Pro Messer Sec+

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Professor Messer’s CompTIA Security+

SY0-601 Course Notes http://www.ProfessorMesser.com


1.1 - Phishing
Phishing – Some great summaries on • Attack the victim as someone higher in
• Social engineering with a touch of https://reddit.com/r/Scams rank
spoofing – Office of the Vice President for
– Often delivered by email, text, etc. Finding the best spot to phish Scamming
– Very remarkable when well done • Reconnaissance • Throw tons of technical details around
• Don’t be fooled – Gather information on the victim – Catastrophic feedback due to the
– Check the URL • Background information depolarization of the differential
• Usually there’s something not quite – Lead generation sites magnetometer
right – LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram • Be a buddy
– Spelling, fonts, graphics – Corporate web site – How about those Cubs?
• Attacker builds a believable pretext
Tricks and misdirection – Where you work Eliciting information
• How are they so successful? – Where you bank • Extracting information from the victim
– Digital sleight of hand - it fools the best – Recent financial transactions – The victim doesn’t even realize this is
of us – Family and friends happening
• Typosquatting – Hacking the human
– A type of URL hijacking Spear phishing • Often seen with vishing (Voice Phishing)
https://professormessor.com • Targeted phishing with inside – Can be easier to get this information
– Prepending: information over the phone
https://pprofessormesser.com – Makes the attack more believable • These are well-documented
• Pretexting • Spear phishing the CEO is “whaling” psychological techniques
– Lying to get information – Targeted phishing with the possibility of – They can’t just ask, “So, what’s your
– Attacker is a character in a situation a large catch password?”
they create – The CFO (Chief Financial Officer) is
– Hi, we’re calling from Visa regarding an commonly speared Identity fraud
automated payment to your utility • These executives have direct access to • Your identity can be used by others
service… the corporate bank account – Keep your personal information safe!
– The attackers would love to have those • Credit card fraud
Pharming credentials – Open an account in your name, or use
• Redirect a legit website to a bogus site your credit card information
– Poisoned DNS server or client 1.1 - Impersonation • Bank fraud
vulnerabilities The pretext – Attacker gains access to your account or
• Combine pharming with phishing • Before the attack, the trap is set opens a new account
– Pharming - Harvest large groups of – There’s an actor and a story • Loan fraud
people • “Hello sir, my name is Wendy and I’m – Your information is used for a loan or
– Phishing - Collect access credentials from Microsoft Windows. This is an urgent lease
• Difficult for anti-malware software to check up call for your computer as we • Government benefits fraud
stop have found several problems with it.” – Attacker obtains benefits on your behalf
– Everything appears legitimate to the • Voice mail: “This is an enforcement
user action executed by the US Treasury Protect against impersonation
intending your serious attention.” • Never volunteer information
Phishing with different bait • “Congratulations on your excellent – My password is 12345
• Vishing (Voice phishing) is done over the payment history! You now qualify for 0% • Don’t disclose personal details
phone or voicemail interest rates on all of your credit card – The bad guys are tricky
– Caller ID spoofing is common accounts.” • Always verify before revealing info
– Fake security checks or bank updates – Call back, verify through 3rd parties
• Smishing (SMS phishing) is done by text Impersonation • Verification should be encouraged
message • Attackers pretend to be someone they – Especially if your organization owns
– Spoofing is a problem here as well aren’t valuable information
– Forwards links or asks for personal – Halloween for the fraudsters
information • Use some of those details from 1.1 - Dumpster Diving
• Variations on a theme reconnaissance Dumpster diving
– The fake check scam, phone verification – You can trust me, I’m with your help • Mobile garbage bin
code scam, desk – United States brand name “Dumpster”
– Boss/CEO scam, advance-fee scam – Similar to a rubbish skip
• Important information thrown out with • Some hoaxes will take your money • Anti-virus / Anti-malware signature
the trash – But not through electronic means updates
– Thanks for bagging your garbage for me! • A hoax about a virus can waste as much – The Polish Financial Supervision
• Gather details that can be used for a time as a regular virus Authority attack code was recognized and
different attack stopped by generic signatures in
– Impersonate names, use phone De-hoaxing Symantec’s anti-virus software
numbers • It’s the Internet. Believe no one.
• Timing is important – Consider the source 1.1 - Spam
– Just after end of month, end of quarter • Cross reference Spam
– Based on pickup schedule – http://www.hoax-slayer.net • Unsolicited messages
– http://www.snopes.com – Email, forums, etc.
Is it legal to dive in a dumpster? • Spam filters can help – Spam over Instant Messaging (SPIM)
• I am not a lawyer. – There are so many other ways... • Various content
– In the United States, it’s legal • If it sounds too good to be true... – Commercial advertising
– Unless there’s a local restriction – So many sad stories – Non-commercial proselytizing
• If it’s in the trash, it’s open season – Phishing attempts
– Nobody owns it 1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks • Significant technology issue
• Dumpsters on private property or “No Watering Hole Attack – Security concerns
Trespassing” signs may be restricted • What if your network was really secure? – Resource utilization
– You can’t break the law to get to the – You didn’t even plug in that USB key – Storage costs
rubbish from the parking lot – Managing the spam
• Questions? Talk to a legal professional. • The attackers can’t get in
– Not responding to phishing emails Mail gateways
Protect your rubbish – Not opening any email attachments • Unsolicited email
• Secure your garbage • Have the mountain come to you – Stop it at the gateway before it reaches
– Fence and a lock – Go where the mountain hangs out the user
• Shred your documents – The watering hole – On-site or cloud-based
– This will only go so far – This requires a bit of research
– Governments burn the good stuff Identifying spam
• Go look at your trash Executing the watering hole attack • Allowed list
– What’s in there? • Determine which website the victim – Only receive email from trusted senders
group uses • SMTP standards checking
1.1 - Shoulder Surfing – Educated guess - Local coffee or – Block anything that doesn’t follow RFC
Shoulder surfing sandwich shop standards
• You have access to important – Industry-related sites • rDNS - Reverse DNS
information • Infect one of these third-party sites – Block email where the sender’s domain
– Many people want to see – Site vulnerability doesn’t match the IP address
– Curiosity, industrial espionage, – Email attachments • Tarpitting
competitive advantage • Infect all visitors – Intentionally slow down the server
• This is surprisingly easy – But you’re just looking for specific conversation
– Airports / Flights victims • Recipient filtering
– Hallway-facing monitors – Now you’re in! – Block all email not addressed to a valid
– Coffee shops recipient email address
• Surf from afar Because that’s where the money is
– Binoculars / Telescopes • January 2017 1.1 - Influence Campaigns
– Easy in the big city • Polish Financial Supervision Authority, Hacking public opinion
– Webcam monitoring National Banking and Stock Commission of • Influence campaigns
Preventing shoulder surfing Mexico, State-owned bank in Uruguay – Sway public opinion on political and
• Control your input – The watering hole was sufficiently social issues
– Be aware of your surroundings poisoned • Nation-state actors
• Use privacy filters • Visiting the site would download – Divide, distract, and persuade
– It’s amazing how well they work malicious JavaScript files • Advertising is an option
• Keep your monitor out of sight – But only to IP addresses matching banks – Buy a voice for your opinion
– Away from windows and hallways and other financial institutions • Enabled through Social media
• Don’t sit in front of me on your flight • Did the attack work? – Creating, sharing, liking
– I can’t help myself – We still don’t know – Amplification

Computer hoaxes Watching the watering hole Hybrid warfare


• A threat that doesn’t actually exist • Defense-in-depth • Military strategy
– But they seem like they COULD be real – Layered defense – A broad description of the techniques
• Still often consume lots of resources – It’s never one thing – Wage war non-traditionally
– Forwarded email messages, printed • Firewalls and IPS • Not a new concept
memorandums, wasted time – Stop the network traffic before things – The Internet adds new methods
• Often an email get bad • Cyberwarfare
– Or Facebook wall post, or tweet, or... – Attack an entity with technology
• Influence with a military spin – Emailed funeral notifications of a friend • Your computer must run a program
– Influencing foreign elections or associate – Email link - Don’t click links
– “Fake news” – Web page pop-up
- Other Social Engineering Attacks Social engineering principles – Drive-by download
• Authority – Worm
Tailgating – The social engineer is in charge • Your computer is vulnerable
• Use an authorized person to gain – I’m calling from the help desk/office of – Operating system - Keep your OS
unauthorized access to a building the CEO/police updated!
– Not an accident • Intimidation – Applications - Check with the publisher
• Johnny Long / No Tech Hacking – There will be bad things if you don’t help • Script viruses
– Blend in with clothing – If you don’t help me, the payroll checks – Operating system and browser-based
– 3rd-party with a legitimate reason won’t be processed • Macro viruses
– Temporarily take up smoking • Consensus / Social proof – Common in Microsoft Office
– I still prefer bringing doughnuts – Convince based on what’s normally
• Once inside, there’s little to stop you expected Fileless virus
– Most security stops at the border – Your co-worker Jill did this for me last • A stealth attack
week – Does a good job of avoiding anti-virus
Watching for tailgating • Scarcity detection
• Policy for visitors – The situation will not be this way for • Operates in memory
– You should be able to identify anyone long – But never installed in a file or
• One scan, one person – Must make the change before time application
– A matter of policy or mechanically expires
required • Urgency 1.2 - Viruses and Worms
• Mantrap / Airlock – Works alongside scarcity Virus
– You don’t have a choice – Act quickly, don’t think • Malware that can reproduce itself
• Don’t be afraid to ask • Familiarity / Liking – It needs you to execute a program
– Who are you and why are you here? – Someone you know, we have common • Reproduces through file systems or the
friends network
Invoice scams • Trust – Just running a program can spread a
• Starts with a bit of spear phishing – Someone who is safe virus
– Attacker knows who pays the bills – I’m from IT, and I’m here to help • May or may not cause problems
• Attacker sends a fake invoice – Some viruses are invisible, some are
– Domain renewal, toner cartridges, etc. 1.2 - An Overview of Malware annoying
– From: address is a spoofed version of • Anti-virus is very common
the CEO Malware – Thousands of new viruses every week
• Accounting pays the invoice • Malicious software – Is your signature file updated?
– It was from the CEO, after all – These can be very bad
• Might also include a link to pay • Gather information Virus types
– Now the attacker has payment details – Keystrokes • Program viruses
• Participate in a group – It’s part of the application
Credential harvesting – Controlled over the ‘net • Boot sector viruses
• Also called password harvesting • Show you advertising – Who needs an OS?
– Attackers collect login credentials – Big money
• There are a lot of stored credentials on • Viruses and worms Worms
your computer – Encrypt your data • Malware that self-replicates
– The attacker would like those – Ruin your day – Doesn’t need you to do anything
– Chrome, Firefox, Outlook, Windows – Uses the network as a transmission
Credential Manager, etc. Malware Types and Methods medium
• User receives an email with a malicious • Viruses – Self-propagates and spreads quickly
Microsoft Word doc • Crypto-malware • Worms are pretty bad things
– Opening the document runs a macro • Ransomware – Can take over many systems very quickly
– The macro downloads credential- • Worms • Firewalls and IDS/IPS can mitigate many
harvesting malware • Trojan Horse worm infestations
• User has no idea • Rootkit – Doesn’t help much once the worm gets
– Everything happens in the background • Keylogger inside
• Adware/Spyware
Effective social engineering • Botnet Ransomware and Crypto-malware
• Constantly changing Your data is valuable
– You never know what they’ll use next How you get malware • Personal data
• May involve multiple people • These all work together – Family pictures and videos
– And multiple organizations – A worm takes advantage of a – Important documents
– There are ties connecting many vulnerability • Organization data
organizations – Installs malware that includes a remote – Planning documents
• May be in person or electronic access backdoor – Employee personally identifiable
– Phone calls from aggressive “customers” – Bot may be installed later information (PII)
– Financial information • A backup utility that displays ads • Use a remover specific to the rootkit
– Company private data • Browser search engine hijacker – Usually built after the rootkit is
• How much is it worth? discovered
– There’s a number Backdoors • Secure boot with UEFI
• Why go through normal authentication – Security in the BIOS
Ransomware methods?
• The attackers want your money – Just walk in the back door 1.2 - Spyware
– They’ll take your computer in the • Often placed on your computer through Adware
meantime malware • Your computer is one big advertisement
• May be a fake ransom – Some malware software can take – Pop-ups with pop-ups
– Locks your computer “by the police” advantage of backdoors created by other • May cause performance issues
• The ransom may be avoided malware – Especially over the network
– A security professional may be able to • Some software includes a backdoor • Installed accidentally
remove these kinds of malware (oops) – May be included with other software
– Old Linux kernel included a backdoor • Be careful of software that claims to
Crypto-malware – Bad software can have a backdoor as remove adware
• A newer generation of ransomware part of the app – Especially if you learned about it from a
– Your data is unavailable until you pop-up
provide cash Remote Access Trojans (RATs)
• Malware encrypts your data files • Remote Administration Tool Spyware
– Pictures, documents, music, movies, etc. – The ultimate backdoor • Malware that spies on you
– Your OS remains available – Administrative control of a device – Advertising, identity theft, affiliate fraud
– They want you running, but not working • Malware installs the server/service/host • Can trick you into installing
• You must pay the bad guys to obtain the – Attacker connects with the client – Peer to peer, fake security software
decryption key software • Browser monitoring
– Untraceable payment system • Control a device – Capture surfing habits
– An unfortunate use of public-key – Key logging • Keyloggers - Capture every keystroke
cryptography – Screen recording /screenshots – Send it back to the mother ship
– Copy files
Protecting against ransomware – Embed more malware Why is there so much adware and
• Always have a backup spyware?
– An offline backup, ideally Protecting against Trojans and RATs • Money
• Keep your operating system up to date • Don’t run unknown software – Your eyeballs are incredibly valuable
– Patch those vulnerabilities – Consider the consequences • Money
• Keep your applications up to date • Keep anti-virus/anti-malware signatures – Your computer time and bandwidth is
– Security patches updated incredibly valuable
• Keep your anti-virus/anti-malware – There are always new attacks • Money
signatures up to date • Always have a backup – Your bank account is incredibly valuable
– New attacks every hour – You may need to quickly recover – Yes, even your bank account
• Keep everything up to date
Rootkits Protecting against adware/spyware
1.2 - Trojans and RATs • Originally a Unix technique • Maintain your anti-virus / anti-malware
Trojan horse – The “root” in rootkit – Always have the latest signatures
• Used by the Greeks to capture • Modifies core system files • Always know what you’re installing
– Troy from the Trojans – Part of the kernel – And watch your options during the
– A digital wooden horse • Can be invisible to the operating system installation
• Software that pretends to be something – Won’t see it in Task Manager • Where’s your backup?
else • Also invisible to traditional anti-virus – You might need it someday
– So it can conquer your computer utilities – Cleaning adware isn’t easy
– Doesn’t really care much about – If you can’t see it, you can’t stop it • Run some scans - Malwarebytes
replicating
• Circumvents your existing security Kernel drivers 1.2 - Bots and Botnets
– Anti-virus may catch it when it runs • Zeus/Zbot malware Bots (Robots)
– The better Trojans are built to avoid and – Famous for cleaning out bank accounts • Once your machine is infected, it
disable AV • Now combined with Necurs rootkit becomes a bot
• Once it’s inside it has free reign – Necurs is a kernel-level driver – You may not even know
– And it may open the gates for other • Necurs makes sure you can’t delete Zbot • How does it get on your computer?
programs – Access denied – Trojan Horse (I just saw a funny video of
• Trying to stop the Windows process? you! Click here.) or...
Potentially Unwanted Program (PUP) – Error terminating process: Access – You run a program or click an ad you
• Identified by anti-virus/anti-malware denied THOUGHT was legit, but...
– Potentially undesirable software – OS or application vulnerability
– Often installed along with other Finding and removing rootkits • A day in the life of a bot
software • Look for the unusual
• Overly aggressive browser toolbar – Anti-malware scans
– Sit around. Check in with the Command – Each is unique – Most accounts will lockout after a
and Control (C&C) server. Wait for – No predefined signatures number of failed attempts
instructions. • Process and procedures • Brute force the hash - Offline
– Formal change control – Obtain the list of users and hashes
Botnets • Electronic monitoring – Calculate a password hash, compare it
• A group of bots working together – Alert on changes to a stored hash
– Nothing good can come from this – Host-based intrusion detection, – Large computational resource
• Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) Tripwire, etc. requirement
– The power of many • Constant auditing
• Relay spam, proxy network traffic, – An administrator can circumvent Dictionary attacks
distributed computing tasks existing systems • Use a dictionary to find common words
• Botnets are for sale – Passwords are created by humans
– Rent time from the botnet owner Plaintext / unencrypted passwords • Many common wordlists available on
– Not a long-term business proposition • Some applications store passwords “in the ‘net
the clear” – Some are customized by language or
Logic Bomb – No encryption. You can read the stored line of work
• Waits for a predefined event password. • The password crackers can substitute
– Often left by someone with grudge – This is rare, thankfully letters
• Time bomb • Do not store passwords as plaintext – p&ssw0rd
– Time or date – Anyone with access to the password file • This takes time
• User event or database has every credential – Distributed cracking and GPU cracking is
– Logic bomb • What to do if your application saves common
• Difficult to identify passwords as plaintext: • Discover passwords for common words
– Difficult to recover if it goes off – Get a better application – This won’t discover random character
passwords
Real-world logic bombs 1.2 - Password Attacks
• March 19, 2013, South Korea Hashing a password 1.2 - Password Attacks (continued)
– Email with malicious attachment sent to • Hashes represent data as a fixed-length Rainbow tables
– South Korean organizations string of text • An optimized, pre-built set of hashes
– Posed as a bank email – A message digest, or “fingerprint” – Saves time and storage space
– Trojan installs malware • Will not have a collision (hopefully) – Doesn’t need to contain every hash
• March 20, 2013, 2 p.m. local time – Different inputs will not have the same – Contains pre-calculated hash chains
– Malware time-based logic-bomb hash • Remarkable speed increase
activates • One-way trip – Especially with longer password lengths
– Storage and master boot record deleted, – Impossible to recover the original • Need different tables for different
system reboots message from the digest hashing methods
– Boot device not found. – A common way to store passwords – Windows is different than MySQL
– Please install an operating system on
your hard disk. The password file Adding some salt
• Different across operating systems and • Salt
1.2 - Logic Bombs applications – Random data added to a password
Stopping the bot – Different hash algorithms when hashing
• Prevent the initial infection • Every user gets their own random salt
– OS and application patches Spraying attack – The salt is commonly stored with the
– Anti-virus/anti-malware and updated • Try to login with an incorrect password password
signatures – Eventually you’re locked out • Rainbow tables won’t work with salted
• Identify an existing infection • There are some common passwords hashes
– On-demand scans, network monitoring – – Additional random value added to the
• Prevent command and control (C&C) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the original password
– Block at the firewall _most_common_passwords • This slows things down the brute force
– Identify at the workstation with a host- • Attack an account with the top three (or process
based firewall or host-based IPS more) passwords – It doesn’t completely stop the reverse
• December 17, 2016, 11:53 p.m. – If they don’t work, move to the next engineering
– Kiev, Ukraine, high-voltage substation account • Each user gets a different random hash
– Logic bomb begins disabling electrical – No lockouts, no alarms, no alerts – The same password creates a different
circuits hash
– Malware mapped out the control Brute force
network • Try every possible password When the hashes get out
– Began disabling power at a combination until the hash is matched • January 2019 - Collection #1
predetermined time • This might take some time – A collection of email addresses and
– Customized for SCADA networks – A strong hashing algorithm slows things passwords
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) down – 12,000+ files and 87 GB of data
• Brute force attacks - Online • 1,160,253,228 unique emails and
Preventing a logic bomb – Keep trying the login process passwords
• Difficult to recognize – Very slow – A compilation of data breach results
• 772,904,991 unique usernames • Create a duplicate of a card Supply chain
– That’s about 773 million people – Looks and feels like the original • The chain contains many moving parts
• 21,222,975 unique passwords – Often includes the printed CVC (Card – Raw materials, suppliers, manufacturers,
– You really need a password manager Validation Code) distributors, customers, consumers
• https://haveibeenpwned.com/ • Can only be used with magnetic stripe • Attackers can infect any step along the
cards way
1.2 - Physical Attacks – The chip can’t be cloned – Infect different parts of the chain
• Cloned gift cards are common without suspicion
Malicious USB cable – A magnetic stripe technology – People trust their suppliers
• It looks like a normal USB cable • One exploit can infect the entire chain
– It has additional electronics inside 1.2 Adversarial Artificial Intelligence – There’s a lot at stake
• Operating system identifies it as a HID Machine learning
– Human Interface Device • Our computers are getting smarter Supply chain security
– It looks like you’ve connected a – They identify patterns in data and • Target Corp. breach - November 2013
keyboard or mouse improve their predictions – 40 million credit cards stolen
– A keyboard doesn’t need extra rights or • This requires a lot of training data • Heating and AC firm in Pennsylvania was
permissions – Face recognition requires analyzing a lot infected
• Once connected, the cable takes over of faces – Malware delivered in an email
– Downloads and installs malicious – Driving a car requires a lot of road time – VPN credentials for HVAC techs was
software • In use every day stolen
• Don’t just plug in any USB cable – Stop spam • HVAC vendor was the supplier
– Always use trusted hardware – Recommend products from an online – Attackers used a wide-open Target
retailer network to infect every cash register at
Malicious flash drive – What movie would you like to see? This 1,800 stores
• Free USB flash drive! one. • Do these technicians look like an IT
– Plug it in and see what’s on it – Prevent car accidents security issue?
– That’s a bad idea
• Older operating systems would Poisoning the training data Supply chain security
automatically run files • Confuse the artificial intelligence (AI) • Can you trust your new
– This has now been disabled or removed – Attackers send modified training data server/router/switch/firewall/software?
by default that causes the AI to behave incorrectly – Supply chain cybersecurity
• Could still act as a HID (Human Interface • Microsoft AI chatter bot named Tay • Use a small supplier base
Device) /Keyboard • (Thinking About You) – Tighter control of vendors
– Start a command prompt and type – Joins Twitter on March 23, 2016 • Strict controls over policies and
anything without your intervention – Designed to learn by interacting with procedures
• Attackers can load malware in Twitter users – Ensure proper security is in place
documents – Microsoft didn’t program in anti- • Security should be part of the overall
– PDF files, spreadsheets offensive behavior design
• Can be configured as a boot device – Tay quickly became racist, sexist, and – There’s a limit to trust
– Infect the computer after a reboot inappropriate
• Acts as an Ethernet adapter Attacks can happen anywhere
– Redirects or modifies Internet traffic Evasion attacks • Two categories for IT security
requests • The AI is only as good as the training – The on-premises data is more secure!
– Acts as a wireless gateway for other – Attackers find the holes and limitations – The cloud-based data is more secure!
devices • An AI that knows what spam looks like • Cloud-based security is centralized and
• Never connect an untrusted USB device can be fooled by a different approach costs less
– Change the number of good and bad – No dedicated hardware, no data center
Skimming words in the message to secure
• Stealing credit card information, usually • An AI that uses real-world information – A third-party handles everything
during a normal transaction can release confidential information • On-premises puts the security burden
– Copy data from the magnetic stripe: – Trained with data that includes social on the client
– Card number, expiration date, card security numbers – Data center security and infrastructure
holder’s name – AI can be fooled into revealing those costs
• ATM skimming numbers • Attackers want your data
– Includes a small camera to also watch – They don’t care where it is
for your PIN Securing the learning algorithms
• Attackers use the card information for • Check the training data On-premises security
other financial transactions – Cross check and verify • Customize your security posture
– Fraud is the responsibility of the seller • Constantly retrain with new data – Full control when everything is in-house
• Always check before using card readers – More data • On-site IT team can manage security
– Better data better
1.2 - Physical attacks (continued) • Train the AI with possible poisoning – The local team can ensure everything is
Card cloning – What would the attacker try to do? secure
• Get card details from a skimmer – A local team can be expensive and
– The clone needs an original 1.2 - Supply Chain Attacks difficult to staff
• Local team maintains uptime and – Message Digest Algorithm 5 development errors
availability – Published in April 1992, Collisions – Takes advantage of the trust a user has
– System checks can occur at any time identified in 1996 for a site
– No phone call for support • December 2008: Researchers created CA – Complex and varied
• Security changes can take time certificate that appeared legitimate when • Malware that uses JavaScript - Do you
– New equipment, configurations, and MD5 is checked allow scripts? Me too.
additional costs – Built other certificates that appeared to
be legit and issued by RapidSSL Non-persistent (reflected) XSS attack
Security in the cloud • Web site allows scripts to run in user
• Data is in a secure environment Downgrade attack input
– No physical access to the data center • Instead of using perfectly good – Search box is a common source
– Third-party may have access to the data encryption, use something that’s not so • Attacker emails a link that takes
• Cloud providers are managing large- great advantage of this vulnerability
scale security – Force the systems to downgrade their – Runs a script that sends
– Automated signature and security security credentials/session IDs/cookies to the
updates • 2014 - TLS vulnerability - POODLE attacker
– Users must follow security best- (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy • Script embedded in URL executes in the
practices Encryption) victim’s browser
• Limited downtime – On-path attack – As if it came from the server
– Extensive fault-tolerance and 24/7/365 – Forces clients to fall back to SSL 3.0 • Attacker uses credentials/session
monitoring – SSL 3.0 has significant cryptographic IDs/cookies to steal victim’s information
• Scalable security options vulnerabilities without their knowledge
– One-click security deployments – Because of POODLE, modern browsers – Very sneaky
– This may not be as customizable as won’t fall back to SSL 3.0
necessary Persistent (stored) XSS attack
Privilege escalation • Attacker posts a message to a social
1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks • Gain higher-level access to a system network
Cryptographic attacks – Exploit a vulnerability - Might be a bug – Includes the malicious payload
• You’ve encrypted data and sent it to or design flaw • It’s now “persistent” - Everyone gets the
another person • Higher-level access means more payload
– Is it really secure? How do you know? capabilities • No specific target - All viewers to the
• The attacker doesn’t have the – This commonly is the highest-level page
combination (the key) access • For social networking, this can spread
– So they break the safe (the – This is obviously a concern quickly
cryptography) • These are high-priority vulnerability – Everyone who views the message can
• Finding ways to undo the security patches have it
– There are many potential cryptographic – You want to get these holes closed very posted to their page
shortcomings quickly – Where someone else can view it and
– The problem is often the – Any user can be an administrator propagate it further...
implementation • Horizontal privilege escalation
– User A can access user B resources 1.3 - Cross-site Scripting
Birthday attack Hacking a Subaru
• In a classroom of 23 students, what is 1.3 - Privilege escalation • June 2017, Aaron Guzman
the chance of Mitigating privilege escalation – Security researcher
two students sharing a birthday? About • Patch quickly • When authenticating with Subaru, users
50%. – Fix the vulnerability get a token
– For a class of 30, the chance is about • Updated anti-virus/anti-malware – This token never expires (bad!)
70% software • A valid token allowed any service
• In the digital world, this is a hash – Block known vulnerabilities request
collision • Data Execution Prevention – Even adding your email address to
– A hash collision is the same hash value – Only data in executable areas can run someone
for two • Address space layout randomization else’s account
different plaintexts – Prevent a buffer overrun at a known – Now you have full access to someone
– Find a collision through brute force memory address else’s car
• The attacker will generate multiple • Web front-end included an XSS
versions of Cross-site scripting vulnerability
plaintext to match the hashes • XSS – A user clicks a malicious link, and you
– Protect yourself with a large hash – Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) are have
output size something else entirely their token
• Originally called cross-site because of
Collisions browser security flaws Protecting against XSS
• Hash digests are supposed to be unique – Information from one site could be • Be careful when clicking untrusted links
– Different input data should never create shared with another – Never blindly click in your email inbox.
the same hash • One of the most common web Never.
• MD5 hash application • Consider disabling JavaScript
– Or control with an extension Replay attack – You visit ProfessorMesser.com
– This offers limited protection • Useful information is transmitted over – Your browser loads text from the
• Keep your browser and applications the network ProfessorMesser.com server
updated – A crafty hacker will take advantage of – Your browser loads a video from
– Avoid the nasty browser vulnerabilities this YouTube
• Validate input • Need access to the raw network data – – Your browser loads pictures from
– Don’t allow users to add their own Network tap, ARP poisoning, malware on Instagram
scripts to an input field the victim computer • HTML on ProfessorMesser.com directs
• The gathered information may help the requests from your browser
Code injection attacker – This is normal and expected
• Code injection – Replay the data to appear as someone – Most of these are unauthenticated
– Adding your own information into a data else requests
stream • This is not an on-path attack
• Enabled because of bad programming – The actual replay doesn’t require the The client and the server
– The application should properly handle original workstation • Website pages consist of client-side
input and output • Avoid this type of replay attack with a code and server-side code
• So many different data types salt – Many moving parts
– HTML, SQL, XML, LDAP, etc. – Use a session ID with the password hash • Client side
to create a unique authentication hash – Renders the page on the screen
SQL injection each time – HTML, JavaScript
• SQL - Structured Query Language • Server side
– The most common relational database Header manipulation – Performs requests from
management system language • Information gathering the client - HTML, PHP
• SQL Injection – Wireshark, Kismet – Transfer money from one
– Modifying SQL requests • Exploits – Cross-site scripting account to another
– Your application shouldn’t really allow • Modify headers – Tamper, Firesheep, – Post a video on YouTube
this Scapy
• Modify cookies – Cookies Manager+ Cross-site request forgery
1.3 - Injection Attacks (Firefox add-on) • One-click attack, session riding - XSRF,
XML injection and LDAP injection CSRF (sea surf)
• XML - Extensible Markup Language Prevent session hijacking • Takes advantage of the trust that a web
– A set of rules for data transfer and • Encrypt end-to-end application has for the user
storage – They can’t capture your session ID if – The web site trusts your browser
• XML injection they can’t see it – Requests are made without your
– Modifying XML requests - a good – Additional load on the web server consent or your knowledge
application will validate (HTTPS) – Attacker posts a Facebook status on
• LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access – Firefox extension: HTTPS Everywhere, your account
Protocol Force-TLS • Significant web application development
– Created by the telephone companies – Many sites are now HTTPS-only oversight
– Now used by almost everyone • Encrypt end-to-somewhere – The application should have anti-forgery
• LDAP injection – At least avoid capture over a local techniques added
– Modify LDAP requests to manipulate wireless network – Usually a cryptographic token to prevent
application results – Still in-the-clear for part of the journey a forgery
– Personal VPN (OpenVPN, VyprVPN, etc.)
DLL injection Server-side request forgery (SSRF)
• Dynamic-Link Library Browser cookies and session IDs • Attacker finds a vulnerable web
– A Windows library containing code and • Cookies application
data – Information stored on your computer by – Sends requests to a web server
– Many applications can use this library the browser – Web server performs the request on
• Inject a DLL and have an application run • Used for tracking, personalization, behalf of the attacker
a program session management • Caused by bad programming
– Runs as part of the target process – Not executable, not generally a security – Never trust the user input
Buffer overflows risk – Server should validate the input
• Overwriting a buffer of memory – Spills – Unless someone gets access to them and the responses
over into other memory areas • • Could be considered be a privacy risk – These are rare, but can be
Developers need to perform bounds – Lots of personal data in there critical vulnerabilities
checking – The attackers spend a lot of • Session IDs are often stored in the
time looking for openings • Not a simple cookie 1.3 - Request Forgeries (continued)
exploit – Takes time to avoid crashing – Maintains sessions across multiple Capital One SSRF breach - March 2019
things – Takes time to make it do what browser sessions • Attacker is able to execute commands
you want • A really useful buffer overflow on the Capital One website
is repeatable – Which means that a 1.3 - Request Forgeries – This is normally stopped by a WAF
system can be compromised Cross-site requests (Web Application Firewall)
• Cross-site requests are common and – The WAF was misconfigured
1.3 - Replay Attacks legitimate
• Attacker obtained security credentials SSL stripping / HTTP downgrade – Used software interlocks instead of
for the WAF role • Combines an on-path attack with a hardware
• WAF-Role account listed the buckets on downgrade attack – Race condition caused 100 times the
Amazon S3 – Difficult to implement, but big returns normal dose of radiation
• Attacker retrieved the data from the for the attacker – Six patients injured, three deaths
Amazon buckets • Attacker must sit in the middle of the
• Credit card application data from 2005 conversation Other Application Attacks
through 2019 – Must modify data between the victim Memory vulnerabilities
– 106 million names, address, phone, and web server • Manipulating memory can be
email, DoB – Proxy server, ARP spoofing, rogue Wi-Fi advantageous
– 140,000 Social Security numbers, hotspot, etc. – Relatively difficult to accomplish
80,000 bank accounts • Victim does not see any significant • Memory leak
problem – Unused memory is not properly released
Malware hide-and-go-seek – Except the browser page isn’t encrypted – Begins to slowly grow in size
• Traditional anti-virus is very good at – Strips the S away from HTTPS – Eventually uses all available memory
identifying known attacks • This is a client and server problem – System crashes
– Checks the signature – Works on SSL and TLS • NULL Pointer dereference
– Block anything that matches – Programming technique that references
• There are still ways to infect and hide 1.3 - SSL Stripping a
– It’s a constant war SSL and TLS portion of memory
– Zero-day attacks, new attack types, etc. • SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) 2.0 - – What happens if that reference points to
Deprecated in 2011 nothing?
Your drivers are powerful • SSL 3.0 – Application crash, debug information
• The interaction between the hardware – Vulnerable to the POODLE attack displayed, DoS
and your operating system – Deprecated in June 2015 • Integer overflow
– They are often trusted • Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0 – Large number into a smaller sized space
– Great opportunity for security issues – Upgrade to SSL 3.0, and a name change – Where does the extra number go?
• May 2016 - HP Audio Drivers from SSL to TLS – You shouldn’t be able to manipulate
– Conexant audio chips – Can downgrade to SSL 3.0 memory this way
– Driver installation includes audio control • TLS 1.1
software – Deprecated in January 2020 by modern Directory traversal
– Debugging feature enables a keylogger browsers • Directory traversal / path traversal
• Hardware interactions contain sensitive • TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 - The latest – Read files from a web server that are
information standards outside of the website’s file directory
– Video, keyboard, mouse – Users shouldn’t be able to browse
1.3 - Race Conditions the Windows folder
1.3 - Driver Manipulation Race condition • Web server software vulnerability
Shimming • A programming conundrum – Won’t stop users from browsing past
• Filling in the space between two objects – Sometimes, things happen at the same the
– A middleman time web server root
• Windows includes it’s own shim – This can be bad if you’ve not planned for • Web application code vulnerability
– Backwards compatibility with previous it – Take advantage of badly written code
Windows versions • Time-of-check to time-of-use attack
– Application Compatibility Shim Cache (TOCTOU) Improper error handling
• Malware authors write their own shims – Check the system • Errors happen
– Get around security (like UAC) – When do you use the results of your last – And you should probably know about it
• January 2015 Microsoft vulnerability check? • Messages should be just informational
– Elevates privilege – Something might happen between the enough
check – Avoid too much detail
Refactoring and the use – Network information, memory dump,
• Metamorphic malware stack traces, database dumps
– A different program each time it’s Race conditions can cause big problems • This is an easy one to find and fix
downloaded • January 2004 - Mars rover “Spirit” – A development best-practice
• Make it appear different each time – Reboot when a problem is identified
– Add NOP instructions – Problem is with the file system, so Improper input handling
– Loops, pointless code strings reboot because of the file system problem • Many applications accept user input
• Can intelligently redesign itself – Reboot loop was the result – We put data in, we get data back
– Reorder functions • GE Energy - Energy Management System • All input should be considered malicious
– Modify the application flow – Three power lines failed at the same – Check everything. Trust nobody.
– Reorder code and insert unused data time • Allowing invalid input can be
types – Race condition delayed alerts devastating
• Difficult to match with signature-based – Caused the Northeast Blackout of 2003 – SQL injections, buffer overflows,
detection • Therac-25 radiation therapy machine in denial of service, etc.
– Use a layered approach the 1980s • It takes a lot of work to find input that
can be used maliciously
– But they will find it • Sending of unsolicited messages to channel switch announcements, etc.
another • Not everything is encrypted
API attacks device via Bluetooth – Beacons, probes, authentication,
• API - Application Programming Interface – No mobile carrier required! association
• Attackers look for vulnerabilities in this • Typical functional distance is about 10 • 802.11w is required for 802.11ac
new meters compliance
communication path – More or less, depending on antenna and – This will roll out going forward
– Exposing sensitive data, DoS, interference
intercepted • Bluejack with an address book object Radio frequency (RF) jamming
communication, privileged access – Instead of contact name, write a • Denial of Service
message – Prevent wireless communication
Resource exhaustion – “You are Bluejacked!” • Transmit interfering wireless signals
• A specialized DoS (Denial of Service) – “You are Bluejacked! Add to contacts?” – Decrease the signal-to-noise ratio at
attack • Third-party software may also be used the receiving device
– May only require one device and low – Blooover, Bluesniff – The receiving device can’t hear the good
bandwidths signal
• ZIP bomb Bluesnarfing • Sometimes it’s not intentional
– A 42 kilobyte .zip compressed file • Access a Bluetooth-enabled device and – Interference, not jamming
– Uncompresses to 4.5 petabytes (4,500 transfer data – Microwave oven, fluorescent lights
terabytes) – Contact list, calendar, email, pictures, • Jamming is intentional
– Anti-virus will identify these video, etc. – Someone wants your network to not
• DHCP starvation • First major security weakness in work
– Attacker floods a network with IP Bluetooth
address requests – Marcel Holtmann in September 2003 Wireless jamming
– MAC address changes each time and • Many different types
– DHCP server eventually runs out of – Adam Laurie in November 2003 – Constant, random bits / Constant,
addresses – This weakness was patched legitimate frames
– Switch configurations can rate limit • Serious security issue • Data sent at random times
DHCP requests – If you know the file, you can download it – Random data and legitimate frames
without authentication • Reactive jamming
Rogue access points – Only when someone else tries to
• An unauthorized wireless access point 1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks communicate
– May be added by an employee or an It started as a normal day • Needs to be somewhere close
attacker • Surfing along on your wireless network – Difficult to be effective from a distance
– Not necessarily malicious – And then you’re not • Time to go fox hunting
– A significant potential backdoor • And then it happens again – You’ll need the right equipment to hunt
• Very easy to plug in a wireless AP – And again down the jam
– Or enable wireless sharing in your OS • You may not be able to stop it – Directional antenna, attenuator
• Schedule a periodic survey – There’s (almost) nothing you can do 1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks
– Walk around your building/campus – Time to get a long patch cable RFID (Radio-frequency identification)
– Use third-party tools / WiFi Pineapple • Wireless disassociation • It’s everywhere
• Consider using 802.1X (Network Access – A significant wireless – Access badges
Control) denial of service (DoS) attack – Inventory/Assembly line tracking
– You must authenticate, regardless of the – Pet/Animal identification
connection type 802.11 management frames – Anything that needs to be tracked
• 802.11 wireless includes a number of • Radar technology
Wireless evil twins management features – Radio energy transmitted to the tag
• Looks legitimate, but actually malicious – Frames that make everything work – RF powers the tag, ID is transmitted
– The wireless version of phishing – You never see them back
• Configure an access point to look like an • Important for the operation of 802.11 – Bidirectional communication
existing network wireless – Some tag formats can be
– Same (or similar) SSID and security – How to find access points, manage QoS, active/powered
settings/captive portal associate/
• Overpower the existing access points disassociate with an access point, etc. RFID Attacks
– May not require the same physical • Original wireless standards did not add • Data capture
location protection for management frames – View communication
• WiFi hotspots (and users) are easy to – Sent in the clear – Replay attack
fool – No authentication or validation • Spoof the reader - Write your own data
– And they’re wide open Protecting against disassociation to the tag
• You encrypt your communication, right? • IEEE has already addressed the problem • Denial of service - Signal jamming
– Use HTTPS and a VPN – 802.11w - July 2014 • Decrypt communication
• Some of the important management – Many default keys are on Google
1.4 - Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing frames
Bluejacking are encrypted Near field communication (NFC)
– Disassociate, deauthenticate, • Two-way wireless communication
– Builds on RFID, which is mostly one-way – You never know your traffic was – Builds the list based on the source MAC
• Payment systems redirected address of incoming traffic
– Many options available • ARP poisoning – These age out periodically, often in 5
• Bootstrap for other wireless – ARP has no security minutes
– NFC helps with Bluetooth pairing – On-path attack on the local IP subnet • Maintain a loop-free environment
• Access token, identity “card” – Using Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
– Short range with encryption support On-path browser attack
• What if the middleman was on the same Learning the MACs
NFC Security Concern computer as the victim? • Switches examine incoming traffic
• Remote capture – Malware/Trojan does all of the proxy – Makes a note of the source MAC
– It’s a wireless network work address
– 10 meters for active devices – Formerly known as man-in-the-browser • Adds unknown MAC addresses to the
• Frequency jamming • Huge advantages for the attackers MAC address table
– Denial of service – Relatively easy to proxy encrypted traffic – Sets the output interface to the received
• Relay / Replay attack – Everything looks normal to the victim interface
– On-path attack • The malware in your browser waits for
• Loss of NFC device control you to login to your bank 1.4 - DNS Attacks
– Stolen/lost phone – And cleans you out DNS poisoning
• Modify the DNS server
1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography 1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning – Requires some crafty hacking
Cryptographic nonce The MAC address • Modify the client host file
• Arbitrary number • Ethernet Media Access Control address – The host file takes precedent over DNS
– Used once – The “physical” address of a network queries
– “For the nonce” - For the time being adapter • Send a fake response to a valid DNS
• A random or pseudo-random number – Unique to a device request
– Something that can’t be reasonably • 48 bits / 6 bytes long – Requires a redirection of the original
guessed – Displayed in hexadecimal request
– Can also be a counter or the resulting response
• Use a nonce during the login process MAC flooding
– Server gives you a nonce • The MAC table is only so big Domain hijacking
– Calculate your password hash using the • Attacker starts sending traffic with • Get access to the domain registration,
nonce different source MAC addresses and you have control where the traffic
– Each password hash sent to the host will – Force out the legitimate MAC addresses flows
be • The table fills up – You don’t need to touch the actual
different, so a replay won’t work – Switch begins flooding traffic to all servers
interfaces – Determines the DNS names and DNS IP
Initialization Vectors (IV) • This effectively turns the switch into a addresses
• A type of nonce hub • Many ways to get into the account
– Used for randomizing an encryption – All traffic is transmitted to all interfaces – Brute force
scheme – No interruption in traffic flows – Social engineer the password
– The more random the better • Attacker can easily capture all network – Gain access to the email address that
• Used in encryption ciphers, WEP, and traffic! manages the account
some • Flooding can be restricted in the switch’s – The usual things
SSL implementations port
security settings Domain hijacking
Salt • Saturday, October 22, 2016, 1 PM
• A nonce most commonly associated MAC cloning / MAC spoofing • Domain name registrations of
with password randomization • An attacker changes their MAC address 36 domains are changed
– Make the password hash unpredictable to match the MAC address of an existing – Brazilian bank
• Password storage should always be device – Desktop domains, mobile domains, and
salted – A clone / a spoof more
– Each user gets a different salt • Circumvent filters • Under hacker control for 6 hours
• If the password database is breached, – Wireless or wired MAC filters – The attackers became the bank
you can’t correlate any passwords – Identify a valid MAC address and copy it • 5 million customers, $27 billion in assets
– Even users with the same password • Create a DoS – Results of the hack have not been
have different hashes stored – Disrupt communication to the legitimate publicly released
MAC
1.4 - On-Path Attacks • Easily manipulated through software URL hijacking
On-path network attack – Usually a device driver option • Make money from your mistakes
• How can an attacker watch without you – There’s a lot of advertising on the ‘net
knowing? LAN switching • Sell the badly spelled domain to the
– Formerly known as man-in-the-middle • Forward or drop frames actual owner
• Redirects your traffic – Based on the destination MAC address – Sell a mistake
– Then passes it on to the destination • Gather a constantly updating list of MAC • Redirect to a competitor
addresses – Not as common, legal issues
• Phishing site • Launch an army of computers to bring – The hacker is on borrowed time
– Looks like the real site, please login down a service
• Infect with a drive-by download – Use all the bandwidth or resources - Windows PowerShell
– You’ve got malware! traffic spike • Command line for system administrators
• This is why the attackers have botnets – .ps1 file extension
Types of URL hijacking – Thousands or millions of computers at – Included with Windows 8/8.1 and 10
• Typosquatting / brandjacking your command • Extend command-line functions
– Take advantage of poor spelling – At its peak, Zeus botnet infected over – Uses cmdlets (command-lets)
• Outright misspelling 3.6 million PCs – PowerShell scripts and functions
– professormesser.com vs. – Coordinated attack – Standalone executables
professormessor.com • Asymmetric threat • Attack Windows systems
• A typing error – The attacker may have fewer resources – System administration
– professormeser.com than the victim – Active Domain administration
• A different phrase – File share access
– professormessers.com DDoS amplification
• Different top-level domain • Turn your small attack into a big attack Python
– professormesser.org – Often reflected off another device or • General-purpose scripting language
service – .py file extension
Domain reputation • An increasingly common DDoS • Popular in many technologies
• The Internet is tracking your security technique – Broad appeal and support
posture – Turn Internet services against the victim • Commonly used for cloud orchestration
– They know when things go sideways • Uses protocols with little (if any) – Create and tear down application
• Email reputation authentication or checks instances
– Suspicious activity – NTP, DNS, ICMP • Attack the infrastructure
– Malware originating from the IP address – A common example of protocol abuse – Routers, servers, switches
• A bad reputation can cause email
delivery to fail Application DoS Shell script
– Email rejection or simply dropped • Make the application break or work • Scripting the Unix/Linux shell
• Check with the email or service provider harder – Automate and extend the command line
to check the reputation – Increase downtime and costs – Bash, Bourne, Korn, C
– Follow their instructions to remediate • Fill the disk space • Starts with a shebang or hash-bang #!
• Infected systems are noticed by the – A 42 kilobyte .zip compressed file – Often has a .sh file extension
search engines – Uncompresses to 4.5 petabytes (4,500 • Attack the Linux/Unix environment
– Your domain can be flagged or removed terabytes) – Web, database, virtualization servers
• Users will avoid the site – Anti-virus will identify these • Control the OS from the command line
– Sales will drop • Overuse a measured cloud resource – Malware has a lot of options
– Users will avoid your brand – More CPU/memory/network is more
• Malware might be removed quickly money Macros
– Recovery takes much longer • Increase the cloud server response time • Automate functions within an
– Victim deploys a new application application
Denial of Service instance - repeat – Or operating system
• Force a service to fail • Designed to make the application easier
– Overload the service Operational Technology (OT) DoS to use
• Take advantage of a design failure or • The hardware and software for – Can often create security vulnerabilities
vulnerability industrial equipment • Attackers create automated exploits
– Keep your systems patched! – Electric grids, traffic control, – They just need the user to open the file
• Cause a system to be unavailable manufacturing plants, etc. – Prompts to run the macro
– Competitive advantage • This is more than a web server failing
• Create a smokescreen for some other – Power grid drops offline Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)
exploit – All traffic lights are green • Automates processes within Windows
– Precursor to a DNS spoofing attack – Manufacturing plant shuts down applications
• Doesn’t have to be complicated • Requires a different approach – Common in Microsoft Office
– Turn off the power – A much more critical security posture • A powerful programming language
– Interacts with the operating system
A “friendly” DoS Scripting and automation • CVE-2010-0815 / MS10-031
• Unintentional DoSing - It’s not always a • Automate tasks – VBA does not properly search for
ne’er-do-well – You don’t have to be there ActiveX
• Network DoS - Layer 2 loop without STP – Solve problems in your sleep controls in a document
• Bandwidth DoS - Downloading multi- – Monitor and resolve problems before – Run arbitrary code embedded in a
gigabyte Linux distributions over a DSL they happen document
line • The need for speed – Easy to infect a computer
• The water line breaks – The script is as fast as the computer
– Get a good shop vacuum – No typing or delays 1.5 - Threat Actors
– No human error Threat actors and attributes
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) • Automate the attack
• The entity responsible for an event that • There’s a reason we lock the data center
has Organized crime – Physical access to a system is a
an impact on the safety of another entity • Professional criminals significant attack vector
– Also called a malicious actor – Motivated by money • Modify the operating system
• Broad scope of actors – Almost always an external entity – Reset the administrator password in a
– And motivations vary widely • Very sophisticated few minutes
• Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) – Best hacking money can buy • Attach a keylogger
– Attackers are in the network and • Crime that’s organized – Collect usernames and passwords
undetected – One person hacks, one person manages • Transfer files
– 2018 FireEye report: the exploits, another person sells the – Take it with you
Americas: 71 days, data, another handles customer support • Denial of service
EMEA: 177 days, • Lots of capital to fund hacking efforts – This power cable is in the way
APAC: 204 days
Hackers Wireless attack vectors
Insiders • Experts with technology • Default login credentials
• More than just passwords on sticky – Often driven by money, power, and ego • Modify the access point configuration
notes • Authorized • Rogue access point
– Some insiders are out for no good – An ethical hacker with good intentions • A less-secure entry point to the network
• Sophistication may not be advanced, – And permission to hack • Evil twin
but the insider has institutional • Unauthorized • Attacker collects authentication details
knowledge – Malicious, violates security for personal • On-path attacks
– Attacks can be directed at vulnerable gain • Protocol vulnerabilities
systems • Semi-authorized • 2017 - WPA2 Key Reinstallation Attack
– The insider knows what to hit – Finds a vulnerability, doesn’t use it (KRACK)
• Extensive resources • Older encryption protocols (WEP, WPA)
– Eating away from the inside Shadow IT
• Going rogue Email attack vectors
Nation states – Working around the internal IT • One of the biggest (and most successful)
• Governments organization attack vectors
• National security, job security • Information Technology can put up – Everyone has email
• Always an external entity roadblocks • Phishing attacks
• Highest sophistication – Shadow IT is unencumbered – People want to click links
• Military control, utilities, financial – Use the cloud • Deliver the malware to the user
control – Might also be able to innovate – Attach it to the message
• United States and Israel destroyed 1,000 • Not always a good thing • Social engineering attacks
nuclear centrifuges with the Stuxnet – Wasted time and money – Invoice scam
worm – Security risks
• Constant attacks – Compliance issues Supply chain attack vectors
• Commonly an Advanced Persistent – Dysfunctional organization • Tamper with the underlying
Threat (APT) Competitors infrastructure
• Many different motivations – Or manufacturing process
Hacktivist – DoS, espionage, harm reputation • Gain access to a network using a vendor
• A hacker with a purpose • High level of sophistication – 2013 Target credit card breach
– Social change or a political agenda – Based on some significant funding • Malware can modify the manufacturing
– Often an external entity – The competitive upside is huge (and process
• Can be remarkably sophisticated very unethical) – 2010 - Stuxnet disrupts Iran’s uranium
– Very specific hacks • Many different intents enrichment program
– DoS, web site defacing, release of – Shut down your competitor during an • Counterfeit networking equipment
private documents, etc. event – Install backdoors, substandard
• Funding is limited – Steal customer lists performance and availability
– Some organizations have fundraising – Corrupt manufacturing databases – 2020 - Fake Cisco Catalyst 2960-X and
options – Take financial information WS-2960X-48TS-L

Script kiddies 1.5 - Attack Vectors Social media attack vectors


• Runs pre-made scripts without any Attack vectors • Attackers thank you for putting your
knowledge • A method used by the attacker personal information online
of what’s really happening – Gain access or infect to the target – Where you are and when
– Not necessarily a youngster • A lot of work goes into finding – Vacation pictures are especially telling
• Can be internal or external vulnerabilities in these vectors • User profiling
– But usually external – Some are more vulnerable than others – Where were you born?
• Not very sophisticated • IT security professional spend their – What is the name of your school
• No formal funding career watching these vectors mascot?
– Looking for low hanging fruit – Closing up existing vectors • Fake friends are fake
• Motivated by the hunt – Finding new ones – The inner circle can provide additional
– Working the ego, trying to make a name Direct access attack vectors information
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures • Indicators
Removable media attack vectors (CVE) – Unusual amount of network activity
• Get around the firewall – A community managed list of – Change to file hash values
– The USB interface vulnerabilities – Irregular international traffic
• Malicious software on USB flash drives – Sponsored by the U.S. Department of – Changes to DNS data
– Infect air gapped networks Homeland Security (DHS) and – Uncommon login patterns
– Industrial systems, high-security services Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security – Spikes of read requests to certain files
• USB devices can act as keyboards Agency (CISA)
– Hacker on a chip • U.S. National Vulnerability Database Predictive analysis
• Data exfiltration (NVD) • Analyze large amounts of data very
– Terabytes of data walk out the door – A summary of CVEs quickly
– Zero bandwidth used – Also sponsored by DHS and CISA – Find suspicious patterns
• NVD provides additional details over the – Big data used for cybersecurity
Cloud attack vectors CVE list • Identify behaviors
• Publicly-facing applications and services – Patch availability and severity scoring – DNS queries, traffic patterns, location
– Mistakes are made all the time data
• Security misconfigurations Public/private information-sharing • Creates a forecast for potential attacks
– Data permissions and public data stores centers – An early-warning system
• Brute force attacks • Public threat intelligence • Often combined with machine learning
– Or phish the users of the cloud service – Often classified information – Less emphasis on signatures
• Orchestration attacks • Private threat intelligence
– Make the cloud build new application – Private companies have extensive Threat maps
instances resources • Identify attacks and trends
• Denial of service • Need to share critical security details – View worldwide perspective
– Disable the cloud services for everyone – Real-time, high-quality cyber threat • Created from real attack data
information sharing – Identify and react
1.5 - Threat Intelligence • Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA)
Threat intelligence – Members upload specifically formatted File/code repositories
• Research the threats - And the threat threat intelligence • See what the hackers are building
actors – CTA scores each submission and – Public code repositories, GitHub
• Data is everywhere validates • See what people are accidentally
– Hacker group profiles, tools used by the across other submissions releasing
attackers, and much more – Other members can extract the – Private code can often be published
• Make decisions based on this validated data publicly
intelligence • Attackers are always looking for this
– Invest in the best prevention Automated indicator sharing (AIS) code
• Used by researchers, security operations • Intelligence industry needs a standard – Potential exploits exist
teams, and others way to share important threat data – Content for phishing attacks
– Share information freely 1.5 - Threat Research
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) • Structured Threat Information Threat research
• Open-source eXpression (STIX) • Know your enemy
– Publicly available sources – Describes cyber threat information – And their tools of war
– A good place to start – Includes motivations, abilities, • A never-ending process
• Internet capabilities, and response information – The field is constantly moving and
– Discussion groups, social media • Trusted Automated eXchange of changing
• Government data Indicator Information (TAXII) • Information from many different places
– Mostly public hearings, reports, – Securely shares STIX data – You can’t rely on a single source
websites, etc.
• Commercial data Dark web intelligence Vendor websites
– Maps, financial reports, databases • Dark web • Vendors and manufacturers
– Overlay networks that use the Internet – They wrote the software
Closed/proprietary intelligence – Requires specific software and • They know when problems are
• Someone else has already compiled the configurations to access announced
threat information • Hacking groups and services – Most vendors are involved in the
– You can buy it – Activities disclosure process
• Threat intelligence services – Tools and techniques • They know their product better than
– Threat analytics, correlation across – Credit card sales anyone
different data sources – Accounts and passwords – They react when surprises happen
• Constant threat monitoring • Monitor forums for activity – Scrambling after a zero-day
– Identify new threats – Company names, executive names announcement
– Create automated prevention workflows – Mitigating and support options
Indicators of compromise (IOC)
Vulnerability databases • An event that indicates an intrusion Vulnerability feeds
• Researchers find vulnerabilities – Confidence is high • Automated vulnerability notifications
– Everyone needs to know about them – He’s calling from inside the house • National Vulnerability Database
(https://nvd.nist.gov) – Cisco, Microsoft, VMware, etc. - Secure • Very easy to leave a door open
• CVE Data Feeds (https://cve.mitre.org) specific technologies – The hackers will always find it
• Third-party feeds • Increasingly common with cloud storage
• Additional vulnerability coverage Social media – Statistical chance of finding an open
• Roll-up to a vulnerability management • Hacking group conversations - Monitor permission
system the chatter • June 2017 - 14 million Verizon records
• Coverage across teams • Honeypot monitoring on Twitter exposed
• Consolidated view of security issues – Identify new exploit attempts – Third-party left an Amazon S3 data
• Keyword monitoring - CVE-2020-*, repository open
Conferences bugbounty, 0-day – Researcher found the data before
• Watch and learn • Analysis of vulnerabilities - Professionals anyone else
– An early warning of things to come discussing the details • Many, many other examples
• Researchers • Command and control - Use social – Secure your permissions!
– New DDoS methods, intelligence media as the transport
gathering, Unsecured root accounts
hacking the latest technologies Threat feeds • The Linux root account
• Stories from the trenches • Monitor threat announcements - Stay – The Administrator or superuser account
– Fighting and recovering from attacks informed • Can be a misconfiguration
– New methods to protect your data • Many sources of information – Intentionally configuring an easy-to-hack
• Building relationships - forge alliances – U.S. Department of Homeland Security password
– U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation – 123456, ninja, football
Academic journals – SANS Internet Storm Center • Disable direct login to the root account
• Research from academic professionals – VirusTotal Intelligence: – Use the su or sudo option
– Cutting edge security analysis – Google and Facebook correlation • Protect accounts with root or
• Evaluations of existing security administrator access
technologies TTP – There should not be a lot of these
– Keeping up with the latest attack • Tactics, techniques, and procedures
methods – What are adversaries doing and how are Errors
• Detailed post mortem they doing it? • Error messages can provide useful
– Tear apart the latest malware and • Search through data and networks information to an attacker
see what makes it tick – Proactively look for threats – Service type, version information, debug
• Extremely detailed information – Signatures and firewall rules can’t catch data
– Break apart topics into their smaller everything • September 2015 - Patreon is
pieces • Different types of TTPs compromised
– Information on targeted victims (Finance – Used a debugger to help monitor and
Request for comments (RFC) for energy companies) troubleshoot web site issues
• Published by the Internet Society (ISOC) – Infrastructure used by attackers (DNS – Was left exposed to the Internet
– Often written by the Internet and IP addresses) – Effectively allowed for remote code
Engineering – Outbreak of a particular malware variant executions
Task Force (IETF) on a service type – Gigabytes of customer data was
– Internet Society description is RFC 1602 released online
• Not all RFCs are standards documents 1.6 - Vulnerability Types
– Experimental, Best Current Practice, Zero-day attacks Weak encryption
Standard Track, and Historic • Many applications have vulnerabilities • Encryption protocol (AES, 3DES, etc.)
• Many informational RFCs analyze – We’ve just not found them yet – Length of the encryption key (40 bits,
threats • Someone is working hard to find the 128 bits,
– RFC 3833 - Threat Analysis of the next 256 bits, etc.)
Domain big vulnerability – Hash used for the integrity check (SHA,
Name System – The good guys share these with MD5, etc.)
– RFC 7624 - Confidentiality in the Face of developers – Wireless encryption (WEP, WPA)
Pervasive Surveillance: • Attackers keep these yet-to-be- • Some cipher suites are easier to break
– A Threat Model and Problem Statement discovered holes to themselves than others
– They want to use these vulnerabilities – Stay updated with the latest best
Local industry groups for practices
• A gathering of local peers personal gain • TLS is one of the most common issues
– Shared industry and technology, • Zero-day – Over 300 cipher suites
geographical presence – The vulnerability has not been detected • Which are good and which are bad?
• Associations or published – Weak or null encryption (less than 128
– Information Systems Security – Zero-day exploits are increasingly bit key sizes),
Association, common outdated hashes (MD5)
Network Professional Association • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
– Meet others in the area, discuss local (CVE) Insecure protocols
challenges – http://cve.mitre.org/ • Some protocols aren’t encrypted
• Industry user groups – All traffic sent in the clear - Telnet, FTP,
Open permissions SMTP, IMAP
• Verify with a packet capture • IT security doesn’t change because it’s a – Check for backdoors
– View everything sent over the network third-party – Validate data protection and encryption
• Use the encrypted versions- SSH, SFTP, – There should be more security, not less
IMAPS, etc. • Always expect the worst Data storage
– Prepare for a breach • Consider the type of data
Default settings • Human error is still the biggest issue – Contact information
• Every application and network device – Everyone needs to use IT security best – Healthcare details, financial information
has a default login practices • Storage at a third-party may need
– Not all of these are ever changed • All security is important encryption
• Mirai botnet – Physical security and cybersecurity work – Limits exposure, adds complexity
– Takes advantage of default hand-in-hand • Transferring data
configurations – The entire data flow needs to be
– Takes over Internet of Things (IoT) System integration risk encrypted
devices • Professional installation and
– 60+ default configurations maintenance 1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts
– Cameras, routers, doorbells, garage – Can include elevated OS access Vulnerability impacts
door openers, etc. • Can be on-site • Malicious cyber activity cost the U.S.
• Mirai released as open-source software – With physical or virtual access to data economy between $57 billion and $109
– There’s a lot more where that came and systems billion in 2016
from – Keylogger installations and USB flash – The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to
drive data transfers the U.S. Economy,
Open ports and services • Can run software on the internal – The Council of Economic Advisers,
• Services will open ports network February 2018
– It’s important to manage access – Less security on the inside • Many other non-economic impacts - Far
• Often managed with a firewall – Port scanners, traffic captures reaching effects
– Manage traffic flows – Inject malware and spyware, sometimes • These are the reasons we patch
– Allow or deny based on port number or inadvertently vulnerabilities
application
• Firewall rulesets can be complex 1.6 Third-party Risks (continued) Data loss
– It’s easy to make a mistake • Vulnerability: Unsecured databases
• Always test and audit Lack of vendor support – No password or default password
– Double and triple check • Security requires diligence • July 2020 - Internet-facing databases are
– The potential for a vulnerability is being deleted
Improper patch management always there – No warning, no explanation
• Often centrally managed • Vendors are the only ones who can fix • Thousands of databases are missing
– The update server determine when you their products – I hope you had a backup
patch – Assuming they know about the problem • Overwrites data with iterations of the
– Test all of your apps, then deploy – And care about fixing it word “meow”
– Efficiently manage bandwidth • Trane Comfortlink II thermostats – No messages or motivational content
• Firmware - The BIOS of the device – Control the temperature from your
• Operating system- Monthly and on- phone Identity theft
demand patches – Trane notified of three vulnerabilities in • May through July 2017 - Equifax
• Applications April 2014 – Data breach of 147.9 million Americans,
– Provided by the manufacturer as- – Two patched in April 2015, one in – 15.2 million British citizens, 19,000
needed January 2016 Canadian citizens
– Names, SSNs, birthdates, addresses,
Legacy platforms Supply chain risk some driver’s license numbers
• Some devices remain installed for a long • You can’t always control security at a • Apache Struts vulnerability from March
time third-party location 7, 2017
– Perhaps too long – Always maintain local security controls – Breach started March 12th
• Legacy devices • Hardware and software from a vendor – Wasn’t patched by Equifax until July
– Older operating systems, applications, can contain malware 30th after discovering “suspicious
middleware – Verify the security of new systems network traffic”
• May be running end-of-life software • Counterfeit hardware is out there – September 7th - Public disclosure
– The risk needs to be compared to the – It looks like a Cisco switch…Is it • September 15th - CIO and CSO depart
return malicious? Equifax
• May require additional security • July 2019 - Equifax pays $575 million in
protections Outsourced code development fines
– Additional firewall rules • Accessing the code base
– IPS signature rules for older operating – Internal access over a VPN Financial loss
systems – Cloud-based access • March 2016 - Bank of Bangladesh
• Verify security to other systems – Society for Worldwide Interbank
1.6 - Third-party Risks – The development systems should be Financial
Third-party risks isolated Telecommunications (SWIFT)
• Test the code security
• Attackers sent secure messages to – Security operations, security – You’re a normal user,
transfer nearly one billion dollars in intelligence, threat response emulates an insider attack
reserves to accounts in Philippines and Sri • Fuse the security data together with
Lanka big data analytics Identify vulnerabilities
– Fortunately, most of the messages were – Analyze massive and diverse datasets • The scanner looks for everything
incorrectly formatted – Pick out the interesting data points – Well, not everything - The signatures are
• Thirty-five requests were acted upon and correlations the key
– $81 million lost and laundered through • Application scans
the Fusing the data – Desktop, mobile apps
Filipino casino industry • Collect the data • Web application scans
• Similar SWIFT vulnerabilities: $12 million – Logs and sensors, network information, – Software on a web server
from Wells Fargo, $60 million from Internet events, intrusion detection • Network scans
Taiwanese Far Eastern International Bank • Add external sources – Misconfigured firewalls, open ports,
– Threat feeds, governmental alerts, vulnerable devices
Reputation impacts advisories and bulletins, social media
• Getting hacked isn’t a great look • Correlate with big data analytics Vulnerability research
– Organizations are often required to – Focuses on predictive analytics and user • The vulnerabilities can be cross-
disclose behavior analytics referenced online
– Stock prices drop, at least for the short – Mathematical analysis of unstructured – Almost all scanners give you a place to
term data go
• October 2016 - Uber breach • National Vulnerability Database:
– 25.6 million Names, email addresses, Cybersecurity maneuvers http://nvd.nist.gov/
mobile numbers • In the physical world, move troops and • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
• Didn’t publicly announce it until tanks (CVE):
November 2017 – Stop the enemy on a bridge or shore https://cve.mitre.org/cve/
– Allegedly paid the hackers $100,000 and • In the virtual world, move firewalls and • Microsoft Security Bulletins:
had them sign an NDA operating systems http://www.microsoft.com/technet/secur
– 2018 - Uber paid $148 million in fines – Set a firewall rule, block an IP address, ity/current.aspx
• Hackers pleaded guilty in October 2019 delete malicious software • Some vulnerabilities cannot be
– August 2020 - Uber’s former Chief • Automated maneuvers definitively identified
Security Officer – Moving at the speed of light – You’ll have to check manually to see if a
– The computer reacts instantly system is vulnerable
Availability loss • Combine with fused intelligence – The scanner gives you a heads-up
• Outages and downtime - Systems are – Ongoing combat from many fronts • National Vulnerability Database:
unavailable • Tomorrow it’s a different fight http://nvd.nist.gov/
• The pervasive ransomware threat – Synchronized with the CVE list
– Brings down the largest networks 1.7 - Vulnerability Scans – Enhanced search functionality
• September 2020 - BancoEstado Vulnerability scanning • Common Vulnerability Scoring System
– One of Chile’s three biggest banks • Usually minimally invasive (CVSS)
– Ransomware attack over the weekend – Unlike a penetration test – Quantitative scoring of a vulnerability - 0
• Bank closed for an extended period • Port scan to 10
– Segmented network - Only hit internal – Poke around and see what’s open – The scoring standards change over time
systems • Identify systems – Different scoring for CVSS 2.0 vs CVSS
– Wipe and restore everything – And security devices 3.x
• Test from the outside and inside • Industry collaboration
Threat hunting – Don’t dismiss insider threats – Enhanced feed sharing and automation
• The constant game of cat and mouse • Gather as much information as possible
– Find the attacker before they find you – We’ll separate wheat from chaff later Vulnerability scan log review
• Strategies are constantly changing • Lack of security controls
– Firewalls get stronger, so phishing gets Scan types – No firewall
better • Scanners are very powerful – No anti-virus
• Intelligence data is reactive – Use many different techniques to – No anti-spyware
– You can’t see the attack until it happens identify • Misconfigurations
• Speed up the reaction time vulnerabilities – Open shares
– Use technology to fight • Non-intrusive scans – Guest access
– Gather information, don’t try to exploit • Real vulnerabilities
Intelligence fusion a – Especially newer ones
• An overwhelming amount of security vulnerability – Occasionally the old ones
data • Intrusive scans
– Too much data to properly detect, – You’ll try out the vulnerability to see if it Dealing with false positives
analyze, and react works • False positives
• Many data types • Non-credentialed scans – A vulnerability is identified that doesn’t
– Dramatically different in type and scope – The scanner can’t login to the remote really exist
• Separate teams device • This is different than a low-severity
• Credentialed scan vulnerability
– It’s real, but it may not be your highest • Constant information flow • The rules
priority – Important metrics in the incoming logs – IP address ranges
• False negatives • Track important statistics – Emergency contacts
– A vulnerability exists, but you didn’t – Exceptions can be identified – How to handle sensitive information
detect it • Send alerts when problems are found – In-scope and out-of-scope devices
• Update to the latest signatures – Email, text, call, etc. or applications
– If you don’t know about it, you can’t see • Create triggers to automate responses
it – Open a ticket, reboot a server Working knowledge
• Work with the vulnerability detection • How much do you know about the test?
manufacturer Analyzing the data – Many different approaches
– They may need to update their • Big data analytics • Unknown environment
signatures for your environment – Analyze large data stores – The pentester knows nothing about the
– Identify patterns that would normally systems under attack
Configuration review remain invisible – “Blind” test
• Validate the security of device • User and entity behavior analytics • Known environment
configurations (UEBA) – Full disclosure
– It’s easy to misconfigure one thing – Detect insider threats • Partially known environment
– A single unlocked window puts the – Identify targeted attacks – A mix of known and unknown
entire home at risk – Catches what the SIEM and DLP systems – Focus on certain systems or applications
• Workstations might miss
– Account configurations, local device • Sentiment analysis Exploiting vulnerabilities
settings – Public discourse correlates to real-world • Try to break into the system
• Servers - Access controls, permission behavior – Be careful; this can cause a denial of
settings – If they hate you, they hack you service or
• Security devices - Firewall rules, – Social media can be a barometer loss of data
authentication options – Buffer overflows can cause instability
SOAR – Gain privilege escalation
SIEM • Security orchestration, automation, and • You may need to try many different
• Security Information and Event response vulnerability types
Management – Automate routine, tedious, and time – Password brute-force, social
– Logging of security events and intensive activities engineering,
information • Orchestration database injections, buffer overflows
• Log collection of security alerts – Connect many different tools together • You’ll only be sure you’re vulnerable if
– Real-time information – Firewalls, account management, email you can bypass security
• Log aggregation and long-term storage filters – If you can get through, the attackers can
– Usually includes advanced reporting • Automation - Handle security tasks get through
features automatically
• Data correlation - Link diverse data • Response - Make changes immediately The process
types Testing • Initial exploitation - Get into the
• Forensic analysis - Gather details after Penetration testing network
an event • Pentest • Lateral movement
– Simulate an attack – Move from system to system
Syslog • Similar to vulnerability scanning – The inside of the network is relatively
• Standard for message logging – Except we actually try to exploit unprotected
– Diverse systems, consolidated log the vulnerabilities • Persistence
• Usually a central log collector • Often a compliance mandate – Once you’re there, you need to make
– Integrated into the SIEM – Regular penetration testing by a 3rd- sure there’s a way back in
• You’re going to need a lot of disk space party – Set up a backdoor, build user accounts,
– No, more. More than that. • National Institute of Standards and change or verify default passwords
– Data storage from many devices over Technology Technical Guide to • The pivot
an extended timeframe Information Security Testing and – Gain access to systems that would
Assessment normally not be accessible
SIEM data – https://professormesser.link/800115 – Use a vulnerable system as a proxy or
• Data inputs (PDF) relay
– Server authentication attempts
– VPN connections Rules of engagement Pentest aftermath
– Firewall session logs • An important document • Cleanup
– Denied outbound traffic flows – Defines purpose and scope – Leave the network in its original state
– Network utilizations – Makes everyone aware of the test – Remove any binaries or temporary files
• Packet captures parameters – Remove any backdoors
– Network packets • Type of testing and schedule – Delete user accounts created during the
– Often associated with a critical alert – On-site physical breach, internal test, test
– Some organizations capture everything external test • Bug bounty
– Normal working hours, after 6 PM only, – A reward for discovering vulnerabilities
Security monitoring etc. – Earn money for hacking a system
– Document the vulnerability to earn cash • Cybersecurity involves many skills – Documentation and processes will be
– Operational security, penetration critical
1.8 - Reconnaissance testing, exploit research, web application
Reconnaissance hardening, etc. Diagrams
• Need information before the attack • Become an expert in your niche • Network diagrams - Document the
– Can’t rush blindly into battle – Everyone has a role to play physical wire and device
• Gathering a digital footprint • The teams • Physical data center layout
– Learn everything you can – Red team, blue team, purple team, – Can include physical rack locations
• Understand the security posture white team • Device diagrams - Individual cabling
– Firewalls, security configurations
• Minimize the attack area Red team Baseline configuration
– Focus on key systems • Offensive security team - The hired • The security of an application
• Create a network map attackers environment
– Identify routers, networks, remote sites • Ethical hacking - Find security holes should be well defined
• Exploit vulnerabilities -Gain access – All application instances must follow this
Passive footprinting • Social engineering - Constant vigilance baseline
• Learn as much as you can from open • Web application scanning - Test and test – Firewall settings, patch levels, OS file
sources again versions
– There’s a lot of information out there – May require constant updates
– Remarkably difficult to protect or Blue team • Integrity measurements check for the
identify • Defensive security - Protecting the data secure baseline
• Social media • Operational security - Daily security – These should be performed often
• Corporate web site tasks – Check against well-documented
• Online forums, Reddit • Incident response - Damage control baselines
• Social engineering • Threat hunting - Find and fix the holes – Failure requires an immediate
• Dumpster diving • Digital forensics - Find data everywhere correction
• Business organizations
Purple team Protecting Data
1.8 Reconnaissance (continued) • Red and blue teams • A primary job task
Wardriving or warflying – Working together – An organization is out of business
• Combine WiFi monitoring and a GPS • Competition isn’t necessarily useful without data
– Search from your car or plane – Internal battles can stifle organizational • Data is everywhere
– Search from a drone security – On a storage drive, on the network, in a
• Huge amount of intel in a short period – Cooperate instead of compete CPU
of time • Deploy applications and data securely • Protecting the data
– And often some surprising results – Everyone is on-board – Encryption, security policies
• All of this is free • Create a feedback loop • Data permissions
– Kismet, inSSIDer – Red informs blue, blue informs red – Not everyone has the same access
– Wireless Geographic
– Logging Engine White team Data sovereignty
– http://wigle.net • Not on a side • Data sovereignty
– Manages the interactions between red – Data that resides in a country is subject
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) teams to
• Gathering information from many open and blue teams the laws of that country
sources • The referees in a security exercise – Legal monitoring, court orders, etc.
– Find information on anyone or anything – Enforces the rules • Laws may prohibit where data is stored
– The name is not related to open-source – Resolves any issues – GDPR (General Data Protection
software – Determines the score Regulation)
• Data is everywhere - • Manages the post-event assessments – Data collected on EU citizens must be
https://osintframework.com/ – Lessons learned stored
• Automated gathering - Many software – Results in the EU
tools available – A complex mesh of technology and
2.1 Configuration Management legalities
Active footprinting • Where is your data stored?
• Trying the doors Configuration management – Your compliance laws may prohibit
– Maybe one is unlocked • The only constant is change moving data out of the country
– Don’t open it yet – Operating systems, patches, application
– Relatively easy to be seen updates, network modifications, new Data masking
• Visible on network traffic and logs application instances, etc. • Data obfuscation
• Ping scans, port scans, DNS queries, • Identify and document hardware and – Hide some of the original data
OS scans, OS fingerprinting, Service scans, software settings • Protects PII
version scans – Manage the security when changes – And other sensitive data
occur • May only be hidden from view
1.8 - Security Teams • Rebuild those systems if a disaster – The data may still be intact in storage
Security teams occurs – Control the view based on permissions
• Many different techniques • Data transmitted over the network Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems
– Substituting, shuffling, encrypting, – Also called data in-motion • On your computer
masking out, etc. • Not much protection as it travels – Data in use
– Many different switches, routers, – Endpoint DLP
Data encryption devices • On your network
• Encode information into unreadable • Network-based protection – Data in motion
data – Firewall, IPS • On your server
– Original information is plaintext, • Provide transport encryption – Data at rest
encrypted – TLS (Transport Layer Security)
form is ciphertext – IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) USB blocking
• This is a two-way street • DLP on a workstation
– Convert between one and the other Data in-use – Allow or deny certain tasks
– If you have the proper key • Data is actively processing in memory • November 2008 - U.S. Department of
– System RAM, CPU registers and cache Defense
2.1 - Configuration Management • The data is almost always decrypted – Worm virus “agent.btz” replicates using
(continued) – Otherwise, you couldn’t do anything USB storage
with it – Bans removable flash media and storage
Standard naming conventions • The attackers can pick the decrypted devices
• Create a standard information out of RAM • All devices had to be updated
– Needs to be easily understood by – A very attractive option – Local DLP agent handled USB blocking
everyone • Target Corp. breach - November 2013 • Ban was lifted in February 2010
• Devices – 110 million credit cards – Replaced with strict guidelines
– Asset tag names and numbers – Data in-transit encryption and data at-
– Computer names - location or region rest encryption 2.1 - Data Loss Prevention
– Serial numbers – Attackers picked the credit card Cloud-based DLP
• Networks - Port labeling numbers out of the point-of-sale RAM • Located between users and the Internet
• Domain configurations – Watch every byte of network traffic
– User account names Tokenization – No hardware, no software
– Standard email addresses • Replace sensitive data with a non- • Block custom defined data strings
sensitive placeholder – Unique data for your organization
IP schema – SSN 266-12-1112 is now 691-61-8539 • Manage access to URLs
• An IP address plan or model • Common with credit card processing – Prevent file transfers to cloud storage
– Consistent addressing for network – Use a temporary token during payment • Block viruses and malware
devices – An attacker capturing the card numbers – Anything traversing the network
– Helps avoid duplicate IP addressing can’t use them later
• Locations • This isn’t encryption or hashing DLP and email
– Number of subnets, hosts per subnet – The original data and token aren’t • Email continues to be the most critical
• IP ranges mathematically related risk vector
– Different sites have a different subnet – No encryption overhead – Inbound threats, outbound data loss
– 10.1.x.x/24, 10.2.x.x/24, 10.3.x.x/24 • Check every email inbound and
• Reserved addresses 2.1 - Protecting Data (continued) outbound
– Users, printers, routers/default Information Rights Management (IRM) – Internal system or cloud-based
gateways • Control how data is used • Inbound - Block keywords, identify
• Confusion – Microsoft Office documents, impostors,
– The encrypted data is drastically email messages, PDFs quarantine email messages
different • Restrict data access to unauthorized • Outbound - Fake wire transfers, W-2
than the plaintext persons transmissions, employee information
• Diffusion – Prevent copy and paste
– Change one character of the input, and – Control screenshots Emailing a spreadsheet template
many – Manage printing • November 2016 - Boeing employee
characters change of the output – Restrict editing emails spouse a spreadsheet to use as a
• Each user has their own set of rights template
Data at-rest – Attackers have limited options • Contained the PII of 36,000 Boeing
• The data is on a storage device employees
– Hard drive, SSD, flash drive, etc. Data Loss Prevention (DLP) – In hidden columns
• Encrypt the data • Where’s your data? – Social security numbers, date of birth,
– Whole disk encryption – Social Security numbers, credit card etc.
– Database encryption numbers, • Boeing sells its own DLP software
– File- or folder-level encryption medical records – But only uses it for classified work
• Apply permissions • Stop the data before the attackers get it
– Access control lists – Data “leakage” Geographical considerations
– Only authorized users can access the • So many sources, so many destinations • Legal implications
data – Often requires multiple solutions in – Business regulations vary between
different places states
Data in-transit
– For a recovery site outside of the – Impossible to recover the original – Automated replication
country, personnel must have a passport message • Flip a switch and everything moves
and be able to clear immigration from the digest – This may be quite a few switches
– Refer to your legal team – Used to store passwords /
• Offsite backup confidentiality 2.1 - Site Resiliency
– Organization-owned site or 3rd-party • Verify a downloaded document is the Cold Site
secure facility same • No hardware
• Offsite recovery as the original – Empty building
– Hosted in a different location, outside – Integrity • No data
the scope of the disaster • Can be a digital signature – Bring it with you
– Travel considerations for support staff – Authentication, non-repudiation, and • No people
and employees integrity – Bus in your team
• Will not have a collision (hopefully)
2.1 - Managing Security – Different messages will not have the Warm site
Response and recovery controls same hash • Somewhere between cold and hot
• Incident response and recovery has – Just enough to get going
become API considerations • Big room with rack space
commonplace • API (Application Programming Interface) – You bring the hardware
– Attacks are frequent and complex – Control software or hardware • Hardware is ready and waiting
• Incident response plan should be programmatically – You bring the software and data
established • Secure and harden the login page
– Documentation is critical – Don’t forget about the API Honeypots
– Identify the attack • On-path attack • Attract the bad guys
– Contain the attack – Intercept and modify API messages, – And trap them there
• Limit the impact of an attacker replay API commands • The “attacker” is probably a machine
– Limit data exfiltration • API injection – Makes for interesting recon
– Limit access to sensitive data – Inject data into an API message • Honeypots
• DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) – Create a virtual world to explore
SSL/TLS inspection – One bad API call can bring down a • Many different options
• Commonly used to examine outgoing system – Kippo, Google Hack Honeypot, Wordpot,
SSL/TLS etc.
– Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer API security • Constant battle to discern the real from
Security • Authentication the fake
– For example, from your computer to – Limit API access to legitimate users
your bank – Over secure protocols Honeyfiles and honeynets
• Wait a second. Examine encrypted • Authorization • Honeynets
traffic? – API should not allow extended access – More than one honeypot on a network
– Is that possible? – Each user has a limited role – More than one source of information
• SSL/TLS relies on trust – A read-only user should not be able to – Stop spammers -
– Without trust, none of this works make https://projecthoneypot.org
changes • Honeyfiles
Trust me, I’m SSL • WAF (Web Application Firewall) – Bait for the honeynet (passwords.txt)
• Your browser contains a list of trusted – Apply rules to API communication – An alert is sent if the file is accessed
CAs – A virtual bear trap
– My browser contains about 170 trusted Site resiliency
CAs certificates • Recovery site is prepped Fake telemetry
• Your browser doesn’t trust a web site – Data is synchronized • Machine learning
unless a CA has signed the web server’s • A disaster is called – Interpret big data to identify the
encryption certificate – Business processes failover to the invisible
– The web site pays some money to the alternate • Train the machine with actual data
CA for this processing site – Learn how malware looks and acts
• The CA has ostensibly performed some • Problem is addressed – Stop malware based on actions instead
checks – This can take hours, weeks, or longer of signatures
– Validated against the DNS record, phone • Revert back to the primary location • Send the machine learning model fake
call, etc. – The process must be documented for telemetry
• Your browser checks the web server’s both directions – Make malicious malware look benign
certificate
– If it’s signed by a trusted CA, the Hot site DNS sinkhole
encryption • An exact replica • A DNS that hands out incorrect IP
works seamlessly – Duplicate everything addresses
• Stocked with hardware – Blackhole DNS
Hashing – Constantly updated • This can be bad
• Represent data as a short string of text – You buy two of everything – An attacker can redirect users to a
– A message digest • Applications and software are constantly malicious site
• One-way trip updated • This can be good
– Redirect known malicious domains to a Cloud service providers – A huge amount of data
benign IP address • Provide cloud services • Edge computing - “Edge”
– Watch for any users hitting that IP – SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, etc. – Process application data on an edge
address • Charge a flat fee or based on use server
– Those devices are infected – More data, more cost – Close to the user
• Can be integrated with a firewall • You still manage your processes • Often process data on the device itself
– Identify infected devices not directly – Internal staff – No latency, no network requirement
connected – Development team – Increased speed and performance
– Operational support – Process where the data is, instead of
2.2 - Cloud Models processing in the cloud
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) Managed service providers
• Sometimes called Hardware as a Service • Managed Service Provider (MSP) Fog computing
(HaaS) – Also a cloud service provider • Fog
– Outsource your equipment – Not all cloud service providers are MSPs – A cloud that’s close to your data
• You’re still responsible for the • MSP support – Cloud + Internet of Things - Fog
management – Network connectivity management computing
– And for the security – Backups and disaster recovery • A distributed cloud architecture -
• Your data is out there, but more within – Growth management and planning Extends the cloud
your control • Managed Security Service Provider • Distribute the data and processing
• Web server providers (MSSP) – Immediate data stays local - No latency
– Firewall management – Local decisions made from local data
Platform as a service (PaaS) – Patch management, security audits – No bandwidth requirements
• No servers, no software, no – Emergency response – Private data never leaves - Minimizes
maintenance team, security concerns
no HVAC On-premises vs. off-premises – Long-term analysis can occur in the
– Someone else handles the platform, • On-premises cloud - Internet only when required
you handle the development – Your applications are on local hardware
• You don’t have direct control of the – Your servers are in your data center in 2.2 - Designing the Cloud
data, your building Designing the cloud
people, or infrastructure • Off-premises / hosted • On-demand computing power
– Trained security professionals are – Your servers are not in your building – Click a button
watching your stuff – They may not even be running on your • Elasticity
– Choose carefully hardware – Scale up or down as needed
• Put the building blocks together – Usually a specialized computing • Applications also scale
– Develop your app from what’s environment – Access from anywhere
available on the platform • How does it all happen?
– SalesForce.com Cloud deployment models – Planning and technology
• Public
Software as a service (SaaS) – Available to everyone over the Internet Thin client
• On-demand software • Community • Basic application usage
– No local installation – Several organizations share the same – Applications actually run on a remote
– Why manage your own email resources server
distribution? • Private – Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI),
– Or payroll? – Your own virtualized local data center – Desktop as a Service (DaaS)
• Central management of data and • Hybrid – Local device is a keyboard, mouse, and
applications – A mix of public and private screen.
– Your data is out there • Minimal operating system on the client
• A complete application offering 2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing – No huge memory or CPU needs
– No development work required Cloud computing • Network connectivity
– Google Mail • Computing on-demand – Big network requirement
– Instantly available computing power – Everything happens across the wire
Anything as a Service (XaaS) – Massive data storage capacity
• A broad description of all cloud models • Fast implementation Virtualization
– Use any combination of the cloud – IT teams can adjust rapidly to change • Virtualization
• Services delivered over the Internet – Smaller startup costs and pay-as-you-go – Run many different operating systems
– Not locally hosted or managed • Not always the best solution on the
• Flexible consumption model – Latency - the cloud is far away same hardware
– No large upfront costs or ongoing – Limited bandwidth • Each application instance has its
licensing – Difficult to protect data own operating system
• IT becomes more of an operating model – Requires Internet/network connectivity – Adds overhead and complexity
– And less of a cost-center model – Virtualization is relatively expensive
– Any IT function can be changed into a Edge computing
service • Over 30 billion IoT devices on the Application containerization
Internet • Container
2.2 - Cloud Models (continued) – Devices with very specific functions
– Contains everything you need to run an resource (Amazon)
application – Userlist is associated with the resource SDV (Software Defined Visibility)
– Code and dependencies • You must see the traffic to secure the
– A standardized unit of software Service integration data
• An isolated process in a sandbox • Service Integration and Management – React and respond
– Self-contained (SIAM) • Dynamic deployments include security
– Apps can’t interact with each other • Many different service providers and network visibility devices
• Container image – The natural result of multisourcing – Next-generation firewalls, web
– A standard for portability • Every provider works differently application firewalls,
– Lightweight, uses the host kernel – Different tools and processes – Security Information and Event
– Secure separation between applications • SIAM is the integration of these Management (SIEM)
diverse providers • Data is encapsulated and encrypted
Microservices and APIs – Provide a single business-facing – VXLAN and SSL/TLS
• Monolithic applications IT organization • New technologies change what you can
– One big application that does everything • An evolving set of processes and see
• Application contains all decision making procedures – Infrastructure as code, microservices
processes Database • Security devices monitor application
– User interface traffic
– Business logic Transit gateway – SDV provides visibility to traffic flows
– Data input and output • Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) • Visibility expands as the application
• Code challenges – A pool of resources created in a public instances expand
– Large codebase cloud – Real-time metrics across all traffic flows
– Change control challenges • Common to create many VPCs • Application flows can be controlled via
• APIs – Many different application clouds API
– Application Programming Interfaces • Connect VPCs with a transit gateway – Identify and react to threats
• API is the “glue” for the microservices – And users to VPCs
– Work together to act as the application – A “cloud router” 2.2 - Virtualization Security
• Scalable • Now make it secure VM sprawl avoidance
– Scale just the microservices you need – VPCs are commonly on different IP • Click a button
• Resilient subnets – You’ve built a server
– Outages are contained – Connecting to the cloud is often through – Or multiple servers, networks, and
• Security and compliance a VPN firewalls
– Containment is built-in • It becomes almost too easy to build
2.2 - Infrastructure as Code instances
Serverless architecture Infrastructure as code – This can get out of hand very quickly
• Function as a Service (FaaS) • Describe an infrastructure • The virtual machines are sprawled
– Applications are separated into – Define servers, network, and everywhere
individual, autonomous functions applications as code – You aren’t sure which VMs are related
– Remove the operating system from the • Modify the infrastructure and create to which applications
equation versions – It becomes extremely difficult to
• Developer still creates the server-side – The same way you version application deprovision
logic code • Formal process and detailed
– Runs in a stateless compute container • Use the description (code) to build other documentation
• May be event triggered and ephemeral application instances – You should have information on every
– May only run for one event – Build it the same way every time based virtual object
• Managed by a third-party on the code
– All OS security concerns are at the third- • An important concept for cloud VM escape protection
party computing • The virtual machine is self-contained
– Build a perfect version every time – There’s no way out - Or is there?
Resource policies • Virtual machine escape
• Assigning permissions to cloud SDN (Software Defined Networking) – Break out of the VM and interact with
resources • Networking devices have two functional the host operating
– Not the easiest task planes of operation system or hardware
– Everything is in constant motion – Control plane, data plane • Once you escape the VM, you have
• Specify which resources can be • Directly programmable great control
provisioned (Azure) – Configuration is different than – Control the host and control other guest
– Create a service in a specific region, forwarding VMs
deny all others • Agile - Changes can be made • This would be a huge exploit
• Specify the resource and what actions dynamically – Full control of the virtual world
are • Centrally managed - Global view, single
permitted (Amazon) pane of glass Escaping the VM
– Allow access to an API gateway from an • Programmatically configured • March 2017 - Pwn2Own competition
IP address range – No human intervention – Hacking contest
• Explicitly list the users who can access • Open standards / vendor neutral – You pwn it, you own it - along with some
the – A standard interface to the network cash
• JavaScript engine bug in Microsoft Edge • Logistical challenges • The security policies should be part of
– Code execution in the Edge sandbox – New servers the orchestration
• Windows 10 kernel bug – New software – As applications are provisioned, the
– Compromise the guest operating system – Restart or interrupt of service proper security is automatically included
• Hardware simulation bug in VMware
– Escape to the host Secure baselines Deprovisioning
• Patches were released soon afterwards • The security of an application • Dismantling and removing an
environment should be well defined application instance
2.3 - Secure Deployments – All application instances must follow this – All good things
Development to production baseline • Security deprovisioning is important
• Your programming team has been – Firewall settings, patch levels, OS file – Don’t leave open holes, don’t close
working on a new application versions important ones
– How will you deploy it safely and – May require constant updates • Firewall policies must be reverted
reliably? • Integrity measurements check for the – If the application is gone, so is the
• Patch Tuesday secure baseline access
– Test and deploy Wednesday? Thursday? – These should be performed often • What happens to the data?
Friday? – Check against well-documented – Don’t leave information out there
• Manage the process baselines
– Safely move from a non-production – Failure requires an immediate 2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques
phase to full production correction Secure coding concepts
• A balance between time and quality
Sandboxing 2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning – Programming with security in mind is
• Isolated testing environment Provisioning often secondary
– No connection to the real world or • Deploy an application • Testing, testing, testing
production system – Web server, database server, – The Quality Assurance (QA) process
– A technological safe space middleware server, user workstation • Vulnerabilities will eventually be found
• Use during the development process configurations, certificate updates, etc. – And exploited
– Try some code, break some code, • Application software security
nobody gets hurt – Operating system, application Stored procedures
• Incremental development • Network security • SQL databases
– Helps build the application – Secure VLAN, internal access, external – Client sends detailed requests for data
access – ‘SELECT * FROM wp_options WHERE
Building the application • Software deployed to workstations option_id = 1’
• Development – Check executables for malicious code, • Client requests can be complex
– Secure environment verify security posture of the workstation – And sometimes modified by the user
– Writing code – This would not be good
– Developers test in their sandboxes Scalability and elasticity • Stored procedures limit the client
• Test • Handle application workload interactions
– Still in the development stage – Adapt to dynamic changes – ‘CALL get_options’
– All of the pieces are put together • Scalability – That’s it. No modifications to the query
– Does it all work? – The ability to increase the workload in a are possible.
– Functional tests given infrastructure • To be really secure, use only stored
– Build an application instance that can procedures
Verifying the application handle – The application doesn’t use any SQL
• Quality Assurance (QA) – 100,000 transactions per second queries
– Verifies features are working as • Elasticity
expected – Increase or decrease available resources Obfuscation/camouflage
– Validates new functionality as the workload changes • Obfuscate
– Verifies old errors don’t reappear – Deploy multiple application instances to – Make something normally
• Staging handle understandable very difficult to
– Almost ready to roll it out – 500,000 transactions per second understand
– Works and feels exactly like the • Take perfectly readable code and turn it
production Orchestration into nonsense
environment • Automation is the key to cloud – The developer keeps the readable code
– Working with a copy of production data computing and gives you the chicken scratch
– Run performance tests – Services appear and disappear – Both sets of code perform exactly the
– Test usability and features automatically, same way Page 43
or at the push of a button https://ProfessorMesser.com
Using the application2 • Entire application instances can be • Helps prevent the search for security
https://ProfessorMesser.com instantly provisioned holes
• Production – All servers, networks, switches, firewalls, – Makes it more difficult to figure out
– Application is live and policies what’s happening - But not impossible
– Rolled out to the user community • Instances can move around the world as
• A challenging step needed Code reuse/dead code
– Impacts the users – Follow the sun • Code reuse
– Use old code to build new applications • Third-party libraries and software • An attack against different binaries
– Copy and paste development kits would only be successful on a fraction of
• If the old code has security – Extend the functionality of a the users
vulnerabilities, reusing the code spreads it programming language – An attacker wouldn’t know what exploit
to other applications • Security risk to use
– You’re making this much more difficult – Application code written by someone – Make the game much harder to win
for everyone else 2.3 - Automation and Scripting
• Dead code – Might be secure. Might not be secure. Automation and scripting
– Calculations are made, code is executed, – Extensive testing is required • Plan for change
results are tallied • Balancing act - Application features vs. – Implement automatically
– The results aren’t used anywhere else in unknown code base • Automated courses of action
the – Many problems can be predicted
application Data exposure – Have a set of automated responses
• All code is an opportunity for a security • So much sensitive data • Continuous monitoring
problem – Credit card numbers, social security – Check for a particular event, and then
– Make sure your code is as alive as numbers, medical information, address react
possible details, email information • Configuration validation
• How is the application handling the – Cloud-based technologies allow for
Input validation data? constant change
• What is the expected input? – No encryption when stored – Automatically validate a configuration
– Validate actual vs. expected – No encryption across the network before going live
• Document all input methods – Displaying information on the screen – Perform ongoing automated checks
– Forms, fields, type • All input and output processes are
• Check and correct all input important Continuous integration (CI)
(normalization) – Check them all for data exposure • Code is constantly written
– A zip code should be only X characters – And merged into the central repository
long with a letter in the X column Version control many times a day
– Fix any data with improper input • Create a file, make a change, make • So many chances for security problems
• The fuzzers will find what you missed another change, and another change – Security should be a concern from the
– Don’t give them an opening – Track those changes, revert back to a beginning
previous version • Basic set of security checks during
Validation points • Commonly used in software development
• Server-side validation development – Documented security baselines as the
– All checks occur on the server – But also in operating systems, wiki bare minimum
– Helps protect against malicious users software, and cloud-based file storage • Large-scale security analysis during the
– Attackers may not even be using your • Useful for security testing phase
interface – Compare versions over time – Significant problems will have already
• Client-side validation – Identify modifications to important files been covered
– The end-user’s app makes the validation – A security challenge
decisions – Historical information can be a security Continuous delivery/deployment (CD)
– Can filter legitimate input from genuine risk • Continuous delivery
users 2.3 - Software Diversity – Automate the testing process
– May provide additional speed to the Exploiting an application – Automate the release process
user • Attackers often exploit application – Click a button and deploy the
• Use both - But especially server-side vulnerabilities application
validation – They find the unlocked door and open it • Continuous deployment
• Once you exploit one binary, you can – Even more automation
Memory management exploit them all – Automatically deploy to production
• As a developer, you must be mindful of – The application works the same on all – No human integration or manual checks
how memory is used systems
– Many opportunities to build vulnerable – A Windows 10 exploit affects all Directory services
code Windows 10 users • Keep all of an organization’s usernames
• Never trust data input • What if all of the computers were and passwords in a single database
– Malicious users can attempt to running different software? – Also contains computers, printers, and
circumvent your code – Unique binaries other devices
• Buffer overflows are a huge security risk – Functionally identical • Large distributed database
– Make sure your data matches your – Constantly replicated
buffer sizes Software diversity • All authentication requests reference
• Some built-in functions are insecure • Alternative compiler paths would result this directory
– Use best practices when designing your in a different binary each time – Each user only needs one set of
code – Each compiled application would be a credentials
little bit – One username and password for all
Third-party libraries and SDKs different services
• Your programming language does – But functionally the same • Access via Kerberos or LDAP
everything - Almost
Federation • Time-based One-Time Password – Unique capillary structure in
• Provide network access to others algorithm the back of the eye
– Not just employees - Partners, suppliers, – Use a secret key and the time of day • Iris scanner
customers, etc. – No incremental counter – Texture, color
– Provides SSO and more • Secret key is configured ahead of time • Voice recognition
• Third-parties can establish a federated – Timestamps are synchronized via NTP – Talk for access
network • Timestamp usually increments every 30 • Facial recognition
– Authenticate and authorize between the seconds – Shape of the face and features
two organizations – Put in your username, password, and
– Login with your Facebook credentials TOTP code Biometric acceptance rates
• The third-parties must establish a trust • One of the more common OTP methods • False acceptance rate (FAR)
relationship – Used by Google, Facebook, Microsoft, – Likelihood that an unauthorized user will
– And the degree of the trust etc. be accepted
– Not sensitive enough
Attestation HOTP • False rejection rate (FRR)
• Prove the hardware is really yours • One-time passwords – Likelihood that an authorized user will
– A system you can trust – Use them once, and never again be rejected
• Easy when it’s just your computer – Once a session, once each – Too sensitive
– More difficult when there are 1,000 authentication attempt • Crossover error rate (CER)
• Remote attestation • HMAC-based One-Time Password – Defines the overall accuracy of a
– Device provides an operational report to algorithm biometric system
a – Keyed-hash message authentication – The rate at which FAR and FRR are equal
verification server code (HMAC) – Adjust sensitivity to equalize both values
– Encrypted and digitally signed with the – The keys are based on a secret key and a
TPM counter AAA framework
– An IMEI or other unique hardware • Token-based authentication • Identification
component can be included in the report – The hash is different every time – This is who you claim to be
• Hardware and software tokens available – Usually your username
Short message service (SMS) – You’ll need additional technology to • Authentication
• Text messaging make this work – Prove you are who you say you are
– Includes more than text these days – Password and other authentication
• Login factor can be sent via SMS to a Phone call factors
predefined phone number • A voice call provides the token • Authorization
– Provide username and password – The computer is talking to you – Based on your identification and
– Phone receives an SMS – “Your code is 1-6-2-5-1-7.” authentication, what access do you have?
– Input the SMS code into the login form • Similar disadvantages to SMS • Accounting
• Security issues exist – Phone call can be intercepted or – Resources used: Login time, data sent
– Phone number can be reassigned to a forwarded and received, logout time
different phone – Phone number can be added to another
– SMS messages can be intercepted phone Cloud vs. on-premises authentication
• Cloud-based security
Push notification Static codes – Third-party can manage the platform
• Similar process to an SMS notification • Authentication factors that don’t change – Centralized platform
– Authentication factor is pushed to a – You just have to remember – Automation options with API integration
specialized app • Personal Identification Number (PIN) – May include additional options (for a
– Usually on a mobile device – Your secret numbers cost)
• Security challenges • Can also be alphanumeric • On-premises authentication system
– Applications can be vulnerable – A password or passphrase – Internal monitoring and management
– Some push apps send in the clear – Need internal expertise
• Still more secure than SMS Smart cards – External access must be granted and
– Multiple factors are better than one • Integrated circuit card - Contact or managed
factor contactless
• Common on credit cards - Also used for Multi-factor authentication
Authentication apps access control • Factors
• Pseudo-random token generators • Must have physical card to provide – Something you know
– A useful authentication factor digital access – Something you have
• Carry around a physical hardware token – A digital certificate – Something you are
generator • Multiple factors • Attributes
– Where are my keys again? – Use the card with a PIN or fingerprint – Somewhere you are
• Use software-based token generator on – Something you can do
your phone 2.4 - Biometrics – Something you exhibit
– Powerful and convenient Biometric factors – Someone you know
• Fingerprint scanner
TOTP – Phones, laptops, door access Something you know
• Retinal scanner • Password
– Secret word/phrase, string of characters – Typing analysis - the way you hit the • NICs talk to each other
– Very common authentication factor enter key too hard – Usually multicast instead of broadcast
• PIN – Fails over when a NIC doesn’t respond
– Personal identification number • Someone you know
– Not typically contained anywhere on a – A social factor 2.5 - Network Redundancy
smart card or ATM card – It’s not what you know… UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply
• Pattern – Web of trust – Short-term backup power
– Complete a series of patterns – Digital signature – Blackouts, brownouts, surges
– Only you know the right format • UPS types
2.5 - Disk Redundancy – Offline/Standby UPS
Something you have Redundancy – Line-interactive UPS
• Smart card • Duplicate parts of the system – On-line/Double-conversion UPS
– Integrates with devices – If a part fails, the redundant part can be • Features
– May require a PIN used – Auto shutdown, battery capacity,
• USB token - Certificate is on the USB • Maintain uptime outlets,
device – The organization continues to function phone line suppression
• Hardware or software tokens • No hardware failure
– Generates pseudo-random – Servers keep running 2.5 - Power Redundancy
authentication codes • No software failure Generators
• Your phone -SMS a code to your phone – Services always available • Long-term power backup
• No system failure – Fuel storage required
Something you are – Network performing optimally • Power an entire building
• Biometric authentication – Some power outlets may be marked as
– Fingerprint, iris scan, voice print Geographic dispersal generator-powered
• Usually stores a mathematical • Bad things can happen in a local area • It may take a few minutes to get the
representation – Hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, generator up to speed
of your biometric • Disperse technologies to different – Use a battery UPS while the generator is
– Your actual fingerprint isn’t usually geographies starting
saved – Use multiple data centers
• Difficult to change – In different locations Dual-power supplies
– You can change your password • Data centers might be part of the • Redundancy
– You can’t change your fingerprint normal operations – Internal server power supplies
• Used in very specific situations – East coast and west coast operations – External power circuits
– Not foolproof centers • Each power supply can handle 100% of
• May be part of a disaster recovery the load
Somewhere you are center – Would normally run at 50% of the load
• Provide a factor based on your location – If Florida gets hit, fire up the Denver • Hot-swappable
– The transaction only completes if you data center – Replace a faulty power supply without
are in a powering down
particular geography Disk redundancy
• IP address • Multipath I/O (Input/Output) Power distribution units (PDUs)
– Not perfect, but can help provide more – Especially useful for network-based • Provide multiple power outlets
info storage subsystems – Usually in a rack
– Works with IPv4, not so much with IPv6 – Multiple Fibre Channel interfaces with • Often include monitoring and control
• Mobile device location services multiple switches – Manage power capacity
– Geolocation to a very specific area • RAID - Redundant Array of Independent – Enable or disable individual outlets
– Must be in a location that can receive Disks
GPS • Multiple drives create redundancy SAN replication
information or near an identified mobile – Many different designs and • Share data between different devices
or 802.11 network implementations – If one device fails, you can still work
– Still not a perfect identifier of location with the data
Load balancing – VERY fast recovery times compared to
Something you can do • Some servers are active - Others are on traditional backups
• A personal way of doing things standby • Storage area networks (SANs)
– You’re special • If an active server fails, the passive – Specialized high-performance network
• Handwriting analysis server takes its place of
– Signature comparison storage devices
– Writing technique NIC teaming • SAN-to-SAN replication
• Very similar to biometrics • Load Balancing / Fail Over (LBFO) – Duplicate data from one data center to
– Close to something you are – Aggregate bandwidth, redundant paths another
– Becomes more important in the virtual • SAN snapshot
Other attributes world – Create a state of data based on a point
• Something you exhibit • Multiple network adapters in time
– A unique trait, personal to you – Looks like a single adapter – Copy that state to other SANs
– Gait analysis - the way you walk – Integrate with switches
VM replication – Sequential storage • Rollback to known configuration
• Virtual machine redundancy – 100 GB to multiple terabytes per – Don’t modify the data, but use a
– Maintain one VM, replicate to all others cartridge previous configuration
– The virtual machine is really just one big – Easy to ship and store • Live boot media
file • Disk – Run the operating system from
• Consistent service offering – Faster than magnetic tape - Deduplicate removable
– Maintain copies anywhere in the world and compress media - very portable!
• Recover from a replicated copy • Copy
– Provides a backup if needed – A useful strategy High availability
• Efficient copying – May not include versioning - May need • Redundancy doesn’t always mean
– Only replicates the data that has to keep offsite always available
changed – May need to be powered on manually
NAS vs. SAN • HA (high availability)
On premises vs. cloud redundancy • Network Attached Storage (NAS) – Always on, always available
• Speed – Connect to a shared storage device • May include many different components
– Local devices are connected over very across the network working together
fast networks – File-level access – Active/Active can provide scalability
– Cloud connections are almost always • Storage Area Network (SAN) advantages
slower – Looks and feels like a local storage • Higher availability almost always means
• Money device higher costs
– Purchasing your own storage is an – Block-level access – There’s always another contingency you
expensive – Very efficient reading and writing could add
capital investment • Requires a lot of bandwidth – Upgraded power, high-quality server
– Cloud costs have a low entry point and – May use an isolated network and high- components, etc.
can scale speed
• Security network technologies Order of restoration
– Local data is private • Application-specific
– Data stored in the cloud requires Other backups – Certain components may need to be
additional • Cloud restored first
security controls – Backup to a remote device in the cloud – Databases should be restored before the
–Support many devices application
2.5 - Backup Types –May be limited by bandwidth • Backup-specific
Backup Types • Image – Incremental backups restore the full
• The archive attribute – Capture an exactly replica of everything backup,
– Set when a file is modified on a then all subsequent incremental backups
• Full - Everything storage drive – Differential backups restore the full
– You’ll want this one first – Restore everything on a partition, backup,
• Incremental including then the last differential backup
– All files changed since the last operating system files and user
incremental backup documents Diversity
• Differential Backup locations • Technologies
– All files changed since the last full • Offline backup – A zero-day OS vulnerability can cause
backup – Backup to local devices significant outages
– Fast and secure – Multiple security devices
Incremental Backup – Must be protected and maintained • Vendors
• A full backup is taken first – Often requires offsite storage for – A single vendor can become a
• Subsequent backups contain data disaster recovery disadvantage
changed since the last full backup and last • Online backup – No options during annual renewals
incremental backup – Remote network-connected third-party – A bad support team may not be able to
– These are usually smaller – Encrypted resolve problems in a timely manner
than the full backup – Accessible from anywhere • Cryptographic
• A restoration requires the full backup – Speed is limited by network bandwidth – All cryptography is temporary
and all of the incremental backups – Diverse certificate authorities can
Non-persistence provide
Differential Backup • The cloud is always in motion additional protection
• A full backup is taken first – Application instances are constantly • Controls
• Subsequent backups contain built – Administrative controls
data changed since the last full backup and torn down – Physical controls
– These usually grow larger as • Snapshots can capture the current – Technical controls
data is changed configuration and data – Combine them together
• A restoration requires the full – Preserve the complete state of a device, – Defense in depth
backup and the last differential backup or
just the configuration Embedded systems
Backup media • Revert to known state • Hardware and software designed for a
• Magnetic tape – Fall back to a previous snapshot specific function
– Or to operate as part of a larger system • Vehicles • An operating system with a
• Is built with only this task in mind – Internal network is often accessible from deterministic
– Can be optimized for size and/or cost mobile networks processing schedule
• Common examples – Control internal electronics – No time to wait for other processes
– Traffic light controllers • Aircraft – Industrial equipment, automobiles,
– Digital watches – DoS could damage the aircraft – Military environments
– Medical imaging systems – An outage would be problematic • Extremely sensitive to security issues
• Smart meters - Measure power and – Non-trivial systems
SoC (System on a Chip) water usage – Need to always be available
• Multiple components running on a – Difficult to know what type of security is
single chip VoIP in place
– Common with embedded systems • Voice over Internet Protocol
• Small form-factor – Instead of analog phone line or the Surveillance systems
– External interface support – Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) • Video/audio surveillance
– Cache memory, flash memory • A relatively complex embedded system – Embedded systems in the cameras and
– Usually lower power consumption – Can be relatively important the
• Security considerations are important • Each device is a computer monitoring stations
– Difficult to upgrade hardware – Separate boot process • Secure the security system
– Limited off-the-shelf security options – Individual configurations – Restrict access from others - Prevent a
– Different capabilities and functionalities denial of service
Field-programmable gate array (FPGA) • Physically difficult to replace cameras
• An integrated circuit that can be HVAC – Accessible independently over the
configured • Heating, Ventilation, and Air network
after manufacturing Conditioning – May allow for firmware upgrades
– Array of logic blocks – Thermodynamics, fluid mechanics, and
– Programmed in the field heat transfer 5G
• A problem doesn’t require a hardware • A complex science • Fifth generation cellular networking
replacement – Not something you can properly design – Launched worldwide in 2020
– Reprogram the FPGA yourself • Significant performance improvements
• Common in infrastructure – Must be integrated into the fire system – At higher frequencies
– Firewall logic • PC manages equipment – Eventually 10 gigabits per second
– Routers – Makes cooling and heating decisions for – Slower speeds from 100-900 Mbit/s
workspaces • Significant IoT impact
SCADA/ICS and data centers – Bandwidth becomes less of a constraint
• Supervisory Control and Data • Traditionally not built with security in – Larger data transfers
Acquisition System mind – Faster monitoring and notification
– Large-scale, multi-site Industrial Control – Difficult to recover from an – Additional cloud processing
Systems (ICS) infrastructure DoS
• PC manages equipment Subscriber identity module (SIM)
– Power generation, refining, Drones • SIM card - A universal integrated circuit
manufacturing equipment • Flying vehicle card
– Facilities, industrial, energy, logistics – No pilot on board • Used to provide information to a cellular
• Distributed control systems • May be manually controlled from the network provider - Phones, tablets,
– Real-time information ground embedded systems
– System control – Often with some autonomy • Contains mobile details
• Requires extensive segmentation – Set it and forget it – IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber
– No access from the outside • Extensive commercial and non- Identity)
commercial use – Authentication information, contact
2.6 - Embedded Systems – May require federal licenses information
Smart devices / IoT (Internet of Things) – Security and fail-safes are required • Important to manage
• Sensors - Heating and cooling, lighting – Many embedded systems, many SIM
• Smart devices - Home automation, video Printers, scanners, and fax machines cards
doorbells • All-in-one or multifunction devices
• Wearable technology - Watches, health (MFD) Narrowband
monitors – Everything you need in one single device • Communicate analog signals over a
• Facility automation - Temperature, air • No longer a simple printer narrow range of frequencies
quality, lighting – Very sophisticated firmware – Over a longer distance - Conserve the
• Weak defaults • Some images are stored locally on the frequency use
– IOT manufacturers are not security device • Many IoT devices can communicate over
professionals – Can be retrieved externally long distances
• Logs are stored on the device – SCADA equipment - Sensors in oil fields
Specialized – Contain communication and fax details
• Medical devices Baseband
– Heart monitors, insulin pumps 2.6 - Embedded Systems (continued) • Generally a single cable with a digital
– Often use older operating systems RTOS (Real-Time Operating System) signal
– Can be fiber or copper – Purpose-built - usually does one thing • CCTV (Closed circuit television)
• The communication signal uses all of the very well – Can replace physical guards
bandwidth – May not provide much additional • Camera features are important
– Utilization is either 0% or 100% functionality – Motion recognition can alarm and alert
• Bidirectional communication • Cost when
– But not at the same time using the same – Single-purpose functionality comes at a something moves
wire/fiber low cost – Object detection can identify a license
• Ethernet standard - 100BASE-TX, – Low cost may affect product quality plate or
1000BASE-T, 10GBASE-T • Implied trust person’s face
– Limited access to the hardware and • Often many different cameras
Zigbee software – Networked together and recorded over
• Internet of Things networking – Difficult to verify the security posture time
– Open standard - IEEE 802.15.4 PAN
• Alternative to WiFi and Bluetooth 2.7 - Physical Security Controls Industrial camouflage
– Longer distances than Bluetooth Barricades / bollards • Conceal an important facility in plain
– Less power consumption than WiFi • Prevent access sight
• Mesh network of all Zigbee devices in – There are limits to the prevention – Blends in to the local environment
your home • Channel people through a specific • Protect a data center
– Light switch communicates to light bulbs access point – No business signs
– Tell Amazon Echo to lock the door – And keep out other things – No visual clues
• Uses the ISM band – Allow people, prevent cars and trucks – Surround it with a water feature
– Industrial, Scientific, and Medical • Identify safety concerns – Install a guard gate
– 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz frequencies in the – And prevent injuries – Planters out front are bollards
US • Can be used to an extreme Guards and access lists
– Concrete barriers / bollards • Security guard
Embedded systems – Moats – Physical protection at the reception area
• Not usually a fully capable computer of a
– Low cost, purpose-built Access control vestibules facility
• Adds additional constraints • All doors normally unlocked – Validates identification of existing
– May have limited or missing features – Opening one door causes others to lock employees
– Upgradability limitations • All doors normally locked – Provides guest access
– Limits in communication options – Unlocking one door prevents others • ID badge
• An ongoing trade off from being unlocked – Picture, name, other details
– Low cost systems - Unique management • One door open / other locked – Must be worn at all times
challenges – When one is open, the other cannot be • Access list
unlocked – Physical list of names
Constraints • One at a time, controlled groups – Enforced by security guard
• Power - May not have access to a main – Managed control through an area • Maintains a visitor log
power source
– Batteries may need to be replaced and Alarms Guards
maintained • Circuit-based • Two-person integrity/control
• Compute – Circuit is opened or closed – Minimize exposure to an attack
– Low-power CPUs are limited in speed – Door, window, fence – No single person has access to a physical
– Cost and heat considerations – Useful on the perimeter asset
• Network • Motion detection • Robot sentries
– May not have the option for a wired link – Radio reflection or passive infrared – Monitoring
– May be in the middle of a field – Useful in areas not often in use – Rounds / Periodic checks
– Wireless is the limiting factor • Duress – An emerging technology
• Crypto – Triggered by a person - The big red
– Limited hardware options button Biometrics
– Difficult to change or modify • Biometric authentication
cryptography features Signs – Fingerprint, retina, voiceprint
• Inability to patch • Clear and specific instructions • Usually stores a mathematical
– Some IoT devices have no field- – Keep people away from restricted areas representation
upgradable options – Consider visitors of your biometric
– Upgrade options may be limited or • Consider personal safety – Your actual fingerprint isn’t usually
difficult to install – Fire exits saved
• Authentication – Warning signs • Difficult to change
– Security features are often an – Chemicals – You can change your password
afterthought – Construction – You can’t change your fingerprint
– Limited options, no multi-factor, limited – Medical resources • Used in very specific situations
integration • Informational – Not foolproof
with existing directory services – In case of emergency, call this number
• Range Door access controls
Video surveillance • Conventional - Lock and key
• Deadbolt - Physical bolt – Commonly replaced with Dupont FM- – Focus the cooling
• Electronic - Keyless, PIN 200 – Lower energy costs
• Token-based
– RFID badge, magnetic swipe card, or key Sensors Drones
fob • Motion detection • Quickly cover large areas
• Biometric - Hand, fingers or retina – Identify movement in an area – More than just one building
• Multi-factor - Smart card and PIN • Noise detection • More than physical security
– Recognize an increase in sound – Site surveys, damage assessments
Cable locks • Proximity reader • On-board sensors
• Temporary security – Commonly used with electronic door – Motion detection
– Connect your hardware to something locks – Thermal sensors
solid – Combined with an access card • Video evidence
• Cable works almost anywhere • Moisture detection – High resolution video capture
– Useful when mobile – Useful to identify water leaks
• Most devices have a standard connector • Temperature Faraday cage
– Reinforced notch – Monitor changes over time • Blocks electromagnetic fields
• Not designed for long-term protection – Discovered by Michael Faraday in 1836
– Those cables are pretty thin 2.7 - Secure Areas • A mesh of conductive material
– The cage cancels the electromagnetic
USB data blocker Secure areas field’s
• Don’t connect to unknown USB • Physically secure the data effect on the interior
interfaces – As important as the digital security – The window of a microwave oven
– Even if you need a quick charge • An important part of a security policy • Not a comprehensive solution
– Prevent “juice jacking” – Not a question to leave unanswered – Not all signal types are blocked
• Use a USB data blocker • Secure active operations – Some signal types are not blocked at all
– Allow the voltage, reject the data – Prevent physical access to the systems • Can restrict access to mobile networks
• Use your power adapter • Secure offline data – Some very specific contingencies would
– Avoid the issue entirely – Backups are an important security need to be in place for emergency calls
concern
Proper lighting Screened subnet
• More light means more security Air gap • Formerly known as a demilitarized zone
– Attackers avoid the light • Physical separation between networks (DMZ)
– Easier to see when lit – Secure network and insecure network – An additional layer of security between
– Non IR cameras can see better – Separate customer infrastructures the
• Specialized design • Most environments are shared Internet and you
– Consider overall light levels – Shared routers, switches, firewalls – Public access to public resources
– Lighting angles may be important – Some of these are virtualized
– Facial recognition • Specialized networks require air gaps Protected distribution
– Avoid shadows and glare – Stock market networks • Protected Distribution System (PDS)
– Power systems/SCADA – A physically secure cabled network
Fencing – Airplanes • Protect your cables and fibers
• Build a perimeter – Nuclear power plant operations – All of the data flows through these
– Usually very obvious conduits
– May not be what you’re looking for Vaults and safes • Prevent cable and fiber taps
• Transparent or opaque • Vault – Direct taps and inductive taps
– See through the fence (or not) – A secure reinforced room • Prevent cable and fiber cuts
• Robust – Store backup media – A physical denial of service (DoS)
– Difficult to cut the fence – Protect from disaster or theft • Hardened protected distribution system
• Prevent climbing – Often onsite – Sealed metal conduit, periodic visual
– Razor wire • Safe inspection
– Build it high – Similar to a vault, but smaller
– Less expensive to implement 2.7 - Secure Data Destruction
Fire suppression – Space is limited - Install at more
• Electronics require unique responses to locations Data destruction and media sanitization
fire • Disposal becomes a legal issue
– Water is generally a bad thing Hot and cold aisles – Some information must not be
• Detection • Data centers destroyed
– Smoke detector, flame detector, heat – Lots and lots of equipment – Consider offsite storage
detector – This equipment generates heat • You don’t want critical information in
• Suppress with water • Optimize cooling the trash
– Where appropriate – Keep components at optimal – People really do dumpster dive
• Suppress with chemicals temperatures – Recycling can be a security concern
– Halon - No longer manufactured • Conserve energy – Physically destroy the media
– Destroys ozone – Data centers are usually very large • Reuse the storage media
rooms – Sanitize the media for reuse
– Ensure nothing is left behind – One-off or industrial removal and Asymmetric encryption
destroy • Public key cryptography
Protect your rubbish – Two (or more) mathematically related
• Secure your garbage - Fence and a lock Cryptography keys
• Shred your documents • Greek: “kryptos” • Private key - Keep this private
– This will only go so far – Hidden, secret • Public key - Anyone can see this key -
– Governments burn the good stuff • Confidentiality Give it away
• Burn documents - No going back – It’s a secret • The private key is the only key that can
• Pulp the paper • Authentication and access control decrypt data encrypted with the public
– Large tank washing to remove ink – I know it’s you. I REALLY know it’s you. key
– Paper broken down into pulp • Non-repudiation - You said it. You can’t – You can’t derive the private key from
– Creates recycled paper deny it. the public key
• Integrity - Tamper-proof
Physical destruction 2.8 - Symmetric and Asymmetric
• Shredder / pulverizer Cryptography terms The key pair
– Heavy machinery, complete destruction • Plaintext - An unencrypted message (in • Asymmetric encryption
• Drill / Hammer the clear) – Public Key Cryptography
– Quick and easy - Platters, all the way • Ciphertext - An encrypted message • Key generation
through • Cipher - The algorithm used to encrypt – Build both the public and private key at
• Electromagnetic (degaussing) and/or decrypt the same time
– Remove the magnetic field • Cryptanalysis – Lots of randomization
– Destroys the drive data and renders the – The art of cracking encryption – Large prime numbers
drive unusable – Researchers are constantly trying to find – Lots and lots of math
• Incineration - Fire hot. weaknesses in ciphers • Everyone can have the public key
– A mathematically flawed cipher is bad – Only Alice has the private key
Certificate of destruction for everyone
• Destruction is often done by a 3rd party Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
– How many drills and degaussers do you 2.8 - Cryptography Concepts • Asymmetric encryption
have? Cryptographic keys – Need large integers composed of two or
• Need confirmation that your data is • Keys more large prime factors
destroyed – Add the key to the cypher to encrypt • Instead of numbers, use curves!
– Service should include a certificate – Larger keys are generally more secure – Uses smaller keys than non-ECC
• A paper trail of broken data • Some encryption methods use one key asymmetric
– You know exactly what happened – Some use more than one key encryption
– Every method is a bit different – Smaller storage and transmission
Sanitizing media requirements
• Purge data Give weak keys a workout – Perfect for mobile devices
– Remove it from an existing data store • A weak key is a weak key
– Delete some of the data from a – By itself, it’s not very secure Key stretching libraries
database • Make a weak key stronger by • Already built for your application
• Wipe data performing – No additional programming involved
– Unrecoverable removal of data on a multiple processes • bcrypt
storage device – Hash a password. Hash the hash of the – Generates hashes from passwords
– Usually overwrites the data storage password. And continue… – An extension to the UNIX crypt library
locations – Key stretching, key strengthening – Uses Blowfish cipher to perform
– Useful when you need to reuse or • Brute force attacks would require multiple
continue using the media reversing each of those hashes rounds of hashing
– The attacker has to spend much more • Password-Based Key Derivation Function
Data security time, even though the key is small 2 (PBKDF2)
• July 2013 - UK National Health Service – Part of RSA public key cryptography
Surrey Symmetric encryption standards
– Provided hard drives to a 3rd-party to be • A single, shared key (PKCS #5, RFC 2898)
destroyed – Encrypt with the key
– Contained 3,000 patient records – Decrypt with the same key Lightweight cryptography
– Received a destruction certificate, but – If it gets out, you’ll need another key • Powerful cryptography has traditionally
not • Secret key algorithm required strength
actually destroyed. – A shared secret – A powerful CPU and lots of time
– Sold on eBay. Buyer contacted • Doesn’t scale very well • Internet of Things (IoT) devices have
authorities, – Can be challenging to distribute limited power
fined £200,000 • Very fast to use – Both watts and CPU
• File level overwriting – Less overhead than asymmetric • New standards are being created
– Sdelete – Windows Sysinternals encryption – National Institute of Standards and
• Whole drive wipe secure data removal – Often combined with asymmetric Technology (NIST) leading the effort
– DBAN - Darik’s Boot and Nuke encryption – Provide powerful encryption
– Physical drive destruction - – Include integrity features
– Keep costs low – Random data added to a password
when hashing Key exchange
Homomorphic encryption (HE) • Every user gets their own random salt • A logistical challenge
• Encrypted data is difficult to work with – The salt is commonly stored with the – How do you transfer an encryption key
– Decrypt the data password across an insecure medium without
– Perform a function • Rainbow tables won’t work with salted having an encryption key?
– Encrypt the answer hashes – Additional random value added • Out-of-band key exchange
• Homomorphic encryption to the original password – Don’t send the symmetric key over the
– Perform calculations of data while it’s • This slows things down the brute force ‘net
encrypted process – Telephone, courier, in-person, etc.
– Perform the work directly on the – It doesn’t completely stop the reverse
encrypted data engineering Real-time encryption/decryption
– The decrypted data can only be viewed • Each user gets a different random hash • There’s a need for fast security
with – The same password creates a different – Without compromising the security part
the private key hash • Share a symmetric session key using
• Many advantages asymmetric encryption
– Securely store data in the cloud Digital signatures – Client encrypts a random (symmetric)
– Perform research on data without • Prove the message was not changed key with a server’s public key
viewing the data – Integrity – The server decrypts this shared key and
2.8 - Hashing and Digital Signatures • Prove the source of the message uses it to encrypt data
Hashes – Authentication – This is the session key
• Represent data as a short string of text - • Make sure the signature isn’t fake • Implement session keys carefully
A message digest – Non-repudiation – Need to be changed often (ephemeral
• One-way trip • Sign with the private key keys)
– Impossible to recover the original – The message doesn’t need to be – Need to be unpredictables
message from the digest encrypted
– Used to store passwords / – Nobody else can sign this (obviously) Symmetric key from asymmetric keys
confidentiality • Verify with the public key • Use public and private key cryptography
• Verify a downloaded document is the – Any change in the message will to create a symmetric key
same as the original invalidate the signature – Math is powerful
– Integrity • In-band key exchange
• Can be a digital signature – It’s on the network Traditional web server encryption
– Authentication, non-repudiation, and – Protect the key with additional • SSL/TLS uses encryption keys to protect
integrity • Will not have a collision encryption web
(hopefully) – Use asymmetric encryption to deliver server communication
– Different messages will not have the a symmetric key – Traditionally, this has been based on the
same hash web server’s RSA key pair
2.8 - Cryptographic Keys – One key that encrypts all symmetric
Collision Cryptographic Keys keys
• Hash functions – Take an input of any • There’s very little that isn’t known about • This server’s private key can rebuild
size - Create a fixed size string the cryptographic process everything
– Message digest, checksum- – The algorithm is usually a known entity – If you capture all of the traffic, you can
• The hash should be unique – The only thing you don’t know is the decrypt all of the data
– Different inputs should never create the key • One point of failure for all of your web
same hash • The key determines the output site encryption
– If they do, it’s a collision – Encrypted data
• MD5 has a collision problem – Found in – Hash value Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)
1996 - Don’t use MD5 – Digital signature • Change the method of key exchange
• Keep your key private! – Don’t use the server’s private RSA key
Practical hashing – It’s the only thing protecting your data • Elliptic curve or Diffie-Hellman
• Verify a downloaded file ephemeral
– Hashes may be provided on the Key strength – The session keys aren’t kept around
download site – Compare the downloaded • Larger keys tend to be more secure • Can’t decrypt with the private server key
file hash with the posted hash value – Prevent brute-force attacks – Every session uses a different private
• Password storage – Attackers can try every possible key key for the exchange
– Instead of storing the password, store a combination • PFS requires more computing power
salted hash • Symmetric encryption – Not all servers choose to use PFS
– Compare hashes during the – 128-bit or larger symmetric keys are • The browser must support PFS
authentication process common – These numbers get larger as – Check your SSL/TLS information for
– Nobody ever knows your actual time goes on details
password • Asymmetric encryption
– Complex calculations of prime numbers Obfuscation
Adding some salt – Larger keys than symmetric encryption • The process of making something
• Salt – Common to see key lengths of 3,072 bits unclear
or larger
– It’s now much more difficult to • Breaks our existing encryption • Block cipher modes of operation
understand mechanisms – Avoid patterns in the encryption
• But it’s not impossible to understand – Quickly factor large prime numbers – Many different modes to choose from
– If you know how to read it • This would cause significant issues
• Make source code difficult to read – None of the existing cryptography could Block cipher mode of operation
– But it doesn’t change the functionality be trusted • Encrypt one fixed-length group of bits at
of the code – No financial transactions would be safe a time
• Hide information inside of an image – No data would be private – A block
– Steganography • Peter Shor invented Shor’s algorithm in • Mode of operation
1994 – Defines the method of encryption
Steganography – Given an integer N, find its prime factors – May provide a method of authentication
• Greek for “concealed writing” – Traditional computers would take longer • The block size is a fixed size
– Security through obscurity than the – Not all data matches the block size
• Message is invisible lifetime of the universe perfectly
– But it’s really there – Shor’s algorithm would theoretically be – Split your plaintext into smaller blocks
• The covertext much, – Some modes require padding before
– The container document or file much faster encrypting
• Time for updated cryptography
2.8 - Steganography – Not vulnerable to quantum computer ECB (Electronic Code Book)
Common steganography techniques based attacks • The simplest encryption mode
• Network based • NTRU – Too simple for most use cases
– Embed messages in TCP packets – A cryptosystem using lattice theory • Each block is encrypted with the same
• Use an image – Relies on the “closest-vector” problem key
– Embed the message in the image itself – Instead of finding the prime – Identical plaintext blocks create identical
• Invisible watermarks factorizations of ciphertext blocks
– Yellow dots on printers large numbers
Quantum communication ECB (Electronic Code book) cipher mode
Other steganography types • Protect against eavesdropping using Post-quantum cryptography
• Audio steganography quantum • Breaks our existing encryption
– Modify the digital audio file cryptography mechanisms
– Interlace a secret message within the – Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) – Quickly factor large prime numbers
audio • Create unbreakable encryption • This would cause significant issues
– Similar technique to image – Send a random stream of qubits (the – None of the existing cryptography could
steganography key) across a quantum network channel be trusted
• Video steganography • Both sides can verify the key – No financial transactions would be safe
– A sequence of images – If it’s identical, the key was not viewed – No data would be private
– Use image steganography on a larger during • Peter Shor invented Shor’s algorithm in
scale transmission 1994
– Manage the signal to noise ratio • An attacker eavesdropping on the – Given an integer N, find its prime factors
– Potentially transfer much more communication would modify the data – Traditional computers would take longer
information stream than the lifetime of the universe
– The attacker would have to violate – Shor’s algorithm would theoretically be
2.8 Quantum Computing quantum physics much,
Quantum computing much faster
• Computers based on quantum physics 2.8 - Stream and Block Ciphers • Time for updated cryptography
– This is not an upgrade to your existing Stream ciphers – Not vulnerable to quantum computer
computer • Encryption is done one bit or byte at a based attacks
– This is a new computing technology time • NTRU
• Classical mechanics – High speed, low hardware complexity – A cryptosystem using lattice theory
– Smallest form of information is a bit • Used with symmetric encryption – Relies on the “closest-vector” problem
– Bits are zeros and ones – Not commonly used with asymmetric – Instead of finding the prime
• Quantum mechanics encryption factorizations of
– Smallest form of information is a qubit • The starting state should never be the large numbers
– Bits are zeros, ones, and any same twice • We will need to consider our options for
combination – Key is often combined with an future cryptography
in-between, at the same time initialization vector (IV) – This is a problem that can be easily seen
– This is called quantum superposition and
• Search quickly through large databases Block ciphers addressed
– Index everything at the same time • Encrypt fixed-length groups
• Simulate the quantum world – Often 64-bit or 128-bit blocks
– Medical advances, weather prediction, – Pad added to short blocks CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)
astrophysics, and much more – Each block is encrypted or decrypted • A popular mode of operation - Relatively
independently easy to implement
Post-quantum cryptography • Symmetric encryption • Each plaintext block is XORed with the
– Similar to stream ciphers previous ciphertext block
– Adds additional randomization – Encrypted data hides the active malware – Reusing the same key reduces
– Use an initialization vector for the first code complexity
block – Decryption occurs during execution – Less cost and effort to recertify keys
• Authentication – Less administrative overhead
CTR (Counter) – Password hashing – If the key is compromised, everything
• Block cipher mode / acts like a stream – Protect the original password using that key is at risk
cipher – Encrypts successive values of a – Add salt to randomize the stored – IoT devices often have keys embedded
“counter” password hash in the firmware
• Plaintext can be any size, since it’s part • Non-Repudiation • Resource vs. security constraints
of the XOR i.e., 8 bits at a time (streaming) – Confirm the authenticity of data – IoT devices have limited CPU, memory,
instead of a 128-bit block – Digital signature provides both integrity and power
and non-repudiation – Real-time applications can’t delay
GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) – Difficult to maintain and update security
• Encryption with authentication 2.8 - Cryptography Limitations components
– Authentication is part of the block mode
– Combines Counter Mode with Finding the balance 3.1 - Secure Protocols
– Galois authentication • Cryptography isn’t a perfect solution Voice and video
• Minimum latency, minimum operation – It can have significant limitations • SRTP
overhead • Not all implementations are the same – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol /
– Very efficient encryption and – Different platforms, different Secure RTP
authentication cryptographic options • Adds security features to RTP
• Commonly used in packetized data • Cryptography can’t fix bad technique – Keep conversations private
– Network traffic security (wireless, IPsec) – Hashing easily guessed passwords • Encryption
– SSH, TLS without a salt – Uses AES to encrypt the voice/video
• Every situation is different flow
2.8 - Blockchain Technology – Do your homework • Authentication, integrity, and replay
Blockchain protection
• A distributed ledger Limitations – HMAC-SHA1 - Hash-based message
– Keep track of transactions • Speed authentication code using SHA1
• Everyone on the blockchain network – Cryptography adds overhead
maintains the ledger – A system needs CPU, CPU needs power Time synchronization
– Records and replicates to anyone and – More involved encryption increases the • Classic NTP has no security features
everyone load – Exploited as amplifiers in DDoS attacks
• Many practical applications • Size – NTP has been around prior to 1985
– Payment processing – Typical block ciphers don’t increase the • NTPsec
– Digital identification size of – Secure network time protocol
– Supply chain monitoring encrypted data – Began development in June of 2015
– Digital voting – AES block size is 128 bits/16 bytes • Cleaned up the code base
– Encrypting 8 bytes would potentially – Fixed a number of vulnerabilities
2.8 - Cryptography Use Cases double the storage size
Finding the balance • Weak keys Email
• Low power devices – Larger keys are generally more difficult • S/MIME
– Mobile devices, portable systems to brute force – Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
– Smaller symmetric key sizes – The weak IV in RC4 resulted in the WEP Extensions
– Use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for security issues – Public key encryption and digital signing
asymmetric encryption • Time of mail content
• Low latency – Encryption and hashing takes time – Requires a PKI or similar organization of
– Fast computation time – Larger files take longer keys
– Symmetric encryption, smaller key sizes – Asymmetric is slower than symmetric • Secure POP and Secure IMAP
• High resiliency • Longevity – Use a STARTTLS extension to encrypt
– Larger key sizes – A specific cryptographic technology can POP3 with SSL or use IMAP with SSL
– Encryption algorithm quality become less secure over time • SSL/TLS
– Hashing provides data integrity – Smaller keys are easier to brute force, – If the mail is browser based, always
larger keys take long er to process encrypt with SSL
Use cases – Key retirement is a good best practice
• Confidentiality • Predictability and entropy Web
– Secrecy and privacy – Random numbers are critical for secure • SSL/TLS
– Encryption (file-level, drive-level, email) cryptography – Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer
• Integrity – Hardware random number generators Security
– Prevent modification of data can • HTTPS
– Validate the contents with hashes be predictable – HTTP over TLS / HTTP over SSL / HTTP
– File downloads, password storage – A passphrase needs to be appropriately Secure
• Obfuscation random • Uses public key encryption
– Modern malware • Key reuse – Private key on the server
– Symmetric session key is transferred file transfer features – May require an additional public key
using configuration
asymmetric encryption Domain name resolution – Set up a trust relationship
– Security and speed • DNS had no security in the original – Certificates, IP addresses
design 3.2 - Endpoint Protection
IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) – Relatively easy to poison a DNS The endpoint
• Security for OSI Layer 3 • DNSSEC • The user’s access - Applications and data
– Authentication and encryption for every – Domain Name System Security • Stop the attackers - Inbound attacks,
packet Extensions outbound attacks
• Confidentiality and integrity/anti-replay • Validate DNS responses • Many different platforms - Mobile,
– Encryption and packet signing – Origin authentication desktop
• Very standardized – Data integrity • Protection is multi-faceted - Defense in
– Common to use multi-vendor • Public key cryptography depth
implementations – DNS records are signed with a trusted
• Two core IPSec protocols third party Anti-virus and anti-malware
– Authentication Header (AH) – Signed DNS records are published in • Anti-virus is the popular term
– Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) DNS – Refers specifically to a type of malware
– Trojans, worms, macro viruses
File transfer Routing and switching • Malware refers to the broad malicious
• FTPS • SSH - Secure Shell software category
– FTP over SSL (FTP-SSL) – Encrypted terminal communication – Anti-malware stops spyware,
– File Transfer Protocol Secure • SNMPv3 - Simple Network ransomware,
– This is not SFTP – Management Protocol version 3 fileless malware
• SFTP – Confidentiality - Encrypted data • The terms are effectively the same these
– SSH File Transfer Protocol – Integrity - No tampering of data days
– Provides file system functionality – Authentication - Verifies the source – The names are more of a marketing tool
– Resuming interrupted transfers, • HTTPS – Anti-virus software is also anti-malware
directory listings, remote file removal – Browser-based management software now
– Encrypted communication – Make sure your system is using
LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access – a comprehensive solution
Protocol) Network address allocation
• Protocol for reading and writing • Securing DHCP Endpoint detection and response (EDR)
directories over an IP network – DHCP does not include any built-in • A different method of threat protection
– An organized set of records, like a phone security – Scale to meet the increasing number of
directory – There is no “secure” version of the DHCP threats
• X.500 specification was written by the protocol • Detect a threat
International Telecommunications Union • Rogue DHCP servers – Signatures aren’t the only detection tool
(ITU) – In Active Directory, DHCP servers must – Behavioral analysis, machine learning,
– They know directories! be authorized process monitoring
• DAP ran on the OSI protocol stack – Some switches can be configured with – Lightweight agent on the endpoint
– LDAP is lightweight, and uses TCP/IP “trusted” interfaces • Investigate the threat
• LDAP is the protocol used to query and – DHCP distribution is only allowed from – Root cause analysis
update an X.500 directory trusted interfaces • Respond to the threat
– Used in Windows Active Directory, – Cisco calls this DHCP Snooping – Isolate the system, quarantine the
Apple OpenDirectory, OpenLDAP, etc. – DHCP client DoS - Starvation attack threat, rollback to a previous config
– Use spoofed MAC addresses to exhaust – API driven, no user or technician
Directory services the DHCP pool intervention required
• LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access – Switches can be configured to limit the
Protocol) number of MAC addresses per interface Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
• LDAPS (LDAP Secure) – Disable an interface when multiple MAC • Where’s your data?
– A non-standard implementation of LDAP addresses are seen – Social Security numbers, credit card
over SSL numbers,
• SASL (Simple Authentication and Subscription services medical records
Security Layer) • Automated subscriptions • Stop the data before the attacker gets it
– Provides authentication using many – Anti-virus / Anti-malware signature – Data “leakage”
different updates • So many sources, so many destinations
methods, i.e., Kerberos or client – IPS updates – Often requires multiple solutions
certificate – Malicious IP address databases / – Endpoint clients
Firewall updates – Cloud-based systems
Remote access • Constant updates – Email, cloud storage, collaboration tools
• SSH (Secure Shell) – Each subscription uses a different
– Encrypted terminal communication update method Next-generation firewall (NGFW)
– Replaces Telnet (and FTP) • Check for encryption and integrity • The OSI Application Layer - All data in
– Provides secure terminal checks every packet
communication and • Can be called different names
– Application layer gateway • Persistent memory – Device provides an operational report to
– Stateful multilayer inspection, deep – Comes with unique keys burned in a
packet inspection during production verification server
• Broad security controls • Versatile memory – Encrypted and digitally signed with the
– Allow or disallow application features – Storage keys, hardware configuration TPM
– Identify attacks and malware information • Attestation server receives the boot
– Examine encrypted data • Password protected report
– Prevent access to URLs or URL – No dictionary attacks – Changes are identified and managed
categories
Boot integrity 3.2 - Database Security
Host-based firewall • The attack on our systems is constant Database security
• Software-based firewall – Techniques are constantly changing • Protecting stored data
– Personal firewall, runs on every • Attackers compromise a device – And the transmission of that data
endpoint – And want it to stay compromised • Intellectual property storage
• Allow or disallow incoming or outgoing • The boot process is a perfect infection – Data is valuable
application traffic point • Compliance issues
– Control by application process – Rootkits run in kernel mode – PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR, etc.
– View all data – Have the same rights as the operating • Keep the business running
• Identify and block unknown processes system – Security provides continuity
– Stop malware before it can start • Protecting the boot process is important • Breaches are expensive - Keep costs low
• Manage centrally – Secure boot, trusted boot, and
measured boot Tokenization
Finding intrusions – A chain of trust • Replace sensitive data with a non-
• Host-based Intrusion Detection System sensitive placeholder
(HIDS) UEFI BIOS Secure Boot – SSN 266-12-1112 is now 691-61-8539
– Uses log files to identify intrusions • Secure Boot • Common with credit card processing
– Can reconfigure firewalls to block – Part of the UEFI specification – Use a temporary token during payment
• Host-based Intrusion Prevention System • UEFI BIOS protections – An attacker capturing the card numbers
(HIPS) – BIOS includes the manufacturer’s public can’t use them later
– Recognize and block known attacks key • This isn’t encryption or hashing
– Secure OS and application configs, – Digital signature is checked during a – The original data and token aren’t
validate BIOS update mathematically related
incoming service requests – BIOS prevents unauthorized writes to – No encryption overhead
– Often built into endpoint protection the flash
software • Secure Boot verifies the bootloader Hashing a password
• HIPS identification – Checks the bootloader’s digital signature • Hashes represent data as a fixed-length
– Signatures, heuristics, behavioral – Bootloader must be signed with a string of text
– Buffer overflows, registry updates, trusted certificate – A message digest, or “fingerprint”
writing files to the Windows folder – Or a manually approved digital signature • Will not have a collision (hopefully)
– Access to non-encrypted data – Different inputs will not have the same
Trusted Boot hash
3.2 - Boot Integrity • Bootloader verifies digital signature of • One-way trip
Hardware root of trust the OS kernel – Impossible to recover the original
• Security is based on trust – A corrupted kernel will halt the boot message
– Is your data safely encrypted? process from the digest
– Is this web site legitimate? • The kernel verifies all of the other – A common way to store passwords
– Has the operating system been startup components
infected? – Boot drivers, startup files Adding some salt
• The trust has to start somewhere • Just before loading the drivers, • Salt
– Trusted Platform Module (TPM), – ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) starts – Random data added to a password
– Hardware Security Module (HSM) – Checks every driver to see if it’s trusted when hashing
– Designed to be the hardware root of the – Windows won’t load an untrusted driver • Every user gets their own random salt
trust – The salt is commonly stored with the
• Difficult to change or avoid Measured Boot password
– It’s hardware • Nothing on this computer has changed • Rainbow tables won’t work with salted
– Won’t work without the hardware – There have been no malware infections hashes
– How do you know? – Additional random value added to the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) • Easy when it’s just your computer original
• A specification for cryptographic – More difficult when there are 1,000 password
functions • UEFI stores a hash of the firmware, boot • This slows things down the brute force
– Hardware to help with encryption drivers, and everything else loaded during process
functions the Secure Boot and – It doesn’t completely stop the reverse
• Cryptographic processor – Trusted Boot process engineering
– Random number generator, key – Stored in the TPM
generators • Remote attestation 3.2 - Application Security
Secure coding concepts • This isn’t designed to be secure storage • Static Application Security Testing (SAST)
• A balance between time and quality • Help to identify security flaws
• Programming with security in mind is HTTP secure headers • Many security vulnerabilities found
often secondary • An additional layer of security easily
• Testing, testing, testing • Add these to the web server • Buffer overflows, database injections,
• The Quality Assurance (QA) process configuration etc.
• Vulnerabilities will eventually be found • You can’t fix every bad application • Not everything can be identified through
• And exploited • Enforce HTTPS communication analysis
• Ensure encrypted communication • Authentication security, insecure
Input validation • Only allow scripts, stylesheets, or images cryptography, etc.
• What is the expected input? from • Don’t rely on automation for everything
• Validate actual vs. expected the local site • Still have to verify each finding
• Document all input methods • Prevent XSS attacks • False positives are an issue
• Forms, fields, type • Prevent data from loading into an inline
• Check and correct all input frame 3.2 - Application Hardening
(normalization) (iframe) Static code analyzer results
• A zip code should be only X characters • Also helps to prevent XSS attacks Application hardening
long • Minimize the attack surface
with a letter in the X column Code signing – Remove all possible entry points
• Fix any data with improper input • An application is deployed • Remove the potential for all known
• The fuzzers will find what you missed • • Users run application executable or vulnerabilities
Don’t give them an opening scripts • So many security questions – As well as the unknown
• Has the application been modified in • Some hardening may have compliance
Dynamic analysis (fuzzing) any way? mandates
• Send random input to an application • Can you confirm that the application – HIPAA servers, PCI DSS, etc.
• Fault-injecting, robustness testing, was written by a specific developer? • There are many different resources
syntax testing, negative testing • The application code can be digitally – Center for Internet Security (CIS)
• Looking for something out of the signed by the developer – Network and Security Institute (SANS)
ordinary • Application crash, server error, • Asymmetric encryption – National Institute of Standards and
exception • A trusted CA signs the developer’s public Technology (NIST)
• 1988 class project at the University of key
Wisconsin • Developer signs the code with their Open ports and services
• “Operating System Utility Program private key • Every open port is a possible entry point
Reliability” • For internal apps, use your own CA – Close everything except required ports
• Professor Barton Miller • Control access with a firewall
• The Fuzz Generator Allow list / deny list – NGFW would be ideal
• Any application can be dangerous • Unused or unknown services
Fuzzing engines and frameworks • Vulnerabilities, trojan horses, malware – Installed with the OS or from other
• Many different fuzzing options • Security policy can control app applications
• Platform specific, language specific, etc. execution • Applications with broad port ranges
• Very time and processor resource heavy • Allow list, deny/block list – Open port 0 through 65,535
• Many, many different iterations to try • Allow list • Use Nmap or similar port scanner to
• Many fuzzing engines use high- • Nothing runs unless it’s approved - Very verify
probability tests restrictive – Ongoing monitoring is important
• Carnegie Mellon Computer • Deny list
• Emergency Response Team (CERT) • Nothing on the “bad list” can be Registry
• CERT Basic Fuzzing Framework (BFF) executed • The primary configuration database for
• https://professormesser.link/bff • Anti-virus, anti-malware Windows
– Almost everything can be configured
Secure cookies Examples of allow and deny lists from the registry
• Cookies • Decisions are made in the operating • Useful to know what an application
• Information stored on your computer by system modifies
the • Often built-in to the operating system – Many third-party tools can show registry
browser management • Application hash changes
• Used for tracking, personalization, • Only allows applications with this unique • Some registry changes are important
session identifier • Certificate security settings
management • Allow digitally signed apps from certain – Configure registry permissions
• Not executable, not generally a security publishers – Disable SMBv1
risk • Path - Only run applications in these
• Unless someone gets access to them folders Disk encryption
• Secure cookies have a Secure attribute • Network zone • Prevent access to application data files
set • The apps can only run from this network – File system encryption
• Browser will only send it over HTTPS zone • Full disk encryption (FDE)
• Sensitive information should not be – Encrypt everything on the drive
saved in a cookie Static code analyzers – BitLocker, FileVault, etc.
• Self-encrypting drive (SED) • Caching Logical segmentation with VLANs
– Hardware-based full disk encryption – Fast response • Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)
– No operating system software needed • Prioritization – Separated logically instead of physically
• Opal storage specification – QoS – Cannot communicate between VLANs
– The standard for of SED storage • Content switching without
– Application-centric balancing a Layer 3 device / router
Operating system hardening
• Many and varied Scheduling Screened subnet
– Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, et al. • Round-robin • Previously known as the demilitarized
• Updates – Each server is selected in turn zone (DMZ)
– Operating system updates/service • Weighted round-robin – An additional layer of security between
packs, – Prioritize the server use the Internet and you
security patches • Dynamic round-robin – Public access to public resources
• User accounts – Monitor the server load and distribute
– Minimum password lengths and to the server with the lowest use Extranet
complexity • Active/active load balancing • A private network for partners
– Account limitations – Vendors, suppliers
• Network access and security Affinity • Usually requires additional
– Limit network access • Affinity authentication
• Monitor and secure – A kinship, a likeness – Only allow access to authorized users
– Anti-virus, anti-malware • Many applications require
communication to the same instance Intranet
Patch management – Each user is “stuck” to the same server • Private network - Only available
• Incredibly important – Tracked through IP address or session internally
– System stability, security fixes IDs • Company announcements, important
• Monthly updates – Source affinity / sticky session / session documents, other company business
– Incremental (and important) persistence – Employees only
• Third-party updates • No external access
– Application developers, device drivers Active/passive load balancing – Internal or VPN access only
• Auto-update - Not always the best • Some servers are active
option – Others are on standby East-west traffic
• Emergency out-of-band updates • If an active server fails, the passive • Traffic flows within a data center
– Zero-day and important security server takes its place – Important to know where traffic starts
discoveries and ends
3.3 - Network Segmentation • East-west
Sandboxing Segmenting the network – Traffic between devices in the same
• Applications cannot access unrelated • Physical, logical, or virtual segmentation data center
resources – Devices, VLANs, virtual networks – Relatively fast response times
– They play in their own sandbox • Performance • North-south traffic
• Commonly used during development – High-bandwidth applications – Ingress/egress to an outside device
– Can be a useful production technique • Security – A different security posture than east-
• Used in many different deployments – Users should not talk directly to west traffic
– Virtual machines database servers
– Mobile devices – The only applications in the core are SQL Zero-trust
– Browser iframes (Inline Frames) and SSH • Many networks are relatively open on
– Windows User Account Control (UAC) • Compliance the inside
– Mandated segmentation (PCI – Once you’re through the firewall, there
3.3 - Load Balancing compliance) are few security controls
Balancing the load – Makes change control much easier • Zero trust is a holistic approach to
• Distribute the load network security
– Multiple servers Physical segmentation – Covers every device, every process,
– Invisible to the end-user • Devices are physically separate - Air gap every person
• Large-scale implementations between Switch A and Switch B • Everything must be verified
– Web server farms, database farms • Must be connected to provide – Nothing is trusted
• Fault tolerance communication – Multifactor authentication, encryption,
– Server outages have no effect – Direct connect, or another switch or system permissions, additional firewalls,
– Very fast convergence router monitoring and analytics, etc.
• Web servers in one rack - Database
Load balancer servers on another 3.3 - Virtual Private Networks
• Configurable load • Customer A on one switch, customer B VPNs
– Manage across servers on another • Virtual Private Networks
• TCP offload – No opportunity for mixing data – Encrypted (private) data traversing a
– Protocol overhead • Separate devices public network
• SSL offload – Multiple units, separate infrastructure • Concentrator
– Encryption/Decryption – Encryption/decryption access device
– Often integrated into a firewall • Hash of the packet and a shared key • Not used in IPv6
• Many deployment options – SHA-2 is common – Focus on multicast
– Specialized cryptographic hardware – Adds the AH to the packet header
– Software-based options available • This doesn’t provide encryption Broadcast storm control
• Used with client software – Provides data integrity (hash) • The switch can control broadcasts
– Sometimes built into the OS – Guarantees the data origin – Limit the number of broadcasts per
(authentication) second
SSL VPN (Secure Sockets Layer VPN) – Prevents replay attacks (sequence • Can often be used to control multicast
• Uses common SSL/TLS protocol numbers) and unknown unicast traffic
(tcp/443) – Tight security posture
– (Almost) No firewall issues! Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) • Manage by specific values or by
• No big VPN clients • Encrypts and authenticates the tunneled percentage
– Usually remote access communication data – Or the changeover normal traffic
• Authenticate users – Commonly uses SHA-2 for hash, AES for patterns
– No requirement for digital certificates or encryption
shared – Adds a header, a trailer, and an Integrity Loop protection
passwords (like IPSec) Check Value • Connect two switches to each other
• Can be run from a browser or from a • Combine with Authentication Header – They’ll send traffic back and forth
(usually light) VPN client (AH) for integrity and authentication of forever
– Across many operating systems the outer header – There’s no “counting” mechanism at
• On-demand access from a remote the MAC layer
device – Software connects to a VPN IPsec Transport mode and Tunnel mode • This is an easy way to bring down a
concentrator • Tunnel mode is the most common network
• Some software can be configured as – Transport mode may not even be an – And somewhat difficult to troubleshoot
always-on option – Relatively easy to resolve
• IEEE standard 802.1D to prevent loops in
AH (Authentication Header) HTML5 VPNs bridged (switched) networks (1990)
• Data integrity • Hypertext Markup Language version 5 – Created by Radia Perlman
• Origin authentication – The language commonly used in web – Used practically everywhere
• Replay attack protection browsers
• Keyed-hash mechanism • Includes comprehensive API support BPDU Guard
• No confidentiality/encryption – Application Programming Interface • Spanning tree takes time to determine if
– Web cryptography API a switch port should forward frames
ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) • Create a VPN tunnel without a separate – Bypass the listening and learning states
• Data confidentiality (encryption) VPN application – Cisco calls this PortFast
• Limited traffic flow confidentiality – Nothing to install • BPDU (Bridge Protocol Data Unit)
• Data integrity • Use an HTML5 compliant browser – The spanning tree control protocol
• Anti-replay protection – Communicate directly to the VPN • If a BPDU frame is seen on a PortFast
concentrator configured interface (i.e., a workstation),
AH and ESP shut down the interface
• Combine the data integrity of AH 3.3 - Port Security – This shouldn’t happen - Workstations
with the confidentiality of ESP Port security don’t send BPDUs
• There’s a lot of security that happens at
L2TP the DHCP Snooping
• Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol physical switch interface • IP tracking on a layer 2 device (switch)
– Connecting sites over a layer 3 network – Often the first and last point of – The switch is a DHCP firewall
as if they were connected at layer 2 transmission – Trusted: Routers, switches, DHCP
• Commonly implemented with IPsec • Control and protect servers
– L2TP for the tunnel, IPsec for the – Limit overall traffic – Untrusted: Other computers, unofficial
encryption – Control specific traffic types DHCP servers
– L2TP over IPsec (L2TP/IPsec) – Watch for unusual or unwanted traffic • Switch watches for DHCP conversations
• Different options are available – Adds a list of untrusted devices to a
IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) – Manage different security issues table
• Security for OSI Layer 3 • Filters invalid IP and DHCP information
– Authentication and encryption for every Broadcasts – Static IP addresses
packet • Send information to everyone at once – Devices acting as DHCP servers
• Confidentiality and integrity/anti-replay – One frame or packet, received by – Other invalid traffic patterns
– Encryption and packet signing everyone
• Very standardized – Every device must examine the MAC filtering
– Common to use multi-vendor broadcast • Media Access Control
implementations • Limited scope - The broadcast domain – The “hardware” address
• Two core IPSec protocols • Routing updates, ARP requests - Can add • Limit access through the physical
– Authentication Header (AH) up quickly hardware address
– Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) • Malicious software or a bad NIC – Keeps the neighbors out
Authentication Header (AH) – Not always normal traffic – Additional administration with visitors
• Easy to find working MAC addresses – Voice traffic needs to have priority over • Windows - SFC (System File Checker)
through wireless LAN analysis YouTube • Linux - Tripwire
– MAC addresses can be spoofed • Many host-based IPS options
– Free open-source software QoS (Quality of Service)
• Security through obscurity • Prioritize traffic performance 3.3 - Firewalls
– Voice over IP traffic has priority over The universal security control
3.3 - Secure Networking web-browsing • Standard issue
Domain Name Resolution – Prioritize by maximum bandwidth, – Home, office, and in your operating
• DNS had no security in the original traffic rate, system
design VLAN, etc. • Control the flow of network traffic
– Relatively easy to poison a DNS • Quality of Service – Everything passes through the firewall
• DNSSEC – Describes the process of controlling • Corporate control of outbound and
– Domain Name System Security traffic flows inbound data
Extensions • Many different methods – Sensitive materials
• Validate DNS responses – Across many different topologies • Control of inappropriate content
– Origin authentication – Not safe for work, parental controls
– Data integrity IPv6 security is different • Protection against evil
• Public key cryptography • More IP address space – Anti-virus, anti-malware
– DNS records are signed with a trusted – More difficult to IP/port scan (but not
third party impossible) Network-based firewalls
– Signed DNS records are published in – The tools already support IPv6 • Filter traffic by port number or
DNS • No need for NAT application
– NAT is not a security feature – Traditional vs. NGFW firewalls
Using a DNS for security • Some attacks disappear • Encrypt traffic - VPN between sites
• Stop end users from visiting dangerous – No ARP, so no ARP spoofing • Most firewalls can be layer 3 devices
sites • New attacks will appear (routers)
– The DNS resolves to a sinkhole address – For example, Neighbor Cache – Often sits on the ingress/egress of the
• A query to a known-malicious address Exhaustion network
can identify infected systems • IPsec built in / IPsec ready – Network Address
– And prevent further exploitation – Translation (NAT) functionality
• Content filtering Taps and port mirrors – Authenticate dynamic routing
– Prevent DNS queries to unwanted or • Intercept network traffic communication
suspicious sites – Send a copy to a packet capture device
• Physical taps Stateless firewall
Out-of-band management – Disconnect the link, put a tap in the • Does not keep track of traffic flows
• The network isn’t available middle – Each packet is individually examined,
– Or the device isn’t accessible from the – Can be an active or passive tap regardless of past history
network • Port mirror – Traffic sent outside of an active session
• Most devices have a separate – Port redirection, SPAN (Switched Port will
management interface Analyzer) traverse a stateless firewall
– Usually a serial connection / USB – Software-based tap
• Connect a modem – Limited functionality, but can work well Stateful firewall
– Dial-in to manage the device in a pinch • Stateful firewalls remember the “state”
• Console router / comm server of the session
– Out-of-band access for multiple devices Monitoring services – Everything within a valid flow is allowed
– Connect to the console router, then • Constant cybersecurity monitoring
choose – Ongoing security checks UTM / All-in-one security appliance
where you want to go – A staff of cybersecurity experts at a • Unified Threat Management (UTM) /
Security Operations Center (SoC) • Web security gateway
The need for QoS • Identify threats • URL filter / Content inspection
• Many different devices – A broad range of threats across many • Malware inspection
– Desktop, laptop, VoIP phone, mobile different • Spam filter
devices organizations • CSU/DSU
• Many different applications • Respond to events • Router, Switch
– Mission critical applications, streaming – Faster response time • Firewall
video, • Maintain compliance • IDS/IPS
streaming audio – Someone else ensures PCI DSS, HIPAA • Bandwidth shaper
• Different apps have different network compliance, etc. • VPN endpoint
requirements Next-generation firewall (NGFW)
– Voice is real-time FIM (File Integrity Monitoring) • The OSI Application Layer
– Recorded streaming video has a buffer • Some files change all the time – All data in every packet
– Database application is interactive – Some files should NEVER change • Can be called different names
• Some applications are “more important” • Monitor important operating system – Application layer gateway
than others and application files – Stateful multilayer inspection
– Identify when changes occur – Deep packet inspection
• Requires some advanced decodes – Host-based firewalls are application- Proxies
– Every packet must be analyzed and aware and can view non-encrypted data • Sits between the users and the external
categorized before a security decision is – Virtual firewalls provide valuable network
determined East/West • Receives the user requests and sends
network security the request
NGFWs on their behalf (the proxy)
• Network-based Firewalls 3.3 - Network Access Control • Useful for caching information, access
– Control traffic flows based on the Edge vs. access control control,
application • Control at the edge URL filtering, content scanning
– Microsoft SQL Server, Twitter, YouTube – Your Internet link • Applications may need to know
• Intrusion Prevention Systems – Managed primarily through firewall how to use the proxy (explicit)
– Identify the application rules • Some proxies are invisible (transparent)
– Apply application-specific vulnerability – Firewall rules rarely change
signatures to the traffic • Access control Application proxies
• Content filtering – Control from wherever you are - Inside • One of the simplest “proxies” is NAT
– URL filters or outside • A network-level proxy
– Control website traffic by category – Access can be based on many rules • Most proxies in use are application
– By user, group, location, application, etc. proxies
Web application firewall (WAF) – Access can be easily revoked or changed • The proxy understands the way the
• Not like a “normal” firewall – Change your security posture at any application works
– Applies rules to HTTP/HTTPS time • A proxy may only know one application
conversations • HTTP
• Allow or deny based on expected input Posture assessment • Many proxies are multipurpose proxies
– Unexpected input is a common method • You can’t trust everyone’s computer • HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, etc.
of – BYOD (Bring Your Own Device)
exploiting an application – Malware infections / missing anti- Forward Proxy
• SQL injection malware • An “internal proxy”
– Add your own commands to an – Unauthorized applications • Commonly used to protect and control
application’s • Before connecting to the network, user access to the Internet
SQL query perform a health check
• A major focus of Payment Card Industry – Is it a trusted device? Open Proxy
– Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) – Is it running anti-virus? Which one? Is it • A third-party, uncontrolled proxy
updated? • Can be a significant security concern
Firewall rules – Are the corporate applications installed? • Often used to circumvent existing
• Access control lists (ACLs) – Is it a mobile device? security controls
– Allow or disallow traffic based on tuples – Is the disk encrypted?
– Groupings of categories – The type of device doesn’t matter - Reverse Proxy
– Source IP, Destination IP, port number, Windows, Mac, Linux, iOS, Android • Inbound traffic from the Internet to your
time of day, application, etc. internal service
• A logical path Health checks/posture assessment
– Usually top-to-bottom • Persistent agents 3.3 - Intrusion Prevention
• Can be very general or very specific – Permanently installed onto a system NIDS and NIPS
– Specific rules are usually at the top – Periodic updates may be required • Intrusion Detection System /
• Implicit deny • Dissolvable agents – Intrusion Prevention System
– Most firewalls include a deny at the – No installation is required – Watch network traffic
bottom – Runs during the posture assessment • Intrusions
– Even if you didn’t put one – Terminates when no longer required – Exploits against operating systems,
• Agentless NAC applications, etc.
Firewall characteristics – Integrated with Active Directory – Buffer overflows, cross-site scripting,
• Open-source vs. proprietary – Checks are made during login and logoff other
– Open-source provides traditional – Can’t be scheduled vulnerabilities
firewall functionality • Detection vs. Prevention
– Proprietary features include application Failing your assessment – Detection – Alarm or alert
control and high-speed hardware • What happens when a posture – Prevention – Stop it before it gets into
• Hardware vs. software assessment fails? the network
– Purpose-built hardware provides – Too dangerous to allow access
efficient and • Quarantine network, notify Passive monitoring
flexible connectivity options administrators • Examine a copy of the traffic
– Software-based firewalls can be – Just enough network access to fix the – Port mirror (SPAN), network tap
installed issue • No way to block (prevent) traffic
almost anywhere • Once resolved, try again
• Appliance vs. host-based vs. virtual – May require additional fixes Out-of-band-response
– Appliances provide the fastest • When malicious traffic is identified,
throughput 3.3 - Proxies – IPS sends TCP RST (reset) frames
– After-the-fact
– Limited UDP response available • Authenticate the users before granting • Once you have the PSK, you have
access everyone’s
Inline monitoring – Who gets access to the wireless wireless key
• IDS/IPS sits physically inline network? – There’s no forward secrecy
– All traffic passes through the IDS/IPS – Username, password, multi-factor
authentication SAE
In-band response • Ensure that all communication is • WPA3 changes the PSK authentication
• Malicious traffic is immediately confidential process
identified – Encrypt the wireless data – Includes mutual authentication
– Dropped at the IPS • Verify the integrity of all communication – Creates a shared session key without
– Does not proceed through the network – The received data should be identical to sending that key across the network
the – No more four-way handshakes, no
Identification technologies original sent data hashes,
• Signature-based – A message integrity check (MIC) no brute force attacks
– Look for a perfect match – Adds perfect forward secrecy
• Anomaly-based Wireless encryption • Simultaneous Authentication of Equals
– Build a baseline of what’s “normal” • All wireless computers are radio (SAE)
• Behavior-based transmitters and receivers – A Diffie-Hellman derived key exchange
– Observe and report – Anyone can listen in with an authentication component
• Heuristics • Solution: Encrypt the data - Everyone – Everyone uses a different session key,
– Use artificial intelligence to identify has an encryption key even with the same PSK
• Only people with the right key can – An IEEE standard - the dragonfly
3.3 - Other Network Appliances transmit and listen handshake
Hardware Security Module (HSM) – WPA2 and WPA3
• High-end cryptographic hardware 3.4 - Wireless Authentication Methods
– Plug-in card or separate hardware WPA2 and CCMP Wireless authentication methods
device • Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) • Gain access to a wireless network
• Key backup – WPA2 certification began in 2004 – Mobile users
– Secured storage • CCMP block cipher mode – Temporary users
• Cryptographic accelerators – Counter Mode with Cipher Block • Credentials
– Offload that CPU overhead from other Chaining – Shared password / pre-shared key (PSK)
devices – Message Authentication Code Protocol, – Centralized authentication (802.1X)
• Used in large environments Clusters, or • Configuration
redundant power – Counter/CBC-MAC Protocol – Part of the wireless network connection
• CCMP security services – Prompted during the connection process
Jump server – Data confidentiality with AES
• Access secure network zones – Message Integrity Check (MIC) with CBC- Wireless security modes
– Provides an access mechanism to a MAC • Configure the authentication on your
protected network wireless
• Highly-secured device WPA3 and GCMP access point / wireless router
– Hardened and monitored • Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) - • Open System
• SSH / Tunnel / VPN to the jump server Introduced in 2018 – No password is required
– RDP, SSH, or jump from there • GCMP block cipher mode • WPA3-Personal / WPA3-PSK
• A significant security concern – Galois/Counter Mode Protocol – WPA3 with a pre-shared key
– Compromise to the jump server is a – A stronger encryption than WPA2 – Everyone uses the same key
significant breach • GCMP security services – Unique WPA3 session key is derived
– Data confidentiality with AES from the PSK using SAE
Sensors and collectors – Message Integrity Check (MIC) with (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals)
• Aggregate information from network – Galois Message Authentication Code • WPA3-Enterprise / WPA3-802.1X
devices (GMAC) – Authenticates users individually with an
– Built-in sensors, separate devices authentication server (i.e., RADIUS)
– Integrated into switches, routers, The WPA2 PSK problem
servers, firewalls, etc. • WPA2 has a PSK brute-force problem Captive Portal
• Sensors – Listen to the four-way handshake • Authentication to a network - Common
– Intrusion prevention systems, firewall – Some methods can derive the PSK hash on wireless networks
logs, without the handshake • Access table recognizes a lack of
authentication logs, web server access – Capture the hash authentication
logs, database transaction logs, email logs • With the hash, attackers can brute force – Redirects your web access to a captive
• Collectors the portal page
pre-shared key (PSK) • Username / password - And additional
3.4 - Cryptography • This has become easier as technology authentication factors
Securing a wireless network improves • Once proper authentication is provided,
• An organization’s wireless network can – A weak PSK is easier to brute force the
contain confidential information – GPU processing speeds web session continues
– Not everyone is allowed access – Cloud-based password cracking
– Until the captive portal removes your authenticate
access • Used in conjunction with an access EAP-TTLS
database • EAP Tunneled Transport Layer Security –
Using WPS – RADIUS, LDAP, TACACS+ Support other authentication protocols in
• Wi-Fi Protected Setup a TLS tunnel • Requires a digital certificate
– Originally called Wi-Fi Simple Config IEEE 802.1X and EAP on the AS – Does not require digital
• Allows “easy” setup of a mobile device • Supplicant – The client certificates on every device
– A passphrase can be complicated to a • Authenticator – Builds a TLS tunnel using this digital
novice – The device that provides access certificate • Use any authentication
• Different ways to connect • Authentication server method inside the TLS tunnel
– PIN configured on access point must be – Validates the client credentials – Other EAPs
entered on the mobile device – MSCHAPv2
– Push a button on the access point EAP-FAST – Anything else
– Near-field communication - • EAP Flexible Authentication via Secure
– Bring the mobile device close to the Tunneling RADIUS Federation
access point – Authentication server (AS) and • Use RADIUS with federation
supplicant share a protected access – Members of one organization can
The WPS hack credential (PAC) (shared secret) authenticate to the network of another
• December 2011 - WPS has a design flaw • Supplicant receives the PAC organization
– It was built wrong from the beginning • Supplicant and AS mutually authenticate – Use their normal credentials
• PIN is an eight-digit number and • Use 802.1X as the authentication
– Really seven digits and a checksum negotiate a Transport Layer Security (TLS) method
– Seven digits, 10,000,000 possible tunnel – And RADIUS on the backend - EAP to
combinations • User authentication occurs over the TLS authenticate
• The WPS process validates each half of tunnel • Driven by eduroam (education roaming)
the PIN • Need a RADIUS server – Educators can use their normal
– First half, 4 digits. Second half, 3 digits. – Provides the authentication database authentication when visiting a different
– First half, 10,000 possibilities, and campus
second half, 1,000 possibilities EAP-FAST services – https://www.eduroam.org/
• It takes about four hours to go through 3.4 - Installing Wireless Networks
all of them PEAP Site surveys
– Most devices never considered a lockout • Protected Extensible Authentication • Determine existing wireless landscape
function Protocol – Sample the existing wireless spectrum
– Brute force lockout features are now the – Protected EAP • Identify existing access points
norm – Created by Cisco, Microsoft, and RSA – You may not control all of them
Security • Work around existing frequencies
3.4 - Wireless Authentication Protocols • Also encapsulates EAP in a TLS tunnel – Layout and plan for interference
Wireless authentication – AS uses a digital certificate instead of a • Plan for ongoing site surveys
• We’ve created many authentication PAC – Things will certainly change
methods – Client doesn’t use a certificate • Heat maps - Identify wireless signal
through the years • User authenticates with MSCHAPv2 strengths
– A network administrator has many – Authenticates to Microsoft’s MS-
choices • Use a username and password CHAPv2 databases Wireless survey tools
– Other factors can be included • User can also authenticate with a GTC • Signal coverage
• Commonly used on wireless networks – – Generic Token Card, hardware token • Potential interference
Also works on wired networks generator • Built-in tools
• 3rd-party tools
EAP EAP-TLS • Spectrum analyzer
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) • EAP Transport Layer Security
– An authentication framework – Strong security, wide adoption Wireless packet analysis
• Many different ways to authenticate – Support from most of the industry • Wireless networks are incredibly easy to
based on • Requires digital certificates on the AS monitor
RFC standards and – Everyone “hears” everything
– Manufacturers can build their own EAP all other devices • You have to be quiet
methods – AS and supplicant exchange certificates – You can’t hear the network if you’re
• EAP integrates with 802.1X for busy transmitting
– Prevents access to the network until the mutual authentication • Some network drivers won’t capture
authentication succeeds – TLS tunnel is then built for the user wireless information
authentication process – You’ll need specialized
IEEE 802.1X • Relatively complex implementation adapters/chipsets and drivers
• IEEE 802.1X – Need a public key infrastructure (PKI) • View wireless-specific information
– Port-based Network Access Control – Must deploy and manage certificates to – Signal-to-noise ratio, channel
(NAC) all wireless clients information, etc. • Try it yourself! -
– You don’t get access to the network – Not all devices can support the use of https://www.wireshark.org
until you digital certificates
Channel selection and overlaps • On-path attack – USB, Lightning, or proprietary on your
• Overlapping channels – Modify and/or monitor data phone
– Frequency conflicts - use non- • Denial of service • Physical access is always a concern
overlapping channels – Frequency interference – May be easier to gain access than over a
– Automatic or manual configurations remote connection
Bluetooth • A locked device is relatively secure
Access point placement • High speed communication over short – Always auto-lock
• Minimal overlap distances • Mobile phones can also exfiltrate
– Maximize coverage, minimize the – PAN (Personal Area Network) – Phone can appear to be a USB storage
number of access points • Connects our mobile devices device
• Avoid interference – Smartphones, tethering, headsets and
– Electronic devices (microwaves) headphones, health monitors, automobile Global Positioning System (GPS)
– Building materials and • Created by the U.S. Department of
– Third-party wireless networks phone integration, smartwatches, Defense
• Signal control external speakers – Over 30 satellites currently in orbit
– Place APs where the users are • Precise navigation
– Avoid excessive signal distance RFID (Radio-frequency identification) – Need to see at least 4 satellites
• It’s everywhere • Determines location based on timing
Wireless infrastructure security – Access badges differences
• Wireless controllers – Inventory/Assembly line tracking – Longitude, latitude, altitude
– Centralized management of wireless – Pet/Animal identification • Mobile device location services and
access points – Anything that needs to be tracked geotracking
– Manage system configuration and • Radar technology – Maps, directions
performance – Radio energy transmitted to the tag – Determine physical location based on
• Securing wireless controllers – RF powers the tag, ID is transmitted GPS,
– Control access to management console back – WiFi, and cellular towers
– Use strong encryption with HTTPS – Bidirectional communication
– Automatic logout after no activity – Some tag formats can be 3.5 - Mobile Device Management
• Securing access points active/powered Mobile Device Management (MDM)
– Use strong passwords • Manage company-owned and user-
– Update to the latest firmware Near field communication (NFC) owned mobile devices
• Two-way wireless communication – BYOD - Bring Your Own Device
3.5 - Mobile Networks – Builds on RFID • Centralized management of the mobile
Point-to-point • Payment systems devices
• One-to-one connection – Google wallet, Apple Pay – Specialized functionality
– Conversation between two devices • Bootstrap for other wireless • Set policies on apps, data, camera, etc.
• Connections between buildings – NFC helps with Bluetooth pairing – Control the remote device
– Point-to-point network links • Access token, identity “card” – The entire device or a “partition”
• Wi-Fi repeaters – Short range with encryption support • Manage access control
– Extend the length of an existing network – Force screen locks and PINs on these
NFC security concerns single user devices
Point-to-multipoint • Remote capture
• One of the most popular communication – It’s a wireless network Application management
methods 802.11 wireless – 10 meters for active devices • Managing mobile apps are a challenge
• Does not imply full connectivity • Frequency jamming - Denial of service – Mobile devices install apps constantly
between nodes • Relay / Replay attack - Man in the • Not all applications are secure
middle – And some are malicious
Cellular networks • Loss of RFC device control - Stolen/lost – Android malware is a rapidly growing
• Mobile devices phone security concern
– “Cell” phones • Manage application use through allow
• Separate land into “cells” IR (Infrared) lists
– Antenna coverages a cell with certain • Included on many smartphones, tablets, – Only approved applications can be
frequencies and smartwatches installed
• Security concerns – Not really used much for printing – Managed through the MDM
– Traffic monitoring • Control your entertainment center • A management challenge
– Location tracking – Almost exclusively IR – New applications must be checked and
– Worldwide access to a mobile device • File transfers are possible added
• Other phones can be used to control
Wi-Fi your IR devices Content management
• Local network access • Mobile Content Management (MCM)
– Local security problems USB (Universal Serial Bus) – Secure access to data, protect data from
• Same security concerns as other Wi-Fi • Physical connectivity to your mobile outsiders
devices device • File sharing and viewing
• Data capture – USB to your computer – On-site content (Microsoft Sharepoint,
– Encrypt your data! file servers)
– Cloud-based storage (Box, Office 365) – Only the company information is
• Data sent from the mobile device Passwords and PINs deleted
– DLP (Data Loss Prevention) prevents • The universal help desk call – Personal data is retained
copy/paste of sensitive data – I need to reset my password – Keep your pictures, video, music, email,
– Ensure data is encrypted on the mobile • Mobile devices use multiple etc.
device authentication methods
• Managed from the mobile device – Password/passphrase, PINs, patterns Full device encryption
manager (MDM) • Recovery process can be initiated from • Scramble all of the data on the mobile
the device
Remote wipe – Even if you lose it, the contents are safe
• Remove all data from your mobile MDM • Devices handle this in different ways
device – Password reset option is provided on – Strongest/stronger/strong ?
– Even if you have no idea where it is the • Encryption isn’t trivial
– Often managed from the MDM mobile device – Uses a lot of CPU cycles
• Connect and wipe from the web – “What is the name of your favorite car – Complex integration between hardware
– Nuke it from anywhere maiden and software
• Need to plan for this cat’s color?” • Don’t lose or forget your password!
– Configure your mobile device now • MDM also has full control – There’s no recovery
• Always have a backup – Completely remove all security controls – Often backed up on the MDM
– Your data can be removed at any time – Not the default or best practice
– As you are walking out the door 3.5 - Mobile Device Security
Biometrics MicroSD HSM
Geolocation • You are the authentication factor • Shrink the PCI Express
• Precise tracking details - Tracks within – Fingerprint, face – Hardware Security Module - Now in a
feet • May not be the most secure microSD card form
• Can be used for good (or bad) authentication factor • Provides security services
– Find your phone, find you – Useful in some environments – Encryption, key generation, digital
• Most phones provide an option to – Completely forbidden in others signatures,
disable • Availability is managed through the authentication
– Limits functionality of the phones MDM • Secure storage
• May be managed by the MDM – Organization determines the security of – Protect private keys - Cryptocurrency
the device storage
Geofencing • Can be managed per-app
• Some MDMs allow for geofencing – Some apps require additional biometric Unified Endpoint Management (UEM)
– Restrict or allow features when the authentication • Manage mobile and non-mobile devices
device is in a particular area – An evolution of the Mobile Device
• Cameras Context-aware authentication Manager (MDM)
– Might only work when outside the office • Who needs 2FA? • End users use different types of devices
• Authentication – The attackers can get around anything – Their use has blended together
– Only allow logins when the device is • Authentication can be contextual • Applications can be used across
located in a particular area – If it walks like a duck… different platforms
• Combine multiple contexts – Work on a laptop and a smartphone
Screen lock – Where you normally login (IP address • All of these devices can be used from
• All mobile devices can be locked – Where you normally frequent (GPS anywhere
– Keep people out of your data information) – User’s don’t stay in one place
• Simple passcode or strong passcode – Other devices that may be paired
– Numbers vs. Alphanumeric (Bluetooth, etc.) Mobile Application Management (MAM)
• Fail too many times? • And others • Provision, update, and remove apps
– Erase the phone – An emerging technology – Keep everyone running at the correct
• Define a lockout policy – Another way to keep data safe version
– Create aggressive lockout timers • Create an enterprise app catalog
– Completely lock the phone Containerization – Users can choose and install the apps
• Difficult to separate personal from they need
Push notification services business • Monitor application use
• Information appears on the mobile – Especially when the device is BYOD – Apps used on a device, devices with
device screen – Owned by the employee unauthorized apps
– The notification is “pushed” to your • Separate enterprise mobile apps and • Remotely wipe application data
device data – Securely manage remote data
• No user intervention – Create a virtual “container” for company
– Receive notifications from one app data SEAndroid
when using a completely different app – A contained area - limit data sharing • Security Enhancements for Android
• Control of displayed notifications can be – Storage segmentation keeps data – SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux)
managed from the MDM separate in the Android OS
– Or notifications can be pushed from the • Easy to manage offboarding – Supports access control security policies
MDM
• A project from the US National Security • The operating system of a mobile device – From a security perspective, it’s too
Agency (NSA) is convenient
– Based on the NSA’s SELinux constantly changing - Similar to a desktop
• Addresses a broad scope of system computer Recording microphone
security • Updates are provided over the air (OTA) • Audio recordings
– Kernel, userspace, and policy – No cable required – There are microphones on every mobile
configuration • Security patches or entire operating device
• Enabled by default with Android version system updates • Useful for meetings and note taking
4.3 – Significant changes without connecting – A standard for college classes
– July 2013 the device • A legal liability
– Protect privileged Android system • This may not be a good thing – Every state has different laws
daemons – The MDM can manage what OTA – Every situation is different
– Prevent malicious activity updates are allowed • Disable or geo-fence - Manage from the
• Change from Discretionary Access MDM
Control (DAC) to Mandatory Access Camera use
Control (MAC) • Cameras are controversial Geotagging / GPS tagging
– Move from user-assigned control to – They’re not always a good thing • Your phone knows where you are
object labels and minimum user access – Corporate espionage, inappropriate use – Location Services, GPS
– Isolates and sandboxes Android apps • Almost impossible to control on the • Adds your location to document
• Centralized policy configuration device metadata
– Manage Android deployments – No good way to ensure the camera – Longitude, latitude - Photos, videos, etc.
won’t be used • Every document may contain geotagged
3.5 - Mobile Device Enforcement • Camera use can be controlled by the information
Third-party app stores MDM – You can track a user quite easily
• Centralized app clearinghouses – Always disabled • This may cause security concerns
– Apple App Store – Enabled except for certain locations – Take picture, upload to social media
– Google Play (geo-fencing)
• Not all applications are secure WiFi Direct/ad hoc
– Vulnerabilities, data leakage SMS/MMS • We’re so used to access points
• Not all applications are appropriate for • Short Message Service / Multimedia – SSID configurations
business use Messaging Service • The wireless standard includes an ad hoc
– Games, instant messaging, etc. – Text messages, video, audio mode
• MDM can allow or deny app store use. • Control of data can be a concern – Connect wireless devices directly
– Outbound data leaks, financial – Without an access point
Rooting/jailbreaking disclosures • WiFi Direct simplifies the process
• Mobile devices are purpose-built – Inbound notifications, phishing attempts – Easily connect many devices together
systems • MDM can enable or disable SMS/MMS – Common to see in home devices
– You don’t need access to the operating – Or only allow during certain timeframes • Simplicity can aid vulnerabilities
system or locations – Invisible access to important devices
• Gaining access - Android - Rooting /
Apple iOS - Jailbreaking External media Hotspot/tethering
• Install custom firmware • Store data onto external or removable • Turn your phone into a WiFi hotspot
– Replaces the existing operating system drives – Your own personal wireless router
• Uncontrolled access – SD flash memory or USB/lightning drives – Extend the cellular data network to all of
– Circumvent security features, sideload • Transfer data from flash your devices
apps without using an app store – Connect to a computer to retrieve • Dependent on phone type and provider
– The MDM becomes relatively useless • This is very easy to do – May require additional charges and data
– Limit data written to removable drives costs
Carrier unlocking – Or prevent the use of them from the • May provide inadvertent access to an
• Most phones are locked to a carrier MDM internal network
– You can’t use an AT&T phone on Verizon – Ensure proper security / passcode
– Contract with a carrier subsidizes the USB OTG
cost of the phone • USB On-The-Go - Connect devices Payment methods
• You can unlock the phone directly together • Send small amounts of data wirelessly
– If your carrier allows it – No computer required, only a cable over
– A carrier lock may be illegal in your • The mobile device can be both a host a limited area (NFC)
country and a device – Built into your phone
• Security revolves around connectivity – Read from an external device, then act – Payment systems, transportation, in-
– Moving to another carrier can as person
circumvent the MDM a storage device itself information exchange
– Preventing a SIM unlock may not be – No need for a third-party storage device • A few different standards
possible on a personal device • A USB 2.0 standard - Commonly seen on – Apple Pay, Android Pay, Samsung Pay
Android devices • Bypassing primary authentication would
Firmware OTA updates • Extremely convenient allow payment
– Use proper security - or disable – Each AZ has independent power, HVAC, – One permission mistake can cause a
completely and networking data breach
• Build applications to be highly available – Accenture, Uber, US Department of
3.5 - Mobile Deployment Models (HA) Defense
BYOD – Run as active/standby or active/active • Public access
• Bring Your Own Device / Bring Your Own – Application recognizes an outage and – Should not usually be the default
Technology moves to the other AZ • Many different options
• Employee owns the device • Use load balancers to provide seamless – Identity and Access Management (IAM)
– Need to meet the company’s HA – Bucket policies
requirements – Users don’t experience any application – Globally blocking public access
• Difficult to secure issues – Don’t put data in the cloud unless it
– It’s both a home device and a work really
device Resource policies needs to be there
– How is data protected? • Identity and access management (IAM)
– What happens to the data when a – Who gets access, what they get access Encryption
device is to • Cloud data is more accessible than non-
sold or traded in? • Map job functions to roles cloud data
– Combine users into groups – More access by more people
COPE • Provide access to cloud resources • Server-side encryption
• Corporate owned, personally enabled – Set granular policies - Group, IP address, – Encrypt the data in the cloud
– Company buys the device date and time – Data is encrypted when stored on disk
– Used as both a corporate device and a • Centralize user accounts, synchronize • Client-side encryption
personal device across all platforms – Data is already encrypted when it’s sent
• Organization keeps full control of the to the cloud
device Secrets management – Performed by the application
– Similar to company-owned laptops and • Cloud computing includes many secrets • Key management is critical
desktops – API keys, passwords, certificates
• Information is protected using corporate • This can quickly become overwhelming Replication
policies – Difficult to manage and protect • Copy data from one place to another
– Information can be deleted at any time • Authorize access to the secrets – Real-time data duplication in multiple
• CYOD - Choose Your Own Device – Limit access to the secret service locations
– Similar to COPE, but with the user’s • Manage an access control policy • Disaster recovery, high availability
choice of device – Limit users to only necessary secrets – Plan for problems
• Provide an audit trail – Maintain uptime if an outage occurs
Corporate owned – Know exactly who accesses secrets and – Hot site for disaster recovery
• The company owns the device when • Data analysis
– And controls the content on the device – Analytics, big data analysis
• The device is not for personal use Integration and auditing • Backups
– You’ll need to buy your own device for • Integrate security across multiple – Constant duplication of data
home platforms
• Very specific security requirements – Different operating systems and 3.6 - Securing Cloud Networks
– Not able to mix business with home use applications Cloud Networks
• Consolidate log storage and reporting • Connect cloud components
VDI/VMI – Cloud-based Security Information and – Connectivity within the cloud
• Virtual Desktop Infrastructure / Virtual Event – Connectivity from outside the cloud
Mobile Management (SIEM) • Users communicate to the cloud
Infrastructure • Auditing - Validate the security controls – From the public Internet
– The apps are separated from the mobile – Verify compliance with financial and – Over a VPN tunnel
device user data • Cloud devices communicate between
– The data is separated from the mobile each other
device 3.6 - Securing Cloud Storage – Cloud-based network
• Data is stored securely, centralized Cloud storage – East/west and north/south
• Physical device loss - Risk is minimized • Data is on a public cloud communication
• Centralized app development – But may not be public data – No external traffic flows
– Write for a single VMI platform • Access can be limited
• Applications are managed centrally – And protected Virtual networks
– No need to update all mobile devices • Data may be required in different • A cloud contains virtual devices
geographical locations – Servers, databases, storage devices
3.6 - Cloud Security Controls – A backup is always required • Virtual switches, virtual routers
HA across zones • Availability is always important – Build the network from the cloud
• Availability zones (AZ) – Data is available as the cloud changes? console
– Isolated locations within a cloud region – The same configurations as a physical
(geographical location) Permissions device
– AZ commonly spans across multiple • A significant cloud storage concern • The network changes with the rest of
regions the infrastructure
– On-demand – Individual addresses – How do you keep everything secure?
– Rapid elasticity – CIDR block notation – The organization already has well-
– IPv4 or IPv6 defined
Public and private subnets security policies
• Private cloud Dynamic resource allocation • How do you make your security policies
– All internal IP addresses • Provision resources when they are work in the cloud?
– Connect to the private cloud over a VPN needed – Integrate a CASB
– No access from the Internet – Based on demand - Provisioned – Implemented as client software, local
• Public cloud automatically security
– External IP addresses • Scale up and down appliances, or cloud-based security
– Connect to the cloud from anywhere – Allocate compute resources where and solutions
• Hybrid cloud when they are needed • Visibility
– Combine internal cloud resources with – Rapid elasticity – Determine what apps are in use
external – Pay for only what’s used – Are they authorized to use the apps?
– May combine both public and private • Ongoing monitoring • Compliance
subnets – If CPU utilization hits a particular – Are users complying with HIPAA? PCI?
threshold, provision a new application • Threat prevention
Segmentation instance – Allow access by authorized users,
• The cloud contains separate VPCs, prevent attacks
containers, Instance awareness • Data security
and microservices • Granular security controls – Ensure that all data transfers are
– Application segmentation is almost – Identify and manage very specific data encrypted
guaranteed flows – Protect the transfer of PII with DLP
• Separation is a security opportunity – Each instance of a data flow is different
– Data is separate from the application • Define and set policies Application security
– Add security systems between – Allow uploads to the corporate box.com • Secure cloud-based applications
application file share – Complexity increases in the cloud
components • Corporate file shares can contain PII • Application misconfigurations
• Virtualized security technologies • Any department can upload to the – One of the most common security issues
– Web Application Firewall (WAF) corporate file share – Especially cloud storage
– Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) – Deny certain uploads to a personal • Authorization and access
• Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) box.com file share – Controls should be strong enough for
• Allow graphics files access
API inspection and integration • Deny any spreadsheet from anywhere
• Microservice architecture is the • Deny files containing credit card • API security - Attackers will try to exploit
underlying application engine numbers interfaces and APIs
– A significant security concern • Quarantine the file and send an alert
• API calls can include risk Next-Gen Secure Web Gateway (SWG)
– Attempts to access critical data Virtual private cloud endpoints • Protect users and devices
– Geographic origin • Microservice architecture is the VPC – Regardless of location and activity
– Unusual API calls gateway endpoints • Go beyond URLs and GET requests
• API monitoring – Allow private cloud subnets to – Examine the application API
– View specific API queries communicate to other cloud services – Dropbox for personal use or corporate
– Monitor incoming and outgoing data • Keep private resources private use?
– Internet connectivity not required • Examine JSON strings and API requests
3.6 - Securing Compute Clouds • Add an endpoint to connect VPC – Allow or disallow certain activities
Compute cloud instances resources • Instance-aware security
• The IaaS component for the cloud – A development instance is different than
computing Container security production
environment • Containers have similar security
– Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) concerns as any other application 3.6 - Cloud Security Solutions (continued)
– Google Compute Engine (GCE) deployment method Firewalls in the cloud
– Microsoft Azure Virtual Machines – Bugs, insufficient security controls, • Control traffic flows in the cloud
• Manage computing resources misconfigurations – Inside the cloud and external flows
– Launch a VM or container • Use container-specific operating • Cost
– Allocate additional resources systems – Relatively inexpensive compared to
– Disable/remove a VM or container – A minimalist OS designed for containers appliances
• Group container types on the same host – Virtual firewalls
Security groups – The same purpose, sensitivity, and – Host-based firewalls
• A firewall for compute instances threat posture • Segmentation
– Control inbound and outbound traffic – Limit the scope of any intrusion – Between microservices, VMs, or VPCs
flows • OSI layers
• Layer 4 port number 3.6 - Cloud Security Solutions – Layer 4 (TCP/UDP), Layer 7 (Application)
– TCP or UDP port Cloud access security broker (CASB)
• Layer 3 address • Clients are at work, data is in the cloud Security controls
• Cloud-native security controls – Public/private keys - Critical for – Not the default - Removed from
– Integrated and supported by the cloud automation Windows 10 build 10159
provider • Key management is critical
– Many configuration options – Centralize, control, and audit key use Service accounts
– Security is part of the infrastructure • SSH key managers - Open source, • Used exclusively by services running on
– No additional costs Commercial a computer
• Third-party solutions – No interactive/user access (ideally)
– Support across multiple cloud providers SSH key-based authentication – Web server, database server, etc.
– Single pane of glass • Create a public/private key pair • Access can be defined for a specific
– Extend policies outside the scope of the – ssh-keygen service
cloud provider • Copy the public key to the SSH server – Web server rights and permissions will
– More extensive reporting – ssh-copy-id user@host be different than a database server
• Try it out • Commonly use usernames and
3.7 - Identity Controls – ssh user@host passwords
Identity provider (IdP) – No password prompt! – You’ll need to determine the best policy
• Who are you? for
– A service needs to vouch for you 3.7 - Account Types password updates
– Authentication as a Service User accounts
• A list of entities • An account on a computer associated Privileged accounts
– Users and devices with a • Elevated access to one or more systems
• Commonly used by SSO applications or specific person – Administrator, Root
an – The computer associates the user with a • Complete access to the system
authentication process specific identification number – Often used to manage hardware,
– Cloud-based services need to know who • Storage and files can be private to that drivers, and
you are user software installation
• Uses standard authentication methods – Even if another person is using the same • This account should not be used for
– SAML, OAuth, OpenID Connect, etc. computer normal
• No privileged access to the operating administration
Attributes system – User accounts should be used
• An identifier or property of an entity – Specifically not allowed on a user • Needs to be highly secured
– Provides identification account – Strong passwords, 2FA
• Personal attributes • This is the account type most people will – Scheduled password changes
– Name, email address, phone number, use
Employee ID – Your user community 3.7 - Account Policies
• Other attributes Account policies
– Department name, job title, mail stop Shared and generic accounts • Control access to an account
• One or more attributes can be used for • Shared account – It’s more than just username and
identification – Used by more than one person password
– Combine them for more detail – Guest login, anonymous login – Determine what policies are best for an
• Very difficult to create an audit trail organization
Certificates – No way to know exactly who was • The authentication process
• Digital certificate - Assigned to a person working – Password policies, authentication factor
or device – Difficult to determine the proper policies, other considerations
• Binds the identity of the certificate privileges • Permissions after login - Another line of
owner to a • Password management becomes defense
public and private key difficult
– Encrypt data, create digital signatures – Password changes require notifying Perform routine audits
• Requires an existing public-key everyone • Is everything following the policy?
infrastructure (PKI) – Difficult to remember so many password – You have to police yourself
– The Certificate Authority (CA) is the changes • It’s amazing how quickly things can
trusted entity – Just write it down on this yellow sticky change
– The CA digitally signs the certificates paper – Make sure the routine is scheduled
• Best practice: Don’t use these accounts • Certain actions can be automatically
Tokens and cards Guest accounts identified
• Smart card • Access to a computer for guests – Consider a tool for log analysis
– Integrates with devices - may require a – No access to change settings, modify
PIN applications, view other user’s files, and Auditing
• USB token - Certificate is on the USB more • Permission auditing
device – Usually no password – Does everyone have the correct
• This brings significant security permissions?
SSH keys challenges – Some Administrators don’t need to be
• Secure Shell (SSH) - Secure terminal – Access to the userspace is one step there
communication closer to an exploit – Scheduled recertification
• Use a key instead of username and • Must be controlled • Usage auditing - How are your resources
password used?
– Are your systems and applications Password keys 3.8 - PAP and CHAP
secure? • Hardware-based authentication PAP (Password Authentication Protocol)
– Something you have • A basic authentication method
Password complexity and length • Helps prevent unauthorized logins and – Used in legacy operating systems
• Make your password strong - Resist account takeovers – Rare to see singularly used
brute-force attack – The key must be present to login • PAP is in the clear
• Increase password entropy • Doesn’t replace other factors – Weak authentication scheme
– No single words, no obvious passwords – Passwords are still important – Non-encrypted password exchange
• What’s the name of your dog? – We didn’t require encryption on analog
– Mix upper and lower case and use Password vaults dialup lines
special characters • Password managers – The application would need to provide
• Don’t replace a o with a 0, t with a 7 – All passwords in one location any encryption
• Stronger passwords are at least 8 – A database of credentials
characters • Secure storage CHAP
– Consider a phrase or set of words – All credentials are encrypted • Challenge-Handshake Authentication
• Prevent password reuse – Cloud-based synchronization options Protocol
– System remembers password history, • Create unique passwords – Encrypted challenge sent over the
requires – Passwords are not the same across sites network
unique passwords • Personal and enterprise options • Three-way handshake
– Corporate access – After link is established, server sends a
Account lockout and disablement challenge
• Too many incorrect passwords will cause Trusted Platform Module (TPM) – Client responds with a password hash
a lockout • A specification for cryptographic calculated from the challenge and the
– Prevents online brute force attacks functions password
– This should be normal for most user – Hardware to help with all of this – Server compares received hash with
accounts encryption stuff stored hash
– This can cause big issues for service • Cryptographic processor • Challenge-Response continues
accounts – Random number generator, key – Occurs periodically during the
• You might want this generators connection
• Disabling accounts • Persistent memory – User never knows it happens
– Part of the normal change process – Comes with unique keys burned in
– You don’t want to delete accounts during production MS-CHAP
• At least not initially • Versatile memory • Microsoft’s implementation of CHAP
• May contain important decryption keys – Storage keys, hardware configuration – Used commonly on Microsoft’s
information – Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)
Location-based policies • Password protected – MS-CHAP v2 is the more recent version
• Network location – No dictionary attacks • Security issues related to the use of DES
– Identify based on IP subnet – Relatively easy to brute force the 256
– Can be difficult with mobile devices Hardware Security Module (HSM) possible keys to decrypt the NTLM hash
• Geolocation - determine a user’s • High-end cryptographic hardware – Don’t use MS-CHAP!
location – Plug-in card or separate hardware – Consider L2TP, IPsec, 802.1X or some
– GPS - mobile devices, very accurate device other secure authentication method
– 802.11 wireless, less accurate • Key backup
– IP address, not very accurate – Secured storage 3.8 - Identity Access Services
• Geofencing • Cryptographic accelerators RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-in
– Automatically allow or restrict access – Offload that CPU overhead from other User Service)
when the user is in a particular location devices • One of the more common AAA protocols
– Don’t allow this app to run unless you’re • Used in large environments – Supported on a wide variety of
near the office – Clusters, redundant powers platforms and devices
• Geotagging – Not just for dial-in
– Add location metadata to a document or Knowledge-based authentication (KBA) • Centralize authentication for users
file • Use personal knowledge as an – Routers, switches, firewalls, server
– Latitude and longitude, distance, time authentication factor authentication, remote VPN access,
stamps – Something you know 802.1X network access
• Location-based access rules • Static KBA • RADIUS services available on almost any
– Your IP address is associated with an IP – Pre-configured shared secrets server OS
block in Russia – Often used with account recovery
– We don’t have an office in Russia – What was the make and model of your TACACS
– You were in Colorado Springs an hour first car? • Terminal Access Controller
ago • Dynamic KBA – Access-Control System
– Permission not granted – Questions are based on an identity – Remote authentication protocol
• Time-based access rules verification service – Created to control access to dial-up lines
– Nobody needs to access the lab at 3 AM – What was your street number when you to ARPANET
lived in Pembroke Pines, Florida? • XTACACS (Extended TACACS)
3.8 - Authentication Management
– A Cisco-created (proprietary) version of – Extensible Authentication Protocol • The operating system limits the
TACACS – 802.1X prevents access to the network operation on an object
– Additional support for accounting and until the authentication succeeds – Based on security clearance levels
auditing • Used in conjunction with an access • Every object gets a label
• TACACS+ database – Confidential, secret, top secret, etc.
– The latest version of TACACS, not – RADIUS, LDAP, TACACS+ • Labeling of objects uses predefined rules
backwards – The administrator decides who gets
compatible 3.8 - Federated Identities access to
– More authentication requests and Federation what security level
response codes • Provide network access to others – Users cannot change these settings
– Released as an open standard in 1993 – Not just employees - Partners, suppliers,
customers, etc. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Kerberos – Provides SSO and more • Used in most operating systems
• Network authentication protocol • Third-parties can establish a federated – A familiar access control model
– Authenticate once, trusted by the network • You create a spreadsheet
system – Authenticate and authorize between the – As the owner, you control who has
– No need to re-authenticate to two access
everything organizations – You can modify access at any time
– Mutual authentication - the client and – Login with your Facebook credentials • Very flexible access control
the server • The third-parties must establish a trust – And very weak security
– Protect against on-path or replay attacks relationship
• Standard since the 1980s – And the degree of the trust Role-based access control (RBAC)
– Developed by the Massachusetts • You have a role in your organization
Institute of Security Assertion Markup Language – Manager, director, team lead, project
Technology (MIT) (SAML) manager
• Microsoft starting using Kerberos in • Open standard for authentication and • Administrators provide access based on
Windows 2000 authorization the role of the user
– Based on Kerberos 5.0 open standard – You can authenticate through a third- – Rights are gained implicitly instead of
– Compatible with other operating party to gain access explicitly
systems and devices – One standard does it all, sort of • In Windows, use Groups to provide role-
• Not originally designed for mobile apps based
SSO with Kerberos – This has been SAML’s largest roadblock access control
• Authenticate one time – You are in shipping and receiving, so you
– Lots of backend ticketing OAuth can
– Cryptographic tickets • Authorization framework use the shipping software
• No constant username and password – Determines what resources a user will – You are the manager, so you can review
input! be shipping logs
– Save time able to access
• Only works with Kerberos • Created by Twitter, Google, and many Attribute-based access control (ABAC)
– Not everything is Kerberos-friendly others • Users can have complex relationships to
• There are many other SSO methods – Significant industry support applications and data
– Smart-cards, SAML, etc. • Not an authentication protocol – Access may be based on many different
– OpenID Connect handles the single sign- criteria
RADIUS, TACACS+, or Kerberos? on • ABAC can consider many parameters
• Three different ways to communicate to authentication – A “next generation” authorization model
an – OAuth provides authorization – Aware of context
authentication server between applications • Combine and evaluate multiple
– More than a simple login process • Relatively popular parameters
• Often determined by what is at hand – Used by Twitter, Google, Facebook, – Resource information, IP address, time
– VPN concentrator can talk to a RADIUS – LinkedIn, and more of day, desired action, relationship to the
server data, etc.
– We have a RADIUS server 3.8 - Access Control
• TACACS+ Access control Rule-based access control
– Probably a Cisco device • Authorization • Generic term for following rules
• Kerberos – The process of ensuring only authorized – Conditions other than who you are
– Probably a Microsoft network rights are exercised • Access is determined through system-
• Policy enforcement enforced rules
IEEE 802.1X – The process of determining rights – System administrators, not users
• IEEE 802.1X • Policy definition • The rule is associated with the object
– Port-based Network Access Control • Users receive rights based on – System checks the ACLs for that object
(NAC) – Access Control models • Rule examples
– You don’t get access to the network – Different business needs or mission – Lab network access is only available
until you requirements between 9 and 5
authenticate – Only Chrome browsers may complete
• EAP integrates with 802.1X Mandatory Access Control (MAC) this web form
• Distribution • The entity requesting the certificate
File system security – Make the key available to the user needs to be verified
• Store files and access them • Storage – The RA identifies and authenticates the
– Hard drive, SSDs, flash drives, DVDs, part – Securely store and protect against requester
of most OSs unauthorized use • Approval or rejection
• Accessing information • Revocation – The foundation of trust in this model
– Access control list – Manage keys that have been • Also responsible for revocations
– Group/user rights and permissions compromised – Administratively revoked or by request
– Can be centrally administered and/or • Expiration • Manages renewals and re-key requests
users can manage files they own – A certificate may only have a certain – Maintains certificates for current cert
• The file system handles encryption and “shelf life” holders
decryption
Digital certificates Important certificate attributes
Conditional access • A public key certificate • Common Name (CN)
• Difficult to apply old methods of – Binds a public key with a digital – The FQDN (Fully Qualified
authentication to new methods of signature – Domain Name) for the certificate
working – And other details about the key holder • Subject alternative name
– Mobile workforce, many different • A digital signature adds trust – Additional host names for the cert
devices, – PKI uses Certificate Authority for – Common on web servers
constantly changing cloud additional trust – professormesser.com and
• Conditions – Web of Trust adds other users for www.professormesser.com
– Employee or partner, location, type of additional trust • Expiration
application accessed, device • Certificate creation can be built into the – Limit exposure to compromise
• Controls OS – 398 day browser limit (13 months)
– Allow or block, require MFA, provide – Part of Windows Domain services
limited access, require password reset – 3rd-party Linux options Key revocation
• Administrators can build complex access • Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
rules Commercial certificate authorities – Maintained by the Certificate Authority
– Complete control over data access • Built-in to your browser (CA)
– Any browser • Many different reasons
Privileged access management (PAM) • Purchase your web site certificate – Changes all the time
• Managing superuser access – It will be trusted by everyone’s browser • April 2014 - CVE-2014-0160
– Administrator and Root • Create a key pair, send the public key to – Heartbleed
– You don’t want this in the wrong hands the CA to be signed – OpenSSL flaw put the private key of
• Store privileged accounts in a digital – A certificate signing request (CSR) affected
vault • May provide different levels of trust and web servers at risk
– Access is only granted from the vault by additional features – OpenSSL was patched, every web server
request – Add a new “tag” to your web site certificate was replaced
– These privileges are temporary – Older certificates were moved to the
• PAM advantages Private certificate authorities CRL
– Centralized password management • You are your own CA
– Enables automation – Build it in-house Getting revocation details to the browser
– Manage access for each user – Your devices must trust the internal CA • OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol)
– Extensive tracking and auditing • Needed for medium-to-large – The browser can check certificate
organizations revocation
3.9 - Public Key Infrastructure – Many web servers and privacy • Messages usually sent to an OCSP
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) requirements responder via HTTP
• Policies, procedures, hardware, • Implement as part of your overall – Easy to support over Internet links
software, people computing strategy • Not all browsers/apps support OCSP
– Digital certificates: create, distribute, – Windows Certificate Services, OpenCA – Early Internet Explorer versions did not
manage, support OCSP
store, revoke PKI trust relationships – Some support OCSP, but don’t bother
• This is a big, big, endeavor • Single CA checking
– Lots of planning – Everyone receives their certificates from 3.9 - Certificates
• Also refers to the binding of public keys one authority Web server SSL certificates
to people or devices • Hierarchical • Domain validation certificate (DV)
– The certificate authority – Single CA issues certs to intermediate – Owner of the certificate has some
– It’s all about trust CAs control over a DNS domain
– Distributes the certificate management • Extended validation certificate (EV)
The key management lifecycle load – Additional checks have verified the
• Key generation – Easier to deal with the revocation of an certificate
– Create a key with the requested intermediate CA than the root CA owner’s identity
strength using the proper cipher – Browsers used to show a green name on
• Certificate generation Registration authority (RA) the
– Allocate a key to a user address bar
– Promoting the use of SSL is now – Often devices that you’ll never – Letters and numbers
outdated physically see – Easy to email, readable
• Subject Alternative Name (SAN) • How can you truly authenticate a
– Extension to an X.509 certificate device? PKCS #12
– Lists additional identification – Put a certificate on the device that you • Public Key Cryptography Standards #12
information signed – Personal Information Exchange Syntax
– Allows a certificate to support many • Other business processes rely on the Standard
different domains certificate – Developed by RSA Security, now an RFC
• Wildcard domain – Access to the remote access standard
– Certificates are based on the name of – VPN from authorized devices • Container format for many certificates
the server – Management software can validate the – Store many X.509 certificates in a single
– A wildcard domain will apply to all end device .p12 or .pfx file
server names in a domain – Often used to transfer a private and
– *.professormesser.com Email certificates public key pair
• Use cryptography in an email platform – The container can be password
Code signing certificate – You’ll need public key cryptography protected
• Developers can provide a level of trust • Encrypting emails • Extended from Microsoft’s .pfx format
– Applications can be signed by the – Use a recipient’s public key to encrypt – Personal Information Exchange (PFX)
developer • Receiving encrypted emails – The two standards are very similar
• The user’s operating system will – Use your private key to decrypt – Often referenced interchangeably
examine • Digital signatures
the signature – Use your private key to digitally sign an CER (Certificate)
– Checks the developer signature email • Primarily a Windows X.509 file extension
– Validates that the software has not been – Non-repudiation, integrity – Can be encoded as binary DER format or
modified as the ASCII PEM format
• Is it from a trusted entity? User certificates • Usually contains a public key
– The user will have the opportunity to • Associate a certificate with a user – Private keys would be transferred in the
stop the – A powerful electronic “id card” .pfx file format
application execution • Use as an additional authentication • Common format for Windows
factor certificates
Root certificate – Limit access without the certificate – Look for the .cer extension
• The public key certificate that identifies • Integrate onto smart cards
the root CA (Certificate Authority) – Use as both a physical and digital access PKCS #7
– Everything starts with this certificate card • Public Key Cryptography Standards #7
• The root certificate issues other • Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard
certificates 3.9 - Certificate Formats – Associated with the .p7b file
– Intermediate CA certificates Certificate file formats • Stored in ASCII format
– Any other certificates • X.509 digital certificates – Human-readable
• This is a very important certificate – The structure of the certification is • Contains certificates and chain
– Take all security precautions standardized certificates
– Access to the root certificate allows for – The format of the actual certificate file – Private keys are not included in a .p7b
the can take many different forms file
creation of any trusted certificate • There are many certificate file formats • Wide platform support
– You can convert between many of the – Microsoft Windows
Self-signed certificates formats – Java Tomcat
• Internal certificates don’t need to be – Use openssl or a similar application to
signed by a public CA view the certificate contents Email certificates
– Your company is the only one going to • Use cryptography in an email platform
use it DER (Distinguished Encoding Rules) – You’ll need public key cryptography
– No need to purchase trust for devices • Format designed to transfer syntax for • Encrypting emails
that already trust you data structures – Use a recipient’s public key to encrypt
• Build your own CA – A very specific encoding format • Receiving encrypted emails
– Issue your own certificates signed by – Perfect for an X.509 certificate – Use your private key to decrypt
your own CA • Binary format • Digital signatures
• Install the CA certificate/trusted chain – Not human-readable – Use your private key to digitally sign an
on all devices • A common format email
– They’ll now trust any certificates signed – Used across many platforms – Non-repudiation, integrity
by – Often used with Java certificates
your internal CA User certificates
– Works exactly like a certificate you PEM (Privacy-Enhanced Mail) • Associate a certificate with a user
purchased • A very common format – A powerful electronic “id card”
– BASE64 encoded DER certificate • Use as an additional authentication
Machine and computer certificates – Generally the format provided by CAs factor
• You have to manage many devices – Supported on many different platforms – Limit access without the certificate
• ASCII format • Integrate onto smart cards
– Use as both a physical and digital access information
card – Government agencies may need to ipconfig and ifconfig
decrypt • Most of your troubleshooting starts with
3.9 - Certificate Concepts partner data your IP address
Online and offline CAs – Ping your local router/gateway
• A compromised certificate authority It’s all about the process • Determine TCP/IP and network adapter
– A very, very bad thing • Need clear process and procedures information
– No certificates issued by that CA can be – Keys are incredibly important pieces of – And some additional IP details
trusted information •ipconfig – Windows TCP/IP
• Distribute the load • You must be able to trust your 3rd-party configuration
– Then take the root CA offline and – Access to the keys is at the control of •ifconfig – Linux interface
protect it the configuration
3rd-party
OCSP stapling • Carefully controlled conditions Nmap
• Online Certificate Status Protocol – Legal proceedings and court orders • Network mapper
– Provides scalability for OCSP checks – Find and learn more about network
• The CA is responsible for responding to Certificate chaining devices
all • Chain of trust • Port scan
client OCSP requests – List all of the certs between the server – Find devices and identify open ports
– This does not scale well and the root CA • Operating system scan
• Instead, have the certificate holder • The chain starts with the SSL certificate – Discover the OS without logging in to a
verify their own status – And ends with the Root CA certificate device
– Status information is stored on the • Any certificate between the SSL • Service scan
certificate holder’s server certificate – What service is available on a device?
• OCSP status is “stapled” into the SSL/TLS and the root certificate is a chain Name, version, details
handshake certificate • Additional scripts
– Digitally signed by the CA – Or intermediate certificate – Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE)
• The web server needs to be configured • Extend capabilities, vulnerability scans
Pinning with
• You’re communicating over TLS/SSL to a the proper chain ping
server – Or the end user may receive an error • Test reachability
– How do you really know it’s a legitimate – Determine round-trip time
server? 4.1 - Reconnaissance Tools – Uses Internet Control Message Protocol
• “Pin” the expected certificate or public traceroute (ICMP)
key to an application • Determine the route a packet takes to a • One of your primary troubleshooting
– Compiled in the app or added at first run destination tools
• If the expected certificate or public key – Map the entire path – Can you ping the host?
doesn’t match, the application can decide •tracert (Windows) or traceroute • Written by Mike Muuss in 1983
what to do (POSIX) – The sound made by sonar
– Shut down, show a message • Takes advantage of ICMP Time to Live – Not an acronym for Packet INternet
Exceeded error message Groper
PKI trust relationships – The time in TTL refers to hops, not – A backronym
• Single CA seconds or minutes
– Everyone receives their certificates from – TTL=1 is the first router, TTL=2 is the pathping
one authority second router, etc. • Combine ping and traceroute
• Hierarchical • Not all devices will reply with – Included with Windows NT and later
– Single CA issues certs to intermediate ICMP Time Exceeded messages • First phase runs a traceroute
CAs – Some firewalls filter ICMP – Build a map
• Mesh – ICMP is low-priority for many devices • Second phase
– Cross-certifying CAs - Doesn’t scale well – Measure round trip time and packet loss
• Web-of-trust nslookup and dig at each hop
– Alternative to traditional PKI • Lookup information from DNS servers
– Canonical names, IP addresses, cache hping
• Mutual Authentication
timers, etc. • TCP/IP packet assembler/analyzer
– Server authenticates to the client and
•nslookup – A ping that can send almost anything
the client authenticates to the server
-Both Windows and POSIX-based – Lookup • Ping a device
names and IP addresses – Deprecated – ICMP, TCP, UDP
Key escrow
(use dig instead) – #hping3 --destport 80
• Someone else holds your decryption
•dig or DiG (Domain Information 10.1.10.1
keys
Groper) • Send crafted frames
– Your private keys are in the hands
– More advanced domain information – Modify all IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP values
of a 3rd-party
– Probably your first choice • A powerful tool
• This can be a legitimate business
– Install in Windows: – It’s easy to accidentally flood and DoS
arrangement
https://professormesser.link/ – Be careful!
– A business might need access to
employee digwin
netstat
• Network statistics – A list of email contacts – The tail, or end, or the file
– Many different operating systems • DNS brute force – tail [OPTION] … [FILE] …
•netstat -a – Find those unknown hosts; vpn, chat, • Use -n to specify the number of lines
– Show all active connections mail, partner, etc. – tail -n 5 syslog
•netstat -b
– Show binaries sn1per cat
•netstat -n • Combine many recon tools into a single • Concatenate
– Do not resolve names framework – Link together in a series
– dnsenum, metasploit, nmap, • Copy a file/files to the screen
netcat theHarvester, and much more – cat file1.txt file2.txt
• “Read” or “write” to the network • Both non-intrusive and very intrusive • Copy a file/files to another file
– Open a port and send or receive some scanning options – cat file1.txt file2.txt >
traffic – You choose the volume both.txt
• Many different functions • Another tool that can cause problems grep
– Listen on a port number – Brute force, server scanning, etc • Find text in a file
– Transfer data – Make sure you know what you’re doing – Search through many files at a time
– Scan ports and send data to a port •grep PATTERN [FILE] – grep
• Become a backdoor scanless failed auth.log
– Run a shell from a remote device • Run port scans from a different host
• Other alternatives and OSes - Ncat – Port scan proxy chmod
• Many different services • Change mode of a file system object
IP scanners – Choose the option for scan origination – r=read, w=write, x=execute
• Search a network for IP addresses – Your IP is hidden as the scan source – Can also use octal notation
– Locate active devices – Set for the file owner (u), the group(g),
– Avoid doing work on an IP address that dnsenum others(o), or all(a)
isn’t there • Enumerate DNS information – chmod mode FILE
• Many different techniques – Find host names – chmod 744 script.sh
– ARP (if on the local subnet) • View host information from DNS servers •chmod 744 first.txt
– ICMP requests (ping) – Many services and hosts are listed in – User; read, write execute
– TCP ACK DNS – Group; read only
– ICMP timestamp requests • Find host names in Google – Other; read only
• A response means more recon can be – More hosts can probably be found in the •chmod a-w first.txt
done index – All users, no writing to first.txt
– Keep gathering information - Nmap, •chmod u+x script.sh
hping, etc. Nessus – The owner of script.sh can execute the
• Industry leader in vulnerability scanning file
Address Resolution Protocol – Extensive support
• Determine a MAC address based on an – Free and commercial options logger
IP address • Identify known vulnerabilities • Add entries to the system log
– You need the hardware address to – Find systems before they can be – syslog
communicate exploited • Adding to the local syslog file
•arp -a • Extensive reporting – logger “This information is
– View local ARP table – A checklist of issues added to syslog”
route – Filter out the false positives • Useful for including information in a
• View the device’s routing table local or remote syslog file
– Find out which way the packets will go Cuckoo – Include as part of an automation script
• Windows: route print • A sandbox for malware – Log an important event
• Linux and macOS: netstat -r – Test a file in a safe environment
curl • A virtualized environment 4.1 - Shell and Script Environments
• Client URL – Windows, Linux, macOS, Android SSH (Secure Shell)
– Retrieve data using a URL • Track and trace • Encrypted console communication -
– Uniform Resource Locator – API calls, network traffic, memory tcp/22
– Web pages, FTP, emails, databases, etc. analysis • Looks and acts the same as Telnet
• Grab the raw data – Traffic captures
– Search – Screenshots Windows PowerShell
– Parse • Command line for system administrators
– Automate 4.1 - File Manipulation Tools – .ps1 file extension
head – Included with Windows 8/8.1 and 10
theHarvester • View the first part of a file • Extend command-line functions
• Gather OSINT – The head, or beginning, of the file – Uses cmdlets (command-lets)
– Open-Source Intelligence – head [OPTION] … [FILE] … – PowerShell scripts and functions
• Scrape information from Google or Bing • Use -n to specify the number of lines – Standalone executables
– Find associated IP addresses – head -n 5 syslog • Automate and integrate
• List of people from LinkedIn – System administration
– Names and titles tail – Active Domain administration
• Find PGP keys by email domain • View the last part of a file
Python – dd if=/tmp/sda-image.img • Online cracking
• General-purpose scripting language of=/dev/sda – Try username/password combinations
– .py file extension memdump • Offline cracking
• Popular in many technologies • Copy information in system memory to – Brute force a hash file
– Broad appeal and support the standard output stream • Limitations
– Everything that happens is in memory – Password complexity / strength
OpenSSL – Many third-party tools can read a (entropy)
• A toolkit and crypto library for SSL/TLS memory dump – Hashing method and CPU power
– Build certificates, manage SSL/TLS • Copy to another host across the network – Graphics processors are useful hardware
communication – Use netcat, stunnel, openssl, etc. tools
• Create X.509 certificates
– Manage certificate signing requests Winhex Data sanitization
(CSRs) and certificate revocation lists • A universal hexadecimal editor for • Completely remove data
(CRLs) Windows OS – No usable information remains
• Message digests • Edit disks, files, RAM • Many different use cases
– Support for many hashing protocols – Includes data recovery features – Clean a hard drive for future use
• Encryption and Decryption • Disk cloning – Permanently delete a single file
– SSL/TLS for services – Drive replication • A one-way trip
• Much more • Secure wipe – Once it’s gone, it’s really gone
– Hard drive cleaning – No recovery with forensics tools
4.1 - Packet Tools • Much more
Tcpreplay – A full-featured forensics tool 4.2 - Incident Response Process
• A suite of packet replay utilities Security incidents
– Replay and edit packet captures FTK imager • User clicks an email attachment and
– Open source • Access Data forensic drive imaging tool executes malware
• Test security devices – Includes file utilities and read-only – Malware then communicates with
– Check IPS signatures and firewall rules image mounting external servers
• Test and tune IP Flow/NetFlow devices – Windows executable • DDoS
– Send hundreds of thousands of traffic • Widely supported in many forensics – Botnet attack
flows tools • Confidential information is stolen
per second – Third-party analysis – Thief wants money or it goes public
• Evaluate the performance of security • Support for many different file systems • User installs peer-to-peer software and
devices and full disk allows external access to internal servers
– Test throughput and flows per second encryption methods
– Investigator still needs the password Roles and responsibilities
tcpdump • Can also import other image formats • Incident response team
• Capture packets from the command line – dd, Ghost, Expert Witness, etc. – Specialized group, trained and tested
– Display packets on the screen • IT security management
– Write packets to a file Autopsy – Corporate support
• Perform digital forensics of hard drives, • Compliance officers
Wireshark smartphones – Intricate knowledge of compliance rules
• Graphical packet analyzer – View and recover data from storage • Technical staff
– Get into the details devices – Your team in the trenches
• Gathers frames on the network • Extract many different data types • User community
– Or in the air – Downloaded files – They see everything
• Sometimes built into the device – Browser history and cache
– View traffic patterns – Email messages NIST SP800-61
– Identify unknown traffic – Databases • National Institute of Standards and
– Verify packet filtering and security – Much more Technology
controls – NIST Special Publication 800-61 Rev. 2
• Extensive decodes Exploitation frameworks – Computer Security Incident
– View the application traffic • A pre-built toolkit for exploitations – Handling Guide
4.1 - Forensic Tools – Build custom attacks • The incident response lifecycle:
dd – Add more tools as vulnerabilities are – Preparation
• A reference to the DD command in found – Detection and Analysis
– IBM mainframe JCL (Job Control – Increasingly powerful utilities – Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
Language) • Metasploit – Post-incident Activity
– Data Definition (ASCII to EBCDIC – Attack known vulnerabilities
converter) • The Social-Engineer Toolkit (SET) Preparing for an incident
• Create a bit-by-bit copy of a drive – Spear phishing, Infectious media • Communication methods
– Used by many forensics tools generator – Phones and contact information
• Create a disk image • Incident handling hardware and
– dd if=/dev/sda of=/tmp/sda- Password crackers software
image.img • The keys to the kingdom – Laptops, removable media, forensic
• Restore from an image – Find the passwords software,
digital cameras, etc. Recovery after an incident Tabletop exercises
• Incident analysis resources • Get things back to normal • Performing a full-scale disaster drill can
– Documentation, network diagrams, – Remove the bad, keep the good be costly
baselines, • Eradicate the bug – And time consuming
critical file hash values – Remove malware • Many of the logistics can be determined
• Incident mitigation software – Disable breached user accounts through analysis
– Clean OS and application images – Fix vulnerabilities – You don’t physically have to go through
• Policies needed for incident handling • Recover the system a
– Everyone knows what to do – Restore from backups disaster or drill
– Rebuild from scratch • Get key players together for a tabletop
The challenge of detection – Replace compromised files exercise
• Many different detection sources – Tighten down the perimeter – Talk through a simulated disaster
– Different levels of detail, different levels
of perception Reconstitution Walkthrough
• A large amount of “volume” • A phased approach • Include responders
– Attacks are incoming all the time – It’s difficult to fix everything at once – A step beyond a tabletop exercise
– How do you identify the legitimate • Recovery may take months – Many moving parts
threats? – Large-scale incidents require a large • Test processes and procedures before
• Incidents are almost always complex amount of work an event
– Extensive knowledge needed • The plan should be efficient – Walk through each step
– Start with quick, high-value security – Involve all groups
Incident precursors changes – Reference actual response materials
• An incident might occur in the future • Patches, firewall policy changes • Identifies actual faults or missing steps
– This is your heads-up – Later phases involve much “heavier – The walkthrough applies the concepts
• Web server log lifting” from the tabletop exercise
– Vulnerability scanner in use • Infrastructure changes, large-scale
• Exploit announcement security Simulation
– Monthly Microsoft patch release, rollouts • Test with a simulated event
– Adobe Flash update – Phishing attack, password requests, data
• Direct threats Lessons learned breaches
– A hacking group doesn’t like you • Learn and improve • Going phishing
– No system is perfect – Create a phishing email attack
Incident indicators • Post-incident meeting – Send to your actual user community
• An attack is underway – Invite everyone affected by the incident – See who bites
– Or an exploit is successful • Don’t wait too long • Test internal security
• Buffer overflow attempt – Memories fade over time – Did the phishing get past the filter?
– Identified by an intrusion – Some recommendations can be applied • Test the users
detection/prevention system to the – Who clicked?
• Anti-virus software identifies malware next event – Additional training may be required
– Deletes from OS and notifies
administrator Answer the tough questions Stakeholder management
• Host-based monitor detects a • What happened, exactly? • Keeping an good ongoing relationship
configuration change – Timestamp of the events with
– Constantly monitors system files • How did your incident plans work? customers of IT
• Network traffic flows deviate from the – Did the process operate successfully? – These can be internal or external
norm • What would you do differently next customers
– Requires constant monitoring time? – An incident response will require
– Retrospective views provide context teamwork
Isolation and containment • Which indicators would you watch next – Without the stakeholder, IT would not
• Generally a bad idea to let things run time? exist
their course – Different precursors may give you better • Most of this happens prior to an
– An incident can spread quickly alerts incident
– It’s your fault at that point – Ongoing communication and meetings
• Sandboxes 4.2 - Incident Response Planning – Exercises should include the customers
– An isolated operating system Exercise • Continues after the incident
– Run malware and analyze the results • Test yourselves before an actual event – Prepare for the next event
– Clean out the sandbox when done – Scheduled update sessions (annual,
• Isolation can be sometimes be semi-annual, etc.) Communication plan
problematic • Use well-defined rules of engagement • Get your contact list together
– Malware or infections can monitor – Do not touch the production systems – There are a lot of people in the loop
connectivity • Very specific scenario • Corporate / Organization
– When connectivity is lost, everything – Limited time to run the event – CIO / Head of Information Security /
could be • Evaluate response Internal
deleted/encrypted/damaged – Document and discuss Response Teams
• Internal non-IT
– Human resources, public affairs, legal • Response and intelligence teams need – You’ll have to check manually to see if a
department assistance system is vulnerable
• External contacts – Gather and maintain ongoing – But the scanner gives you a heads-up
– System owner, law enforcement reconnaissance
– US-CERT (for U.S. Government agencies) • Understand attacks Vulnerability scan results
– Many different vectors • Lack of security controls
Disaster recovery plan • Assess the risk in an organization – No firewall
• If a disaster happens, IT should be ready – Determine if a risk exists – No anti-virus
– Part of business continuity planning – Use appropriate mitigation – No anti-spyware
– Keep the organization up and running • Misconfigurations
• Disasters are many and varied MITRE ATT&CK framework – Open shares
– Natural disasters • The MITRE corporation – Guest access
– Technology or system failures – US not-for-profit based in • Real vulnerabilities
– Human-created disasters Massachusetts and Virginia – Especially newer ones
• A comprehensive plan – Supports several U.S. government – Occasionally the old ones
– Recovery location agencies
– Data recovery method • The MITRE ATT&CK framework Dealing with false positives
– Application restoration – https://attack.mitre.org/ • False positives
– IT team and employee availability • Determine the actions of an attacker – A vulnerability is identified that doesn’t
– Identify point of intrusion really exist
Continuity of operations planning (COOP) – Understand methods used to move • This is different than a low-severity
• Not everything goes according to plan around vulnerability
• Disasters can cause a disruption to the – Identify potential security techniques to – It’s real, but it may not be your highest
norm block future attacks priority
• We rely on our computer systems • False negatives
• Technology is pervasive Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis – A vulnerability exists, but you didn’t
• There needs to be an alternative • Designed by the intelligence community detect it
• Manual transactions – • Update to the latest signatures
• Paper receipts https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA5 – If you don’t know about it, you can’t see
• Phone calls for transaction approvals 86960 it
• These must be documented and tested – Guide analysts to help understand • Work with the vulnerability detection
before intrusions manufacturer
a problem occurs – Integrates well with other frameworks – They may need to update their
• Apply scientific principles to intrusion signatures
Incident response team analysis for your environment
• Receives, reviews, and responds – Measurement, testability, and
– A predefined group of professionals repeatability 4.3 - SIEM Dashboards
• Determine what type of events require a – Appears simple, but is remarkably SIEM
response complex • Security Information and Event
– A virus infection? Ransomware? DDoS? • An adversary deploys a capability over Management
• May or may not be part of the some – Logging of security events and
organizational structure infrastructure against a victim information
– Pulled together on an as-needed basis – Use the model to analyze and fill in the • Security alerts
• Focuses on incident handling details – Real-time information
– Incident response, incident analysis, • Log aggregation and long-term storage
incident reporting Cyber Kill Chain – Usually includes advanced reporting
• Seven phases of a cyber attack features
Retention policies – A military concept • Data correlation
• Backup your data – Link diverse data types
– How much and where? Copies, versions 4.3 - Vulnerability Scan Output • Forensic analysis
of copies, lifecycle of data, purging old Identify vulnerability – Gather details after an event
data • The scanner looks for everything
• Regulatory compliance – Well, not _everything_ Getting the data
– A certain amount of data backup may be – The signatures are the key • Sensors and logs
required • The vulnerabilities can be cross- – Operating systems
• Operational needs referenced online – Infrastructure devices
– Accidental deletion, disaster recovery – Almost all scanners give you a place to – NetFlow sensors
• Differentiate by type and application go • Sensitivity settings
– Recover the data you need when you – National Vulnerability Database: – Easy to be overwhelmed with data
need it http://nvd.nist.gov/ – Some information is unnecessary
– Microsoft Security Bulletins: – Informational, Warning, Urgent
4.2 Attack Frameworks – https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
Attacks and responses us/security-updates/ Viewing the data
• A constantly moving chessboard • Some vulnerabilities cannot be • Trends
– The rules are also constantly changing definitively identified – Identify changes over time
– Easily view constant attack metrics – Rsyslog -“Rocket-fast System for log
• Alerts DNS log files processing”
– Identify a security event • View lookup requests – syslog-ng - A popular syslog daemon
– View raw data – And other DNS queries with additional filtering and storage
– Visualize the log information • IP address of the request options
• Correlation – The request FQDN or IP – NXLog - Collection from many diverse
– Combine and compare • Identify queries to known bad URLs log types
– View data in different ways – Malware sites, known command
and control domains Journalctl
4.3 - Log files • Block or modify known bad requests • Linux has a lot of logs
Network log files at the DNS server – The OS, daemons, applications, etc.
• Switches, routers, access points, VPN – Log the results • System logs are stored in a binary
concentrators – Report on malware activity format
– And other infrastructure devices – Optimized for storage and queries
• Network changes Authentication log files – Can’t read them with a text editor
– Routing updates • Know who logged in (or didn’t) • Journalctl provides a method for
– Authentication issues – Account names querying the system journal
– Network security issues – Source IP address – Search and filter
– Authentication method – View as plain text
System log files – Success and failure reports
• Operating system information • Identify multiple failures Bandwidth monitors
– Extensive logs – Potential brute force attacks • The fundamental network statistic
– File system information • Correlate with other events – Percentage of network use over time
– Authentication details – File transfers • Many different ways to gather this
• Can also include security events – Authentications to other devices metric
– Monitoring apps – Application installation – SNMP, NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX protocol
– Brute force, file changes analysis, software agent
• May require filtering Dump files • Identify fundamental issues
– Don’t forward everything • Store all contents of memory into a – Nothing works properly if bandwidth is
diagnostic file highly utilized
Application log files – Developers can use this info
• Specific to the application • Easy to create from the Metadata
– Information varies widely – Windows Task Manager • Metadata
• Windows - Event Viewer / Application – Right-click, Create dump file – Data that describes other data sources
Log • Some applications have their own dump • Email
• Linux / macOS - /var/log file process – Header details, sending servers,
• Parse the log details on the SIEM – Contact the appropriate support team destination address
– Filter out unneeded info for • Mobile - Type of phone, GPS location,
additional details • Web - Operating system, browser type,
Security log files IP address
• Detailed security-related information VoIP and Call Manager logs • Files - Name, address, phone number,
– Blocked and allowed traffic flows • View inbound and outbound call info title
– Exploit attempts – Endpoint details, gateway
– Blocked URL categories communication NetFlow
– DNS sinkhole traffic • Security information • Gather traffic statistics from all traffic
• Security devices – Authentications, audit trail flows
– IPS, firewall, proxy • SIP traffic logs – Shared communication between devices
• Critical security information – Session Initiation Protocol • NetFlow
– Documentation of every traffic flow – Call setup, management, and teardown – Standard collection method
– Summary of attack info – Inbound and outbound calls – Many products and options
– Correlate with other logs – Alert on unusual numbers or country • Probe and collector
codes – Probe watches network communication
Web log files – Summary records are sent to the
• Web server access 4.3 - Log Management collector
– IP address, web page URL Syslog • Usually a separate reporting app
• Access errors • Standard for message logging – Closely tied to the collector
– Unauthorized or non-existent – Diverse systems create a consolidated
folders/files log IPFIX
• Exploit attempts • Usually a central logging receiver • IP Flow Information Export
– Attempt to access files containing – Integrated into the SIEM (Security – A newer, NetFlow-based standard
known Information and Event Manager) – Evolved from NetFlow v9
vulnerabilities • Each log entry is labeled • Flexible data support
• Server activity – Facility code (program that created the – Templates are used to describe the data
– Startup and shutdown notices log) and severity level
– Restart messages • Syslog daemon options sFlow
• sFlow (Sampled Flow) – Only run applications in these folders – Limit the scope of a breach
– Only a portion of the actual network • Network zone
traffic – The apps can only run from this network SOAR
– So, technically not a flow zone • Security Orchestration, Automation, and
• Usually embedded in the infrastructure Response
– Switches, routers 4.4 - Security Configurations – Integrate third-party tools and data
– Sampling usually occurs in Configuration changes sources
hardware/ASICs • Firewall rules – Make security teams more effective
• Relatively accurate statistics – Manage application flows • Runbooks
– Useful information regarding video – Block dangerous applications – Linear checklist of steps to perform
streaming and high-traffic applications • Mobile Device Manager (MDM) – Step-by-step approach to automation
– Enable or disable phone and tablet – Reset a password, create a website
Protocol analyzer output functionality certificate,
• Solve complex application issues – Regardless of physical location back up application data
– Get into the details • Data Loss Prevention (DLP) • Playbooks
• Gathers packets on the network – Block transfer of personally identifiable – Conditional steps to follow; a broad
– Or in the air information (PII) or sensitive data process
– Sometimes built into the device – Credit card numbers, social security – Investigate a data breach, recover from
• View detailed traffic information numbers, etc. ransomware
– Identify unknown traffic • Content filter/URL filter
– Verify packet filtering and security – Limit access to untrusted websites 4.5 - Digital Forensics
controls – Block known malicious sites Digital forensics
– View a plain-language description of the – Large blocklists are used to share • Collect and protect information relating
application data suspicious site URLs to an intrusion
• Updating or revoking certificates – Many different data sources and
4.4 - Endpoint Security Configuration – Manage device certificates to verify protection
The endpoint trust mechanisms
• The end user device – Revoking a certificate effectively • RFC 3227 - Guidelines for
– Desktop PC, laptop, tablet, phone, etc. removes access – Evidence Collection and Archiving
• Many ways to exploit a system – A good set of best practices
– OS vulnerability, malware, user Isolation • Standard digital forensic process
intervention • Administratively isolate a compromised – Acquisition, analysis, and reporting
• Security team has to cover all of the device from everything else • Must be detail oriented
bases – Prevent the spread of malicious – Take extensive notes
– Recognize and react to any malicious software
activity – Prevent remote access or C2 (Command Legal hold
and Control) • A legal technique to preserve relevant
Application approved/deny lists • Network isolation information
• Any application can be dangerous – Isolate to a remediation VLAN – Prepare for impending litigation
– Vulnerabilities, trojan horses, malware – No communication to other devices – Initiated by legal counsel
– Security policy can control app • Process isolation • Hold notification
execution – Limit application execution – Records custodians are instructed to
• Approved list – Prevent malicious activity but allow preserve data
– Nothing runs unless it’s approved device • Separate repository for electronically
– Very restrictive management stored
• Blocklist / deny list information (ESI)
– Nothing on the “bad list” can be Containment – Many different data sources and types
executed • Application containment – Unique workflow and retention
– Anti-virus, anti-malware – Run each application in its own sandbox requirements
• Quarantine – Limit interaction with the host operating • Ongoing preservation
– Anything suspicious can be moved to a system and other applications – Once notified, there’s an ongoing
safe area – Ransomware would have no method of obligation to preserve data
infection
Examples of application approval lists • Contain the spread of a multi-device Capture video
• Decisions are made in the operating security • A moving record of the event
system event, i.e., ransomware – Gathers information external to the
– Often built-in to the operating system – Disable administrative shares computer
management – Disable remote management and network
– Application hash – Disable local account access and change • Captures the status of the screen and
• Only allows applications with this local other
unique identifier administrator password volatile information
• Certificate – Today’s mobile video devices are
– Allow digitally signed apps from certain Segmentation remarkable
publishers • Separate the network • Don’t forget security cameras and your
• Path – Prevent unauthorized movement phone
• The video content must also be archived • Core operating system
– May have some of the most important Reports – Executable files and libraries
record • Document the findings – Can be compared later to known-good
of information – For Internal use, legal proceedings, etc. files
• Summary information – Usually captured with a drive image
Admissibility – Overview of the security event • Other OS data
• Not all data can be used in a court of law • Detailed explanation of data acquisition – Logged in users
– Different rules in different jurisdictions – Step-by-step method of the process – Open ports
• Legal authorization • The findings – Processes currently running
– Search and seizure of information – An analysis of the data – Attached device list
• Procedures and tools • Conclusion
– The correct tools used the correct way – Professional results, given the analysis Device
• Laboratories • Mobile devices and tablets
– Proper scientific principles used to 4.5 - Forensics Data Acquisition – A more challenging forensics task
analyze Order of volatility • Capture data
the evidence • How long does data stick around? – Use an existing backup file
• Technical and academic qualifications – Some media is much more volatile than – Transfer image over USB
– Competence and qualifications of others • Data
experts – Gather data in order from the most – Phone calls
volatile to – Contact information
Chain of custody less volatile – Text messages
• Control evidence – Email data
– Maintain integrity Disk – Images and movies
• Everyone who contacts the evidence • Copy everything on a storage drive
– Use hashes – Hard drive, SSD, flash drive Firmware
– Avoid tampering • Drive image preparation • Extract the device firmware
• Label and catalog everything – Power down to prevent changes – Rootkits and exploited hardware device
– Digitally tag all items for ongoing – Remove storage drive – A reprogrammed firmware or ROM
documentation • Connect to imaging device • Specific to the platform
– Seal and store – With write-protection – Firmware implementations vary widely
• Forensic clone • Attacker gains access to the device
Recording time offsets – Bit-for-bit copy – Maintains access through OS updates
• The time zone determines how the time – Preserve all data (even the “deleted” • Data discovery
is displayed data) – Exploit data
– Document the local device settings – Firmware functionality
• Different file systems store timestamps Random access memory (RAM) – Real-time data
differently • A difficult target to capture
– FAT: Time is stored in local time – Changes constantly Snapshot
– NTFS: Time is stored in GMT – Capturing data changes the data • Generally associated with virtual
• Record the time offset from the • Memory dump machines (VMs)
operating system – Grab everything in active RAM – A point-in-time system image
– The Windows Registry – Many third-party tools • Incremental between snapshots
– Many different values (daylight saving • Important data – Original image is the full backup
time, – Browsing history – Each snapshot is incremented from the
time change information, etc.) – Clipboard information last
– Encryption keys – Restoring requires the original and all
Event logs – Command history snapshots
• System logs • Contains all files and information about
– Documents important operating system Swap/pagefile a VM
and • Used by different operating systems – Similar to a system image
application events – Slightly different usage in each – Operating system, applications, user
• Export and store for future reference • A place to store RAM when memory is data, etc.
– Filter and parse depleted
• Log store – There’s a lot more space on the storage Cache
– Linux: /var/log drive • Store data for use later
– Windows: Event Viewer – Transfer pages of RAM to a storage drive – Often used to increase performance
• Can also contain portions of an – Many different caches (CPU, disk,
Interviews application Internet, etc.)
• Who might have seen this? – Page out portions that aren’t in use • Can contain specialized data
– You won’t know until you ask • Contains data similar to a RAM dump – CPU cache is very short-term instruction
• Interview and document – Anything active on the system storage
– These folks might not be around later • Some data may never be used
• Not all witness statements are 100% Operating system – Erased after a specified timeframe or
accurate • OS files and data when the cache is full
– Humans are fallible – May have been modified – Browser caches are often long-lived
• Data • Data stored in cloud may not be located – The e-discovery process obtains a
– URL locations in the same country storage drive
– Browser page components (text, – Location of the data center may – Data on the drive is smaller than
images) determine how data can be treated expected
• Location of the data is critical – Forensics experts determine that data
Network – Legal frameworks vary widely between was deleted and attempt to recover the
• Gather information about and from the countries data
network – Some countries don’t allow electronic
– Network connections, packet captures searches outside of their borders Data recovery
• Inbound and outbound sessions • Extract missing data without affecting
– OS and application traffic Data breach notification laws the
• Packet data • Notification laws integrity of the data
– Capture raw network data – If consumer data is breached, the – Requires training and expertise
– May include long-term packet captures consumer must be informed • The recovery process can vary
• Third-party packet captures • Many data breach notification laws – Deleted files
– Firewalls, IPS, etc. – Vary widely across countries and – Hidden data
localities – Hardware or software corruption
Artifacts – If you’re in the cloud, you’re a global – Storage device is physically damaged
• Digital items left behind entity
– Every contact leaves a trace • Notification requirements also vary Non-repudiation
– May not be obvious to access – Type of data breached • Proof of data integrity and the origin of
• Artifact locations – Who gets notified the data
– Log information – How quickly – The data is unchanged and really did
– Flash memory come from the sender
– Prefetch cache files 4.5 - Managing Evidence – Hashing the data
– Recycle Bin Integrity • Authentication that is genuine with high
– Browser bookmarks and logins • Hashing confidence
– Cryptographic integrity verification – The only person who could have sent
4.5 - On-Premises vs. Cloud Forensics – A digital “fingerprint” the data is the sender
Forensics in the cloud • Checksums • Message Authentication Code (MAC)
• Adding complexity to the digital – Protects against accidental changes – The two parties can verify non-
forensics process during transmission repudiation
– Cloud technologies – A relatively simple integrity check • Digital Signature
• Technical challenges – Not designed to replace a hash – The non-repudiation can be publicly
– Devices are not totally in your control • Provenance verified
– There may be limited access – Documentation of authenticity
– Associate data with a specific user – A chain of custody for data handling Strategic intelligence/counterintelligence
• Legal issues – Blockchain technology • Strategic intelligence
– Laws are different around the world – A focus on key threat activity for a
– The rules may not be immediately Preservation domain
obvious • Handling evidence – Business sectors, geographical regions,
Right to audit clauses – Isolate and protect the data countries
• Common to work with business partners – Analyze the data later without any – Gather information from internal threat
– Data sharing alterations reports,
– Outsourcing • Manage the collection process third-party data sources, and other data
• Cloud computing providers – Work from copies inputs
– Can hold all of the data – Manage the data collection from mobile – Determine the threat landscape based
– Manage Internet access devices on the trends
– Are they secure? • Live collection has become an important • Strategic counterintelligence (CI)
• Right-to-audit should be in the contract skill – Prevent hostile intelligence operations
– A legal agreement to have the option to – Data may be encrypted or difficult to – Discover and disrupt foreign intelligence
perform a security audit at any time collect after powering down threats
– Everyone agrees to the terms and • Follow best practices to ensure – Gather threat information on foreign
conditions admissibility of data in court intelligence operations
– Ability to verify security before a breach – What happens now affects the future
occurs E-discovery 5.1 - Security Controls
• Electronic discovery Security controls
Regulatory/jurisdiction – Collect, prepare, review, interpret, and • Security risks are out there
• Cloud computing technology appeared produce electronic documents – Many different types to consider
relatively quickly • E-discovery gathers data required by the • Assets are also varied
– The legal world is scrambling to catch up legal process – Data, physical property, computer
• Forensics professionals must know their – Does not generally involve analysis systems
legal rights – There’s no consideration of intent • Prevent security events, minimize the
– Data in a different jurisdiction may be • Works together with digital forensics impact,
bound by very different regulations and limit the damage
– Security controls GDPR - General Data Protection • National Institute of Standards and
Regulation Technology
Control categories • European Union regulation – Risk Management Framework (RMF)
• Managerial controls – Data protection and privacy for – Mandatory for US federal agencies and
– Controls that address security design individuals in the EU organizations that handle federal data
and implementation – Name, address, photo, email address, • Six step process
– Security policies, standard operating bank details, posts on social networking – Step 1: Categorize - Define the
procedures websites, medical information, a environment
• Operational controls computer’s IP address, etc. – Step 2: Select - Pick appropriate controls
– Controls that are implemented by • Controls export of personal data – Step 3: Implement - Define proper
people – Users can decide where their data goes implementation
– Security guards, awareness programs • Gives individuals control of their – Step 4: Assess - Determine if controls
• Technical controls personal data are working
– Controls implemented using systems – A right to be forgotten – Step 5: Authorize - Make a decision to
– Operating system controls • Site privacy policy authorize a system
– Firewalls, anti-virus – Details all of the privacy rights for a user – Step 6: Monitor - Check for ongoing
compliance
Control types PCI DSS
• Preventive • Payment Card Industry NIST CSF
– Physically control access – Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) • National Institute of Standards and
– Door lock – A standard for protecting credit cards Technology
– Security guard • Six control objectives – Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
– Firewall – Build and maintain a secure network – A voluntary commercial framework
• Detective and • Framework Core
– May not prevent access systems – Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and
– Identifies and records any intrusion – Protect cardholder data Recover
attempt – Maintain a vulnerability management • Framework Implementation Tiers
– Motion detector, program – An organization’s view of cybersecurity
IDS/IPShttps://ProfessorMesser.com – Implement strong access control risk and processes to manage the risk
• Corrective measures • Framework Profile - The alignment of
– Designed to mitigate damage – Regularly monitor and test networks standards, guidelines, and practices to the
– IPS can block an attacker – Maintain an information security policy Framework Core
– Backups can mitigate a ransomware
infection 5.2 - Security Frameworks ISO/IEC frameworks
– A backup site can provide options when Security frameworks • International Organization for
a storm hits • Secure your data. Standardization
• Deterrent – Where do you start? What are the best – International Electrotechnical
– May not directly prevent access practices? Commission
– Discourages an intrusion attempt – If only there was a book. • ISO/IEC 27001
– Warning signs, login banner • Often a complex problem – Standard for an Information Security
• Compensating – Unique organizational requirements Management System (ISMS)
– Doesn’t prevent an attack – Compliance and regulatory • ISO/IEC 27002
– Restores using other means requirements – Code of practice for information security
– Re-image or restore from backup – Many different processes and tools are controls
– Hot site available • ISO/IEC 27701
– Backup power system • Use a security framework – Privacy Information Management
• Physical – Documented processes Systems (PIMS)
– Fences, locks, mantraps – A guide for creating a security program • ISO 31000
– Real-world security – Define tasks and prioritize projects – International standards for risk
management practices
Compliance Center for Internet Security (CIS)
• Compliance • Center for Internet Security SSAE SOC 2 Type I/II
– Meeting the standards of laws, policies, – Critical Security Controls for • The American Institute of Certified
and regulations – Effective Cyber Defense Public Accountants (AICPA) auditing
• A healthy catalog of regulations and – CIS CSC standard Statement on Standards for
laws • Improve cyber defenses Attestation Engagements number 18
– Across many aspects of business and life – Twenty key actions (the critical security (SSAE 18)
– Many are industry-specific or situational controls) • SOC 2 - Trust Services Criteria (security
• Penalties – Categorized for different organization controls)
– Fines, incarceration, loss of employment sizes – Firewalls, intrusion detection, and multi-
• Scope • Designed for implementation - Written factor authentication
– Covers national, territory, or state laws for IT professionals • Type I audit
– Domestic and international – Includes practical and actionable tasks – Tests controls in place at a particular
requirements point in time
NIST RMF • Type II
– Tests controls over a period of at least • Programming languages, runtime – Limit the exposure of sensitive data to
six libraries, etc. third-parties
consecutive months – Usually between the web server
and the database Least privilege
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) – Middleware • Rights and permissions should be set to
• Security in cloud computing • Very specific functionality the bare minimum
– Not-for-profit organization – Disable all unnecessary services – You only get exactly what’s needed to
• Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) • Operating system updates complete your objective
– Cloud-specific security controls – Security patches • All user accounts must be limited
– Controls are mapped to standards, best • File permissions and access controls – Applications should run with minimal
practices, and regulations – Limit rights to what’s required privileges
• Enterprise Architecture – Limit access from other devices • Don’t allow users to run with
– Methodology and tools administrative privileges
– Assess internal IT groups and cloud Network infrastructure devices – Limits the scope of malicious behavior
providers • Switches, routers, firewalls, IPS, etc.
– Determine security capabilities – You never see them, but they’re always Background checks
– Build a roadmap there • Background checks
• Purpose-built devices – Pre-employment screening
5.2 - Secure Configurations – Embedded OS, limited OS access – Verify the applicant’s claims
Secure configurations • Configure authentication – Discover criminal history, workers
• No system is secure with the default – Don’t use the defaults compensation claims, etc.
configurations • Check with the manufacturer – Legalities vary by country
– You need some guidelines to keep – Security updates • Adverse actions
everything safe – Not usually updated frequently – An action that denies employment
• Hardening guides are specific to the – Updates are usually important based on the background check
software or platform – May require extensive documentation
– Get feedback from the manufacturer or 5.3 - Personnel Security – Can also include existing employees
Internet interest group Acceptable use policies (AUP)
– They’ll have the best details • What is acceptable use of company Personnel security procedures
• Other general-purpose guides are assets? • NDA (Non-disclosure agreement)
available online – Detailed documentation – Confidentiality agreement / Legal
– May be documented in the Rules of contract
Web server hardening Behavior – Prevents the use and dissemination of
• Access a server with your browser • Covers many topics confidential information
– The fundamental server on the Internet – Internet use, telephones, computers, • Social media analysis
– Microsoft Internet Information Server, mobile devices, etc. – Gather data from social media
Apache HTTP Server, et al. • Used by an organization to limit legal – Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram
• Huge potential for access issues liability – Build a personal profile
– Data leaks, server access – If someone is dismissed, these are the – Another data point when making a
• Secure configuration well documented reasons why hiring decision
– Information leakage: Banner
information, directory browsing Business policies On-boarding
– Permissions: Run from a non-privileged • Job rotation • Bring a new person into the organization
account, configure file permissions – Keep people moving between – New hires or transfers
– Configure SSL: Manage and install responsibilities • IT agreements need to be signed
certificates – No one person maintains control for – May be part of the employee handbook
– Log files: Monitor access and error logs long periods of time or
• Mandatory vacations a separate AUP
Operating system hardening – Rotate others through the job • Create accounts
• Many and varied - Windows, Linux, iOS, – The longer the vacation, the better – Associate the user with the proper
Android, et al. chance groups
• Updates to identify fraud and departments
– Operating system updates/service – Especially important in high-security • Provide required IT hardware
packs, environments – Laptops, tablets, etc. - Preconfigured
security patches • Separation of duties and ready to go
• User accounts – Split knowledge
– Minimum password lengths and • No one person has all of the details Off-boarding
complexity • Half of a safe combination • All good things… (But you knew this day
– Account limitations – Dual control would come)
• Network access and security • Two people must be present to perform • This process should be pre-planned
– Limit network access the business function – You don’t want to decide how to do
• Monitor and secure • Two keys open a safe (or launch a things at this point
– Anti-virus, anti-malware missile) • What happens to the hardware and the
• Clean desk policy data?
Application server – When you leave, nothing is on your desk
• Account information is usually • Target didn’t segment the vendor – Don’t make decisions based on incorrect
deactivated network data!
– But not always deleted from the corporate – Used with quality management systems,
– The attackers jumped from the vendor i.e., Six Sigma
User training to the – Assess the measurement process
• Gamification Target network – Calculate measurement uncertainty
– Score points, compete with others, • The corporate network was not • Business Partnership Agreement (BPA)
collect badges segmented from point of sale (POS) – Going into business together
• Capture the flag (CTF) terminals – Owner stake
– Security competition – Once on the inside, it was relatively easy – Financial contract
– Hack into a server to steal data (the flag) to get to your credit card numbers – Decision-making agreements
– Can involve highly technical simulations – (110 million card numbers) – Prepare for contingencies
– A practical learning environment
• Phishing simulation Supply chain Product support lifetime
– Send simulated phishing emails • The system involved when creating a • End of life (EOL)
– Make vishing calls product – Manufacturer stops selling a product
– See which users are susceptible to – Involves organizations, people, – May continue supporting the product
phishing attacks activities, and resources – Important for security patches and
without being a victim of phishing • Supply chain assessment updates
• Computer-based training (CBT) – Get a product or service from supplier to • End of service life (EOSL)
– Automated pre-built training customer – Manufacturer stops selling a product
– May include video, audio, and Q&A – Evaluate coordination between groups – Support is no longer available for the
– Users all receive the same training – Identify areas of improvement product
experience – Assess the IT systems supporting the – No ongoing security patches or updates
operation – May have a premium-cost support
Role-based security awareness training – Document the business process changes option
• Before providing access, train your users • New laptops arrive with bundled • Technology EOSL is a significant concern
– Detailed security requirements malware – Security patches are part of normal
• Specialized training – Lenovo, August 2014 through early 2015 operation
– Each user role has unique security – Superfish software added a self-signed
responsibilities root cert (!) Non-disclosure agreement (NDA)
• Also applies to third-parties – Allowed for on-path attacks when • Confidentiality agreement between
– Contractors, partners, suppliers browsing any site, including over HTTPS parties
• Detailed documentation and records – Information in the agreement should
– Problems later can be severe for Business partners not
everyone • Much closer to your data than a vendor be disclosed
– May require direct access • Protects confidential information
5.3 - Third-party Risk Management – May be a larger security concern than an – Trade secrets
Vendors outside hacker – Business activities
• Every organization works with vendors • Often involves communication over a – Anything else listed in the NDA
– Payroll, customer relationship trusted connection • Unilateral or bilateral (or multilateral)
management, – More difficult to identify malicious – On-way NDA or mutual NDA
email marketing, travel, raw materials activity • Formal contract
• Important company data is often shared • Partner risk management should be – Signatures are usually required
– May be required for cloud-based included
services – Requirements for best practices, data 5.3 - Managing Data
• Perform a risk assessment handling, intellectual property Data governance
– Categorize risk by vendor and manage • Include additional security between • Rules, processes, and accountability
the risk partners associated with an organization’s data
• Use contracts for clear understanding – Firewalls and traffic filters – Data is used in the right ways
– Make sure everyone understands the • Data steward
expectations Common agreements – Manages the governance processes
– Use the contract to enforce a secure • Service Level Agreement (SLA) – Responsible for data accuracy, privacy,
environment – Minimum terms for services provided and security
– Uptime, response time agreement, etc. – Associates sensitivity labels to the data
Target credit card breach - November – Commonly used between customers and – Ensures compliance with any applicable
2013 service providers laws and standards
• Every point of sale terminal infected • Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) • Formal rules for data
– A third-party was allowed in through – Both sides agree on the contents – Everyone must know and follow the
lapses in of the memorandum processes
security policy – Usually includes statements of
• A vendor was infected through an email confidentiality Data classification
attachment – Informal letter of intent; not a signed • Identify data types
– The vendor didn’t have or follow a contract – Personal, public, restricted, etc.
security policy for their workstations • Measurement system analysis (MSA) – Use and protect data efficiently
• Associate governance controls to the – Cloud platforms for payroll, enterprise • Have clear policies
classification levels resource planning, etc. – Frequency, duration, installation
– How the data class should be managed • Third-party access to corporate systems process,
• Data compliance – Access can come from anywhere fallback procedures
– Laws and regulations regarding certain • Add additional layers of security • Sometimes extremely difficult to
types of data – 2FA (two factor authentication) implement
– GDPR - General Data Protection – Audit the security posture of third- – It’s hard to change corporate culture
Regulation parties
• Don’t allow account sharing Change control
Data retention – All users should have their own account • A formal process for managing change
• Keep files that change frequently for – Avoid downtime, confusion, and
version control Device accounts mistakes
– Files change often • Access to devices • Nothing changes without the process
– Keep at least a week, perhaps more – Mobile devices – Determine the scope of the change
• Recover from virus infection • Local security – Analyze the risk associated with the
– Infection may not be identified – Device certificate change
immediately – Require screen locks and unlocking – Create a plan
– May need to retain 30 days of backups standards – Get end-user approval
• Often legal requirements for data – Manage through a Mobile Device – Present the proposal to the change
retention Manager (MDM) control board
– Email storage may be required over • Add additional security – Have a backout plan if the change
years – Geography-based doesn’t work
– Some industries must legally store – Include additional authentication factors – Document the changes
certain data types – Associate a device with a user
– Different data types have different Asset management
storage requirements Service accounts • Identify and track computing assets
– Corporate tax information, customer PII, • Used exclusively by services running on – Usually an automated process
tape backups, etc. a computer • Respond faster to security problem
– No interactive/user access (ideally) – You know who, what, and where
5.3 - Credential Policies – Web server, database server, etc. • Keep an eye on the most valuable assets
Credential management • Access can be defined for a specific – Both hardware and data
• All that stands between the outside service • Track licenses
world and – Web server rights and permissions will – You know exactly how many you’ll need
all of the data be • Verify that all devices are up to date
– The data is everything different than a database server – Security patches, anti-malware signature
• Passwords must not be embedded in the • Commonly use usernames and updates, etc.
application passwords
– Everything needs to reside on the – You’ll need to determine the best policy 5.4 - Risk Management Types
server, not the client for Risk assessment
• Communication across the network password updates • Identify assets that could be affected by
should be encrypted Administrator/root accounts an attack
– Authentication traffic should be • Elevated access to one or more systems – Define the risk associated with each
impossible to see – Super user access asset
• Complete access to the system – Hardware, customer data, intellectual
Personnel accounts – Often used to manage hardware, property
• An account on a computer associated drivers, and • Identify threats
with software installation – Loss of data, disruption of services, etc.
a specific person • This account should not be used for • Determine the risk - High, medium, or
– The computer associates the user with a normal low risk
specific identification number administration • Assess the total risk to the organization
• Storage and files can be private to that – User accounts should be used – Make future security plans
user • Needs to be highly secured
– Even if another person is using the same – Strong passwords, 2FA Risk assessments
computer – Scheduled password changes • External threats
• No privileged access to the operating – Outside the organization
system 5.3 - Organizational Policies – Hacker groups, former employees
– Specifically not allowed on a user Change management • Internal threats
account • How to make a change – Employees and partners
• This is the account type most people will – Upgrade software, change firewall – Disgruntled employees
use configuration, modify switch ports • Legacy systems
– Your user community • One of the most common risks in the – Outdated, older technologies
enterprise – May not be supported by the
Third-party accounts – Occurs very frequently manufacturer
• Access to external third-party systems • Often overlooked or ignored – May not have security updates
– Did you feel that bite?
– Depending on the age, may not be easily Audit risk model – New storage requirements, network
accessible • Inherent risk security,
– Impact + Likelihood protect against threats
Multi-party risk – Risk that exists in the absence of • GDPR - General Data Protection
• Breaches involving multiple parties controls Regulation
– Often trusted business relationships – Some models include the existing set of – European Union data protection and
– Events often involve many different controls privacy
parties • Residual risk – Personal data must be protected and
• May 2019 - American Medical Collection – Inherent risk + control effectiveness managed for privacy
Agency – Risk that exists after controls are
– Provided debt collection for many considered Qualitative risk assessment
different – Some models base it on including • Identify significant risk factors
organizations additional controls – Ask opinions about the significance
– Data breach disclosed personal • Risk appetite – Display visually with traffic light grid or
information on 24 million individuals – The amount of risk an organization is similar method
– Twenty-three healthcare organizations willing to take
affected by this single breach Quantitative risk assessment
– A single breach can cause a ripple effect Risk control assessment • Likelihood
• Risk has been determined – Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO)
Risk assessments – Heat maps have been created – How likely is it that a hurricane will hit?
• Intellectual Property (IP) theft • Time to build cybersecurity In Montana? In Florida?
– Theft of ideas, inventions, and creative requirements • SLE (Single Loss Expectancy)
expressions – Based on the identified risks – What is the monetary loss if a single
– Human error, hacking, employees with • Find the gap event occurs?
access, etc. – Often requires a formal audit – Laptop stolen (asset value or AV) =
– Identify and protect IP – Self-assessments may be an option $1,000
– Educate employees and increase • Build and maintain security systems • ALE (Annualized Loss Expectancy)
security based on the requirements – ARO x SLE
• Software compliance/licensing – The organizational risk determines the – Seven laptops stolen a year (ARO) x
– Operational risk with too few licenses proper $1,000 (SLE) = $7,000
– Financial risk with budgeting and over- controls • The business impact can be more than
allocated licenses • Determine if existing controls are monetary
– Legal risk if proper licensing is not compliant or noncompliant – Quantitative vs. qualitative
followed – Make plans to bring everything into
compliance Disaster types
Risk management strategies • Environmental threats
• Acceptance Risk awareness – Tornado, hurricane, earthquake, severe
– A business decision; we’ll take the risk! • A constantly changing battlefield weather
• Risk-avoidance – New risks, emerging risks • Person-made threats
– Stop participating in a high-risk activity – A nearly overwhelming amount of – Human intent, negligence, or error
• Transference information – Arson, crime, civil disorder, fires, riots,
– Buy some cybersecurity insurance – Difficult to manage a defense etc.
• Mitigation • Knowledge is key • Internal and external
– Decrease the risk level – Part of every employee’s daily job role – Internal threats are from employees
– Invest in security systems – Part of the onboarding process for – External threats are from outside the
employees organization
5.4 - Risk Analysis and partners
Evaluating risk • Maintaining awareness 5.4 - Business Impact Analysis
• Risk register – Ongoing group discussions Recovery
– Every project has a plan, but also has – Presentations from law enforcement • Recovery time objective (RTO)
risk – Attend security conferences and – Get up and running quickly
– Identify and document the risk programs – Get back to a particular service level
associated • Recovery point objective (RPO)
with each step Regulations that affect risk posture – How much data loss is acceptable?
– Apply possible solutions to the identified • Many of them – Bring the system back online; how far
risks – Regulations tend to regulate back
– Monitor the results • Regulations directly associated to does data go?
• Risk matrix / risk heat map cybersecurity • Mean time to repair (MTTR)
– View the results of the risk assessment – Protection of personal information, – Time required to fix the issue
– Visually identify risk based on color disclosure of information breaches • Mean time between failures (MTBF)
– Combines the likelihood of an event – Requires a minimum level of – Predict the time between outages
with information security
the potential impact • HIPAA - Health Insurance Portability and Functional recovery plans
– Assists with making strategic decisions Accountability Act • Recover from an outage
– Privacy of patient records – Step-by-step guide
• Contact information – Applications • Almost everything can affect privacy
– Someone is on-call – Personnel – New business relationships, product
– Keep everyone up to date – Equipment updates, website features, service offering
• Technical process – Work environment • Privacy risk needs to be identified in
– Reference the knowledge base each initiative
– Follow the internal processes 5.5 - Privacy and Data Breaches – How could the process compromise
• Recover and test Information life cycle customer privacy?
– Confirm normal operation • Creation and receipt • Advantages
– Create data internally or receive data – Fix privacy issues before they become a
Removing single points of failure from a third-party problem
• A single event can ruin your day • Distribution - Records are sorted and – Provides evidence of a focus on privacy
– Unless you make some plans stored – Avoid data breach
• Network configuration • Use – Shows the importance of privacy to
– Multiple devices (the “Noah’s Ark” of – Make business decisions, create everyone
networking) products
• Facility / Utilities and services Notices
– Backup power, multiple cooling devices • Maintenance • Terms of service
• People / Location – Ongoing data retrieval and data – Terms of use, terms and conditions
– A good hurricane can disrupt personnel transfers (T&C)
travel • Disposition – Legal agreement between service
• There’s no practical way to remove all – Archiving or disposal of data provider and user
points of failure – User must agree to the terms to use the
– Money drives redundancy Consequences service
• Reputation damage • Privacy notice, privacy policy
Disaster recovery plan (DRP) – Opinion of the organization becomes – May be required by law
• Detailed plan for resuming operations negative – Documents the handling of personal
after a disaster – Can have an impact on products or data
– Application, data center, building, services – May provide additional data options and
campus, region, etc. – Can impact stock price contact information
• Extensive planning prior to the disaster • Identity theft
– Backups – Company and/or customers information 5.5 - Data Classifications
– Off-site data replication becomes public Labeling sensitive data
– Cloud alternatives – May require public disclosure • Not all data has the same level of
– Remote site – Credit monitoring costs sensitivity
• Many third-party options • Fines – License tag numbers vs. health records
– Physical locations – Uber • Different levels require different security
– Recovery services • Data breach in 2016 wasn’t disclosed and handling
• Uber paid the hackers $100,000 instead – Additional permissions
Impact • Lawsuit settlement was $148 million – A different process to view
• Life - The most important consideration – Equifax – Restricted network access
• Property - The risk to buildings and • 2017 data breach
assets • Government fines were approximately Data classifications
• Safety - Some environments are too $700 million • Proprietary
dangerous to work • Intellectual Property (IP) theft – Data that is the property of an
• Finance - The resulting financial cost – Stealing company secrets organization
• Reputation – Can put an organization out of business – May also include trade secrets
– An event can cause status or character – Often data unique to an organization
problems Notification • PII - Personally Identifiable Information
• Internal escalation process – Data that can be used to identify an
Mission-essential functions – Breaches are often found by technicians individual
• If a hurricane blew through, what – Provide a process for making those – Name, date of birth, mother’s maiden
functions would be essential to the findings known name,
organization? • External escalation process biometric information
– That’s where you start your analysis – Know when to ask for assistance from • PHI - Protected Health Information
– These are broad business requirements external resources – Health information associated with an
• What computing systems are required – Security experts can find and stop an individual
for these mission-essential business active breach – Health status, health care records,
functions? • Public notifications and disclosures payments for health care, and much more
– Identify the critical systems – Refer to security breach notification • Public / Unclassified
laws – No restrictions on viewing the data
Site risk assessment – All 50 US states, EU, Australia, etc. • Private / Classified / Restricted / Internal
• All locations are a bit different – Delays might be allowed for criminal use only
– Even those designed to be similar investigations – Restricted access, may require a non-
• Recovery plans should consider unique disclosure agreement (NDA)
environments Privacy impact assessment (PIA) • Sensitive - Intellectual property, PII, PHI
• Confidential - Very sensitive, must be • Protects PII • Data protection officer (DPO)
approved to view – And other sensitive data – Responsible for the organization’s data
• Critical - Data should always be available • May only be hidden from view privacy
• Financial information – The data may still be intact in storage – Sets policies, implements processes and
– Internal company financial information – Control the view based on permissions procedures
– Customer financial details • Many different techniques
• Government data – Substituting, shuffling, encrypting,
– Open data masking out, etc.
– Transfer between government entities
– May be protected by law Pseudo-anonymization
• Customer data • Pseudonymization
– Data associated with customers – Replace personal information with
– May include user-specific details pseudonyms
– Legal handling requirements – Often used to maintain statistical
relationships
5.5 - Enhancing privacy • May be reversible
Tokenization – Hide the personal data for daily use or in
• Replace sensitive data with a non- case of breach
sensitive placeholder – Convert it back for other processes
– SSN 266-12-1112 is now 691-61-8539 • Random replacement
• Common with credit card processing – James Messer -> Jack O’Neill -> Sam
– Use a temporary token during payment Carter -> Daniel Jackson
– An attacker capturing the card numbers • Consistent replacements
can’t use them later – James Messer is always converted to
• This isn’t encryption or hashing George Hammond
– The original data and token aren’t
mathematically related 5.5 - Data Roles and Responsibilities
– No encryption overhead Data responsibility
• High-level data relationships
Data minimization – Organizational responsibilities, not
• Minimal data collection always technical
– Only collect and retain necessary data • Data owner
• Included in many regulations – Accountable for specific data, often a
– HIPAA has a “Minimum Necessary” rule senior officer
– GDPR - “Personal data shall be – VP of Sales owns the customer
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relationship data
relation to the purpose or purposes for – Treasurer owns the financial information
which they are processed.”
• Some information may not be required Data roles
– Do you need a telephone number or • Data controller
address? – Manages the purposes and means by
• Internal data use should be limited which
– Only access data required for the task personal data is processed
• Data processor
Anonymization – Processes data on behalf of the data
• Make it impossible to identify individual controller
data – Often a third-party or different group
from a dataset • Payroll controller and processor
– Allows for data use without privacy – Payroll department (data controller)
concerns defines
• Many different anonymization payroll amounts and timeframes
techniques – Payroll company (data processor)
– Hashing, masking, etc. processes payroll
• Convert from detailed customer and stores employee information
purchase data
– Remove name, address, change phone Additional data roles
number to ### ### #### • Data custodian/steward
– Keep product name, quantity, total, and – Responsible for data accuracy, privacy,
sale date and security
• Anonymization cannot be reversed – Associates sensitivity labels to the data
– No way to associate the data to a user – Ensures compliance with any applicable
laws
Data masking and standards
• Data obfuscation – Manages the access rights to the data
– Hide some of the original data – Implements security controls

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