coordination has also enhanced the role of intelligence agencies in policy
decisions.
o Institutional arrangements have been made to deal with the role of federal states,
particularly those bordering immediate neighbours, in foreign policy but such coordination
faces critical challenges at the political level.
o For instance, in India’s approach towards Bangladesh, the role of West Bengal on the Teesta
water sharing issue and of Assam on the question of illegal migration will continue to pose
practical difficulties. Similarly, the role of Tamil Nadu wrt Sri Lanka.
• The third factor impinging adversely on Modi’s ‘neighbourhood first’ initiative has been the rise of
extremism and polarization in India.
• The explicit emphasis on Hindu identity both within the domestic Indian political context as well
as in relation to neighbouring countries, is not always compatible with India’s stated policy
objectives and sends discomforting messages to those neighbours that do not have predominantly
Hindu societies.
• Fourth factor that has affected Modi’s ‘neighbourhood first’ initiative is the competition posed by
China. For its own strategic and economic reasons, China is making a strong push into South Asia.
• As per David Malone, since independence, India’s principal challenges have included the
promotion of internal cohesion and the management of its often troubled relations with its
neighbors, the two often being closely linked.
• While dwarfed by India’s size, population, and subregional weight, several of India’s neighbors
are consequential states in their own right and reluctant to bow to Indian predominance or
pressure.
• Thus, the challenge of managing asymmetry in its neighbourhood relationships, within its notional
‘sphere of influence’, is both a real and serious one.
• India’s economic liberalization and consequent sharply higher economic growth allowed the
country to cast itself as a potential regional economic locomotive. This strand of Indian policy is, in
fact, both rational and helpful, but Delhi clearly has not done enough to make greater economic
integration politically attractive and administratively feasible.
• C. Raja Mohan point to the reasons why India has failed to assume regional primacy in South
Asia:
o One is the Partition of the Subcontinent. The problems generated by the great division of
the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.

T.me/SleepyClasses
o Second, the arrival of China at the Indo-Tibetan frontier during 1950-51. With its economic
progress and military might, an assertive China has constantly attempted to make deeper
inroads into South Asia.
o Third was independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation, which led to
a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
o Fourth is the persistent issue wherein the country believes the neighbourhood is India’s to
will. It ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics
that they need to manage.
• Stanly John argues that at least two decisions taken by the government mainly keeping its
domestic audience in mind have had foreign policy consequences.
o First, the passing of the CAA. The official narrative has been that India is offering
citizenship to the persecuted minorities of select countries in its neighbourhood.
o There were two problems. One, this is regionalisation of the domestic problems of the
countries in India’s neighbourhood, some of which are its long-time friends. These
countries are genuinely upset with India’s move.
o Two, Muslims, including those sub-sects persecuted in neighbouring countries, were by

design excluded from the citizenship programme.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Brief-China’s South Asia Policy and implications on India

• Mohan Malik has outlined the following features of China's South Asia policy:
o Firstly, a key feature of Beijing's South Asia policy has been its 'India-centric' approach,
which, in turn, has seen military links with India's of neighbors dominating the policy
agenda.
o Secondly, boundary disputes have shaped China's relations with South Asia.
o Thirdly, of all China's relations with South Asian states, those with Pakistan outweigh and
overlay any other bilateral relationship.
o Fourthly, China remains a major economic aid bas donor to Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka. Beijing's economic ties with South Asian bey states supplement and
reinforce its military has security objectives and goals“
• As per Dr. Jagannath Panda, following factors shape China's South Asia policy:
o the strategic and economic location of South Asia itself;
o connection between China's two problematic regions-Xinjiang and Tibet- with the South
Asian region;
o tactical dynamism of Pakistan and India in its strategic interests;
o economic tie-ups with smaller South Asian China's countries
Implications and challenges for India

• As per Mahfooz Alam, China's power projection capability is the strongest in Asia. Such is the scale
and intensity of Chinese military, politico-strategic and economic presence in the South Asian
region that no country wants to antagonize China openly. India's neighbours have would
cultivated cordial ties with extra-regional power China. India needs to factor in these challenges
posed to regional stability in its foreign policy strategies.
• As per T.V. Paul, "China wants to limit India's power capabilities to South Asia and thereby
constrain New Delhi's aspirations to become a major power in Asia. "The geopolitical realities are
such that India and China are locked in an inescapable maze of competition, if not confrontation, in
South Asia.”
• Thus, we see that the nature of strategic interactions between India and China is going to have its
implications on the regional security environment. Both the countries are unable to find a way out
of this complicated and troublesome maze.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Way forward for India
• As per C. Raja Mohan, a realistic appreciation of the challenges facing India suggests that Delhi’s
emphasis should be on tending the region, undertaking sustained efforts to resolve long-standing
differences, open its market to the neighbours and generate possibilities for common prosperity.
• While the responses from the neighbours would vary, making incremental progress wherever
possible is the only way forward. Merely claiming a sphere of influence would only set Delhi up
for inevitable failure.
• Delhi must instead focus on accelerating its own economic growth, give a serious stake for its
neighbours in India’s success and manage the unique complexities that shape its relations with all
the neighbours.
• Above all, India should focus on building a more open region rather than an exclusive India-led
one. Building trans-regional frameworks, developing wider coalitions of like-minded powers,
would make it easier for the neighbours to engage India and deepen interdependence with it.
• As per Stanly John, in the backdrop of setbacks, especially in the neighbourhood, the country has
to reconsider its diplomacy’s trajectory
• As per Harsh V Pant, New Delhi is coming to terms with the reality of a ‘new’ South Asia- India
will not only have to more creatively reimagine its strategic geography but also evolve new terms
of engagement with its neighbours which reflect reality of our times.
• As per Srinath Raghavan, there is a broader shift in the way that we think, for instance, on climate
change, terrorism, and the fact is that the destiny of South Asia hangs or falls together- need to take
a broader view of what kinds of severe challenges the region faces beyond political compulsions of
the here and now.
• We need a much deeper engagement beyond government, at the level of civil society, even at very
localised levels between India and its neighbours.
• According to Shyam Saran, India should build a web of “dense interdependencies” and imagine
national boundaries but as “connectors”, bringing India closer to its neighbours.
• According to Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, contemporary Indian foreign policy is focused largely on
the promotion of economic interests, India’s graduation to the high table of international relations
and, most consistently since its independence, on enhancing its security within its immediate
neighbourhood.
• C.Raja Mohan and SD Muni argue that for India, “achieving the objective of becoming one of the
principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India’s ability to manage its own immediate
neighbourhood”.

T.me/SleepyClasses
India and SAARC

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
• As per Dr Shaveta Sharma, regional organisations are the concrete manifestation of regionalism
and are considered as one of the most apt means to channelise the cooperative gestures into the
right tract besides securing a sense of security among the members.
• SAARC remains one of the key ingredients for transformation of South Asia into a region of
enhanced connectivity, security and economic integration.
• On December 8, 1985 at the first SAARC Summit in Dhaka, the leaders of the seven South Asian
states — the Maldives, India, Bhutan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka — signed a
charter to establish the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Afghanistan
became the eight SAARC member in 2007.
Relevance of SAARC
• SAARC was formulated as a furtherance of Panchsheel principles to revitalize South Asia:
o Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political equality and independence of all
member states.
o Non- interference in the internal matters is one of its objectives. Cooperation for mutual
benefit.
o All decisions to be taken unanimously and need a quorum of all eight members.
o All bilateral issues to be kept aside and only multilateral (involving many countries) issues
to be discussed without being prejudiced by bilateral issues.
Why regional cooperation matters

• As per Jayant Prasad, unhindered regional linkages can help in improving the living conditions of
people, especially the most impoverished among them, which is no doubt the most important goal
for all South Asian governments.
• The negative opportunity cost for non-integration of South Asian economies amounts to losing an
estimated two per cent of additional GDP growth annually. Integration and connectivity, by
permitting economies of scale, have attendant social benefits by promoting growth, and improving
public health and environment management.
• Regional cooperation can also reduce inter-state conflicts and raise the threshold below which
bilateral relations will not fall. Increasing integration, entailing interweaving interactions and
interdependence, based on mutual benefit, will reduce regional tensions, augment India’s
leverage vis-à-vis the great powers, and stabilise the region by raising the costs of non-cooperative
behaviour.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Relevance of SAARC
• As per Smruti S. Pattanaik, the relevance of the SAARC should be seen in the following manner:
o It provides a platform for the regional countries to meet and discuss issues confronting the
region.
o The smaller countries of the region can play a visible role by setting regional agenda in
spite of 'big India's' presence.
o It has helped in expanding areas of cooperation that require collective regional effort,
including certain non-traditional issues like terrorism, drug smuggling, etc.
o Meeting of leaders on the sidelines of the SAARC summits have often helped in ironing out
bilateral differences.
• S.D. Muni underlines the importance of SAARC. He argues that a ‘dead SAARC at India’s behest
will only make India’s neighbourhood policy more difficult and its international image more
unpalatable’.
• As political differences with Pakistan remain a hurdle, an important dimension of ‘new

regionalism’ is the ‘bottom-up approach’. Many scholars contend that ‘sub-regionalism approach
to regional integration in South Asia’- BIMSTEC, MGC.
• When Pakistan expressed its reservations on the SAARC-Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) during
the Kathmandu Summit in 2014, India along with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal initiated a sub-
regional initiative to enhance connectivity and signed the BBIN-MVA in 2015.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• One of the important examples of India’s
push for generosity and collective
prosperity was the launch of SAARC
satellite in 2017 by ISRO to take advantage
of tele-medicine, disaster relief and e-
learning. The satellite was announced in
the 2014 Kathmandu summit and includes
all SAARC states except Pakistan.
• Covid19 pandemic gave an opportunity to

SAARC to revive itself so as to aid the
region and its population. At a virtual
conference in March 2020 attended by all
the states, PM Modi announced a SAARC
Covid19 Fund as a standalone activity with
10 million dollars contribution to help its
neighbours in time of crises.
• S.S. Patnaik believes that this regional

response to the pandemic can be a way to
reignite SAARC and build up momentum
for other key areas as well. Suhasini Haider
underlines reviving SAARC is crucial to
countering the common challenges brought
about by the pandemic.
• P. Ranjan also points to the need to reinvigorate SAARC to deal with China’s expansionism in
South Asia. While Pakistan has been a close ally to China, Nepal is moving closer to China for
ideational and material reasons. China is wooing Bangladesh by offering tariff exemption to 97% of
Bangladeshi products, and has intensified its ties with Sri Lanka through massive investments.
• According to a Brookings India study, most South Asian nations are now largely dependent on
China for imports despite geographical proximity to India.
Past success of SAARC

• Its relevance is also inspired from its various successes in the past through creation of various
institutions and forums where heads of states have got a reason to meet and diffuse tension
example:
o SAARC Arbitration Council,
o South Asian University,
o SAARC Development Fund,

T.me/SleepyClasses
o SAARC Regional Standards Organization etc.
o It has witnessed exchanges in civil energy, cooperation on grave issues of fighting terrorism
etc.
Failure of SAARC
• ORF paper- The paradox of India’s rise is that while there is a clear positive trend in its role in
global governance, regional governance remains locked in geopolitics. South Asia is a region where
despite the existence of a pan-South Asian organisation SAARC for decades, it is yet to implement
a single, all-SAARC project.
• As per Dr Shaveta Sharma, Many factors contributed to the sluggish growth of SAARC like:
o Firstly, there is a fear- psychosis among the members of SAARC vis-a-vis India. Similarly,
Harsh V Pant argues that India's structural dominance of South Asia makes it a natural
target of resentment and suspicion, which New Delhi has often found difficult to overcome
.
o India is also a part of the domestic politics of most regional states where anti-India
sentiment is often used to bolster the nationalist credentials of various political
formations .
o At the same time, China's growing profile in India's neighborhood has given greater
strategic space to smaller countries in the region for diplomatic maneuvering between the
two regional giants.
o Secondly, the success of SAARC has remained a prisoner of the Indo- Pak rivalry- (South
Asia security complex). Thus, the psychological alienation and past hangovers have been
haunting both the regional rivals which disrupted the course of their amicable conflict-
resolutions.
o Thirdly, one can clearly witness a sense of identity crisis among the members. For instance,
Pakistan and Bangladesh are more inclined towards joining the OIC and feel more secured
and comfortable to be a part of Muslim- solidarity regime’.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Likewise, Sri Lanka, Maldives and India are satiated with identifying themselves as the members of
ASEAN, East Asian Summit and other extra- regional/ trans-national groupings.
• Eighthly, there is a problem of networking and absence of geographical proximity between certain
South- Asian countries. India is experiencing geographical distantness to reach Afghanistan
whereas Pakistan seems to be dependent upon India to access Nepal and Bangladesh.
• Ninthly, South Asia is one of the least economically one major integrated regions in the world.
According to World Bank, the intra-regional trade in South Asia is less than five percent of its total
trade s remained a and the intra-regional investment accounts for less than one percent.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Lastly, the leadership of hangovers in the region has failed to articulate and operationalise the
process of regional amicable cooperation. There is inward-looking approach and and clearly
domestic concentration of all these countries rather than identifying themselves in a broader Asian
or south-Asian landscape
Ways to revive SAARC

• The SAARC members must adopt and implement the following course of actions to revive SAARC:
o Firstly, the tradition of disorganized and irregular summits must be replaced by regular
and annual Summits.
o Secondly, operational principle of consensus voting must be replaced by a new voting

pattern of 2/3 majority.
o Thirdly, the bi-lateral conflictual issues should be discussed at the SAARC platform
because only an effective dispute-redressal mechanism could help in shrinking the areas of
conflict and expanding the areas of trust and cooperation.
• Fourthly, SAARC members should diversify and employ the options of Track II diplomacy which
would immensely help in generating confidence and trust-surplus among them.
• Fifthly, economic policy-alteration and credible economic mechanisms should be adopted with the
purpose of accelerating the intra-regional economic growth rate.
• Sixthly, the engagement of extra-regional and potent economic actors would undoubtedly, benefit
the credibility and economic stature of SAARC.

T.me/SleepyClasses
SAFTA
• S. Haider points as the world moves towards a surge of regional trade agreements MERCUSAR,
USMCA, GCC, the only regional trade agreement India is a part of remains SAFTA. Haider
remarks that dealing with the challenge from China too, both at India’s borders and in its
neighbourhood, a unified South Asian platform remains India’s most potent countermeasure.
• The South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) was signed by SAARC in 1995 as a step
towards strengthening regional trade. However, SAPTA was not successful in enhancing trade
among the member nations because its product coverage and tariff concessions were too limited.
Thus, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was introduced.
• SAFTA aimed towards eventually bringing tariffs down to zero. SAFTA was signed on January 6,
2004, during the 12th SAARC Summit, held at Islamabad. The tariff liberalisation began to be
implemented only in July 2006.
• SAFTA required the developing countries in South Asia (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) to bring
their duties down to 20 percent in the first phase of the two-year period ending in 2007. In the final
five-year phase ending in 2012, the 20 percent duty was reduced to zero in a series of annual cuts.
• The least developed countries in South Asia (Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and the
Maldives) had an additional three years to reduce tariffs to zero. Despite the signing of SAFTA,
there are a number of hurdles to greater integration. All countries have extensive sensitive list of
items for LDCs and Non-LDCs which does not include tariff concession.
Issues in SAFTA
• The governments of South Asia were not able to streamline their relations often due to conflicts
between two or more nations.
• A 2006 article in Economic and Political Weekly titled ‘Does SAFTA have a Future?’ by Dushni
Weerakoon and Jayanthi Thennakoon stated that nearly 53% of import trade amongst South Asian
countries was excluded from the trade liberalisation as required under SAFTA.
• Many economists are of the view that SAFTA’s ineffectiveness could be attributed to the fact that it
maintains a sensitive list which allows the exclusion of goods from the trade liberalisation
process and account for 6-45% of intra-regional imports in South Asia.
• SAFTA’s trade remains the lowest in the world among all other Regional Trade Agreements
(RTAs) because South Asian countries are keener on trading with the US or the European Union.
• There is a tendency of introducing para-tariffs that are levied on imports and not on domestic
production. These para-tariffs increase protection for domestic producers but also increase non-
transparency between nations which hinders the process of free trade.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• SAFTA’s narrow focus on trade in products is also a problem. Comparative advantage on trade in
goods is difficult to exploit in the region, as all countries are characterized by labour surpluses and
lack of capital. However, in the case of services, national comparative advantages can be exploited.
• Lack of connectivity in the region also adversely affects intraregional trade.
• Sanjay Kathuria points out how India has a leadership role to play in opening up to trade with
its neighbours because larger and more sophisticated economies usually open up their markets
before their smaller and less industrialised trading partners do.
• Indeed, India has accepted such “asymmetric” liberalisation, and, in 2012, provided unilateral
duty-free access to its market for the least developed countries from South Asia (Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal).
• However, World Bank report — ‘A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia’
points out that India’s regime discriminates against fellow South Asian countries.
• An index of overall trade restrictiveness developed in the report is two to nine times higher for
Indian, Nepalese, Sri Lankan and Pakistani imports from South Asia than for imports from the rest
of the world.
• Kathuria points to three broad set of measures that India can adopt for a more liberal trade policy
with its neighbours:
o One, encourage the Indian private sector to invest more in the neighbourhood to create long
term cross-border value chains especially in sectors like IT services, tourism, spices,
garments, leather products, agriculture products.

T.me/SleepyClasses
o Two, keep improving the hard and soft infrastructure that enables trade and investment
such as electronic data interchange, risk management systems and single windows at more
locations along India’s borders.
o Three, take pro-active steps to help neighbours address India’s non-tariff measures (NTMs)
like quotas, sanitary regulations, and licensing.
o Another positive step could be for India to help with capacity building for standards and
testing, so that exporters from neighbouring countries can more easily certify their
products as conforming to Indian standards.
• At the 18th SAARC Summit on 'Deeper Regional Integration for Peace and Prosperity', Prime
Minister Modi said 'Our vision for the region rests on five pillars –
o Trade,
o Investment,
o Assistance,
o Cooperation in every area,
o Contacts between our people through seamless connectivity.
• He further mentioned some important initiatives by India like setting up a Special Purpose Facility
in India to finance infrastructure projects in our region that enhances regional connectivity and t
trade, India to give business visa for 3-5 years for the citizens of SAARC nations and also proposed
the idea of a 'SAARC Business Traveler Card' for ease of doing business.
• For those coming to India for medical treatment, India will provide immediate medical visa for the
patient and an attendant.
Conclusion
• According to Dinesh Bhattarai, as the largest regional cooperation organisation, SAARC’s
importance in stabilising and effectively transforming the region is becoming increasingly self-
evident.
• Allowing SAARC to become dysfunctional and irrelevant greatly distorts our ability to address the
realities and mounting challenges facing SAARC nations.
• The failure of South Asian nations to act in accord will plunge South Asia into a perilous theatre of
discord and escalating tensions with jihadi militias at the forefront, placing the entire region in
turmoil.
• SAARC is needed as institutional scaffolding to allow for the diplomacy and coordination that is
needed between member-states in order to adequately address the numerous threats and
challenges the region faces.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Look East and Act East

What is Agartala Doctrine?
• The Agartala Doctrine formulated at Tripura Conclave held in
Agartala in July 2014, refers to principles derived from the policies
and postures adopted by successive governments in Tripura vis-à-
vis East Pakistan and later Bangladesh that scholars like Subir
Bhaumik argue should be incorporated in India’s foreign policy.
• The three most basic components of the doctrine are:
o states should have a greater say in foreign policy matters

involving neighbours so that their core interests are protected;
o states should act as responsible stake holders and not as spoilers seeking narrow domestic
electoral gains, and
o states should take the initiative to improve relations with neighbouring countries while
keeping in mind the broader national interest.
• Even though the architects of the so-called Agartala Doctrine envisage a proactive role for states in
India’s relations with its neighbours, it is imperative to note that when it comes to matters
pertaining foreign policy the role and authority of the Union government remains paramount.
States can, at best, play a cooperative/supportive role.
Evolution of Look East Policy

• A combination of factors—the collapse of its valued economic partner, the Soviet Union, the
financial crisis that hit India and the ineluctable logic of globalization—compelled India to embark
on its economic reforms in 1991.
• Under Narsimha Rao, developing robust relationship with East Asian and South East Asian
countries became a part of India’s foreign policy which was given shape in the form of ‘Look East’.
• Reasons for India developing strategic relations with East Asia:
o According to Rajiv Sikri, the continuing relatively low share of its South Asian neighbours
in India’s global trade gives India limited economic opportunities in its immediate
neighbourhood. This led to it looking to its extended neighbourhood- led to a surge in
trade, economic, tourist and investment relations and an important source of FDI into
India.
o It can help the Northeast Region get over the handicap of its geographical location.
o At the same time, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea see closer ties with India as providing a
useful balance and a hedge against China’s current economic dominance and future
uncertainties.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The Look East Policy which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained
political, strategic and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for
dialogue and cooperation.
• According to Kanti Bajpayee, conclusion of India’s sectoral dialogue status with ASEAN in 1992 is
often cited as the origin point of the policy.
• New Delhi’s relations with Southeast Asia became further institutionalised when India became a
full dialogue partner in 1996 and a summit-level dialogue partner (on par with China, Japan, and
South Korea) in 2002.
• Apart from ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), regional forums
like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),
Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA).

T.me/SleepyClasses
From Look East to Act East Policy
• Despite being launched by Rao’s government, the LEP became institutionalized in the country’s
foreign policy agenda, which ensured a degree of policy continuity across various administrations.
• Under the Modi government in 2014, the look East policy was rechristened ‘Act East’. According to
Harsh V Pant the shift has energized India’s ASEAN policy.
• India’s Act East Policy focuses on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region. For C.
Raja Mohan, The policy of ‘Acting East’ is about injecting new vigour and purpose into India’s
Asia policy.
• A key component of the policy is the centrality of the ASEAN and both sides commemorated 2022
as the ‘ASEAN-India Year of Friendship’. Officially, the ‘Act East’ Policy remains robust and
‘ASEAN centrality’ remains a core pillar of the policy with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
noting that, ‘ASEAN’s central role is synced to India’s Act East Policy’.
Key components of Act East Policy

• Prioritising North-East- It provides an interface between North-East India including the state of
Arunachal Pradesh and the ASEAN region. Some of the major projects include Kaladan Multi-
modal Transit Transport Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, Rhi-
Tiddim Road Project, Border Haats, etc.
• Contribution to LDCs- Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) have been a special
focus area for India. Infrastructure development, human capacity development and trade
concessions are important steps pledged by India. India has offered zero-duty import facility under
its LDC programme.
• Civilisational Links- Buddhist and Hindu links could be energized to develop new contacts and
connectivity between people. Ta Prohm temple has been restored by ASI with ongoing projects at
Vat Phou temple in Lao PDR and Bagan Pagodas in Myanmar.
• Diaspora- Another key component of India’s soft power in the region has been through a vigorous
engagement with the diaspora and a strong commitment to build on shared civilisational bonds.
• Extension to Indo-Pacific- Dr. Prabir De argues that as India is set to emerge as a 5 trillion $
economy, it is becoming increasingly important for India to provide stability to the Indo-Pacific.
The AEP, thus, by a natural extension, transitions to an ‘Act Indo-Pacific’ policy. India’s Act East
policy and Japan’s ‘Open and free Indo-Pacific strategy’ converge and both countries are keen to
extend their cooperation to the broader Indo-Pacific region by building a series of sea corridors that
will connect with India and other countries of South and Southeast Asia.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Greater coverage: C. Raja Mohan argues that Modi has significantly expanded the geographic
scope of India’s Look East policy in his new Act East Policy. The policy expanded India’s out reach
to Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands thorough visits and participation in Pacific Island
Forum. The QUAD grouping has also become a great power engagement in the Asia Pacific region.
With the to ‘Act East’, Raja Mohan argues that there is increased focus on maritime security as
well as defence partnerships with the region amidst the ongoing power tussle
Challenges of Act East Policy

• According to Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan,
ASEAN countries are not entirely comfortable with
the idea of the Indo- Pacific. Several ASEAN states
have been lukewarm to the idea, worried about
having to take sides between the United States and
China.
• BIMSTEC has also so far been less than a grand

success. Even though at the Colombo virtual
summit in 2022, BIMSTEC charter was signed and
adopted, a lot more needs to be done.
• India does not enjoy a very good track record in creating alternative to China’s BRI. Despite the
rhetoric of a strengthened outreach, the capacity to extend regional connectivity and infrastructure
building has been insufficient. The trilateral highway with Myanmar and Thailand is a case in
point.
• Rahul Mazumdar of EXIM bank, argues that since the signing of the FTA with ASEAN, India has
been experiencing a negative trade balance with the regional grouping.
• Professor Rohan Mukharjee argues that countries such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar in
particular, given their low levels of development compared to other ASEAN members, have
proved susceptible to Chinese inducements and pressure (Vietnam, while less developed, has
sought to diversify partnerships and resist Chinese influence).
• India also opted out of RCEP, one of the largest regional trading agreement originally being
negotiated between 16 countries — ASEAN members and countries with which they have free
trade agreements (FTAs), namely Australia, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and India to cover
trade in goods, services and investment; intellectual property rights; and special and differential
treatment to less developed ASEAN member states.
• Akarsh Bhutani argues that by not signing the RCEP, India let go of a chance to become part of a
mega-national trade deal that has the potential to shape regional trade patterns and economic
integration in the future as well as increase engagement with ASEAN countries due to its
geopolitical tensions with China.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Way forward
• A Policy paper published by ORF argues that India can enter into connectivity initiatives with its
Southeast Asian neighbours as a part of the Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. In these
connectivity programs, India can work alongside with countries like Japan, South Korea, US,
Australia. The Asia Africa Growth Corridor spearheaded by Japan, India’s Sagarmala and the
Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity can work in tandem.
• Prof. Prabir de, in his book Act East to Act Indo-Pacific recommends to complete the tasks as
promised in the Delhi Declaration 2018. Three sets of tasks are worth mentioning:
o Complete and scale up the digital connectivity projects in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar
and Vietnam;
o Complete the Trilateral Highway (TH), resume the replacement of 69 bridges along the TH
and negotiate the Trilateral Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA);
o Continue with the high impact projects such as fellowships for integrated Ph.D.
programmes to ASEAN scholars; set up a network of universities to encourage greater
inter-university exchanges between ASEAN and India.
• There is also need to empower Eastern and Northeastern states to engage with ASEAN further by
setting up of a Northeast branch of NITI Aayog that would help in bridging the gaps between
Centre and States while implementing the Act East. MEA Jaishankar termed Assam to be a
‘springboard to ASEAN’ which needs to be put in action.
• C. Raja Mohan focuses on BIMSTEC as the natural connector of South and Southeast Asia.
Complete the commitments taken at the BIMSTEC Summit. Focus on BIMSTEC MVA, BIMSTEC
coastal shipping agreement, and BIMSTEC TFA. Alongside, we must continue with our activities
for BCIM-EC.
• Development cooperation projects earmarked for the Act East should be put in fast-track by
avoiding cumbersome documentation and bureaucratic procedures.
• Low-hanging fruits include civilisational bonds and tourism. Indian states are rich in culture. Even
while India may not be a part of RCEP, it can concentrate on bilateral agreements on lines of India-
Singapore CECA, India-Malaysia CECA.
• Institutions and governance in institutions matter for AEP. Commitments like setting up of
ASEAN–India Centre (AIC) or ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) in Northeast India or opening up of
foreign consulates in Northeast India are yet to be fulfilled.
• C. Raja Mohan also highlights the role of India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood in
cultivating Act East policy, particularly that of Bangladesh and Myanmar. Dr Udai Bhanu Singh
also underlines Vietnam is a key pillar of India’s AEP” (PM Modi). In 2016 the two countries
signed an Agreement to raise Strategic Partnership to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

T.me/SleepyClasses
BIMSTEC
• The failure of SAARC to nurture cooperation in South Asia has pushed regional players to search
for an alternative. BIMSTEC, grouping the nations in the Bay of Bengal region, is popularly
favoured as the viable option.
• BIMSTEC includes the countries of the Bay of Bengal region: five countries from South Asia and
two from ASEAN. The organisation is a bridge between South Asia and South East Asia.
• It includes all the major countries of South Asia, except Maldives, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Changing geo-political dynamics in the Bay of Bengal region

• In 2018, India’s former Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale, referred to the Bay of Bengal as a
“subset of the growth region that we call the Indo-Pacific.”
• BIMSTEC may be helpful in achieving two major goals:
o National development and
o Fulfilling its strategic aspiration to cater to the wider concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and
Indian Ocean community.
• It is a natural platform to fulfil India’s key foreign policy priorities of ‘Neighbourhood First’ and
‘Act East.’

T.me/SleepyClasses
• BIMSTEC emerged out of the necessities of the member countries (ORF):
o India was motivated to join BIMSTEC as it wanted to enhance its connectivity with
ASEAN countries: a major component of its Look East Policy, now rechristened ‘Act East’
policy.
o It also provided India an opportunity of furthering development in its Northeast region.
o For Thailand, BIMSTEC helps achieve the country’s Look West Policy.
o BIMSTEC also helps smaller countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan to develop
connectivity with ASEAN countries, the hub of major economic activities globally.
• Constantino Xavier stressed that despite increasing connectivity in South, Southeast Asia, and the
Bay of Bengal region, there exists a significant cooperation gap which can be filled by BIMSTEC.
• C. Raja Mohan highlights that in the past, India refrained from making use of multilateral
partnerships which hampered its progress in sub-regional connectivity and cooperation.
• BIMSTEC is taking the connectivity agenda forward through a sectoral approach based on 7 pillars
since the 5th summit in 2022.
• C. Raja Mohan suggests that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands should be a key focus for
connectivity efforts as it is strategically located in the middle of the Bay of Bengal and offers
significant economic possibilities.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• M. Kaul stressed the significance of the Blue Economy in the region and how it could help drive
growth via BIMSTEC through the:
o establishment of institutional governance mechanisms (bilateral, multilateral or even

unilateral);
o promotion of resources and financing mechanisms;
o follow a whole of community approach;
o sustainable development of oceanic sectors that support livelihood, and;
o strengthening of resilience to climate change.
Challenges
• Limited organizational capacity: Former PM Manmohan Singh cautioned in 2010, “We have created
institutions for regional cooperation, but we have not yet empowered them adequately to enable
them to be more pro-active.”
• Politics and pace of delivery: C. Xavier underscores the need for India to bridge the gap between
politics and projects and focus on implementation and project delivery. The delay in the adoption
of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a framework that was agreed upon in 2004, fuels doubts about
BIMSTEC’s efficacy.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Lack of meetings: The infrequency of the BIMSTEC summits, the highest decision-making body of
the organisation is a major challenge to BIMSTEC.
• Resource crunch: A landmark achievement for BIMSTEC was the establishment of a permanent
secretariat in Dhaka. However, the secretariat faces a severe resource crunch, both in terms of
money and manpower, which has adversely affected its performance.
• The two organisations—SAARC and BIMSTEC—focus on geographically overlapping regions.
• However, this does not make them equal alternatives. SAARC is a purely regional organisation,
whereas BIMSTEC is interregional and connects both South Asia and ASEAN.
• Insofar as their regions of interest overlap, SAARC and BIMSTEC complement each other in
terms of functions and goals. BIMSTEC provides SAARC countries a unique opportunity to
connect with ASEAN.
• The success of BIMSTEC does not render SAARC pointless; it only adds a new chapter in regional
cooperation in South Asia.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Way Forward
• The developments so far under BIMSTEC have been encouraging. To maintain the momentum and
to strengthen BIMSTEC as a sustainable platform for regional cooperation, the following steps
must be considered (ORF) :
o Consistency in the frequency of the summits to ensure regularity in decision-making;
o Improving the capacity of the secretariat, both in terms of manpower and funding;
o Ensuring tangible results/benefits, which will add to the motivation of the countries to
concentrate on BIMSTEC; and
o Empowering BIMSTEC to be a platform for dispute resolution among member countries

in a consensus-based manner.
• India’s growing interest in BIMSTEC reflects a geo-economic priority to correct the exceptional
connectivity gap that continues to divide the Bay of Bengal region. But BIMSTEC will not enjoy
any exclusivity and will have to coexist and compete with other connectivity initiatives.
• J. Bhattarcharjee in an ORF article also points that India has been eager to take on the leadership
mantle in BIMSTEC through a number of initiatives like- BIMSTEC Energy Centre in Bengaluru
and the BIMSTEC Business Council, a forum for business organisations to promote regional trade.

T.me/SleepyClasses
India-Bangladesh Relations
India-Bangladesh relationship
• India and Bangladesh are not only geographically close to each other but closely tied“- PM Modi.
• As per Dr. Prasanta Sahoo, India's relations and with Bangladesh are civilizational, cultural, social
and economic. There are a lot of things unite the two countries a shared history and common
heritage, by linguistic and cultural ties, passion for music, literature and the arts.
• As per David Malone, either by design or due to drift, relations with Bangladesh, although much
more positive than those with Pakistan, are amongst the least cooperative that India has developed
in South Asia. A major portion of Bangladesh is surrounded by Indian states, which sometimes
makes the country feel ‘India locked’.
• As per Kathryn Jacques, after 1971 India–Bangladesh relations gradually became fraught, with
India being accused of insensitivity, intolerance, and high-handedness, and Bangladesh erring on
the side of ultra-sensitivity, unfounded suspicion, and mistrust.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• As per Sreeradha Datta, convergences of their cultural links and economic complementarities are
apparently not compelling enough for both countries to overcome the growing bilateral problems
between the two.
• As per S.Dutta and Krishnan Srinivasan, bilateral relations have been dependent on the character
of the political party in power in Dhaka, and ties have become hostage to the vagaries of domestic
party politics in both countries.
• Satish Chandra- Bangladesh has always been deeply polarized between those at the forefront for
the liberation struggle, as represented by the Awami League with its more secular and India-
friendly outlook, and those opposing it many of whom had their sympathies with Pakistan and
enjoyed radical Islamic support.
• The justification for Bangladesh’s political independence from Pakistan, and earlier separation
from India, lies in its identity as both ‘Bengali’ and ‘Muslim’.
• I.A. Chowdhary- Bengali Muslim has been the search for self-identity, first from Hindu India and
then from Urdu-speaking Pakistan.
• A distinctive Bengali Muslim identity has been forged in a post-colonial secular nationalist setting
that can be favorably contrasted with Pakistan because of its relative tolerance, informed by
attempts to preserve the richness of Bengali language and culture in a Muslim country within a
context of religious influences over many centuries that included Buddhist, Hindu, and Sufi
traditions.
Evolution of the relationship

• Aided in formation of Bangladesh and dealt a heavy blow to Jinnah’s two nation theory. India’s
foreign policy trumped backed by the force of arms.
• But along with this there were a few problems as well.
o 10 million refugees
o Massive internal displacement
o Famine
o Mujibur Rahman’s impetuous maladministration
• As per Dr Prasanta Sahoo, the Awami League (AL) government pursued "clear pro-India policy"
during its tenure from 1971- -Bangladesh 1975.
• The two governments signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace on 19 March 1972
which among other things, promised to promote relations in the field of arts, literature, and
culture.
• The historical India-Bangladesh Land Boundary agreement was also signed on 16th May 1974.
Phase II - Period of Military Rule until 1990

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The coup against Mujib was engineered by elements in the army and civil society, supported by
the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China.
• Islam was declared a state religion.
• Dhaka’s official policy was to keep India at arm’s length and enlist Islamist forces inside and
outside the country.
• This diluted its ties with India.
• As per Dr. Prasanta Sahoo, Being suspicious of India's strategic designs, Zia Ur Rehman floated
the idea of a regional grouping like SAARC.
Phase III - Multi-party democracy

• Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under Khaleda Zia stood for Bangladeshi nationalism that was
interpreted as synonymous with stridently standing up to the Indian ‘domination’ and its rival the
Awami League (AL).
• AL professed the values of the Liberation War, namely Bengali nationalism, secularism and
socialism which coincided with those of India.
• Both the parties often had recourse to support from the anti-independence party the Jamaat e
Islami (JeI), which had revived after its leaders returned from self-exile abroad, during which they
had portrayed the Liberation War as a confrontation between India and Islam.
• The nadir for Indian foreign policy was reached between 2001 and 2006, when the BNP JeI
government sponsored rampant terrorist activity in and from Bangladesh, together with vicious
attacks on domestic minorities.
Phase IV - Return of Awami League

• Return of the Awami League government in the elections of 2009 represents the current fourth
phase. The bilateral relationship was transformed from neighbors to partners in growth and
economic development.
• Relations focused on 3 Cs- Cooperation, Coordination and Consolidation. 2021 marked 50 years
of bilateral ties between the two.
• The India- Bangladesh relations reached at its new ever height with Modi in Delhi and Hasina in
Dhaka coming to power.
Importance of Bangladesh
• As per S. Datta And K. Srinivasan, India has abiding interests for which it needs Dhaka to extend
its cooperation.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Foreign Policy: It is of importance also to Indian foreign policy in respect of Muslim countries
elsewhere. Therefore, India’s relationship with Bangladesh has a greater far-reaching significance
than bilateralism alone and any government in Dhaka that inclines to India rather than Pakistan
would merit Indian support.
• India’s neighbourhood first policy has focused on Bangladesh, which has emerged as a key
interlocutor in India’s Act East policy and sub-regional groupings like BIMSTEC and BBIN
initiative.
• Islamist Militance and Counter-terrorism Cooperation: Given the sensitivity and vulnerability of
its volatile northeast, which borders on five nations including Bangladesh, New Delhi is conscious
of the potential threat if Bangladesh became a focal point of Islamist militancy.
• 2017- Signed the India-Bangladesh Defence Cooperation Agreement to combat Terrorism to

enhance cooperation in human and drug trafficking between the two/
• Secure Borders and Defence: It would be impossible to seal a border of 4096 km that is the fifth
longest in the world, is porous, and subject not only to cross-border militancy but illegal migration
into India and smuggling. India wants Bangladesh to work cooperatively for better border
controls.
• Defence cooperation agreement between the two- Also Agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear
Energy and Outer Space (2015).
• River Waters and Coastal cooperation : The difficulty is to find modus vivendi between the upper
and lower riparian, India and Bangladesh.
• Other than the Ganga, there is no agreement on any of the other 53 common rivers that flow from
India to Bangladesh, the major of them being the Brahmaputra, Teesta, and Barak.
• In 2015 Agreement on Coastal Shipping, enables India’a merchant vessels to use Chattogram port,
Chittagong port and Mangla port to ship goods to Bangladesh, promote Blue Economy.
• Commercial Diplomacy: India provides quota-free and duty-free access to Bangladeshi exports.
The trade is in favour of India. India and Bangladesh have made significant progress in enhancing
their economic ties over the years.
• India is one of the largest trading partners of Bangladesh, and bilateral trade between the two
countries has been growing steadily. The main items of trade between the two countries include
textiles, chemicals, machinery, and electronics.
• Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade: This agreement was signed in 1972 and revised in
2020. It provides for the use of inland waterways for trade between the two countries and allows
for the movement of goods between Kolkata and northeastern states of India through Bangladesh

T.me/SleepyClasses
• To offset the economic asymmetry, India has granted Bangladesh generous lines of credit (LOCs)
and grants, with commitments reaching $8 billion.
• While LOCs mainly cover infrastructure and connectivity projects, grants flow into social sector
development.
• Capacity building under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme is an
important strand in bilateral ties and people-to-people interaction. Bangladeshis are among the
largest groups of tourists into India. The visa regime has been liberalised and over a million visas
are issued to Bangladeshi citizens annually.
• Bangladesh is one of India’s largest trading partner in South Asia with an annual turnover of
around $10 billion.
• Cooperation in connectivity, energy, security and intelligence matters has intensified. The Padma
multipurpose bridge and the Akhaura-Agartala rail link will dramatically change connectivity
within Bangladesh and with India. Waterways are also being revived to reduce the cost of trade.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has a provision for maritime
boundary delimitation between neighboring states.
• In 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague delivered its decision on the
maritime boundary dispute between India and Bangladesh, based on the UNCLOS.
• The PCA's decision, which was binding and final, awarded Bangladesh a larger share of the
disputed area than India had previously recognized. It established a single maritime boundary
between the two countries, and Bangladesh was granted the right to explore and exploit all
resources within its EEZ. The ruling also settled a long-standing dispute over the ownership of a
tiny island called New Moore/South Talpatti.
• Both India and Bangladesh accepted the PCA's decision and pledged to implement it in good faith.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Energy: India has also become a partner in Bangladesh’s nuclear power programme, with the
beginning of construction at the Rooppur nuclear power plant.
• Bangladesh is currently importing about 660 MW of power from India. The power is being
supplied to Bangladesh through two transmission lines connecting the two countries. The first line
was commissioned in 2013, and the second line was commissioned in 2020. The power is being
supplied by several power plants in India, including the Tripura and Palatana power plants in
northeastern India.
• India has agreed to fund the construction of India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline from Siliguri
to Parbatipur for supply of Diesel to Bangladesh from Numaligarh Refinery Limited.
• ONGC Videsh Ltd has acquired two shallow water blocks in consortium with Oil India Limited
and is currently exploring these blocks. The possibility of gas grid interconnectivity for the mutual
benefit of the two countries is also being explored.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Improvement in bilateral ties has led to newer areas of
cooperation such as cyberspace. Bangladesh has provided cyber
connectivity between the international gateway at Cox’s Bazar to
Agartala for faster Internet connectivity in India’s northeastern
States.
• Maitree Thermal Power Project is a joint venture between India

and Bangladesh to set up a 1,320-megawatt coal-fired power
plant at Rampal in the Bagerhat district of Bangladesh.
• The project is being implemented by the Bangladesh-India Friendship Power Company

(BIFPCL), which is a joint venture between the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) of
India and the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB).
Other areas of cooperation

• Land boundary agreements-In the last decade the relationship between the two neighbours has
reached new heights—virtually almost all outstanding issues have been amicably settled including
demarcation of boundaries, resolution of adverse territorial possessions including ‘teen bigha’ and
the enclaves.
• As per Dr. Prasanta Sahoo, finalizing the ratification of Land Boundary Agreement is like falling of
the "Berlin Wall" between India and Bangladesh which is considered as the golden chapter in their
bilateral relationships.
• Transferred 51 enclaves to India. This exchange of enclaves was seen as a major step towards
resolving border issues and improving relations between the two countries.
• In addition to the exchange of enclaves, the agreement also involved the demarcation of the border
between the two countries. This was a significant achievement, as the border had remained
undefined since the partition of India in 1947.
• PM Modi’s visit to Bangladesh in March 2021 to join the 50th

anniversary celebration of independence of Bangladesh, the
birth centenary of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
nation’s founding father and the 50th year of Bangladesh-India
diplomatic ties, hopes to calm India’s ally which is being
wooed by China.
• The 2022 visit of Sheikh Hasina was seen as another addition to

what scholars have come to define as a ‘Sonali Adhyay’
(golden chapter) in bilateral relations of both the countries.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• As per Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta, the visit was significant in many senses given the geopolitical
dynamics of the South Asian region, where China is always on the look out to wean away India's
neighbors with its deep pocket.
• A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed on sharing of the waters of the Kushiyara
river, a distributary of the Barak river which flows through Assam, and then on to Bangladesh.
• According to water expert, Dr. Ainun Nishat, the agreement is

aimed at addressing part of the problem that the changing
nature of the river has posed before Bangladesh as it unleashes
flood during the monsoon and goes dry during the winter
when demand of water goes up because of a crop cycle in
Sylhet.
• Under this MoU, Bangladesh will be able to withdraw 153 cusecs

(cubic feet per second) of water from the Kushiyara out of the
approximately 2,500 cusecs of water that is there in the river
during the winter season.
• The river is also a part of the National Waterway 16 (NW 16) of India. The waterway has been
crucial in linking the landlocked NER with the coastal city of Kolkata via India-Bangladesh
protocol routes.
Other MoUs
• MoU on training of Bangladesh Railway personnel in India;
• MoU on collaboration in IT systems such as on FOIS & other IT application for Bangladesh
Railway;
• MoU on training and capacity building including programme for Bangladesh Judicial Officers in
India;
• MoU on scientific and technological have cooperation between India's Council for such issues
Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR) and Bangladesh's Council of Scientific & Industrial Research
(BCSIR);
• MoU on cooperation in areas of space technology;
• MoU between Prasar Bharti & Bangladesh Television (BTV) on cooperation in broadcasting.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Other decisions apart from MOUs
• First, there was the agreement “to continue close security cooperation” over counter-terrorism,
border crimes, and border management.
• Second, the two sides recommitted themselves to enhancing their development partnership
which is already quite extensive and multi-faceted.
• Third, they agreed “to build resilient supply chains” between the two countries and “across the
region”. A significant decision was to launch the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) in 2022 and to conclude negotiations by the time Bangladesh graduates from
least developed country status in 2026.
• Fourthly, the discussions were also held about India and Bangladesh working together on data-
sharing technology to detect natural calamities and disasters, especially those related to river
overflow during the monsoon.
• Fifthly, Bangladesh allowed India to use two of its important shipping ports, Mongla and
Chittagong. Chittagong Port is well connected with Tripura through two of its cities- Comilla
and Feni. The distance of these two cities are 212 km and 241 km from Agartala (Capital of
Tripura) respectively.
• Presently, Agartala is well-

connected by road, railway, and
airway the with the rest of the
states of the Northeast. This
facilitates Bangladesh with
possibility of regular formal
trade through these routes in
the whole of northeast. The test
run has already tatus been
conducted successfully by
India.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Finally, two new railway links are upcoming between India and Bangladesh which India will boost
connectivity between two countries. order.
o First, is the connectivity between Mahishasan in Karimganj Assam to Shahbazapur in

Bangladesh, and
o Second is between Agartala in Tripura to Akhaura in Bangladesh.
• Both these connectivity projects are to be completed over the next three years. Some more
connectivity projects are being discussed to take the present ones further deep inside both the
countries.
Bottlenecks in the relationship

• As per Rajiv Bhatia four specific issues seem to trouble the Bangladeshi side.
o First, the continued presence of 1.1 million Rohingyas from Myanmar has created
enormous pressure on the economy and social harmony. Ms. Hasina has said India is a big
country that should “accommodate” them. Further, she wants stronger support from India
to facilitate their early return to Myanmar.
o Second, though the two governments agreed on the sharing of the waters of the Kushiyara,
the common border river but the absence of agreement on sharing of the Teesta’s waters,
pending since 2011 due to West Bengal’s refusal to relent, and the broader issue of joint
management of 54 common rivers, have been constant grievances.
o Third, India’s sensitivity to growing cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing rankles the
authorities in Bangladesh.
o Fourth, despite her government’s secular policy, “incidents” against the Hindu minority
have occurred, but her government has acted against miscreants.
• As per Harsh V Pant, India’s relations with Bangladesh have suffered as New Delhi has failed to
capitalize on the propitious political circumstances in Bangladesh.
• Bureaucratic inertia and lack of political will on India’s part has prevented serious progress on
outstanding bilateral issues.
• Bangladesh is seeking an expeditious Indian response to its demand for the removal of tariff and
non-tariff barriers on Bangladeshi products.
• There has also been slow movement on transit rights and on a water-sharing agreement for the
Teesta River, which is crucial to agricultural production in north-western Bangladesh. India has
failed to reciprocate fully Hasina’s overtures.
• Meanwhile, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has used the India–Bangladesh
cordiality under Hasina to criticize the government for perceived subservience to India.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Bilaterally, the issue of illegal migration has already acquired a high profile in India with the
publication of the draft National Register of Citizens in Assam.
• China’s security and economic footprint has

grown in South Asia and managing this will
remain a challenge for both countries.
• While Bangladesh is overwhelmingly dependent

on military hardware from China, India has
provided a $500 million LOC for procurement of
defence-related goods from India.
• The steady influx of Bangladeshis to India led to

demographic changes in the bordering states.
o Rising population and the effects of

climate change resulting in submergence
of coastal lands are likely to magnify this
trend in years to come. Therefore, action
like population control measures within
Bangladesh, efficacy of border control, and
bilateral mechanisms are needed to check
illegal migration to India.
Issue of CAA and NRC

• The Citizenship Amendment Act provides citizenship to non-Muslim minorities from Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Bangladesh who entered the country on or before December 31, 2014.
• Sanjib Baruah contends that CAA defines the 3 neighboring countries in essentialist terms as
Muslim majority countries, ignoring the history, and the dynamics of political change. Sheikh
Hasina on a trip to UAE in 2020 referred CAA was internal issue of India but added that it was
“not necessary”.
Way forward
• As per Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta, the relationship has been mutually beneficial for both the
neighbours. Northeast continues to be an important connectivity and capacity platform for the
success of Government of India's 'Act East Policy' too.
• Its implementation and the development of Bangladesh corridor is significant towards

optimization of Indian Government's dream of injecting development and bringing prosperity to
its northeast region.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The connectivity projects would also facilitate growth of people- to-people contact thereby creating
security community within both these countries, and would help them to tackle many other
problems such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorist activities etc.
• Both the countries need to bring their youths through some exchange programs so that they are
able to interact more closely and push Track 3 diplomacy.
• Initiatives like the NADI Conclave [Natural Allies in Development & Interdependence) and
interaction with the concerned parties at the official level as well as other stakeholders can identify
the common areas of interests between the two countries.
• As per Harsh V Pant India’s robust ties with Bangladesh are essential. Strong India-Bangladesh ties
make it possible to imagine a vibrant North-eastern region in India as well as a serene and peaceful
Bay of Bengal periphery. It is only this that makes India a key interlocutor in the emerging Indo-
Pacific strategic architecture.
• With the marginalisation of SAARC, India made BIMSTEC the key pillar of its regional outreach
where Bangladesh has important role but much more may need to be done to make BIMSTEC a
more potent organisation.
• As per Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty while bilateral ties will continue to grow, inimical forces will
seek to undermine goodwill. Both countries must cooperate more closely against this menace if the
future has to be secured for economic growth and prosperity.
Conclusion
• PM Hasina graciously described the India-Bangladesh relationship as “a role model for
neighborhood diplomacy worldwide”. But such a relationship — for it to stay strong and grow —
needs to be carefully nurtured.

T.me/SleepyClasses
India-Nepal Relations
Nepal and Bordering Indian States

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Rajiv Sikri calls Nepal India’s critically important neighbour while SD Muni calls it a unique one given
the deep relationships between the two.
• Following the Arthshastra’s Mandal logic, Nepal for long has been seen as a ‘buffer state’ between
the two Asian giant of India and China.
• Since time immemorial, people-to-people relations between Nepal and India have remained
unique mainly because it is based on the twin pillars of an open border system and people-to-
people contacts of kinship- ‘beti-roti’ ka rishta.
• Also, the over 80 percent Hindu population in both countries integrate the people. Indians and
Nepalese share a common culture and terrain south of the Himalaya.
• Bound by languages and religions, marriage and mythology, the links of their civilizational
contacts run through Lumbini (Buddha’s Birth place) to Bodh Gaya, Pashupatinath to Kashi
Vishwanath, and Muktinath to Tirupati.
India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950
• Over time, a lot of noise in Nepal to revise the Treaty to reflect “new changes and realities” during
the India-Nepal Joint Commission Meeting.
• In the aftermath of PM Modi’s visit to Nepal in 2014, an India-Nepal Eminent Persons’ Group
(EPG) was created to look into this issue and other matters of bilateral importance.
• The EPG report, which was finalised in 2018, had prominently recommended revision of this
treaty. But the report has not yet been officially adopted.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The Treaty of Peace and Friendship was officially signed by then Indian ambassador to Nepal
representing New Delhi, with Nepal Prime Minister M.S. Rana, who had a troubled
relationship with the King of Nepal.
• Nepal has always had reservations with Articles 2, 6 and 7 of the treaty.
o Article 2 states that both governments should “inform each other of any serious friction or
misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly
relations subsisting between the two Governments”.
o Articles 6 and 7 stipulate India and Nepal will give the same privileges of economic
activity, employment, resident and ownership of property to each other’s nationals in their
territory.
Trade and economy

• India is Nepal’s largest trade partner and the largest source of foreign investments, besides
providing transit for almost the entire third country trade of Nepal.
• Indian firms engage in manufacturing, services (banking, insurance, dry port), power sector and
tourism industries etc.
• India-Nepal Treaty of Trade: The treaty was first signed in 1991 and has been renewed
periodically. The Trade Treaty allows Nepal unilateral duty-free access to the Indian market.
• Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA): BIPPA was signed in 2011
and is aimed at promoting and protecting investments made by the two countries in each other's
territories. It provides for a mechanism for settling disputes between investors and the host
government.
• South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA): SAFTA is a regional free trade agreement among the
countries of South Asia, including India and Nepal. It aims to promote trade and economic
cooperation among the member countries by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers.
• Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture: The agreement was signed in 2018 and aims to
enhance cooperation in the areas of agriculture and allied sectors.
Connectivity
• Nepal being a landlocked country, it is surrounded by India from three sides and one side is open
towards Tibet.
• MOUs have been signed between both the governments for laying electric rail track linking
Kathmandu with Raxaul (Bihar)in India.
• India is looking to develop the inland waterways for the movement of cargo, within the framework
of trade and transit arrangements, providing additional access to sea for Nepal calling it linking
Sagarmath (Mt. Everest) with Sagar (Indian Ocean)

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Motor Vehicles Agreement: The agreement was signed in 2015 and allows for seamless movement
of passenger and cargo vehicles between the two countries.
• Treaty of Transit: It confers transit rights through each other’s territory through mutually agreed
routes and modalities. Its revised version was signed on 6 January 1999 and has since been auto-
renewed every seven years, the last being in 2020.
Development and Relief Assistance

• Government of India provides development assistance to Nepal, focusing on creation of
infrastructure at the grass-root level.
• The areas assistance include infrastructure, health, water resources, and education and rural &
community development.
• As part of Covid19 assistance, India supplied drugs, medical equipment, oxygen as well as
vaccines to Nepal. During the 2015 earthquake, India was the first responder and carried out its
largest disaster relief operation abroad under Operation Maitri.
Defence Cooperation
• Bilateral defence cooperation includes assistance to Nepalese Army in its modernization through
provision of equipment and training.
o Since 1950, both countries have been providing honorary rank of General to each others
Army chiefs.
• The Gorkha Regiments of the Indian Army are raised partly by recruitment from hill districts of
Nepal.
• India from 2011, every year undertakes joint military exercise with Nepal known as Surya Kiran.
The two countries also share intelligence information to counter transnational security threats, such
as terrorism and organized crime.
• Cultural:
o There have been initiatives to promote people-to-people contacts in the area of art &
culture, academics and media with different local bodies of Nepal.
o India has signed three sister-city agreements for twinning of Kathmandu-Varanasi,

Lumbini-Bodhgaya and Janakpur-Ayodhya.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Buddhist Circuit- India & Nepal
• Indian Community
o Huge number of Indians lives in Nepal, these include businessmen, traders, doctors,
engineers and labourers (including seasonal/migratory in the construction sector
• Multilateral Partnership
o India and Nepal share multiple multilateral forums such as BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, and Nepal), BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation) NAM, and SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation) etc.
Challenges in relationship:
• Chinese inroads into Nepal
o Nepal's attempt to balance the overwhelming presence of India next door by reaching out to
China is resented by India. Such actions heighten our security concerns.
o Chinese are building a number of highways from the Tibetan side into Nepal, all the way down
to East-West highway that traverses Nepal, hacking through high mountains and difficult
terrain.
o The Tibet railway has now been extended from Lhasa to Shigatse and could well be extended
to Kathmandu across the border in the next few years.
o China’s salami-slice strategy on Nepal’s northern border has resulted in the encroachment of 36
hectares of Nepal’s land at 10 places on the northern border by China.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• In December 2022, Nepali Maoist leader Shri Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ became the Prime
Minister of Nepal with a coalition of eight political parties.
• In 2022, China was seen trying to broker an alliance between Dahal's CPN-MC and Oli's CPN-
UML. China had done this earlier too (China was instrumental in Dahal and Oli coming to a deal
in 2017 and then entering into a formal alliance in 2018).
• PM Prachanda is considered as pro-China. Nepal has formally joined China’s BRI under him in
2017.
• In 2019, Nepal under the PM Oli, who was known for his dependence on China, proposed nine
different projects to be pursued under the BRI.
• These included a feasibility study of the trans-Himalayan railway connecting from the Chinese
port of entry of Jilong/Keyrung to Kathmandu, an extension of a 400 KV electricity transmission
line, setting up a technical university in Nepal, and the construction of new roads, tunnels and
hydro-electricity dams.
o Nepali local population is increasingly opposing the BRI projects on the grounds of lack of
progress and increasing debt alongside causing displacement of large number of people.
Rise of Anti Indianism

• India resorted to an intrusive approach, muscular diplomacy and economic coercion in relation to
Nepal's constitutional process over Madhesi issue in 2015.
• And Nepal reacted, under Oli's leadership, by whipping up a robust anti-Indian nationalism and
an aggressive display of the China card to reduce its dependence on India.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The Madhesis have castes and ethnicity similar to Bihar and eastern UP, with frequent inter-
marriages between families on either side of the border. The Madhesis were not satisfied with the
new constitution of Nepal which was drafted in 2015.
Madhesi Agitation- 2015

• The new Constitution has a provision for a 165-member Parliament, but the constituencies have
been demarcated in such a way that the people of the hill and mountain region would get 100 seats
while Terai would get only 65 seats.
• Madheshis and Tharus who constitute 70% of the Terai population, regarded the formation of
seven federal provinces as per the Constitution as grossly unfair to them.
• This led to a blockade by the Madhesis of Birgunj border in Raxaul leading to severe shortage of
commodities, which Pahadi Nepalese believe was supported by India.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Formation of Madhesh Pradesh
• In January 2022, the provincial assembly of Province 2 in Nepal with over two-thirds majority
named Province 2 as Madhesh
Pradesh with its capital in
Janakpur.
• Lal Bahu Raut, first Chief

Minister of Madhesh Pradesh
stated that the naming of
Province 2 as Madhesh Pradesh
has given an identity to the
Madheshi people for the first
time in Nepal’s history.
• Certain Madhesi leaders still think that the Madhesh region, on the whole, is not confined to only
eight districts. The entire region from east to west in the Terai region carries common culture and
identity under the broader framework of the country.
• In the past, the Government of Nepal had agreed with the Madheshi leaders that the Madhesh
region will be granted “Ek Madhesh, Ek Pradesh” i.e. “One Madhesh, One Province” with the
right to autonomy, but later on, the agreement could not be implemented.
Trust deficit
• For quite some time, the trust deficit between Nepal and India largely affected the implementation
of various Indian-aided projects in Nepal.
• At times, some of the Indian investment projects had been attacked.
• Nepal’s central bank has banned the use of Indian currency notes of ₹2,000, ₹500 and ₹200
denominations, which causes difficulties for people while they travel to each other’s country.
• Internal Security is a major concern for India; Indo-Nepal border is virtually open and lightly
policed which is exploited by terrorist outfits and insurgent groups from North Eastern part of
India e.g., supply of trained cadres, fake Indian currency.
Hydro-diplomacy between India-Nepal

• Nepal upper riparian state: There are a number of well-endowed rivers originating in the
Himalayas such as the four crucial tributaries of the Ganges: Mahakali, Karnali, Sapta Gandaki,
and Sapta Kosi.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• They contribute approximately
45 percent of the annual flow of
the Ganges and 70 percent of
the dry-season flow, thereby
making them the “lifeblood of
the Indian fertile low land.”
(Sohini Nayak- ORF)
• Both countries are working to

optimise the potential benefits
and address prevailing
problems through a joint
bilateral apparatus. This
includes the creation of a three-
tier mechanism:
o Joint Ministerial Commission for Water Resources (JMCWR),
o Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR), and
o Joint Standing Technical Committee (JSTC)
• There is also an additional mechanism of the Joint Committee on Inundation and Flood
Management (JCIFM) that looks into embankments and flood forecasting.
Key treaties and agreements

• The Mahakali Treaty: Signed in 1996, the treaty governs the sharing of water from the Mahakali
River, which flows along the India-Nepal border. The treaty also provides for the development of
hydropower projects on the river by both countries.
• The Gandak Treaty: Signed in 1959, the treaty governs the sharing of water from the Gandak
River, which flows from Nepal into India. The treaty also provides for the construction of irrigation
and hydropower projects on the river.
• The Kosi Agreement: Signed in 1954, the agreement governs the sharing of water from the Kosi
River, which originates in Tibet and flows through Nepal and India before joining the Ganges. The
agreement also provides for flood control measures and the construction of irrigation projects on
the river. The Tanakpur Agreement:
• Signed in 1991, the agreement governs the sharing of water from the Mahakali River at the
Tanakpur Barrage, which is located on the border between India and Nepal. The agreement also
provides for the construction of irrigation projects on both sides of the border.
• The two countries have undertaken various collaborative projects, with the latest being the Lower
Arun Hydropower Project, a USD 1.3-billion deal between the partners.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The Indian Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) aided a 679-MW project between Sankhuwasabha and
Bhojpur in eastern Nepal. This is the second mega project undertaken by India after the USD 1.04
billion 900 MW Arun III project.

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses
Kalapani Issue
• In recent years there have been increasing issues between the two neighbours along with a
growing interference by China to create deeper ties after the 2015 blockade by India. The year 2020
witnessed a spate of territorial dispute between India and Nepal.
• In May 2020 India’s defence minister virtually inaugurated a new 80 km-long road in the
Himalayas, connecting to the border with China, at the Lipulekh pass. The Nepali government
protested immediately, contending that the road crosses territory that it claims and accusing India
of changing the status quo without diplomatic consultations.
• India has been in effective possession of this territory for at least sixty years, although Nepal claims
it conducted a census there in the early 1950s and refers to the 1815-16 Sugauli Treaty as
legitimising its claims.
• In a controversial step, Nepal’s house of representatives passed a constitutional amendment act to

include Kala Pani, Lipu Lekh and Limpiyadhura as part of Nepal’s territories in maps which was
called as ‘cartographic tussle’ at behest of China leading to a diplomatic spat between the two.
• Rakesh Sood notes that after After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali that envisaged the Pancheshwar
multipurpose hydel project, the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997. The matter
was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-
identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India- Nepal border.
• The Committee clarified 98% of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani
and Susta (in the Terai) when it was dissolved in 2008. It was subsequently agreed that the matter
would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road
began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal. Sood notes that like many other neighbours,
Nepal’s nationalism has been based on ‘anti-Indianness’. In Nepali thinking, the China card has
provided them the leverage to practise their version of non-alignment believes Rakesh Sood.
• Sood underlines the need to reset the India-Nepal relations for the 21st century. Kallol
Bhattacharjee underlines the need to have an open dialogue at Foreign Secretary level so as to
resolve these issues. C. Raja Mohan thus identifies the territorial dispute as “merely a symptom of
the structural changes unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.”
• Constantino Xavier of the Brookings Institute points that Nepal’s domestic politics are playing an
excessive role in shaping its foreign policy. Nepal’s foreign policy establishment has embraced an
ambitious and forward- looking agenda of external balancing and diversification in recent years.
• Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran emphasised that “stability in Nepal is in the best
interests of India” and that “democracy in Nepal is the best guarantee of such stability.”
• The outbreak of Covid19 has given an opportunity to rework the relationship between the two.
Rohan Mukherjee points how China was labelled an unreliable trade partner for closing certain
trade routes during the COVID-19 pandemic whereas the India through ‘Vaccine Maitri’ and
conduct of 6th meeting of Nepal- India Joint Commission (JC) in New Delhi on 15 January 2021
co-chaired by MEA S. Jaishankar. Issues discussed in this forum ranged from COVID-19
vaccine(s) to boundary and border management, connectivity, economic cooperation, trade, transit,
power, water resources, culture, and education.

T.me/SleepyClasses
• The visit of PM Prachanda in 2023 shows the importance of India in his foreign policy. It will
strengthen the relationship of both the countries. But both the countries should look into the
following matters:
• Both are affected due to the misuse of open border by internal and external forces, the
responsibility of border management and regulation depends on both.
• India should provide an alternative narrative for India-Nepal ties, one that takes into account
longstanding people-to-people ties and cultural connect.
• India should focus on fructifying the potential of hydropower cooperation, which has remained
untapped largely due to differing perceptions.
• India should maintain the policy of keeping away from internal affairs of Nepal, meanwhile in the
spirit of friendship India should guide the nation towards more inclusive rhetoric.
• With its immense strategic relevance in the Indian context as Indian security concern, stable and
secure Nepal is one requisite which India can’t afford to overlook.
• But Nepal should also keep in mind that China should not come close to India’s border. And it
should help India in preventing terrorists or fugitives who take advantage of open border.

T.me/SleepyClasses
India – Sri Lanka
• Mahatma Gandhi once referred to Sri Lanka as India’s ‘daughter state’. The relationship between
India and Sri Lanka is more than 2,500 years old- from the time of Mauryan Empire when Ashoka
sent his son and daughter (Mahindra & Sanghamittra) to Sri Lanka to propagate Buddhism.
• It continued in Chola Empire when Rajaraja Chola first time started to conquer Sri Lanka or
Ceylon and Rajendra Chola (his son) conquered the Ceylon.
• In recent years, the relationship has been marked by close contacts at all levels. Trade and
investment have grown and there is cooperation in the fields of infrastructure development,
education, culture and defence.
• The nearly three-decade long armed conflict between the Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE came to
an end in May 2009. India's consistent position has been in favour of a negotiated political
settlement, which is acceptable to all communities within the framework of a united Sri Lanka
and is consistent with democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights.

T.me/SleepyClasses
India - Sri Lanka, Areas of Cooperation

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses
Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm

• Trincomalee Harbour is a seaport in Trincomalee Bay or Koddiyar Bay, a large natural
harbour situated on the northeastern coast of Sri Lanka in the heart of the Indian Ocean, its
strategic importance has shaped its history.
• The harbour, one of the largest natural harbours in the world. According to strategic thinker
Brahma Chellaney, ensnared in a Chinese debt trap, Sri Lanka is increasingly cognizant of and
concerned about the growing implications that this situation holds for its strategic autonomy.
• The Trinco Petroleum Terminal (Private) Limited has been set up for the joint venture project, with
51 per cent of stakes held by the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and 49 per cent by the LIOC.
• A Trincomalee port joint project with India also makes sense in terms of Sri Lanka's domestic
ethnic considerations as well as for India to counter China’s growing belligerence in the
neighbourhood.

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses
India - Sri Lanka Issues

T.me/SleepyClasses

T.me/SleepyClasses
• Katchatheevu is an uninhabited islet in the Palk Strait that was formed due to volcanic eruption in
the 14th century.
• The 285-acre land, strategically important for fishing activities, was owned by the Raja of
Ramnad (Ramanathapuram) and later became part of the Madras Presidency.
• In 1921, both Sri Lanka and India claimed this piece of land for fishing and the dispute remained
unsettled.
• In 1974, Katchatheevu was ceded to Sri Lanka by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi through the
Indo-Sri Lankan Maritime agreement to settle the maritime boundary in the Palk Strait with her
counterpart Srimavo Bandaranaike.
• Though ceded to Sri Lanka, the agreement, which did not specify fishing rights, allowed Indian
fishermen to fish around Katchatheevu and to dry their nets on the island.
• In 1976, Another agreement was finalized to determine the boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and
Bay of Bengal and restricted both the countries’ fishermen from fishing in the other’s waters.
• 2008, Jayalalithaa moved the Supreme Court to nullify the Katchatheevu agreements of 1974 and
1976.
• The Sri Lankan government claims that depletion of marine resources on its waters has affected the
livelihood of fishermen.
• In 2014, the Centre informed the Madras high court responding to a PIL that Sri Lanka’s
sovereignty over Katchatheevu is a settled matter and fishermen from India do not enjoy any right
to engage in fishing activities in the region.
Recent Developments in India-Sri Lanka relations

• Economic Crisis in Sri Lanka:
o In the aftermath of the Covid19 pandemic, Sri Lanka went through a deep economic crisis
(Balance of Payment crisis).
o In early 2022, Sri Lankans started experiencing power cuts and shortages of basics such as
fuel. The rate of inflation rose to 50% a year.
o As a result, protests broke out in the capital Colombo in April that year and spread across
the country.
As a result,
• Sri Lanka was unable to buy goods it needs from abroad.
• And in May 2022, it failed to make an interest payment on its foreign debt for the first time in its
history.

T.me/SleepyClasses
What led to the economic crisis?
• Critics say the roots of the crisis lie in economic mismanagement by successive governments that
created and sustained a twin deficit – a budget shortfall alongside a current account deficit. “Twin
deficits signal that a country’s national expenditure exceeds its national income, and that its
production of tradable goods and services is inadequate.”
• Then PM Rajapaksa also introduced big tax cuts in 2019, which lost the government more than
$1.4bn a year in revenues.
• Tourism is also a very big factor in Sri Lanka's condition. Since the Easter bombings at various
churches in Colombo killed 253 people in April 2019, tourists have been hesitant to visit the place.
This affected its foreign exchange reserves. In such a situation, the tourism industry was destroyed,
which is a part of the 10 per cent GDP of the country. Tourism also came to a standstill due to
COVID-19.
• Due to the corona pandemic, exports of tea, rubber, spices, and garments suffered.
• To make Sri Lanka a 100% organic farming country, the government has completely banned all
fertiliser imports since 2021. This led to widespread crop failures. Sri Lanka had to supplement its
food stocks from abroad, which made its foreign currency shortage even worse.
• Unsustainable debt from China (Sri Lanka owes near $8 billion to China, about 10 per cent of the
island nation’s total external debt). It gave Hambantota port on lease to China for 99 years in 2017.
China also invested in Colombo Port City and other smaller infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka.
(China’s debt trap policy)
India’s assistance to Sri Lanka

• As a part of Neighbourhood first policy, India stands with Sri Lanka.
o India extended aid worth USD 4 billion to help Sri Lanka sustain itself in face of the acute
economic and financial crisis and meet its immediate needs such as medicines, cooking gas,
fuel, and food items, etc.
▪ In Feb 2022, $500mn worth credit line to overcome its fuel shortage,
▪ $ 1bn credit line for essential goods
▪ $ 55mn credit line for fertilisers
▪ India extends duration of USD 400 million currency swap facility, etc.
• India sent financing assurances to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) becoming the first of
Sri Lanka’s creditors to officially back the crisis-hit island nation’s debt restructuring programme.
This took Sri Lanka one step closer to getting a crucial $2.9-billion package from the IMF.

T.me/SleepyClasses
India VS China in Sri Lanka
• Dr A. Choudhury says, since the onset of Sri Lanka’s ongoing crisis, India has acted with alacrity
to provide succour to the island nation, while China has taken a back seat.
• Sri Lanka owes $7.1 billion to bilateral creditors, with $3 billion owed to China, $2.4 billion to the
Paris Club and $1.6 billion to India.
• Shakthi De Silva said, India acted as the first responder to Sri Lanka. This benefits India as it
reinforces its neighbourhood-first policy and renders a positive image of New Delhi among the
subcontinent’s smaller nations.

T.me/SleepyClasses
Way ahead
• C. Raja Mohan writes that the “stage” is “ready for a reset in the bilateral
relations between the two strong governments in Delhi and Colombo”. He
points to 2 main structural factors that particularly shape bilateral relations
that need to be worked on:
o The China factor.
o The Tamil factor.
• Raja Mohan argues that Delhi’s unstinting support — both material and financial — for Colombo
during this unprecedented economic and political crisis offers a major opportunity to reframe
Delhi’s ties with Colombo.
• Shyam Saran argues that India should not look upon its relationship with Sri Lanka or with any
other country in South Asia as a 'zero-sum game' between India and China.
• There is a need to increase developmental and connectivity outreach to

further improve relations between the countries, with Tamil Nadu as
well as people.
• IRCON, an Indian Railways subsidiary, restored the Colombo-Jaffna

railway line, which was opened for the public in 2014, and has since
expanded to Kankesanthurai beyond Jaffna.
• India also has been working on deepening its image as a collaborative

and responsible neighbour-By launching a South Asian satellite
entirely funded by India, Modi attempted a novel approach in
boosting ties.
• For the promotion of Buddhist links with its neighbour Sri Lanka, where the religion is practiced
by over 70 % of population, the Indian government approved a $15 million grant in 2022.
• Further, External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar underlined during his visit to Colombo in
January 2023 has opened a new chapter in ties between the neighbours, according to Sri Lankan
High Commissioner to India Milinda Moragoda.

T.me/SleepyClasses


IFP___Volume_1_lyst1688

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

IFP___Volume_1_lyst1688

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

T.

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 1

India’s Foreign Policy- Determinants, Continuity and change and

o A focus on key challenges by broad engagement with many parties;

o Managing, if not leveraging, the global contradictions;

Factors that influence Indian foreign policy

• Public opinion • socio- cultural milieu

• Leadership • Economic considerations

• Negotiations • Public opinion

2 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

• Kautilya’s conception of foreign policy was an

• As per Prof. Snehalata Panda, Himalayas in the

• Rajiv Sikri argues the very conception of India

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 3

• According to Pratap Mehta, India is often viewed in international relations scholarship as an

• Upinder Singh argues that by connecting the independence

4 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

o replacing Cold War tactics with open

o replacing vestiges of colonialism with

• The centrality of economics in Modi’s policy has

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 5

• As per Dr. Chanchal Kumar, Modi's foreign policy mantra is threefold:

o the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement,

6 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

o its nuclear strategy, and

o its response to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.

Global and Regional Challenges

o Three neighbors will conduct difficult elections with outcomes uncertain.

o Afghanistan is an ungoverned space that can sprout unsavory elements.

o Myanmar is beset with domestic turmoil.

o China's border forays can never be discounted.

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 7

Role of public diplomacy

8 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

• Five developments are especially significant in India’s Public Diplomacy:

o India’s effort to reach out to overseas Indians;

o its attempts to build connections with foreign business

o its nascent foreign aid and development program;

o its use of major events to showcase and “nation-brand”

o its use of new social media to reach out to younger, tech-

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 9

Phases of evolution of IFP

• Phase 4 (1991-99)- Quest for strategic

10 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

• Continuation of the India Way:

• Respect for International Law and Order:

• Leading the Global South

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 11

• Emphasis on Soft Power

• From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment:

o MEA S. Jaishankar remarked non-alignment to be a concept of a bygone era. On the other

12 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

• Balancing Power to Great Power:

• More realism and assertiveness:

• Dealing with PRC and USA:

• Look East to Act East:

• Balancing Act in West Asia:

Institutions for making Foreign policy

Ministry of External Affairs

14 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com

www.sleepyclasses.com Available on App Store 15

• Chaired by the PM, the NSC consists of

Prime Minister’s Office

16 Available on App Store www.sleepyclasses.com