Doctrine of Waiver- Basheshwar Nath vs CIT

Facts- The commission found the assessee to have evaded tax on his income
Appellant applied to the commission for a settlement of his case
The commission and the central govt. accepted the settlement and recovery of the said
amount was directed.
After some time, the appellant defaulted in its payments and his properties were attached.
He applied to the commissioner income tax challenging the validity of the settlement itself
on the ground that the section which stipulated this was already declared void.
SC held that a. 14 is a command issued by the constitution to the state as a matter of public
policy. It was not correct to contend that the appellant by entering into settlement had
waived his fundamental right. No citizen could waiver of any one of them relieve the state of
the solemn obligation that lay on it.

 No fundamental right can ever be waived. A person who has waived that protection in
any situation may not afterwards raise the issue that the particular constitutional rights
have been infringed in that situation as well as whatever injury he may suffer is due to
his own act. According to the Constitution, the State is forbidden from making any law
which takes away the rights as stated in Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, the
State is not expected to impose any right which contradicts the constitutional
prohibition on the reason that the party waived his fundamental right.
 Majority of the people of India are economically poor, educationally backward and
politically due to which they are unaware of their rights. In such a situation, it is the
duty of the court to protect their rights. Hence, it was held that the fundamental rights
set up by the Constitution are spiritual in nature and enacted in the public interest, and
hence cannot be waived.

Doctrine of Severability- State of Bombay vs FN Balsara

A bad or unconstitutional part of a statute does not the void the entire act.
Issue- Whether the Bombay Prohibition Act, is constitutionally valid, in so far it restricts the
possession and sale of foreign liquors
The sale of liquor does not come under reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights.
Therefore, medicinal and toilet preparations should be prohibited.
Wine, beer and whiskey are distinctly separable items which are easily severable from the
last category.

 F.N. Balsara stated that he should be given assent to use his right to keep Whisky,
Brandy, Wine, Beer, with medicine U.D.Colon etc.
 He further stated to use them and import-export them within the Custom Limits. Also,
he stated that the government must not obstruct him from such usage under the
Prohibition Act as it was his personal right to pass the similar orders under the Specific
Relief Act.
 The Supreme Court therefore declared some provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act
as illegal. These provisions were with regard to keeping alcohol-mixed medicines, and
toilet goods, and also selling them. The other provisions were declared legal and valid.
Thus, due to some provisions being illegal, the whole of the Act cannot be declared
illegal.
  Doctrine of Reasonable Classification
 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar

 Issue- Whether the whole, or any portion of the West Bengal Special Courts Act 1950,
is invalid as being opposed to equality before the law and the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

FACTS:

 Special Courts were introduced in West Bengal under section 3 of the West Bengal
Special Courts ordinance, 1949, (Ordinance No. 3 of 1949) which was replaced in
March, 1950, by the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, (West Bengal Act X of
1950), for the speedier trials of some cases which were to be referred to Special Courts
by the State Government.
 A case, the Special court tried under a notification under section – 5 of the said Act, and
Mr. Anwar Ali and 49 others were tried for various offences alleged to be committed by
them in the course of raiding a factory, known as Jessop Factory, as an armed gang, and
were convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonments.
 The accused applied in High Court under Article 226[2] of Constitution of India for the
issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the conviction and sentence on the ground that the
Special Court had no jurisdiction to try the case as section – 5 of the said act is
unconstitutional and void under Article 13(2)[3] of constitution of India, as it denied to
the respondent, equal protection of laws enjoined by Article 14[4] of constitution of
India.
 The High court by a full bench consisting of the Chief Justice and four other judges
quashed the conviction and directed the trial of the respondent and the other accused
people according to law. Hence the appeal.

HELD:

 The Supreme Court held that Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act
contravened Article 14 and was void since it conferred arbitrary power on the
Government to classify offences or cases at its pleasure and the Act didn’t lay down
any policy or guideline for the exercise of discretion to classify cases or offences at its
pleasure and the act didn’t lay down any policy or guidelines for the exercise of
discretion to classify cases or offences. The procedure laid down by the Act for the
trial by the special courts varied substantially from the procedure laid down for the
trial of offences generally by the criminal procedure court.

Kathi Raning Rawat v. Saurashtra

ISSUE:

 Whether the provisions of ordinance, contravention with the provisions laid down in
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

FACTS:

 Kathi Raning Rawat was convicted under section 307, section 302 and section 392 read
with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  The appellant was tried by special court which was constituted under section 11 of
Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures inserted by third amendment in 1949 which
was pronounced by Rajpramukh.
 Kathi raning Rawat was sentenced to death and 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. His
sentence was later upheld by the state High Court and aggrieved by the decision of the
state High Court Kathi Raning Rawat appealed in the Supreme Court against the
decision of the special court and state High Court.
 The provisions questioned herein according to Section 9 the State by notification may
constitute special Courts for such ‘areas as may be specified in the notification and
section 10 provides for appointment of Special Judges to preside over such courts.
 Section 11 enacts that the Special Judge shall try “such offences or classes of offences
or such cases or classes of cases as the Government may direct them to do so.

HELD:

 The Supreme Court held that all legislative differentiation is not necessarily
discriminatory.
 Discrimination involves an element of unfavourable bias, and it is in that sense that the
expression has to be understood in the context.
 Equal protection claims under Art. 14 are examined with the presumption that the State
action is reasonable and justified.
 Though differing procedures might involve disparity in treatment of persons tried
under them, such disparity is not in itself sufficient to outweigh this presumption and
establish discrimination unless the degree of disparity goes beyond what the reason for
its existence demands, e.g., when it amounts to a denial of a fair and impartial trial.

The classification satisfied he two conditions necessary for a valid classification- That it must
not be arbitrary but must be rounded on intelligible differentia and the differentia must have
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the act.

Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal

ISSUE:

 Whether there was actual damage to the roof of godowns of the firm?
 Whether the damage on roofs on godowns of the firm is caused by the military?

FACTS:

 The appellants were the owners of the firm, Kedar Nath Mohanlal (firm) which was the
managing agent for the Shiva Jute Press Ltd. Some of the godowns of the press were
requisitioned by the government for military purposes including the roofs of Nos. 19
and 20 which form one continuous space and were known as roof No. 20 of the Press.
 The military was in possession of the roof for 2 years and the charges arose out of the
compensation claims made by the appellants to the military regarding the damage
caused to the roofs due to the misuse and the damage of jute stock due to rain leaks
through damaged roofs.
 The compensation accounts were calculated by the Area Lands and Hirings Disposals
Officer namely Hari Ram, but the calculated accounts were said to be fraudulent by the
succeeding officer.
  The charges were made against four people including the appellants in the Special
Court Allipur, Calcutta where two people were acquitted whereas the appellants were
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.
 Then the appellants have approached the High Court of Calcutta where the convictions
were held affirmed by the common judgment. The case reached the constitutional bench
of the Supreme Court where the contentions were raised using Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.
 Though Article 20 was accepted it only changed the fine imposed but not the
imprisonment.

HELD:

 It was found that portions of the roofs were damaged due to the deterioration of Tee
iron pieces supporting the flat tiles.
 The damages are due to the inherent defects in the construction of the roofs and the
military cannot be held responsible for the damages on the repair of these private
godowns.
 It was found that the roof was already defective and thus it will wear out due to natural
consequences. Moreover, no damage was caused due to the roof of keeping the
packing cases. It is also noted that there was no jute in the godown and even in case of
leakage there would be no chance of damaging of Jutes.
 The Supreme Court held that there is a complete lack of any reference to these matters
in the questions put to either of the appellants under Section 342 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. This undoubtedly is a serious irregularity and cannot be lightly
ignored.
 The circumstances prove that there is a criminal conspiracy but the charges under
Sections 420 of the Indian Penal code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act will not sustain.

Maganlal Chhaganlal Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay

PPT

Rajbala vs State of Haryana

ISSUE:

 Whether the Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 8 of 2015) is
constitutionally valid or not?

RULE:

 Those who aspire to get elected to those civic bodies and administer them must set an
example for others. To the said end if the legislature stipulates that those who are not
following basic norms of hygiene are ineligible to become administrators of the civic
body and disqualifies them as a class from seeking election to the civic body, such a
policy, in our view, can neither be said to create a class based on unintelligible criteria
nor can such classification be said to be unconnected with the object sought to be
achieved by the Act.

Held- PPT
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India

 Whether sections 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 constitutionally valid?

 Whether a restriction on employment of a particular group of people, not a hindrance to
their fundamental right to equality under Article 16?
 Section 30 of the Act has been declared to be ultra vires Articles 19(1)(g), 14 and 15 of
the Constitution of India because it prohibits employment to “any woman” in any part
of such premises in which liquor or intoxicating drug is consumed by the public.
 The respondents filed a special petition questioning that part of the order whereby
restrictions had been put on employment of any man below the age of 25 years.
 The appellants (few citizens of Delhi), submitted that Mr. Rajiv Dutta submitted that
since liquor is not something protected under the Constitution and cannot be said to be
anyone’s fundamental right. Being Res extra Commercium, the state has the right to
make a law and/or continue the old law imposing reasonable restrictions on the nature
of employment therein.
 The respondents submitted the arguments in favor of the judgment of the High court of
Delhi and sought the remaining prohibition on the 25 years age limit to be removed.

The conditions should be satisfied to review a protective discrimination statute. The

legislative interference should be justified in principle. The same should be proportionate in
measure.

Air India vs Nergesh Meerza

FACTS:

 The Appellant challenged the service regulation which required the air hostesses were
required to retire on their marriage, first pregnancy, or the age of 35, whichever
happens earlier.
 The Airlines authorities’ submissions emphasised on the importance of physical
appearance, youth, glamour, etc. as the essential qualities for inflight service. In the
early stages, the corporation decided that the air hostesses were to be retiring at the age
of 50 with a choice of ground duties.
 This was later on challenged as being violative of the Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the
Constitution of India and certain provisions of the Equal Remuneration and Air
Corporation Acts, in comparison to male employees who were to retire at the age of
58.
 On the basis of proposals filed, an order was passed by the Bombay High Court which
lays special considerations which are not gender biased and that both the male and
female cadres will be given an option to choose retirement at the age of 50 or 58.
 However, different associations representing employees including air hostesses
challenged the judgement of The High Court marking that this will adversely affect
their seniority and promotional possibility which are only governed by agreements.
 Hence, a writ petition was filed in the honourable Supreme Court which challenged the
regulations 46 and 47 of the Air India Employees Service Regulation, to decide for
these regulations which created an essential degree of disparity between male and
female on various grounds such as promotional approach, difference in retirement
ages, termination in cases of pregnancy or marriage.

HELD:
  The Supreme Court held that the clauses regarding retirement and pregnancy are
unconstitutional and thus ordered for them to be struck down.
 Furthermore, Regulation 47 experienced a similar fate, for it was found that the said
regulation suffered from excessive delegation of powers without any reasonable
guidelines to police the same.

Indian Young Lawyers Associations vs State of Kerala

ISSUE:

 Whether this restriction imposed by the temple authorities violates Articles 15, 25, and
26 of the Indian Constitution?
 Whether this restriction violates the provisions of the Kerala Hindu Place of Public
Worship Act, 1965?
 Whether the Sabarimala Temple has a denominational character?

PPT