Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

SUBMISSION of ‘ICE Mode I: PROJECT’ for ‘Constitution 1:

“Case Analysis on PRAMATI EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL TRUST vs UOI”

Submitted by:
Name: Mahek Gupta

PRN: 21010224028

Programme: BBA.LLB._

Division: A

Semester: III

Year: 2nd Year

Batch: 2021-26

Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

Submitted to:

Dr. Sakshi Parashar

Assistant Professor

Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

(August-September 2022)
 INDEX

S.NO. PARTICULARS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. ISSUES

3. RULES

4. ANALYSIS

5. CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION

In the case of P. A. Inamdar and Others v. State of Maharashtra1, the Supreme Court ruled on August 12,
2005, that unassisted, private colleges for minorities and non-minorities, including professional institutions, are
exempt from the State's reservation policy. In Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Others in 2008, the
Court found that Article 15(5)'s validity and adherence to the Constitution's core values are both upheld.. It
explained the application of Article 15(5) to State-owned, state-held, and state-aided educational institutions.
However, it was not determined exactly what private educational institutions covered.

In order to ascertain the legality of Article 15(5) of the Constitution, which was added by the 93rd amendment
to the Constitution in 2005 and Article 21A added by the 86 th amendment of the Constitution in 2002, a three
judge bench issued an order in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of
India2 referring the matter to a constitutional bench.

A second constitutional challenge to the RTE Act was brought in 2014 by private schools in the Pramati case
before a five-judge Supreme Court bench. This time, the argument against it was that by making an arbitrary
distinction between minority schools that receive government aid and those that do not, Article 15(5) and
Article 21A of the Constitution as well as the RTE Act violated both the fundamental principles of the latter and
the right to equality.

The constitutionality of the RTE Act was once again affirmed by the Supreme Court's constitutional bench. The
Court determined that while Articles 15(5) and 21A have as their goals giving pupils from underprivileged
groups in society equal opportunities, they would not infringe Article 19(1)'s protections for private schools (g).
Unfortunately, the Court carved out yet another exception, ruling that all minority schools, including those that
receive government assistance, would be excluded from the RTE Act's reach. While the judgement supported
the legality of Article 21A, it also made it subject to Article 30 and therefore weakened it.

The lack of analysis in this judgment's treatment of two issues—namely,

(1) enabling of reservation in private educational establishments in view under Articles 15(5) and 21A, and

(2) bringing minority institutions under the purview of these two Articles—raises questions.

1
P. A. Inamdar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.,(2005), 6 SCC 537,
2
Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India,(2012), 6 SCC 102
RULES3

 “Article 144 of the Indian Constitution – Right to equality”

 “Article 15 clause 5 of the Indian Constitution – state’s power to make reservations in the private
educational institutions.”

 “Article 19 (1)(g)- to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business”

 “Article 21A of the Indian Constitution deals with the right to free and compulsory education for
children between 6-14 years of age.”

 “Article 30 Right of Minorities to establish and administer educational institutions”

ISSUES

 Whether or not the Indian Constitution's fundamental structure has been amended by the addition of
clause 5 to article 15 by the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 2005?

 Whether or not the essential framework or basic structure of the Indian Constitution has changed as a
result of the 86th constitutional amendment, which added Article 21A to the document?

ANALYSIS

Supreme Court outlook on the validity of clause (5) of Article 15 in respect to this case:

The Act's goal is to increase access to higher education for students from socially and educationally
disadvantaged groups ofcitizensaswell as for members of SCs and STs, as required by Article 46 of the
Constitution. Additionally, compared to private, unaided colleges, it is believed that there are fewer seats
available in state-funded educational institutions.

In the Ashok Kumar Thakur case, the court ruled that Article15(5)ofthe Constitution is not a deviation from
ARTICLE 15(1)but rather can be understood as an enablingclause to carry out the constitutional requirement of
equality of opportunity. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution grants private educational institutions the freedom
3
All articles taken from the Constitution of India
4
to admit students of their choosing and to manage their own affairs, but it is evident from the T. M. Pai
Foundation's argument that if a tiny percentage of students from less advantaged and backward socioeconomic
groups obtain scholarships out of altruism, this freedom won't be jeopardized or destroyed.

In the P.A. Inamdar case, the court determined that The state does not have the power to regulate or control
admittance to private entities that are not obtaining government funding, according to Article 19(6)of the
Constitution. Because of reservationpolicydoes not meet the requirements of Article19(g)of the Constitution,
the state inserted clause (5) into Article15 of the Constitution.

By using the identification test, it can be determined that the liberties guaranteed by Article19(1) of the
Constitution provide a voluntary element and may be subject to justifiable legal restrictions within clauses (2)
though (6)of thesame article. Therefore, the individuality of the right of unaided private educational
establishments under Article 19 ( 1) of the Constitution has not been destroyed by Article 15(5) of the
Constitution.

Now that the width test has been applied, it is clear that the literal interpretation of Article15(5) of the
Constitution seems to have no direct effect on the individual freedom and rights that private institutions
receiving no government assistance are guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g), as was the case with in T.M. Pai
Foundation case. As a result, Article 19(6) of the Constitution limits the authority given to the State under
Article 15 (5).

As mandated by Article15(5) of the Constitution, it must be decided if any legislative provisions meant to
ensure reimbursement for private entities receiving no government aid for admissions granted in line with the
law have been taken into account. The other equality standards outlined in Section 14 of the Constitution are not
explicitly specified in Article 15's clause (5). Since the Constitution's Article 14 guarantees equality, addressing
aided and unaided private schools of education equally is not in conflict with that provision.

An aided or unaided minority institution's minority identity cannot be lost by taking students from cultures apart
from the minority community that established the school. Several criteria, including the sort of school, will
determine whether or not such admittance to any given percentage of seats would damage the institution's
minority character.

Because minority academic institutions are, by themself, a separate class and have their rights protected by
Article 30 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench upheld that the exclusion of minority schools and
universities from Article 15(5) is not an infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Supreme Court outlook in relation to Article 21(A) under the 86th Amendment act of the Constitution
Even after 50 years after it was enacted, the Indian Constitution's Directive Principle found in Article 45 was
unable to accomplish its objective. The ultimate objective of delivering universal and high-quality education has
not yet been achieved by the Government of India, despite its arduous efforts to carry out this responsibility. As
a part of the Constitution's Fundamental Rights, Article 21A is included to achieve this objective. In Article
21A, the word "state" refers to the State that has the power to enact laws. The State, however, shall by law
define how it will carry out its constitutional commitments, according to Article 21A. As a result, the State was
given a new power to enable it to fulfil this fundamental commitment by enacting legislation.

Article 21A must be interpreted in a way that is consistent with Article 19(1)(g) andarticle 30(1) of the
Constitutionin order to fulfil its constitutional tasks. When two provisions of an enactment cannot be reconciled,
it is accepted construction practise to construe the provisions so that, if at all possible, both can be given effect.

While deliberating the constitutional validity of clause (5) of Article15 of the Constitution, the Court has held
that all of the freedom and rights under Article 19(1) of the Constitution have a component of voluntariness.
However, the voluntariness of these freedom and rights can be subject to the law made using state's power
under clauses (2) to (6) of 19(1)of the Constitution. If they do not clash with other rights, the Constitution's
rights within Article 19(1)(g) may permit the admittance of a limited number of students from socially
disadvantaged groups..

Minorities are granted particular rights under the Constitution's Article 30(1). In light of this, the State's
authority under Article 21A of the Constitution is limited and cannot be used to enact laws that would deny
minorities the ability to form and run schools of their choosing.

The 2009 Act's Sections 12(1)(b) and 12(1)(c) read with Sections 2(n)(iii) and 2(n)(iv), respectively, apply to
aided schools and Section 12(1)(c) read with Section 2(n)(iv), appears to apply to unaided schools, enabling
them to openly acknowledge up to 25% of the class I students who are from unprivileged sections and
neighbourhood groups. We have claimed that when evaluating the legitimacy of the Article 15 clause, the
identification and privileges of minority organisations cannot be eliminated (5). As a result, the 2009 Act is
unconstitutional insofar as it affects the minority schools listed in Article 30(a) of the Constitution (1).

CONCLUSION
After reading the court's decision above, it is clear that, as long as the state's power does not interfere with the
rights protected under Article45 of the IndianConstitution, Article 21A rights are guaranteed priority over those
safeguarded by Article 19(1)(g). Achieving such supremacy in the judicial process might not be possible if this
wasn't adequately enabled.

In deciding on Pramati, the Court made a serious error. It has left a great deal of room for uncertainty in how to
apply its concepts because it hasn't offered any thorough examination. Additionally, without any logical
rationale, it has widened the protections afforded to institutions of minority groups. In order to fulfil the
socialist promises of the welfare state, how far should private entities' rights be infringed upon? In this situation,
according to Pramati, private institutions are at a loss. It's possible that the decision may open a Pandora's Box,
where other institutions will now compete for minority status in order to gain autonomy. Any private entity's
fundamental theme continues to be autonomy, and the State now needs to offer a logical justification for why it
should be restricted.

The verdict is a landmark judgement in the sphere of education. However, barring minority organizations from
the scope of Article 21A runs counter to the principle of ensuring that everyone has equal access. In the
subsequent case of Sobha George v. State of Kerala, the same defence was modified by incorporating minority
institutions inside Article 21A. Because of various rulings, the law is currently unsure of its position as a whole.
The Supreme Court must examine the issues in order to establish clear, binding law that anyone can abide by.