The United States and Latin America, 1945–2007

Introduction: In the East/ West division and competition (because russia was not able to
effect far places) during 1940s Central and South America was not affected from this division
and USA was effective in the area.
In 1980 Ronald Regan was quoting Truman Doctrine1 to fight against communism in Central
America. Except Cuba, the effect of Russia was limited in the area but Latin America was becoming
one of the hottest cold war area.

The Monroe Doctrine2 was justifying American economic and political dominance in the
Western Hemisphere during the first half of the 20th century. The United States exerted
control over its Central American neighbors through direct intervention or local dictators such
as the Somozas in Nicaragua, Batista in Cuba, or Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, for their
own economic and political benefit, until the early 1930s.
Although American troops were not present in South American countries, their economies
were heavily dependent on the United States. During the Second World War, the removal of
serious challengers to Washington's hegemony, such as Britain, Germany, or Japan, from
Latin American markets only increased American influence. After the Second World War, the
United States realized that it could no longer assume control over the troubled continent of
South America, where economic and social upheaval was widespread and American
dominance, referred to as "Yankee imperialism," was often seen as the primary cause of
pervasive inequality.
perception of military dictators in Washington in the post-war years was different. While they
were previously seen as the only force capable of ensuring stability in Latin America, they
became targets of popular uprisings due to economic inequality, anti-Americanism,
nationalism, and socialism. This created a problem for American policy-makers as they faced
calls for removing the "yoke of American imperialism." To maintain their dominance, they
employed covert or overt, economic or military responses in the region.
Hemispheric unity, internal dislocation
Latin America countries did not hold victory parades in 1945 due to their limited participation
in World War II. However, they had high expectations as they played a significant role in
supplying raw materials and formally joined the Allied cause. The war also solidified
American dominance in the Western Hemisphere as it became difficult for Latin America to
trade with other parts of the world. The power of countries that could challenge American
supremacy in the region was destroyed or weakened(England, Germany, Japan). As a result,
the Monroe Doctrine's dominance had never been greater by 1945.
clash between America's regional interests in Latin America and the internationalism of the
United Nations did not affect inter-American relations. In 1945, a pan-American conference
in Chapultepec, Mexico, foreshadowed the formation of a post-war military alliance in the
1
Truman Doctrine The policy of American president Harry S. Truman, as advocated in his address to Congress
on 12 March 1947, to provide military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Subsequently used to justify aid
to any country perceived to be threatened by communism
2
Monroe Doctrine The doctrine declared by President James Monroe in 1823 in which he announced that the
United States would not tolerate intervention by the European Powers in the affairs of the Western
Hemisphere.
Western Hemisphere. Later that year, the US advocated for Articles 51-54 to be added to the
UN Charter, giving regional bodies the right to handle crises without external intervention. In
1947, the American republics formed a collective defense pact known as the Rio Treaty3,
creating a regional institution dominated by the United States that legitimized American
intervention. This allowed the US to combine its oldest foreign policy principle (the Monroe
Doctrine) with its new internationalist focus.

The Organization of American States (OAS)4 – a regional body established to settle inter-
American disputes – was launched in 1948 and formally established in 1951.
Despite the formalized treaty structure, Latin American nationalism grew beneath the surface
and led to an increase in anti-Americanism due to high poverty, illiteracy, inadequate health
care, and population growth. Many blamed the structure of dependency and the dominance of
American-based multinational companies for the inequality. Washington's support for right-
wing dictatorships also fueled antipathy towards the US in the area
In 1950, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Latin America was one-seventh of that of the
United States, despite having roughly the same population size. Latin America accounted for
28% of American exports and 35% of US imports. In the Caribbean basin, the US share of
exports of countries such as Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua was between 70 and 80%.
These statistics illustrate the dependency and inequality in the inter-American relationship,
with the economically weaker "South" being dependent on the prosperous "North".
The emergence of the Cold War contributed to American domination over Latin America, but
during the early post-war years, recovery efforts in Europe and the civil war in China forced
Washington to focus on resuscitating Japan's economy, leaving limited resources available for
aid to South or Central America. The political stability provided by strong military dictators
was relied upon to keep the specter of communism in check, and a Marshall Plan5 for Latin
America was deemed unnecessary for national security purposes. Despite acknowledging the
long-term difficulties of this approach, American observers believed the best way to contain
communism in the Western Hemisphere was to rely on locals who saw their interests best
served by continued dependency on the United States.
In 1950, the United States faced a serious threat from communism, and one of the key
architects of the policy of containment6, George Kennan, argued that the US needed to take

3
Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) Signed on 2 September 1947, and originally
ratified by all twenty-one American republics. Under the treaty, an armed attack or threat of aggression against
a signatory nation, whether by a member nation or some other power, will be considered an attack against all.
4
Organization of American States (OAS) An organization formed in 1948 for the purpose of coordinated action
in economic, political and military matters. Its members include all countries in the Western Hemisphere.
5
Marshall Plan Officially known as the European Recovery Programme (ERP). Initiated by American Secretary
of State George C. Marshall’s 5 June 1947 speech and administered by the Economic Co-operation
Administration (ECA). Under the ERP the participating countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and West
Germany) received more than $12 billion between 1948 and 1951
6
Containment : The term coined by George Kennan for the American, and broadly Western, policy towards the
Soviet Union (and communism in general). The overall idea was to contain the USSR (that is, keep it within its
current borders) with the hope that internal division, failure or political evolution might end the perceived
threat from what was considered a chronically expansionist force
the threat seriously and not be too hesitant in fighting it. Kennan's memorandum reflected the
general US attitude towards Latin American political systems, with the Cold War beginning
to dominate American thinking about Latin American problems. Kennan also reflected the
traditions of the Monroe Doctrine, which emphasized the need (and assumed right) to defend
American interests in the Western Hemisphere against an "alien" force, specifically
communism. Kennan used the example of Guatemala, where communism appeared to be
gaining ground, to illustrate this argument.

From 1931 to 1944, Jorge Ubico governed Guatemala as a typical Latin American dictator,
suppressing labor organizations and political dissent while ignoring the native Indian
population. Ubico maintained close ties with the United States and the United Fruit Company,
Guatemala's largest landowner. After Ubico was forced to resign in 1944, Guatemala held
presidential elections, and Juan José Arévalo, a professor of literature and philosophy, was
elected. During his six-year rule, Arévalo championed political, social, and economic reform,
but General Ponce accused him of being a communist. The United States did not support
Ponce's requests for intervention, fearing it would disrupt hemispheric unity. However,
Arévalo's reform efforts and Ponce's warnings of "Moscow's growing influence" in
Guatemala contributed to the thinking behind George Kennan's summary of the need to
contain communism in Latin America.
Presidenct Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, a military officer who became president of Guatemala in
1951 could not finish his time as president. Arbenz implemented reforms, including
progressive taxation and social welfare programs, and expropriated non-cultivated land owned
by the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which led to the company's hostility towards him. The
UFCO launched a lobbying effort in the US to portray Arbenz as a communist and Guatemala
as a breeding ground for Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere. The Eisenhower
administration approved a CIA plan to overthrow Arbenz in 1953, and American-trained
Guatemalan exiles were deployed to training camps in Nicaragua and Honduras. The US also
initiated a resolution in the OAS declaring communist domination of any state in the Western
Hemisphere a threat to the security of all member states, which was passed with Guatemala as
the lone objector. The US had cut off all assistance to Guatemala by this time
The situation in Guatemala escalated quickly, as Arbenz believed that a campaign to
overthrow his government was underway and turned to the Soviet bloc for arms. In May
1954, a Swedish ship carrying Czech-made weapons arrived in Guatemala. The following
month, Castillo Armas and his group attacked from Honduras while American planes bombed
Guatemala City. Arbenz fled, and Armas ruled Guatemala until his assassination in 1957.
Under Armas, the UFCO lands were returned, left-wing critics were imprisoned, and the
Guatemalan rulers became loyal supporters of the US. In the early 1960s, Guatemala became
a training ground for another CIA force of Latin American exiles, the Cubans who were
preparing to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime.
Despite the success of the CIA and its director Allen Dulles in overthrowing Arbenz, the
operation did little to quell the growing criticism of the US throughout Latin America. To
many intellectuals, students, and others in Latin America, the operation in Guatemala
confirmed that the real source of the region's economic and social problems lay in the US.
The links between the CIA, Armas, and UFCO became part of folklore and added to the
growing anti-American sentiment among various left-wing groups demanding social and
economic reform. The slogan "Yankee go home" became widespread in the region.
Vice-President Richard Nixon experienced the growth of anti-Americanism during his tour of
South America in April to May 1958. In Venezuela, Nixon felt the full force of regional anti-
Americanism when the US provided asylum for the country's recently deposed dictator and
his chief of police. Nixon's motorcade was surrounded by hostile crowds, and he narrowly
escaped before actual shooting broke out. This incident brought home the unpopularity of US
policies in the region and convinced the Eisenhower administration that the threat of
communism in Latin America was growing.
The United States responded to the growing anti-Americanism in Latin America by increasing
its aid programs, focusing on military aid to counter the threat of communism. However, this
approach failed to address the demands of Latin American nationalism, including an end to
American interference in their internal affairs and increased control over raw materials. In
1959, the United States supported thekğ establishment of the Inter-American Development
Bank7 and pledged $500 million for projects to be managed by the new body. But, the same
year saw further problems with widespread riots and demonstrations in Panama against
American ownership of the Canal Zone, and the overthrow of the American-supported
dictator Fulgencio Batista in Cuba.
The Cuban Revolution
In the late 1950s, many did not expect Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba to last into the 21st
century. The location of the island, being only 150 kilometers or 90 miles south of Florida,
made it a unique concern for American foreign policy. As Theodore Roosevelt had stated
earlier, the United States would not willingly allow Cuba to be dominated by a foreign power,
especially a hostile one. Additionally, the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala
in 1954 was a reminder of the American commitment to maintaining its control over countries
immediately south of its border.
Castro was keen to avoid the same fate as Arbenz of Guatemala , but he knew that his
domestic popularity was heavily dependent on the anti-Americanism of the 'Fidelista'
revolution8. Moreover, Cuba could not become truly independent if he did not take active
measures to reduce the control of American financiers and corporations on the country's
economic and political affairs. Initially, Castro implemented only partial nationalization of
foreign interests while making overtures(Asked for meeting and discuss) to Washington.
However, when the Eisenhower administration ignored these invitatios, Castro began to move
closer to Moscow. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, who wanted to build on his image
as a promoter of wars of national liberation, offered economic assistance to Cuba. Castro
responded by buying oil from the USSR. When American companies refused to refine the oil,
he retaliated by nationalizing their refineries and took similar actions against other American
interests.
The Soviet support, nationalization of American business interests, and domestic pressure to
eliminate the communism near the Florida coast prompted both Eisenhower and Kennedy
7
Inter-American Development Bank Organized in 1959 to foster the economic development of the Western
Hemisphere. It is mainly funded by the United States.
8
Fidelistas: The name used for the Cuban revolutionaries under Fidel Castro’s leadership. After a long guerrilla
campaign the Fidelistas eventually toppled the Batista regime on 1 January 1959.
administrations to initiate unsuccessful actions to remove Castro's regime. As early as
November 1959, the Eisenhower administration had concluded that Castro's regime had to be
overthrown. In March 1960, Eisenhower authorized the CIA to train Cuban exiles through an
executive order, and Washington imposed a complete trade embargo on Cuba.
In April 1961, the Cuban-American hostility reached its peak with the Bay of Pigs9 invasion.
Based on the successful model used in Guatemala seven years earlier, the CIA planned to
train a force of Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro's regime by invading their homeland. The
plan was put together during the last months of the Eisenhower administration and inherited
by the new president, John F. Kennedy, who had used strong rhetoric about Cuba during the
presidential campaign. Consequently, on April 16, 1961, a CIA-trained force of 1,500
guerrillas landed at the Bay of Pigs, 125 miles south of Havana. However, faced with
international criticism for allowing American planes to engage in bombing attacks to assist
the invaders, Kennedy on the second day of the operation canceled any further air support. As
a result, the small Cuban air force quickly destroyed the ships carrying vital ammunition
supplies for the invaders. Stranded without adequate supplies and unable to gather significant
indigenous support, the invaders were either captured or killed by April 19.
The Bay of Pigs invasion demonstrated the United States' hostility towards Cuba, even though
it failed. The Kennedy administration attempted to overthrow Castro in other ways, including
through the CIA's failed Operation Mongoose(assasination of Castro). In response, Castro
sought support from the USSR, which resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. While the
crisis had positive outcomes for Cuba, such as the Kennedy administration's pledge not to use
force against the regime, negative effects included increased economic and political pressure
from the US and Cuba's isolation from the Western Hemisphere.

❚ The Alliance for Progress

The Bay of Pigs invasion showed that military intervention was a short-term solution to the
problems of anti-Americanism and nationalism in Latin America. The Kennedy
administration recognized the potential for revolution in the region and launched a
development aid program in the spring of 1961 to counter Soviet influence and prevent
another Cuba.
In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration recognized the need for increased economic
aid to Latin America and launched an ambitious aid program called the Alliance for
Progress10. The program aimed to modernize the region and counter the threat of Soviet-style
communism. Kennedy emphasized that poverty was the major problem in the region and
called for a cooperative effort to address basic needs such as housing, employment,
healthcare, and education. His speech announcing the program drew comparisons to the
9
Bay of Pigs The site on 17 April 1961 of an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles opposed to the
Castro regime. It had the support of the American government and the CIA was heavily involved in its planning.
By 20 April most exiles were either killed or captured. The failed invasion was the first major foreign policy act
of the Kennedy administration and provoked anti-American demonstrations in Latin America and Europe and
further embittered American–Cuban relations.
10
Alliance for Progress The American assistance programme for Latin America begun in 1961, which called for
an annual increase of 2.5 per cent in per capita income, the establishment of democratic governments, more
equitable income distribution, land reform, and economic and social planning. Latin American countries
(excluding Cuba) pledged $80 billion over ten years, while the United States pledged $20 billion. After a decade
of mixed results, the Alliance was disbanded in 1973.
Marshall Plan and echoed George Marshall's call for a campaign against hunger, poverty, and
chaos in Europe.
The Alliance for Progress was officially launched in August 1961 in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
with all Latin American countries except Cuba in attendance. The program committed $20
billion of American funds for development over the following decade, with recipient countries
expected to match the American aid effort. The Alliance aimed to address economic
inequality, poor living conditions, inadequate healthcare, and high levels of illiteracy in Latin
American countries through trade, aid, and cooperation. Although the United States did not
intend to impose full-scale democracy on the countries south of its borders, political change
was a requirement for receiving aid. The program aimed to create a substantial Latin
American middle class, which would decrease the need for military dictatorships as protection
against communism and ultimately transform the Western Hemisphere into a bastion of
modernized liberal democracy.
The Kennedy administration established the Alliance for Progress in response to the Cuban
Revolution and the growing relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 1961, Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev pledged support for national liberation movements, including
economic assistance to Cuba, which added to the urgency of the situation. The Alliance aimed
to prevent further revolutions like Cuba by addressing the social and economic circumstances
that led to the revolution. Despite being popular in Latin America, the practical
implementation of the program faced difficulties due to vested interests and the fact that it
offered only a long-term solution to structural problems. The inability to achieve immediate
results led American policy-makers to increasingly rely on direct and covert intervention to
maintain stability in the region.
Despite the hopes of modernization theory11, social engineering was generally opposed by
authorities in many recipient countries, as well as American governmental bureaucracies and
private firms with significant investments in Latin America. The United States abandoned the
initial requirement that aid was to be tied to political reform in order to accommodate local
interests, resulting in corruption and opposition to land reform and progressive taxation.
Political change was necessary for the Alliance for Progress to succeed, but American
officials were not interested in working against traditional elites and Congress banned the use
of American funds for land redistribution to the poor. The lack of an effective master plan and
a coherent overall organizational structure made the Alliance for Progress a half-hearted
effort.
American businesses were focused on preserving the stability provided by local rulers and
were not interested in supporting policies that would increase wages and improve the social
status of cheap labor in countries like Guatemala. American investors encouraged local
landowners to use Alliance funds to develop export crops, such as coffee, rather than staple
foods like beans. This led to large profits for local elites and American investors but resulted
in inadequate food supplies in Latin America.

11
modernization’ theory: The idea that rapid economic development is achieved by a state going through a
‘take-off’ stage in which an entrepreneurial class and high investment in economic growth play a crucial part.
The theory is closely associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economist Walt Rostow,
who served in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
An additional problem faced by the Alliance for Progress - a population explosion. While
infant death rates improved, the Roman Catholic Church, the dominant religion in Latin
America, resisted any plans for birth control. Thus, economic expansion and improvements in
living conditions had little effect on regions with an average annual population growth
exceeding 2.5% per year. The Alliance for Progress failed to meet its goal of halving infant
deaths by the end of the 1960s, and in 1968, the death rate for children under one year of age
remained high in several countries, including Peru, Chile, and Guatemala. In the case of
Guatemala, the death rate had actually increased, but the population continued to grow.
Alliance for Progress failed to achieve its goal of an annual GDP growth rate of 5.5% by the
mid-1960s. Only Nicaragua could boast such a rate due to the stranglehold of the Somoza
family, which prevented new wealth from trickling down to the majority of the population.
Other countries' GDP growth rates in the first half of the 1960s varied from 1.6% in Colombia
to 3.7% in El Salvador. Additionally, the benefits of this modest growth mainly benefited
those who already had wealth, as only $2 of every $100 of new income generated in the 1960s
trickled down to the poorest one-fifth of the population.
Failure of the Alliance for Progress in reducing the appeal of revolutionary ideas during the
1950s and 1960s. was visible. This failure led to the emergence of almost thirty different
revolutionary and guerrilla groups, which challenged the existing political power structures in
many countries. While some, such as Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, were successful in seizing
power, most remained a marginalized but constant threat to their country’s internal stability.
This posed a significant threat to the American point of view, as several Cuban
revolutionaries attempted to export their movement to the rest of the Western Hemisphere.
The most famous attempt was made by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, who organized the so-called
foco group in the Bolivian highlands in the mid-1960s.
Despite the idealistic language used by the Alliance for Progress, both the US and Latin
American governments responded to the spread of revolutionary movements with force. The
US provided increasing military aid while many Latin American governments actively
repressed any signs of discontent and hunted down guerrillas. Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, who
was unable to gain the mass support he had hoped for, was killed in October 1967. The
Johnson administration supported a military coup in Brazil in 1964 due to concerns over the
leftward shift in the country, and was even willing to send troops there if necessary. The result
for Brazil was two decades of military rule, with democratic elections not occurring until
1985.
In the 1960s, the United States did not hesitate to intervene directly in Latin American affairs.
In 1965, 20,000 American marines landed in the Dominican Republic, marking the largest
American intervention in the Caribbean since the 1920s. This return of "gunboat diplomacy"
had been brewing for some time. In May 1961, following the assassination of the American-
supported military dictator Rafael Trujillo, the Kennedy administration, fresh from the Bay of
Pigs fiasco and fearing "another Cuba" on its watch, had dispatched a naval force to the
Dominican capital, Santo Domingo. Additionally, the US had boosted the Council of State
that ruled the Dominican Republic through extensive economic aid and assistance to the local
security forces, and by training the Dominican army in counter-insurgency methods. After
presidential elections in late 1962, journalist-politician Juan Bosch ruled the country from
January to September 1963, at which point he succumbed to a military coup and took refuge
in Puerto Rico. General Donald Reid Cabral's presidency ended on April 24, 1965, when a
coalition of Bosch supporters and young officers set up a rival government. The Dominican
Republic, specifically its military forces, was now divided between the Constitutionalists
(who called for the return of Bosch) and the Loyalists (who worked to restore a military junta)
The Johnson administration faced a dilemma regarding the Dominican Republic. They did not
want to take a side or allow a civil war to break out, which could result in the election of a
left-wing politician or Cuban/Soviet intervention. The solution was to install a provisional
junta, restore stability, and hold elections while ensuring that undesired candidates did not
win. In 1965, the US sent marines to the Dominican Republic, marking the return of
interventionism as an official American policy option. Many charged that "gunboat
diplomacy" had been revived.
-------Part 2Revolutionaries and reformers from Chile to Nicaragua

Despite the Alliance for Progress and the return of gunboat diplomacy, anti-Americanism and
revolutionary ideas continued to spread in Latin America. The US was perceived as the chief
obstacle to true independence because of their support for ruling elites and their slow response
to the demands of a growing population. However, as the US became increasingly embroiled
in the Vietnam War, the likelihood of another intervention in the Dominican Republic became
less likely. By the 1970s, although Latin American demands for change continued, the US
was constrained from overt intervention by the need to avoid getting involved in another
guerrilla war.
In 1970, Salvador Allende, the leader of the Unidad Popular movement supported by both
communists and socialists, was elected as president in Chile. The election was very close, and
Allende won a narrow plurality of the votes (36.6%) but did not have the majority required to
become president automatically. The decision was transferred to the Chilean National
Congress, which had previously favored the candidate who won the most votes. In October
1970, the Congress confirmed Allende as the president of Chile, adhering to this established
civic tradition. The US was reluctant to use American troops in Chile, demonstrating a shift in
policy towards non-intervention.

The Nixon administration was outraged when Salvador Allende was confirmed as president of
Chile in 1970, despite their efforts to prevent it through schemes involving bribes and
clandestine maneuvers. The administration adopted a longer-term strategy to bring down
Allende and install a friendly government in Chile. After three years of economic pressure
and generous support to Allende's opponents, the Chilean military assumed command of the
country in September 1973, led by General Augusto Pinochet. The junta launched a brutal
crackdown on Marxism, resulting in the deaths and disappearances of at least 3,000 Chileans
and foreign nationals, detention and torture of scores of others, raids on socialist and
communist party headquarters, dissolution of labor unions, and close government surveillance
of universities. This demonstrated the Nixon administration's willingness to engage in covert
operations and their disregard for democratic processes in foreign countries.
The concern of the Nixon administration about a democratically elected socialist government
in Chile was not limited to its potential economic or strategic impact. Rather, it was a concern
about the political implications of such a government for the Western Hemisphere. The fear
was that if a socialist government could be successful in Chile, it could serve as a model for
other countries in the region and undermine the American-led capitalist system. The concern
was not just about Chile, but about the potential spread of socialist ideas and influence in the
region. In this sense, the Nixon administration saw Chile as a potential threat to American
interests and the stability of the region. As a result, it was determined to bring down the
Allende government and prevent the rise of a socialist alternative in the Western Hemisphere.
The overthrow of Chilean President Allende in 1973 did not fix the issues in inter-American
relations, similar to the case in Guatemala in the 1950s. Allende became a martyr for those in
Latin America who blamed the United States for their economic and social problems. Despite
the growth in American investment and trade with Latin American countries during the Cold
War, the region's relative economic importance to the United States declined over time. For
example, in 1950, Latin America received 37% of all American direct investment abroad, but
by 1990, that figure was only about 10%. Similarly, American exports to Latin America
declined from 28% in 1950 to 15% in the mid-1970s, where it remained through the 1980s.
Despite Latin America's decreasing economic significance to the United States in the 1970s
and 1980s, it did not result in any positive outcomes for the continent. In fact, the economic
growth rates declined and became negative in the early 1980s. The region's external debt also
increased rapidly, such as Brazil's external debt, which more than quadrupled between 1975
and 1985. The declining economic significance of Latin America to the United States also did
not lead to a more relaxed political attitude in Washington. The call to rise against "Yankee
imperialism" remained as strong in the 1970s as it was in the 1950s, and the fate of socialist
reformers like Allende meant that guerrilla movements, rather than democratic socialism,
became the center of anti-American resentment.
While there were many guerrilla movements challenging governmental authority in South
America during the 1970s and 1980s, the ones that gained Washington's attention were based
in Central America. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador,
which formed in the late 1970s by several groups, challenged the ruling civilian-military junta
throughout the 1980s, resulting in over 80,000 deaths. In Guatemala, various guerrilla groups
also continued a similar struggle. However, it was the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua in
1979 that provoked the United States and led to a prolonged, mostly secret war.
In July 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, led by Daniel Ortega, brought down
one of the longest-standing dictatorships in Latin America by defeating the Somoza family,
who had ruled Nicaragua since the 1930s with consistent support from the United States. By
the 1970s, however, the Somoza family had lost the support of both the local oligarchy and
the general population. Despite this, the US continued to support the Somozas almost until
their downfall, and the Carter administration refused to engage in talks with the Sandinistas
until they were on the brink of seizing power. This stance did little to win the US any support
in Central America, where the Somozas were known for their human rights abuses and had
few rivals in that regard.
The Sandinistas, like Castro's Cuba, were able to take power due to fortunate circumstances.
Initially, they did not align with the Soviet bloc but pursued a policy of non-alignment while
focusing on social justice and a mixed economy. Between 1979 and 1982, Nicaragua received
aid from various sources, with the Soviet bloc providing roughly 20% of aid and foreign
trade, while other Latin American countries provided more than 30%, and Mexico giving
twice as much aid as the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the early 1980s, Nicaragua was not
another Cuba, but the Sandinistas were attempting to avoid dependence on the US by
diversifying their external ties.
In 1981, the Reagan administration was alarmed by the threat of "communist infiltration" in
America's backyard, particularly from the "Moscow-Havana axis" promoting the creation of
"Cuba-model states". The administration moved rhetorically towards a policy of global
containment, and Reagan's Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, claimed that the Soviets had a
"hit list" of Central American states, with Nicaragua and El Salvador at the top.
The Reagan administration perceived that Moscow had targeted Central America for
revolution, leading to a policy of eradication in El Salvador. The administration supported the
right-wing opposition to the left-wing FMLN rebels, including the infamous death squads,
and ensured that José Napoleón Duarte was elected in the presidential election. The civil war
continued through to the late 1980s until a peace treaty with the rebels was signed in early
1992, ending the twelve-year conflict. The FMLN demobilized, participated in the 1994
elections, and terrorism and violence greatly decreased. However, El Salvador's land
redistribution program was implemented slowly, and the country's economy continued to pay
the price of decades of turmoil.
In addition to supporting the right-wing opposition in El Salvador, the Reagan administration
worked to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua by cutting off all foreign aid in 1981 and
imposing an economic embargo in 1985. Nicaraguans responded by inviting Cuban medical
specialists and teachers, as well as military advisers. Despite a 1982 Congressional resolution
forbidding the Reagan administration from trying to overthrow the Sandinistas, the CIA
provided extensive funding to the Contras, an anti-Sandinista force based in Honduras and
Costa Rica, and by the mid-1980s, the Contras were conducting extensive raids into
Nicaragua. Although the American link to the Contras became apparent, the Reagan
administration continued to channel money to the rebels via private organizations, and in
1985-86, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North funnelled profits from a secret arms deal with Iran
to the Contras in a spectacular and bizarre case that almost led to impeachment hearings
against Reagan.

In the 1980s, the Sandinistas turned to Cuba and the Soviet Union for help due to political
tensions. However, this move led to negative consequences as the United States established
clear links between Managua, Havana, and Moscow. As a result, Reagan was able to secure
$100 million from Congress to fund humanitarian aid for the Contras. Additionally, Latin
American countries proposed peace initiatives, but they were ignored by the US, including a
plan by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez in 1987 for a ceasefire and national
reconciliation.
After the Reagan administration left office, fears of a communist conspiracy in Central
America were proven to be overblown as the Soviet bloc collapsed. In February 1989, a
meeting of five Central American presidents produced the "Tesoro Beach Accord," calling for
free elections and the disbanding of the Contras. The Sandinistas agreed to allow opposition
groups to operate, and an extensively monitored election in February of the following year
resulted in the National Opposition Union headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro soundly
defeating Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. After serving as president for the previous five
years, Ortega accepted the result, and fighting finally ceased in Nicaragua after a prolonged
civil war that claimed at least 30,000 lives.
Guatemala had been dealing with intermittent civil war between the government and leftist
opposition groups since the overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954. In 1986, a civilian
government headed by Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo took office, which was succeeded by
one led by Jorge Serrano Elías in 1991. However, ironically, a peace agreement was only
signed in 1996 after the military deposed Serrano and allowed the inauguration of de Leon
Carpio, the former attorney general for human rights, in 1993. This ended the longest civil
war in Latin American history, which had left approximately 200,000 Guatemalans dead over
three-and-a-half decades. In 1997, UNESCO awarded the new Guatemalan president and the
guerrilla movement leader the Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize, echoing general hopes for a
more peaceful future. As the Cold War ended, several Central American countries moved
towards the challenging but less violent phase of national reconciliation.
Into the new millennium: an age of uncertainty
In the 1980s, it was widely believed that the United States was losing its dominant position in the
Western Hemisphere. The revolutions in Central America, the growing independence of Latin
American economies, and America's reluctance to intervene abroad in the post-Vietnam era
appeared to be bringing an end to the era of the Monroe Doctrine. Statistics showed that American
trade and direct investment in the Western Hemisphere had been in constant decline since the
1950s. Even the Reagan administration was hesitant to intervene openly in places other than
Grenada. The survival of a communist regime in Cuba also added to this perception. By the end of
the Cold War, it seemed that Latin America was destined for a new era of independence and perhaps
prosperity, which would ultimately result in the diminishing influence of the United States in the
southern half of the Western Hemisphere.

Contrary to earlier predictions, it became evident in the 1990s that Latin America remained
economically dependent on the United States. This was partly due to the long-standing wealth
disparity between the two regions, with the United States having a GDP seven times higher
than all of Latin America combined. The population of Latin America had also grown
significantly larger than that of the United States. As a result, Latin America remained
relatively poor and overpopulated, leading to large-scale illegal migration towards the north.
Despite the decline in American trade with the region in the 1970s and 1980s, the United
States was still the largest single trading partner of all Latin American countries in 1990.
Although Japan and the European Union made some relative gains in the 1990s, investment
by the United States remained twice as high as that of its two major competitors combined.
Most significantly, the United States continued to wield preponderant political influence in
the Western Hemisphere throughout the first post-Cold War decade
The post-Cold War era in the Western Hemisphere began with an American military
intervention. In 1989, 13,000 American troops, along with a similarly sized group that
permanently guarded American rights in the Panama Canal area, captured Manuel Noriega,
the leader of the Panamanian Defense Forces who had earlier declared himself the chief of
government. Noriega had been convicted for money-laundering and drug-trafficking by a US
federal court in Florida but had refused to leave Panama. The Bush administration launched
"Operation Just Cause," identifying Noriega as a symbol of the illegal drug trade, without
consulting the member states of the OAS. While there were protests throughout Latin
America, the American public generally cheered the intervention as a victory in the so-called
"war on drugs," and the United States was able to wield its power effectively and unilaterally.
However, Noriega's removal did little to address the real problem as the drug trade from Latin
America to the United States continued to flourish throughout the 1990s
Under these circumstances, President Clinton authorized a military intervention in Haiti,
which led to the restoration of Aristide to power in October 1994. The intervention was not
without controversy, as many in Latin America saw it as an example of US interventionism,
and the OAS had not authorized it. Nevertheless, the intervention was generally supported in
the United States, where there was concern about the influx of refugees and a desire to
promote democracy in Haiti. The intervention also demonstrated the continued willingness of
the United States to use military force to achieve its foreign policy goals in the Western
Hemisphere.
two instances of American intervention in the Caribbean region - Panama and Haiti. In both
cases, the justification for intervention differed from the Cold War era and was framed as a
need to uphold democracy and Wilsonian internationalism12. The Bush administration cited
the war on drugs in Panama, while the Clinton administration was concerned about the
prospect of a large influx of refugees from Haiti. American military pressure eventually led to
the step aside of military rulers in Haiti and the acceptance of the return of Aristide. American
troops arrived to restore order and were replaced by a Canadian-led UN peacekeeping force.
However, political instability and economic chaos continued in Haiti. These interventions
demonstrated American regional hegemony and its capability for military action against
smaller countries
the relationship between the United States and Latin America has changed in the post-Cold
War era. While the United States remains a dominant presence in the region, its influence has
declined as Latin American countries have become less dependent on the United States
economically and politically. Anti-American sentiment has increased in the region, in part due
to the historically unequal relationship between the United States and its southern neighbors.
The rise of leaders like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela has challenged American influence and
promoted alternative economic and political models. Despite these changes, it remains to be
seen whether conflict between the United States and Latin America will continue in the
future.

12
Wilsonian internationalism Woodrow Wilson’s notion, outlined in his so-called fourteen points, of trying to
create a new world society, which would be governed by the self-determination of peoples, be free from secret
diplomacy and wars, and have an association of nations to maintain international justice