Africa: decolonization and independence, 1945–2007

In most 20th-century historical accounts, references to Africa are often scarce. The prevailing
Western perception of the continent as trapped in a cycle of corruption, poverty, and political
violence has led to its neglect in international politics. However, this simplistic view overlooks Africa's
significant role in key themes of the latter half of the century: the end of European imperialism, the
underdevelopment debate, and the influence of the Cold War paradigm. Africa has undergone
substantial political transformations since 1945. Within two decades, most of the continent gained
independence from European colonial powers, ultimately abolishing white minority rule with the
collapse of apartheid in 1994. Additionally, Africa serves as a prominent example of Third World
poverty perpetuation, prompting questions about its unfortunate leadership, the impact of the Cold
War and global capitalism, and the lingering effects of its colonial past.

The End of Empire

Besides the campaigns in East and North Africa, Africa largely avoided direct involvement in the
widespread fighting of World War II (1939-1945). However, the continent was not completely
isolated from the war. The Allied powers needed to utilize colonial resources to defeat the Axis
powers, leading to significant developments. One notable outcome was the increased production of
resources like rubber and tin in African colonies, as the loss of raw materials from Southeast Asia
necessitated alternative sources. Furthermore, the war had a significant impact on the mobilization
of the African population, surpassing even the efforts of World War I. Around 374,000 Africans were
recruited into the British armed forces alone. Many of those who served abroad underwent
transformative experiences, returning home with heightened political awareness and a desire to
achieve European standards of living.

Amidst the changing dynamics of the continent, certain colonial powers, particularly Britain
and France, recognized the need for constitutional reforms during and after the war. These
reforms aimed to increase local representation and legitimize efforts towards economic
development. In 1944, France organized a conference in Brazzaville, Equatorial Africa, where
agreements were reached to abolish forced labor, enhance African participation in local
politics, and establish a constituent assembly in Paris to draft a constitution for a new French
Union. In a similar vein, Britain decided in 1946 to grant African majorities in the legislative
councils of Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana) and expand their powers

Amidst the changing dynamics of the continent, certain colonial powers, particularly Britain
and France, recognized the need for constitutional reforms during and after the war. These
reforms aimed to increase local representation and legitimize efforts towards economic
development. In 1944, France organized a conference in Brazzaville, Equatorial Africa, where
agreements were reached to abolish forced labor, enhance African participation in local
politics, and establish a constituent assembly in Paris to draft a constitution for a new French
Union. In a similar vein, Britain decided in 1946 to grant African majorities in the legislative
councils of Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana) and expand their Powers.

However, it would be incorrect to perceive these reforms as part of a plan aimed at achieving
independence in the near future. The French, during the Brazzaville conference, explicitly
stated that independence was not their objective. Similarly, in 1943, the British colonial
secretary, Oliver Stanley, ruled out any transfer of power in Africa for several generations.
These political reforms were instead intended to maintain imperial control, as the colonies
were considered vital for the future prosperity and security of the colonial powers. Following
the end of World War II, the European colonial powers allocated even more resources to
develop their African territories. In 1945, the British Labour government passed the second
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, providing £120 million for its colonies in Africa, the
Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. In 1947, the French established the Fonds d'Investissement et
de Développement Economique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (FIDES - Investment
and Economic and Social Development of Overseas Territories), which invested $542 million
in French West Africa alone between 1943 and 1957, surpassing British development efforts.
This emphasis on development was driven by the belief that increased production of raw
materials would contribute to the post-war economic recovery of the metropolitan powers by
boosting their dollar earnings. Additionally, it was hoped that mobilizing African resources
would help maintain Britain and France as global powers capable of independent action
separate from the United States and the Soviet Union.

The hope that Africa would contribute to a return to prosperity and power turned out to be a
chimera(Kuruntu-korku), not least because the very act of encouraging development led, as in
the case of India before, to increasing political, economic and social unrest. Indeed, the drive
for development proved to be one of the main causes of the rapid shift towards decolonization
in Africa in the 1950s, for the social and economic discontent that it generated meant that
those who preached the cause of liberation from colonial rule began to find a ready audience
for their rhetoric.

The first signs of the changing dynamics emerged in February 1948 with the outbreak of riots
in Accra, the capital of the Gold Coast (now Ghana). The urban unrest had multiple causes
related to the push for development, including high inflation, dissatisfaction with employment
opportunities (especially among recently demobilized soldiers), and the dominance of British
companies over imports. Initially, the British responded with force, employing a heavy-
handed approach by arresting leaders of the newly formed nationalist party, the United Gold
Coast Convention (UGCC), including Kwame Nkrumah, who had recently returned from
studies in the United States and Britain. However, upon further investigation into the root
causes of the riots, the British government realized that only constitutional reforms could
restore stability. Thus, in 1949, a new parliamentary system of government was introduced in
the Gold Coast with the belief that it would quell discontent. However, this hope proved
unfounded, as in 1951, Nkrumah's more radical Convention People's Party won the first
legislative elections, advocating for self-government. Faced with the choice between either a
swift transition to self-government within the Commonwealth or prolonged political
instability, Britain opted for the former, setting the Gold Coast on its path to independence as
Ghana in 1957.

The case of the Gold Coast illustrates how many transfers of power in Africa were not part of
planned strategies but rather the result of ad hoc retreats and compromises imposed on
colonial authorities. The colonial powers often had clear objectives in mind, but they were
compelled to make concessions to accommodate African aspirations due to changing
circumstances. For instance, Britain initially aimed to establish a racially diverse political
system in Kenya and the Central African Federation (which united Nyasaland, Northern
Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia), but eventually had to abandon these plans in the early
1960s and agree to independence under African majority rule.

France, on the other hand, announced its intention in 1958 to transform its empire into a
French Community, granting Equatorial and West African colonies control over domestic
affairs while cooperating with Paris on foreign affairs, security, and overall economic policy.
However, this ambitious initiative suffered a setback when Guinea rejected joining the
Community, and shortly thereafter, Senegal and French Sudan (Mali) opted for full
independence. This triggered a general wave of independence movements that France had
little choice but to accept.

The Belgian Congo followed a similar pattern. In January 1959, following riots in
Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Belgium announced its plan to transfer power in four years.
However, mounting pressures in the colony forced Belgium to accelerate the process, granting
independence in June 1960 after just eighteen months.

These examples highlight how transfers of power in Africa often unfolded through a series of
unplanned events and compromises, as the colonial powers adjusted their positions in
response to African demands and changing circumstances.

The trend of granting independence in Africa was reinforced by the disastrous outcomes when
colonial powers attempted to suppress nationalism through the use of force. A prime example
of this was the French effort to quell the challenge posed by the Front de Libération National
(FLN) in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. Algeria, with its substantial European settler population
and constitutional ties to France, was considered non-negotiable in terms of its status by the
Paris government. Consequently, France responded to the FLN's national liberation war with
a brutal campaign of repression.

Although France managed to contain the military aspects of the conflict, the political costs
were immense and gradually eroded its defiance. The FLN effectively portrayed its cause as
emblematic of the Third World's struggle against colonialism, garnering significant
international support. France's attempts to subdue the Algerians generated widespread
international criticism, as it appeared to be resisting an unstoppable moral force. French
strategies to regain international esteem and isolate the FLN, such as granting independence
to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, proved futile. In the end, full Algerian independence became
the only viable option.

Recognizing the damage inflicted on French prestige and unity, President de Gaulle finally
acquiesced to a transfer of power in 1962 through the Évian agreement. This example further
illustrates the futility and adverse consequences of employing force to suppress nationalist
movements, ultimately leading to the acknowledgment of the inevitability of granting
independence.

The painful experience of France in Algeria led to a general reluctance among European
powers to resist African nationalism elsewhere. The Algerian conflict heightened awareness
among European states of the costs associated with maintaining colonial control, making them
wary of getting entangled in similar quagmires. This sentiment was particularly evident in the
aftermath of public outcry over the revelation of unnecessary police brutality in Kenya and
the Central African Federation, which dealt a severe blow to the hard-line policy pursued by
the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan in 1959.

Algeria's significance extended beyond its own context. The FLN's connections with leading
Third World states and occasional flirtations with the communist bloc confirmed to both
colonial powers and the United States that it was preferable to make concessions on self-
government in the short term rather than risk the rise of radical or pro-Soviet national
liberation movements in the long run. On the other hand, nationalist governments and
movements in the Third World capitalized on the fears of the colonial powers and their
American allies. They praised the FLN, sought ties with the Afro-Asian movement, and
hinted at finding sympathetic voices in Moscow or Beijing. In this way, they skillfully
manipulated the dynamics of the Cold War to their advantage.

Another significant factor in African decolonization was the diminishing economic

dependence of the imperial powers on their colonial possessions. As the capitalist world
economy thrived within the framework of the Bretton Woods system e, the colonial territories
became more of a burden than a benefit to the metropolitan conomies. The imperial powers
became less inclined to allocate precious resources to areas that drained their economies
rather than contributed to them. Furthermore, there was a general expectation that granting
independence would result in a political transfer of power while maintaining existing
economic ties. The European trading concerns, such as Britain's United Africa Company,
hoped to continue flourishing in the post-independence era.

Consequently, by 1966, when Botswana achieved independence, the majority of African

territories had become sovereign states, with notable exceptions including Portuguese-
controlled colonies, Southern Rhodesia, and South-West Africa (Namibia

), which remained under South African rule. While this marked a triumph for the principle of
self-determination, it also posed challenges for the newly independent states. They now faced
the complex task of charting their individual and collective paths, which involved issues such
as economic development, constitutional reform, and the possibility of regional federations or
even a united African government

The rise and fall of pan-Africanism

influence of pan-Africanist thought on nationalist movements in Africa… Pan-Africanism,

emphasizing the unity of people of African descent, originated from the African diaspora and
prominent figures like W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. In the 1930s and 1940s, African students
from British colonies, including Nkrumah, Kenyatta, and Nyerere, became interested in pan-
Africanism and incorporated its principles into their liberation struggles. Within the French Empire,
figures like Léopold Senghor developed the négritude movement, highlighting the cultural affinity of
African peoples.
During the process of independence in the 1950s, the influence of pan-Africanism on the new Africa
became a significant question. Pan-Africanism, advocating common social and cultural ties among
African peoples, suggested discarding European-imposed state boundaries and moving towards a
federal government. Nkrumah, as the leader of the first major Sub-Saharan state to gain independence,
supported this idea. He organized conferences in Accra in 1958 and an All-African People's
Conference in December, involving delegates from both independent and colonized countries.
Nkrumah championed African unification and demonstrated this by establishing a loose union
between Ghana, Guinea, and later Mali.

Nkrumah's ideas regarding African unification faced significant opposition and resulted in division
among African states. Ghana found support from radical states in the Casablanca Group, including
Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic. However, Nkrumah encountered opposition
from the Monrovia Group, consisting of traditionally independent states like Ethiopia, Liberia,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and most former French colonies. The leaders of the Monrovia Group saw little
benefit in merging their states into a larger political entity. Nkrumah's vision exacerbated existing
disputes at the regional level.
The collapse of the French Community between 1958 and 1960 was driven in part by tensions
surrounding the choice between maintaining a federation or establishing independent states in French
West Africa. The decision to pursue independence was influenced by the strong opposition to
federalism from influential figures like Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast. Houphouët-Boigny,
having successfully opposed federalism once, became a fierce adversary of Nkrumah, determined not
to lose the second round of this struggle.

Another reason for the opposition to Nkrumah's ideas was his policies as Ghana's leader, which caused
resentment among neighboring countries. The primary issue was his stance on the Congo Crisis, a
significant international issue in Africa during the early 1960s. After the Congo gained independence,
Belgian troops intervened to suppress a mutiny by the Congolese army, and the province of Katanga
declared its secession. The Congo government sought United Nations assistance to defend itself,
leading to the withdrawal of Belgian forces. However, the UN hesitated to help defeat Katanga,
frustrating Lumumba, the leader of Congo. Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for support, but his
actions resulted in his assassination in January 1961.
The Congo Crisis had a notable impact on African international politics. While the Soviet Union
lacked the capacity to intervene effectively, the crisis radicalized regimes, including Nkrumah's, who
were appalled by the West's involvement in Lumumba's ousting. Nkrumah, who shared a pan-African
socialist vision with Lumumba, became increasingly radical and confrontational in his rhetoric.
Reports circulated that Ghana was establishing connections with dissident groups in other countries,
aiming to overthrow their "bourgeois governments." In January 1963, Ghana was implicated in the
assassination of President Olympio of Togo. These actions diminished the appeal of Nkrumah's pan-
African vision, even among sympathizers like Nyerere, who advised him to adopt a more gradualist
approach.
The final defeat for Nkrumah’s pan-African schemes came in May 1963 with the holding of a
conference of the independent African states in Addis Ababa, which agreed that rather than moving
towards continental federation, the African states should become members of an Organization of
African Unity (OAU). While the name paid due respect to the ideals of pan-Africanism, the reality
was that the OAU’s main function was to uphold the status quo. Indeed, in 1964 the OAU passed a
resolution pledging member states ‘to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national
liberation’. From this point on the pan-African dream faded, a process that was accelerated by
Nkrumah’s losing power in a coup in 1966.

IMPERİALİSM AND ‘WHİTE RULE’ İN SOUTHERN AFRİCA;

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) supported the existing territorial boundaries in Africa but
took a more radical stance against imperialism and white minority governments. It offered support to
national liberation movements, particularly in southern Africa. The main countries affected were
Angola and Mozambique, which were Portuguese colonies, South Africa and its satellite state South-
West Africa (now Namibia), and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The exception was Portuguese Guinea
(Guinea-Bissau) in West Africa.
South Africa, with its policy of apartheid, was the most influential and significant among these states.
After becoming an independent state within the British Empire in 1910, South Africa was dominated
politically by the Afrikaners, who believed in white supremacy and sought to maintain white control
over the country's mineral wealth. They implemented racial segregation, treating the black population
as a source of cheap labor for mines and factories. The Native Land Act of 1913 restricted land
ownership by Africans, and municipalities were given the power to segregate Africans from
Europeans in 1923. In 1948, the National Party, led by D. F. Malan, came to power and introduced
apartheid as a means of preserving white control. Apartheid enforced strict segregation, including bans
on mixed marriages and relationships, separate residential areas and facilities, restrictions on the
movement of non-white populations, and limited autonomy in designated rural areas called
"Bantustans."
Initially, apartheid in South Africa had the support of a minority of the white population, primarily
Afrikaners. However, over time, its appeal expanded. One factor was the predictable resitance it
provoked from the black population, led by the African National Congress (ANC), which grew
increasingly militant. In 1961, following the killing of black demonstrators at Sharpeville, the ANC
adopted an armed struggle policy, resulting in acts of sabotage. The government responded with a
security crackdown, leading to the imprisonment of several key ANC figures, including Nelson
Mandela.
The rise in political violence and the ongoing transition to black majority rule in Africa created a sense
of the state being under siege. As a result, those of British descent began to accept apartheid as a
means of ensuring their security and preserving their social privileges. Additionally, apartheid gained
support by delivering economic prosperity for the white population as a whole. Throughout the 1960s,
the South African economy experienced 5% annual growth, fueled by the rapid development of import
substitution industries. The country also attracted significant capital investments from Britain and the
United States, demonstrating confidence in its future. By the 1960s, apartheid was no longer solely
advocated by a militant Afrikaner minority; it had gained the support of a broad white coalition.
North of South Africa, there was Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), which strongly opposed the shift towards
black majority rule. In 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence from Britain to preserve
white privilege. The government, led by Ian Smith, resisted pressure from London to implement a
more equitable electoral system before granting independence. The Smith regime managed to survive,
partly because the British Labour government was reluctant to intervene militarily against people of
British descent and partly due to support from South Africa and Portugal, which undermined the
international sanctions imposed by the United Nations in 1966.
Portugal, with its colonial empire, was the final stronghold of white rule in southern Africa. It lasted
longer than the colonial powers of Britain, France, and Belgium, which may seem surprising.
Portugal's ability to hold onto its African possessions was based on its autocratic regime under the
leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar. Portugal had developed an autarkic economy heavily reliant
on trade with its colonies. The Salazar regime depended on maintaining control over its African
territories and was willing to pay the necessary cost, even in terms of bloodshed, to retain them.
The neighboring states still under white domination were able to resist the wave of decolonization due
to their strategic positions and their perceived value to the Western powers. Portugal, as a NATO
member and controller of the Azores, which housed important American military bases, could
leverage its significance to deter criticism from the United States. South Africa, although not aligned
with any Cold War alliance, capitalized on its anti-communist stance, rich mineral deposits, and
strategic location along the Cape route, giving it leverage with Western governments. Rhodesia,
despite being in a weaker position, could still maneuver to some extent as one of the largest producers
of chrome.
Furthermore, these states benefited from residual sympathy in the West, particularly among
Republicans in the United States and the Conservative Party in Britain. This sentiment provided some
support and understanding for the white minority regimes, adding another layer of resilience to their
resistance against change.

The white governments in southern Africa, confident in their ability to withstand African nationalism
and backed by the support of the West, refused to compromise and resisted calls for change. As a
result, armed struggle became the primary form of resistance in the region, setting it apart from other
areas of the continent where decolonization was mostly peaceful, except for cases like Algeria and
Kenya. The necessity of resorting to violence in the struggle against imperialism in southern Africa
had significant consequences. The emerging national liberation movements sought international
support for their armed campaigns, but as they were unable to gain support from the Western powers,
some turned to the Soviet bloc for assistance. This shift further entrenched the Cold War dynamics in
Africa.
THE COLD WAR İN AFRİCA
After gaining independence, some African states such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville),
and Tanzania adopted left-wing ideologies. While this caused concern among Western states, the
international impact of this trend was relatively limited. The new African leaders were determined not
to replace one imperial power with another, making them cautious about getting too close to Moscow.
For example, Guinea's leader Sékou Touré accepted Soviet aid but later ordered the withdrawal of
Soviet diplomats when he discovered they were in contact with his domestic opponents.
Additionally, African leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere who advocated for socialist-style economic
development did not align with orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Their ideologies were more in line with
what was loosely described as "African socialism," which did not hold much appeal to the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union, doubting Africa's revolutionary potential and prioritizing other regions like
India and radical Arab states, allocated few resources to the continent, except for the close relationship
that developed with Somalia due to its strategic naval facilities at Berbera.
The United States, on the other hand, viewed Africa as having little significance in the broader context
of the Cold War and believed that former colonial powers should primarily bear the responsibility for
Africa's security.,

The struggle against imperialism in southern Africa, particularly in the Portuguese colonies of
Mozambique and Angola, began to shift the attention of the superpowers towards Africa. In the early
1960s, national liberation movements such as FRELIMO in Mozambique, and FNLA, MPLA, and
UNITA in Angola emerged as significant voices of nationalism. These movements, especially
FRELIMO and MPLA, received support from the communist bloc.
Similar patterns emerged in South Africa with the ANC developing links with the Soviet Union, and
in Rhodesia with ZAPU aligning with the ANC and ZANU leaning towards the People's Republic of
China. The association of these parties with communist regimes led them to be viewed as Soviet or
Chinese puppets by the political mainstream in the West.
However, initially, the support provided by communist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and
Cuba was not substantial enough to have a significant impact on these liberation movements, both
militarily and politically. Their support did not bring immediate advantages or major changes to the
power dynamics in the region.
The overthrow of Marcello Caetano and the subsequent transfer of power in Portugal in April 1974
marked a turning point in the colonial wars in Africa. The new regime in Lisbon, eager to withdraw
from the costly colonial wars, swiftly negotiated transfers of power in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,
and Angola.
However, the transition to independence in Angola led to a civil war. The Alvor Agreement of January
1975 stipulated that Angola would gain independence in November of that year, with interim elections
to determine the new government. Unfortunately, the leading political parties in Angola, namely the
FNLA, UNITA, and the MPLA, were unwilling to work together due to ideological differences, tribal
and ethnic animosities, and a thirst for power.
As a result, each party sought external support to strengthen its position. The FNLA looked to Zaire
(now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and the United States for support, UNITA sought assistance
from South Africa and the United States, while the MPLA aligned with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
This external intervention further escalated the conflict and deepened the involvement of superpowers
in the region. The civil war in Angola became a proxy battleground for the Cold War, with various
external powers supporting different factions based on their own strategic interests and ideological
affiliations.
The escalation of foreign intervention in the Angolan civil war had significant implications for the
conflict and the broader region. In October 1975, South African forces invaded Angola in an attempt
to prevent an MPLA victory and to support the FNLA-UNITA coalition. This move was driven by
South Africa's concern that an MPLA victory would lead to the establishment of a communist regime
on its border.
In response to South Africa's intervention, Cuba dispatched its own troops to support the MPLA. By
early 1976, there were approximately 12,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. The United States perceived
the Cuban presence as part of a larger Soviet effort to establish Angola as a Soviet-aligned client state.
However, due to congressional opposition, the U.S. was unable to provide comparable military
assistance to its allies in Angola.
As a result, the Cuban troops, backed by Soviet weaponry, played a crucial role in assisting the MPLA
in defeating the South African and FNLA-UNITA forces. This outcome solidified Angola's ties to the
communist bloc and posed a security threat to the wider southern African region. Additionally, Angola
provided support to SWAPO (South West African People's Organization), the leading liberation
movement in Namibia, further complicating the regional dynamics.
The involvement of external powers, including South Africa, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, turned the
Angolan civil war into a proxy conflict within the larger context of the Cold War. The consequences
of these interventions would have far-reaching effects on the political landscape of southern Africa
and the struggle for independence in the region.

The emergence of a FRELIMO government in Mozambique had a significant impact on the regional
balance of power and the situation in Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe). With Mozambique becoming
a hostile state for Rhodesia, as it openly supported the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU),
which operated from Mozambique, Rhodesia found itself bordered on three sides by unfriendly
nations.
This new environment provided a favorable operating environment for ZANU, as it could launch
guerrilla operations from Mozambique with the support of FRELIMO. The intensification of the
guerrilla war within Rhodesia, coupled with the potential escalation of Cold War tensions, changed the
dynamics in the country. It increased pressure on the government of Ian Smith from both Britain and
the United States to seek a political settlement that would lead to majority rule.
Initially, Smith attempted to find an internal solution and formed a government in 1979 under Bishop
Abel Muzorewa, a moderate black political figure. However, this solution, which still retained many
white privileges, was not acceptable to the Patriotic Front consisting of ZANU and ZAPU, as well as
to the international community.
As Rhodesia's security situation deteriorated, it was eventually compelled to participate in the
Lancaster House talks in London in 1979. These negotiations resulted in an agreement for majority
rule in Rhodesia. In April 1980, after elections won by Robert Mugabe's ZANU, Zimbabwe gained
independence and came into being as a newly formed nation.
The spread of the Cold War extended beyond southern Africa and also impacted East Africa. In 1974,
a coup in Ethiopia led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the establishment of a new
republic controlled by a military council known as the Dergue. While the Dergue initially embraced
loosely socialist ideas, it increasingly relied on Marxist advisers as it implemented policies aimed at
modernizing the predominantly feudal country.
The transformation of Ethiopia reached its climax in 1977 with the rise of Mengistu Haile Mariam as
the key political figure. Ethiopia's leftward shift created a rift with its former patron, the United States,
but attracted the attention of the Soviet Union, which saw it as a potentially genuine Marxist-Leninist
regime emerging in Africa. Consequently, when Somalia launched a war against Ethiopia in 1977 to
annex the Ogaden region, which had a predominantly Somali population, the Soviet Union severed its
ties with the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu and began supplying substantial amounts of arms to
Mengistu's government. Similar to the events in Angola, around 10,000 Cuban troops were deployed
to Ethiopia to assist in repelling the Somali challenge.
As a result, Ethiopia became another client state of the Soviet Union, reinforcing the perception of
communism gaining ground in Africa. This raised concerns that Marxist-Leninist ideologies might be
seen as the most effective means for African states to achieve rapid economic development. The
Ethiopian situation exemplified the influence of the Cold War on the African continent and
contributed to the geopolitical dynamics of the region during that period.

While the events of the middle to late 1970s suggested that Africa could be on the verge of being
divided along Cold War lines, in the end the impact was less substantial. I n part, this was because the
Marxist regimes in Africa faced such sever e domestic problems that it was impossible for them to
expor t their beliefs to their neighbours. In the case of Ethiopia, the radical land reform policy
launched by the Mengistu government and its refusal to make any concessions to the secessionist
movements in Eritrea and Tigre helped to spark a debilitating civilwar, while Angola was beset by the
continued resistance offered by UNITA, which was able to draw on support from the United States
and South Africa. Another important constraint on the spread of communism was the fact that the
West could still massively outbid the Soviet bloc in the provision of economic aid. The relative
weakness of the Soviet position in Africa was graphically illustrated in 1980, when Mozambique’s
application to join COMECON was rejected on the grounds that it would prove too great a strain on
that organization’s resources. Desperate to find trading partners, Mozambique was forced to turn
instead to the EEC, and negotiated its entry into the Lomé Convention agreement that regulated trade
between the Community and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.