Case 3:94-cv-02080-FAB Document 2078 Filed 07/10/24 Page 1 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-2080 (FAB)

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

Defendant,
______________________________________

MONITOR’S INTERIM INFORMATIVE MOTION REGARDING ONGOING

SAFETY AND SECURITY CONCERNS IN VILLALBA

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

The Monitor hereby submits this Motion as an Interim Report regarding compliance

due to ongoing security and safety concerns in the CTS Villalba facility. This Court has a

hearing set for August 22, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. where matters regarding Villalba are included

on the agenda. The recent events in Villalba, including a brutal slashing of a youth on June

16, 2024, necessitate more immediate intervention and planning prior to that hearing to

create a remedial plan to address violence, gang type behaviors, the prevalence of knives,

blades and other dangerous contraband, continued delays in essential security equipment,

rising rates of youth isolation, and the lack of priority given to interdiction efforts.

While Six-Month-depth discussion of these issues will be included in the Monitor’s

First Six Month Report for 2024, that report will not be filed until mid-September. This

interim Motion calls for a plan with aggressive remedial measures to be created prior to

the hearing and distributed to the United States Department of Justice and the Monitor.

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1) Settlement Agreement Provisions

The concerns expressed in this Motion fall in two primary areas of the Settlement

Agreement and subsequent Orders of this Court. First, Paragraph 48 requires that the

Defendants “have sufficient direct care staff to implement all terms of this agreement.” A

subsequent Order from 2009 also required that “all necessary steps shall be taken immediately

to ensure the reasonable safety of youth by providing adequate supervision of youth in all

facilities….” Therefore, DCR must ensure not only that a sufficient number of staff are

available, but that these staff are adequately supervising youth and ensuring their reasonable

safety.

Second, S.A. Paragraph 79 addresses restrictions on the use of isolation and requires

that youth be placed in isolation “only when the juvenile poses a serious and immediate

physical danger to himself or others and only after less restrictive methos have failed.”

Additional protections are in place for when youth are isolated, and youth must be released

from isolation “as soon as the juvenile no longer poses a serious and immediate danger to

himself or others.”

As described throughout this report, youth in Villalba are routinely exposed to or

engaged in violence, have ready access to blades, knives and other dangerous contraband, and

are permitted to create and sustain a gang like power structure (i.e. negative leadership, or

“unions”) which exert power over presumed weaker youth, threaten and intimidate some

officers, and create a dangerous environment where treatment needs are difficult if not

impossible to adequate address. As a result, youth who self-isolate and many of the youth

who are placed by the treatment committee in Villalba do so out of fear of being cut, beaten,

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forced to do something they do want to want to do, and which could lead to new charges and

a lengthening of their sentence.

The Monitor’s Interim Report sent to the Parties on April 14th 2024 noted that:

• Concerns continue regarding safety and security issues involving dangerous

contraband, suicidal and self-harm behaviors, and youth leadership
assaults/intimidation, particularly in Villalba.

• The youth in isolation during this quarter included a youth who “refused to join
the union as he is trying not to damage his chances of early release,” a youth
“trying to avoid further problems with other youth” after being attacked and
bitten,” a youth in “medical observation” after needing 50 stitches in his head
after being cut, youth who refuse to “be forced to do things I don’t want to do”
when trying to just get released, youth who observed a knife and fears he will be
cut by others with it, a youth “afraid of being attacked by others after they were
banging on his door threatening him,” a youth attacked by others and beaten,
requiring him to be taken to the ER with multiple bruises and soreness in various
parts of his body, and a youth who refused to come out of his room because “he
didn’t like the things happening on his module” and felt he was not safe.

• Youth in isolation routinely express concerns for safety, have been assaulted or
threatened with assault, and voice concerns regarding negative leadership within
their modules. Isolation is permissible only “when the juvenile poses a serious
and immediate physical danger to himself or others and only after less restrictive
methods of restraint have failed.” The language of paragraph 79 is explicit on this
point, as is the language of Policy 17.20. For this first quarter, only 3 of the events
occurred in Ponce, and the remainder were in Villalba.

• This provision will likely not move into substantial compliance until and unless
there is a culture shift within Villalba which can ensure safety in the modules,
employ zero tolerance for gang type behaviors which threaten and coerce other
youth, and until youth and staff feel safe from being attacked by blades and other
sharp objects.

• PIJ should explore a more intensive program and setting for negative leaders who
are threatening and creating dangerous situations for youth and staff. There are
currently no meaningful consequences for this behavior, requiring a game of
chess to move youth around in the best possible scenarios, leaving other youth to
self-isolate or ask to be placed in TM status.

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At the end of June, 2024, eleven (11) of 52 youth in Villalba were in isolation status, and an

additional youth was self-isolating for several days.

. The conditions described herein relate to both provisions, and detail for this Court why

aggressive and immediate steps must be taken to provide a safe and secure setting for both staff

and youth in Villalba which meet constitutionally mandated protection from harm.

2) Dangerous Conditions within Villalba Fail to Keep Youth and Officers Safe

On June 16, 2024 four high security level youth slashed another youth with at least one

blade, while also punching and kicking the youth. The youth victimized was hospitalized for a

week after the attack and with serious injuries, including over 100 stitches and ongoing medical

care. While the case is still under investigation, there are serious questions about the staffing that

evening in Villalba, and the failure to address issues leading up to the attack. In early February,

another youth was attacked and severely cut on both sides of his face resulting in over 50

stitches. In both incidents, youth had access to blades, including a 3–4-inch box cutter blade.

The severity of these two incidents is a dramatic example of the lack of effective

searches, security measures, and available detection equipment. However, as one youth recently

told the Monitor in an interview, “we are stuck here, and we are not the ones able to bring things

in.” The Monitoring team has long questioned why aggressive interdiction efforts have not been

intensified to prioritize finding the source(s) of contraband coming into the facility. The

following sections detail a sample of the information obtained by the Monitor through detailed

review of incident reports, OISC investigative reports, youth interviews, file notations by social

workers and others, and video reviews of significant incidents. It includes overlapping account

weapons and violence by youth against officers and other youth, increased use of isolation as

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protection for many youth, and a culture which tolerates, if not encourages, youth to create a

negative and violent leadership structure over other youth, and at times, officers.

A) Weapons and Violence against Youth and Officers

In addition to the two incidents mentioned above, multiple reports made to OISC during

the first six months of 2024 suggest that the availability of knives, blades and other sharp objects

is routine. In addition to incidents where weapons were used or their use was threatened, in other

cases youth were assaulted by other youth, at times requiring emergency care. Below are just

some of the examples which have occurred in Villalba over the last six months involving

violence, including weapons, against youth and/or staff:

• OISC 24-014: Officer in Villalba allowed a room to remain open while 3 youth
attacked another youth and assaulted him. The officer stood by the door without
intervention. He indicated that “I have nothing to defend myself with. You enter
the room, they lock me up, and cut me. You have nothing to guarantee your
safety.” The officer said he did not ensure the door was closed because “you can
block it, but the youth will riot if you close it……. [he] dare not intervene with
them, [because of] the possibility that they do have knives and would lock him
in the room.” Officer was also off the module to use the bathroom without
authorization.

• OISC 24-016: Officer in Villalba left the module unattended to give a 15-
minute break to the mini control officer. During that time, youth congregated in
the bathroom, and a threat was made to cut one of the youth in the module. A
supervisor authorized the breaks leaving the module unattended.

• OISC 24-036: Youth in Level II in Villalba was attacked by other youth recently
moved from Level IV, sustaining multiple bruises in the areas of the back,
abdomen, right thigh and left shoulder, resulting in a visit to the ER room.

• OISC 24-37: Youth was “charged with stupidity” (by “leader”) and given slaps
to the face and was subjected to multiple fists after two Level IV youth were
moved to Level II. While video didn’t verify the assault, it was clear that the
officer allowed several youth in a room together and did not supervise.

• OISC 24-041: Two Level V youth in Villalba were assaulted while in the court
area during recreation by three other Level V youth. One of the youth had
multiple abrasions on his back, chest, left arm, left hand and lower eyelid of his
left eye. One of the aggressors had lacerations with bleeding on his index finger

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and multiple abrasions on his shoulder, arm, chest and side. Staff indicated these
youth had previously not fought, and that this incident was spontaneous.

OISC 24-048: Level V youth in Villalba is observed with an open wound on his
leg, and his account occurring several days prior and how it occurred was not
consonant with this injury. The nurse previously observed him, and the injury
was not present. While not conclusive of any neglect by an officer, the injury is
suspect. The youth was seen later that day with a laceration on his back and 2
lacerations on his thigh.

• OISC 24-058: Level IV youth in Villalba attempts to throw a 3–4-inch box

cutter type blade under the door of another module for two Level V youth to
intercept. An officer noticed this and stepped on the blade to avoid retrieval, but
was threatened, grabbed and forced to lose his balance. The youth grabbed the
blade and ran into the bathroom. The weapon was not retrieved. The officer
sustained minor injuries.

• OISC 24-059: Level V youth in Villalba was in preventative supervision and

seen with a laceration on his neck, hematoma on his right side, abrasion under
this arm, inconsistent with his story about playing rough on the field. The bruise
on his forehead, according to the nurse, was visible and anyone with youth must
have seen it. The officer did not report the event, and was assigned to the
youth’s direct supervision, plus being responsible for 5 youth in the module
(double posts).

In addition, there are several cases during this reporting period where it is clear that officers saw

a knife, even if the knife was not retrieved, or if the knife was not used. For example:

• OISC 24-11: Youth was taken to the hospital and x-rayed after a canine search marked
him, detecting a razor in his anal cavity which was retrieved.

• OISC 24-032: A knife is retrieved in a classroom under a desk where a youth was sitting
and observed manipulating the table.

• OISC 24-043: During a routine search, a Level V youth searched with a metal detector
tested positive and was referred for an x-ray, where they found a two-inch razor wrapped
in black rubber with black glue at one end. between his buttocks. OISC noted continued
use of the metal detector and thorough searched upon arrival of youth from court, other
institutions, or hospitals to counter the introduction of contraband.

• OISC 24-055: Youth did not want to be located in his room and got into an altercation
with a supervisor, including lowering his pants and retrieving a blade. Two other officers
intervened. The blade was not found.

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• OISC 24-070: During a search the day after a youth was attacked and cut, officers found
a piece of a knife in the bathroom.

• IR V-24-03-078: A youth is noted as warning others that a search was going to be done
and is observed by an officer putting his hand down his pants into his rectal area. They do
a search but do not find anything on him.

• IR V-24-4-123: Emergency registration is carried out in a module where two youth are
in Transitional Measures. An officer saw one of the youth retrieve a knife from his room
and put it in his pants. When the second youth was searched by two other officers, a 3-
inch cylindrical metal piece fell from him. Neither blade was retrieved that day.

• IR-V-24-05-173: Youth attacked an officer after inserting his hand into his anal area and
taking out a sharp edge. It was not possible for the officer to remove the metal piece. The
youth assaulted the officer on the head resulting in a use of force. No object was found,
and it is unclear whether a search was subsequently conducted.

The sample of OISC reports and Incident Reports noted herein represent two sources of

information which can demonstrate the problem of violence and weapons in Villalba.

Additionally, however, the Monitor and her Consultants have many other accounts from

interviews with youth which amplify these concerns and provide additional information as to

how weapons may come into the facility, how and where they are hidden, and a lack of diligence

among some officers and/or supervisors in finding this contraband.1 To preserve confidentiality

and ensure that youth are not identifiable, these examples will not be discussed in this Motion.

B) Increase in Isolation Events

Thirty (30) transitional measure events were recorded for the first six months of 2024.

Additionally, 14 isolation events were noted as “self-confinement” and were voluntary on the part

of the youth. Another six youth were placed on “preventative supervision” or “other” due to having

been assaulted, fearing for their safety, or other circumstances which were not strictly mental health

1
This information has been shared when appropriate with security personnel.

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related. Only six (6) of the thirty (30) transitional measures, and one self confinement incident

were in Ponce; all of the remaining incidents were in Villalba.

Sixteen interviews were conducted with youth who were TM status or self-isolating

either remotely or in person by the Monitor, and/or Dr. Miriam Martinez. Some youth had more

than one isolation event during the six-month period. Additionally, several youth interviews

were conducted by Javier Burgos during the reporting period while making in person visits to

both facilities.

The majority of isolation events which resulted in transitional measures did not include a

finding that the youth posed a serious and immediate danger to himself and others, and that other

alternatives have been tried and failed. Rather, notations made by staff when youth were placed

in TM include:

• Youth faced problems due to his style of dealing with other youth, and exercises
leadership that is perceived negatively by the rest of the youth

• Youth placed in a transitional measure after evaluating the case of the young man due to
an incident where he allegedly was attacked on two occasions by young people from his
home.

• Youth noticed that other youth were acting strangely to him, and he had a feeling that
they were going to locate him… They told him that he couldn't be in the house and they
locked him out. He admits that he got so upset that he watered his room and when the
psychologist saw him and found him uncontrolled and decided to assign him supervision.

• [Youth] verbalizes that he does not live in the level IV modules (none). He alleges that he
has 28 days left to graduate and is afraid that something will happen to him.

• Youth says that he does not trust and fears for his safety. He tells us that he is not going to
go out and prefers to stay in his room. The case was discussed in the treatment committee
and the institutional head Rafael Malave authorized the initiation of a transitional measure.

• Youth was seen in medical with a bruise on his cheek, chest and right side of his head. He
has a bruise on the left side of his head. He has bruising on both ears. He reports pain in
the area of the bruises. In observation until committee can meet. Treatment committee is
held to discuss the case of a young man who got involved in a fight with [another minor]

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last night. Because the young man expresses to the [social worker] that he fears for his
safety and that he does not live together [with the other youth]

• The case is discussed in the Treatment Committee where the location of the young man
and his decision to separate [self-confine] and take services individually are explained.
Young man says he does not feel safe and is not going to go out allege that he still cannot
integrate because he does not feel safe and does not trust the other young people.

• Youth reported to medical that "I don't like the things that are happening in the module, I
don't want to damage my operative measure and I don't want to risk my cheek. I had an
argument yesterday (I won't mention with whom)…” "I'm tired of what's happening, I want
to be apart." "Right now I'm not safe in the module, I'm not well. I don't want to go back
to the housing." Young man begins transitional measure.

• Youth in self-isolation verbalized that "that he cannot continue with these leaders who have
no mind to lead a group, who try to control everything he does and who does not trust
them."

• Youth placed in preventative supervision because, “[the] last minors admitted changed
everything. They have him doing clearing tasks and can't rest, he has a bad back and can't
take it anymore. Evaluated and sent to hospital for tests. Says two youth were responsible
for attacking him… and they also attacked another youth - taken to hospital. Young man
has multiple bruises in the area of the back, abdomen, right thigh, left shoulder. He has pain
to touch on the flanks of the abdomen and in the area of the ankles and right thigh area. He
has bruises in the head area.”
• The youth has problems and observed a nebula (blade) among the youth and fears
something will happen to him.

• Youth self-isolated because “they will do something to me or force me to do something.”

(called it preventative supervision)

• Youth placed in TM because he does not want to live in the module and be involved in
incidents with other youth. Does not want to integrate info D-2 because of leadership
issues [there].”

3) Youth Exhibiting Gang Like Behaviors and Attitudes

With the availability of weapons comes the opportunity for youth to exert control over

others, whether officers or other youth. The Monitor and her team conducted more than eighty

(80) interviews with youth, both in person and remotely. Of this number, thirty (30) were in

Ponce and the remainder were in Villalba. This included interviews with youth who were in

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isolation status, and certain youth were interviewed multiple times as a result of specific

circumstances which raised concerns for the Monitoring team.

It is clear during the course of these interviews, along with references in multiple incident

reports, OISC reports, and file notations by social workers or mental health staff, that Villalba

fosters a culture which permits youth to make decisions about how modules are run, who is in

charge, and what youth and officers they want in the modules. Examples noted above indicate

that youth are at times threatened (sometimes with knives), assaulted, and /or intimidated to go

along with the wishes of “leaders.” As one youth noted to the Monitor after he participated in an

assault, “you have to understand that the pressure we are under to live together is very strong and

we have to follow some instructions. I take responsibility for what I did.” It is also clear from

the examples above that some officers are fearful of intervening with youth and have admitted

this to OISC agents, to members of the Monitoring team, and likely others. With few tools

available to them, and the failed efforts of the agency to eradicate weapons from youth, it is not

surprising.

Youth have explained during interviews with members of the Monitoring team how the

leadership structure works.

• “When I first came weren’t any problems with the [other] youth…Then came 3 others
and the problems began... About 2 weeks ago. [Two of those youth] were the two that
beat him up. Right now, they are all like that - they are waiting for me to go to sleep and
they will beat me up. It started when they were making me do a lot of chores, clean all
bathrooms, sweep, mop and bring down all dirty laundry. Same every day. They also
assaulted another youth. [The leaders in the module] have shown them razors. They all
have razors in the modules I am in now and in the other module. They stick them in anus
with glue - security officers are not allowed to check. I have seen them. I don't know
where [the razors] come from. [Another level] is across [from us] and they use sign
language between them. They are dictating what the [we] do.

• IR V-24-03-173: Officer stated that he was told by “the leader” that in order to have a
good shift he has to let them do what they want. The officer needs to follow the rules.”
The supervisor is contacted and removed the officer.”

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• IR-V-24-03-84: After seeing the exchange of medications between youth, an officer is

warned by a youth that “you will see things and it’s best to be blind, deaf and dumb as
this affects the officer’s colleagues as well.” Nothing was found during this search.

• Another youth described how youth threatened all kinds of things so supervisors will
remove certain officers who enforce rules. He referred to a hierarchy where he has to
prepare breakfasts for others, clean the module, and it is beaten if anything is found on
the floor. There are consequences to pay for that, and he noted the officers look the other
ways. The “leaders” have razors and will threaten to cut you. He described strip searches
and how youth avoid detection. One youth cut his pants “just to how him how sharp the
knife was.”

• Youth report feeling resigned to live in fear as there are multiple ways to hide weapons
during searches to avoid detection during a search including in windows where there is
also metal, giving it to an officer who will “hold it for them,” placing it in the anus,
gluing the weapon between the cheeks, and placing them in toilet.

• Youth states that he “was removed.” He alluded to the youth making this decision – that
he did not belong/could not get along with them. He states he does not want to return and
would spend the entire 1 year 8 month that remains on sentence in isolation. States all of
[his module] threatened him. Showed him razors.

• Youth was eligible to change levels (he was in TM) but he doesn't get along with them
either. Had problems with current level. When in the modules he didn't want to form a
union with any of them. There is pressure to join so that youth can go out together and
together they can get more privileges. He doesn't trust them at all. “I’m doing things ok -
I don't want anyone to be in charge of me or be in charge.”

• Youth volunteered that he went into self-seclusion because [two other] youth don’t want
him to be the leader anymore. I asked about “unions” and if this was part of the problem.
This youth is in “union” with another youth and wants to go to a different level.

• The youth in the module were throwing objects (plastics and other things) under his door,
threw water and showed him a razor under the door as well. Volunteered that the reason
PIJ can’t find the razors is because they hide them in the anus. If they go to hospital, they
take them out before x-ray and just put it back in after... When asked where the official
was during the threats and when the youth put the razor under the door, he stated that the
security officer just ignores what is happening. The youth yell at him that he is a snitch.
The other module adjacent is “in union” with the module he came from so this is why he
is being bullied by both.

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Multiple other youth have described similar behaviors and threats to members of the monitoring

team, social workers and others as documented in file notes.

It is concerning that little to no consequences are put into place for youth who threaten,

assault or intimidate others, including both officers and youth. Referrals to a disciplinary

committee are made with a potential consequence of “loss of privileges” for a couple of weeks or

even a month at a time. As one youth states during an interview with a Monitoring Team

member, “so what if they take my piece of candy that I’m supposed to get on Fridays. I am not a

baby. I don’t need candy.” Few privileges are given, so there is little to lose by engaging in this

type of behavior. The conduct can result in a change in treatment level, however, there are few

differences among the levels as to what incentives or privileges the youth receive. Early

bedtimes are ignored as youth often refuse them or bargain with officers.

Criminal charges for these behaviors appear to be rare, complicated by the lack of

cooperation of youth who are victimized. Youth who are over the age of 18 who have incurred

new charges as an adult continue to be housed with other youth in PIJ as they await adult

criminal charges and sentencing. These youth often create serious problems in the institution

and destabilize the modules in which they are placed.

In spite of this issue being raised for years, if not decades, by the Monitoring team, no

effective measures are in place to effectively manage the behaviors of youth who seek to exert

power and control over other youth, or over officers, by threats, assaults and intimidation.

3) Continued Failure to Secure Needed Equipment and Resources has Hampered

Efforts to Improve Safety

Enhancing safety and security measures requires that PIJ have adequate detection and

surveillance equipment, a need which has been urgently noted by the Monitoring team for years.

The track record for obtaining and putting into use some of this equipment, such as additional

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video cameras for both Ponce and Villalba, and Intercept Tek842 scanners (a full body scanner

which detects metallic and nonmetallic threats, including weapons, drugs, cellphones and other

contraband) has been fraught with delays for more than 2 years. Additionally, commitments

from DCR to enhance interdiction efforts over the last several months have not yielded any

meaningful results.

A) Increased Video Surveillance Coverage

Early in 2022, the Commonwealth reported on efforts to secure additional video cameras

for both facilities in order to cover blind spots and enhance other areas where camera coverage

would help to provide increased transparency and security. As noted by Bob Dugan in the

Monitor’s Second Quarterly report for 2022 (ECF 1828),

Video Cameras and Radios: On April 28, 2022, Order, ECF 1757, stated that the cameras
were purchased through a contract already in place with ASG. The contractor visited the
facilities on May 18 and May 26, 2022. In the Joint Informative Motion filed on May 16,
2022, DCR informed the Court that to expedite the purchase of the cameras they will
tapped into an existing contract that GSA has in place for this equipment. According to
the supplier, the cameras will be delivered by the end of August. Once the cameras are
received, the property will be registered in DCR’s inventory. Installation will proceed in
three phases: Phase 1: Installation of cables; Phase 2: Installation of cameras and
equipment to be installed at the Video Surveillance Room; Phase3: Configuration of new
cameras. Upon receipt of the video cameras, DCR needs to develop an installation and
activation plan with corresponding dates for both facilities.

More than a year later, the Commonwealth’s Monthly Report on Benchmarks (ECF 1980)

required by the Court noted this in relation to the status of the video cameras:

SA 77, 78 Video Cameras Installation: We have received the project equipment,

inspected it thoroughly, and sent it to the Ponce facility. We are aware of the upcoming
consolidation. Case 3:94-cv-02080-FAB Document 1930 Filed 05/15/23 Page 5 of 7 Due
to Ponce's new mission and objectives, some equipment that was designated for the
Villalba facility has been reallocated to Ponce to ensure the successful execution of the
updated project goals. The scheduled meeting for May 3, 2023, was canceled as the
project supervisor couldn't attend. However, the administrative buildings have been wired
and the wiring is being extended to the indoor court area this week. PIJ is coordinating
with the Company's Chief Supervisor to set a date for a meeting next week to establish
2
https://www.tek84.com

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the percentages for the different phases of the project. We should be presenting more
detailed information in the next report. Further, in compliance with this Honorable
Court’s Order dated January 4, 2023, at ECF No. 1880, the Commonwealth also provides
updated information on some of the matters discussed on the December 29, 2022, status
hearing.

During a Status Hearing of March 12, 2024, the Court ordered the Commonwealth to

ensure that the installation and operationalization of all cameras was completed by June 203,

2024, including the replacement of damaged one, and that the appropriate staffing for video

surveillance would be in place. The Court ordered the Commonwealth to inform the Court of

Compliance with this Order. (ECF 2038). The Commonwealth filed an Informative Motion in

Compliance on 6/29/2024 asking for more time to complete the installation and ensure the

cameras were operational. (ECF 2077) The Commonwealth noted that “a substantial number of

cameras [were] installed and operational” and that they were taking comprehensive efforts to

achieve compliance. The report noted that 111 cameras were now in place in Ponce, an increase

from the previous forty-four (44) cameras. Villalba, however, has only 40 operational cameras,

and the reports note only 12 are identified to cover critical areas with blind spots. An aggressive

plan is included only related to 12 cameras, and not the remaining work to bring it up to the level

of Ponce. Given the delays experienced for the last two years, it seems unlikely that a 30-day

extension, as requested, will achieve completion.

B) Body Scan Machine

Similarly, the Commonwealth responded to the need for internal contraband detection by

requisitioning two Intercept Tek84 machines. Currently, youth suspected of carrying illegal

contraband internally are taken for x-rays to a local hospital or sent to an adult facility in Ponce

for scanning. The current circumstances in Villalba relative to weapons should require

3
Subsequently corrected to read June 30, 2024.

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immediacy in having this equipment operational. Yet, this equipment has also been delayed in

its purchase, transit, and operation multiple times.

In a monthly report filed on October 31, 2024 (ECF 1979-1), the Commonwealth noted

that the supplier acknowledged the shipment in Puerto Rico on October 23, 2023. Arrangements

were made to finalize delivery of the equipment for installation and set up training for staff who

will manage it. On January 31, 2024, the Commonwealth’s monthly filing (ECF 2023-9) noted

that the equipment was delivered to Ponce and that installation took place at the end of

December, 2023. A date was pending for training. On 2/29/2024 the Commonwealth’s filing

noted that staff were trained on February 16, 2024 and that a final review of the Administrative

Order was pending in order to begin to use the equipment. (ECF 2030-9)

At some point, a second Intercept Tek84 was ordered to be placed in Villalba. To date,

this has not been delivered or installed, and no administrative order has been signed regarding

usage of the equipment.

C) Increased Interdiction Efforts

In February of 2024, the Monitor asked the Commonwealth to develop a plan to prevent,

detect, and respond to incidents of contraband smuggling in the youth facilities. The plan

submitted to the Monitor and her team on March 6, 2024 contained multiple strategies for

searches, interagency collaboration and expertise, deployment of reenforced canine units,

comprehensive reporting and accountability, and rapid response teams. Technology solutions

were also included and were dependent upon the contraband detection machines and video

surveillance equipment and officers to monitor video. Only minimal implementation of these

strategies has occurred to date.

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For example, the Villalba June 2024 contraband report submitted to the Monitoring team

shows a total of 15 routine searches, 9 emergency searches, and 2 K-9 searches. No searches

were done between June 6 and June 16, (the day of the attack), and five emergency searches

were done on June 17th. Although the search/contraband report did not document the discovery

of any contraband for the entire month, incident report V-24-06-218 A B, describes an Officer

discovering half of a knife on the bathroom floor of B-2. The last several quarterly reports have

asked/recommended/pleaded for initiation in quality assurance measurements to address the

increasing the frequency of searches as well as the inaccuracy and unreliability of search and

contraband data, which is often inconsistent with any corresponding incident report

documentation.

D) Conclusion

At a time when several areas of the Consent Decree are progressing in compliance status,

the ability to provide adequate supervision and keep youth reasonable safe, at least in Villalba,

has not progressed, and appears to be declining. As noted throughout this Motion, Villalba

continues to experience an unacceptable level of violence toward youth and staff, increased use

of isolation, and an inability to control the flow of weapons and other contraband. Additionally,

the lack of an adequate behavior management system in Villalba has allowed youth to engage in

gang like behaviors to exert control over other youth, as well as staff, with no significant

consequences or accountability. Finally, the lack of adequate equipment and resources has

hampered the facility’s ability to engage in enhanced detection and interdiction efforts.

WHEREFORE, the Monitor respectfully seeks an Order from this Court to require that

DCR prepare a detailed plan for how it will remediate the safety and security concerns raised in

this Motion, and to submit such plan to the Monitor and the USDOJ no later than August 14,

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2024 for discussion during the August 22, 2024 Status Hearing. The plan should consider, but

not be limited to, the following issues:

• A strategy for how the Villalba facility will address the “leadership” structure within
modules, and across modules, to ensure that all youth have equal status in the modules,
and that there is zero tolerance for violence, threats, and intimidation by youth who want
to exert perceived power over other youth. This should include officer-controlled plans
for cleaning and other activities, with no option for youth to control that process, or what
youth or officers can be in the module.
• Strategies for implementation of the March, 2024 interdiction plan, including necessary
resources, interagency cooperation, and aggressive implementation of a zero-tolerance
policy among officers or other staff who bring in contraband.
• Strategies to establish a zero-tolerance policy against weapons among youth, including a
range of meaningful consequences for possession, use, or threats of use, and protection
for those who come forward to report. Meaningful sanctions should be considered, as
well as more robust opportunities for engaging programs and opportunities.
• Consideration of a module created for those youth who pose a serious risk of harm to
others as demonstrated by institutional history, with robust services, but enhanced
security, enforcement and staffing.
• Establishment of modules based on good behavior, program participation, and other
factors for those youth who want to participate but are threatened or intimidated by others
• Consideration of a unit management model, with input from the union, so that there is
consistency in matching officers with specific module in order to bring stability.
• A thorough analysis of the daily roster practices in Villalba to identify weaknesses in the
assignment process and how to better utilize the officers that are assigned to that facility.
• Given the longstanding nature of these issues in Villalba, whether or not the existing
leadership and supervisory structure can make the necessary culture changes in Villalba,
and if not, what staffing resources are needed to do so.

Further, the Monitor fails to discern any justification in the Commonwealth’s pleadings for

a continued delay in the installation and operation of the video equipment in Villalba, nor the

Intercept Tek84 equipment, both critically needed in Villalba. Continued delay further hampers

the security and transparency of operations in Villalba and places youth and staff at risk.

Respectfully Submitted by:

/s/Kim Tandy
Kim Tandy, Federal Monitor
United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
SPEHCE, VIG Tower
1225 Avenida Ponce de Leon, Penthouse Floor, Office #7

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San Juan, Puerto Rico 00907

kimtandy@justicebydesign.net
317-840-9332
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the
Court on July 10, 2024 using the CM/ECF system, which will simultaneously serve
notice of such filing to counsel of record to their registered electronic mail addresses.

Respectfully Submitted,
/s Kim Tandy_______________________________
Kim Tandy
Federal Monitor, United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
SPEHCE, VIG Tower
1225 Avidena Ponce de Leon, Penthouse Floor, Office #7
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00907

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