PAKISTAN’S INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT

Introduction

Future battles will be characterized by high mobility on the

ground and in the air, improved effectiveness of weapon systems,
night and all weather capability, electronic warfare and a very effective
command, control and communication (C3) system. Precise co-
ordination of all elements on the battlefield including air will be
imperative for any successful operation. The other characteristics of
modern battle like high intensity, high casualties, quick contact and
termination of battle, and the necessity to act fast and with foresight
have increased the importance of intelligence in peace as well as in
war. The geo-strategic environments of Pakistan further intensify the
importance of intelligence. The limited depth, the location of important
political and economic regions (close to the border), the threat on two
fronts and the problem to defend overextended frontages with
outnumbered forces demands a good early warning system. Early
warning in fact is a question of survival for Pakistan. As peacetime
intelligence is mainly conducted by special means and is coordinated
at the highest political level, this article will only analyse battlefield
conditions and discuss the improvements required in intelligence
collecting capability of Pakistan Army at brigade, division and corps
level.

The assumptions being made are that the political situation, the
threat perception of Pakistan and the force ratios between Pakistan
and her adversary will remain the same. The Pakistan Army and the
army of her traditional adversary will only be partly mechanized;
although more so then now. In detail; infantry units will have enough
troop carrying vehicles(TCV), infantry brigades will have reserve
battalions mechanised, independent infantry brigades will be
completely mechanised and combat support units of the entire army
will have adequate mobility. The range and effectiveness of weapons
will be improved and Pakistan as well her adversary will have an
effective night fighting capability. Although the tactical doctrines would
have been modified but they would not have changed drastically. Both
sides would continue to prefer the dismounted infantry attack during
night and armour operations during day. Increase in urbanization and
construction of new defense roads will considerably improve the
communication network. In such a scenario the electronic warfare
m e a s u r e s s h a l l , q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , h a v e a n i n c r e a s ed a p p l i c a t i o n .

Intelligence — A Part of the Decision Making Process

The volume and frequency of decisions expected for the Year

2000 from a Pakistani commander will be much higher than today. It
would require the availability of a large flow of intelligence in narrow
limits of time and the dissemination of orders and intelligence in real
time. The technological progress will affect command, control,
communications and intelligence. For the decision making process the
C3 elements along-with intelligence will be tied together even more
closely in the form of C31. The importance of the time factor in future
battles as well as the increased electronic warfare capabilities will
require that the Pakistan Army increases her capabilities in command
and control equipment, communication system and intelligence
agencies and personnel.

Intelligence data can be divided into four categories, that is

“battlefield surveillance” (BES), “target acquisition” (TA), anti-aircraft
sighting/warning at low and very low altitude and NBC detection/
warning. This article is limited to discussing only “battlefield
surveillance and target acquisition

The need for target acquisition and battlefield surveillance is

different at each level of command and depends mainly on the
employment of weapons. In general as illustrated below, companies
and battalions are more concerned about target acquisition and higher
formations are more interested in the commitment of their own
reserves and therefore the need for battlefield data.

Company TA
Battalion
Brigade
Division
Corps
BFS

Nuclear warfare will modify this as higher commanders would be

responsible for the employment of nuclear weapons and therefore they
would also require accurate target acquisition data.

R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r I nt e l l i g e n c e G a t h e r i n g

A pre-condition for an effective intelligence system is good

delegation of responsibilities.

The current doctrine and organisation of reconnaissance does

not establish the correct degree of responsibility even for now let
alone the battle in the Year 2000. The “types of reconnaissance” will
have to be adjusted to the new capabilities and the changed threat
perception. The terms “Battle, Close and Medium” reconnaissance
must be clearly defined and should be included in the major field
manuals for example Field Service Regulations (Operations) 1972. To
define the requirement for reconnaissance it would be useful to
consider time and space problem is of the commander. After the first
employment of his troops the launching of the reserve is of highest
importance. “In the employment of reserve, the commander has to
make three crucial decisions: first and the most important decision lies
in his choice of correct point of its application, the second in the
timing of the manoeuvre and the third in the selection of direction”. So
“Where”, “When” and “How” has to be answered. In modern warfare the
“When” —the e xa c t timing of the reserve —becomes important;
especially if reserves have to “reinforce” the engaged units/formations
their early launching is necessary.

To make the correct decisions a commander has to establish the

extent of the area he needs to cover for gathering intelligence. It is,
therefore, pertinent to consider the concepts of “Area of
Responsibility” and “Area of Interest” starting with the definition of
these two terms: —

— Area of Responsibility. An area within which an intelligence staff

is responsible for the collection and subsequent dissemination of
all available information and intelligence. It may be defined by
the next higher commander.

— Area of Interest. That area of concern to the commander,

including the area of responsibility, areas adjacent thereto, and
extending into enemy terrain to the objectives of current or
planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by
enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the
mission.

Figure 1 shows the hypothetical employment of enemy corps in

attack against a Pakistani Corps. The location of the reserves
indicates how deep a commander must look and also the reaction time
required by him. The deductions of depth and reaction time are
summarized at the end. For comparison the same information is given
in Figure.2 for a Soviet Army against a German Corps.
Observations on Figures 1 and 2

The depth in relation to forward defended localities is according

to the current tactical doctrines and the wartime experience of
Pakistani officers. The distance of Pakistani and West German
reserves are not identical for the counter-penetration position or the
start line for counter-attacks; as with overextended frontages these
distances have to be much more. Such distances depend on the
mission, terrain, communication infra-structure and enemy situation.
There are examples where corps reserves are only 20 km behind the
forward defended lines (FDLs) and also situations where they have to
travel 400 km to possible employment areas. Besides the travelling
time, the organisation in the forming up place (FUP) and the time past
a point (TPP) for the leading unit/formation have also been
considered, for example, for an advancing armoured division only the
leading armoured brigade. According to the 3:1 ratio a reinforced
Pakistani brigade has to hold an enemy division and has to take into
consideration an enemy corps reserve. Therefore a Pakistani brigade
commander will have to servile an area up to 20 km and a Pakistani
division commander up to 60 km. These limits are their ‘areas of
responsibility’ as well. As far as the ‘area of interest’ is concerned, a
brigade’s ‘area of responsibility’ will constitute the ‘area of interest’
for the battalion commander and the division’s ‘area of responsibility’
will be the brigade’s ‘area of interest’. The ‘area of interest’ must also
consider the situation on the flanks. The terrain has to determine the
lateral extent of such an area. However, the higher commander and
the flank commander are responsible to provide information about a
flanking ‘area of interest’.

For the battle of the Year 2000 and beyond each commander
must be given adequate intelligence collection and surveillance
agencies to meet the dictates of the mission assigned to him. These
should be able to cover the whole area, day and night, during all
weather conditions, and must facilitate detection, location, evaluation
and passage of information accurately and in a very short time.
Preferably these agencies must provide “real-time” data about the
enemy.

Characteristics of Intelligence Agencies and Devices

Each agency or device, or combination there of, has certain

advantages and disadvantages which are determined primarily by the
five factors described below: —

— Terrain. Profile, obstacles and cover.

— Time. Day and night time conditions.

— Weather. Mist, smoke, fog, drizzle, rain, snow, wind and

thunderstorm.

— E n e m y. Weapons, Electronic Counter Measure (ECM), and

peculiar enemy activities (for example, radio silence or non-firing
guns means little information).

— Own Situation and Technical Capabilities. To include mobility of

the agency, type of agency obtaining the information and its
vulnerability, Limeliness, accuracy of location, amount of details
( f o r e x a m p l e , t y p e o f t a n k s o r n u m b e r o f f or m a t i o n s ) , a v a i l a b i l i t y
for user (for example, corps has only limited availability of
Special Services Group forces which are already in enemy
territory), depth of surveillance and area — coverage.

The above-mentioned factors and their relative effects on various

agencies and equipment/devices are shown in Figure 3 on page 33.

Figure 3 indicates the advantages and disadvantages of various

agencies and shows that there is no single solution as an “all-round
mean”. Each system has its strong points and can detect targets for
different purposes. So the answer must be to have a mix of the most
effective agencies. High technology systems such as drones, remotely
piloted vehicles and electronic warfare units because of their depth of
penetration, area of coverage, timeliness and better safety to troops
have the highest priority. On the other hand, exercises in North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation environments have shown that armoured
reconnaissance units and long range patrols are necessary. For
example the most important phase of the defensive battle is
determination of the launching of enemy reserves. During this phase of
movement to the start line, the enemy is under cover of radio silence,
s o i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r e l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e u n i t s t o d e t e c t h i s f or w a r d m o v e .
But even one reconnaissance patrol or one element of Special
Services Group can easily detect, locate and evaluate the enemy, of
course under higher risks to personnel.

Recommendations — Intelligence Concept 2000

The tables given at pages 34 and 35 constitute the

recommendations part of the article. They suggest the mix of agencies
required at each level of command from the battalion and regiment to
the corps, catering for the requirements of all arms. The air element
has been deliberately omitted from the above recommendations.
Demands for air reconnaissance should be coordinated at corps level.
Brigades and divisions with the capabilities given above will not be
dependent on air reconnaissance. The corps intelligence branch has to
consider only their drone flights in co-ordination with an aerial
reconnaissance.
 Pakistani forces have to fight in various types of terrain — from
b Himalayan Mountains — to the Punjab Plains, to the Thar Desert. It
is therefore obvious that the agencies and their equipment must be
adjusted to terrain and weather conditions. A similar standard
authorisation for all formations would be an outright waste of money.
Detailed terrain and weather analysis has to be conducted for each
formation be-fore a final decision on authorisation of equipment and
personnel can be made.

As mentioned before intelligence in the Year 2000 has to be a

part of C3 I. Therefore the integration of the new improved agencies
and the dissemination of intelligence data is very important. At the
division and corps —level a new cell that is a reconnaissance cell
should be established. The figure below gives the information flow and
the coordination within the division, with the flanking formations and
with the corps. The corps “reconnaissance cell” should also work in a
similar manner.

The tasks of such a cell will be: —

— The tasking of intelligence agencies.

— To co-ordinate the collection of intelligence information.

— To collate the intelligence information.

— To interpret the collected information.

— To pass information to the intelligence branch and receive

intelligence/information from brigades or flanking formation/units.

— To make contributions in briefings, reports and orders.

— To advise the operation branch about own electronic jamming

measures.

The most important activity is the continuous and accurate ex-

change of information between the intelligence, operation and
reconnaissance cell. However, the paperwork with “records”, “sheets”
etcetra must be reduced! The outline organisation of reconnaissance
cell should in dude a Lieutenant Colonel, with intelligence
experience, as its head. He will have under him field officers from
armour, artillery (locating) and EW (signals) elements of the army. The
cell will obviously have an adequate authorisation of other ranks for
staff purposes. As far as the reconnaissance cell of the corps is
concerned an air force officer will also have to be authorised to it.

The necessity for enhanced battlefield surveillance in the Year

2000 must be highlighted and needs to be correctly appreciated by
commanders and staff at all levels. Awareness of all officers has to be
increased so that they actively involve themselves in the information
collection effort. The current practice at brigade and divisional level
shows that battlefield surveillance has been accorded lower priority at
the cost of creating mobile reserves. The misuse of the
reconnaissance and support battalion, for command and control tasks
during assault across a water obstacle, illustrates this failing.
Concurrent to the creation of new agencies the tactical doctrines have
to be modified as well. In the future there will be more troops, platoons
or even units in an area of an infantry battalion and they will demand
space, security and logistic support. These elements because of the
critical nature of their job will have higher priorities than the infantry.
For example an infantry company may have to hold a high feature
because a radar system or electronic warfare vehicles require to use
this height. Such elements may appear unwelcome “guests” but in the
ultimate analysis they would be of great help to infantry units.
Understanding and knowledge of each others capabilities are the basic
prerequisites for effective co-ordination. The training and education of
officers and other ranks has to give importance to this aspect of a
combined arms team.

Along with the improvements in the capabilities of own

intelligence agencies the threat will also increase. The adversary’s
intelligence capability in the Year 2000 will render Pakistani
formations and installations much more vulnerable. The problem has to
be recognized and counter-measures at all levels have to be initiated
well in advance: for example, dispersion of troops, quick and ‘frequent
changes of positions and command posts, last minute movement of
reserves, improved means of camouflage, using of villages and
urbanised areas for assembly purposes/command posts/firing positions
etcetra.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to make recommendations for the

“Intelligence Concept 2000”. War waged with modern equipment is of
greater intensity, more complex and causes heavier casualties in
lesser time. To meet these characteristics an effective — system”
has to be built up through a continuous effort. The expected
employment of the extent of enemy reserves against own formations
clarifies how deep a commander has to look and how less his reaction
time is. An army fighting outnumbered has to be very flexible and has
to make every effort for obtaining critical intelligence. An effective mix
o f m o d e m e q u i p m e n t a nd a g e n c i e s h a s t o b e p r o v i d e d t o e a c h
commander in order to cover his area of responsibility twenty four
hours of the day. All concerned have to see the need for additional
agencies and modem or sophisticated equipment.

Everyone should be free from biases, be open minded and should

support the early introduction of relevant equipment and the much
needed modification of doctrines and organisations. All this will
contribute to effective cooperation during the combined arms battle of
the future.

Major (general staff) Manfred Dieckmann belongs to the Federal

Republic of Germany. He was commissioned into the Artillery Branch
of the Federal German Army in 1968. He has held various command
and staff appointments. From 1980 to 1982 he attended the
Fuhrungsakademie (German General Staff Course). After the course
he was posted as General Staff Officer (Intelligence) in a division. The
article was written while he was a student at Command and Staff
College Quetta.

“How can any man say what he should do himself if he is

ignorant what his adversary is about.”

Jomini — 1838

“When one army is full and another starving, lead and steel are
hardly needed to decide the victory.”

Sir John Fortescue,

History of the British Army — 1899-1 930

“When the necessity for arms ceases, armaments will disappear.

T h e b a s i c c a u s e s o f W ar a r e n o t a r m a m e n t s , b u t i n h u m a n m i n d s . ”
 Mahan 1840 — 1914
Armaments and Arbitration