Notes toward a Theory of Style

Author(s): John W. Dixon, Jr.

Source: Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Oct., 1967), pp. 172-
177
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society of Architectural
Historians
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 Notes Toward a Theory of Style
JOHN W. DIXON, JR.
THE RESOURCES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE make
possible certain kinds of rhetorical treatment of issues. I
hope very quickly to revert to a more straightforward
treatment, but I want to begin by stating categorically,
"There is no such thing as style."
Since the art historicalprofession quite literally depends
on the concept of style, I should hastily draw on other re-
sourcesof language and shift the emphasisa bit: "There is
no such thingas style."
This emendation may not entirely suffice. Style remains
just as important to the profession whatever tricks of em-
phasis we might use. Yet it really isn't a trick. It is quite
literallytrue that there is no such thingas style and many of
the difficultiesin formulatinga useabletheory of style grow
precisely out of the fact that our common usage has come
to speak of it as though it were a thing and men only its
agents. Perhaps,then, we had better begin by a reformula-
tion of the phenomenon that we call style. For it is true that
works of art do not exist in freely chosen forms but that
they resemble each other in certain clearly identifiable
groupings, that the changes that take place are not random
but, generally speaking, orderly and intelligible.
We have given these groupings the name "style" and it
is a convenient shorthandif we rememberwhat we aretalk-
ing about. Unfortunately we usually do not remember
what the referenceof the word "style"is. The words "Ital-
ian Renaissancestyle" ought to be a shorthandreferencefor
the statement,"those characteristicssharedby the works of
art produced by Italian artists during a given period of
time." But incorrigibly we assumethat words, particularly
nouns, referto things. We presupposea thing even if we do
not know what it is, so we assumethere is a "thing" called
"the ItalianRenaissancestyle."
Let us not play with words and let us particularlytry to
avoid reviving the old quarrelbetween the realistsand the
nominalists.It would be better to stick more closely to the
problems of art history. I am convinced that this "thingify-
172
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University of NorthCarolina
ing," this hypostatization of basic concepts, has been de-
cisive for our professional work. Reducing concepts to
things is not, however, the whole problem. It is rather
what we do with these "things"in the program of the con-
temporary academic mind.
The basic assumption,the unexaminedpresuppositionof
the contemporary academic mind, is still basically linear
and causal.All things have causesand the causeshave causes
and the true natureof a thing is understoodby discovering
its causes,preferablyin infinite regress.This certainly does
not describe all our professionalresearch,but it describes
enough to be disturbingand it describesnearlyall the teach-
ing of the disciplinethat I know of. Sinceneitherthe hypos-
tatizing of style nor the primary importance of causal se-
quence has been demonstrateda more adequate theory of
style is required.
Theorizing of this kind is not popular in our profession,
and for good reason;our immediate ancestorsbadly abused
works of artby compressingthem into the mold of inappro-
priate stylistic theory. Nevertheless, all our investigative
procedurespresupposea theory of style, whether we like it
or not. Therefore,if we areto control our proceduresrather
than being controlled by them it is requiredof us that we
formulate consciously and clearly the theory of style we
want to be committed to.
There is, however, a better reason for seeking a more
adequatetheory of style. I once complimented a colleague
on the range and penetrationof an exam he had made out
but, I added, "There is one question that does not appear
here: what is there about this work of art that justifies
spendingtwo hours out of anybody'slife writing about it?"
"Oh, that's the question we don't ask," he replied.
Yet, it is the question that must be askedand specifically
I want to ask it in the context of a theory of style and not in
the context of philosophictheoriesof value. Partof the rea-
son we don't raise this question, not only in our writing
but also in our teaching, lies preciselyin the fact that those

earlier treatmentsof the question (which we find so pro-
fessionally offensive and an obstruction to true scholarly
work) were drawn from theories of value originating in
either theology or philosophy. Thus, questionsfundamen-
tal to our discipline were being subordinatedto categories
of another discipline. This was not only offensive to the
growing professionalpride of a very young academicdisci-
pline, it manifestlyviolated the works we had to deal with.
If the question is to be dealt with at all-and it is the central
question of our profession-it will have to be in terms rele-
vant to the disciplineand not those of philosophy. Thus, the
theory of style is relevant to the technical problems of the
discipline since, in fact, it does determine how we use our
scholarlytools. It also, in a less usualclaim for such theory,
resolves the question of relevance, the importance or sig-
nificance of works of art that the anecdote raises.
Much of the basic work for this attempt has, fortunately,
alreadybeen done. In his magisterialessay, "Style," Meyer
Schapirohas summed up the various theories of style that
have governed art history and criticism. He did not choose
to group these theories under any general headings and for
the purposesof his essay I see no reasonwhy he should. My
purposes, however, suggest such an attempt.
Very roughly it seems to me that the theories can be di-
vided into two principalgroups, each of which to a greater
or lesserdegree subordinatesthe work of art to something
else by finding its cause outside the creative act of the artist.
The first group of theories derives style from something
outside art-Weltanschauung, social and economic class,
the sexual life of the artistor his group, the physical milieu,
etc. The second group, in a number of complex ways, sees
a style as an existing thing and the individual work of art
as a part of that thing.
Since I have claimed that stylistic theory determines
practice and that practice presupposestheory, let me sug-
gest very briefly the kinds of connections between theory
and practice that are relevant to this argument.
Under the first type of stylistictheory, those that find the
origin of the work in forces outside art, historicaland criti-
cal researchseeks to establishthe necessarylinks with the
structuresthat determinethe work of art and criticalanaly-
sis develops the expression of those views or social struc-
turesin the work itself. If the critic is concernedmore with
the originating force his theory can be called determinist.
If he is more interested in the manifestation of that
force he would more properly be called an expressionist.
These theories, while influential, I would judge to be
much the least influential in the profession at the present
time.
The second group would include those which, con-
sciously or unconsciously, dominate the profession today.
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I73
In these theories the style is consideredan existing thing or
force. The function of criticismand researchis to define the
larger shape of the style or the nature of the originating
force and to clarify the role of the individual work in the
larger whole.
This group in turn divides into two groups. The genetic
theories stressthe origin of the work in preceding works,
whatever the final shape of the style might be. The teleo-
logical theoriesstressthe completion of a preordainedshape
of the style, whatever the motor force might be.
I judge the genetic theories to be the most influentialto-
day, particularly when no theory has been consciously
articulated. While much published work, particularlyin
journals, is the brick and mortar work of iconography,
connoisseurship,and simple historicalresearch,a very large
partof scholarlywriting assumesthat the work of art can be
accounted for by searchingout its genetic antecedents.It is
an assumptionfrequentlymet in our literaturethat no artist
ever really createssomething by himself. He always gets it
from some source.
Where stylistic theories are consciously articulatedthey
tend to be idealist or teleological, assuminga shapeof style
that it is the duty of the individualartistto bring into being.
This is particularlytrue of our conventional attitudes to-
ward certainperiodswith the unexaminedvaluejudgments
of terms like High Gothic, High Renaissance,etc.
The genetic theories are the constant temptation of the
historiansof painting and sculpturewho spend so much of
their time looking for "sources" (which is the genetic fal-
lacy) while assumingthe overriding force of stylisticshape.
Historians of architecturetend to see the overall shape of
the style in its idealist or teleological form.
The cleareststatementI know of this last fallacy is found
in the writings of none other than Erwin Panofsky, in a
statement that is almost a caricatureof this position (sug-
gesting that even the off moments of a great man can be
instructive). In his Gothic Architectureand Scholasticism,
Panofsky points out the return of the architect of Laon
cathedralto the older use oftransepts and many towers and
adds, "it took the succeeding generationstwo more cathe-
drals to get rid of the extra towers surmounting the tran-
septs and the crossing."
This remarkablestatement assumesthat there is such a
thing as "the Gothic cathedral,"that we know what it is
since we can see the whole shape of the style, that those ar-
chitects who did not contribute toward the realizationof
this ideal type must have been obtuse or guilty of a failure
of nerve since the duty of man is to bring into actualitythe
ideal types laid up in the essentialorder of things.
It is relevant to this discussionthat there is a logical de-
velopment in Gothic architectureand Laon doesn't quite
174
fit. The reasonsfor this logic will have to be consideredin
a moment.
All the types of stylistic theory should be similarlyillus-
tratedand in the book length study the subjectrequiresthey
would have to be examined in detail. There are many such
theories consciously or unconsciously held but this one
illustrationof one of the most influentialtheories will have
to suffice.
So many and so complex bodies of theory can hardly be
dealt with by only one counter-argument,but I find myself
disturbed by one characteristicthey seem to share. Each
subsumesthe work of the artistunder something else. The
artistis, therefore, an agent, even a consequence, of forces
outside himself and there is no true freedom. This, of
course,proves nothing in itself. I might be temperamentally
disposed toward freedom and therefore dislike procedures
that call it into question,but in those terms the reply might
well be, "Sorry, but that's the way things are." I would
prefer, therefore, to have a theory of style that would con-
tain some indication of the relevance to us and to our stu-
dents of what is happening,both in the art work and in the
critical act that elucidatesthe art work. It is difficult to lo-
cate relevance in most stylistic theories and, therefore, in
most of our teaching and professionalwriting. Presumably
the deterministtheorieswould shift the question of value to
the ideas or institutions that are being embodied or ex-
pressed.The teleological theorieswould do much the same,
only this time shifting the value problem to the system of
ideastaking shapein the style. I am not surewhere the value
of genetic researchlies, tracing antecedentsback to the first
syllables of recorded time. There is undoubtedly an addi-
tion to the store of human knowledge and we assume that
this is good without saying why. Certainly it is fun to do.
The very existence of these problems reflectsour general
subservienceto modes of thinking, primarilyphilosophical,
that are reallynot appropriateto the making or the study of
art. Ratherthan beginning with large generalideasit would
be farbetterto startwith the operationof artandof criticism.
These general theories of the kind I have been referring
to ought to do something that, so far as I know, none does.
They ought to answer the question-how do we get from
this general force to the actualspecificwork? I assumethey
presupposethe artistas an agent but in my experience they
simply presupposeit without paying the price of an ade-
quate psychological, even physiological, theory, to account
for so extraordinarilycomplex an act.
In point of fact, no institution,no idea or system of ideas,
no past art work or overarching style makes an art work.
A specific human being makes an art work. He makes his
art work in the form of all human achievements:he begins
with his chosen task and makes a series of decisions about
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his tools and his materialsuntil he decidesthe work is com-
plete. The art work, therefore,is not the product of abstract
forces or hypostatized systems. It is the product of human
decision. This is true of all of man's making and I include in
the "all" everything from the simplest pot to the Sistine
ceiling.
There is nothing very obscureabout this elementaryfact,
yet I submit that it is not only elementarybut elemental. If
we take it seriouslyit might not transformour procedures,
but it would transformour understandingof what we do.
This means a significant alterationin our sense of purpose
and makes possiblethe generationwithin the disciplineof a
sense of its value and also, as I shall try to suggest briefly,
puts our proceduresinto a differentrelation to each other.
We are, in fact, dealing with the operational basis for a
doctrine of freedom without depending on philosophical
theory: the art work is the product of actions which are
freely chosen. This capitalin a mediaeval church exists be-
cause a human being chose to cut here and not there.
Obviously, we also have here the operationalbasefor de-
termining the limits of human freedom and thus we might
be safeguardedfrom some sentimentalities:this capital ex-
ists as it does becauseif the mason had cut there instead of
here he would have lost hisjob. This is equally true of many
paintersand sculptorsin the past and many architectsin the
present. But these are external constraintsthat do not de-
cisively qualify the basic position.
What does qualify the position is the simplestfact of our
professionalwork. The theory of free choice as the force
generating the art work does not in itself suggest any limit
on that choice; the pot or the painting could be anything
the artistchooses. In fact, this is not the case: all (or nearly
all) objects fall into groups that are clearly distinguishable
from other groups. This likeness,this style, very clearly re-
lateseach objectwith its predecessorsandthereundoubtedly
is an overall shape to the stylistic changes. The genetic and
the teleological theoriesareoperationallyquite adequatefor
our work. Yet they are rarely in any intimate way related
to the deterministor expressionisttheoriesof style. Current
theory, by and large, does not permit those relations.Con-
sequently from being cooperating theories they become
competing fallacies,each claiming to account for the work.
Thus we arrive at a modified conclusion: the art work is
the product of the decision of the artistbut he is obviously
not free to make the work entirely differentfrom the work
of others. Man's freedom is under constraintbut it is also
conditioned. How far does this conditioning extend?Again
we deal with a questionthat is fundamentalto the theory of
style.
There are two types of relevant evidence. Some of these
groupings of similarwork, such as Egyptian sculpture,that

we refer to as styles have slow movement and a long life.
Others, such as cubism or impressionism, are exhausted
within a generation. Then there are those objects made by
men who would never think of themselves as artists,who
would feel quite astonishedand uneasy at being told they
were free and who find even a religious value in not being
different.Yet as ProfessorKubler in The Shapeof Timehas
so carefullypointed out, among pots so produced there are
very real changes over long periods of time, a shift in the
language that itself producesa shapeof style. Yet even here
we aredealingwith decision. It is a human decisionto decide
to make works like as well as unlike other works, even if
the decision is not articulatedbut assumed.
Thus we are faced with constraintson the freedom of de-
cision as well as long-term changes that follow their own
laws without the intervention of the conscious decision of
the artist. These are serious qualificationsof the notion of
freedom and they become part of the evidence that a theory
of style must account for. Yet this is not a concession to
those who find the origin of history in abstractforces. I am
not talking about "influences,"which are basicallyanother
hypostatization. The creative consciousnessof man is the
arenawhere conflicting choices are made. "Influences"are
those things he is habituatedto and is inclined toward. Only
he himself can make the decision among the variety of such
"influences,"including his own internal pressure toward
the new and original. We can speak of the "determining
forces" because in fact most people are too weak and un-
creative to decide for things other than those they are com-
fortably familiarwith and the greatest man is only partly
original. But, for better or for worse, the decision is the
responsibilityof the individual.
The third piece of evidence that must be accounted for is
the unquestioned shape of a style. Any theory that cannot
account for that shapemust necessarilyfall. It is the presence
of this shapethat has createdboth the genetic and teleologi-
cal fallaciesin criticism,yet I would like to suggest that the
evidence can be read differently.
The very existence of stylistic similaritiesassuresus that
man is by naturelimited in his freedom to choose. He is not
compelled to act by external force. He simply tends to do
what he has been taught to do. Florentineartistsproduced
works looking like other Florentineworks since they saw
the same landscapes,the samepaintings,were taught similar
habits of perception, and came out of a small number of
relatedstudios.If a Flemishwork came to Florenceit had an
impact on the artistsinsofaras they could adjusttheir minds
to it. Right now there is certainly a Florentineartistpaint-
ing like de Kooning or Warhol because Art News is sold
there as well as here.
Thus the process is really not very complicated but it is
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I75
extremely important. Styles endure because of a kind of
inertia growing out of the limitation of man. A new style
is born when some individual comes up with a new way of
doing things, a new artisticidea, a new problem, as Profes-
sor Ackerman has so eloquently defined it.
It develops becauseother artistsseize on the new idea for
their own purposes. The development occupies different
lengths of time and is shaped differently because different
things are wanted of the idea. Rarely can even the greatest
artist, even Giotto or Cezanne, exhaust the possibilitiesof
the basic idea in the early stages of a style and make up a
seriesof experimentsand explorationsto develop the neces-
sary technical instruments, to explore all the possibilities
inherent in the originating idea. It is a time of excitement
and discovery.
There comes a time, however, when the techniquesare
under complete control and all possibilities are explored.
The resourcesof the style are masteredand the calm confi-
dence of the "classic"moment marks this mastery. This is
not a moment which earlierworks havebeen aiming for: the
architectof Paestumwas not trying to build the Parthenon
and failing. It is a moment that appearsas a naturalconse-
quence of the nature of man. Confidence comes with mas-
tery and the classic attitude cannot characterizean earlier
moment.
Prior to the classicmoment thereis an inclinationto resist
radicallynew ideas because of involvement in the current
one. After the classicmoment there is no reasonwhy a new
stylistic idea cannot cut right acrossthe old one as Gothic
did the Romanesque.
If there is not a new idea there are several choices avail-
able. The first is the prolongation of the classic moment.
This is the decision of conservatives,the academics.There
is no reason why this cannot be prolonged indefinitely:
Egyptian sculpturearrivedrapidlyat its classicstatementin
the Fifth Dynasty and prolonged that statementwith slight
modification for centuries.
The second possibility is to rebel againstit. This requires
a particulartemperament and a particularconjunction of
opportunitiesso it cannot be representedas a universalmo-
ment in all styles. It appearsmost prominently in the classi-
cal and post-classicalwestern styles that emphasizechange
rather than the non-classical,non-western styles that em-
phasizecontinuity. We know it best as mannerism-the re-
bellion that takesthe form of exaggeratingor contradicting
the basic idea.
The thirdpossibilityis to play with the basicidea, a reso-
lution that we know best as the Rococo.
At no stage is there anything mysteriousabout thesephe-
nomena: they exist as productsof decision, underlimitation
and within the prevailing conditions. There is nothing in
176
the least compulsive about any of this. The patternhappens
to fit much of western art because our minds work that
way, but it by no meansfits all of western art or a large part
of other art. There is no reasonwhy any stage in the process
cannot become normative if the makers so decide.
At this point we are, perhaps,equipped to handle Panof-
sky's account of the Gothic style. We sit, god-like, above a
style and see its beginning, its middle, and its end. We as-
sume that, becauseit did work out this way, it was intended
to work out this way and individualsfulfill their destiny by
bringing this imperious "reality" to actual form. Thus
Gothic is defined by the coherent development that took
place in the north of France,its influence radiatingto other
areaswhere the true Gothic was modified into provincial
imitation.
I make no case for a different evaluation. Were I asked
my opinion of the greatest Gothic church I could not get
out of the Ile de Franceand in my uninstructedyouth, Lin-
coln and York, which had looked so grand when I first saw
them, looked a little cramped after I saw the great French
cathedrals.What I respondedto at the age of eighteen is of
some interestand probably of some importance. Be that as
it may, neither Lincoln nor SantaCroce look limited to me
now. They are simply different.
There is, apparently,something in us that respondsmost
affectionatelyto that moment of mastery and balance that
representsthe culminating point, the classic moment of a
style. We may know thatthe architectat Paestumwas mak-
ing his own temple. But the Parthenon has our complete
loyalty.
Yet in doing this we have made the pleasures of our
neurophysiologicalsystem, the satisfactionthat comes with
completeness and mastery, into a general theory of value
-even worse-made it a tool of history.
"Gothic" is not a name for a style-thing. It is the descrip-
tion of certainpossibilities.It is not an imperial abstraction
but a way of experiencing the world. Languageconditions
but does not determine the experiences men have and the
issue is not the developing shape of the language except as
that, too, shows us how the creative minds of men actually
work. The point is what men do with the language in the
encounter with their experience.
I cannot prove this next assertion,but I am cheered by
the fact thatI cannotbe proved wrong either.In short, there
is no reasonto think,just becausethe development did take
place in this way and we find the resultaestheticallysatisfy-
ing, that it had to happen in this way. From the initial idea
a number of possibilitieswere open. Each successive solu-
tion to the problem limited by its own force the possibilities
available to the next artist and thus finally generated the
magnificent and coherent stylistic structure we rightly so
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respect.But we forgotthatthisachievementdeterminesthe
responses we maketo it. We arenourishedon the Gothicas
it is andso judge Gothicas it is to be the truestandardof
value.But had men chosendifferentlyGothiccould have
been different.Laonwas a diversionfrom our Gothic.Do
we knowthatit had to be a deadend?
Thepricewe payis a greatone. Forthosewhosenational
or professional loyaltiesdo not requireit of themthe "na-
tional"Gothicstylesdo not nourishthe spiritas the great
FrenchGothicdoes.But the Duomo of Florenceis whatit
is in its own right,not becauseit doesthisor thatwith "the
Gothic."
We paya priceof innocenceaswell. Likeallprofessionals
who arenot specialists I haveseenthe oftenusedpictureof
the exteriorof the choir of St. Pierrein Caen.I did not
know of the chapelsinsidethosewalls.To discoverthem
was to reexperience somethingof the innocenceof my first
experience of art. Herewas a fantasylandunlikeanything
I hadseenoutsideof SouthIndia,a momentof purearchi-
tecturaldelight.The exteriorof thesechapelsmakesan art
historian's pointin thehistoryof style-an illegitimatecross
betweenGothicand Renaissance. But the chapelvaulting
doesn'tproveanythingandso is virtuallyignored.
Thus, the stylisticmoment makespossibleexpressions
thatwouldnot havebeenpossiblebefore,bothbecausethe
techniquesandformswerenot available.It is, therefore,the
conditionwithin which humanexpressiontakesplace.It
doesnot determinevalueandit doesnot replacethejob of
analysisandinterpretation thatmustbe donewhenthecon-
ditionshave been established.This last taskis the whole
point of arthistoricalwork. It is the work thatrevealsthe
relevanceof artfor it is in the dispositionof his expressive
materialprovidedto him by his stylisticmomentthatre-
vealswho the artistis.
Thissuggestsstillanothertheoryof styleto be addedto
Shapiro'slist.Hisfinalitemis whathe refersto as"thislittle
exploredview"thatthe greatartistis the immediatesource
of the periodstyle.Perhapsthisview shouldbe morefully
explored,but I havelittleinclinationto do so, particularly
afterShapiro's expositionof thefaultsof thetheory.Perhaps
I want only to preemptthe designationof the theoryand
drop the word greatfrom the descriptionof it. Thusmy
theoryof stylewouldsimplystatethattheartistis thesource
of the style.The artwork is an act of decisionby an indi-
vidual. Style is a consequenceof rationaland intelligible
actsby particularartists,not hypostatizedsystems.
The phenomenonwe call styleis not, therefore,the es-
senceof theworkbutits condition,the limitswithinwhich
it is made.Morepositively,it is the affirmation of commu-
nity, sinceno man is separatebut workswith the imple-
ments he is given.

Thus the decisions of individualsboth fix the limits and
open the possibilitiesfor those who act in the range of the
choices. Art historicalwork becomes a definition of human
possibility and purpose, thus acquiring a "meaning" be-
yond the securing of increasingquantitiesof information.
I have assertedboth that all art historicalor criticalwork
presupposessome theory of style and, conversely, all theory
of style has consequences in historical and critical work.
What then are the consequences of this one? It does not
suggest that our present proceduresshould be significantly
changed.Ratherthey should be reorderedin their relationto
each other and to the final act of criticism.
We might, for example, be able to make use of a wider
variety of apparentlycompeting methods if we could rec-
ognize just what it is they are really talking about, their
"point of entry" into the account of the creative act. Some
historical and critical proceduresare properly directed to-
ward the conditions of the original decision and certainex-
ternal purposesthat might be inherent in it. Other proce-
dures are directed toward the work that is the product of
those decisions. All these proceduresare appropriateat cer-
tain points and inappropriateonly if they claim to do more
than they properly can or "enter"the account at a point not
properly their own.
Many, even most of us, resistcertaindoctrinaireMarxist
and Freudiancriticism that claims to account for the work
of art. We might be more hospitable if we could see that
those proceduresreally attempt to define the psychical in-
strument the artist uses to make his decisions. They also
provide an account of much of the symbolic material the
artist chooses from and with.
Similarly,the history of style gives an account of the for-
mal possibilitiesavailablefor his decision as well as his pow-
ers of innovation. While I intend this as only one of what
needs to be a number of such accounts,it is of primary im-
portancesinceit dealswith what we dowith so much of our
professional work. A great deal of our work defines the
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177
possibilitieswithin which a man must work. That provides,
of course, a measure of his originality but that is only one
aspect of his relevance. Most significant is what he does
with his possibilities.This "entrance,"as ProfessorKubler
has so aptly termed it, is not so much a limitation as simply
the condition of his work.
These are sampleillustrationsonly. A full account would
have to place all the appropriateproceduresin proper rela-
tion to each other. Time does not permit that here. But the
theory does more thanjust place our proceduresin appro-
priate relation to each other. It centers them on the act of
decision which is the primaryact of being human. Thus art
history, instead of being one of the "sciences,"in the nine-
teenth-century sense of the word, is one of the means of
defining how men have made themselves human. It is a
difficult thing to be a man.
The work of art is the consequenceof a human act. It is,
therefore,a revelationof man'spurposesas he has seen them
and it communicates them to us. The work of art is the
arena of choice and the instrument of choice itself. It is
what happens and we do not have to rely on intention or
effect to decide what happens. Nevertheless what it is, is
not isolated from its human context or humane relevance,
which is the besetting sin of modern research.Rather the
work, whether simple and unpretentiousor as elaborateas
the greatestwork, is an embodiment of, a concretion of,
some aspect of the artist'shumanity and, therefore, acces-
sible to us as persons.
Thus researchbecomes a matter of determiningthe con-
ditions under which the choice is made, the limitationsand
the possibilitiesof any particularsituationand all the factors
that bear on the act of decision.
Criticismalonejustifies and usesthe materialgatheredby
research.Criticism is the account in the work of the deci-
sions as actually made and is, therefore, the accounting for
the human relevance of the object as the consequence and
the occasion for the act.