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FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
FAMILY LAW-II
(MUSLIM LAW)
Short Answers Questions
Q.1. Who is Muslim or Mohammedan?
Or
Who is Muslim? If one of the parents is Muslim what will be the
religion of the child?
Ans. ‘MUSLIM’ is a term referring a person who submits himself to God. A
Muslim is a person who follows Islam. Muslim law applies to a born
Muslim or a person who is a convert Muslim. According to Islam, a
true Muslim is a person who has happily and willingly surrendered
his whole life to one God known as ‘Allah’; and it is his prime duty to
serve Allah. Muslims preach Allah and follow the footsteps of Prophet
Muhammad (last successor).
‘Quran’ is considered as their holy book and acts as guiding light
throughout their lives; according to Islam, Quran is the book where
one can find answers to any and every question that crosses a human
mind and is considered as the literal word of Allah. There are main two
dimensions of Muslims Shia and Sunni.
A Muslim follows 5 pillars of Islam, ‘Shahada’ (testimony/declaration
of faith): ‘Salat’ also known as ‘Namaz’ (praying 5 times in a day);
‘Sawm’ also known as ‘Roza’ (fasting in the auspicious month of
Ramadan): ‘Zakat’ (almsgiving i.e. giving money to poor and needy):
‘Hajj’ (pilgrimage to Mecca once in lifetime); a true Muslim follows all
these practices.
The main aim of a Muslim’s life is to practice deeds which are laid
down by Allah in Quran and to be humane with every one, to not
commit a derogatory act. A Muslim is advised to visit Mosques on
Thursdays and Fridays which are considered to be auspicious days
as per the Islamic Calendar. Muslims celebrate Eid and mourn on
Muharram as it is the day of honouring the martyrs.
A Muslim also believes in almsgiving that is what we call as doing
2 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
Charity, this practice is a very important practice of the Islamic Religion
where less fortunate people are provided with cash or kind and it is
the prime duty of a true Muslim to serve the poor and needy. Muslims
are often considered to be focusing on their personality development
and always want to be spiritually educated; the reason being their
complete submission to Allah. Islamic religion gives a basic idea of
living life peacefully; just practice good deeds.
In Azima Bibi v. Munshi Samalanand, (1912), it was observed that a
child born out of a Muslim couple would be Muslim, even if he by
choice goes to a Hindu temple. The person would be a Muslim, till the
time he does not renounce his religion and converts to another religion.
In Bhaiya Sher Babadur v. Bhaiya Ganga Baksh Singh, (1914), it
was held that, if a Muslim woman has a child from a Hindu man but the
child from the time he was born was brought up as a Hindu, then, in
this case, he would be called a Hindu.
Q. 2. What is Islam?
Ans. Islam means to achieve peace – peace with God, peace within oneself,
and peace with the creations of God – through wholly submitting
oneself to God and accepting His guidance.
The term Islam derives from the three-letter Arabic root,
, which generates words with interrelated meanings,
including “surrender”, “submission”, “commitment” and “peace”.
Commonly, Islam refers to the monotheistic religion revealed to
Muhammad ibn (son of) Abdullah between 610 and 632 of the Common
Era.
The name Islam was instituted by the Qur’an, the sacred scripture
revealed to Muhammad. For believers, Islam is not a new religion.
Rather, it represents the last reiteration of the primordial message of
God’s Oneness, a theme found in earlier monotheistic religious
traditions.
Though Islam can be described as a religion, it is viewed by its
adherents – a fifth of the world’s population – in much broader terms.
Beyond belief in specific doctrines and performance of important ritual
acts, Islam is practiced as a complete and natural way of life, designed
to bring God into the center of one’s consciousness, and thus one’s
life. Essentially, by definition Islam is a world view focused on belief
in the One God and commitment to His commandments.
Q. 3. What are the sects & sub sects of Muslim Law?
Ans. A “Sect” is a group of people divided on the basis of religious,
political or philosophical belief system. Originally this term was used
only for religious separated groups but now it is also referred to any
organization that breaks into smaller parts from the big one. Initially
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 3
Islam was classifies between three major sects known as- Sunni Islam,
Shia Islam and Khariji Islam. Muslim law is basically governed by the
Quran and Prophet Muhammad though recognized by different schools
according to their interpretations.
The schools of Muslim Law can be broadly classified into sects and
sub sects as follows-
1. Sunni Schools-
(a) Hanafi School
(b) Maliki School
(c) Shaffie school
(d) Hanbali school
2. Shia schools-
(a) Ithna-Asharis
(b) The Ismailis
(c) Zaidy
3. Other schools-
(a) Ibadi School
(b) Ahmadiya School
Division between Sunni’s and Shia’s is the oldest history of Islam
who differs in doctrine, ritual, law, theology and few fundamental
beliefs and practices. Estimates suggest that the total percentage of
Sunni and Shia in the world is 90% and 10% approximately. “Sunni”
means people of the tradition, and basically they refer to practices
based on the Prophet Muhammad sayings. Whereas Shia’s are guided
by the wisdom of Muhammad’s descendants through his son-in-law
and cousin Ali as according to them Ali was the rightful successor to
the prophet Muhammad. Pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the many
rituals shared by both the sects
Q. 4. What do you understand by Izma?
Ans. The term ijma means a consensus, i.e., the agreement between all on a
particular point of fact or law. When all the judges in the Supreme
Court unanimously agree to a point and pronounce judgment on that
point, it becomes a precedent and a binding law. Similarly, Ijma is a
concept of law made by consensus of all Islamic jurists or other persons
of knowledge and skill.
With the death of the prophet, the original law-making process ended,
so the questions, which could not be solved either by the principles
of the Quran or the Sunna, were decided by the Jurists with the
introduction of the institution of Ijma.
When Quran and traditions could not supply any rule of law for a
fresh problem, the jurists unanimously gave their common opinion or
a unanimous decision and it was termed as Ijma. Not each and every
4 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
Muslim was competent to participate in the formation of Ijma, but
only Mujtahids (persons who had knowledge of law) could take part
in it.
Sir Abdul Rahim defines Ijma as “the consensus of followers of Prophet
Muhammad on a particular question of law.”
Q. 5. What is Qiyas?
Ans. In Arabic Qiyas means ‘measurement, accord, and equality.’ In other
words, it means measuring or comparing a thing to a certain standard,
or to ‘establish an analogy.’ If the matters which have not been covered
by Quran, Sunna or Ijma, the law may be deducted from what has been
already laid down by these three authorities by the process of analogy
(Qiyas).
Qiyas may be defined as a process of deduction by which the law of
the text is applied to cases, which though not covered by the languages
are governed by reason of text. Thus, it should be noted that Qiyas
does not purport to create a new law, but merely to apply old established
principles to new circumstances.
Q.6. What are the essential conditions of a Marriage?
Ans. Essential of Marriage
The following are the requirements for a legal marriage:-
1. A marriage proposal should be made by or on behalf of one of
the parties to the marriage, and the proposal should be accepted
by or on behalf of the other party.
2. Both the proposal and the approval must be made at the same
time.
3. The parties must be competent.
4. Two male or one male and two female witnesses must be present
and hearing during the marriage proposal and approval, and
they must be sane and adult Mahommedans. (In Shia Law, this
isn’t necessary.)
5. There is no need for writing or another religious ritual.
Capacity to Marry
The following are the general requirements for marriage in Islam:-
(a) Every Mahommedan of sound mind who has reached puberty is
eligible to marry. The age of puberty is fifteen years where there
is no proof or signs of puberty.
(b) By their parents, a minor and insane (lunatic) who have not
reached puberty may be validly married.
(c) The consent of the parties is required. If there is no consent, a
Mahommedan marriage that is of sound mind and has reached
puberty is void.
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 5
Registration of Marriage
Marriage registration is required in Muslims since a Muslim marriage
is considered a civil contract. “Every marriage contracted between
Muslims after the commencement of this Act shall be registered as
hereinafter given, within thirty days from the end of the Nikah
Ceremony,” according to Section 3 of the Muslim Marriages
Registration Act 1981. Nikahnama is a form of legal document used
in Muslim marriages that contains the marriage’s basic conditions
and information.
Q. 6. Distinguish between ‘Khula’ and ‘Mubarat’.
Ans. Difference between ‘Khula’ and ‘Mubarat’ - There are following
differences between Khula and Mubarat -
Khula Mubarat
1. When the desire for separation 1. Where the desire for
is expressed from the side of wife, separation is expressed from
it is called Khula. any side, it is called Mubarat.
2. Consent of Husband is 2. Mutual consent is necessary.
necessary.
3. It is effected by an offer from 3. It can be effected by the offer
wife to compensate the husband, of any of the spouse.
if she is released by him from the
marital tie.
4. Consideration is essential for 4. No such consideration.
Khula marriage. It may be whole
or part of Mehr.
5. The contract of marriage if 5. Irrevocable.
dissolved, is irrevocable.
6. The observance of period 6. It is followed in Mubarat also.
of ‘Iddat’ is necessary.
Q. 7. Explain the concept of Iddat under Muslim Law.
Ans. Iddat is the period during which it is incumbent upon a woman whose
marriage has been dissolved by divorce or death of her husband, to
remain in seclusion and to abstain from marrying another husband.
So Iddat is an interval which the woman is bound to observe between
the termination, by death or divorce of one matrimonial alliance and
commencement of other.
Object of Iddat is to ascertain the pregnancy of wife so as to avoid
confusion of parentage under Sunni law marriage with woman
undergoing Iddat is irregular and not void. But under Shia law marriage
with woman who is undergoing Iddat is void.
6 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
So ‘Iddat’ is described as a period during which a woman is prohibited
from marrying again after the dissolution of her first marriage. Object
of ‘Iddat’ is to ascertain the pregnancy of the wife so as to avoid the
confusion of parentage.
DURATION OF IDDAT
1. Iddat of ‘Talaq’: Period of ‘Iddat’ in case of marriage being
dissolved by ‘Talaq’ (divorce) is that if woman is subject to
menstruation, three courses otherwise (if she is not subject to
menstruation) it is three lunar months. If woman is pregnant at
the time of Divorce the ‘Iddat’ will not terminate till delivery.
2. Iddat of Widowhood: When a person dies leaving a widow, she
is prohibited from marrying before the expiration of 4 months
and 10 days.
3. Iddat of Pregnant Widow Woman: Important point here is that
if marriage is not consummated ‘Iddat’ has to be observed in the
case of death but not in case of divorce.
Under Sunni law marriage with a woman undergoing ‘Iddat’ is irregular
and not void. But under Shia law marriage with a woman who is
undergoing ‘Iddat’ is void.
Leading Case 1.
Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 1 SC 740
Leading Case 2.
Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, AIR (2010) SC 305
Leading Case 3.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR (1985) SC 945
Leading Case 4.
Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 1
Leading Case 5.
M/s Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1281
Leading Case 1
Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 1 SC 740
Introduction
The case of Danial Latifi v. Union of India was a landmark case in the
Indian legal history in multiple aspects. Not only did the Court find itself in a
quagmire (difficulty) dealing with the issue of intrusion of the legislature into
the personal law of Muslims through legislation enacted after the
watershed Shah Bano Begum case, but the judges were also in unchartered
territories, in deciding on the extent of rights of Muslim women upon divorce
to seek maintenance from their former husbands after the period of iddat had
ended.
Background of the Case:
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, the Supreme Court was
concerned with the issue of interpreting Section 127(3)(b) of The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.
This particular clause mandated that: “(3) Where an order has been
made under section 125 in favour of a woman who has been divorced by, or
has obtained a divorce from, her husband, the Magistrate shall, if he is
satisfied that – (b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 193
she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole
of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the
parties, was payable on such divorce, cancel such order…”
In essence, this meant that an order of maintenance granted in favour
of any divorced woman under section 125 of the same statute, could be
struck down and cancelled by the magistrate if such woman had received any
amount as was payable on divorce under the personal laws of the parties. The
question that arose now was whether the payment of the Mehr amount to the
wife upon or after divorce would qualify in this scenario and absolve the
husband from his obligation to maintain the divorced wife under section 125.
Facts of the Case:
1. The case was challenged before the Supreme Court to validate the
constitutional validity of the Muslim Women.
2. The above act (Protection of Rights on Divorce) was passed to pacify
a particular section of the society in accordance with the intention of
keeping ineffective the decision which was made in Mohd. Ahmed
Khan v. Shah Bano Begum.
3. During Shah Bano’s Case the husband had appealed against the
judgement which was given in M.P. High Court, Court directed him to
pay to his divorced wife Rs. 179 Per Month and enhancing the small
sum of Rs 25 per month originally granted by the Magistrate.
4. In the above case the couple had been married for about 43 years
before. The ill and elderly wife was thrown out of the husband’s house.
5. For 2 Months husband paid maintenance of Rs 200 Per Month, after
that payment by his husband was ceased so his wife under Section 125
Cr.P.C. filed Petition and said that his husband has immediately dissolved
the marriage under Triple Talaq Provision of Muslims.
6. He had Paid Rs 3000 as deferred Mahar and some maintenance for the
Iddat Period. Therefore petition was dismissed on grounds that she
had received the amount due to her on divorce under the Muslim law
applicability.
7. Most Important point of the case was that wife had matrimonial
relationship for more than 40 years and also she have borne 5 children
so she was incapable to take any career independently that is remarriage
was one of the impossible act of the case.
8. His husband, an advocate with income of RS 5000, provided Rs 200 per
month, to his wife who had shared half of her life and also matured his
5 children, was in desperate need of money for survival.
Concept of Mehr
Mehr, meaning dower in English, is the payment made by a groom to
194 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
his bride-to-be at the time of marriage, although the time of actual payment
can vary as per the type of Mehr. While prompt dower requires the payment to
be made immediately on demand of the wife, in cases of deferred dower, this
sum is paid at a particular event in the future until which it has been deferred.
The payment of dower is usually deferred to the time of divorce or the death
of the wife. The Mehr does not have to be in the form of money, rather it can
also consist of property, jewellery, furniture or other goods as may be specified
at the time of marriage.
In Shah Bano, the Court pointed out that the concept of Mehr was
more closely connected with marriage than with divorce, although a significant
portion of Mehr is payable at the time the marriage is dissolved, usually by
death or divorce. Further, it was opined that “it is a sum payable on divorce
within the meaning of Section 127(3)(b) CrPC and held that Mehr is such a
sum which cannot ipso facto absolve the husband’s liability under the Act.”
The Court then proceeded to consider the question of whether the payment
of Mehr can serve as an alternative to maintenance. The contention advanced
by the husband, in this case, was that Muslim law exempted him from any
responsibility towards his divorced wife beyond payment of any Mehr due to
her along with an amount to cover maintenance during the iddat period. It was
put forth that section 127(3)(b) conferred statutory recognition on this principle
of Muslim law.
The decision in Shah Bano
It was noted that if Mehr is not such a sum, then it cannot absolve the
husband from the rigour of section 127(3)(b), but even in that case, Mehr is a
part of the resources available to the woman and is taken into account when
considering her eligibility for a maintenance order and the quantum of
maintenance. Thus, it was concluded in the Shah Bano case that the divorced
women were entitled to apply for maintenance orders against their former
husbands under section 125 and such applications were not barred under
section 127(3)(b).
After referring to various textbooks on Muslim law, it was held that the
divorced wife’s right to maintenance ceased on the expiration of the customary
iddat period but the Court observed that the general propositions reflected in
those statements did not deal with the special situation where the divorced
wife was unable to maintain herself. In such cases, it was stated that it would
not only be incorrect but also unjust to extend the scope of the statements in
situations where a divorced wife is unable to maintain herself. It was opined
that the application of these statements of law must be restricted to those
cases where there is no possibility of vagrancy or destitution to the divorced
wife.
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 195
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
After the Shah Bano case, the Parliament enacted the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Statement of Objects &
Reasons for the Act reads as follows:
“The Supreme Court, in Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum &
Ors. has held that although the Muslim Law limits the husband’s
liability to provide for the maintenance of the divorced wife to the
period of iddat, it does not contemplate or countenance the situation
envisaged by Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The Court held that it would be incorrect and unjust to extend the
above principle of Muslim Law to cases in which the divorced wife is
unable to maintain herself. The Court, therefore, came to the
conclusion that if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the
husband’s liability ceases with the expiration of the period of iddat
but if she is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, she is
entitled to have recourse to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.”
The iddat period is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act to mean, in
the case of a divorced woman – (i) three menstrual courses after the date of
divorce, if she is subject to menstruation; (ii) three lunar months after her
divorce, if she is not subject to menstruation; and (iii) if she is pregnant at the
time of her divorce, the period between the divorce and the delivery of her
child or the termination of her pregnancy whichever is earlier.
The relevant portion of Section 03 of this Act reads as follows: “Mehr
or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce
— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to — (a) a reasonable
and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the
iddat period by her former husband.”
As held in the Shah Bano case, the true position is that if the divorced
wife is able to maintain herself, the husband’s liability to provide maintenance
to her ceases with the expiration of the period of iddat; but if she is unable to
maintain herself after the period of iddat, she is entitled to have recourse to
section 125. Thus, it was held that there is no conflict between the provisions
of section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the
Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife,
who is unable to maintain herself.
However, section 3 of the Act did not seem to reflect this position of
law. It was not clear from the interpretation of the wordings of the provider
whether the divorced wife was entitled to seek maintenance and other
196 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
reasonable provisions from her husband if she was destitute and unable to
maintain herself properly. From the terms used in this section, it was implied
that the husband was liable for maintenance only in the period of iddat and
not beyond that, which was contrary to the position established in the Shah
Bano case and opposed to the very objects and reasons stated behind the
enactment of this Act.
Contentions of the Parties:
Petitioner:-
1. The purpose of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was to meet a situation wherein a
divorced wife was likely to get benefitted from divorce so taking into
consideration the Article 21 of the Constitution of India which is related
to Protection of Life and Personal Liberty. Sec 125 of Cr.P.C. was enacted
to prevent such situations.
2. There could be violations of Article 14 & Article 21, if remedies of
section 125 in relation with Muslim Women are not applied.
3. If the applicability of the provisions of sec 125 of Cr.P.C. were not
applied in relation to Muslim women who are deprived then it will be
against the secular character of constitution of India.
Defendant:-
1. The Parliament could change sec 125 of Cr.P.C. so as to set aside its
application and apply personal law instead.
2. In a matter of Policy, the legislature wants to apply sec 125 Cr.P.C. to
Muslim women then it can be amended, withdraw or change its
implementation and its provisions.
3. Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is not made to create right of maintenance which
may be outside the scope of personal law, hence it could not stand as
an act.
The decision of the Court:
The Court held that “A careful reading of the provisions of the Act
would indicate that a divorced woman is entitled to a reasonable and
fair provision for maintenance. It was stated that Parliament seems to
intend that the divorced woman gets sufficient means of livelihood after
the divorce and, therefore, the word provision indicates that something
is provided in advance for meeting some needs. In other words, at the
time of divorce, the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future
needs and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those
needs.”
Elaborating further, it was opined that reasonable and fair provision
may include provision for her residence, her food, her clothes, and other
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 197
articles. It was held that the wording of the section would mean that the
husband is bound to pay maintenance to the wife before the expiration of the
iddat period and if he fails to do so then the wife is entitled to recover it as
provided in section 3(3). However, it has not been provided anywhere that the
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is limited only for the iddat
period and not beyond it. The Court declared that the liability of a husband to
maintain his wife would extend to the whole life of the divorced wife unless
she gets married for a second time.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court, while upholding the validity of the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, came to the following conclusions
on the various issues raised by the parties in the course of the hearings:
1. That, a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision
for the future of his divorced wife. Such provisions obviously include
maintenance for the wife as well. The scope of making reasonable and
fair provisions extends beyond the iddat period and must be made by
the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the
Act.
2. That, the liability of a Muslim husband towards his divorced wife arising
under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance and make reasonable
provisions is not confined just to iddat period.
3. That, a divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is
not able to maintain herself after iddat period can proceed as
provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are
liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they
inherit on her death according to Muslim law. If the relatives are
unable to provide maintenance, the State Wakf Board may be directed
to pay the same.
4. That, the provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of
the Constitution of India.
Conclusion:
Thus, through this landmark judgement, the Supreme Court of India
struck a fine balance between upholding the constitutionality of the Act and
preserving the rule laid down in the Shah Bano case previously. A very wide
net of interpretation was cast around Section 3 of the Act, which enabled the
Court to declare that the husband’s liability does not extinguish on the
expiration of iddat, rather in cases of vagrancy and destitution of the wife, the
husband will have to maintain her and make reasonable and fair provisions for
her even beyond such a customary period. Not only did the Court appear
198 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
progressive in determining the rights of women, but they also kept themselves
from meddling into the personal laws of the Muslim community. However, the
Court must be criticised for exercising too much restraint and adopting an
overly-cautious approach in this case where they refused to delve into many
issues in a bid to avoid controversy.
Leading Case 2
Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, AIR (2010) SC 305
Introduction
The hue and cry of the Muslim society after the renowned Shah Bano
case[1985], made the Central Government frame Muslim Women (Protection
of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. This Act shaped a statutory obligation
upon the husband and families of the Muslim divorced women to provide her
with maintenance, in case she is incapable of sustaining by herself[Section 3,
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986]. The accurate
interpretation of the Act provides that, the divorced women are eligible for
maintenance within the ‘iddat period’[Section 2 (b), Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.].Further the Apex Court in Danial
Latifi case[2001] held that Muslim husbands have to make rational and
equitable provisions for the future of the wife he is divorcing within the ‘iddat
period’ itself.
Background of the Case
The case was an appeal after its past judgement of Family Courtand the
High Court. The Family Court partially permitted the appellant’s appeal as-
1. The respondent shall be paying Rs.2000/- per month as alimony to the
petitioner from 26.4.2004, date of institution of the petition to the date
of divorce, i.e. 20.8.2004 and then after from 20.8.2004 to the period of
iddat and,
2. The respondent will be paying for the cost of the suit of both parties.
This case was then appealed to the High Court for revision which was
dismissed by the high court on the technical ground that, the Family Court
Act, 1984, which confer jurisdiction on the family court over district court
and subordinate civil courts has to be interpreted in a restricted manner.
The Supreme Court accepted the appeal moved by the Appellant
and overturned the reasonings given by the High Court. In reference to
the Iqbal Bano judgment[2007] the Apex Court stated that proceeding
under Section 125 CrPC is civil in nature and is completely on the discretion
of the court to treat the application under this Section like any other petition
under the Act.
Facts of the Case:
1) The Appellant (Shabana Bano) was married to the respondent (Imran
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 199
Khan) on 26/11/2001, according to the appropriate and necessary
Muslim rites. As per the appellant, after the marriage, the respondent
and his family treated her with cruelty and were continuously
demanding dowry from her.
2) After a while, when the appellant got pregnant, the respondent took
her to her parent’s house. Along with this he also threatened her that,
if his dowry requirements aren’t met then he wouldn’t take her back.
The Appellant delivered a baby in her parental house, and even after
that the respondent didn’t think it fit to take her back to her matrimonial
house.
3) The Appellant therefore requested for a particular amount of
maintenance, from her husband, which he denied instantly. The dispute
then went to the family court, and after that towards the Gwailor Bench
of High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Being dissatisfied with the judgment
given by both the courts, the appellant has now therefore approached
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether a Muslim divorced wife would be entitled to receive the amount
of maintenance from her divorced husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
and, if yes, then through which forum?
Arguments:
Appellant: The counsel for appellant argued before the court that the
appellant was entitled to receive the sum of maintenance. According to
appellant, the respondent earned a monthly sum of 12,000 and out of which he
should provide a sum of Rs. 3000 to her on month to month as maintenance.
The claim of maintenance was brought through Section 125 of The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. Also, the apex court in various previous judgments
had allowed the concept of maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman, even
after the completion of ‘iddat’ period.
Respondent: The counsel for respondent argued before the court that,
there is no specific statute, which states that a Muslim husband is liable to
pay maintenance to his divorced wife, even after the completion of ‘iddat’
period. Apart from that it was the contention of the respondent that, the
appellant has been earning Rs. 6000 per month by giving private tuitions, and
therefore didn’t require the sum of maintenance. Another argument presented
by the respondent was that there were no provisions under Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, to provide maintenance
Related Provisions
Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC): Order for
maintenance of wives, children and parents. In case his wife is unable to
200 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
maintain herself, ”wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has
obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.
Section 20 of the family Act, which makes the situation crystal clear
that the provisions of the Act shall have an overriding effect on all other
enactments in force dealing with the issue of maintenance,
Judgement:
The Court observed that Section 5 of the Muslim Women Act deals
with the possibility to be governed by the provisions of Section 125-128 of
the Cr.P.C. Section 7(1)(f) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides Family
Courts with the authority to try suits or proceedings for maintenance. Also,
Section 20 of the Family Act provides that the Act shall have a superseding
effect on all other enactments in force dealing with this matter. Thus, a Family
Court recognized under the Family Act shall entirely have jurisdiction to
arbitrate upon the claims filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.
Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. The Court
noticed that there was a divorced woman in the case in question; still, it was
open to accepting the petition under the Act bearing in mind the beneficial
character of the legislation. The appellant’s petition under Section 125
Cr.P.C. would be sustainable in front of the Family Court as long as the appellant
does not remarry. The sum of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125
Cr.P.C. cannot be delimited to the iddat period only. The Family Act being a
beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof must be given to the divorced
Muslim women. Thus, the matter was remanded to the Family Court, Gwalior
for its disposal on merits in accordance with the law. Even if a Muslim woman
has been divorced, she would be eligible for the entitlement of maintenance
from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C, after the expiry of the period
of iddat also.
Reasoning of the Court:
The rational of the court, upon which the judgment was given, is historic
as well as mesmerising. The belief that, the family law statutes and legislations
are meant for the welfare of the deprived person was once again proved by the
Hon court. The broad question before the court was that, whether a divorced
Muslim woman can claim maintenance from her husband, even when the
‘iddat’ period is over? As stated, the court decided that Yes, a divorced Muslim
woman can claim maintenance, even after the ‘iddat’ period.
There were various reasons for the court to arrive at this conclusion.
The two precedents, which the court took into consideration, and which helped
immensely, while solving the dispute were, “Danial Latifi and another v. Union
of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 (Const. Bench) and Iqbal Bano v. State of U. P. and
another, (2007) 6 SCC 785”. In both of these cases the significance of Section
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 201
125 of Cr.P.C. is highlighted. These two cases further explain how this section
is a beneficial legislation for a divorced woman. The judges thus observed
that, “in light of the findings already recorded in earlier paras, it is not
necessary for us to go into the merits. The point stands well settled which we
would like to reiterate”. Thereby, they re-iterated what was already discussed
in the cases, and declared in their judgment that a divorced Muslim woman
can claim maintenance, even after the ‘iddat’ period.
Conclusion
From this case, it can be inferred that even after a Muslim woman has
been divorced, she would be eligible to claim maintenance from her husband
under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. after the expiry of period of iddat also.
Leading Case 3
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR (1985) SC 945
Introduction:
The Supreme Court in this revolutionary case dealt with the issue of
maintenance to be given to an aggrieved divorced Muslim woman by her
husband after the divorce. The Supreme Court referred to the holy Quran
as the authoritative text with a great emphasis on the friction between
Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure Code and Muslim Personal Law.
While the appeal of the husband to not provide maintenance was denied,
the same received substantial resistance and was claimed to be against
the Islamic law. The then Government declared the law to only be valid in
the iddat period. The case was later upheld by the apex court in further
decisions.
Background
Section 125(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, deals with the answer
to the question as to “Who can Claim Maintenance?”
1. Wife from his husband,
2. Legitimate or illegitimate minor child from his father,
3. Legitimate or illegitimate minor child (physical or mental abnormality)
from his father, &
4. Father or mother from his son or daughter.
Essentials conditions for granting maintenance include the following
points:
1. Sufficient means for maintenance are available (person who has to give
the maintenance should have means to give the same).
2. Neglect or refusal to maintain after the demand for maintenance (if the
person defaults or omits to provide maintenance or if he denies his
obligation of maintaining then it amounts to neglect or refusal
respectively).
202 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
3. The person claiming maintenance must be unable to maintain himself/
herself (only if the person is unable to maintain themselves).
4. Quantum of maintenance (depends on the standard of living).
Facts of the case:
1. The plaintiff, SHAH BANO BEGUM, and the respondent, MOHD.
AHMED KHAN, who was an affluent and well known advocate in
INDORE, was married in 1932. And then they had 5 children from the
marriage.
2. After 14 years, the respondent took a younger woman as his new wife.
3. In 1975, the plaintiff who was 62 years old at that time was disowned by
her husband and was thrown out along with her children from her
matrimonial house.
4. In April 1978, the respondent stopped giving maintenance of rupees
200 per month as he promised before. The plaintiff filed a suit in lower
court, against her husband (respondent), under section 125 of CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (CrPC).
5. In November1978, the respondent gave divorce to the plaintiff by
articulating “TRIPLE TALAQ” and which was irrevocable.
6. After the respondent pronounced the irrevocable “TRIPLE TALAQ”
he took a safeguard that since because of this divorce the plaintiff has
been terminated from being the respondent’s legal wife and due to that
the respondent was not accountable to furnish her with maintenance
or alimony. Except the amount prescribed under Islamic law which was
in total of rupees 5,400 as “MEHR”.
7. The lower court gave the judgement in the favour of plaintiff and directed
the respondent to give the maintenance of rupees 25 per month to the
plaintiff. Then
8. The plaintiff appealed in high court as to alter the amount of maintenance
decided by the lower court.
9. The high court gave the judgement in which it increased the amount of
maintenance from rupees 25 to rupees 179.20 every month. Then
10. The respondent appealed in the Supreme Court by saying after divorce
he cannot keep any form of alliance or connection to his divorced
wife as it is not allowed by the Islamic law, and it is “HARAM” in
‘ISLAM’ so he is not legally entitled to maintain, his divorced wife,
plaintiff.
11. On 3 February 1981, the two-judge bench composed of Justice
MURTAZA FAZAL ALI and A. VARADARAJAN who first heard the
case matter, and gave the judgement that held that section 125 of
CrPC, applies on Muslims also.
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 203
12. Then the respondent appealed to a larger bench.
13. Muslim bodies, All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Jamiat Ulema-
e-Hind joined the case as intervenor.
Issues:
1. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether the “WIFE”
definition includes a divorced Muslim woman?
2. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether it overrides
personal law?
3. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether a Muslim
husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife is in
or not in the conflict between section 125 and Muslim Personal Law?
4. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 127(3) (b). What is the
sum payable on divorce? The meaning of Mehar or dower is not summed
payable on divorce?
Contentions of the Parties:
The plaintiff contentions was that according to section 125 of Code of
Criminal Procedure says that any person having sufficient means neglects or
refuses to maintain his wife, children or parents who are unable to maintain
themselves, a Judicial Magistrate First Class may order such person to pay
maintenance to them. And essentials for a wife who can claim maintenance
are:
a. A wife who is unable to maintain herself can claim maintenance from
her husband even if she is minor.
b. Only a legally married wife can get maintenance and second wife or
mistress cannot get maintenance. A woman is not entitled to
maintenance merely because she had stayed together with a person.
c. A wife who has been divorced and has not remarried is entitled to
maintenance.
And the plaintiff was unable to maintain herself and she was legally
married to him and has been divorced by her husband and has not remarried
so, she was entitled to claim the maintenance by her husband.
But the contentions of the respondent was that as according to
the Islamic law, after irrevocable divorce “TRIPLE TALAQ” which was
his prerogative under Islamic law, the plaintiff had ceased to be his wife
and therefore he was under no obligation to provide maintenance for her
as except prescribed under the Islamic law which was in total of Rs. 5,400
as “MEHR”. And he cannot keep any form of alliance or connection to
his divorced wife as it is not allowed by the Islamic law, and it is
“HARAM” in ‘ISLAM’ so he is not legally entitled to maintain, his
divorced wife, plaintiff.
204 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
Judgment
1. The verdict was given by C.J, Y.C Chandrachud, and the appeal of
Mohd. Ahmed Khan was dismissed.
2. Supreme Court said Section of the code applies to all citizens
independent of their religion and consequently Section 125(3) of Code
of Criminal Procedure is pertinent to Muslims as well, without any
sort of discrimination. The court further stated that Section 125 overrides
the personal law if there is any conflict between the two It makes clear
that there’s no strife between the provisions of Section 125 and those
of the Muslim Personal Law on the address of the Muslim husband’s
obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife who is incapable
to maintain herself.
3. Supreme Court in this case duly held that since the obligation of Muslim
husband towards her divorced wife is restricted to the degree of “Iddat”
period, indeed though this circumstance does not contemplate the rule
of law that’s said in Section 125 of CrPc., 1973 and subsequently the
obligation of the husband to pay maintenance to the wife extends
beyond the iddat period in the event that the wife does not have
sufficient means to maintain herself. It was further stated by the court
that this rule according to Muslim Law was against humanity or was
wrong because here a divorced wife was not in a condition to maintain
herself.
4. The payment of Mehar by the husband on divorce is not sufficient to
exempt him from the duty to pay maintenance to the wife.
5. After a long court procedure, the Supreme Court finally concluded that
the husbands’ legal liability will come to an end if a divorced wife is
competent to maintain herself. But this situation will be switched in the
case when the wife isn’t able in a condition to maintain herself after the
Iddat period, she will be entitled to get maintenance or alimony under
Section 125 of CrPC.
Case laws Stated
1. Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali and another [(1980) 4 S.C.C. 125]
2. Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissali Chothia & ANR. [(1979) 2 S.C.C. 316]
3. Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal & others [A.I.R. 1970 S.C.
446]
4. Mst Jagir Kaur & ANR v. Jaswant Singh [A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521]
5. Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi [A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 46]
6. SyedSabir Husain v. Farzand Hasan [A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 80.]
Reasoning
• Either Section 125 of the Code applies to Muslims and does the “WIFE”
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 205
definition includes a divorced Muslim woman or not?
The SC after referring to Section 125 of CrPC said that ”The religion
professed by a spouse or by the spouses has no place within the scheme
of these provisions. It would be irrelevant within the application of
these provisions if the spouses are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis,
pagans, or heathens. The rationale for this can be self-evident, in the
sense that Section 125 is a part of the CrPC, not of the Civil Laws
which define and govern the rights and commitments of the parties
belonging to specific, religions, similar to the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, the Shariat, or the Parsi Matrimonial Act. Section
125 was enacted to provide a fast and summary remedy to a category
of persons who are unable to maintain themselves…” (Para 7)
“Clause (b) which is the Explanation to section 125(1), which defines
‘WIFE’ as including a divorced wife, contains no words of limitation
to justify the exclusion of Muslim women from its scope. Section 125 is
truly secular in character.” (Para 7)
Hence, the code applies to any or all religions including Muslims.
Para 9 of the judgment asserts that “‘Wife’ means a wife as defined,
irrespective of the religion professed by her or by her husband.
Therefore, a divorced Muslim woman, unless remarried, is a ‘wife’
under section 125 of the code. The statutory right available to her
under it is unaffected by the provisions of the personal law applicable
to her.”
This clears the very fact that “Wife” includes divorced women too.
• Either Section 125 of CrPC overrides personal law or not?
The Court in replying to the present question gave the illustration of
the Islamic Law concerning polygamy: It is too well-known that “A
Mahomedan may have as many as four wives at the same time but not
more. If he marries a fifth wife when he has already four, the marriage
isn’t void, but is irregular”. Subsequently, the court stated “The
explanation confers upon the wife the right to refuse to live together
with her husband if he contracts another marriage, leave alone three
or four other marriages. It shows, indubitably, that section 125
overrides the personal law if is any there conflict between the two.”
• Is there’s any disagreement between the provisions of Section 125
and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the liability of the Muslim
husband to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife?
Answering this proposition court stated- “The argument of the
appellant that, according to the Muslim Personal Law, his liability
to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife is prescribed
206 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
only to the period of iddat, even if she is unable to maintain herself,
has, therefore, to be rejected. The true position is that, if the divorced
wife can maintain herself, the husband’s liability to provide
maintenance for her ceases with the expiration of the period of iddat.
If she is unable to maintain herself, she is entitled to take recourse
to section 125 of the CrPC. The result of this discourse is that there’s
no strife between the provisions of section 125 and those of the
Muslim Personal Law on the question of the Muslim husband’s
commitment to providing maintenance for a divorced spouse who is
unable to maintain herself.”
• Is the payment of Mehar by the husband on divorce is adequate enough
to exculpate him of any obligation to pay maintenance to the wife?
Quoting the ruling given in Bai Tahira where Justice Krishna Iyer held
that “…The payment of illusory amounts (referring to ‘Mehar’) by
way of customary or personal law requirement is to be considered
within the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate that
rate unless it’s a reasonable substitute.” (p.82, Bai Tahira), the SC in
this case held “…there is no escape from the conclusion that a divorced
Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance under section 125
and that, Mehar isn’t a sum which, under the Muslim Personal Law, is
payable on divorce.”
Aftermath
Article 44 of the Directive Principles in the Constitution, directs the
state to provide for its citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory
of India. C.J Chandrachud while giving judgment stated the need to implement
the same. He said “A common civil code will help the cause of national
integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting
ideologies. A beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any
meaning.” This simulated the debate on the Uniform Civil Code in India.
Shah Bano’s case judgment was criticized by many Muslims especially
Muslim scholars. They considered this decision in conflict with the rules of
the Quran and Islamic Laws/Islam. Subsequently, the Parliament of India in
1986 decided to enact the Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights Of Divorce)
Act, 1986. Protecting the rights of the divorced Muslim Women and of those
who have got divorced from their husbands, was the main objective of this
act. Under this act:
1. Muslim divorced women ought to be entitled to an adequate and
reasonable sum of maintenance till the Iddat period.
2. When a divorced woman keeps up a child born by her anytime,
sometime recently or after the divorce, the spouse is under a legal
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 207
obligation to supply a certain whole of maintenance for the child to a
period of 2 yrs.
3. From the birth date of a child. The women are also authorized to get
“Mehar” or “dower” and get back all the properties or estate which is
given to her by her guardians, companions, relatives, husband, or
husband’s friends.
Conclusion
Though the court took a long time the decision of rejecting the appeal
is very historic because it keeps up the truth and faith of the individuals in the
judiciary. This judgment has marked the significance of maintenance which
ought to be given to the divorced Muslim women who are not in the condition
to earn and maintain themselves. The Shah Bano judgment pulled in a lot of
opposition with authoritative bodies being against the decision for the reason
of it being against the provisions of Islamic law, but SC passed the impartial
judgment and at last, it had maintained the trust and faith of citizens in the
judiciary. This lead to enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights
on Divorce) Act, 1986 which given Muslim women receiving a huge, one-time
payment from their husbands amid the period of Iddat, instead of a maximum
month to month payment of ¹ 500 – an upper limit which has since been
expelled.
Leading Case 4
Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 1
Facts of the Case:
In Shayara Bano and others v. Union of India, Shayara Bano was
married to Rizwan Ahmed for 15 years. In 2016, he divorced her through
instantaneous triple talaq ( talaq-e-biddat ). She file a writ petition in the
supreme court asking it to hold 3 practices:
• Talaq-e-biddat
• Polygamy
• Nikah halala
Unconstitutional as they violate Article 14, 15, 21, 25 of the constitution.
Talaq e biddat is a practice which gives a man the right to divorce to his
wife by uttering talaq three times in one sitting without his wife’s consent.
Nikah halala is a practice where a divorce women who wants to remarry her
husband would have to marry, and obtain divorce, from the second husband
before she goes back to her first husband. And polygamy is a practice which
allows Muslim men’s to have more than one wife.
On 16th of February 2017, the Supreme Court asked Shayara Bano,
the Union of India comma various women’s rights bodies, and all India
Muslim personal law board to give written submission on the issue of talaq-
208 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
e-biddat, nikah halala and polygamy. The Union of India and the women’s
right organisation like Bebaak collective and Bhartiya Muslim Mahila
Andolan supported the Ms Bano’s plea that these practices are
unconstitutional. The AIMPLB has argue that an uncodified Muslim personal
law is not subject to constitutional judicial review and that these are essential
practices of the Islamic religion and protected under article 25 of the
constitution.
After accepting the Sahara Bano’s petition, the Apex court formed a
five judge constitutional bench on 30th March 2017. The first hearing was on
11th May 2017. On 22nd of August 2017, the five judge bench pronounced its
decision in the triple talaq case declaring that the practice was unconstitutional
by a 3:2 majority.
Issues:
1. The validity of triple talaq.
2. Whether Triple Talaq is an essential religious practice?
3. Whether the practice of triple talaq violates any fundamental rights?
Arguments by the Parties:
Arguments of Shayara Bano ( Petitioner):
In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, Mr Amit Chadha. Senior advocate
representing Shayara Bano began by arguing that triple talaq is not a form of
divorce recognised by the Muslim personal law ( shariat ) application act,
1937. He pointed out that several high courts and supreme court decision
have restricted the unilateral tar of Muslim men to divorce women and criticize
the practice of triple talaq has it does not have Quranic sanction. Moreover,
these judgement affirms that the Quran permits divorce for reasonable cause
an if preceded attempt at reconciliation. He urged the court to strike down
triple talaq as allowing an un-codified power to Muslim men to divorce violate
Article 14 and 15 of the constitution.
He concluded by suggesting that if triple talaq is struck down, the law
of divorce for Muslims would be the dissolution of Muslim marriage act, 1939
that could apply equally the entire Muslim community, irrespective of gender.
Arguments by respondent :-
In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, Mr Kapil sibal first clarify that the
shariat act 1937 does not codify substansive Muslim personal law but restate
that the Sharia shall apply as a rule of decision to Muslim overriding any
custom or usage to the contrary. He asserted that object of the act was to
overcome customs that discriminated against women in matter of inheritance.
Moreover, since marriage is private contract and Islamic law, no state legislation
can change it.
Mr. Sibal refer to the constituent assembly debates to argue that the
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 209
definition of law under article 13 does not include personal laws. He pointed
out that the assembly rejected amendment that sought to include “and anything
else” to the definition of law it considered and rejected the inclusion of such
law under article 13. He suggested that the explicit mention of personal law in
the concurrent list and its absence in article 13 demonstrate the constitution
maker’s intention to exclude personal law.
You can turn to the right to freedom of religious practice under article
25 clause 2. He argued that the constitution empowers Parliament to make
social reform law on secular activities associated with religious practices.
Hence, only after Parliament pass the law on the subject can a court assess its
validity. Mr. Sibal suggested that collection of money in a temple an example
of such secular activity.
Mr. Sibal concluded arguments by claiming that Muslim women are not
discriminated against triple talaq rule and may even benefit from immediate
relief from bad marriages. He proposed four options for Muslim women to
protect herself from the discriminatory use of triple talaq :
1. She may register the marriage under the special marriage act, 1954
2. she can insert conditions into the nikahnama to prohibit her husband
from exercising a triple talaq
3. she delegate the right to talaq to herself
4. insist on the payment of a high mehar amount to deter the exercise of
triple talaq.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court laid down this judgment on August 22, 2017 in 3:2
majority holding the practice of Triple Talaaq unconstitutional. The majority
judgment was written by Justice Nariman for himself and on the behalf of
Justice Lalit, while Justice Joseph concurred by the majority opinion Chief
Justice Kehar for himself and on behalf of Justice Nazeer wrote the minority
opinion. While the majority upon lengthy discussion came to the conclusion
that Triple Talaq is not an essential religious practice but minority bench
found this practice to be an essential religious practice.
Under Article 25 of the Constitution the state cannot take away the
essential religious practice of a person. Therefore, if a practice which is arbitrary
and not an essential religious practice it will be hit by the exception laid down
under Article 25. Therefore, the whole issue was whether or not the practice is
an essential religious practice of Islam.
Therefore, as per majority it was held that the Triple Talaqor Talaq-e-
biddatis not protected by the exception laid down in Article 25 i.e. the court
found the said practice not an essential element of Islamic religion. The court
justified its point of view in the sense that although it si practiced by the
210 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
Hanafi School but it is considered sinful in it. Triple Talaqis against the basic
tenets ofQuoran and whatever is against Quoranis contrary to Shariat
therefore, what is bad in theology cannot be good in law. The majority bench
relied on its earlier decision Shamim Ara, which held that this practice of
Triple Talaq is against both theology and law and just because it is followed
by a large number of people it cannot be validated. Therefore, such practice is
declared unconstitutional and set aside.
Article 25 in it carries the right of every person to freely practice and
propagate any religion of choice and such practice is only restricted in the
context of the following exceptions:
1. Public Order
2. Health
3. Morality
4. Other Provisions of Part III of the Constitution
Although the said practice has no relevance to the first three exceptions
but it is surely against other provisions of Part III namely Article 14. The said
practice is in violation of the Fundamental Right of equality since it is against
the rights of women as they have no say in the declaration of divorce unlike
in other religions. Nariman & Lalit JJ. held that the impugned practice is a tool
by which marital tie can be broken on whims of Husband without any attempt
of reconciliation to save it. This form of Talaq therefore, is in violation of
Article 14 and liable to be struck down by the courts.
What is an essential religious practice? It depends on the background,
history and tenets of the religion. If some practice is not prohibited then it
does not necessarily mean that such practice is an essential religious practice.
Essential religious practices are those on which the religion is founded
upon. Essential religious are those which are fundamental to the profession
and propagation of the religion. If taking away of a practice causes a
substantial change in the religion then such practice can be called as ‘an
essential religious practice.’ Only such practices are protected in Article
25(1). The usurpation of religious practices through state intervention will
result in violation in rights mentioned in Article 25(1) & not with the
usurpation of circumstantial and non-essential practices. The fact that
majority of Islamic countries have done away with the said practice also
reflects that the said practice is not one which will be called as an essential
religious practice.
However, Justice Khehar, writing the minority opinion held that such
practice is an essential religious element of Islam. The Minority bench of the
court justified this stance on the ground that this practice is followed by a
large population of people. Since this practice has the sanction of religious
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 211
denomination and followed by an overwhelming majority of Muslim
population, the said practice is declared to be constitutional and an essential
religious practice.
Justice Kehar was, as far as the exceptions mentioned in Article 25(1) of
the Constitution, of the opinion that the impugned practice is not violative of
any of these exceptions since Shariat or Muslim Personal law is not based on
any state legislative action.
Critical Analysis
The Triple Talaq judgment is widely appreciated throughout the
jurisdictions as a protection shield against the social evil such as this
practice promoted. The majority bench on the face of it criticized the
government for not making relevant laws to prohibit such a regressive
practice. This act allowed the husband to end the marital tie on his whims
and fancies, thereby making the life of the women hell. The Muslim women
have since many years demanding the protection from such a regressive
and bad practice and finally it was the apex court which gave them the
appropriate remedy.
Justice Nariman at the outset said that as soon as he would find any
violation of Fundamental Right, he will strike down the practice. There was no
question that the said practice was an essential religious practice or not since
majority of Islamic nations have already banned the practice & in India only
Hanafi School practices it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the practice is one
of religious importance. The majority finding the said practice in violation of
Article 14 as well as of the exceptions laid down in Article 25(1) struck down
the regressive act with 3:2 majority. The bench observed that merely because
the practice is widespread and continuing from time immemorial it cannot be
held as an essential religious practice. Hinduism also after finding Sati Pratha
regressive removed it from the religion. Sati was also practiced widespread
and practiced since time immemorial. Therefore, the court arrived at a very
correct judgment.
The majority started its judgment by the phrase “what is bad in theology
cannot be good in law”. This statement makes it clear the stance of the
majority bench on the impugned act. One does not need to dwell down into
the details and should understand that if Triple Talaq had been a essential
religious practice of Islam then in that case it would not have been banned in
almost all Islamic nations. Further, the said practice is only practiced in Hanafi
School who itself considers it sinful. Therefore, the majority bench correctly
held such practice as unconstitutional.
The minority judgment written by CJ Kehar on the behalf of himself
and Justice Nazeer was flawed in every aspect. The hon’ble judges should
212 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
have considered that fact that:
Firstly, an essential religious practice would not have been banned by
the Islamic nations.
Secondly, an essential religious practice cannot be stated as sinful by
the religion itself.
Thirdly, merely because one community of the religion follows the
practice, then such practice cannot be termed as an essential religious.
The minority bench ignored the atrocities that are committed by the
said practice. It is the duty of the courts to dispense justice and the courts
should not be deterred by mere technicalities in dispense justice. The minority
judgment is per incuriam as the judges said that however bad the practice be,
if it is an essential practice it cannot be struck down. The whole reasoning of
the minority bench is irrational, unfair and unjust. If the two judges have also
ruled in the favor of majority the impact would be altogether different.
However, thanks to the justified reasoning provided by the majority
bench India finally did away with the regressive and backward practice of Triple
Talaqor Talaq-e-biddat.
Conclusion
After so many abortive attempts finally, a petition filed by Shayara
Bano, Ishrat Jahan, Aafreen Rehman, Gulshan Parveen was successful in
bringing justice to many unheard voices of India. The majority decision
restored the trust that the common people possesses for the institution of
Judiciary. The judgment proved that the democratic notions such as equality,
liberty etc. would not bend down against any philosophy even if it is a religion.
The courts finally brought justice to those women who have been a victim
of Triple Talaq. Men after enjoying and extracting pleasure out of women
used to abandon them easily by the virtue of Triple Talaq. Now, after the
pronouncement of the judgment the situation has changed and made such
incidents impossible.
No husband can now abandon his wife by ending marital tie on his
whims and fancies. The court ensured that the ideas of equality especially
gender equality is not a mere theoretical ideology. However, the opinion of
minority bench worries the nation. If the Chief Justice of India is giving primacy
to practices such as Triple Talaq ignoring the widespread atrocities, then
there is some serious rethink required by the Judges of the apex court.
Leading Case 5
M/s Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1281
Background
Political Background
It is an Indian Social Activist and human rights campaigner. She
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 213
started her social activism campaigning about adult literacy in 1981. Since
1989, she has spent most of her time in combating communal and
fundamentalist forces in India. In 2003 she was one of the founders of
ANHAD which administers. It’s FCRA license was cancelled based on
inputs from intelligence agency for using foreign funding to work against
the public interest. She has campaigned against communalism and violation
of human rights in the name of fighting terrorism. She was involved in
exposing what she alleges are terror links of Hindutva forces but also
forces but also fought for the rights of Battla house encounter suspects
who later allegedly joined ISIS. Shabnam Hashmi was amongst nintey-one
women from India who figured in the list of 1,000 women who have been
nominated globally for the Nobel Peace Prize – 2005. Hashmi has focused
on issues of women’s political participation, adoption, gender justice,
democracy and secularism.
The decision of Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India is a very high
watermark in the development of the law relating to adoption.
International background-
In Unites States, through ICA, the legal transfer of parental rights from
birth parents takes place. ICA opens another pathway to children to receive
he care, security and love that only a permanent family can provide.
Adoption was unknown to common law, and is a creature of statute,
the first of which was the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, now replaced by the
Adoption Act, 1976. The English Court only has the jurisdiction, if the applicant,
is in any part of the United Kingdom and the child is in England.
Judicial Background
Adoption is always been a very crucial subject of discussion. In the
regard Bomabay High Court and the Kerala High Court in various cases have
explained the importance of adoption and right to adopt a child. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in this case has referred Article 21 and Article 44 of the
Constitution. The Hon’ble Court has explained the importance of fundamental
rights and right to have adopted child.
Facts of the Case:
1. Specific guidelines were needed for adoption.
2. Shabnam Hashmi, is an Indian Social Activist and human rights
campaigner. She started her social activism campaigning about adult
literacy in 1981.
3. She has filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution..
4. She has requested the court to lay down optional guidelines enabling
adoption of children by persons irrespective of religion, caste, creed
etc.
214 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
Issues Raised
1. Whether adoption of a child is a fundamental right?
2. In case of contradiction between personal law and secular law, what is
going to be prevailed?
3. Whether caste, creed and religions affects the adoption procedure?
Arguments
Peitioner’s argument
1. Petitioner requested the court to lay down optional guidelines enabling
adoption of children by persons irrespective of religion, caste, creed
etc. And further for a direction to the respondent Union of India to
enact an optional law the prime focus of which is the child with
considerable like religion etc. taking a hint seat.
2. It was also highlighted that as per guidelines of 2011 and JJ Rules, 2017
there is undue delay in processing of adoption cases at the level of
Child Welfare Committees, the Adoption Recommendation Committees
as well as the concerned courts.
3. It was also argued by the Petitioner that the JJ Act, 2000 is a secular law
enabling any person, irrespective of the religion he professes, to take a
child in adoption.
4. It was also argued that the court should direct the states and UT under
JJ Act, 2000 to implement Section 41 of the Act and to follow CARA
guidelines.
5. It was also argued that Right to adopt a child is a fundamental right.
Respondent’s argument
1. It is contented that Islamic Law doesn’t recognize an adopted child to
be at par with a biological child. As per Islamic law, it processes what is
known as the “Kafala” system under which the child is placed under a
‘Kafil’ who provides for the well being of the child remains the true
descendant of his biological parents and not that of the “adoptive”
parents.
2. It was also contended that this system is recognized in UN Convention
on Rights of the Child and therefore, directions should be issued to all
the Child Welfare Committees to keep in mind and follow the principles
of Islamic Law before declaring a Muslim child available for adoption
under Section 41(5) of the JJ Act, 2000.
Judgment
Summary of court decision and judgment
In 2014, the judgment of Shabnam Hashmi provided the adoption as the
Fundamental Right. It was permitted that any person irrespective of religion
can adopt a child under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
According to syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur 215
Act, 2000. Shabnam had only guardianship rights over a girl adopted by her
as granted by the court because as per the Muslim Law, adoption is not
allowed. She claimed that adoption should be allowed on humanitarian grounds
and as a Fundamental Right as well. After the finality of this case, the judgment
has permitted all the future intended parents to go for adoption process (can
adopt a child) under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000 irrespective of religion and it was also held that this act is of secular
nature for the purpose of adoption of children under the prescribed procedure.
Analysis
The prayer made in the writ petition appears to have been substantially
fructified by the march that has taken place in this sphere of law, gently
nudged by the judicial verdict in Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India,
(1984) 2 SCC 244, and the supplemental, if not consequential, legislative
innovations in the shape of the Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 as amended in 2006 (the JJ Act, 2000) as also the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules promulgated in the year 2007
(the JJ Rules, 2007). The JJ Act, 2000, as amended, is an enabling legislation
that gives a prospective parent the option of adopting an eligible child by
following the procedure prescribed by the Act, Rules and the Central Adoption
Resource Agency (CARA) guidelines, as notified under the Act.
The Act does not mandate any compulsive action by any prospective
parent leaving such person with the liberty of accessing the provisions of the
Act, if he so desires. Such a person is always free to adopt or choose not to do
so and, instead, follow what he comprehends to be the dictates of the personal
law applicable to him. To us, the Act is a small step in reaching the goal
enshrined by Article 44 of the Constitution. Personal beliefs and faiths, though
must be honoured, cannot dictate the operation of the provisions of an enabling
statute. An optional legislation that does not contain an unavoidable imperative
cannot be stultified by principles of personal law which, however, would
always continue to govern any person who chooses to so submit himself
until such time that the vision of a uniform Civil Code is achieved. The same
can only happen by the collective decision of the generation(s) to come to
sink conflicting faiths and beliefs that are still active as on date.
While it is correct that the dimensions and perspectives of the meaning
and content of fundamental rights are in a process of constant evolution as is
bound to happen in a vibrant democracy where the mind is always free,
elevation of the right to adopt or to be adopted to the status of a Fundamental
Right will have to await a dissipation of the conflicting thought processes in
this sphere of practices and beliefs prevailing in the country. The legislature
which is better equipped to comprehend the mental preparedness of the entire
216 FAMILY LAW -II (MUSLIM LAW)
citizenry to think unitedly on the issue has expressed its view, for the present,
by the enactment of the JJ Act, 2000 and the same must receive due respect.
The present is not an appropriate time and stage where the right to adopt and
the right to be adopted can be raised to the status of a fundamental right and/
or to understand such a right to be encompassed by Article 21 of the
Constitution.
Conclusion
Judiciary through its decisions has provided the welfare mechanism to
the uniformity of Adoption such as Shabnam Hashmi. The state should
encourage the practice of adoption instead of promoting surrogacy so that
uniform law of adoption can help the needy child to get a home. As of now, the
judiciary has provided the uniformity of adoption through its judgment and
now, it is duty of the legislature to provide Uniform law for adoption which is
the need of the hour.