Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Leading Case 1
Corfu Channel Case
Leading Case 2
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K v Norway)
Leading Case 3
Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ 6
Leading Case 4
North Sea Continental shelf Cases (1968) ICJ 1
Leading Case 5
The SS Lotus Case (France V Turkey)
Leading Case 6
The Nuremburg Trial
Leading Case 7
Nicaragua v united States (1984) ICJ 169
Leading Case 1
Corfu Channel Case
Background: The Corfu Channel case was the first contentious case
heard by the International Court of Justice, the supreme arbitration organ of
the United Nations and one of the principal sources of authoritative rulings
on international law.
Facts of the Case:
On May 15th 1946 the British warships passed through the Channel
without the approval of the Albanian government and were shot at. Later, on
October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British warships (two cruisers and two
destroyers), left the port of Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel
previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait. Both destroyers were
struck by a mine and were heavily damaged. This incident resulted also in
many deaths.
Public International Law & Human Rights 129
The two ships were mined in Albanian territorial waters in a previously
swept and check-swept channel. After the explosions of October 22nd, the
United Kingdom Government sent a note to the Albanian Government, in
which it announced its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The
Albanian reply, which was received in London on October 31st, stated that
the Albanian Government would not give its consent to this unless the
operation in question took place outside Albanian territorial waters.
Meanwhile, at the United Kingdom Government’s request, the International
Central Mine Clearance Board decided, in a resolution of November 1st, 1946,
that there should be a further sweep of the Channel, subject to Albania’s
consent.
The United Kingdom Government has informed the Albanian
Government, in communication of November 10th, that the proposed sweep
would take place on November 12th, the Albanian Government replied on the
11th, protesting against this ‘unilateral decision of His Majesty’s Government’.
It said it did not consider it inconvenient that the British fleet should undertake
the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added that, before sweeping
was carried out, it considered it indispensable to decide what area of the sea
should be deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed the establishment
of a Mixed Commission for the purpose. It ended by saying that any sweeping
undertaken without the consent of the Albanian Government outside the
channel thus constituted, i.e., inside Albanian territorial waters where foreign
warships have no reason to sail, could only be considered as a deliberate
violation of Albanian territory and sovereignty.
After this exchange of notes, ‘Operation Retail’ took place on November
12th and 13th. One fact of particular importance is that the North Corfu Channel
constitutes a frontier between Albania and Greece, that a part of it is wholly
within the territorial waters of these States, and that the Strait is of special
importance to Greece by reason of the traffic to and from the port of Corfu.
Issues:
T he British government claimed the minefield which caused the
explosions was laid between May 15th, 1946, and October 22nd, 1946, by or
with the approval or knowledge of the Albanian Government. Thus Albania
was responsible for the explosions and loss of life and had to compensate the
UK government. In addition to the passage of the United Kingdom warships
on October 22nd, 1946, the second question in the Special Agreement relates
to the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on November 12th and 13th,
1946 when the British government carried out a minesweeping operation called
‘Operation Retail’ without the consent of Albania.
The UK held the opinion the passage on October 22nd, 1946 was
130 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
innocent and that according to rules of international law it had the right to
innocent passage through the North Corfu Channel as it is considered part of
international highways and does not need a previous approval of the territorial
state. The Albanian Government does not dispute that the North Corfu Channel
is a strait in the geographical sense; but it denies that this Channel belongs to
the class of international highways through which a right of passage exists,
on the grounds that it is only of secondary importance and not even a
necessary route between two parts of the high seas, and that it is used almost
exclusively for local traffic to and from the ports of Corfu. Thus a previous
approval of the territorial state is necessary.
a. Should the North Corfu Channel as it is considered part of international
highways?
Is Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which
occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and
loss of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay
compensation?
Analysis:
The court analyzed the geographical situation of the channel
connecting two parts of the high seas and was in fact frequently being used
for international navigation. Taking into account these various considerations,
the Court concluded that the North Corfu Channel should be considered as
belonging to the class of international highways through which an innocent
passage does not need special approval and cannot be prohibited by a coastal
State in time of peace. The UK government claimed that on October 22nd,
1946, Albania neither notified the existence of the minefield nor warned the
British warships of the danger they were approaching.
According to the principle of state responsibility, they should have
done all necessary steps immediately to warn ships near the danger zone,
more especially those that were approaching that zone. In fact, nothing was
attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave
omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania. But Albania’s
obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her waters depends
on her having obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time before October
22nd; and the duty of the Albanian coastal authorities to warn the British
ships depends on the time that elapsed between the moment that these ships
were reported and the moment of the first explosion.
Conclusion of the Court:
The Court, therefore, reached the conclusion that Albania is responsible
under international law for the explosions which occurred on October 22nd,
1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life which
Public International Law & Human Rights 131
resulted from them, and that there is a duty upon Albania to pay compensation
to the United Kingdom.
In the second part of the Special Agreement, the following question is
submitted to the Court:
Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the
sovereignty of the Albanian People’s Republic by reason of the acts of the
Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th
November 1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction?
Albania was in fact in war with Greece which means that the coastal
state was not in time of peace. The UK had not an innocent passage due to the
way it was carried out. The court assessed the manner of UK warships after
they had been shot on May 15th. Having thus examined the various contentions
of the Albanian Government in so far as they appear to be relevant, the Court
has arrived at the conclusion that the United Kingdom did not violate the
sovereignty of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian
waters on October 22nd, 1946. The United Kingdom Government does not
dispute that ‘Operation Retail’ was carried out against the clearly expressed
wish of the Albanian Government.
It recognizes that the operation had not the consent of the international
mine clearance organizations, that it could not be justified as the exercise of a
right of innocent passage, and lastly that, in principle, international law does
not allow a State to assemble a large number of warships in the territorial
waters of another State and to carry out minesweeping in those waters. The
United Kingdom Government states that the operation was one of extreme
urgency and that it considered itself entitled to carry it out without anybody’s
consent. The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rising to most
serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in
international organization, The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply,
has further classified ‘Operation Retail’ among methods of self-protection or
self-help. The Court cannot accept this defense either find a place in
international law.
The final conclusion of the court:
a. On the first question put by the Special Agreement of March 25th,
1948,: The court gives judgment that the People’s Republic of Albania
is responsible under international law for the explosions which
occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage
and loss of human life that resulted there from; and Reserves for further
consideration the assessment of the amount of compensation and
regulates the procedure on this subject.
132 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
b. On the second question put by the Special Agreement on the violation
of state sovereignty, The court gives judgment that the United
Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of
Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters
on October 22nd, 1946; and unanimously, gave judgment that by
reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters in the course
of the Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom
violated the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of Albania, and
that this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate
satisfaction.
Leading Case 2
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K v Norway)
Background to the case:
The United Kingdom requested the court to decide if Norway had used
a legally acceptable method in drawing the baseline from which it measured
its territorial sea. The United Kingdom argued that customary international
law did not allow the length of a baseline drawn across a bay to be longer than
ten miles. Norway argued that its delimitation method was consistent with
general principles of international law.
Principle:
Some degree of uniformity amongst state practices was essential before
a custom could come into existence
Facts of the case:
Due to the complaints from the King of Denmark and of Norway, at the
beginning of the seventeenth century, British fishermen refrained from fishing
in Norwegian coastal waters for a long period, from 1616-1618 until 1906.
In 1906 a few British fishing vessels appeared off the coasts of Eastern
Finnmark. From 1908 onwards they returned in greater numbers. These were
trawlers equipped with improved and powerful gear. The local population
became perturbed, and measures were taken by the Norwegian Government
with a view to specifying the limits within which fishing was prohibited to
foreigners. The first incident occurred in 1911 when a British trawler was
seized and condemned for having violated these measures. Negotiations
ensued between the two Governments. These were interrupted by the war in
1914.
From 1922 onwards incidents recurred. Further conversations were
initiated in 1924. In 1932, British trawlers, extending the range of their activities,
appeared in the sectors off the Norwegian coast west of the North Cape, and
the number of warnings and arrests increased. On July 27th, 1933, the United
Kingdom Government sent a memorandum to the Norwegian Government
Public International Law & Human Rights 133
complaining that in delimiting the territorial sea the Norwegian authorities had
made use of unjustifiable base-lines.
On July 12th, 1935, a Norwegian Royal Decree was enacted delimiting
the Norwegian fisheries zone north of 66 degrees 28.8' North latitude. A number
of British trawlers were arrested and condemned. It was then that the United
Kingdom Government raised this dispute. The United Kingdom, in its
arguments against the Norwegian method of measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea, referred to an alleged rule of custom whereby a straight line may
be drawn across bays of less than ten miles from one projection to the other,
which could then be regarded as the baseline for the measurement of the
territorial sea.
Decisions: The Court dismissed the argument of Great Britain by
pointing out that the actual practice of states did not justify the creation of
any such custom. In other words, there had been insufficient uniformity of
behaviour.
Aftermath of the Judgement: The Judgment delivered by the Court in
this case ended a long controversy between the United Kingdom and Norway
which had aroused considerable interest in other maritime States. In 1935
Norway enacted a decree by which it reserved certain fishing grounds situated
off its northern coast for the exclusive use of its own fishermen. The question
at issue was whether this decree, which laid down a method for drawing the
baselines from which the width of the Norwegian territorial waters had to be
calculated, was valid international law. This question was rendered particularly
delicate by the intricacies of the Norwegian coastal zone, with its many fjords,
bays, islands, islets and reefs. The United Kingdom contended, inter alia, that
some of the baselines fixed by the decree did not accord with the general
direction of the coast and were not drawn in a reasonable manner. In its
Judgment of 18 December 1951, the Court found that, contrary to the
submissions of the United Kingdom, neither the method nor the actual baselines
stipulated by the 1935 Decree were contrary to international law.
Leading Case 3
Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ 6
Background:
The case of Colombia v. Peru or commonly known as the Asylum case
is a landmark in Public International law for several reasons, inter alia, its
expansion of laws on extradition and political asylum, development of
customary international law and concept of sovereignty in International law.
The case, having been decided as early as the 1950s, [Judgment on 20
November 1950] has played a significant role in moulding the international
law and giving it the shape as it stands today.
134 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
Facts:
Peru is a country in the Continent of Latin America or South America
and has its capital at Lima. In 1948, the country went through rough times
where a very long tussle broke out in Lima for the acquisition of political
powers and government.
After a long struggle and siege, the Military Junta Government came
to power defeating the American Citizens’ Revolutionary Alliance which
automatically became the opposition party.
As a result of this loss of power and government, the leader of the
opposition, Victor Raul, commenced a rebellion against the Junta government
in Peru intending to dethrone him. However, due to extreme political powers
vested in the government, the rebellion was surmounted within 24 hours. The
leading party also instituted criminal proceedings against Raul for instigating
the rebellion and sedition. As a result, Raul had to run for his life, and he
sought asylum in the capital of Peru, Lima, under a Colombian Embassy.
Three months after his escape, on January 04, 1949, the Peruvian
government was informed about his asylum, and they immediately claimed his
custody. On the other hand, the Colombian embassy claimed that Victor has a
right to passage and requested safe passage for him to leave the country.
Moreover, the Colombian government unilaterally qualified the offence
committed by Victor to be a political offense and allowed political refuge
without consideration from the Peruvian government. The already enraged
government of Peru categorically denied the safe passage arguing that there
exists no right of political or diplomatic asylum for Raul since he is responsible
for the rebellion or in legalese, common crimes.
Due to non-agreement between both the States, Peru and Colombia,
the situation reached a diplomatic stalemate and no provision was left for
either party rather than to move an independent authority. Hence, an agreement
was signed between the two States and it was decided that the ICJ will adjudge
the matter, and the award will be agreed to by both the parties.
Issues before the ICJ:
• Whether the State of Colombia had right to unilaterally qualify the
offense of Victor Raul as a political offense under any international
treaty, customary international law or any general principles of
international law?
• Whether the Peruvian government was bound to grant safe passage to
Raul to leave the country under international law?
• Whether the Colombian government and ambassador was liable for
violating the provisions of the Havana Convention on Asylum, 1928 by
providing and continuing to provide asylum
Public International Law & Human Rights 135
Relevant Legal Provisions:
• Article 18 of the Bolivarian Agreement on Extradition, 1911
• Articles 1 and 2 of the Havana Convention on Asylum, 1928
• Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum, 1933
• Customary International Law
Arguments on Behalf of the Colombian Government:
The Colombian government put forth a threefold argument before
the court to substantiate its actions. Now, before proceeding with the
arguments, it is vital to note that in the present case, Colombia has
filed a claim before the court to hold its asylum valid and allow safe-
passage to Victor Raul to leave the State. On the contrary, Peru has
filed a counter-claim to hold the asylum invalid, extradite the offender
to the Peruvian government and deny safe passage to the offender.
Hence, both the parties tried to justify their actions through profound
arguments.
The threefold arguments of the Columbian government can be explained as
follows:
1. Under Article 18 of the Bolivarian Agreement, 1911 every country is
entitled to grant political asylum to any political refugee in accordance
with the international law. This has been further reiterated under the
Montevideo Convention, 1933 as well. Both the agreements were ratified
and signed by Peru and Colombia. These provisions were relied upon
by Colombia and argued that according to these treaty obligations,
Colombia had every right to grant asylum to the political offender and
hence, no law has been violated.
2. Further, Colombia argued the existence of an ancient and long practised
custom in South American countries that vests right upon these
countries to grant asylum to anyone seeking it. Further, Colombia also
claimed that the custom does not prevent any unilateral qualification
of an offender as a political offender for the purpose of granting asylum.
Hence, Colombia prayed that since the State has the right to qualify
anyone as a political offender unilaterally, it is the duty of other States
to respect such qualification and allow safe passage to such refugees
or asylum-seekers.
3. Lastly, Colombia argued that according to Article 2 (2) of the Havana
Convention, Peru was obliged to provide a free and safe passage to the
asylum seeker to leave the country without any harm. Moreover, it was
implored that the provision of this convention align with the American
custom demands respect for such rights and hence, Peru is liable to
provide passage to Raul.
136 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
Arguments on Behalf of the Peruvian Government:
As mentioned before, the Peruvian government filed a counterclaim to
claim the extradition of Kaul and hold Colombia liable for hiding an offender.
The arguments of the Peruvian government were twofold;
1. Firstly, the Bolivarian agreement is a treaty on extradition and
does not deal with asylum. Further, according to the Havana
Convention on Asylum, political asylum can be provided only in
favour of a political offender. A political offender means any
person who has committed an act towards the detriment of the
State and caused or attempted to cause harm to its sovereignty
and integrity. Political offenders are allowed asylums because
several times, these political offenders are rebels fighting against
their cruel government or a dictator’s rule and under their radar
to be found and exterminated. In the present case, Peru argued
that Victor was no t a political offender and the unilateral
qualification of Victor as a political offender by the Colombian
government is invalid.
2. Secondly, it was also argued by the Peruvian government that according
to Article 2 of the Havana Convention, asylum should be granted in
cases of dire need or utmost emergency. For instance, when there is an
immediate threat of extermination or persecution of the asylum seeker.
In the present case, the Peruvian government has not shown any such
intention of persecuting Raul. On the contrary, a legal trial has been
initiated against him in the Peruvian court. Hence, the asylum is invalid
and against international law.
Judgment of the ICJ | Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru),
With respect to the unilateral qualification of Raul’s offense as a political
offense, the ICJ observed that in a normal scenario, the procedure is that the
asylum granting State has right to provisionally qualify an offense as a political
offense and the territorial State is entitled to consent to such qualification. In
the present case, consent was denied by the Peruvian government, but the
Colombian embassy made the qualification absolute even without consent.
Moreover, the court also observed that the Havana Convention does
not provide any right or entitlement to any State for the unilateral qualification
of an offense as a political offense. Hence, it would be wrong to assert that
Colombia had any right to make such a qualification.
The Colombian government relied highly on the Montevideo Convention
of 1933 which allows such power to the State, to which the court observed
that Peru has neither signed nor ratified the Montevideo Convention.
Moreover, the convention has not been ratified by a large number of States,
Public International Law & Human Rights 137
and its provisions are very rarely used. Hence, it is neither binding as a treaty
nor as a general principle of International law.
Adding to the issue of unilateral qualification, the court also held that
the Colombian government’s argument related to c customary practice in
the Latin American States to grant asylum is also futile. It is because an
essential ingredient of a valid custom is “consistent and uniform usage”. In
the case of South American States, the practice has always arisen, taking into
consideration some unforeseen exigencies and urgent need. There is no
uniform practice as such and hence, no customary International law as well.
Conclusion & Analysis:
This case evolved the concept of customary international law and
added two essential ingredients to it, i.e. consistent and uniform usage. Now,
when you distinguish practice from a custom, the essential requirement is to
prove that the practice has been going on for centuries in the same fashion
and is still in vogue guiding the way of the State. Hence, the court rightly
concluded that Peru has the right over the custody of the Victor Court.
Leading Case 4
North Sea Continental shelf Cases (1968) ICJ 1
Facts of the case
Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on
the equidistance principle. An agreement on further prolongation of the
boundary proved difficult because Denmark and Netherlands wanted this
prolongation to take place based on the equidistance principle. Germany was
of the view that, together, these two boundaries would produce aninequitable
result for her. Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line
would result in her losing out on her share of the continental shelf based on
proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline.
The Court had to decide the principles and rules of international law
applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the Court had to decide if the
principles espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either through
treaty law or customary international law.
Issues:
Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special
circumstances principle, contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a customary international law rule or
on the basis of the Geneva Convention?
The case involved the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in the
North Sea between Germany and Denmark and Germany and Netherlands
beyond the partial boundaries previously agreed upon by these States. The
parties requested the Court to decide the principles and rules of international
138 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
law that are applicable to the above delimitation because the parties disagreed
on the applicable principles or rules of delimitation.
Netherlands and Denmark relied on the principle of equidistance (the
method of determining the boundaries in such a way that every point in the
boundary is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breath of the territorial sea of each State is measured). Germany sought to
get a decision in favor of the notion that the delimitation of the relevant
continental shelf was governed by the principle that each coastal state is
entitled to a just and equitable share (hereinafter called just and equitable
principle/method). Contrary to Denmark and Netherlands, Germany argued
that the principle of equidistance was neither a mandatory rule in delimitation
of the continental shelf nor a rule of customary international law that was
binding on Germany.
The Court was not asked to delimit because the parties had already
agreed to delimit the continental shelf as between their countries, by agreement,
after the determination of the Court on the applicable principles.
Decision:
The use of the equidistance method had not crystallized into customary
law and the method was not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas in the
North Sea related to the present proceedings.
Leading Case 5
The SS Lotus Case (France V Turkey)
Backgorund:
Turkey’s (D) assertion of jurisdiction over a French citizen who had
been the first officer of a ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the high
seas was challenged by France (P) as a violation of international law.
Synopsis of Rule of Law:
A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the state’s
national jurisdiction, does not exist.
Facts:
A collision occurred shortly before midnight on the 2nd of August 1926
between the French (P) mail steamer Lotus and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-
Kourt. The French mail steamer was captained by a French citizen by the name
Demons while the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt was captained by Hassan Bey.
The Turks lost eight men after their ship cut into two and sank as a result of
the collision.
Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to help the ship
wrecked persons, it continued on its course to Constantinople, where it arrived
on August 3. On the 5th of August, Lieutenant Demons was asked by the
Public International Law & Human Rights 139
Turkish (D) authority to go ashore to give evidence. After Demons was
examined, he was placed under arrest without informing the French (P) Consul-
General and Hassan Bey. Demons were convicted by the Turkish (D) courts
for negligence conduct in allowing the accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction over him. With this, both countries agreed to submit to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the question of whether the exercise
of Turkish (D) criminal jurisdiction over Demons for an incident that occurred
on the high seas contravened international law.
Issue:
Does a rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising
criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the
state’s national jurisdiction exist?
Decision:
A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the state’s
national jurisdiction, does not exist. Failing the existence of a permissive rule
to the contrary is the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law on a state and it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of
another state.
This does not imply that international law prohibits a state from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case that relates to
acts that have taken place abroad which it cannot rely on some permissive
rule of international law. In this situation, it is impossible to hold that there is
a rule of international law that prohibits Turkey (D) from prosecuting Demons
because he was aboard a French ship. This stems from the fact that the effects
of the alleged offense occurred on a Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over this
matter because there is no rule of international law in regards to collision
cases to the effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the state whose flag is flown.
The court enunciated two principles, namely – outside its territory and
within its territory, collectively known as Lotus principles. The first principle
says that a country cannot act beyond its jurisdiction unless the same is
being allowed by a convention, custom or a treaty. The second principle says
that a state may exercise jurisdiction within its territory even though there is
no specific international law or treaty allowing to do so.
However, there is no international treaty or convention that prohibits a
state to exercise its jurisdiction in case the act/incident is committed in a
foreign country. A wide discretionary power lies in the hand of the country, in
140 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
that case, which has to decide when to invoke jurisdiction and when not. In
that pursuit, the country should keep in mind that they do not overstep the
limitation laid down by the international law. In the case, the court held that
there lies a concurrent jurisdiction i.e. both the Turkish and French authority
has the right to try the offender and not just the flag state i.e. the French
authorities. In this case, the court considered both the Turkish and French
vessel as a territorial extension of their respective countries and thus came
into the decision. The court further held that the Turkish authorities by initiating
the criminal proceeding against M. Demons did not violate article 15 of the
Lausanne Convention 1923 respecting conditions of residence and business
and jurisdiction.
Analysis:
In 1975, France enacted a law regarding its criminal jurisdiction over
aliens because of this the situation surrounding this case. The law
stipulates that aliens who commit a crime outside the territory of the
Republic may be prosecuted and judged pursuant to French law, when the
victim is of French nationality. This is contained in 102 Journal Du Droit
International 962 (Clunet 1975). Several eminent scholars have criticized
the holding in this case for seeming to imply that international law permits
all that it does not forbid.
Leading Case 6
The Nuremburg Trial
Background: Nurnberg trials, Nurnberg also spelled Nuremberg,
series of trials held in Nurnberg, Germany, in 1945–46, in which former Nazi
leaders were indicted and tried as war criminals by the International Military
Tribunal. The indictment lodged against them contained four counts:
i. crimes against peace (i.e., the planning, initiating, and waging of wars
of aggression in violation of international treaties and agreements),
ii. crimes against humanity (i.e., exterminations, deportations, and
genocide),
iii. war crimes (i.e., violations of the laws of war), and
iv. “a common plan or conspiracy to commit” the criminal acts listed in the
first three counts.
Facts:
The authority of the International Military Tribunal to conduct these
trials stemmed from the London Agreement of August 8, 1945. On that date,
representatives from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and
the provisional government of France signed an agreement that included a
charter for an international military tribunal to conduct trials of major Axis war
criminals whose offenses had no particular geographic location. Later 19 other
Public International Law & Human Rights 141
nations accepted the provisions of this agreement. The tribunal was given the
authority to find any individual guilty of the commission of war crimes (counts
1–3 listed above) and to declare any group or organization to be criminal in
character. If an organization was found to be criminal, the prosecution could
bring individuals to trial for having been members, and the criminal nature of
the group or organization could no longer be questioned. A defendant was
entitled to receive a copy of the indictment, to offer any relevant explanation
to the charges brought against him, and to be represented by counsel and
confront and cross-examine the witnesses.
The tribunal consisted of a member plus an alternate selected by each
of the four signatory countries. The first session, under the presidency of
Gen. I.T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet member, took place on October 18, 1945, in
Berlin At this time, 24 former Nazi leaders were charged with the perpetration
of war crimes, and various groups (such as the Gestapo, the Nazi secret
police) were charged with being criminal in character. Beginning on November
20, 1945, all sessions of the tribunal were held in Nürnberg under the presidency
of Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence (later Baron Trevethin and Oaksey), the
British member.
After 216 court sessions, on October 1, 1946, the verdict on 22 of the
original 24 defendants was handed down. Robert Ley committed suicide while
in prison, and Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach mental and physical
condition prevented his being tried.) Three of the defendants were acquitted:
Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche. Four were sentenced
to terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 20 years: Karl Dönitz, Baldur von
Schirach, Albert Speer, and Konstantin von Neurath. Three were sentenced to
life imprisonment: Rudolf Hess, Walther Funk, and Erich Raeder. Twelve of the
defendants were sentenced to death by hanging. Ten of them—Hans Frank,
Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Joachim
von Ribbentrop, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Keitel, and Arthur Seyss-
Inquart—were hanged on October 16, 1946. Martin Bormann was tried and
condemned to death in absentia, and Hermann Göring committed suicide before
he could be executed.
In rendering these decisions, the tribunal rejected the major defenses
offered by the defendants. First, it rejected the contention that only a state,
and not individuals, could be found guilty of war crimes; the tribunal held that
crimes of international law are committed by men and that only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law
be enforced. Second, it rejected the argument that the trial and adjudication
were ex post facto. The tribunal responded that such acts had been regarded
as criminal prior to World War II.
142 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
Decision:
On October 1, 1946, after months of testimony, examination and cross
examination of the defendants, and deliberation by the judges from the four
Allied powers who presided over the trials, the verdicts were announced.
Twelve defendants received the death sentence (Bormann, Frank, Frick,
Göring, Jodl, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Sauckel, Seyss-
Inquart, and Streicher). Three were sentenced to life in prison (Hess, Funk,
and Raeder). Four received prison terms ranging from 10 to 20 years (Dönitz,
von Neurath, Schirach, and Speer). In general, the decisions for prison
sentences rather than execution were made because the judges felt either
that certain circumstances surrounding a defendant’s actions warranted a
more lenient punishment or that the evidence was not strong enough to
support a death penalty. The sentences were carried out with two exceptions:
Göring died by suicide shortly before he could be executed, and Bormann
remained missing.
Three of the defendants were acquitted—Schacht, von Papen, and
Fritzsche. Schacht, who had been minister of economics, had played an
important role in German rearmament in the 1930s, but there was no evidence
that he had done so with the specific intention of waging war. There was no
proof that von Papen, who had been the German chancellor before Hitler came
to power, knew of Hitler’s intentions and his plans to wage aggressive wars.
Fritzsche, who had worked under Goebbels in the propaganda ministry, had
helped arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the war, but that in
itself was not considered to be a war crime. All three were released when the
trials ended.
The conviction and death sentence for Julius Streicher was particularly
noteworthy. Streicher was convicted neither of planning the war nor of war
crimes but only on the charge of crimes against humanity. In issuing the
verdict, the president of the tribunal explained how he and the other judges
had determined Streicher’s guilt.
The pronouncement of the sentences ended the trial. Twelve more
trials, involving 190 defendants, were held at Nuremberg. But the first trial
and the principles of international law that it established remained the most
important. Judge Charles Wyzans, writing immediately after the trial ended,
concluded: “The outstanding accomplishment of the trial which never could
have been achieved by any more executive action, is that it has crystallized
the concept that there is inherent in the international community a
machinery both for the expression of international criminal law and for its
enforcement”
Public International Law & Human Rights 143
Leading Case 7
Nicaragua v united States (1984) ICJ 169
On 9 April 1984 Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings
against the United States of America, together with a request for the indication
of provisional measures concerning a dispute relating to responsibility for
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. On 10 May 1984
the Court made an Order indicating provisional measures.
One of these measures required the United States immediately to cease
and refrain from any action restricting access to Nicaraguan ports, and, in
particular, the laying of mines. The Court also indicated that the right to
sovereignty and to political independence possessed by Nicaragua, like any
other State, should be fully respected and should not be jeopardized by
activities contrary to the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force and to
the principle of nonintervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
a State. The Court also decided in the a forementioned Order that the
proceedings would first be addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of
the Court and of the admissibility of the Nicaraguan Application. Just before
the closure of the written proceedings in this phase, El Salvador filed a
declaration of intervention in the case under Article 63 of the Statute, requesting
permission to claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Nicaragua’s
Application. In its Order dated 4 October 1984, the Court decided that El
Salvador’s declaration of intervention was inadmissible inasmuch as it related
to the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings.
After hearing argument from both Parties in the course of public hearings
held from 8 to 18 October 1984, on 26 November 1984 the Court delivered a
Judgment stating that it possessed jurisdiction to deal with the case and that
Nicaragua’s Application was admissible. In particular, it held that the
Nicaraguan declaration of 1929 was valid and that Nicaragua was therefore
entitled to invoke the United States declaration of 1946 as a basis of the
Court’s jurisdiction (Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute). The
subsequent proceedings took place in the absence of the United States, which
announced on 18 January 1985 that it “intends not to participate in any further
proceedings in connection with this case”. From 12 to 20 September 1985, the
Court heard oral argument by Nicaragua and the testimony of the five
witnesses it had called. On 27 June 1986, the Court delivered its Judgment on
the merits. The findings included a rejection of the justification of collective
self-defence advanced by the United States concerning the military or
paramilitary activities in or against Nicaragua, and a statement that the United
States had violated the obligations imposed by customary international law
not to intervene in the affairs of another State, not to use force against another
144 According to Syllabus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Law University, Jaipur
State, not to infringe the sovereignty of another State, and not to interrupt
peaceful maritime commerce. The Court also found that the United States had
violated certain obligations arising from a bilateral Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation of 1956, and that it had committed acts such to
deprive that treaty of its object and purpose.
It decided that the United States was under a duty immediately to
cease and to refrain from all acts constituting breaches of its legal obligations,
and that it must make reparation for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the
breaches of obligations under customary international law and the 1956 Treaty,
the amount of that reparation to be fixed in subsequent proceedings if the
Parties were unable to reach agreement. The Court subsequently fixed, by an
Order, time-limits for the filing of written pleadings by the Parties on the matter
of the form and amount of reparation, and the Memorial of Nicaragua was filed
on 29 March 1988, while the United States maintained its refusal to take part in
the case. In September 1991, Nicaragua informed the Court, inter alia, that it
did not wish to continue the proceedings. The United States told the Court
that it welcomed the discontinuance and, by an Order of the President dated
26 September 1991, the case was removed from the Court’s List.