The Ottoman Road to War in 1914:

The Ottoman Empire and the First World War

By Mustafa Aksakal

A Review

Chris Murray

Submitted to
Dr. Nikolas Gardner

War Studies 543

The First World War

Royal Military College of Canada

25th November 2013
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Aksakal, Mustafa. The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World
War. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 194 Pages. Bibl. to p. 207. Index to p.
216. $36.95(CDN)

Reviewed by Chris Murray

At the outbreak of the First World War there remained one imperial power not

immediately drawn into the fray, the Ottoman Empire. By the beginning of the 20th century the

Ottomans were being described as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ in diplomatic circles.1 However

weak the Ottoman Empire was, or appeared to be, its geographical location made its strategic

significance clear to all major powers.2 Beyond strategic concerns, ‘Great Power’ anxiety over

the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war was rooted in domestic concerns. Britain, France,

Russia, and Austria-Hungary, all had significant Muslim populations within their own empires

and the Ottoman entry into the war risked a call to jihad the name of Islam by the Ottoman’s

against their enemies.3

The motivations for the Ottoman Empire’s delayed entry into the war and chosen

alliances has historically been portrayed in a rather simplistic light.4 Traditional attempts to

address the Ottoman entry into the war often describe it as being precipitated by Enver Pasha,

Ottoman Minister of War. These accounts describe Enver Pasha as a “hawk in thrall to Germany,

[who] more or less single-handedly pushed the empire into a war it did not want” by essentially

“hijack[ing] Ottoman policy”5

1
Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig, “European Wars, 1815-1914”, in Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War,
1914-1917 (2004), 3; Scott Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the
Modern Middle East. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013), 34; Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in
1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1
2
Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917, 28, 32
3
Ian F.W. Beckett, The Great War. (2nd ed.) (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 104; David French,
“The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914—1916”, War & Society 5, no. 1 (May
1987), 48, 51-2; Joseph Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War." ." Middle Eastern
Studies 12, no. 1 (1976), 9, 12
4
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 1; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 77-9
5
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 1
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Mustafa Aksakal’s recent contribution to this historiography, The Ottoman Road to War

in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (2010), is aimed at remedying the lack of

substantive work on the subject of Ottoman entry into the war. Aksakal’s aim is to establish a

thorough understanding of the Ottoman view of events leading up to and immediately after the

outbreak of the war. In doing so Aksakal addresses shortcomings in the established orthodoxy

and attempts to dispel the myths surrounding these events.6

Aksakal’s knowledge of German and Turkish places him in a unique position to examine

elements previously overlooked by most contemporary scholars.7 His research is guided by

extensive use of Ottoman archives which has incorporated previously unpublished material. He

utilizes several Ottoman archival collections, including the archives of the Prime Minister and

Turkish General Staff. Beyond this several German archival collections and a host of official

histories are utilized. In addition Aksakal draws upon contemporary publications and memoirs

outside the reach of most English language scholars because of linguistic limitations. Ultimately

his examination provides a fresh and expansive insight into the Ottoman perspective and

motivations leading up to the outbreak of the war.

Aksakal’s examination develops a far more complicated picture of events surrounding

Ottoman entry into the war than previously considered. Without failing to emphasize Enver

Pasha’s influence within the Ottoman government, Aksakal effectively dispels the myth of the

one man policy maker.8 Instead of the simple explanation that has prevailed, Aksakal promotes a

narrative that is both, more complex and surprisingly familiar to those who study the ‘Great

Powers’ entry into the war.9 Indeed, through Aksakal’s research it would appear that the

6
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 1-18
7
Ibid, introduction
8
Ibid, 10-17, 39-41, 191
9
Ibid, 1, 30-4
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Ottoman road to war closely paralleled that of other ‘Great Powers’, most closely that of

Germany. This involved the common elements of security concerns; a desire to tweak the

imperial balance of power; popular opinion; imperial prestige; militaristic culture; social

Darwinism; and imperial ambition.10

Aksakal describes the Ottoman Empire’s chief concern to lie in security against the threat

of imperial encroachment by Europe’s ‘Great Powers’.11 The First and Second Balkan wars in

particular were disheartening to any Ottoman policy maker who had placed faith in the

‘Congress of Europe’s’ international system. Increasingly, the ‘Congress of Europe’ appeared to

be a house of hypocrisy, morally bankrupt and long bereft of any sense of honour or credibility.

To a great many within the Ottoman Empire, “might makes right” was seen as the only true

avenue to securing one’s place under the sun.12

With the loss of territory and imperial power on the decline the issues of imperial

ambition and security became intertwined for the Ottomans. The Ottomans were firmly

convinced of the insecurity of their international position and that their paramount priority lay in

fortifying the empire against further encroachment.13 By Aksakal’s account, the most significant

source of Ottoman insecurity lay in the threat of Russian aggression concerning the Straits.14

Beyond this, the members of the Entente, despite its declared interest in preserving the Ottoman

Empire as a ‘buffer state’, were beginning to take on a more adversarial posturing in the Balkans.

This was part of a grander strategy aimed at checking the Ottomans and chiselling away at her

imperial frontiers.15 Aksakal points to Entente support of Greece as further alienating the

10
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 30-4
11
Ibid, 10-17, 39-41, 57-62
12
Ibid, 96; Aksakal, Mustafa. ‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad” War in History
18, no. 2 (April 2011), 195
13
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 39-41
14
Ibid, 42
15
Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917, 28; Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire”, 4
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Ottomans from the Entente. It would seem that the two powers held irreconcilable interests.16

Indeed, this Entente-Ottoman conflict had become so severe that in Aksakal’s eyes it was what

had precipitated the Young Turk revolution.17

With mounting concerns, Ottoman leaders viewed the most effective path to securing

their future to lie in an alliance with one or several of the ‘Great Powers.’ To the Ottomans, war

was viewed as an opportunity to secure its position within the international order and assure an

alliance treaty with one of the ‘Great Power’ blocks.18 Of particular interest in Aksakal’s

narrative is the level of sophistication that seems to have been demonstrated in Ottoman

diplomatic strategy. Aksakal’s research finds that not only were the Ottomans well versed in

‘Great Power’ diplomacy but had learnt their lessons well.19

Likely the most intriguing element in Aksakal’s work lies in this examination of Ottoman

diplomatic manoeuvring whilst pursuing these alliance ambitions. Aksakal describes the

Ottomans as employing a deeply perceptive, cunning and successful diplomatic campaign aimed

at achieving their goals for a ‘Great Power’ alliance while avoiding, or at least delaying entry

into the war.20 Aksakal challenges the conventional view that the Ottoman’s first sought out,

with sincerity, an Entente alliance and only after being rebuffed turned to the central powers.

Aksakal argues that the traditional narrative ignores the reality of the Ottoman-Entente

relationship as well as Ottoman perceptions of the Entente’s agenda. As such, in Aksakal’s view,

Ottoman concerns over growing Entente ambitions makes any genuine overtures of

rapprochement on the part of the Ottomans unlikely.21

16
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 46-7
17
Ibid, 57-62
18
Ibid, 96; Mustafa Aksakal, "The Limits of Diplomacy: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War." Foreign
Policy Analysis 7 (2011), 197
19
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 98, 113-4, 117, 128-9
20
Ibid, 98, 113-4, 117, 128-9
21
Ibid, 90-1
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Aksakal argues that Ottoman negotiations must be viewed within the context of Ottoman-

Entente antagonism. In this view, it is Aksakal’s opinion that the Ottomans saw an alliance with

the central powers as the only real course of action.22 Aksakal therefore contends that the

Ottomans engaged in what one might liken to the proxy politics of the Cold War era, engaging in

a double game of negotiations using the threat of alliance with one power against the other.23 He

further contends that all negotiations between the Ottomans and Entente powers leading up to the

Ottoman entry into the war were simply, an elaborate Ottoman smokescreen aimed at keeping

Entente powers from learning their game whilst simultaneously using these negotiations to force

a better deal with the central powers.24

Aksakal’s contribution brings light to an avenue of First World War research that has

remained dark. In doing so, Aksakal dispelled many of the myths contemporary historiography

on the subject is predicated upon. Aksakal reveals that a level of misunderstanding prevails on

crucial issues surrounding a region of the world that was essentially the lynch pin for the

outbreak of the First World that is cause for a moments pause. Although Aksakal has begun

pursuit of a topic which could fill volumes, his work represents a brief, but comprehensive

overview of the currents prevalent within Ottoman decision making. His work acts as a jumping

off point for further research into the field and is an essential element in creating a

comprehensive foundation for any examination into, to borrow from the lexicon of the ‘Great

Powers’, the “Eastern Question”.25

CHRIS MURRAY
Royal Military College of Canada

22
Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, 96, 192
23
Ibid, 49, 98, 113-4, 117, 128-9
24
Ibid, 114-7, 128
25
Niall Ferguson “The Last Days of Mankind: 28 June-4 August 1914”, in Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining
World War I (1998), 143; Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917, 26
 Bibliography

Aksakal, Mustafa. "The Limits of Diplomacy: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War."
Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 197-203.

Aksakal, Mustafa. ‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad” War in
History 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 184-199.

Aksakal, Mustafa. The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World
War. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the
Modern Middle East. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013.

Beckett, Ian F.W. The Great War. (2nd ed.) Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2007.

French, David. “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern
Strategy, 1914—1916” War & Society 5, no. 1 (May 1987): 45-61.

Ferguson, Niall. “The Last Days of Mankind: 28 June-4 August 1914”, in Ferguson, The Pity of
War: Explaining World War I (1998).

Hamilton, Richard and Herwig, Holger. “European Wars, 1815-1914”, in Hamilton and Herwig,
Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (2004), 23-46.

Heller, Joseph. "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War." Middle Eastern
Studies 12, no. 1 (1976): 3-44.