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The National resistance

army (NRA) as a guerrilla
force
a
Edward Katumba‐Wamala
a
Student US Army War College ,
Published online: 26 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Edward Katumba‐Wamala (2000) The National resistance

army (NRA) as a guerrilla force, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:3, 160-171, DOI:
10.1080/09592310008423293

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 REPORT FROM THE FIELD

The National Resistance Army (NRA)

as a Guerrilla Force

EDWARD KATUMBA-WAMALA1
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Africa has had no shortage of guerrilla movements since 1975. However, very few have
been successful that have not fought against European colonial rule or white minority
regimes. Fundamentally, without external support, these movements have been almost
universally failures. One major exception to this rule was the National Resistance Army
of Uganda, which overthrew the regime led by General Tito Okello in 1986. What made
the National Resistance Army a success and distinct from other guerrilla armies were its
sound leadership, its superior organization and its creative strategy.

Africa has seen the emergence of many guerrilla movements during the past
25 years. Those fighting against colonial rulers or white minority governments
were able to attract substantial external support and international legitimacy,
which assisted them in attaining their objectives. Most of the guerrilla move-
ments which were not fighting against colonialism or minority rule, though,
have not succeeded. One of the most important exceptions to this has been
the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Uganda, which overthrew the repres-
sive government of General Tito Okello in 1986. The NRA succeeded where
other guerrilla movements failed because of its leadership, organization, and
strategy. An understanding of these offers important insights into the nature
of guerrilla struggle in Africa.

Leadership
The NRA was a brainchild ofYoweri Kaguta Museveni. A graduate in political
science from the University of Dar-Es-Salaam, Museveni got interested in
revolutionary warfare while at the university. He was inspired by Stokely
Carmichael and admired the late Samora Machel leader of the Frente de
Libertagdo de Mozambique (FRELIMO) who provided him and a few others
like the late Fred Ryigema and Salim Saleh (Museveni's brother) their initial
military training specializing in guerrilla warfare.
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 11, No.3 (Winter 2000), pp. 160-171
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
 THE NRA AS A GUERRILLA FORCE 161

Museveni had briefly worked as a secretary to the president during the first
Obote regime before Idi Amin overthrew it in 1971. While in exile between
1971 and 1978, he recruited and sent to Mozambique about 30 cadres to train
in guerrilla warfare. After falling out with his former boss Obote on the
strategy of fighting Idi Amin, he formed his own fighting group, Front for
National Salvation (FRONASA). In 1972, he was convinced by Obote and the
Tanzanian President the late Julius Nyerere to join hands with Obote's forces
and launch an attack against Idi Amin's government. The attempt was futile,
ending with many lost lives and barely scratching Amin's control on the
reins of power. Museveni and a few others survived and retreated back into
Tanzania. Efforts to infiltrate some of his fighters into Uganda to start insur-
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gency operations were thwarted when they were identified and eliminated by
Amin's security organs. These operations were suspended until 1978.
In 1978 Tanzania launched an attack against Idi Amin's government. The
Ugandans in exile, including FRONASA, joined the Tanzania People's
Defense Forces (TPDF) in the war against Amin. Along the way, FRONASA
recruited within its ranks many combatants from the western region of the
country including Rwandese exiles who had been equally persecuted by
Amin. The war was concluded in April 1979 when Kampala was overrun by
the combined forces.
A government was formed from the different fighting groups with the
main ones being Obote's and Musevini's. However, differences soon weak-
ened the coalition and infighting weakened the government. The government
changed hands several times until it was eventually placed under a military
commission which was tasked with the responsibility of organizing the
elections in 1980 with the help of the TPDF.
The fairness of these elections was doubtful from the start. The chairman
of the military commission, the late Paul Muwanga, was a close associate of
Milton Obote. The Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere was also a close friend
of Obote and would do anything to see him back in power. Before the elections,
Obote returned to Uganda in May 1980, to contest in the elections. These were
held in December 1980 and, before the results could be released, the chairman
of the commission declared an embargo until he had personally scrutinized
the results. The released results as expected favored Obote who was declared
the winner of the elections. This angered many including Yoweri Museveni
who was the candidate of the Uganda People's Movement (UPM). Prior to the
elections, Museveni had forewarned that if the elections were not free and fair,
he would challenge the results in every way possible.
Following on his promise, Museveni immediately canvassed the support
of some of his FRONASA cadres who were by now part of the national army,
the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). With 35 people equipped
with 27 rifles, he took to the bush to start the protracted people's struggle,
 162 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES

which lasted five years. Before this happened, there was divided opinions
among the fighters as to what was the appropriate strategy. There were some
who advocated a coup d'etat. This approach was rejected on the grounds that
Ugandans had had bitter experiences of a coup under Amin and would not
readily accept another government coming in power this way. Second, the
Tanzanian troops who had instructions to protect Obote's government could
easily suppress a coup.
On 6 February 1981, Museveni's group, under the identity of People's
Resistance Army (PRA) launched its first attack on one of the UNLA training
camps 80 miles south west of the capital Kampala. The attack was not success-
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ful as the Tanzanian instructors in the camp beat it off, but the message had
been sent that Museveni was serious about his armed struggle against the
regime. Gradually contacts were established among the FRONASA com-
batants and soon there were defections from the government forces. Museveni
opted for a protracted people's war because:

• The PRA's strength at the time could not match the TPDF and the UNLA
forces so a direct approach could spell disaster.
• Short-term solutions like a coup would echo past power seizures and could
easily be misinterpreted as a mere power struggle rather than a revolu-
tionary transformation.
• There was a need to construct a viable political base among the people in
support of the resistance. This would allow time to educate people, organize
them and develop structures during the struggle that would replace the
regime and not simply the individual, Obote.
• The situation was conducive to this kind of warfare. The state was very
weak at the time in every respect. The economy had not recovered from
mismanagement by Idi Amin, the population especially in the central region
had never forgiven Obote for attacking and exiling the king who doubled
as the President after independence (The King Frederick Mutesa died in
exile in the UK in 1969). The rigging of the elections was highly publicized
and the masses were discontented. The support of the population was
extremely vital in this kind of war.

After the initial strike and a few ones against soft targets like police stations,
the PRA suspended its operations. This was mainly due to the following
reasons:
• The PRA did not and could not confront the TPDF not only because of its
might but also to avoid casualties against the force that had assisted in the
liberation of the country. It was more reasonable to wait than to push for
the TPDF force to withdraw, which it was scheduled to do in six months.
 THE NRA AS A GUERRILLA FORCE 163

• There was need to organize the political network and built contacts with
the local population if the strategy of fighting a people's protracted war was
to be achieved. This phase was crucial, as the combatants were to rely
heavily on the population for food and intelligence gathering. An effort was
launched to form Resistance Councils (RCs) among the population to act
not only as sources of food but also as intelligence cells. The region chosen
for the initial bases of the struggle was what later came to be referred to as
the Luwero Triangle (see Map 1) which was only 40-60 miles north of the
capital. This was not only a hub of a population which hated the incumbent
president, but it also offered the opportunity easily to link up with the
capital where contacts with potential sectors in society, including students
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in universities and training institutions.

• There was the need to sell the movement abroad and establish external
contacts and solicit for external support. Museveni used this time to move
from country to country seeking assistance. Though not much was realized,
the organization came to be externally known and its cause understood. It
was during this time that after meeting the first president after the liberation
war in 1979, Yusuf Lule. (Lule was deposed 68 days after the fall of
Kampala in the war against Amin in 1979), the two agreed to join forces
and transformed the PRA into the National Resistance Army (NRA) with
a political wing the National Resistance Movement (NRM).

Organization
At the central level was the National Resistance Council (NRC) which was
the main political organ of the movement. The NRC was first headed by Yusuf
Lule with Museveni as the Vice Chairman and Moses Kigongo as the second
Vice Chairman. It drew its membership from both combatants and civilians.
It had Yusuf Lule as its first Chairman with Museveni as the deputy. Its sub-
committees included:
• The External Sub-Committee, headed by Mathew Rukikaire, which had
responsibility for mobilizing Ugandans abroad and seeking external funding.
• The Finance and Supplies Sub-Committee. This was headed by Zak Kaheru
and was responsible for raising and distributing funds and supplies within
Uganda. It was responsible for external coordination and gaining assis-
tance. This committee ensured that every civilian's contributed resource in
support of the struggle was acknowledged with a commitment note and all
these were valued and reimbursed after the war.
• Political and Diplomatic Sub-Committee. This committee was headed by
Eriya Kategaya and had responsibility for canvassing external support of
other nations and international bodies and also internal political education
 MAP 1
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The marked area is what was commonly referred to as the 'Luwero Triangle'.
 THE NRA AS A GUERRILLA FORCE 165

within the movement and among the local population. It was this committee
that had the task of establishing village resistance committees.
• Publicity and Propaganda Sub-Committee. The committee was responsible
for publicizing the struggle, exposing crimes committed by the incumbent
government against the population by soldiers and other security organs. It
was through this committee that the human rights abuses by Obote's regime
was brought to the attention of the international community.

The Military (NRA)

Former FRONASA fighters deserted the government forces (UNLA) and
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soon joined the 35 original members. Clandestine contacts were soon estab-
lished with students in Makerere University and other institutions who were
recruited in large numbers. However the largest number of recruits came from
the Luwero Triangle through the established resistance committees. These
clandestine operations continued throughout the war especially within the
urban centres and among the village councils.
It was realized early in the struggle that the support of civilians was of
paramount importance. All efforts were made to ensure that there was no
antagonism with the population but instead win over its support. The
behaviour by the government forces made this easy as it brutalized the
population, which drew nearer to the NRA for protection. In its efforts to fight
the NRA the government forces looted, raped and murdered indiscriminately.
Among those received by the NRA were orphaned children whose parents
had been killed by government forces. These were the child soldiers who were
in the NRA ranks at the time of liberation. (After the war special schools under
military guidance were set up and these children received the formal education
they had missed as a result of the war.)
The force was broken into small units with a few weapons between
them. The units were tasked with acquisition of more arms by attacking soft
targets like police stations, military convoys and isolated military detach-
ments. These were later designated as zonal units operating within their local
areas to maintain contact with the civilian population and act as recruitment
contact centres and provided intelligence. After the numbers had swollen, a
mobile brigade was formed and placed under the command of Salim Saleh
(Museveni's bother) and was tasked to conduct more aggressive operations in
search of arms to arm the combatants whose numbers grew daily.
As is the case with most organizations, the NRA experienced difficult
times especially when Museveni was abroad soliciting for help. Most notable
of these was the differences, which arose between the different ethnic
tribes, the professional soldiers (former FRONASA and UNLA deserters),
the civilian volunteers who resented being subjected to military discipline and
 166 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES

the intellectuals who considered themselves 'natural leaders'. This reached a

climax when commander Magala (left in charge of the force) put to death by
firing squad one of the combatants who defied the standing orders and
travelled to the city. Magara considered the act a threat to the security of the
organization. Magala became the army commander after the death of Seguya
who was the first army commander.
This situation caused great concern and when Museveni returned the
developments were discussed among the leadership and the rank and file. The
following conclusions were drawn:
a. The revolutionary campaign could not be executed successfully without
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organizational structures that would manage it.

b. That it was dangerous to rely on Museveni alone as the only leader.
This resulted in the formation of structures of command and management as
follows:
a. The National Resistance Army Council. This drew its membership from all
battalion commanders and heads of administrative departments. Among
its functions was devising policy for the whole army in matters of command
structures and administration.
b. The Unit Policy and Administration Committee (PAC). It comprised the
unit commander as the chairman and all officers, heads of departments
and the unit regimental sergeant major and one private soldier. The PAC
assisted the unit commander with administrative chores conducted in a
transparent way. Other sub-committees like the food committee, and most
importantly the disciplinary committee were established.
At all levels a post of a political commissar was created and regular meet-
ings were held whenever the situation allowed to provide for an outlet for the
soldiers to participate/contribute to the running of their unit affairs.
This culminated in the formulation and adoption of a code of conduct with
a code of service discipline. The offences were categorized as:
Category 'A'. Offences in this category included: murder of a civilian or
combatant, disobedience of lawful orders leading to loss of life, rape, and
deliberate breaking of concealment. Offences in this category could carry a
death sentence.
Category 'B'. This category included such offences as: theft of property, quest
for cheap popularity, mistreating civilians, promoting tribalism, destruction
of military equipment, cowardice in action etc. Punishments in this category
ranged from corporal punishment, suspension, demotion, to imprisonment.
The punishments were usually carried out in public and the reasons explained.
 THE NRA AS A GUERRILLA FORCE 167

Later unit tribunals and court-martials were established to try quickly

offences committed during operations.

Stages of the War

The NRA size swelled very fast, by 1983 it had risen to an estimated number
of 4,000 combatants but with only about 500 weapons. In January 1983 the
government launched a grand offensive to dislodge it from its base in the
Luwero Triangle. An estimated total of 7,000 troops supported with APCs,
helicopter gunships and artillery were committed in the effort to annihilate
the NRA. The mounting pressure forced the NRA to retreat from the Luwero
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Triangle and move further northwest.

The retreat created 'refugees' who feared acts of revenge by the govern-
ment forces. A critical decision had to be arrived at as the large numbers of
the refugees would not only bog down operations, but would make conceal-
ment impossible, in addition to causing unacceptable humanitarian hardships.
Most of these people were cattle keepers, so it was decided that they surrender
their animals to NRA to assist it in its retreat with the promise of being
compensated after the war. (Each owner was given an acknowledgement note
for the number of cows contributed.)
However, the tide of the offensive turned when the Chief of Staff of the
UNLA died in a 'helicopter crash' in December 1983. His death created
confusion within the UNLA and opened bitter rivalry between two major
tribes that dominated the force (the Acholis and Langis). Faced with this
problem Obote decided to play 'safe' by promoting one of his tribesman, a
junior Langi officer, over the senior Acholi officers and appointed him the
Chief of Staff.
The rivalry greatly weakened the UNLA while the NRA was making gains
in its retreat by attacking larger units. In February 1984 it launched one of its
major offensives ever when it attacked Masindi military barracks, overran it
and captured more than 900 weapons of different calibres. This success greatly
boosted the morale of the NRA and as it continued its path westwards it over-
run other smaller government sub-units. Reorganization and training was
launch in early in 1985 and it attacked its first target of 1981: this time over-
running it and capturing more than 800 weapons and much ammunition.
Meantime the fissures in Obote's regime and the UNLA were widening daily.
It hit a climax in April 1985 when the Acholis in the UNLA retreated to their
home base in the north from where they launched a coup against Obote in July
1985.
As the NRA progressed on its advance to the west it took on many UNLA
soldiers who surrendered to it and others who defected from the government
forces. One of its success stories was the way it handled the captured
 168 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES

combatants. Captured soldiers were usually given the option of either joining
the NRA or returning to his home unharmed. Those who opted to join were
taken through a politicization period before being deployed within the NRA
ranks. This humane treatment, compared to the tribal persecutions in the
UNLA, encouraged many UNLA combatants to join the NRA, in fact some
entire units surrendered intact.
The coup of July 1985 did not come as a surprise given the weak state
of Obote's government. The Army Commander of the UNLA, General Tito
Okello was sworn in as the president in the same month. Tito had no
educational background, except his experience in the army, which dated from
the colonial period.
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With the military successes and a weakened political system, the NRA
moved to its next level of operation and started conducting siege operations
against resistant military units. One of these was the Masaka unit 80 miles
west of the capital, which was besieged for two months.
Efforts were made by the Tito regime to strike a deal with the NRA to form
a coalition government. President Arap Moi of Kenya was asked to mediate
between the NRA and Tito's government. The NRA gave several conditions
before it could accept to negotiate. Among them were; ending the brutality
meted out on the civilians by the government forces, moving military barracks
a reasonable distance from the main city, equal sharing of power among the
fighting groups in a government of national unity, etc. However, Tito's
government was not committed to the agreement and failed to meet any of the
conditions. Civilians were murdered and tortured the same way that they were
during Obote's regime. Tito also backed out on the formation of a government
of national unity. Instead the government imported more arms and recruited
all kinds of combatants including former Amin soldiers to fight the NRA.
The NRA had meanwhile continued with the siege of the government garrison
at Masaka (see Map 1) which was forced to surrender after the death of the
commanding officer. The NRA at this time controlled more than half of the
country, moreover the most productive area in terms of food and cash crops.
The months of November and December 1985 saw bitter fighting between
the NRA and the government forces at Katonga bridge 35 miles south west
of the capital, which the government troops had prepared, as the final defen-
sive position. Life in the capital became unbearable as Tito's troops became
extremely unruly and brutal, living became very expensive and uncertain. The
resistance at Katonga soon collapsed as the forces became divided and became
more interested in looting property from civilians than fighting the war.
On 24 January 1986, the NRA launched its final offensive on the capital,
which fell on the morning of 26 January ending a five-year people's protracted
war. Tito and his government fled to Kenya while others especially the soldiers
fled back to the north and into Sudan from where they tried to destabilize the
 THE NRA AS A GUERRILLA FORCE 169

northern part of the country but soon surrendered. The group which escaped
to Kenya also tried to stage a comeback through a rebel group, but it was
eventually defeated.
It is important to note that the NRA/NRM has not enjoyed a calm period
since the end of the major war in 1986. There have been several rebel groups
which have tried to stage guerrilla wars with support from the Sudan govern-
ment and some of the politicians in exile. A total of six have so far been
defeated although two are still persisting (The Lord's Resistance Arm (LRA)
in the north and the Allied Democratic Front in the west), both of them
supported by Sudan.
The NRA was by the Act of Parliament 208 of 1995 transformed into a
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government force and renamed the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF)
and subordinated to civilian authority. It is interesting to note that throughout
its struggle the NRA never had significant external support but relied on
captured arms to build its military capacity.

The Political Vision

The NRA and the whole struggle was guided by a political vision which was
contained in the Ten Point Programme. This document formed the backbone
of the political education instructions to the combatants and politicians alike.
The NRA High Command (senior military leaders) and the executive of the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) formulated these guidelines. They
were:

a. The Restoration of Democracy: Since Uganda's independence in 1962,

Ugandans had not enjoyed the benefit of an elected government of their
choice, elected by the people and for the people. However, this had to be
combined with improving the standards of living.
b. Restoration of Security. There was a need to ensure and guarantee the
security of the Ugandans as a people and their property, a situation which
had not existed since the time of independence resulting in more than
800,000 people losing their lives between 1962 and 1986.
c. Consolidation of National Unity and Elimination of All Forms of Sec-
tarianism. All past politicians had manipulated the population through the
promotion of sectarian lines of religion and tribal cleavages. This had
promoted divisions among the population causing underdevelopment and
uncalled for hatred.
d. Defending and Consolidating National Independence. Past leaders had not
given much attention to consolidating the state after independence, but
instead used their offices to enrich themselves at the expense of the
 170 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES

citizens. The NRM was to concentrate on developing social and political

systems directed towards national development and proper utility of the
national resources.
e. Building an Independent, Integrated and Self-Sustaining National Economy.
This point involves the structural reconstruction of the present asym-
metrical economy. The country's economy has for a long time depended
on export of three crops; coffee, tea and cotton in their raw form. There
are few manufacturing industries and the few that do exist are heavily
dependent on foreign inputs. The NRM aims to change this situation
through:
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(i) The diversification in agriculture to enlarge the existing narrow cash

crop base,
(ii) An extensive process of import substitution in order to reduce the
import bill especially of basic consumer goods,
(iii) A process of ending the exportation of solely of raw materials in order
to add value,
(iv) The building of basic industries especially for iron, steel and basic
chemicals.
It was the belief of the NRM that both political mismanagement and the
narrow economy could not accommodate the aspirations of the people and
contributed to turmoil in Uganda.
f. Restoration and Improvement of Social Services and Rehabilitation of War
Ravaged Areas. The majority of Ugandans lived in impoverished con-
ditions with no access to basic utilities like clean water and basic health
services. This situation had to change.
g. Elimination of Corruption and the Misuse of Power. The prevalence of
corruption and the misuse of public office compound the many problems
outlined so far. The diversion of hospital drugs by corrupt officials, the
demand for kickbacks before signing government contracts by officials all
eventually harm the population.
h. Redressing Errors that Have Resulted in the Dislocation of Some Sections
of the Population. This required addressing the people displaced by land
grabbers or through erroneously conceived development projects, the
pastoral groups who are forced to live nomadic lives in search of water
whenever there is a dry spell in their areas and the salary earners who lived
in poverty due to soaring inflation.
i. Cooperation with Other African Countries. The NRM would encourage
and promote the formation of larger economic and political organizations
like the East African Community (EAC) and Preferential Trade Area
(PTA).
 THE NRA AS A GUERRILLA FORCE 171

j . Following an Economic Strategy of a Mixed Economy. This means that the

economic activities will be carried out by both private entrepreneurs with
the government taking part only in crucial sectors and providing social
services. The state will not be involved in activities at the micro-economic
level and will do away with nationalized industries and follow a policy of
laissez-faire capitalism.

Conclusion
The success of the NRA/NRM was achieved as a result of the support of the
people. This was precipitated by hatred for Obote and exacerbated by the
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government forces' violent methods employed in fighting the insurgency. This

strategy was supported by effective organizational structures that maintained
the cohesion of the movement. Political leadership defined the course of the
struggle and ensured the commitment of the combatants. The final blow came
through the weakening of the regime by Tito's coup.
The strength of the leadership provided by Yoweri Museveni was a major
factor in the success of the NRA/NRM and has also contributed greatly to the
success of the country's recovery after the war. The road to total recovery of
the country still faces many difficulties just like most African countries but
the leadership has so far provided hope and has kept within the political vision.

NOTE

1. Please note that the author did not physically participate in this struggle. His contribution to this
conflict was limited to clandestine operations within the government forces in which he served
until January 1986.