Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

SUBMISSION of ‘ICE Mode I: PROJECT’ for ‘Family Law 1:

“Case Analysis on Alok Kumar vs State”

Submitted by:
Name: Mahek Gupta

PRN: 21010224028

Programme: BBA.LLB._

Division: A

Semester: III

Year: 2nd Year

Batch: 2021-26

Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

Submitted to:

Dr. Deepali Sahao

Assistant Professor

Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

(August-September 2022)

1
 INDEX

S.NO. PARTICULARS

1. FACTS OF THE CASE

2. ISSUES

3. RULES

4. ANALYSIS

5. CONCLUSION

2
FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner is a divorced man who separated in 2004 and is the mother of a 12-year-old child. In 2002, she
first met the petitioner, and they soon began meeting often in Delhi. The petitioner had travelled to see the
complaint in Germany in the month of March 2003, and they had spent time together there. Following that, they
frequently reconnected in Delhi and grew close. The petitioner's mother notified the complainant in July 2003
that the complainant questioned the petitioner, who admitted that he was already married and that his divorce
settlement was still ongoing after a two-month marriage. He asked the plaintiff to visit him in London in
September 2004 and made travel arrangements for her there. He also offered her some cash for personal use
while she was there. The complainant and the petitioner had intimate relationships during their time in London
and engaged in physical contact, but only after the petitioner gave her his word and informed her he would
marry her after divorcing his previous wife, with whom he had a son. After that, they continued to live together
and have intimate relationships. Further allegations are that the complainant went to the IGI Airport on October
18, 2007, while the petitioner was travelling from Delhi to London, between 11:00 and 11:30 AM, and
discovered the petitioner holding hands with a woman whose name she later learned to be Amrita Das.

ISSUES

 Whether registration of second FIR by the police valid that too when the first FIR was already quashed
by the police which was based on similar grounds only.

 Whether a ground taken by the defendant that promise of marriage was within the meaning of
“misconception of facts” was valid or not?

 Whether the FIR filed by the complainant was done out of mala fide intention or not?

 Whether the act of physical intimacy between the parties on the basis of false promise for marriage be
termed as Rape under the given situation?

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RULES USED

 “Section 354 of IPC – Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.”1
 “Section 376 of IPC - Punishment for rape”2
 “Section 506 of IPC - Punishment for criminal intimidation”3

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

The case's facts, as described in two FIRs, demonstrate that the appellant and the complainant admittedly had a
live-in relationship for more than five years. Although the couples had formerly exchanged marriage proposals,
the petitioner ultimately decided he could not proceed with the union. The conditions described disallow
drawing a conclusion about the complainant's lack of consent automatically. A comprehensive analysis of the
circumstances that occurred over the five years that the live-in relationship existed and during which, according
to the complainant, she allegedly had an abortion would have to come before such a decision. On the premise of
the FIR's current allegations, it appeared to this Court it would be risky to infer the complainant's lack of
permission, which is a necessary component of the rape offence.

The court further believed that the FIR against the petitioner was filed maliciously in an effort to exact revenge
on the petitioner because, after careful consideration, the petitioner refused to maintain a live-in relationship
with the complainant. The event happened about 12:30 p.m., the FIR was filed at 4:00 p.m., and the
complainant's MLC was completed around 7:15 p.m., revealing no external damage to her body. The claims that
the petitioner gave his passport to his fiancée for safekeeping even though she was present are absurd.

The petitioner's learned attorney argued on behalf of the appellant that the first FIR filed against the appellant
on October 18, 2007, under Sections 345 and 506 of the IPC, contained all the allegations related to Section
376, and that the filing of the current FIR constitutes a gross abuse of the judicial process. Due to this, the police
had no need to file a second FIR on the identical facts on February 14, 2008. In actuality, the second FIR serves
just to explain the first FIR.

If the lead investigator of the case believed that a case under Section 376 IPC needed to be filed, the said
Section might have been incorporated in the first FIR itself; however, two FIRs would not have been filed based
1
INDIAN PENAL CODE,(1860),§,sec 354.
2
INDIAN PENAL CODE,(1860),§,sec 376.
3
INDIAN PENAL CODE,(1860),§,sec 506.
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on the same facts. At best, this complaint could be considered the complainant's supplemental statement. It was
decided to base this argument on TT Antony v. State of Kerela.4

It is further asserted that the initial FIR was dismissed by this court in a decision dated August 9, 2010, which
took the circumstances of the current case into account. Because of this, the second FIR is likely to be dismissed
once the first one was dismissed. The FIR may be quashed with the order on charge by the court in the exercise
of its authority under Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code5. Furthermore, it is argued that the
allegations made in the FIR show that the parties were living together and had known each other for a
significant amount of time. Since both parties were previously married with children, there can be no
misunderstanding that the petitioner had a physical relationship with the complainant under the promise of
marriage. The parties allegedly knew one another since 2002, according to the charges. The complainant
divorced his or her spouse in 2002. While the petitioner was also married and had not yet divorced, the
complainant's divorce only occurred in 2004. Due to this, it is impossible to claim that a marriage commitment
was made in order to qualify the case as a matter of factual misinterpretation. The court cited a number of
decisions, including Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana6, Uday v. State of Karnataka7, and Harish Kumar
v. State of NCT of Delhi8, in support of its argument that the current case is an obvious instance of abuse of the
legal system, and that the FIR should be thrown out in addition to the order on charge.

CONCLUSION

A "live-in relationship" is a walk-in/walk-out arrangement. This relationship is free of conditions and does not
give rise to a binding contract between the parties. It is a contract for cohabitation that is renewed by the parties
each day. Either party may end it without the other's consent, and either party may leave at any moment. Those
who do not want to enter into this type of walk-in, walk-out relationship do so by getting married. In a marriage,
the bond between the partners has legal ramifications and obligations and cannot be dissolved by either side at
will. As a result, those who choose to be in a "live-in relationship" cannot accuse one another of immorality or
infidelity because such relationships are also known to exist between married men and women who are not
married or between married women and men who are not married.

4
(2001),6,SCC,181
5
CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL CODE,(1973) §, sec 428
6
(2013),7, SCC, 675
7
AIR,(2003),SC,1639
8
Crl. M.C. (3877/2009),Bombay High Court.
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It is the complainant's accepted case that she personally travelled to IGI International Airport after learning that
the petitioner was returning to London and getting married to a new partner. She then filed a FIR under Section
376 IPC against the petitioner. These circumstances made it plainly evident that the complaint's only purpose
was to stop the petitioner from leaving India because the petitioner had chosen to end the parties' live-in
relationship. According to established legal precedent, the Court should refrain from invalidating a FIR on the
grounds that its claims were untrue. However, the courts have intervened as an extraordinary matter and
dismissed FIRs where they are filed with mala fide intentions to exact revenge, and malice was amply
demonstrated in this case.

In this instance, the complainant's motivation is abundantly clear in her two complaints. Despite the fact that the
petitioner was not even yet divorced at the time, she had entered into a live-in relationship anyhow. She was an
educated woman who had once been married, so she wasn't so naive as to not understand the reality of a live-in
relationship. She had previously shared a home in London with the petitioner. After careful consideration, I
believe the FIR No. 426/2007 PS IGI Airport was filed against the petitioner with the intent to exact revenge
because the petitioner declined to maintain a live-in relationship with the complainant. Hence, I believe for the
fact that the decision of quashing the FIR was righteously done by the court.