Deontological Ethics and I Mmanuil Kant

Deontological Ethics and
Immanuel Kant
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Understand the difference • Explain the difference between perfect
between consequentialist and non- and imperfect duties.
consequentialist approaches to ethics. • Apply Kantian reasoning to a variety of
• Describe different deontological cases in the real world.
approaches to ethics. • Provide an overview of Immanuel Kant's
• Explain the difference between moral philosophy.
hypothetical and categorical imperatives. • Defend your own thesis with regard to the
• Describe two formulations of the value of deontological ethics.
categorical imperative.
B
etween 1932 and 1972, experiments were conducted in Tuskegee, Alabama,
in which 390 poor and illiterate African American men who had syphilis were
followed in order to determine the progress of the disease, whether it was always
fatal, and how it was spread. The researchers even failed to give the men penicillin
treatment for syphilis, when it became available in the early 1940s. The study was
ended in 1972 when it became public and a source of major controversy. The reasons
were by now obvious; these men had not been treated with respect but had been used
for the purpose of obtaining information.
According to utilitarian thinking, the Tuskegee experiments could perhaps be
justifiable. If the harm done to the participants was minimal and the study had no
other negative effects, and if the knowledge gained was valuable in reducing overall
suffering, then the study might be justified.1 However, since the post-World War II
trials of Nazi war criminals held in Nuremberg, Germany, standards for treatment
of human research subjects have become widely accepted. One of the most basic
principles of the Nuremberg Code is this, “The voluntary consent of the human sub
ject is absolutely essential.”2 Consent must be informed and uncoerced. Implied in this
principle is the belief that persons are autonomous, and this autonomy ought to be
respected and protected even if this means that we cannot do certain types of research
and cannot thereby discover valuable information. Based on the rule of voluntary
consent and its respect for the autonomy of research subjects, the Tuskegee experi
ments were immoral, even if they produced valuable information.
This emphasis on personal autonomy and the idea that people ought not to be used
as they were in the Tuskegee experiments are central tenets in the moral philosophy
of Immanuel Kant, which we examine in detail in this chapter. Kant also maintains
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Chapter 6 << Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant 111
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Subjects in the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments.
that there are certain things we ought not do, even deontological ethics focuses on what makes us wor
if these things would produce the greatest happiness thy of happiness. For Kant, as for the Stoics and
for the greatest number. others who emphasize duty, we are worthy of happi
ness only when we do our duty. As Kant explained,
D EONTOLOGY AND THE ETHICS morality “is not properly the doctrine of how we
OF DUTY are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to
K ant’s theory of ethics is best described as a become worthy of happiness.”4 For Kant, morality is
deontological theory. The word deontology means not a “doctrine of happiness” or set of instructions
“ theory of duty” (the Greek word deon means on how to become happy. Rather, morality is the
“ duty” ). Deontological ethics focuses on duties, “rational condition of happiness.”
obligations, and rights. The term deontological was There are a variety of deontological theories.
coined by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, Divine command ethics, as discussed in Chapter 2,
who described it as “knowledge of what is right or is deontological in the sense that obedience to God’s
proper.”3 Bentham thought that deontology points command is a duty that must be followed no
in the direction of the principle of utility. But con matter what the consequences. The biblical story
temporary philosophers use the term deontological of Abraham and Isaac (in Chapter 22 of Genesis)
to indicate a contrast with the utilitarian focus on provides an example of duty. Out of obedience to
the consequences of actions. Instead of focusing on God’s command, Abraham is willing to sacrifice his
consequences, deontological ethics focuses on duties own son. In this story, religious duty must be done
and obligations: things we ought to do regardless of despite the consequences and the unhappiness that
the consequences. One way of describing this is to is produced.
say that deontological theories emphasize the right This episode shows us one of the problems for
over the good , by which we mean that deontology divine command ethics—a problem that has been
focuses on right actions and right intentions, while recognized since Socrates discussed it with Euthy-
downplaying the importance of the goods or benefits phro in Plato’s dialogue (see Chapter 2). How is
that are produced by these actions. morality related to God’s commands? And how are
While utilitarian ethics focuses on producing we to know that it is, in fact, God who commands us
the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and not the voice of our culture or our own selfish
112 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
motives or even mental illness? The Abraham and the natural order of things. Rather than struggling
Isaac episode famously prompted Kant to sug against external circumstances that we cannot con
gest that Abraham should have questioned God trol—such as the things that happen to us and the
as follows: “That I ought not to kill my good son actions of others—the Stoics argue that the key to
is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are morality and happiness is internal, a matter of how
God—of that I am not certain, and never can be, not we orient our will and intentions. According to this
even if this voice rings down to me from heaven.”5 view, duty is its own reward. Epictetus, a Stoic phi
For Kant, the commands of ethics are clear, certain, losopher who died in 135 CE, explains, “As Zeus
and without exception—and they do not include the has ordained, so act: if you do not act so, you will
command to kill our own children. In response to feel the penalty, you will be punished. What will be
this sort of criticism, the Danish philosopher Soren the punishment? Nothing else than not having done
Kierkegaard suggested that the story of Abraham your duty: you will lose the character of fidelity,
shows us that there may be religious duties that modesty, propriety. Do not look for greater penalties
transcend the duties of ethics. Such a claim is than these.”6
rejected by Kant. For Kant, moral duties are univer The typical image of a Stoic is of a sternly dis
sal and absolute; and we should use our knowledge ciplined, courageous, and emotionally composed
of morality to criticize and interpret religious stories individual who acts solely for the sake of duty—and
and ideas. whose commitment to obedience and duty infuses
Another form of deontological ethics can be every part of life. We often associate Stoic ethics
found in the ancient Greek and Roman philoso with the kind of courageous and selfless obedience
phy of Stoicism . The Stoics emphasized doing to duty that is typical of soldiers. This image of mili
your duty and playing your part as determined by tary service and duty was embodied in the Roman
Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who describes the
life of Stoic duty as follows: “It is thy duty to order
thy life well in every single act; and if every act
does its duty, as far as is possible, be content; and
no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall
not do its duty.” 7 He imagines someone objecting
to the rigors of duty by claiming that some external
circumstances stand in the way of the fulfillment of
duty. But he replies, “Nothing will stand in the way
of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.”
As Marcus explains elsewhere, “it is thy business to
do thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town.”8
The basic idea of Stoicism is that we can control our
own intentions and actions, even when we can
not control the consequences and external circum
stances. From this standpoint, you fulfill your moral
obligation by doing what you know is right, even if
the external world makes that difficult.
Although Immanuel Kant admired the Stoics’
emphasis on “ strength of the so u l,”9 he also
believed they underestimated the difficulty of being
moral. One problem is that we are confused about
moral duty—because we often confuse moral duties
The story of Abraham and Isaac is an example of how with other more practical concerns, including the
religious duties may conflict with ethical duties. concerns of happiness. To clarify this, Kant focused
on the logical and rational structure of duty itself— that matters most. Suppose, for example, that I try
apart from considerations of happiness, prudence, to do what is right by complimenting someone on
or the natural order of things. her achievements. Through no fault of my own, my
While it is easy enough to state in general that action ends up hurting that person because she mis
there are duties and obligations that we ought to understands my efforts. According to Kant, because
fulfill, it is more difficult to establish exactly what I intended and tried to do what I thought was right, I
those duties and obligations are. Is patriotism an ought not to be blamed for things having turned out
obligation—and does it include patriotism to an unjust badly. The idea is that we generally ought not to be
or corrupt state? Is the duty to our parents and ances blamed or praised for what is not in our control. The
tors primary, as it is in the morality of Confucius? consequences of our acts are not always in our con
Do we have obligations of compassion and concern trol, and things do not always turn out as we want.
for all sentient beings, as many Buddhists argue? However, Kant believed that our motives are in our
These questions remind us that deontological eth control. We are responsible for our intention to do
ics might need to be supplemented with a broader good or bad, and thus it is for this that we are held
theory of “the good,” which tells us how the theory morally accountable.
of duty should apply to personal, social, and political Kant also objected to basing morality on the
affairs. Indeed, this criticism of deontological ethics consequences of our actions for another reason. To
was noted by John Stuart Mill, who criticized Kant for make morality a matter of producing certain states
defining a theory of duty that was so abstract that it of affairs, such as happy experiences, puts matters
could not rule out immoral actions. backward, he might say. On such a view, actions and
As we turn to a discussion of Kant, bear this even human beings could be thought of as merely
accusation in mind. Is Kant’s conception of duty too having use value. We would be valued to the extent
abstract? Or does the Kantian theory help to specify that we were instrumental in bringing about what
our duties in sufficient detail to avoid this charge?
IMMANUEL KANT
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German phi
losopher who is now regarded as a central figure in
the history of modern philosophy. Modern philoso
phy itself is sometimes divided into pre-Kantian and
post-Kantian periods. In fact, some people regard
him as the greatest modern philosopher. Although
he is renowned for his moral philosophy, he wrote
on a variety of matters including science, geography,
beauty, and war and peace. He was a firm believer
in the ideas of the Enlightenment (as discussed in
Chapter 2), especially reason and freedom, and he
also was a supporter of the American Revolution.
Two of the main questions that Kant believed
philosophy should address are: “What can I know?”
and “What ought I do?” 10 While Kant’s theory of
knowledge is important and influential, our concern
here is his moral philosophy.
One way to begin your examination of Kant’s
moral theory is to think about how he would answer
the question, What gives an act moral worth? It is
not the consequences of the act, according to Kant, A portrait of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
itself was of greater value, namely, happy states or special respect, or even a moral reverence, for people
experiences. However, in Kant’s view, we should who act out of a will to do the right thing, especially
not be used in this way for we are rational beings when this comes at great cost to themselves. An act
or persons. Persons have intrinsic or inherent value, has moral worth only when it is motivated by con
according to Kant, not mere instrumental value. The cern for the moral law.
belief that people ought not to be used, but ought Now we do not always know whether our acts
to be regarded as having the highest intrinsic value, are motivated by self-interest, inclination, or pure
is central to Kant’s ethics, as is having a motive to respect for morality. Also, we often act from mixed
do what is right. As we shall see in the next two motives. We are more certain that the motive is pure,
sections, Kant uses this second idea to answer the however, when we do what is right even when it is
question: What gives an act moral worth? not in our best interest (when it costs us dearly) and
when we do not feel like doing the right thing. In
What Is the Right Motive? these cases, we can know that we are motivated by
Kant believed that an act has moral worth only concern to do the right thing because the other two
if it is done with a right intention or motive.11 He motives are missing. Moreover, this ability to act for
referred to this as having a “good will.” Kant writes moral reasons, while resisting other inclinations, is
that the only thing that is unconditionally good is a one reason that human beings have a unique value
good will. Everything else needs a good will to make and dignity. The person who says to himself, “I feel
it good. Without a right intention, such things as like being lazy (or mean or selfish), but I am going
intelligence, wit, and control of emotions can be bad to try not to because it would not be right,” is oper
and used for evil purposes. Having a right intention ating out of the motive of respect for morality itself.
means doing what is right (or what one believes to This ability to act for moral reasons or motives, Kant
be right) just because it is right. In Kant’s words, it believes, is one part of what gives human beings
is to act “out of duty,” out of a concern and respect dignity and worth.
for the moral law. Kant was not a relativist. He
believed that there is a right and a wrong thing to What Is the Right Thing to Do?
do, whether or not we know or agree about it. For our action to have moral worth, according to
To explain his views on the importance of a right Kant, we must not only act out of a right motivation
motive or intention, Kant provides the example of a but also do the right thing. Consider again the dia
shopkeeper who does the right thing, who charges gram that we used in the first chapter.
her customers a fair price and charges the same to
all. But what is her motive? Kant discusses three
possible motives: (1) The shopkeeper’s motive or
reason for acting might be because it is a good busi
ness practice to charge the same to all. It is in her
own best interest that she do this. Although not
necessarily wrong, this motive is not praiseworthy. As noted earlier, Kant does not believe that
(2) The shopkeeper might charge a fair and equal morality is a function of producing good conse
price because she is sympathetic toward her cus quences. We may do what has good results, but if
tomers and is naturally inclined to do them good. we do so for the wrong motive, then that act has
Kant said that this motive is also not the highest. no moral worth. However, it is not only the motive
We do not have high moral esteem or praise for peo that counts for Kant. We must also do what is right.
ple who simply do what they feel like doing, even The act itself must be morally right. Both the act and
if we believe they are doing the right thing. (3) If the motive are morally relevant. In Kant’s terms,
the shopkeeper did the right thing just because she we must act not only “out of duty” (have the right
believed it was right, however, then this act would motive) but also “according to duty” or “as duty
be based on the highest motive. We do have a requires” (do what is right). How then are we to
know what is the right thing to do? Once we know If there is something I morally ought to do, I ought
this, we can try to do it just because it is right. to do it no matter what—whether or not I want to,
To understand Kant’s reasoning on this matter, and whether or not it fulfills my desires and goals or
we need to examine the difference between what he is approved by my society. Moral obligation is not
calls a hypothetical imperative and a categorical contingent on what I or anyone happens to want
imperative. First of all, an imperative is simply a or approve. Moral “oughts” are thus, in Kant’s ter
form of statement that tells us to do something, for minology, unconditional or necessary. Moreover,
example, “Stand up straight” and “ Close the door” whereas hypothetical “oughts” relate to goals we
and also “You ought to close the door.” Some, but each have as individuals, moral “oughts” stem from
only some, imperatives are moral imperatives. Other the ways in which we are alike as persons, for only
imperatives are hypothetical. For example, the state persons are subject to morality. This is because per
ment “If I want to get there on time, I ought to leave sons are rational beings, and only persons can act
early” does not embody a moral “ought” or a moral from a reason or from principles. These “oughts”
imperative. What I ought to do in that case is a are thus not individualized but universal as they
function of what I happen to want—to get there on apply to all persons. Kant calls moral “ oughts”
time—and of the means necessary to achieve this— categorical imperatives because they tell us what
leaving early. Moreover, I can avoid the obligation to we ought to do no matter what, under all conditions,
leave early by changing my goals. I can decide that I or categorically.
do not need or want to get there on time. Then I need It is from the very nature of categorical or moral
not leave early. These ends may be good or bad. imperatives, their being unconditional and univer
Thus, the statement “If I want to harm someone, sally binding, that Kant derives his views about
then I ought to use effective means” also expresses morality. In fact, he uses the term the categorical
a hypothetical “ought.” These “oughts” are avoid imperative to describe the basic moral principle by
able, or, as Kant would say, contingent. They are which we determine what we ought and ought not
contingent or dependent on what I happen to want to do.
or the desires I happen to have, such as to please
others, to harm someone, to gain power, or to be THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
punctual. The categorical imperative, Kant’s basic moral prin
These “ oughts” are also quite individualized. ciple, is comparable in importance for his moral phi
What I ought to do is contingent or dependent on losophy to the principle of utility for utilitarians. It
my own individual goals or plans. These actions is Kant’s test for right and wrong. Just as there are
serve as means to whatever goals I happen to have different ways to formulate the principle of utility,
(or whatever goals my particular community or soci so also Kant had different formulations for his prin
ety happens to approve). Other people ought to do ciple. Although at least four of them may be found
different things than I because they have different in his writings, we will concentrate on just two and
goals and plans. For example, I ought to take intro call them the first and second forms of the categori
duction to sociology because I want to be a sociol cal imperative. The others, however, do add differ
ogy major, while you ought to take a course on the ent elements to our understanding of his basic moral
philosophy of Kant because you have chosen to be principle and will be mentioned briefly.
a philosophy major. These are obligations only for
those who have these goals or desires. Think of The First Form
them in this form: “If (or because) I want X , then Recall that moral obligation is categorical; that is, it
I ought to do Y.” Whether I ought to do Y is totally is unconditional and applies to all persons as per
contingent or dependent on my wanting X . sons rather than to persons as individuals. It is in
Moral obligation, on the other hand, is quite dif this sense universal. Moreover, because morality is
ferent in nature. Kant believed that we experience not a matter of producing good consequences of any
moral obligation as something quite demanding. sort (be it happiness or knowledge or peace), the
basic moral principle will be formal, without content. morally acceptable, it must pass the test of the cat
It will not include reference to any particular good. egorical imperative. If I were to use this test, I would
Knowing this, we are on the way to understanding ask whether I could will that sort of thing for all.
the first form of the categorical imperative, which I must ask whether I could will a general practice
simply requires that we do only what we can accept in which people who made promises—for example,
or will that everyone do. Kant’s own statement of it to pay back some money—could make the promises
is basically the following: without intending to keep them. If people who gen
erally made such promises did so falsely, then others
Act only on that maxim that you can will as a would know this and would not believe the prom
universal law. ises. Consider whether you would lend money to a
person if she said she would pay you back but you
In other words, whatever I consider doing, it must knew she was lying. The reasoning is thus: If I tried
be something that I can consistently will or accept to will a general practice of false promise-making, I
that all others do. To will something universally is would find it impossible to do so because by willing
similar to willing it as a law, for a law by its very that promises could be false, I would also will a situ
nature has a degree of universality. By m axim , ation in which it would be impossible to succeed in
Kant means a description of the action or policy that making a lying promise. Everyone would know that
I will put to the test. This is expressed in the form all promises were potential lies. No one could then
of a rule or principle. For example, I might want to make a promise, let alone a false promise, because
know whether “being late for class” or “giving all no one would believe him or her. Part of being
my money to the homeless” describes a morally per able to make a promise is to have it believed. The
missible action. I need only formulate some maxim universal practice of false promise-making is self
or rule and ask whether I could will that every contradictory and could not exist. If everyone made
one follow that maxim. For example, I might ask such lying promises, no one could!
whether I could will the universal maxim or gen Now consider the example at the beginning of
eral rule, “Whenever I have money to spare, I will this chapter: the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, in
give it to the homeless.” However, this needs further which people were used as medical test subjects
clarification.12 without their full knowing consent. Using Kant’s
How do I know what I can and cannot will as a categorical imperative to test this, one would see
universal practice? As a rational being, I can only that if it were a general practice for researchers to
will what is noncontradictory. What do we think of a lie to their subjects in order to get them into their
person who says that it is both raining and not rain experiments, they would not be able to get people to
ing here now? It can be raining here and not there, participate. A general practice of deceiving potential
or now and not earlier. But it is either raining here research subjects would undermine the credibility of
or it is not. It cannot be both. So also we say that a all researchers. The only way a particular researcher
person who wants to “have his cake and eat it, too” could lie would be if most other researchers told
is not being rational. “Make up your mind,” we say. the truth. Only then could she get her prospective
“If you eat it, it is gone.” subjects to believe her. But this would be to make
How I know if I can rationally, without contradic herself an exception to the universal rule. Like false
tion, will something for all can best be explained by promising, a universal practice in which researchers
using one of Kant’s own examples. He asks us to lied to their prospective subjects is self-contradic
consider whether it is morally permissible for me to tory and cannot be willed with consistency. There
“make a lying or false promise in order to extricate fore, lying to prospective research subjects fails the
myself from some difficulty.” Thus, I would consider test of the categorical imperative and is morally
the maxim, “Whenever I am in some difficulty that I impermissible.
can get out of only by making a lying or false prom In some ways, Kant’s basic moral principle, the
ise, I will do so.” To know whether this would be categorical imperative, is a principle of fairness.
I should not do what I am not able to will that things. Things cannot choose what they wish to do.
everyone do. For me to succeed in making a lying We decide how we shall use things. We impose our
promise, others must generally make truthful prom own goals on things, using wood to build a house
ises so that my lie will be believed. This would be to and a pen or computer to express our ideas. It is
treat myself as an exception. But this is not fair. In appropriate to use things for our ends, but it is not
some ways, the principle is similar to the so-called appropriate to use persons as though they were
Golden Rule, which requires us only to do unto oth things purely at our disposal and without wills of
ers what we would be willing for them to do unto their own. Kant’s statement of this second form of
us. However, it is not the same, for Kant’s principle the categorical imperative is as follows:
requires our not willing self-canceling or contradic
tory practices, whereas the Golden Rule requires that Always treat humanity, whether in your own person
we appeal in the final analysis to what we would or or that of another, never simply as a means but
would not like to have done to us. As you will see in always at the same time as an end.
the reading excerpt that follows, Kant explains in a
footnote that the Golden Rule This formulation tells us how we ought to treat
. . . cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain
ourselves as well as others, namely, as ends rather
the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of than merely as means. Kant believes that we should
benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly treat persons as having value in themselves and
consent that others should not benefit him, provided not just as having instrumental value. People are
only that he might be excused from showing benev valuable, regardless of whether they are useful or
olence to them), nor finally that of duties of strict loved or valued by others. We should not simply
obligation to one another, for on this principle the use others or let ourselves be used. Although I may
criminal might argue against the judge who punishes in some sense use someone—for example, to paint
him, and so on.13
my house—I may not sim ply use her. The goal of
To explain, the Golden Rule is only about what I or getting my house painted must be shared by the
you like or don’t like (what we would have others painter, who is also a person and not just an object
“do unto us”). But this fails to get us to the level of to be used by me for my own ends. She must know
universal duty that is central to Kant’s moral theory. what is involved in the project. I cannot lie to her to
manipulate her into doing something to which she
The Second Form otherwise would not agree. And she must agree to
The first form of Kant’s categorical imperative paint the house voluntarily rather than be coerced
requires universalizing one’s contemplated action into doing it. These and similar requirements are
or policy. In the second form, we are asked to con necessary for treating another person as an end
sider what constitutes proper treatment of persons as rather than merely as a means to my ends or goals.
persons. According to Kant, one key characteristic of We can also use this second form of the categori
persons is their ability to set their own goals. Persons cal imperative to evaluate the examples we consid
are autonomous (from the Greek auto, meaning ered for the first form. The moral conclusions should
“ self,” and nomos, meaning “rule” or “law”). They be the same whether we use the first or second form.
are literally self-ruled, or at least capable of being Kant believes that in lying to another person—for
self-ruled. As persons, we choose our own life plans, example, saying that we will pay back money when
what we want to be, our friends, our college courses, we have no intention of doing so—we would be
and so forth. We have our own reasons for doing attempting to manipulate another person against his
so. We believe that although our choices are influ will. (He is presumably unwilling to just give us the
enced by our circumstances and by the advice and money.) This would violate the requirement not to
opinions of others, we knowingly allow ourselves use persons. Similarly, in the Tuskegee experiments,
be so influenced, and thus these choices are still our the deceptive researchers used the subjects as means
own choices. In this way, persons are different from to an end rather than as ends in themselves.
We noted that Kant provided more formulations generally think of moral obligation. If there is any
of his categorical imperative than the two discussed thing that we morally ought to do, then we simply
here. In another of these formulations, Kant relies ought to do it. Thus, this type of obligation is unlike
on his views about nature as a system of everything that which flows from what we ought to do because
that we experience because it is organized accord of the particular goals that we each have as individ
ing to laws. Thus, he says that we ought always uals. To evaluate this aspect of Kant’s moral philoso
to ask whether some action we are contemplating phy, you must ask yourself whether this is also what
could become a universal law of nature. The effect you think about the nature of moral obligation. This
of this version is to emphasize morality as universal is important for Kant’s moral philosophy because
and rational, for nature necessarily operates accord acting out of respect for the moral law is required for
ing to coherent laws. Other formulations of the cat an action to have moral worth. Furthermore, being
egorical imperative stress autonomy. We are to ask able to act out of such a regard for morality is also
whether we could consider ourselves as the author the source of human dignity, according to Kant.
of the moral practice that we are about to accept.
We are both subject to the moral law and its author The Application of the Categorical Imperative
because it flows from our own nature as a rational Critics such as Mill (as noted previously) have
being. Another formulation amplifies what we have pointed out problems with the universalizing form
here called the second form of the categorical imper of the categorical imperative. For example, some
ative. This formulation points out that our rational have argued that when using the first form of the
ity makes us alike as persons, and together we form categorical imperative, there are many things that
a community of persons. He calls the community I could will as universal practices that would hardly
of rational persons a kingdom of ends—that is, a seem to be moral obligations. I could will that every
kingdom in which all persons are authors as well as one write their names on the top of their test papers.
subjects of the moral law. Thus, we ask whether the If everyone did that, it would not prevent anyone
action we are contemplating would be fitting for and from doing so. There would be no contradiction
promote such a community. These formulations of involved if this were a universal practice. Neverthe
the categorical imperative involve other interesting less, this would not mean that people have a moral
elements of Kant’s philosophy, but they also involve obligation to write their names on their test papers.
more than we can explore here. A Kantian might respond that to write your name
on your test paper is an example of a hypothetical,
EVALUATING KANT'S M ORAL TH EORY not a categorical, imperative. I write my name on
There is much that is appealing in Kant’s moral phi my paper because I want to be given credit for it. If
losophy, particularly its central aspects—its focus I can will it as a universal practice, I then know it is
on motives, its emphasis on fairness, its aim of a morally permissible action. If I cannot will it uni
consistency, and its basic idea of treating persons versally, then it is impermissible or wrong. Thus, the
as autonomous and morally equal beings. Kant’s categorical imperative is actually a negative test—in
deontological approach is quite different from that other words, a test for what we should not do, more
exemplified by utilitarianism, with its emphasis on than a test for what we ought to do. Whether or not
the maximization of happiness and the production this is a satisfactory response, you should know that
of good consequences. To more fully evaluate Kant’s this is just one of several problems associated with
theory, consider the following aspects of his thought. Kant’s universalizing test.
Concern for the universality of moral rules is
The Nature of Moral Obligation not unique to Kantian ethics. We saw in the pre
One of the bases on which Kant’s moral philosophy vious chapter that rule utilitarianism is focused on
rests is his view about the nature of moral obliga the general utility of rules. Although Kantians and
tion. He believes that moral obligation is real and rule utilitarians are both interested in universal
strictly binding. According to Kant, this is how we ized rules, there is a difference in how Kantian and
rule utilitarian reasoning proceeds. Rule utilitarians Kant does, at times, seem to favor absolutism. He
require that we consider what the results would provides examples in which it seems clear that he
be if some act we are contemplating were to be a believes it is always wrong to make a false promise
universal practice. Reasoning in this way, we ask or to lie deliberately. There is even one example in
what would be the results or consequences of some which Kant himself suggests that if a killer comes
general practice, such as making false promises, to the door asking for a friend of yours inside whom
or whether one practice would have better results he intends to kill, you must tell the truth. But Kant’s
than another. Although in some sense Kant’s theory moral theory provides only one exceptionless rule,
requires that we consider the possible consequences and that is given in the categorical imperative. We
when universalizing some action, the determinant of are never permitted to do what we cannot will as
the action’s morality is not whether its practice has a universal law or what violates the requirement to
good or bad consequences, but whether there would treat persons as ends in themselves. Even with these
be anything contradictory in willing the practice as two tests in hand, it is not always clear just how
a universal law. Because we are rational beings, we they apply. Furthermore, they may not give ade
must not will contradictory things. quate help in deciding what to do when they seem
The second form of the categorical imperative to produce contradictory duties, as in the conflict
also has problems of application. In the concrete, it is between telling the truth and preserving a life.
not always easy to determine whether one is using
a person—for example, what is coercion and what Moral Equality and Impartiality
is simply influence, or what is deception and what is One positive feature of Kant’s moral theory is its
not. When I try to talk a friend into doing something emphasis on the moral equality of all persons, which
for me, how do I know whether I am simply pro is implied in his view that the nature of moral obli
viding input for my friend’s own decision-making or gation is universally binding. We should not make
whether I am crossing the line and becoming coer exceptions for ourselves but do only what we can
cive? Moreover, if I do not tell the whole truth or will for all. Moral obligation and morality itself flow
withhold information from another person, should from our nature as rational and autonomous per
this count as deception on my part? Although these sons. Morality is grounded in the ways in which we
are real problems for anyone who tries to apply are alike as persons, rather than the ways in which
Kant’s views about deceit and coercion, they are not we are different as individuals. These views might
unique to his moral philosophy. Theories vary in the provide a source for those who want to argue for
ease of their use or application. Difficulty of appli moral equality and equal moral rights. If we do not
cation is a problem for most, if not all, reasonable treat others as equal persons, we are disrespecting
moral philosophies. them. If we are not willing to make the same judg
ment for cases similar to our own, or if we are not
Duty willing to have the same rules apply to all, we can
Some of the language and terminology found in be accused of hypocrisy. When we criticize hypoc
Kant’s moral theory can sound harsh to modern risy, we act in the spirit of Kant.
ears. Duty, obligation, law, and universality may Another feature of Kant’s moral philosophy is its
not be the moral terms most commonly heard today. spirit of impartiality. For an action to be morally per
Yet if one considers what Kant meant by duty, the missible, we should be able to will it for all. How
idea may not seem so strange to us. Kant was not ever, persons do differ in significant ways. Among
advocating any particular moral code or set of duties these are differences in gender, race, age, and talents.
held by any society or group. Rather, duty is what In what way does morality require that all persons
ever reason tells us is the right thing to do. How be treated equally, and in what way does it perhaps
ever, Kant might acknowledge that there is a streak require that different persons be treated differently?14
of absolutism in his philosophy. Absolutists think Some critics have wondered about Kant’s stress
that morality consists of a set of exceptionless rules. on the nature of persons as rational and autonomous
beings. It might be that human beings are not best categorical imperative to test the morality of this
conceived as rational autonomous beings, such as practice, we must ask whether we could will that
Kant describes. Kant seems to forget our emotions everyone was an egoist. If I try to do this, I would
and our dependency relationships. (In Chapter 9, we need to will that I was an egoist as well as others,
examine a type of morality that stresses the emo even in those situations when I needed others’ help.
tional and personal ties we have to particular indi In those situations, I must allow that they not help
viduals.) Kant might reply to these critics that we me when it is not in their own best interest. But
often have no control over how we feel and thus our being an egoist myself, I would also want them to
feelings should not be a key element of our moral help me. In effect, I would be willing contradictories;
lives. He might also argue that it is the common that they help me (I being an egoist) and that they
aspects of our existence as persons, and not the not help me (they being egoists). Although Kant
ways in which we are different and unique, that give admits that a society of egoists could indeed exist,
us dignity and are the basis for the moral equality no rational person could will it, for a rational person
that we possess. In short, even if we are often not does not will contradictories. We have an imperfect
fully autonomous or rational, we ought to consider or meritorious duty, then, not to be egoists but to
ourselves as autonomous and rational—and treat help people for their own good and not just for ours.
others as if they were autonomous and rational—for However, just when to help others and how much
this is the source of human dignity. to help them is a matter of some choice. There is a
certain flexibility here. One implication of this view
PER FECT AND IM PERFECT DUTIES is that there is no absolute duty to give one’s whole
In his attempt to explain his views, Kant provides us life to helping others. We, too, are persons and thus
with several examples. We have already considered have moral rights and also can at least sometimes
one of these: making a false promise. His conclusion act for our own interests.
is that we should not make a false or lying promise, The same conclusion regarding the wrongness
both because we could not consistently will it for all of egoism results from the application of the second
and because it violates our obligation to treat per form of the categorical imperative. If I were an egoist
sons as persons and not to use them only for our and concerned only about myself, I might argue that
own purposes. Kant calls such duties perfect duties I was not thereby committed to using other people.
(they are sometimes described as necessary duties). I would simply leave them alone. But according to
As the term suggests, perfect duties are absolute. Kant, such an attitude and practice would still be
We can and should absolutely refrain from making inconsistent with the duty to treat others as persons.
false or lying promises. From the perspective of the As persons, they also have interests and plans, and
first form of the categorical imperative, we have a to recognize this I must at least sometimes and in
perfect duty not to do those things that could not some ways seek to promote their ends and goals.
even exist and are inconceivable as universal prac Thus, avoiding egoism appears to be an imperfect
tices. Using the second form of the categorical duty according to Kant’s theory. The distinction
imperative, we have a perfect duty not to do what between perfect and imperfect duties will have impli
violates the requirement to treat persons as ends in cations for handling conflicts among different duties.
themselves. Perfect duties will take precedence over imperfect
However, some duties are more flexible. Kant ones; we cannot help some by violating the rights
calls these duties imperfect duties (sometimes also of others.
called meritorious duties). Consider another exam
ple he provides: egoism. Ethical egoism, you will VARIATIONS ON KANT AND
recall, is the view that we may rightly seek only our DEONTOLOGY
own interest and help others only to the extent that Just as there are contemporary versions of and
doing so also benefits us. Is this a morally accept developments within the utilitarian tradition, there
able philosophy of life? Using the first form of Kant’s are also many contemporary versions of Kantian
and deontological moral theory. One is found in the we could accept no matter which position in soci
moral philosophy of W. D. Ross, who also held that ety we happen to occupy. For details about Rawls’
there are things we ought and ought not do regard principles, see Chapter 14 on economic justice. Kan
less of the consequences.15 We discussed Ross tian and other versions of deontology continue to
in Chapter 3 in relation to pluralism. According to be influential. You will be able to better evaluate the
Ross, we have duties not only of beneficence but Kantian theory as you see aspects of it applied to
also to keep promises, pay our debts, and be good issues in Part Two of this text.
friends and parents and children. Contrary to Kant, The reading selection in this chapter from Kant’s
Ross believed that we can know through moral intu Fundamental Principles o f the Metaphysic o f Morals
ition in any instance what we ought to do. Some contains the key elements of his moral philosophy.
times we are faced with a conflict of moral duties. It As the title implies, Kant is trying to establish the
seems intuitive that we ought to be both loyal and foundations of morality. He begins by claiming that
honest, but we cannot be both. We have prim afacie the only thing that is good without qualification is a
or conditional duties of loyalty and honesty. Ross is good will. He goes on to explain duty and the cat
the source of the phrase prim afacie, which is often egorical imperative, while applying these ideas to
used in ethical arguments. In such cases, accord some basic examples.
ing to Ross, we have to consider which duty is the
NOTES
stronger—that is, which has the greater balance of
1. At least this might be true from an act utilitarian point of
rightness over wrongness. In choosing honesty in view. A rule utilitarian might want to know whether the
some situations, however, one does not negate or results of the general practice of not fully informing research
forget that one also has a duty to be loyal. Obvious participants would be such that the good achieved would not
be worth it.
problems arise for such a theory. For example, how 2. From Trials o f War Crim inals before the Nurem berg M ilitary
does one go about determining the amount of right Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 2 (Wash
ness or wrongness involved in some action? Don’t ington, DC: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1949),
181-82.
people have different intuitions about the rightness 3. Jeremy Bentham, Deontology or the Science o f M orality
or wrongness of any particular action? This is a (Edinburgh, William Tait, 1834), vol. 1, Chapter 2.
problem for anyone who holds that intuition is the 4. Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Practical Reason, in Practical
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
basis for morality. 5: 130, p. 244.
One of the most noted contemporary versions 5. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict o f the Faculties, in Religion
of Kant’s moral philosophy is found in the political and R ational Theology, ed. A.W. Wood and G. di Giovanni
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 283.
philosophy of John Rawls. In A Theory o f Ju stice, 6. Epictetus, D iscourses, 3.7 (Internet Classics Archive: http://
Rawls applies some aspects of Kantian principles classics.mit.edu//Epictetus/discourses.html).
to issues of social justice. According to Rawls, jus 7. Marcus Aurelius, M editations (Internet Classics Archive:
http://classics.mit.edu//Antoninus/meditations.html), bk. 8.
tice is fairness.16 To know what is fair, we must put 8. Aurelius, M editations, bk. 7.
ourselves imaginatively in the position of a group 9. Kant, Critique o f Practical Reason 5: 127, p. 242. Also see
of free and equal rational beings who are choosing J. B. Schneewind, “Kant and Stoic Ethics,” in E ssa ys on the
H istory o f M oral Philosophy (Oxford University Press,
principles of justice for their society. In thinking of 2009).
persons as free and equal rational beings in order 10. Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
to develop principles of justice, Rawls is securely in Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965), 635.
11. We will not distinguish here m otive and intention, although
the Kantian tradition of moral philosophy. Kant also the former usually signifies that out of which we act (an
stresses autonomy. It is this aspect of our nature that impetus or push) and the latter that for which we act (an
gives us our dignity as persons. Kant’s categorical aim or objective).
12. I thank Professor Joyce Mullan for suggestions regarding
imperative also involves universalization. We must what Kant means by m axim .
do only those things that we could will that every 13. Kant, Fundam ental Principles o f the M etaphysics o f M orals
one do. It is only a short move from these notions trans. Abbott (Project Gutenburg: http://www.gutenberg.org/
cache/epub/5682/pg5682.html), second section.
of autonomy and universalization to the Rawlsian 14. See also the criticism of Kantian theories of justice in the
requirement to choose those principles of justice that treatment of gender and justice in Susan Moller Okin,
Ju stice, Gender, and the Fam ily (New York: Basic Books, 15. W. D. Ross, The R ight and the Good (Oxford: Oxford Uni
1989), 3-22. See also Marilyn Friedman, “The Social Self versity Press, 1930).
and the Partiality Debates,” in Fem inist E th ics, ed. Claudia 16. John Rawls, A Theory o f Ju stice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Card (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991). University Press, 1971).
E A D I N G
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
I M M A N U EL KANT
S tu d y Q u e stio n s wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind,

1. What is meant by a "good will,"and why is it the only however they may be named, or courage, resolu
thing good "without qualification?" tion, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are
2. Out of what motives other than duty do people act? undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects;
3. If we do the right thing, such as not overcharging but these gifts of nature may also become extremely
customers or preserving our life, do these actions bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use
always have full moral worth, according to Kant? of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is
4. What does Kant mean when he says that some called character, is not good. It is the same with the
kinds of love cannot be commanded?
g ifts offortune. Power, riches, honor, even health,
5. What does duty have to do with having respect for
and the general well-being and contentment with
morality?
6. How does Kant state his basic moral principle?
one’s condition which is called happiness, inspire
7. What is the difference between how one would pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good
reason about whether it is prudent to make a false will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and
or lying promise and how one should determine with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting
whether it is the right thing to do? and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who
8. How does Kant describe what it means to be under is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and
obligation or subject to an "ought?" good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never
9. What is the difference between a rule of skill, a give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus
counsel of prudence, and a command of morality? a good will appears to constitute the indispensable
10. Explain how Kant uses the categorical imperative in
condition even of being worthy of happiness.
his four examples.
There are even some qualities which are of service
11. What does Kant mean by an "end?" How does this
notion relate to the second form of the moral
to this good will itself, and may facilitate its action,
imperative? yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but
12. Explain how Kant uses the second formulation in always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the
the same four examples. esteem that we justly have for them, and does not
permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moder
THE GOOD WILL** ation in the affections and passions, self-control and
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, calm deliberation are not only good in many respects,
or even out of it, which can be called good with but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic
out qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, worth of the person; but they are far from deserv
ing to be called good without qualification, although
they have been so unconditionally praised by the
From Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles o f the Metaphysic of
Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill abbott, (1879; project Gutenberg
ancients. For without the principles of a good will,
2004), secs. 1 and 2, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682 they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of
*Headings added by the editor. a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but
*Som e notes have been deleted and the remaining ones also immediately makes him more abominable in our
renumbered. eyes than he would have been without it.
A good will is good not because of what it per readily distinguish whether the action which agrees
forms or effects, not by its aptness for the attain with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view.
ment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of It is much harder to make this distinction when the
the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and consid action accords with duty, and the subject has besides
ered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than a direct inclination to it. For example, it is always a
all that can be brought about by it in favour of any matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge
inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclina an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is
tions. Even if it should happen that, owing to special much commerce the prudent tradesman does not
disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for every one,
a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack so that a child buys of him as well as any other.
power to accomplish its purpose, if with its great Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough
est efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted
should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a from duty and from principles of honesty: his own
mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our advantage required it; it is out of the question in
power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its this case to suppose that he might besides have a
own light, as a thing which has its whole value in direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as
itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add it were, from love he should give no advantage to
nor take away anything from this value. It would one over another. Accordingly the action was done
be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but
it the more conveniently in common commerce, or merely with a selfish view.
to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain
connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true con one’s life; and, in addition, every one has also a
noisseurs, or to determine its value____ direct inclination to do so. But on this account the
often anxious care which most men take for it has
ACTING FROM DUTY no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral
We have then to develop the notion of a will which import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no
deserves to be highly esteemed for itself, and is good doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other
without a view to anything further, a notion which hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have com
exists already in the sound natural understanding, pletely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortu
requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, nate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather
and which in estimating the value of our actions than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and
always takes the first place, and constitutes the con yet preserves his life without loving it—not from
dition of all the rest. In order to do this we will take inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim
the notion of duty, which includes that of a good has a moral worth.
will, although implying certain subjective restrictions To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and
and hindrances. These, however, far from conceal besides this, there are many minds so sympatheti
ing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it cally constituted that without any other motive
out by contrast, and make it shine forth so much of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in
the brighter. I omit here all actions which are already spreading joy around them, and can take delight
recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own
may be useful for this or that purpose, for with work. But I maintain that in such a case an action
these the question whether they are done from duty of this kind, however proper, however amiable it
cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it. may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but
I also set aside those actions which really conform to is on a level with other inclinations, e.g., the incli
duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, nation to honour, which, if it is happily directed to
performing them because they are impelled thereto that which is in fact of public utility and accordant
by some other inclination. For in this case we can with duty, and consequently honourable, deserves
praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For the The second proposition1 is: That an action done
maxim wants the moral import, namely, that such from duty derives its moral worth, notfrom the
actions be done from duty, not from inclination. purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the
Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist maxim by which it is determined, and therefore
were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing does not depend on the realization of the object of
all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while the action, but merely on the principle o f volition by
he still has the power to benefit others in distress which the action has taken place, without regard to
he is not touched by their trouble because he is any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes
absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he that the purposes which we may have in view in our
tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and per actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs
forms the action without any inclination to it, but of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional
simply from duty, then first has his action its genu or moral worth. In what then can their worth lie,
ine moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to
sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in
supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament the principle o f the w ill without regard to the ends
cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, per which can be attained by the action. For the will
haps because in respect of his own he is provided stands between its a priori principle which is formal,
with the special gift of patience and fortitude, and and its a posteriori spring which is material, as
supposes, or even requires, that others should have between two roads, and as it must be determined by
the same—and such a man would certainly not be something, it follows that it must be determined
the meanest product of nature—but if nature had by the formal principle of volition when an action is
not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would done from duty, in which case every material prin
he not still find in himself a source from whence to ciple has been withdrawn from it.
give himself a far higher worth than that of a good-
natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It RESPECT FOR THE MORAL LAW
is just in this that the moral worth of the character The third proposition, which is a consequence of
is brought out which is incomparably the highest of the two preceding, I would express thus: Duty is
all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclina the necessity o f acting from respectfo r the law.
tion, but from duty. I may have inclination for an object as the effect of
To secure one’s own happiness is a duty, at least my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for
indirectly; for discontent with one’s condition under it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an
a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied energy of will. Similarly, I cannot have respect for
wants might easily become a great temptation to inclination, whether my own or another’s; I can at
transgression o f duty. . . . most if my own, approve it; if another’s, sometimes
It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are even love it; i.e., look on it as favorable to my own
to understand those passages of Scripture also in interest. It is only what is connected with my will
which we are commanded to love our neighbour, as a principle, by no means as an effect—what does
even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or
be commanded, but beneficence for duty’s sake; at least in case of choice excludes it from its calcula
even though we are not impelled to it by any incli tion—in other words, simply the law of itself, which
nation, nay, are even repelled by a natural and can be an object of respect, and hence a command.
unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude
not pathological, a love which is seated in the will, the influence of inclination, and with it every object
and not in the propensions of sense, in principles of the will, so that nothing remains which can
of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this determine the will except objectively the law , and
love alone which can be commanded. subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and
consequently the maxim2 to follow this law even to undoubtedly often be the case. I see clearly indeed
the thwarting of all my inclinations. that it is not enough to extricate m yself from a
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but
the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of it must be well considered whether there may not
action which requires to borrow its motive from this hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconve
expected effect. For all these effects—agreeableness nience than that from which I now free myself, and
of one’s condition, and even the promotion of the as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences
happiness of others—could have been also brought cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost
about by other causes, so that for this there would may be much more injurious to me than any mis
have been no need of the will of a rational being; chief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be
it is in this, however, alone that the supreme and considered whether it would not be more prudent to
unconditional good can be found. The preeminent act herein according to a universal maxim, and to
good which we call moral can therefore consist in make it a habit to promise nothing except with the
nothing else than the conception o f law in itself, intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that
which certainly is only possible in a rational being, such a maxim will still only be based on the fear of
in so far as this conception, and not the expected consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to
effect, determines the will. This is a good which is be truthful from duty, and to be so from apprehen
already present in the person who acts accordingly, sion of injurious consequences. In the first case, the
and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the very notion of the action already implies a law for
result.3 me; in the second case, I must first look about else
where to see what results may be combined with it
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE which would affect myself. For to deviate from the
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to
which must determine the will, even without paying be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often
any regard to the effect expected from it, in order be very advantageous to me, although to abide by
that this will may be called good absolutely and it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however,
without qualification? As I have deprived the will of and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this
every impulse which could arise to it from obedience question whether a lying promise is consistent with
to any law, there remains nothing but the univer duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content that my
sal conformity of its actions to law in general, which maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false
alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am promise) should hold good as a universal law, for
never to act otherwise than so that I could also will myself as well as for others? and should I be able
that my maxim should become a universal law. to say to myself, “Every one may make a deceitful
Here now, it is the simple conformity to law in gen promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from
eral, without assuming any particular law applicable which he cannot otherwise extricate himself”? Then
to certain actions, that serves the will as its prin I presently become aware that while I can will the
ciple, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a
delusion and a chimerical notion. The common rea universal law. For with such a law there would be
son of men in its practical judgments perfectly coin no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege
cides with this, and always has in view the principle my intention in regard to my future actions to those
here suggested. Let the question be, for example: who would not believe this allegation, or if they over
May I when in distress make a promise with the hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin.
intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a
between the two significations which the ques universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.
tion may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether I do not therefore need any far-reaching pen
it is right, to make a false promise. The former may etration to discern what I have to do in order that
my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the rela
course of the world, incapable of being prepared for tion of the objective laws to a will that is not thor
all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou oughly good, is conceived as the determination of
also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? the will of a rational being by principles of reason,
If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because but which the will from its nature does not of neces
of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even sity follow.
to others, but because it cannot enter as a princi The conception of an objective principle, in so far
ple into a possible universal legislation, and reason as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of
extorts from me immediate respect for such legis reason), and the formula of the command is called
lation. I do not indeed as yet discern on what this an Imperative.
respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), All imperatives are expressed by the word ought
but at least I understand this, that it is an estima (or shall ), and thereby indicate the relation of an
tion of the worth which far outweighs all worth of objective law of reason to a will, which from its sub
what is recommended by inclination, and that the jective constitution is not necessarily determined by
necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical it (an obligation). They say that something would
law is what constitutes duty, to which every other be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will
motive must give place, because it is the condition of which does not always do a thing because it is con
a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a ceived to be good to do it. That is practically good,
will is above everything. however, which determines the will by means of the
Thus then, without quitting the moral knowl conceptions of reason, and consequently not from
edge of common human reason, we have arrived at subjective causes, but objectively, that is, on princi
its principle. And although no doubt common men ples which are valid for every rational being as such.
do not conceive it in such an abstract and univer It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which
sal form, yet they always have it really before their influences the will only by means of sensation from
eyes, and use it as the standard of their decision____ merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of
this or that one, and not as a principle of reason,
MORAL AND NONMORAL IMPERATIVES which holds for every one.4
Everything in nature works according to laws. A perfectly good will would therefore be equally
Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting subject to objective laws (viz., of good), but could
according to the conception o f laws, that is accord not be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully,
ing to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduc because of itself from its subjective constitution it
tion of actions from principles requires reason, the can only be determined by the conception of good.
will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infal Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or
libly determines the will, then the actions of such a in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place,
being which are recognised as objectively necessary because the volition is already of itself necessarily in
are subjectively necessary also; i.e., the will is a fac unison with the law. Therefore imperatives are only
ulty to choose that only which reason independent formulae to express the relation of objective laws of
of inclination recognises as practically necessary, all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will
i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not suffi of this or that rational being, e.g., the human will.
ciently determine the will, if the latter is subject also Now all imperatives command either hypotheti
to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which cally or categorically. The former represent the
do not always coincide with the objective conditions; practical necessity of a possible action as means
in a word, if the will does not in itself completely to something else that is willed (or at least which
accord with reason (which is actually the case with one might possibly will). The categorical imperative
men), then the actions which objectively are rec would be that which represented an action as neces
ognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, sary of itself without reference to another end, that
and the determination of such a will according to is, as objectively necessary.
Since every practical law represents a possible arbitrary ends, of none of which can they determine
action as good, and on this account, for a subject whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to
who is practically determinable by reason as neces their pupil, but which it is at all events possible that
sary, all imperatives are formulae determining an he might aim at; and this anxiety is so great that
action which is necessary according to the principle they commonly neglect to form and correct their
of a will good in some respects. If now the action is judgment on the value of the things which may be
good only as a means to something else, then the chosen as ends.
imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good There is one end, however, which may be
in itself and consequently as being necessarily the assumed to be actually such to all rational beings (so
principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, far as imperatives apply to them, viz., as dependent
then it is categorical. beings), and, therefore, one purpose which they not
Thus the imperative declares what action possible merely may have, but which we may with certainty
by me would be good, and presents the practical rule assume that they all actually have by a natural
in relation to a will which does not forthwith per necessity, and this is happiness. The hypothetical
form an action simply because it is good, whether imperative which expresses the practical necessity of
because the subject does not always know that it is an action as means to the advancement of happiness
good, or because, even if it know this, yet its max is assertorical. We are not to present it as necessary
ims might be opposed to the objective principles of for an uncertain and merely possible purpose, but
practical reason. for a purpose which we may presuppose with cer
Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only tainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs
says that the action is good for some purpose, to his being. Now skill in the choice of means to his
possible or actual. In the first case it is a problemat own greatest well-being may be called prudence,5 in
ical, in the second an assertorical practical principle. the narrowest sense. And thus the imperative which
The categorical imperative which declares an action refers to the choice of means to one’s own happi
to be objectively necessary in itself without reference ness, that is, the precept of prudence, is still always
to any purpose, that is, without any other end, is hypothetical; the action is not commanded abso
valid as an apodictic (practical) principle. lutely, but only as means to another purpose.
Whatever is possible only by the power of some Finally, there is an imperative which commands
rational being may also be conceived as a pos a certain conduct immediately, without having as its
sible purpose of some will; and therefore the prin condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This
ciples of action as regards the means necessary to imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter
attain some possible purpose are in fact infinitely of the action, or its intended result, but its form and
numerous. All sciences have a practical part con the principle of which it is itself a result; and what
sisting of problems expressing that some end is is essentially good in it consists in the mental dis
possible for us, and of imperatives directing how it position, let the consequence be what it may. This
may be attained. These may, therefore, be called in imperative may be called that of morality.
general imperatives of skill. Here there is no ques There is a marked distinction also between the
tion whether the end is rational and good, but only volitions on these three sorts of principles in the dis
what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts similarity of the obligation of the will. In order to
for the physician to make his patient thoroughly mark this difference more clearly, I think they would
healthy, and for a poisoner to ensure certain death, be most suitably named in their order if we said they
are of equal value in this respect, that each serves are either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or
to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth commands (laws) of morality. For it is law only that
it cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to involves the conception of an unconditional and
us in the course of life, parents seek to have their objective necessity, which is consequently univer
children taught a great many things, and provide sally valid; and commands are laws which must be
for their skill in the use of means for all sorts of obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition
to inclination. Counsels, indeed, involve necessity, When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in

but one which can only hold under a contingent general, I do not know before hand what it will con
subjective condition, viz., they depend on whether tain, until I am given the condition. But when I con
this or that man reckons this or that as part of his ceive a categorical imperative I know at once what
happiness; the categorical imperative, on the con it contains. For as the imperative contains, besides
trary, is not limited by any condition, and as being the law, only the necessity of the maxim7 conform
absolutely, although practically, necessary may be ing to this law, while the law contains no condition
quite properly called a command. We might also call restricting it, there remains nothing but the general
the first kind of imperatives technical (belonging to statement that the maxim of the action should con
art), the second pragmatic6 (belonging to welfare), form to a universal law, and it is this conformity
the third moral (belonging to free conduct generally, alone that the imperative properly represents as
that is, to morals). necessary.
Now arises the question, how are all these imper There is therefore but one categorical imperative,
atives possible? This question does not seek to know namely this: A ct only on that maxim whereby thou
how we can conceive the accomplishment of the canst at the same time will that it should become a
action which the imperative ordains, but merely how universal law.
we can conceive the obligation of the will which Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced
the imperative expresses. No special explanation is from this one imperative as from their principle, then
needed to show how an imperative of skill is pos although it should remain undecided whether what
sible. Whoever wills the end wills also (so far as is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at
reason decides his conduct) the means in his power least we shall be able to show what we understand
which are indispensably necessary thereto____ by it and what this notion means.
We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the
possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have APPLYING THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
not in this case the advantage of its reality being Since the universality of the law according to which
given in experience, so that (the elucidation of ) its effects are produced constitutes what is properly
possibility should be requisite only for its explana called nature in the most general sense (as to form),
tion, not for its establishment. In the meantime it that is the existence of things so far as it is deter
may be discerned beforehand that the categorical mined by general laws, the imperative of duty may
imperative alone has the purport of a practical law; be expressed thus: A ct as if the maxim o f thy action
all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will were to become by thy w ill a Universal Law o f
but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for Nature.
the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting
considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any the usual division of them into duties to ourselves
time be free from the precept if we give up the pur and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.8
pose; on the contrary, the unconditional command 1. A man reduced to despair by a series of mis
leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite, fortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in
consequently it alone carries with it that necessity possession of his reason that he can ask himself
which we require in a law____ whether it would not be contrary to his duty to him
In this problem we will first inquire whether the self to take his own life. Now he inquires whether
mere conception of a categorical imperative may the maxim of his action could become a universal
not perhaps supply us also with the formula of it, law of nature. His maxim is: From self-love I adopt
containing the proposition which alone can be a cat it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer
egorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfac
of such an absolute command, yet how it is possi tion. It is asked then simply whether this principle of
ble will require further special and laborious study; self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now
which we postpone to the last section. we see at once that a system of nature of which it
should be a law to destroy life by the very feeling the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rust,
which is designed to impel to the maintenance of and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness,
life would contradict itself, and therefore could not amusement, and propagation of their species, in a
exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim can word to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will
not possibly exist as a universal law of nature and that this should be a universal law of nature, or be
consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For,
supreme principle of all duty. as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to faculties be developed, since they serve him for all
borrow money. He knows that he will not be able sorts of possible purposes, and have been given him
to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent for this.
to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a 4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees
definite time. He desires to make this promise, but that others have to contend with great wretchedness
he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: and that he could help them, thinks: What concern
Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to is it of mine? Let every one be as happy as heaven
get out of a difficulty in this way? Suppose how pleases or as he can make himself; I will take noth
ever that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of ing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish
his action would be expressed thus: When I think to contribute anything either to his welfare or to his
myself in want of money, I will borrow money and assistance in distress! Now no doubt if such a mode
promise to repay it, although I know that I never of thinking were a universal law, the human race
can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one’s might very well subsist, and doubtless even better
own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my than in a state in which every one talks of sympa
whole future welfare; but the question now is, Is thy and good will, or even takes care occasionally to
it right? I change then the suggestion of self-love put it into practice, but on the other side, also cheats
into a universal law, and state the question thus: when he can, betrays the rights of men or otherwise
How would it be if my maxim were a universal violates them. But although it is possible that a uni
law? Then I see at once that it could never hold versal law of nature might exist in accordance with
as a universal law of nature, but would necessar that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a prin
ily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a univer ciple should have the universal validity of a law of
sal law that every one when he thinks himself in nature. For a will which resolved this would contra
a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he dict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in
pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his prom which one would have need of the love and sympa
ise, the promise itself would become impossible, thy of others, and in which by such a law of nature,
as well as the end that one might have in view in sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself
it, since no one would consider that anything was of all hope of the aid he desires.
promised to him, and would ridicule all such state These are a few of the many actual duties, or at
ments as vain pretences. least what we regard as such, which obviously fall
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with into two classes on the one principle that we have
the help of some culture might make him a use laid down. We must be able to w ill that a maxim
ful man in many respects. But he finds himself in of our action should be a universal law. This is the
comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge canon of the moral appreciation of the action gen
in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging erally. Some actions are of such a character, that
and improving his happy natural capacities. He their maxim cannot without contradiction be even
asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it
natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination being possible that we should will that it should be
to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found,
He sees then that a system of nature could indeed but still it is impossible to w ill that their maxim
subsist with such a universal law, though men (like should be raised to the universality of a law of
nature, since such a will would contradict itself. It is alone would lie the source of a possible categorical
easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous imperative, i.e., a practical law. Now I say, man and
(inflexible) duty; the latter only laxer (meritorious) generally any rational being exists as an end in him
duty. Thus it has been completely shown how all self, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used
duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether
(not the object of the action) on the same principle. they concern himself or other rational beings, must
If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any always be regarded at the same time as an end. All
transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact objects of the inclinations have only a conditional
do not will that our maxim should be a universal worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded
law, for that it is impossible for us; on the contrary on them did not exist, then their object would be
we will that the opposite should remain a universal without value. But the inclinations themselves being
law, only we assume the liberty of making an excep sources of want, are so far from having an abso
tion in our own favour or (just for this time only) in lute worth for which they should be desired, that on
favour of our inclination____ the contrary it must be the universal wish of every
The will is conceived as a faculty of determining rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus
oneself to action in accordance with the conception the worth of any object which is to be acquired
o f certain laws. And such a faculty can be found by our action is always conditional. Beings whose
only in rational beings. Now that which serves the existence depends not on our will but on nature’s,
will as the objective ground of its self-determination have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings,
is the end, and if this is assigned by reason alone, it only a relative value as means, and are therefore
must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, called things; rational beings on the contrary, are
that which merely contains the ground of possibil called persons , because their very nature points
ity of the action of which the effect is the end, this them out as ends in themselves, that is as some
is called the means. The subjective ground of the thing which must not be used merely as means, and
desire is the spring, the objective ground of the voli so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an
tion is the motive; hence the distinction between object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely
subjective ends which rest on springs, and objec subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us
tive ends which depend on motives that hold for as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that
every rational being. Practical principles areform al is things whose existence is an end in itself; an end
when they abstract from all subjective ends, they moreover for which no other can be substituted,
are material when they assume these, and there which they should subserve merely as means, for
fore particular springs of action. The ends which otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute
a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as worth; but if all worth were conditioned and there
effects of his actions (material ends) are all only fore contingent, then there would be no supreme
relative, for it is only their relation to the particular practical principle of reason whatever.
desires of the subject that gives them their worth, If then there is a supreme practical principle or,
which therefore cannot furnish principles universal in respect of the human will, a categorical impera
and necessary for all rational beings and for every tive, it must be one which, drawn from the concep
volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all tion of that which is necessarily an end for every one
these relative ends can give rise only to hypotheti because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective
cal imperatives. principle of will, and can therefore serve as a uni
versal practical law. The foundation of this principle
PERSONS AS ENDS is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man
Supposing, however, that there were something necessarily conceives his own existence as being so;
whose existence has in itse lf an absolute worth, so far then, this is a subjective principle of human
something which being an end in itse lf , could actions. But every other rational being regards its
be a source of definite laws, then in this and this existence similarly, just on the same rational principle
that holds for me:9 so that it is at the same time an Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious)
objective principle, from which as a supreme practi duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action
cal law all laws of the will must be capable of being does not violate humanity in our own person as an
deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be end in itself, it must also harmonize with it . . . . Now
as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection
thine own person or in that o f any other, in every which belong to the end that nature has in view in
case as an end withal, never as a means only. . . . regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject; to
We will now inquire whether this can be practi neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the
cally carried out. maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but
To abide by the previous examples: not with the advancement of this end.
First, under the head of necessary duty to one Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards
self: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself others: The natural end which all men have is their
whether his action can be consistent with the idea of own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist
humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys him although no one should contribute anything to the
self in order to escape from painful circumstances, happiness of others, provided he did not intention
he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a ally withdraw anything from it; but after all, this
tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man would only harmonize negatively, not positively,
is not a thing, that is to say, something which can with humanity as an end in itself, if everyone does
be used merely as means, but must in all his actions not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward
be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which
therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be
person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. my ends also, if that conception is to have its full
(It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle effect with me.
more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding,
for example, as to the amputation of the limbs in NOTES
order to preserve myself; as to exposing my life to 1. The first proposition was that to have moral worth an action
danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question must be done from duty.
2. A m axim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective
is therefore omitted here.) principle (i.e., that which would also serve subjectively as a
Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full
of strict obligation, towards others: He who is power over the faculty of desire) is the practical law .
3. It might here be objected to me that I take refuge behind the
thinking of making a lying promise to others will word respect in an obscure feeling instead of giving a dis
see at once that he would be using another man tinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But
merely as a means, without the latter containing although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received
through influence, but is self-w rought by a rational concept,
at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I and, therefore, is specially distinct from all feelings of the
propose by such a promise to use for my own pur former kind, which may be referred either to inclination or
poses cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting fear. What I recognise immediately as a law for me, I recog
nise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness
towards him, and therefore cannot himself contain that my will is subordinate to a law, without the interven
the end of this action. This violation of the prin tion of other influences on my sense. The immediate deter
ciple of humanity in other men is more obvious if mination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of
this is called respect, so that this is regarded as an e ffe c t of
we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and the law on the subject, and not as the cause of it. Respect is
property of others. For then it is clear that he who properly the conception of a work which thwarts my self
transgresses the rights of men intends to use the love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither
as an object of inclination nor of fear, although it has some
person of others merely as means, without consid thing analogous to both. The object of respect is the law
ering that as rational beings they ought always to only, and that, the law which we impose on ourselves, and
be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who yet recognise as necessary in itself. As a law, we are sub
jected to it without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on
must be capable of containing in themselves the ourselves, it is a result of our will. In the former respect it
end of the very same action.10 has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination. Respect
for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, 6. It seems to me that the proper signification of the word prag
& c.), of which he gives us an example____ m atic may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanc
4. The dependence of the desires on sensations is called incli tions are called pragmatic which flow properly, not from the
nation, and this accordingly always indicates a w ant. The law of the states as necessary enactments, but from precau
dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles tion for the general welfare. A history is composed pragmati
of reason is called an interest. This, therefore, is found only cally when it teaches prudence, that is, instructs the world
in the case of a dependent will which does not always of how it can provide for its interests better, or at least as well
itself conform to reason; in the Divine will we cannot as the men of former time.
conceive any interest. But the human will can also take an 7. A maxim is a subjective principle of action . . . the principle on
interest in a thing without therefore actingfom interest. which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle
The former signifies the practical interest in the action, the valid for every rational being, and is the principle on which
latter the pathological in the object of the action. The former it ought to act that is an imperative.
indicates only dependence of the will on principles of reason 8. It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for
in themselves; the second, dependence on principles of rea afu tu re m etaphysic o f m orals; so that I give it here only as
son for the sake of inclination, reason supplying only the an arbitrary one (in order to arrange my examples). For the
practical rules how the requirement of the inclination may be rest, I understand by a perfect duty, one that admits no
satisfied. In the first case the action interests me; in the sec exception in favour of inclination, and then I have not
ond the object of the action (because it is pleasant to me). merely external but also internal perfect duties.
We have seen in the first section that in an action done from 9. This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The ground of
duty we must look not to the interest in the object, but only it will be found in the concluding section.
to that in the action itself, and in its rational principle (viz., 10. Let it not be thought that the common: quod tib i non vis
the law). fie r i, etc., could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is
5. The word prudence is taken in two senses: in the one it may only a deduction from the former, though with several limi
bear the name of knowledge of the world, in the other that of tations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain
private prudence. The former is a man's ability to influence the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevo
others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is lence to others (for many a one would gladly consent that
the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting others should not benefit him, provided only that he might
benefit. This latter is properly that to which the value even of be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally
the former is reduced, and when a man is prudent in the for that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this
mer sense, but not in the latter, we might better say of him principle the criminal might argue against the judge who
that he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent. punishes him, and so on.
1. Give one of Kant's reasons for his opposi c. Because everyone wants to be happy, we ought
tion to locating an action's moral worth in its to consider everyone's interests equally.
consequences. d. I ought not to cheat on this test if I do not want
2. When Kant refers to "a good will" or "good to get caught.
intention," does he mean wishing others well? 5. How does the character of moral obligation lead
Explain. to Kant's basic moral principle, the categorical
3. What does Kant mean by "acting out of duty?" imperative?
How does the shopkeeper exemplify this? 6. Explain Kant's use of the first form of the categorical
4. What is the basic difference between a categorical imperative to argue that it is wrong to make a false
and a hypothetical imperative? In the following promise. (Make sure that you do not appeal to the bad
examples, which are hypothetical and which are consequences as the basis of judging it wrong.)
categorical imperatives? Explain your answers. 7. According to the second form of Kant's categorical
a. If you want others to be honest with you, then imperative, would it be morally permissible for me
you ought to be honest with them. to agree to be someone's slave? Explain.
b. Whether or not you want to pay your share, you 8. What is the practical difference between a perfect
ought to do so. and an imperfect duty?

Deontological Ethics and I Mmanuil Kant

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Deontological Ethics and I Mmanuil Kant

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Deontological Ethics and

Subjects in the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments.

S tu d y Q u e stio n s wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind,

to inclination. Counsels, indeed, involve necessity, When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in

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