Virtue Ethics

Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Explain how virtue ethics differs from • Identify some features of the diverse
other approaches to ethics. cultural approaches to virtue.
• Describe some key virtues and how they • Explain how the idea of the Golden
are manifest in concrete situations. Mean functions in virtue ethics.
• Explain how virtues are connected to an • Provide an overview of Aristotle's moral
account of the functions or purposes of philosophy.
human life. • Defend your own thesis with regard to
• Describe how eudaimonia functions in the the value of virtue ethics.
theory of virtue.

MindTap For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.

P
at Tillman was a successful NFL player. He played safety for the Arizona Cardi­
nals, earning hundreds of thousands of dollars. After the September 11 attacks
in 2001, Tillman turned down a $3.6 million contract offer and enlisted in the Army.
He qualified to become an Army Ranger. His unit served in Iraq and in Afghanistan,
where he was killed, by accident, by members of his own platoon during a firefight.
Tillman’s death prompted a number of controversies. The Arm y initially informed
Tillman’s family and the public that he had been killed by enemy fire, in an appar­
ent effort to preserve the image of Tillman as a war hero. (Among other awards, he
posthumously received the Arm y’s Silver Star for Valor.) A subsequent book about
Tillman claimed that Tillman was not a supporter of the Iraq war and was critical
of President George W. B u sh .1 Nonetheless, Tillman remains a model of virtue and
courage. Senator John McCain used Tillman’s story to explain the virtues of citizen­
ship and patriotism in his book Character I s D e stin y .2 W hat is remarkable about
Tillman is his willingness to sacrifice a lucrative football career for life and death
as an Army Ranger. He seemed to embody virtues— such as courage, loyalty, self­
sacrifice, and patriotism—that are often mourned as deficient or absent in contempo­
rary society. Do you agree with this assessment? What role do such virtues play in
your own moral life?

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156 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY

When thinking about virtue, it is useful to think

about the people you admire. Whether it is a relative,
a coworker, a friend, or some celebrity, it is helpful
to consider the traits that make those people good.
We usually admire people who are courageous, kind,
honest, generous, loyal, diligent, temperate, fair,
modest, and hospitable. Such traits of character are
traditionally known as virtues.

VIRTUES AND EVERYDAY LIFE

The theories that we have treated so far in this text
are concerned with how we determine the right
action to take or policy to establish. The focus on
virtue takes a different approach to morality. Rather
than asking what we ought to do, virtue ethics asks
how we ought to be. Virtue ethics is concerned with
those traits of character, habits, tendencies, and dis­
positions that make a person good. When some or
all of the traits mentioned above are unusually well
developed in a person, that person may be regarded
as a hero or even as a saint. One version of virtue
ethics is focused on thinking about saints and heroes
as paradigms or exemplars of human excellence.
In a well-known article on the topic, Susan Wolf
Pat Tillman is looked to as a model of virtue.
described a moral saint as, “a person whose every
action is as good as possible, that is, who is as mor­
ally worthy as can b e.”3 But W olf goes on to argue get rid of the bad ones, that is, to develop our virtues
that moral saints are not especially happy, since and eliminate our vices.
the demands of saintly perfection m ight include The ethical issues that are treated in the second
self-sacrifice. A t issue here is a definition of happi­ h alf of this text are generally controversial social
ness. Virtue ethics tends to hold that happiness is issues: the death penalty, abortion, and terrorism,
something different from pleasure. Pat Tillman’s life for example. Virtue ethics seems more personal. It
and death were not particularly pleasant—he suf­ involves not so much asking which side of some
fered through Arm y Ranger training and then was social issue one should support as what kind of per­
killed at the age of twenty-seven. But perhaps there son one should be. Virtues can help us make good
is something more important than pleasure. A t any decisions in tough situations. But they also serve
rate, even if it is difficult and unpleasant to become us on a daily basis. Virtues such as courage, lo y ­
a hero or a saint, the virtue tradition maintains that alty, honesty, and fairness show up in our interac­
people live better when they possess most or all of tions with relatives, friends, and coworkers. We
the virtues. People can also exhibit bad character often think about virtues when we consider how our
traits. For exam ple, they can be coward, dishon­ behavior serves as a good (or bad) model for our
est, tactless, careless, boorish, stingy, vindictive, children, students, and colleagues.
disloyal, lazy, or egotistical. Another word for these Virtue ethics can be useful in thinking about the
bad traits such as these is vice. An ethics focused on applied issues discussed in the second h alf of the
virtue encourages us to develop the good traits and text. Virtues depend, in part, on our roles and help us

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fulfill the requirements of our roles: so soldiers ought
to be courageous and strong, while teachers ought to
be patient and kind. Virtue ethics encourages us to
consider the question of how a soldier’s virtues might
differ from those of a teacher. Some of the applied
topics we will discuss have connections with ques­
tions about the virtues of various vocations and roles.
In thinking about euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide, for example, issues arise regarding the proper
virtues of health care providers. In thinking about the
morality of abortion, we might think about proper vir­
tues of parents and lawmakers, as well as doctors. In
thinking about the morality of war, we consider the
virtues we associate with military service.
There will be overlap among the virtues found in
different vocations. But different roles require differ­
ent character traits and habits. This reminds us that
virtue ethics has a pluralistic aspect. There are many
different virtues that can be emphasized and inte­
grated in various w ays in the life of an individual.
Moreover, virtuous people tend to be responsive to
the unique demands of various situations; they do
the right thing, at the right time, in the right way,
exhibiting a sort of “ practical wisdom” that is sensi­
tive to context. From the standpoint of utilitarianism
or deontology, which wants clearly defined rules and
principles for action, virtue ethics can seem impre­
cise and vague. But an asset of virtue ethics may be
its sensitivity to context and its recognition of plu­
rality in morals.
Although we probably do not use the term vir­
tuous as frequently today as in times past, we still
understand the essence of its meaning. A virtuous
person is a morally good person, and virtues are good
traits. Another word that is useful in understanding
virtue is the word excellence. The virtues are those
things that make us excellent; they allow us to mani­
fest our highest potential. There is more than one
thing that makes us excellent. Indeed, virtues are
often described in the plural—as a list of qualities
that lead to living well. Loyalty is a virtue, and so is
honesty. A moral philosophy that concentrates on the
notion of virtue is called a virtu e e th ics. For virtue
ethics, the moral life is about developing good char­
acter. It is about determining the ideals for human life
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Chapter 8 « Virtue Ethics 157
and trying to embody these ideals in one’s own life.
The virtues are ways in which we embody these ide­
als. For example, if we consider honesty to be such an
ideal, then we ought to try to become honest persons.
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle was born in 384 bce in Stagira in northern
Greece. His father was a physician for King Philip of
Macedonia. Around age seventeen, he went to study
at Plato’s Academy in Athens. Aristotle traveled for
several years and then for two or three years was
the tutor to Alexander, Philip’s young son who later
became known as Alexander the Great. In 335 bce ,
Aristotle returned to Athens and organized his own
school, called the Lyceum . There, he taught and
wrote almost until his death thirteen years later, in
322 bce .4 Aristotle is known not only for his moral
theory, but also for writings in logic, biology, phys­
ics, metaphysics, art, and politics. The basic notions
of his moral theory can be found in his N icom a -
chean E th ics, named for his son Nicomachus.5
As noted in Chapter 7, Aristotle was one of the
earliest writers to ground morality in nature, and
specifically in hum an nature. His theory of eth­
ics and morality also stressed the notion of virtue.
For Aristotle, virtue was an excellence of some sort.
Our word virtu e originally came from the Latin vir
and referred to strength or manliness.6 In Aristotle’s
Greek, the term for virtue was arete, a word that can
also be translated as “excellence.”
According to Aristotle, there are two basic types
of virtue (or excellence): intellectual virtues and
moral virtues. Intellectual virtues are excellences of
mind, such as the ability to understand and reason
and judge well. Moral virtues, on the other hand,
dispose us to act w ell. These virtues are learned
by repetition. For instance, by practicing courage
or honesty, we become more courageous and hon­
est. Just as repetition in playing a musical instru­
ment makes playing easier, repeated acts of honesty
make it easier to be honest. The person who has the
virtue of honesty finds it easier to be honest than
the person who does not have the virtue. It becomes
habitual or second nature to him or her. The same
thing applies to the opposite of virtue, namely, vice.
158 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
The person who lies and lies again finds that lying is
easier and telling the truth is more difficult. One can
have bad moral habits (vices) as well as good ones
(virtues). Just like other bad habits, bad moral habits
are difficult to change or break. And like other good
habits, good moral habits take practice to develop.
V ir tu e a s a M e a n
Aristotle’s philosophy outlines a variety of particular
virtues including courage, temperance, justice, pride,
and magnanimity. However, Aristotle also provides a
unifying framework for understanding virtue in gen­
eral, as a mean between extremes. This idea is occa­
sionally known as the Golden Mean (and should
not be confused with the Golden Rule, which we’ve
discussed in previous chapters). By saying that vir­
tue is a m ean, we are using the word with reference
to how it is used in mathematics, where the m ean is
the average. (The term m ean here should also not
be confused with the idea of using someone as a
m eans, as we discussed in Chapter 6.)
To better understand the idea that virtue is a
m ean, take the follow ing exam ple. The virtue of
courage can be understood as a mean or middle
between the two extremes of deficiency and excess.
The virtue of courage has to do with fear. When fac­
ing danger or challenges, we should have neither too
much fear—which makes us unable to act—nor too
little fear—which makes us take reckless or foolish
risks. Too little fear leaves us “ foolhardy” ; too much
fear is called “ cowardice.” The virtue of courage is
having just the right amount of fear, depending on
what is appropriate for us as individuals and for the
circumstances we face. So, too, the other virtues can
be seen as means between extremes (as indicated in
the following table).
Deficit (Too Little)
Fear Foolhardiness
Giving Illiberality
Self-Regard Humility
Pleasures (No Name Given)
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Different authors have offered different lists
of virtues and corresponding vices. For the Greek
tradition, following Plato, there were four basic or
cardinal virtues: prudence (or wisdom), justice,
temperance, and courage. Questions arise about
which traits count as virtues and how these virtues
are related to corresponding vices. For example, we
might want to count loyalty and honesty as virtues.
If loyalty is a virtue, then is it also a middle between
two extremes? Can there be such a thing as too lit­
tle or too much loyalty? What about honesty? Too
much honesty might be seen as undisciplined open­
ness, and too little as deceitfulness.
Not all virtues m ay be rightly thought o f as
means between extremes. For example, if justice is
a virtue, then could there be such a thing as being
too just? It is important to note that virtue ethics still
maintains that some things are simply wrong and
not amenable to explanation in virtue terminology.
For example, murder is wrong; there is no right time
for murder or right amount of murder.
N a tu re , H u m a n N a tu re , a n d th e H u m a n G o o d
Aristotle was a close observer of nature. In fact, in
his writings, he mentions some five hundred differ­
ent kinds of anim als.7 He noticed that seeds of the
same sort alw ays grew to the same mature form.
He opened developing eggs of various species and
noticed that these organisms manifested a pattern
in their development even before birth. Tadpoles, he
might have said, always follow the same path and
become frogs, not turtles. So also with other living
things. Acorns always become oak trees, not elms.
He concluded that there was an order in nature. It
was as if natural beings, such as plants and animals,
had a principle of order within them that directed
Virtue (the Mean) Excess (Too Much)
Courage Cowardice
Liberality Prodigality
Pride Vanity
Temperance Profligacy

them toward their goal—their mature final form.
This view can be called a teleological view, from the
Greek word for “goal,” telos, because of its emphasis
on a goal embedded in natural things. It was from
this conclusion that Aristotle developed his notion
of the good. You might also notice that the idea of a
natural goal, purpose, or function showed up in the
discussion of natural law (in Chapter 7).
According to Aristotle, “the good is that at which
all things aim .” Good things are things that fulfill
some purpose, end, or goal. Thus, the good of the
shipbuilder is to build ships. The good of the lyre
player is to play well. The traits that allow for good
shipbuilding or lyre-playing will be somewhat differ­
ent. But good shipbuilders and good lyre players will
share certain virtues, such as intelligence and cre­
ativity. Aristotle asks whether there is anything that
is the good of the human being— not as shipbuilder
or lyre player, but simply as human. To answer this
question, we must first think about what it is to be
human. According to Aristotle, natural beings come
in kinds or species. From their species flow their
essential characteristics and certain key tendencies
or capacities. For exam ple, a squirrel is a kind of
animal that is, first of all, a living being. It devel­
ops from a young to a mature form. It is a mammal
and therefore has other characteristics of mammals.
It is bushy-tailed, can run along telephone wires,
and gathers and stores nuts for its food. From the
characteristics that define a squirrel, we also can
know what a g o o d squirrel is. A good specimen of a
squirrel is one that is effective, successful, and func­
tions well. It follows the pattern of development and
growth it has by nature. A good squirrel does, in
fact, have a bushy tail and good balance, and knows
how to find and store its food. It would be a bad
example of a squirrel if it had no balance, couldn’t
find its food, or had no fur and was sickly. It would
have been better for the squirrel if its inherent nat­
ural tendencies to grow and develop and live as a
healthy squirrel had been realized.
A ristotle though t o f hum an beings as n atu ­
ral beings with a specific hum an nature. Human
beings have certain specific characteristics and
abilities that we share as humans. Unlike squirrels
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Chapter 8 « Virtue Ethics 159
and acorns, hum an beings can choose to act in
the service of their good or act against it. But just
what is their good? Aristotle recognized that a good
eye is a healthy eye that sees well. A good horse
is a well-functioning horse, one that is healthy and
able to run and do w hat horses do. W hat about
human beings? Is there something comparable for
the human being as human? Is there some good for
humans as humans?
Just as we can tell w hat the good squirrel is
from its own characteristics and abilities as a squir­
rel, the same should be true for the human being.
For human beings to function well or flourish, they
should perfect their hum an capacities. If they do
this, they will be functioning well as human beings.
They will also be happy, for a being is happy to the
extent that it is functioning well. Aristotle believed
that the ultimate good o f hum ans is happiness,
blessedness, or prosperity. The Greek word for this
sort of happiness is eudaimonia. E u daim on ia is
not to be confused with pleasure. Indeed, the virtues
are often at odds with pleasure. A coward who is
afraid of danger is reluctant to experience pain. And
a courageous person may have to forgo pleasure and
submit to pain—including the pain of being killed.
Aristotle warned that pleasure can distract us from
w hat is good. Thus, Aristotle’s account of eu d a i­
m onia aims at a kind of happiness that is deeper and
longer lasting than mere pleasure. The term eudai­
m onia gives us a clue about this. The eu - prefix
means “good” ; and daim onia is related to the Greek
word for “ spirit” or “ soul.” Thus, Aristotle’s idea is
that virtue produces the happiness of having a good
soul or spirit, which fulfills essential human func­
tions or purposes.
Aristotle is thus interested in the question of
w hat our human functions or purposes might be.
Human beings have much in common with lower
forms of beings. For example, we are living, just as
plants are. Thus, we take in material from outside
us for nourishment, and we grow from an immature
to a mature form. We have senses of sight, hearing,
and so forth, as do the higher animals. We are social
animals as well, who must live in groups together
with other human beings. Since human beings have
160 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
various functions or purposes, there are various
types of virtue. For exam ple, the virtues of social
life help us fulfill our function as social beings. The
moral or social virtues would include honesty, loy­
alty, and generosity.
But is there an yth in g unique to h um ans, an
essentially hum an function or purpose? A risto­
tle believed that it is our “ rational element” that is
peculiar to us. The good for humans, then, is living
in accord with this rational element. Our rational ele­
ment has two different functions: one is to know,
and the other is to guide choice and action. We must
develop our ability to know the world and the truth.
We must also choose wisely. In doing this, we will
be functioning well, specifically as humans. Thus,
in addition to social or moral virtues, there are also
intellectual virtues, which help us fulfill our func­
tion as intelligent anim als. According to Aristotle,
these virtues include practical knowledge, scientific
knowledge, and practical wisdom. It is not surprising
that Aristotle—who was a philosopher and a student
of Plato—thought that the intellectual virtues were
more important than the other virtues, since they
help us fulfill our uniquely human capacities.
CROSS-CULTURAL AND
CONTEMPORARY VIRTUE ETHICS
Versions of virtue ethics can also be found in other
traditions. The Confucian tradition in China is often
described as a virtue tradition. This tradition traces
its roots back to Confucius (551-479 bce ), a figure
whose role in Chinese philosophy was similar to the
role Socrates played in Greek philosophy—as found­
ing character and touchstone for later authors who
w ant to reflect upon virtue and w isdom . Unlike
Socrates, however, who was something of a rough-
mannered outsider to the elite social scene of Athens,
Confucius was viewed as a model of courtly gentil­
ity and decorum. The Confucian tradition empha­
sizes two main virtues, je n (or ren) and li. Je n is
often translated as “humaneness” or “ compassion.”
L i is often translated as “ propriety,” “ manners,” or
“culture.” Confucian ethics aims toward a synthesis
of the virtues oriented around compassion and pro­
priety. In the A n a lects of Confucius, this is explained
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in various w a ys. Consider the follow ing sayin g
attributed to Confucius:
A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad,
respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and
truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and
cultivate the friendship of the good. When he has
time and opportunity, after the performance of these
things, he should employ them in polite studies.8
Confucius advises young people to be polite and
respectful, earnest and truthful, and to overflow
with love. Similar advice holds for others who are
at different stages of life’s journey. Confucius also
holds that there are specific virtues for those inhabit­
ing different roles: for fathers, brothers, sons, and
government officials. As is true of most of the other
traditions of the ancient world, the primary focus
here is on male roles; women’s roles were defined in
subordination to the male.
Other traditions emphasize different forms of vir­
tue. Hinduism emphasizes five basic moral virtues
ory a m a s: nonviolence (ahim sa), truthfulness, hon­
esty, chastity, and freedom from greed.9 Hinduism
also includes mental virtues to be perfected in medi­
tation and yogic practice: calm ness, self-control,
self-settledness, forbearance, faith, and complete con­
centration, as well as the hunger for spiritual libera-
tion.10 Buddhism shares with Hinduism an emphasis
on both intellectual and moral virtues. The “ noble
eightfold path” of Buddhism includes moral virtues
such as right speech, right action, and right liveli­
hood, as well as intellectual virtues of understanding
and m indfulness.11 Christian virtue ethics includes
similar moral virtues, as well as what Thomas Aqui­
nas called the “theological virtues.” In the Christian
tradition, the four cardinal moral virtues are pru­
dence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, while the
three theological virtues are faith, hope, and love. It
is easy to see that there is overlap among these dif­
ferent traditions in terms of the virtues required for a
good life, despite some clear differences. The common
thread that links them as traditions of virtue ethics is
the idea that habits and character traits matter, along
with sustained philosophical reflection on the reasons
that these habits and character traits matter.

Statue of Confucius in Shanghai, China.
Various contemporary moral philosophers have
also stressed the importance of virtue.12 For exam ­
ple, Philippa Foot has developed a contemporary
version of virtue ethics. She believes that the vir­
tues are “ in some general way, beneficial. Human
beings do not get on well without them .” 13 Accord­
ing to Foot, virtues provide benefits both to the vir­
tuous person and to his or her community, just as
vices harm both the self and the community. Think
of courage, temperance, and wisdom, for example,
and ask yourself how persons having these virtues
might benefit others as well as them selves. Some
virtues such as charity, how ever, seem to ben­
efit mostly others. But this makes sense for social
virtues, which help us fulfill our function as social
beings. However, there is an open question about
which beneficial character traits are to be thought of
as moral virtues and which are not. Wit or powers of
concentration benefit us, but we would probably not
consider them to be m oral virtues.
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Chapter 8 « Virtue Ethics 161
Foot also asks whether virtue is best seen in the
intention that guides an action or in the execution of
an action. Think of generosity. Does the person who
intends to be generous—but who cannot seem to do
what helps others—really possess the virtue of gen­
erosity? Or rather, is it the person who actually does
help who has the virtue? Foot believes that virtue is
also something we must choose to develop and work
at personifying. Furthermore, following Aristotle, Foot
argues that the virtues are corrective. They help us be
and do things that are difficult for us. For example,
courage helps us overcome natural fear. Temperance
helps us control our desires. Since people differ in their
natural inclinations, they also differ in what virtues
would be most helpful for them to develop. Foot’s view
is just one example of how the notion of virtue contin­
ues to be discussed by moral philosophers.
EVALUATING VIRTUE ETHICS
One question that has been raised for virtue eth­
ics concerns how we determine which traits are vir­
tues, and whether they are so in all circumstances.
Are there any universally valuable traits? Wherever
friendship exists, loyalty would seem necessary,
although the form it might take would vary according
to time and place. Honesty also seems necessary for
good human relations. We might also start with Aris­
totle’s own list of virtues, which reflected what were
considered the primary civic virtues of his day. But
Aristotle’s society included slavery and gender hier­
archy. One wonders whether it makes sense to speak
of virtuous slave-masters or whether the submis­
sive traits of women in patriarchal cultures are really
virtuous. Similar problems occur as we consider dif­
ferences among civilizations. Are the virtues of Con-
fucian culture the same (or better or worse) than the
virtues of Muslim, Christian, or Hindu cultures?
Con tem porary m oral p h ilo so p h e r A la sd a ir
MacIntyre believes that virtues depend at least partly
on the practices of a culture or society. A warlike
society will value heroic virtues, whereas a peaceful
and prosperous society might think of generosity as a
particularly important virtue.14 However, these must
also be virtues specific to human beings as humans,
for otherw ise one could not speak o f “ hum an
162 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
excellences.” But this is just the problem. What is it to
live a full human life? Can one specify this apart from
what it is to live such a life in a particular society or
as a particular person? The problem here is not only
how we know what excellences are human excel­
lences, but also whether there are any such traits that
are ideal for all persons, despite differences in gender,
social roles, and physical and mental capacities.
A further problem with regard to virtue is the
question of the degree of effort and discipline required
to be virtuous. Who manifests the virtue of courage
the most—the person who, as Foot puts it, “wants
to run away but does not or the one who does not
even want to run aw ay?”15 We generally believe that
we ought to be rewarded for our moral efforts, and
thus, the person who wants to run away but does not
seem more praiseworthy. On the other hand, posses­
sion of the virtue of courage is supposed to make it
easier to be brave. Part of Foot’s own answer to this
dilemma involves the distinction between those fears
for which we are in some way responsible and those
that we cannot help. Thus, a woman who feels like
running aw ay because she has contributed by her
own choices to being afraid is not the more virtuous
person. Foot also addresses the question of whether
someone who does something morally wrong—say,
robs a bank or commits a murder—and does so cou­
rageously, demonstrates the virtue of courage.
We can also ask whether virtue ethics is really a
distinct type of ethics. Consider two of the other theo­
ries we have discussed: utilitarianism (Chapter 5) and
deontology (Chapter 6). The concept of virtue is not
foreign to Mill or Kant. However, for both of them,
it is secondary. Their moral theories tell us how we
ought to decide what to do. Doing the right thing—
and with Kant, for the right reason—is primary. How­
ever, if the development of certain habits of action or
tendencies to act in a certain way will enable us to
do good more easily, then they would surely be rec­
ognized by these philosophers as good. Utilitarians
would encourage the development of those virtues
that would be conducive to the maximization of hap­
piness. If temperance in eating and drinking will help
us avoid the suffering that can come from illness and
drunkenness, then this virtue ought to be encouraged
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and developed in the young. So also with other vir­
tues. According to a Kantian, we should develop hab­
its and virtues that would make it more likely that we
act fairly (according to universalizable maxims) and
treat people as ends rather than simply as means.
When evaluating the virtue ethics tradition devel­
oped by Aristotle, we should also consider a more
specific criticism of it introduced by Kant. Kant argues
that Aristotle’s notion of virtue as a mean between
two vices—the Golden Mean—is simply false. Kant
writes that, “it is incorrect to define any virtue or vice
in terms of mere degree,” which “proves the useless­
ness of the Aristotelian principles that virtue consists
in the middle way between two vices.” 16 Kant rejects
the idea that there is a gradation of behaviors or dis­
positions from one extreme (or vice) to the other with
virtue in the middle. Rather, for Kant, some things
are praiseworthy and others are wrong, and do not
vary by degrees on a continuum. Kant suggests that
the Aristotelian idea of the Golden Mean simply con­
fuses us and distracts us from thinking about w hy a
given virtue is good. Bearing this argument in mind,
it is worth considering whether the idea of virtue as
a mean between vices really makes sense of the way
we ordinarily understand virtues such as courage and
vices like cowardice. Is this idea genuinely helpful to
us in identifying the nature of virtue?
In virtue ethics, the primary goal is to be a good
person. Now, a critic of virtue ethics might argue
that b ein g good is only a function of being in clin ed
to do good. However, ethics appears to require not
only a habitual inclination toward good deeds, but
also actually doing good. Is what matters the deed or
the inclination to carry it out? If what really matters
is the actions and deeds, then virtue is simply one
aspect of an action-oriented moral philosophy such
as consequentialism. However, virtue ethics does
have a somewhat different emphasis. It is an ethics
whose goal is to determine what is essential to being
a well-functioning or flourishing human person. Vir­
tue ethics stresses an ideal for humans or persons.
A s an ethics of ideals or excellences, it is an opti­
mistic and positive type of ethics. One problem that
virtue ethics may face is what to say about those of
us who do not meet the ideal. If we fall short of the

virtuous model, does this make us bad or vicious?
As with all moral theories, many questions concern­
ing virtue remain to engage and puzzle us.
The reading selection for this chapter is from
Aristotle’s The N icom achean E th ic s. In this piece,
Aristotle explains what virtue is, how it is related to
human functioning, and how it is a mean between
extremes.
NOTES
1. Jon Krakauer, Where Men Win Glory (New York:
Doubleday, 2009).
2. John McCain, Character Is Destiny (New York:
Random House, 2007).
3. Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” TheJournal o f
Philosophy 89, no. 8 (August 1982), p. 419.
4. W. T. Jones, A H istory o f Western Philosophy:
The Classical M ind, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1969), pp. 214-16.
5. This was asserted by the neo-Platonist Porphyry
(ca. 232 ce). However, others believe that the work
got its name because it was edited by Nicomachus.
See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame,
IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), p. 147.
6. Milton Gonsalves, Fagothy’s Right and Reason,
9th ed. (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1989), p. 201.
R E A D I N G
The Nicomachean Ethics
ARISTOTLE
MindTap For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
S tu d y Q u e s tio n s
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. What is virtue, and how do we acquire it?
2. How is virtue a mean? Explain this by using some of Aristotle's examples.
3. Why is it so difficult to be virtuous?
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Chapter 8 << Virtue Ethics 163
7. W. T. Jones, A History o f Western Philosophy, p. 233.
8. Confucius, Analects, in The Chinese Classics—
Volume 1: Confucian Analects, bk. 1, Chapter 6,
trans. James Legge (Project Gutenberg), http://
www.gutenberg.org/files/4094/4094-h/4094-h.htm
(accessed July 21, 2016).
9. Sunil Sehgal, ed., Encyclopedia o f Hinduism (New
Delhi: Sarup and Sons, 1999), p. 2:364.
10. Vensus A. George, Paths to the Divine: Ancient
and Indian (Washington, DC: CRVP Press, 2008),
p. 205.
11. Peter Harvey, Buddhism: Teachings, H istory and
Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 68-69.
12. See, for example, the collection of articles in Chris­
tina Hoff Sommers, Vice and Virtue in Everyday
Life (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985).
13. Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
14. Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Virtue in Heroic Societies”
and “The Virtues at Athens,” in After Virtue (Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984),
pp. 121-45.
15. Foot, Virtues and Vices, p. 10.
16. Kant, “Doctrine of Virtue,” in M etaphysics o f Mor­
als, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 184-85.
164 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD**
Every art and every scientific inquiry, and similarly
every action and purpose, m ay be said to aim at
some good. Hence the good has been well defined as
that at which all things aim. But it is clear that there
is a difference in the ends; for the ends are some­
times activities, and sometimes results beyond the
mere activities. Also, where there are certain ends
beyond the actions, the results are naturally superior
to the activities.
As there are various actions, arts, and sciences, it
follows that the ends are also various. Thus health is
the end of medicine, a vessel of shipbuilding, victory
of strategy, and wealth of domestic economy. It often
happens that there are a number of such arts or sci­
ences which fall under a single faculty, as the art of
making bridles, and all such other arts as make the
instruments of horsemanship, under horsemanship,
and this again as well as every military action under
strategy, and in the same way other arts or sciences
under other faculties. But in all these cases the ends
of the architectonic arts or sciences, whatever they
may be, are more desirable than those of the sub­
ordinate arts or sciences, as it is for the sake of the
former that the latter are themselves sought after. It
makes no difference to the argument whether the
activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or
something else beyond the activities as in the above
mentioned sciences.
If it is true that in the sphere of action there is
an end which we wish for its own sake, and for the
sake of which we wish everything else, and that we
do not desire all things for the sake of something else
(for, if that is so, the process will go on ad infinitum,
and our desire will be idle and futile) it is clear that
this will be the good or the supreme good. Does it
not follow then that the knowledge of this supreme
good is of great importance for the conduct of life,
and that, if we know it, we shall be like archers who
From Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. E. C. Welldon
(London: Macmillan, 1892), bks. 1 and 2.
*Headings added by the editor.
*Some notes omitted; the remaining notes renumbered.
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have a mark at which to aim, we shall have a bet­
ter chance of attaining what we want? But, if this
is the case, we must endeavour to comprehend, at
least in outline, its nature, and the science or faculty
to which it belongs____
HAPPINESS: LIVING AND DOING WELL
A s every knowledge and moral purpose aspires to
some good, what is in our view the good at which
the political science aim s, and w hat is the h igh ­
est of all practical goods? As to its name there is, I
may say, a general agreement. The masses and the
cultured classes agree in calling it happiness, and
conceive that “ to live w ell” or “ to do w ell” is the
same thing as “ to be happy.” But as to the nature
of happiness they do not agree, nor do the masses
give the same account of it as the philosophers. The
former define it as something visible and palpable,
e .g . pleasure, w ealth, or honour; different people
give different definitions of it, and often the same
person gives different definitions at different times;
for when a person has been ill, it is health, when
he is poor, it is w ealth, and, if he is conscious of
his own ignorance, he envies people who use grand
language above his own comprehension. Some phi­
losophers1 on the other hand have held that, besides
these various goods, there is an absolute good which
is the cause of goodness in them a ll____
THE FUNCTION OF A PERSON
Perhaps, however, it seems a truth which is generally
admitted, that happiness is the supreme good; what is
wanted is to define its nature a little more clearly. The
best way of arriving at such a definition will prob­
ably be to ascertain the function of Man. For, as with
a flute-player, a statuary, or any artisan, or in fact
anybody who has a definite function and action, his
goodness, or excellence seems to lie in his function,
so it would seem to be with M an, if indeed he has
a definite function. Can it be said then that, while a
carpenter and a cobbler have definite functions and
actions, M an, unlike them, is naturally functionless?
The reasonable view is that, as the eye, the hand, the
foot, and similarly each several part of the body has a

definite function, so Man may be regarded as having
a definite function apart from all these. What then,
can this function be? It is not life; for life is appar­
ently something which Man shares with the plants;
and it is something peculiar to him that we are look­
ing for. We must exclude therefore the life of nutri­
tion and increase. There is next what may be called
the life of sensation. But this too, is apparently shared
by M an with horses, cattle, and all other animals.
There remains what I may call the practical life of the
rational part of M an’s being. But the rational part is
twofold; it is rational partly in the sense of being obe­
dient to reason, and partly in the sense of possess­
ing reason and intelligence. The practical life too may
be conceived of in two w ays,2 viz., either as a moral
state, or as a moral activity: but we must understand
by it the life of activity, as this seems to be the truer
form of the conception.
The function of Man then is an activity of soul in
accordance with reason, or not independently of rea­
son. Again the functions of a person of a certain kind,
and of such a person who is good of his kind e.g. of a
harpist and a good harpist, are in our view generically
the same, and this view is true of people of all kinds
without exception, the superior excellence being only
an addition to the function; for it is the function of a
harpist to play the harp, and of a good harpist to play
the harp well. This being so, if we define the function
of Man as a kind of life, and this life as an activity
of soul, or a course of action in conformity with rea­
son, if the function of a good man is such activity or
action of a good and noble kind, and if everything is
successfully performed when it is performed in accor­
dance with its proper excellence, it follows that the
good of Man is an activity of soul in accordance with
virtue or, if there are more virtues than one, in accor­
dance with the best and most complete virtue. But it
is necessary to add the words “in a complete life.” For
as one swallow or one day does not make a spring, so
one day or a short time does not make a fortunate or
happy m an___
VIRTUE
Virtue or excellence being twofold, partly intel­
lectual and partly moral, intellectual virtue is both
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Chapter 8 << Virtue Ethics 165
originated and fostered mainly by teaching; it there­
fore demands experience and time. Moral3 virtue
on the other hand is the outcome of habit____From
this fact it is clear that no moral virtue is implanted
in us by nature; a law of nature cannot be altered
by habituation. Thus a stone naturally tends to fall
downwards, and it cannot be habituated or trained
to rise upwards, even if we were to habituate it by
throwing it upwards ten thousand times; nor again
can fire be trained to sink downwards, nor anything
else that follows one natural law be habituated or
trained to follow another. It is neither by nature then
nor in defiance of nature that virtues are implanted
in u s. Nature gives us the capacity of receiving
them, and that capacity is perfected by habit.
A g a in , if we take the various natural powers
which belong to us, we first acquire the proper facul­
ties and afterwards display the activities. It is clearly
so with the senses. It was not by seeing frequently
or hearing frequently that we acquired the senses of
seeing or hearing; on the contrary it was because we
possessed the senses that we made use of them, not
by making use of them that we obtained them. But
the virtues we acquire by first exercising them, as is
the case with all the arts, for it is by doing what we
ought to do when we have learnt the arts that we
learn the arts themselves; we become e.g. builders
by building and harpists by playing the harp. Simi­
larly it is by doing just acts that we become just, by
doing temperate acts that we become temperate, by
doing courageous acts that we become courageous.
The experience of states is a witness to this truth, for
it is by training the habits that legislators make the
citizens good. This is the object which all legislators
have at heart; if a legislator does not succeed in it,
he fails of his purpose, and it constitutes the distinc­
tion between a good polity and a bad one.
A gain, the causes and means by which any vir­
tue is produced and by which it is destroyed are the
same; and it is equally so with any art; for it is by
playing the harp that both good and bad harpists are
produced and the case of builders and all other arti­
sans is similar, as it is by building well that they will
be good builders and by building badly that they will
be bad builders. If it were not so, there would be no
166 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
need of anybody to teach them; they would all be
born good or bad in their several trades. The case
of the virtues is the same. It is by acting in such
transactions as take place between man and man
that we become either just or unjust. It is by acting
in the face of danger and by habituating ourselves
to fear or courage that we become either cowardly
or courageous. It is much the same with our desires
and angry passions. Some people become temperate
and gentle, others become licentious and passionate,
according as they conduct themselves in one way or
another way in particular circumstances. In a word
moral states are the results of activities correspond­
ing to the moral states them selves. It is our duty
therefore to give a certain character to the activities,
as the moral states depend upon the differences of
the activities. Accordingly the difference between
one training of the habits and another from early
days is not a light matter, but is serious or rather
all-important.
DEFICIENCY AND EXCESS
The first point to be observed then is that in such
matters as we are considering deficiency and excess
are equally fatal. It is so, as we observe, in regard
to health and strength; for we must judge of what
we cannot see by the evidence of what we do see.
Excess or deficiency of gymnastic exercise is fatal
to strength. Sim ilarly an excess or deficiency of
meat and drink is fatal to health, whereas a suit­
able amount produces, augments and sustains it. It
is the same then with temperance, courage, and the
other virtues. A person who avoids and is afraid of
everything and faces nothing becomes a coward; a
person who is not afraid of anything but is ready
to face everything becomes foolhardy. Similarly he
who enjoys every pleasure and never abstains from
any pleasure is licentious; he who eschews all plea­
sures like a boor is an insensible sort of person. For
temperance and courage are destroyed by excess
and deficiency but preserved by the mean state.
A gain , not only are the causes and the agen­
cies of production, increase and destruction in the
moral states the same, but the sphere of their activ­
ity will be proved to be the same also. It is so in
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other instances which are more conspicuous, e.g. in
strength; for strength is produced by taking a great
deal of food and undergoing a great deal of labour,
and it is the strong man who is able to take most
food and to undergo most labour. The same is the
case with the virtues. It is by abstinence from plea­
sures that we become temperate, and, w hen we
have become temperate, we are best able to abstain
from them. So too with courage; it is by habituating
ourselves to despise and face alarms that we become
courageous, and, w hen we have become coura­
geous, we shall be best able to face them.
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
We have next to consider the nature of virtue.
Now, as the qualities of the soul are three, viz.
emotions, faculties and moral states, it follows that
virtue must be one of the three. By the emotions I
mean desire, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, love,
hatred, regret, emulation, pity, in a word whatever is
attended by pleasure or pain. I call those faculties in
respect of which we are said to be capable of experi­
encing these emotions, e.g. capable of getting angry
or being pained or feeling pity. And I call those moral
states in respect of which we are well or ill-disposed
towards the emotions, ill-disposed e.g. towards the
passion of anger, if our anger be too violent or too
feeble, and well-disposed, if it be duly moderated,
and similarly towards the other emotions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emo­
tions; for we are not called good or evil in respect of
our emotions but in respect of our virtues or vices.
A gain , we are not praised or blamed in respect of
our emotions; a person is not praised for being afraid
or being angry, nor blamed for being angry in an
absolute sense, but only for being angry in a cer­
tain way; but we are praised or blamed in respect of
our virtues or vices. A gain, whereas we are angry
or afraid without deliberate purpose, the virtues are
in some sense deliberate purposes, or do not exist
in the absence o f deliberate purpose. It m ay be
added that while we are said to be moved in respect
of our emotions, in respect of our virtues or vices
we are not said to be moved but to have a certain
disposition.

These reasons also prove that the virtues are not
faculties. For we are not called either good or bad,
nor are we praised or blamed, as having an abstract
capacity for emotion. Also while Nature gives us our
faculties, it is not Nature that makes us good or bad,
but this is a point which we have already discussed.
If then the virtues are neither emotions nor faculties,
it remains that they must be moral states.
The nature of virtue has been now generically
described. But it is not enough to state merely that
virtue is a moral state, we must also describe the
character of that moral state.
It must be laid down then that every virtue or
excellence has the effect of producing a good con­
dition of that of which it is a virtue or excellence,
and of enabling it to perform its function well. Thus
the excellence of the eye makes the eye good and
its function good, as it is by the excellence of the
eye that we see well. Similarly, the excellence of the
horse makes a horse excellent and good at racing, at
carrying its rider and at facing the enemy.
If then this is universally true, the virtue or excel­
lence of man will be such a moral state as makes a
man good and able to perform his proper function
well. We have already explained how this will be the
case, but another w ay of making it clear will be to
study the nature or character of this virtue.
VIRTUE AS A MEAN
Now in everything, whether it be continuous or dis­
crete, it is possible to take a greater, a smaller, or an
equal amount, and this either absolutely or in rela­
tion to ourselves, the equal being a mean between
excess and deficiency. By the mean in respect of
the thing itself, or the absolute mean, I understand
that which is equally distinct from both extremes;
and this is one and the same thing for everybody.
By the mean considered relatively to ourselves I
understand that which is neither too much nor too
little; but this is not one thing, nor is it the same for
everybody. Thus if 10 be too much and 2 too little
we take 6 as a mean in respect of the thing itself; for
6 is as much greater than 2 as it is less than 10, and
this is a mean in arithmetical proportion. But the
mean considered relatively to ourselves must not be
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Chapter 8 « Virtue Ethics 167
ascertained in this way. It does not follow that if 10
pounds of meat be too much and 2 be too little for a
man to eat, a trainer will order him 6 pounds, as this
may itself be too much or too little for the person
who is to take it; it will be too little e.g . for M ilo,4
but too much for a beginner in gym nastics. It will
be the same with running and wrestling; the right
amount will vary with the individual. This being so,
everybody who understands his business avoids
alike excess and deficiency; he seeks and chooses
the mean, not the absolute mean, but the mean con­
sidered relatively to ourselves.
Every science then performs its function well,
if it regards the mean and refers the works which
it produces to the mean. This is the reason w hy it
is usually said of successful works that it is impos­
sible to take anything from them or to add anything
to them, which implies that excess or deficiency is
fatal to excellence but that the mean state ensures
it. G o o d .. .artists too, as we say, have an eye to the
mean in their works. But virtue, like Nature herself, is
more accurate and better than any art; virtue there­
fore will aim at the mean;—I speak of moral virtue,
as it is moral virtue which is concerned with emotions
and actions, and it is these which admit of excess
and deficiency and the mean. Thus it is possible to
go too far, or not to go far enough, in respect of fear,
courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain
generally, and the excess and the deficiency are alike
wrong; but to experience these emotions at the right
times and on the right occasions and towards the
right persons and for the right causes and in the right
manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is
characteristic of virtue. Similarly there may be excess,
deficiency, or the mean, in regard to actions. But vir­
tue is concerned with emotions and actions, and here
excess is an error and deficiency a fault, whereas the
mean is successful and laudable, and success and
merit are both characteristics of virtue.
It appears then that virtue is a mean state, so
far at least as it aims at the mean. Again, there are
many different ways of going wrong; for evil is in its
nature infinite, to use the Pythagorean5 figure, but
good is finite. But there is only one possible way of
going right. Accordingly the former is easy and the
168 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark but difficult
to hit it. This again is a reason why excess and defi­
ciency are characteristics of vice and the mean state
a characteristic of virtue.
“For good is simple, evil manifold.”6
Virtue then is a state of deliberate moral purpose
consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the
mean being determined ...b y reason, or as a prudent
man would determine it.
It is a mean state fir s t ly a s ly in g between two
vices, the vice o f excess on the one h and, and
the vice of deficiency on the other, and secondly
because, whereas the vices either fall short of or go
beyond what is proper in the emotions and actions,
virtue not only discovers but embraces that mean.
Accordingly, virtue, if regarded in its essence
or theoretical conception, is a mean state, but, if
regarded from the point of view of the highest good,
or of excellence, it is an extreme.
But it is not every action or every emotion that
admits of a mean state. There are some whose very
name implies wickedness, as e.g. malice, shameless­
ness, and envy, among emotions, or adultery, theft,
and murder, am ong actions. A ll these, and others
like them, are censured as being intrinsically wicked,
not merely the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is
never possible then to be right in respect of them;
they are always sinful.
Right or wrong in such actions as adultery does
not depend on our committing them with the right
person, at the right time or in the right manner; on
the contrary it is sinful to do anything of the kind at
all. It would be equally wrong then to suppose that
there can be a mean state or an excess or deficiency
in unjust, cowardly, or licentious conduct; for, if it
were so, there would be a mean state of an excess
or of a deficiency, an excess of an excess and a defi­
ciency of a deficiency. But as in temperance and
courage there can be no excess or deficiency because
the mean is, in a sense, an extreme, so too in these
cases there cannot be a mean or an excess or defi­
ciency, but, however the acts may be done, they are
wrong. For it is a general rule that an excess or defi­
ciency does not admit of a mean state, nor a mean
state of an excess or deficiency.
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But it is not enough to lay down this as a gen­
eral rule; it is necessary to apply it to particular cases,
as in reasonings upon actions, general statements,
although they are broader... , are less exact than par­
ticular statements. For all action refers to particulars,
and it is essential that our theories should harmonize
with the particular cases to which they apply.
SOME VIRTUES
We must take particular virtues then from the cata­
logue7 o f virtues.
In regard to feelings of fear and confidence, cour­
age is a mean state. On the side of excess, he whose
fearlessness is excessive has no nam e, as often
happens, but he whose confidence is excessive is
foolhardy, while he whose timidity is excessive and
whose confidence is deficient is a coward.
In respect of pleasures and pains, although not
indeed of all pleasures and pains, and to a less
extent in respect o f pains than of pleasures, the
mean state is tem perance. . . , the excess is licen­
tiousness. We never find people who are deficient in
regard to pleasures; accordingly such people again
have not received a name, but we m ay call them
insensible.
As regards the giving and taking of money, the
mean state is liberality, the excess and deficiency
are prodigality and illiberality. Here the excess and
deficiency take opposite forms; for while the prodigal
man is excessive in spending and deficient in taking,
the illiberal man is excessive in taking and deficient
in spending.
(For the present we are giving only a rough and
summary account o f the virtu es, and that is suffi­
cient for our purpose; we will hereafter determine
their character more exactly.8)
In respect of money there are other dispositions
as well. There is the mean state which is magnifi­
cence; for the m agnificent m an, as havin g to do
with large sums of money, differs from the liberal
man who has to do only with small sums; and the
excess corresponding to it is bad taste or vulgarity,
the deficiency is meanness. These are different from
the excess and deficiency of liberality; what the dif­
ference is will be explained hereafter.
 Chapter 8 « Virtue Ethics 169

In respect o f honour and dishonour the mean but we must do our best here as elsewhere to give
state is highmindedness, the excess is what is called them a name, so that our argument may be clear
vanity, the deficiency littlemindedness. Correspond­ and easy to follow____
ing to liberality, which, as we said, differs from mag­
nificence as having to do n o t w ith g re a t b u t with WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO BE VIRTUOUS
small sums of money, there is a moral state which That is the reason why it is so hard to be virtuous;
has to do with petty honour and is related to high­ for it is always hard work to find the mean in any­
mindedness which has to do with great honour; for thing, e .g . it is not everybody, but only a man of
it is possible to aspire to honour in the right way, or science, who can find the mean or centre9 of a cir­
in a way which is excessive or insufficient, and if a cle. So too anybody can get angry—that is an easy
person’s aspirations are excessive, he is called ambi­ matter— and anybody can give or spend money,
tious, if they are deficient, he is called unambitious, but to give it to the right persons, to give the right
while if they are between the two, he has no name. amount of it and to give it at the right time and for
The dispositions too are nameless, except that the the right cause and in the right way, this is not what
disposition of the ambitious person is called ambi­ anybody can do, nor is it easy. That is the reason
tion. The consequence is that the extremes lay claim w hy it is rare and laudable and noble to do well.
to the mean or intermediate place. We ourselves Accordingly one who aims at the mean must begin
speak of one who observes the mean sometimes as by departing from that extreme which is the more
ambitious, and at other times as unambitious; we contrary to the mean; he must act in the spirit of
sometimes praise an ambitious, and at other times Calypso’s10 advice,
an unambitious person. The reason for our doing
“Far from this smoke and swell keep thou thy bark"
so will be stated in due course, but let us now dis­
cuss the other virtues in accordance with the method for of the two extremes one is more sinful than the
which we have followed hitherto. other. A s it is difficult then to hit the mean exactly,
Anger, like other emotions, has its excess, its defi­ we must take the second best course,11 as the say­
ciency, and its mean state. It may be said that they ing is, and choose the lesser of two evils, and this
have no names, but as we call one who observes we shall best do in the way that we have described,
the mean gentle, we will call the mean state gentle­ i.e . b y stee rin g clea r o f the e v il w hich is fu r th e r
ness. Am ong the extremes, if a person errs on the fro m the m ean. We must also observe the things to
side of excess, he may be called passionate and his which we are ourselves particularly prone, as differ­
vice passionateness, if on that of deficiency, he may ent natures have different inclinations, and we may
be called impassive and his deficiency impassivity. ascertain what these are by a consideration of our
There are also three other mean states with a feelings of pleasure and pain. And then we must
certain resemblance to each other, and yet with a drag ourselves in the direction opposite to them; for
difference. For while they are all concerned with it is by removing ourselves as far as possible from
intercourse in speech and action, they are different what is wrong that we shall arrive at the mean, as
in that one of them is concerned with truth in such we do when we pull a crooked stick straight.
intercourse, and the others with pleasantness, one But in all cases we must especially be on our
with pleasantness in amusement and the other with guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure,
pleasantness in the various circumstances of life. We as we are not impartial judges of pleasure. Hence
must therefore discuss these states in order to make our attitude towards pleasure must be like that of the
it clear that in all cases it is the mean state which elders of the people in the Iliad towards Helen, and
is an object of praise, and the extremes are neither we must never be afraid of applying the words they
right nor laudable but censurable. It is true that these use; for if we dismiss pleasure as they dismissed
mean and extreme states are generally nameless, Helen, we shall be less likely to go wrong. It is by

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170 PART ONE » ETHICAL THEORY
action of this kind, to put it summarily, that we shall
best succeed in hitting the mean.
NOTES
1. Aristotle is thinking of the Platonic “ideas.”
2. In other words life may be taken to mean either the
mere possession of certain faculties or their active
exercise.
3. The student of Aristotle must familiarize himself
with the conception of intellectual as well as of
moral virtues, although it is not the rule in modern
philosophy to speak of the “virtues” of the intellect.
4. The famous Crotoniate wrestler.
5. The Pythagoreans, starting from the mystical sig­
nificance of number, took the opposite principles of
“the finite” . . . and “the infinite” . . . to represent good
and evil.
REVIEW EXERCISES
1. What is the basic difference between virtue ethics
and other types of ethics we have studied?
2. According to Aristotle, what is the difference
between intellectual and moral virtue?
3. Explain the importance of character and habits in
evaluating the morality of a human life.
4. Give a list of some virtues and related vices; explain
how these virtues contribute to eudaimonia.
MindTap For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
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6. A line—perhaps Pythagorean—of unknown
authorship.
7. It would seem that a catalogue of virtues. . . must
have been recognized in the Aristotelian school. Cp,
Eud. Eth. ii. Chapter 3.
8. I have placed this sentence in a parenthesis, as it
interrupts the argument respecting the right use of
money.
9. Aristotle does not seem to be aware that the
centre ...o f a circle is not really comparable to the
mean... between the vices.
10. Odyssey, pp. xii, 219, and 200; but it is Odys­
seus who speaks there, and the advice has been
given him not by Calypso but by Circe (ibid.
pp. 101-110).
11. The Greek proverb means properly “we must take
to the oars, if sailing is impossible.”
5. According to Aristotle, how is virtue a mean between
extremes? Give some examples.
6. Are there virtues that are excellences for all human
beings, or are virtues dependent upon our roles or
our culture?
7. Who most exemplifies the virtue of courage— the
person who finds it difficult to be brave or the person
who finds it easy to be courageous?