(Primary Sources in Phenomenology) Hamid Taieb - Relational Intentionality_ Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition-Springer International Publishing (2018)

Primary Sources in Phenomenology
Franz Brentano Studies
Hamid Taieb
Relational
Intentionality:
Brentano and
the Aristotelian
Tradition
Series Editors
Guillaume Fréchette, University of Salzburg, Austria
Kevin Mulligan, University of Italian Switzerland, Lugano, Switzerland
Peter Simons, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Barry Smith, University at Buffalo, NY, USA
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Hamid Taieb
Relational Intentionality:
Brentano and the Aristotelian
Tradition
Hamid Taieb
University of Salzburg
Salzburg, Austria
ISSN 0924-1965
ISBN 978-3-319-98886-3 ISBN 978-3-319-98887-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953185
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Preface
The word “intentionality” brings to mind a tangle of philosophical notions. The

term plays a central role not just in the phenomenological tradition, but also in ana-
lytic philosophy of mind, and often serves to designate the pure “aiming at an
object” or aboutness. Aboutness is a property that belongs to mental activities with-
out regard to whether the object of the activity exists or not: it is possible to think
about non-existent things, such as a golden mountain, or even impossible things,
such as a round square. However, the term “intentionality” is also used to name a
special kind of relation between a subject and the outer world, namely, the act’s
cognitive access to reality, or (mental) reference, a property that belongs only to acts
having an object that exists. When discussing this access, philosophers often won-
der whether “intentionality” can be reduced to a causal relation (that is, whether the
mental act is related to its object as an effect is to its cause), or whether “intentional-
ity” and causality should be kept distinct. In other words, the discussion shifts, little
by little, from the act’s aiming at an object to its reference to reality, and then from
reference to causality. These shifts in meaning bring with them a series of problems.
While it might well be legitimate to identify reference with causality, it is less so to
treat the pure aiming at an object simply as a causal relation, or to merge, without
further explanation, this aiming with the act’s reference to reality: thinking about
something does not entail that the thing exists (except perhaps in some specific
cases such as perception). Though this last point is uncontroversial, philosophers do
not always take adequate heed of it; indeed, this leads some of them to fall into a
dilemma: on the one hand, they are willing to understand “intentionality” in rela-
tional terms when the question is how to ensure our access to reality, even while, on
the other hand, they resign themselves to accepting that there can be a non-relational
“intentional” aiming, that is, one that does not have an existent object (this is true at
any rate when they reject the possibility that objects can have a specific, intra-psy-
chic existence insofar as they are thought about). The issue is perhaps not so much
a philosophical difficulty as a problem of terminology, since the word “intentional-
ity” is used here to talk about distinct things—namely, on the one hand, the act’s
reference to reality and, on the other hand, its aboutness. Thus, in a study of the
nature of intentionality and of its logico–linguistic and ontological features, it seems
v
vi Preface
that a good thing to do would be to begin by clarifying the usage of the term
“intentionality.”
The variations of meaning in strictly philosophical studies have repercussions in
historical research. Among works that address the theme of “intentionality” in the
history of philosophy, some of them at times deal with the act’s pure aiming, at other
times with its reference. When they investigate the causal dimension of “intention-
ality”, it is in fact not the nature of the aboutness of thought that is analyzed, but
rather the nature of its reference to reality. When discussing the major thinkers on
intentionality – whether Aristotle, medieval authors, or the Austro-German philoso-
phers – historical studies have sometimes failed to keep these ideas fully distinct
from one another. Indeed, these studies usually begin with intentionality as it is
discussed by Brentano, that is, understood as the pure aiming at an object. They then
go back to the passages in Aristotle’s De anima on the special kind of “being
affected” (πάσχειν) that is brought about by the reception of “sensible forms with-
out matter” (τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης), that is (so it seems), they turn to
“intentionality” understood as causality. They then touch on the theory, laid out by
Thomas Aquinas in his Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, of the assimilation of
cognitive acts to reality, that is, “intentionality” as reference, explained in terms of
“similarity” (similitudo). They then discuss “cognized being” (esse cognitum) as
theorized by Duns Scotus, that is, the ontological status of objects insofar as they are
thought about. And finally, depending on their particular concerns, they conclude
with either phenomenology or analytic philosophy of mind, each understood as the
right path to the elucidation of the nature of intentionality, even if it is not always
obvious whether it has to do with thought’s pure aiming at the object or with its
reference to reality. Admittedly, historians of philosophy are largely justified for
these variations, inasmuch as intentionality seems to have sometimes been likened
to causality in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aquinas, following the lead of Albert
the Great, psychic causality has the unique feature that when the form is received in
the soul without its matter, it has “intentional being” (esse intentionale); however,
this does not lead Aquinas to propose a theory of causal reference, since cognitive
access to reality is explained in terms of similarity. Likewise, Brentano in his 1867
study of Aristotle’s psychology seems very much to identify the psychic causality in
the De anima with intentionality in the sense of “aboutness,” since he affirms that
the form received without matter is “objectively” (obiective) present in the soul—
and here the term should be understood in its original medieval sense, as designat-
ing the ontological status of things insofar as they are objects of thought. The
variations mentioned above are therefore understandable. However, some hints at
how to avoid these pitfalls can be found in texts of the past. Indeed, though
Brentano’s monograph on Aristotle may have helped to produce some confusions,
especially as regards the assimilation of intentionality with causality, nevertheless,
in his later works he draws a distinction between the intentional relation, the causal
relation and the relation of reference. Moreover, he finds this tripartition already in
Aristotle, specifically in Metaphysics Δ.15, which is about the different classes of
relation. Similar distinctions were made by authors in antiquity and the Middle
Ages, precisely in the context of the reception of Aristotle’s texts on relations. This
Preface vii
might make it possible to clear up the confusions mentioned above, in Brentano and
perhaps in Aristotle, but also in medieval thinkers and the Aristotelian tradition
more generally. The present work is intended to meet these desiderata: from its
point of departure in Brentano, it goes back to Aristotle, then considers Alexander
of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonist commentators, before proceeding to the scho-
lastic philosophers of the late Middle Ages and Suárez in the early modern period;
it aims at analyzing these authors’ accounts of intentionality, and the way they dis-
tinguish it from the relations of causality or reference. This is, in broad strokes, the
topic of this work. From the point of view of method, it will aim to harmonize
scholarship over the longue durée with systematic analysis in the history of
philosophy.
This book is the outcome of my doctoral and postdoctoral research conducted
between 2010 and 2017 at the University of Lausanne and the École Pratique des
Hautes Études in Paris, under the supervision of Christophe Erismann and Alain de
Libera; at the University of Geneva as a collaborator with Laurent Cesalli and Kevin
Mulligan; and at the University of Salzburg as a collaborator with Guillaume
Fréchette. Parts of it are also the result of a semester I spent as a visiting doctoral
student at the Humboldt University in Berlin under the supervision of Dominik
Perler. I am immensely indebted to all the people I have mentioned for their crucial
support during the development of this work; I am especially grateful to Laurent
Cesalli, who followed my project from the beginning, devoting a great deal of time
to providing me with both advice and encouragement, and has now generously sup-
ported the translation of my manuscript from his fund in the Philosophy Department
at the University of Geneva. I would also like to thank Olivier Boulnois and
Alexandrine Schniewind for their valuable contributions as members of my thesis
committee, as well as Jean-Baptiste Brenet for writing the preliminary report on my
thesis. I am grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for its help during
those 7 years, and to the Austrian Science Fund, which has supported me since
2016. I also thank the École Normale Supérieure in Paris for welcoming me as a
foreign student for a semester.
I had the opportunity to present my work many times at conferences, in written
form, and in less formal discussions. In addition to Charles Girard-Cédat and
Jocelyn Groisard, with whom I worked at the University of Lausanne, and Alessandra
Lukinovich, whose introduction to ancient Greek I took at the University of Geneva,
I would also like to thank, for their insight, advice, and help (even if some of them
do not remember, I do!), Monika Asztalos, Elena Băltuţă, Jocelyn Benoist, Thomas
Binder, Federico Boccaccini, Philipp Blum, Alessandro Canale, Victor Caston,
Dominique Demange, William Duba, Sten Ebbesen, Santiago Echeverri, Michael
Esfeld, Denis Fisette, Russell Friedman, Heine Hansen, Philippe Hoffmann, Uriah
Kriegel, Stefan Kristensen, Lukáš Lička, Can Laurens Loewe, John Magee, Claudio
Majolino, John Marenbon, Olivier Massin, Mary McCabe, Martine Nida-Rümelin,
Franco Paracchini, Irène Rosier-Catach, Sébastian Roth, Paolo Rubini, Stephan
Schmid, Mark Textor, Anna Tropia and Julia Wilam. I am especially indebted for
our many discussions to Parwana Emamzadah, Lorenzo Menoud, and Laure Piguet.
I also thank the two anonymous referees who read and commented on the first
draft of this book, as well as the editors of the Primary Sources of Phenomenology
viii Preface
series, Guillaume Fréchette, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, for
their support.
I am very grateful to Ian C. Drummond, who translated the manuscript of this
book from French into English. His work was exceptionally precise, and revising it
was almost a pleasure. I thank also Ben Sheredos, who helped me to revise the
translation of the Introduction.
I would have liked for Curzio Chiesa to read this book. We began a discussion
about the third class of relations in Metaphysics Δ.15, but left it unfinished; now,
unfortunately, it can no longer be resumed. I dedicate this book to him.
Salzburg, Austria Hamid Taieb

Sagten wir doch schon früher, es handele sich beim Psychischen
um eine einseitige reale Relation, und somit um etwas ganz
Eigenartiges.
Oskar Kraus, letter to Franz Brentano, 6 October 1904
Cavenda est aequivocatio, quando agimus de esse cognito, aut

aliis similibus denominationibus intellectus.
Francisco Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae 54.2.13
τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια.

Aristotle, Metaphysics Δ.15
ix
Contents
1 Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation?............................................ 1

Notes .......................................................................................................... 9
2 Psychic Causality...................................................................................... 15
2.1 The Young Brentano as a Reader of Aristotle’s De Anima............... 15
2.2 Causality and Intentionality in the Aristotelian Tradition................ 18
2.2.1 The Debate Between Burnyeat and Sorabji......................... 18
2.2.2 Thinking as κρίσις: Alexander of Aphrodisias
and the Neoplatonist Commentators.................................... 22
2.2.3 The Medieval Position.......................................................... 29
2.2.3.1 Thomas Aquinas.................................................... 31
2.2.3.2 Duns Scotus........................................................... 37
2.3 The Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality
in Brentano....................................................................................... 42
Notes .......................................................................................................... 47
3 Intentionality as a Relation...................................................................... 69
3.1 Contemporary Readings of Metaphysics Δ.15................................. 70
3.2 Objects and Correlates from Aristotle to Brentano.......................... 78
3.2.1 Intentional Objects: Antiquity and the Middle Ages............ 78
3.2.1.1 The Neoplatonist Reading of Categories 7,
7b25–27................................................................. 78
3.2.1.2 Cognized Being: Duns Scotus and Others............ 80
3.2.2 “Being Thought About” as an Extrinsic Denomination....... 83
3.2.3 The Intentional Object in Brentano...................................... 88
3.2.3.1 The Discontinuist Interpretation........................... 89
3.2.3.2 The Continuist Interpretation................................ 93
3.2.3.3 In Favour of the Discontinuist Interpretation........ 97
xi
xii Contents
3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before  103

3.3.1 Transcendental Relations in Suárez
(and the Background Scholastic Discussions)..................... 103
3.3.2 Intentionality and Relations According
to the Reist Brentano............................................................ 108
Notes .......................................................................................................... 118
4 Reference................................................................................................... 151
4.1 Reference as Similarity: The Medieval Origins............................... 152
4.1.1 The Assimilation Theory: Thomas Aquinas......................... 152
4.1.2 Thought or Assimilation: Duns Scotus................................. 158
4.2 Reference in Brentano...................................................................... 166
Notes .......................................................................................................... 175
5 Conclusion: Intentionality and History.................................................. 191
Notes .......................................................................................................... 198
Appendix........................................................................................................... 201
References......................................................................................................... 203
Index.................................................................................................................. 229
Chapter 1
Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation?
During the twentieth century, both phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind
devoted themselves to the study of “intentionality”. In §84 of Ideen I, Husserl
describes intentionality as
the own peculiarity of mental processes “to be conscious of something.” […] [A] perceiving
is a perceiving of something, perhaps a physical thing; a judging is a judging of a state of
affairs; valuing, of a state of values; a wishing, of a state of wishes; and so forth. […] In
every actual cogito a radiating “regard” is directed from the pure Ego to the “object” of the
consciousness-correlate in question, to the physical thing, to the state of affairs, etc., and
effects the very different kinds of consciousness of it.1
Similarly, John Searle begins the first chapter of his book on intentionality as
follows:
Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed
at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world. If, for example, I have a belief, it
must be a belief that such and such is the case; if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something
or that something will occur; if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something or that
something should happen or be the case; if I have an intention, it must be an intention to do
something.2
Searle describes intentionality in terms of “directedness” or “aboutness”: thoughts

are about something, either an object (e.g., a fear of something) or a state of affairs
(e.g., a belief that such and such is the case). If language also has this aspect of
intentionality or aboutness—that is, if words relate to things—it has it, according
to Searle, only in a “derived” way: intentionality is an “intrinsic” property of men-
tal acts and states, and it is the mind that “imposes” it on entities that are not
intentional in themselves (“noises made through the mouth,” “marks on paper,”
etc.).3 This property of being about, which is primarily attributed to the mind, has
often been understood as a relation. This can already be seen in Brentano, who is
generally credited with bringing the concept of intentionality into contemporary
philosophy in both the phenomenological and analytic traditions. In Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano describes intentionality as a “relation to
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 1

H. Taieb, Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition,
Primary Sources in Phenomenology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_1
2 1 Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation?
a content” (Beziehung auf einen Inhalt), and as a “relation to something as an

object” (Beziehung auf etwas als Object), or more simply as a “relation to an
object” (Beziehung auf ein Object).4 In his lectures on descriptive psychology in
1890–1891, he speaks of an “intentional relation” (intentionale Relation), which
he also calls a “psychic relation” (psychische Relation).5 In this same series of
lectures Brentano distinguishes between two modes of intentionality, namely,
“only seeing” (bloß sehen), and “noticing” (bemerken) or “being clear about what
is seen” (sich klar sein über das Gesehene). The latter mode seems to refer to an
active dimension of intentionality tied to the notion of attention.6 Thus, in addition
to intentionality understood in static terms, which treats it as a mere aboutness,
there is an intentionality understood in dynamic terms, combining aboutness with
attention, which is, as Victor Caston puts it, “our ability to focus, at will, on vari-
ous objects in our environment or in our thoughts.”7
The aboutness, or relation to an object, of mental acts has been described as a
“conceptually primitive relation.” That is, the relation between mental acts and their
objects cannot be analyzed in terms of other properties.8 It is therefore important to
distinguish the intentional relation from the other kinds of relation with which it
might be confused. As Husserl maintains, intentionality is not reducible to a causal
relation, and this applies even to perception:
One could not evade the recognition that intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of
psychic life which is given quite immediately and evidently prior to all theories. If I per-
ceive a house, then, perhaps I might say to myself at first, what is present is the house out-
side and in me a psychic lived experience of perceiving, for instance a perceptual image, as
a remote effect of the house itself upon my psychophysical subjectivity. But, however
things may stand against it, it can in any case be made evident that a relationship of con-
sciousness is contained in the lived experience of perceiving itself, and indeed a relation to
the house perceived in it itself. It can happen that later on I become correctly convinced that
I have fallen victim to an illusion. But previously I did have purely the consciousness
“house-existing-there”; descriptively it is no different from any other perceiving. Of course
there can be no talk of external-internal psychophysical causality if the house is a mere hal-
lucination. But it is clear that the momentary lived experiencing is in itself not only a sub-
jective lived experiencing but precisely a perceiving of this house. Therefore, descriptively,
the object-relation belongs to the lived experiencing, whether the object actually exists or
not. Likewise, if I imagine a centaur, the lived experiencing of the fiction is itself a fantasy
of this or that centaur; the lived experiencing which we call remembering includes the rela-
tion to the past; loving itself, the relation to the loved; hating, to the hated; willing, to what
is willed, etc.9
The distinction between the intentional relation and the causal relation is closely
connected with an account of mental acts from two different perspectives. The
causal relation depends on the interaction between the environment and the subject
(including its physiology). The account of this relation corresponds to the account
of the genesis of the act: the act is the effect of the object and relates to that object
as the cause of that act.10 The intentional relation, on the other hand, does not depend
on anything other than the act itself; the account of this relation informs us about the
structure of the act. It is Brentano who drew attention to these two perspectives,
referred to, respectively, as genetic psychology and descriptive psychology. Genetic
psychology—which includes “psychophysiology”—is concerned with discovering
the causal chains and chemical-physical processes that lead to the emergence of the
1 Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation? 3
various psychic phenomena; descriptive psychology, on the other hand—also called

“psychognosy” or (even before Husserl) “phenomenology”—describes the types
and essential constituents of psychic phenomena as the latter are given to inner per-
ception.11 In this sense, descriptive psychology is, in the well-known formulation of
Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, an “ontology of mind,” an ontology in which one
of the most important elements is the intentional relation.12
According to the passage from Husserl quoted above, there is an intentional rela-
tion whether the object exists or not. If this is true, the intentional relation must be
distinct not only from the causal relation, but also from any relation that is supposed
to explain the cognitive act’s conformity with reality.13 It could be maintained that a
cognitive act directed towards an existing object has a relation with that object that
expresses the “veridical” aspect of the act, a relation which, following Horgan and
Tienson among others, can be called (mental) “reference.” However, this relation is
not the same as the relation of aboutness, but is in addition to it: it says of the act not
that it is directed towards an object, but that the object towards which it is directed
exists.14 Following Uriah Kriegel, one can explain the relation of reference
counterfactually:
(a) [W]henever the state directed F-wise is veridical, it bears the appropriate relation to F;
(b) whenever the state directed F-wise is non-veridical, a certain counterfactual is still true
of it, namely, that if x were veridical, x would bear the appropriate relation to F. Thus, when
the property of being a dragon figures in the content of some experience, it must be the case
that if the experience were veridical, it would bear the appropriate relation to being a
dragon.15
A similar idea can be found already in Brentano, with a counterfactual not about
veridicality, but about the existence of the object and with the thesis that a cognitive
act whose object exists bears a specific relation to it in addition to intentionality:
With Jupiter, if it were not a question of something imaginary, but of something real and
which truly exists, he certainly could then enter, with the one who is thinking, into a rela-
tion, which could be described as a kind of correspondence; however, this would not be
what is called a psychic relation of the thinker to what is thought, but rather a correspon-
dence between the thinker and the thing, based on the characteristics of the thinker on the
one hand and the thing on the other. This would be a relation that ought to be classified as a
subspecies of the relations of sameness and similarity in the usual sense.16
As the text above indicates, reference is for Brentano a species of the relations of
“sameness” (Gleichheit) and “similarity” (Ähnlichkeit); it therefore cannot be
understood as a causal relation (from the act as an effect to the object as its cause).
It is also entirely distinct from intentionality: as Brentano emphasizes, the existence
of the object does not give the act its dimension of aboutness, but of “correspon-
dence” (Übereinstimmung). Moreover, if the object of a “correct” (richtig) act of
judgement disappears, the cognitive act loses not its dimension of aboutness, but its
correctness:
A man who has judged correctly with respect to an object may persist in his judgment after
the object itself has changed and his judgment will then cease to correspond with its
object.17
An important point of disagreement between Kriegel and Brentano is that Kriegel

does not consider aboutness a relation, but a monadic property of the thinking sub-
ject. More precisely, it is an “adverbial” property: someone who thinks about some
object does not have, simply because she is thinking about it, a relation to that
object, but is disposed “this-object-ly,” or is thinking “this-object-ly.” The object
would thus be not so much something confronting the subject, and with which the
subject comes into “contact” by means of a relation, but rather a way of being of the
act. The adverbial theory of intentionality, of which the best-known exponent is
Roderick Chisholm,18 was first proposed by C.J. Ducasse:
“[B]lue,” “bitter,” “sweet,” etc., are names not of objects of experience nor of species of
objects of experience but of species of experience itself. What this means is perhaps made
clearest by saying that to sense blue is to sense bluely, just as to dance the waltz is to dance
“waltzily” (i.e., in the manner called “to waltz”) to jump a leap is to jump “leapily” (i.e., in
the manner called “to leap”) etc.19
In the adverbial theory, the property of “being intentionally directed towards F”

becomes “being intentionally directed F-wise.”20 Thus, with the replacement of
“towards F” with “F-wise,” the relational conception of intentionality has been
abandoned in favour of a non-relational one. Kriegel emphasizes that this change is
not in itself a “metaphysical” explanation of intentionality, but is meant to show that
there is an “intelligible” way to talk about cognitive acts non-relationally—that is,
that the “divalent,” and thus relational, structure of intentional verbs (“x thinks of
y”) can be bypassed21—which then opens the way for a subsequent metaphysical
explanation:
The purpose of the paraphrase itself is only to show that despite the naturalness of the rela-
tional way of speaking, there is also a consistent non-relational way of doing so.22
However, though adverbialism adequately translates the logical-linguistic structure,

or “grammar,”23 of intentionality into non-relational terms, it is not clear that such a
reduction succeeds from a phenomenological perspective. When Kriegel attempts
to describe the property of “being intentionally directed F-wise” from the point of
view of experience itself, he asserts that its “signature” is that it presents something
as “foreign” or “other” to the possessor of this property.24 But as Eleonora Orlando
comments in her review of Kriegel’s book:
I don’t see how this idea could serve to throw light on the specific adverbialist conception
of the experiential character: a state x that is conceived of as bearing a relation of being
directed at a property F, rather than as being directed F-wise, might also be thought to pres-
ent its content as “foreign.” In other words, it does not provide us with an elucidation of the
experiential property of being intentionally directed F-wise as something different from the
experiential property of being intentionally directed at F.25
To this it could be added that it is only by understanding the cognitive act as “a state
x that is conceived of as bearing a relation of being directed at a property F” that one
can make sense of F’s dimension of foreignness or otherness, which the description
“being directed F-wise” fails to do, at least if F is truly to be reduced to a way of
being of the thinking subject. What is gained from the grammatical point of view
thus seems to be lost from the phenomenological point of view. The difficulty in
performing a phenomenological reduction of the object to a way of being of the

thinking subject might explain why many authors have defended a relational under-
standing of intentionality at the ontological level itself: the “ob-ject” (Gegen-stand)
is not just a way of being of the subject, but is something that confronts the subject
as its counterpart, and such a confrontation involves a relation.
However, it is highly problematic to draw conclusions about ontology from
grammar or phenomenology—not to mention the difficulties entailed by a relational
understanding of intentionality. Indeed, preserving the relational character of inten-
tionality or aboutness regardless of whether or not the object exists presents an
important problem, for a relation has often seemed to require the existence of (at
least) two relata. Various solutions to this problem have been proposed. The most
famous one, usually attributed to Brentano, consists in allowing for “intentional
objects”, which have a special mode of being, and play the role of the intra-psychic
term of the intentional relation.26 Thus, regardless of whether or not the “transcen-
dent object” exists, the act is always directed towards an “immanent object”; in this
way the relational dimension of aboutness is preserved. Admittedly, this solution
brings with it the risk of eliding the “foreignness” of the object, unless we add that
the immanent object does not present itself to the act as immanent. The theory of the
immanent object is originally scholastic: medieval philosophers attributed to objects
of thought a special mode of being, called esse intentionale in anima or esse obiec-
tive in anima, which is distinct from the mode of being that things have in reality.27
Brentano adopted this medieval doctrine and developed it in his psychology. Another
solution, adopted by Alois Höfler and Kazimierz Twardowski as well as by
J.N. Findlay and Reinhardt Grossmann, is to allow for “abnormal relations”, or
“non-extensional relations”, that is, relations without an existing term (terminus or
target).28 In this way, since some relations do not require the existence of their term,
even an act directed towards an impossible object, such as a round square, does not
lose its relational aspect. Note that although the notion of a relation without two
relata may seem to contradict the very idea of a relation, defenders of the notion
insist that it is not an ad hoc solution restricted to intentionality, but that such “ampu-
tated” relations are required in other contexts; one example is the temporal relation
“wholly precedes,” where one of the relata, the one that precedes the other, does not
exist.29 Whether or not these solutions are accepted as valid, many authors balk at
abandoning the relational aspect of intentionality. It is precisely by appeal to the
ontological category of relation that aboutness is often explained.
To sum up, we have reviewed three different relations which cognitive acts have
often been said to have to their objects: (1) intentionality, (2) causality, and (3) refer-
ence. All three of these relations can be found in Brentano (even if his readers have
not always realized this): an intentional relation, which explains aboutness; a causal
relation, which explains the genesis of acts; and a relation of “correspondence”
(Übereinstimmung), which expresses the fact that acts refer to reality. An important
point to note about this tripartition of psychic relations is that Brentano attributes it
to Aristotle, or at least assigns the three relations in question to the three classes of
relation that Aristotle lays out in Metaphysics Δ.15, 1020b26–1021b11: relations
“with respect to number” (κατ᾽ἀριθμόν), which Brentano calls comparative rela-
tions (komparative Relationen), have to do with the conformity of the act to the
object; relations “with respect to power” (κατὰ δύναμιν), which Brentano calls
causal relations (kausale Relationen), have to do with the “genetic” dimension of
psychic activities; and finally, relations that hold between the “measure” and the
“measurable” (μέτρον and μετρητόν) are intentional relations (intentionale
Relationen).30 Aristotle’s writings seem to support such a tripartition: while the De
interpretatione considers the “affections of the soul” (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) to be
“similitudes” (ὁμοιώματα) of “things” (πράγματα),31 and the De anima tends to
treat psychic relations more as causal relations,32 the tripartition in Metaphysics
Δ.15 suggests that there is also a sense in which acts are related to their objects nei-
ther by a relation of similarity nor by a causal relation; thus, there would be here an
intentional relation strictly speaking. As Brentano himself points out: “[Aristotle]
divided relations into three classes: comparative, causal, and intentional.”33
Moreover, what leads one to distinguish in Aristotle a relation that accounts pre-
cisely for the aboutness is the acceptance, among psychic relatives, of cognitive acts
directed towards non-existent objects. For Aristotle, it is not just “sensation”
(αἴσθησις) and “the sensible” (αἰσθητόν), or “intellection” (νόησις) and “the intel-
ligible” (νοητόν) that are correlatives, but also “opinion” (δόξα) and “the opinable”
(δοξαστόν). In the case of the last pair, that to which the psychic relation is directed
does not always exist:
It is not true to say that what is not, since it is opinable, is something that is; for the opinion
about it is not that it is, but that it is not.34
Moreover, see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation than the genus, as (e.g.)
the opinable has, as compared with being; for both what is and what is not are opinable, so
that the opinable could not be a species of being; for the genus is always wider of denotation
than the species.35
If the object does not exist, and if it never existed, the relation to it of “opinion”
(δόξα) cannot be causal, nor can it be referential. This relation must therefore be one
of mere aboutness, that is, a pure “aiming at.”36
Brentano was not the only philosopher who tried to discern in Aristotle a non-
causal, non-referential relation to the object. Already in Alexander of Aphrodisias,
“opinion” (δόξα) and “imagination” or “representation” (φαντασία) are counted
among relatives of the third class from Metaphysics Δ.15; thus, from the very begin-
ning of Aristotelianism, there was attributed to cognitive acts a psychic relation that
is distinct from causality or reference.37 For Alexander, and likewise for the
Neoplatonist commentators,38 the term covering Aristotle’s third class of relatives is
κρίσις, that is, “discrimination.” Now, the noun κρίσις, formed from the verb
κρίνειν, “to discriminate,” seems to imply an active understanding of psychology,
which Alexander explicitly contrasts with psychic passivity:
For even if sensing arises from certain bodily affections, it is not a being-affected, but a
discriminating.39
In other words, Alexander seems to distinguish between intentionality and causality.

It is possible to identify, in Aristotle himself, the basis on which one might distin-
guish an active intentional psychic relation from a causally passive psychic relation.
Though Aristotle says that cognitive acts are relative, he also classifies them not just
as qualities and passions, but as actions—more precisely, as “non-transitive” ones,
that is, actions that have no “product” (ἔργον) in addition to themselves.40 Now, the
term κρίνειν would account precisely for the active dimension of Aristotelian psy-
chology and for a discrimination which could be thought of as a “selection” of the
object, that is, as a sort of attentional intentionality. In any case, both Alexander of
Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonist commentators seem to attribute an active sense to
relations of the third class in Metaphysics Δ.15.
In medieval philosophy as well, Aristotle’s psychology was thought of as includ-
ing an active dimension. Thomas Aquinas, for example, grounds Aristotle’s third-
class relations in what are called “immanent” actions, which is to say that they
“remain” (manens) in the agent.41 Admittedly, Aquinas makes the relation to the
object a relation of similarity—in medieval philosophy, the similarity between the
act and its object belongs not to the first class of relations in Metaphysics Δ.15, but
to the third (contrary to what Brentano maintains). Aquinas thus seems to prefer a
referential interpretation of Aristotle’s account of psychic relations over an inten-
tionalist one. Aristotelian psychic relations seem, in Aquinas’s opinion, to be meant
to explain the truth (veritas) of acts, that is, the fact that they correspond to reality.42
However, this referentialist interpretation of the third class of relations in Metaphysics
Δ.15 is not the only one that medieval philosophers considered. When John Duns
Scotus interprets the Aristotelian theory of psychic relations, he draws a distinction
not just between the relation to the object as cause and the relation to the object as
“measure” (mensura), but also between the relation to the object as measure and the
relation to the object as “term” (terminus). In this way he identifies, within Aristotle’s
third class of relations, a relation to the object that is neither causal nor referential,
but is a pure aiming at the object, thus prefiguring Brentano’s division of psychic
relations into three types.43 Indeed, Scotus’s relation of “termination” is a primitive
relation to the object that is distinct from the causal and referential relations; it can
thus be called an “intentional” relation. The idea of a pure relation of aiming at the
object reappeared in later scholasticism with Suárez’s concept of the “transcenden-
tal relation” (respectus transcendentalis), a real relation that essentially accompa-
nies every cognitive act and is present whether the object exists or not, and even
whether the object is possible or not. Here too, it is legitimate to speak of an inten-
tional relation, at least if one takes care—as I shall in the present study—not to treat
historical scholarship on intentionality as identical to research on the Latin term
intentio or the Greek ἐντείνειν.44 Thus, in the Aristotelian tradition, we find ideas
that resonate with the Brentanian interpretation of Metaphysics Δ.15.45
As this work is meant to show, there are philosophical reasons that have led to the
distinction between intentionality, causality, and (mental) reference, reasons which
appear, under different forms, throughout the history of philosophy, of Aristotelianism
in particular. The main reason for distinguishing between intentionality on the one
hand, and causality and reference on the other, is the problem of non-existent
objects. An act whose object does not (and did not) exist is not undergoing (and did
not undergo) a causal influence from the object, nor does it refer to anything in real-
ity; it is nonetheless about something. The more delicate distinction is the one
between causality and reference: once the object I am thinking about exists in real-
ity, why should my referring to it be distinguished from the causal relation between
the object and the thought about it? As will be made clear in what follows, there are
some reasons to make this additional distinction, one of them being the thought
experiment of God or a machine causing in the cognizer an act directed at an exist-
ing object: in this case, the causal relation would go from the act to God or the
machine, but the act would refer to the object.
Not only did Brentano introduce intentionality into contemporary discussions,
but a careful reading of his texts also reveals that he distinguished intentionality
from two other relations with which it might be confused—namely, causality and
reference—and did so before other thinkers, including Husserl most significantly.
Yet despite its philosophical importance, Brentano’s tripartition of intentionality,
causality, and reference has been little heeded by his readers. This interpretive
lacuna is unfortunate enough in itself, but it has also rendered most studies on the
Aristotelian origins of Brentano’s psychology incomplete. In his earlier works—in
particular, his 1867 study on the psychology of Aristotle, and his Psychology from
an Empirical Standpoint of 1874—Brentano constantly cites the passages in
Aristotle’s De anima on the particular “being affected” (πάσχειν) that is constitutive
of cognition, whereas in the later works, in which he tries to distinguish intentional-
ity, causality, and reference from one another, he favours Metaphysics Δ.15.46 Thus,
it is not just that Brentano’s theory of psychic relations has been insufficiently
explored in the scholarly literature; the Aristotelian origins of the Brentanian tripar-
tition of the intentional relation, the causal relation, and the relation of reference
have also been completely neglected. This ought to be of interest not only to
Brentano scholars, but also to those studying Aristotelian psychology. Ultimately, it
is the exact scope of the philosophically crucial discussions of “intentionality” that
must be re-evaluated. The present study aims to fill these gaps by comparing the
texts of Brentano, including unpublished texts from his Nachlaß, with those of some
of the most important and influential authors in the Aristotelian tradition: Alexander
of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonist commentators in antiquity, Thomas Aquinas
and John Duns Scotus in the Middle Ages, and Suárez in early modern
scholasticism.
Questions about the philosophy of the history of philosophy will be discussed in
the conclusion of this study, where I will use my own historical inquiries as exam-
ples when I evaluate the different views on methodology. However, it is important
to emphasize from the start that, in what follows, I will aim at historical reconstruc-
tion, in which the main objective is fidelity to past authors, in contrast to “rational
reconstruction,” in which authors of the past are interpreted in such a way as to show
their relevance for contemporary discussions.47 In aiming at historical fidelity, I will
try to make clear the theoretical context of past philosophical positions, in order to
understand what specific problems their authors wanted them to answer.48 Finally, I
would also like to mention the following methodological distinction, articulated by
Guy Longworth:
[I]t’s worthwhile to distinguish two ways in which earlier work might be related to later
work. The first way is for the earlier work to be a precedent for later work: minimally, for it
to involve an earlier appearance, in whole or part, of later insights. Here, what matters are
Notes 9
commonalities or similarities between the earlier and later view, whatever the historical
connections between those views. The second way is for the earlier work to be a precursor
for the later work: minimally, for the earlier work to have figured causally in the generation
of the later work, either as a prompt to, or stage in, the development of the insights con-
tained in the later work.49
The purpose of the pages that follow will not be to look for precursors in the
Aristotelian tradition for the Brentanian distinction between intentionality, causal-
ity, and reference. Certainly, when such precursors can be identified, they will be
mentioned, but the main issue will lie elsewhere: it will consist in showing that
ancient and medieval readings of Aristotle form precedents for the Brentanian the-
ory, in other words, that Brentano’s tripartition is historically anchored in
Aristotelianism in general, regardless of who his concrete influences were. On this
basis it will be possible to show that Brentanian descriptive psychology, inasmuch
as it is contrasted with genetic psychology, is part of a longue durée history that
begins with Aristotle and continues through ancient and medieval thought.50
Notes
1. Husserl, Ideen I, §84 (Husserliana 3.1: 188.19–31): “[…] die Eigenheit von
Erlebnissen, ‘Bewußtsein von etwas zu sein’. […] ein Wahrnehmen ist
Wahrnehmen von etwas, etwa einem Dinge; ein Urteilen ist Urteilen von einem
Sachverhalt; ein Werten von einem Wertverhalt; ein Wünschen von einem
Wunschverhalt usw. […] In jedem aktuellen cogito richtet sich ein von dem
reinen Ich ausstrahlender ‘Blick’ auf den ‘Gegenstand’ des jeweiligen
Bewußtseinskorrelats, auf das Ding, den Sachverhalt usw. und vollzieht das
sehr verschiedenartige Bewußtsein von ihm.” Trans. Kersten, in Ideas
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,
First Book, 200 (slightly modified).
2. Searle, Intentionality, 1. On Searle’s supposed ignorance of phenomenology,
see Intentionality, ix–x, and Baumgartner and Klawitter, Intentionality of
Perception. Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are cited by Searle at
(respectively) Intentionality, 44, 154, and 65.
3. Searle, Intentionality, 27.
4. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 124, 137, vi (respectively); ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 106, 115, 9. Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint, 88, 97, vii (modified).
5. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 22. Trans. Müller, in Descriptive
Psychology, 24.
6. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 23–24. Trans. Müller, in Descriptive
Psychology, 26. On attention, see also Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie,
31–65, and Grundzüge der Ästhetik, 38–40.
7. Caston, Connecting Traditions, 39. This is how Caston describes “selective
attention.”
8. See Jacquette, Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation.

9. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana 9: 31.24–32.17: “Man
konnte sich nicht der Erkenntnis entziehen, daß Intentionalität eine
Grundeigenschaft des psychischen Lebens sei, die vor allen Theorien ganz
unmittelbar und evident gegeben sei. Wenn ich ein Haus wahrnehme, so ist,
werde ich mir vielleicht sagen, was hier vorliegt, das Haus draußen, und in mir
ein psychisches Erlebnis des Wahrnehmens, etwa ein Wahrnehmungsbild, als
entfernte Wirkung des Hauses selbst auf meine psychophysische Subjektivität.
Aber wie immer es mit dieser kausalen Beziehung stehen mag und ob gegen sie
etwas zu sagen [ist], ist es doch evident zu machen, daß im
Wahrnehmungserlebnis selbst eine Bewußtseinsbeziehung liegt, und zwar auf
das in ihm selbst wahrgenommene Haus. Es kann sein, daß ich späterhin rech-
tmäßig zur Überzeugung komme, daß ich einer Illusion zum Opfer gefallen
bin. Aber vorher hatte ich doch rein das Bewußtsein ‘dort-seiendes-Haus’,
deskriptiv ist gar nichts unterschieden von einem sonstigen Wahrnehmen. Von
einer äußerlich-innerlichen Kausalität ist natürlich keine Rede, wenn das Haus
eine bloße Halluzination ist. Aber es ist klar, das momentane Erleben an sich
selbst ist nicht überhaupt ein subjektives Erleben, sondern eben Wahrnehmen
von diesem Haus. Also deskriptiv gehört zum Erleben die Objekt-Beziehung,
ob nun das Objekt wirklich existiert oder nicht. Ebenso ist, wenn ich mir einen
Zentauren fingiere, das Erleben der Fiktion selbst Phantasie von dem und dem
Zentauren; in dem Erleben, das wir Erinnerung nennen, liegt ebenso selbst die
Beziehung auf Vergangenes, im Lieben selbst die Beziehung auf das Geliebte,
im Hassen auf das Gehaßte, im Wollen auf das Gewollte usw.” Trans. Scanlon,
in Phenomenological Psychology, 22–23. For discussion of this passage, see
McIntyre and Smith, Husserl and Intentionality, 91–92. On the difference
between the intentional relation and the causal relation in Husserl, see also
Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen 5, §15a (Husserliana 19.2: 405.11–32; 1913
ed., 391); McIntyre and Smith, Theory of Intentionality, 149–152; Zahavi,
Husserl’s Phenomenology, 14–15 and 23–24.
10. The action of the object is of course only part of the genetic explanation of
mental acts. In order to have a complete picture of the way psychic activities (in
all their diversity) are produced, one should consider, in addition to the effect
of the object not just the influence of physiological elements, but also of other
psychic activities, especially with respect to the production of beliefs and
desires.
11. See the texts collected in Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie. Note that Brentano
also makes room for merely psychological genetic explanations, for example,
as regards association of ideas. On the division of psychology into genetic and
descriptive, see Hedwig, Deskription; Mazzù, Psychologie empirique et psy-
chologie métaphysique chez Franz Brentano; Fisette, Descriptive Psychology
and Natural Sciences.
12. See Mulligan and Smith, Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind.
13. By “cognitive acts,” I mean a subspecies of mental acts that excludes both
affective and conative acts, and thus consists mainly of sensation, memory,
Notes 11
conceptual thought, and judgement. In this book I will primarily discuss cogni-
tive acts.
14. On this difference between “being intentionally directed towards something”
and “referring to something,” see Horgan and Tienson, The Intentionality of
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, 529; note however
that the vocabulary in the literature fluctuates: one finds veridical uses of “inten-
tionality” (often described as our “directedness towards the world”) and non-
veridical uses of “reference” (for example, in translations of the [Austro-]
German sich beziehen auf). It must be emphasized that reference here is not a
property of linguistic expressions, but of psychic activities, either conceptual or
non-conceptual. The term should therefore not be understood in the sense it has
as a translation of Frege’s Bedeutung (which would be better translated as “sig-
nification”). For the use of “reference” to designate a feature of mental acts, see
also Chisholm, Presence in Absence. One could choose to talk of “mental refer-
ence”, as Kriegel does, in contrast to linguistic reference; see his Brentano’s
Mature Theory of Intentionality. Speaker reference (someone refers to a with
the word “a”), as a linguistic phenomenon, is also to be distinguished from
mental reference—although the latter surely in part explains the former. On the
philosophical problems created by not distinguishing between intentionality
and reference when speaking of psychic activities—in particular, on the
“dilemma” mentioned in the preface to this book—see Taieb, Intentionality and
Reference.
15. Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality, 154.
16. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51045–51046: “Sollte es sich
nicht um etwas Imaginäres in Jupiter handeln, sondern um etwas Reelles und
wirklich Existierendes, so würde zwar von diesem gelten, daß es mit dem
Denkenden in einer Relation sei, die als eine Art Übereinstimmung bezeichnet
werden könnte, allein diese wäre nicht die s.g. psychische Beziehung des
Denkenden zum Gedachten, sondern eine Übereinstimmung des Denkenden
mit dem Dinge aufgrund der Eigentümlichkeit des Denkenden einerseits und
des Dinges andrerseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen der
Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre.” My
translation.
17. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik’, 1915, n. 30876 (Kategorienlehre, 167):
“[…] ein Urteilender aufhört, sich mit seinem Objekt in jener Übereinstimmung
zu finden, in welcher der richtig Urteilende zu ihm steht, wenn er unverändert
bei seinem Urteil verharrt, aber das Objekt sich ändert.” Trans. Chisholm and
Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 126.
18. See especially Chisholm, Intentional Inexistence.
19. Ducasse, Moore’s Refutation of Idealism, 232–233. It should be noted that
adverbialism does not in itself imply the reduction of secondary qualities to
“species of experience” (even though Ducasse’s article was meant as a defence
of the validity of the esse est percipi thesis for secondary qualities).
20. Orlando, Review of Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality.
21. On the “divalence” of intentional verbs, see Ebbesen, A Porretanean and a

Nominalis on Relations.
22. Kriegel, Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality, 313.
23. This notion of a “grammar” of intentionality comes from Chrudzimski,
Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 240.
24. Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality, 158. Kriegel develops a thesis taken
from Frey, Phenomenal Presence. On the relational character of the phenome-
nology of intentionality, see also Kriegel, Brentano’s Mature Theory of
Intentionality.
25. Orlando, review of Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality.
26. I will return in Sect. 3.2.3 below to Brentano’s theory of the intentional object.
27. I will return in Sects. 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2 below to the medieval theory of esse
obiective.
28. See Höfler, Logik: Unter Mitwirkung von Dr. Alexius Meinong, 105;
Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, 27–29;
Findlay, Values and Intentions, 35, quoted in Haldane, Intentionality and One-
Sided Relations, 97. On the “abnormal relation,” see Grossmann, Non-Existent
Objects, 31–32, as well as Phenomenology and Existentialism, 50–51 and The
Existence of the World, 94–95. For the “non-extensional relation” (or nicht-
extensionale Relation), see Chrudzimski and Smith, Brentano’s Ontology, 216;
Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 239. More gener-
ally on the introduction of relations without a term, see also Kenny, Action,
Emotion and Will, 117.
29. A defence against the objection that the solution is ad hoc is found in Grossmann,
Non-Existent Objects, 31–32, but the example of the temporal relation comes
from Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, 117.
30. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117 and Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn.
51040–51048.
31. Aristotle, De int. 1, 16a3–9. Note that here I follow Pépin, as well as the “mod-
ern commentators” that he cites, and I take the affections of soul to belong to
both the sensitive part of the soul and the intellective part; see Pépin, ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ,
ΣΗΜΕΙΑ, ὉΜΟΙΩΜΑΤΑ, 31–32.
32. See Aristotle, De anima 2.4, 416b33–34 and 3.4, 429a13–15; see also, more
generally, De anima 2.5.
33. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117: “[Aristoteles] teilte die Relationen in
drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen, die
dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt.” Trans. Chisholm et al., in The True
and the Evident, 70.
34. Aristotle, De int. 11, 21a32–33: “τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν
ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.” Trans. Ackrill,
in The Complete Works of Aristotle (slightly modified).
35. Aristotle, Top. 4.1, 121b2–4: “Ἔτι εἰ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται τοῦ γένους τὸ ἐν τῷ
γένει τεθέν, οἷον τὸ δοξαστὸν τοῦ ὄντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξαστόν,
Notes 13
ὥστ᾽οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ δοξαστὸν εἶδος τοῦ ὄντος· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ γένος τοῦ
εἴδους λέγεται.” Trans. Pickard-Cambridge, in The Complete Works of Aristotle
(slightly modified). I thank Olivier Boulnois for this reference.
36. The verb “to aim at” translates the German Abzielen, which one finds as a syn-
onym of Meinen in Husserl; see Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen 5, §11
(Husserliana 19.2: 386.1–2; 1913 ed., 372); trans. Findlay, in Logical
Investigations, 98. As shown by Mulligan, Meaning Something and Meanings,
Husserl’s Meinen is a concept that it is difficult to describe, and often seems to
be closely connected with the concept of signification (Bedeutung). In this
study I shall use the verb “aiming at” in a broad, perhaps non-Husserlian sense,
bringing it closer to aboutness: an act that aims at x is an act that is about x.
37. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 406.35–38 and 407.20–25, and
De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 78.10–21.
38. See Simplicius, In Phys., CAG 9: 401.31–33. It should be pointed out that the
discussion of Neoplatonist authors in the present work will focus mainly on
those referred to as the “commentators” on Aristotle, who were favourable to
Aristotle’s doctrines and took care to articulate them in such a way that they
would harmonize with Plato’s. However, the relationship of the Neoplatonists
with Aristotle was not always friendly, as can be seen, at the very beginning of
the Neoplatonist tradition, in Plotinus’s critique of the Categories; see Plotinus,
Enneads 6.1–3. On the role of Aristotle in Neoplatonist philosophy and educa-
tion, see Ilsetraut Hadot, Commentaire. On psychology, see Blumenthal,
Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity, 121–125. For a more detailed
comparison of Aristotelian psychology with the psychology of Plotinus, see
Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception and Schniewind, Le statut des objets
intelligibles chez Alexandre d’Aphrodise et Plotin.
39. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 84.4–6: “καὶ γὰρ εἰ διά
τινων παθῶν σωματικῶν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεται, ἀλλ’αὐτό γε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
οὐ πάσχειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κρίνειν.” My translation, following Bergeron and
Dufour’s French translation.
40. See Aristotle, Cat. 7, 6a36–8b24 and Met. Δ.15, 1020b26–21b11; Cat. 8, 8b29–
32, 9b33–10a10 and De int. 1, 16a3–9; De anima 2.5, 417b2–18a6; Met. Θ.6,
1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2.
41. See Thomas Aquinas, In Met. 5.1.17 (ed. Marietti, §1027). The distinction is
derived from Aristotle, Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2.
42. See Thomas Aquinas, In Met. 5.1.17 (ed. Marietti, §1003).
43. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.21–22): “[…]
nec sola relatio mensurati est tertii modi, sed omnis similis, scilicet non mutua,
qualis est terminati—modo praedicto—ad terminans.” My translation, follow-
ing Sondag’s French translation.
44. For a critique of histories of intentionality that focus excessively on lexicogra-
phy, see Caston, Connecting Traditions. I thank Laurent Cesalli for drawing my
attention to the importance of making a strict distinction between lexicography,

that is, an inquiry about words, and the history of philosophy, that is, an inquiry
about concepts and propositions.
45. On the existence of a psychology belonging to the Aristotelian tradition taken
broadly (that is, as this tradition is understood here), see most recently the work
of the research group “Representation and Reality: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives on the Aristotelian Tradition,” at the University of Gothenburg.
46. This is the case from 1889 onwards; see Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher
Erkenntnis, ed. Kraus, 54n19; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 62n19.
47. On these distinctions, see Panaccio, Philosophie analytique et histoire de la
philosophie. Panaccio borrows the distinction between rational reconstruction
and historical reconstruction from Richard Rorty, The Historiography of
Philosophy.
48. On the importance of the recontextualization of past philosophical statements
if they are to be understood properly, see de Libera, L’art des généralités,
609–636.
49. Longworth, Grice and Marty on Expression.
50. For studies on intentionality in ancient and medieval philosophy, see especially
Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality; Couloubaritsis
and Mazzù (eds.), Questions sur l’intentionnalité; Lagerlund (ed.),
Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy; Knuuttila and
Kärkkäinen (eds.), Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern
Philosophy; Amerini (ed.), Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality;
Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval
Philosophy. On the Aristotelian–scholastic origins of Brentano’s thought, see
Stumpf, Spinozastudien, 9–18; Spiegelberg, Der Begriff der Intentionalität in
der Scholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl, and ‘Intention’ and ‘Intentionality’
in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl; Étienne Gilson, Franz Brentano’s
Interpretation of Medieval Philosophy; Marras, The Scholastic Roots of
Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality; Hedwig, Der scholastische Kontext
des Intentionalen bei Brentano, Intention: Outlines for the History of a
Phenomenological Concept, and Über die moderne Rezeption der Intentionalität
Thomas-Ockham-Brentano; Volpi, War Franz Brentano ein Aristoteliker?;
McDonnell, Brentano’s Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality
into a Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology, and Brentano’s Modification
of the Medieval-Scholastic Concept of ‘Intentional Inexistence’; Courtine, La
cause de la phénoménologie, 37–74; de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, vol. 1:
Naissance du sujet, 133–154; Tănăsescu, Franz Brentano’s Dissertation and the
Problem of Intentionality.
Chapter 2
Psychic Causality
2.1 The Young Brentano as a Reader of Aristotle’s De Anima
Franz Brentano is one of the major figures of what is known as the “Austro-German”
tradition. A distinctive feature of this tradition is its concern with clarity and argu-
ment, as opposed to the speculative and “jargon-laden” philosophy of the nineteenth
century, which is to say—according to the Austro-German authors themselves—
post-Kantian idealism.1 In this respect, the Austrian philosopher and Catholic priest
Bernard Bolzano, inasmuch as he was anti-Kantian and anti-idealist, can be placed
at the origins of Austro-German philosophy. It should be noted that Bolzano was
well-versed in Aristotelian philosophy and logic, as the numerous references in his
Wissenschaftslehre of 1837 attest. Nonetheless, the most influential thinker in the
Austro-German tradition was not Bolzano, but Brentano. From a methodological
perspective, Brentano also insists on the importance of clarity and argument, and he
also is opposed to speculative thinking. In the famous fourth thesis in his
Habilitationsschrift, he maintains that philosophy, which includes psychology,
should follow “the method of the natural sciences,” that is, it should be based on
experience.2 In the case of psychology, this amounts to saying that it must rest on
“inner perception”—in other words, it should be done from the point of view of
reflexive consciousness—and free itself from any metaphysical prejudices.3
Brentano’s research inspired a large number of followers: probably the best-known
products of the school of Brentano are Husserl’s phenomenology, Meinong’s theory
of objects, the Lvov–Warsaw school of logic founded by Twardowski, and the vari-
ous traditions of Gestalt psychology.4 Brentano himself was a student of Adolf
Trendelenburg in Berlin. Trendelenburg played an important role in the renewal of
Aristotelian thought in the German-speaking world: he taught the philosophy of
Aristotle for almost thirty years without interruption, and was a major influence on
many students.5 Having in this way become familiarized with the philosophy and
psychology of Aristotle, Brentano wrote his famous doctoral thesis on the

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_2
16 2 Psychic Causality
Aristotelian theory of categories in 1862, and his Habilitationsschrift on Aristotles’s

psychology in 1867.6 These two works also attach great importance to the scholastic
reception of Aristotle’s philosophy, especially Thomas Aquinas. This interest in
Aristotle was not confined to Brentano’s youth: he published books on Aristotle
throughout his life, and regularly lectured on the history of ancient and medieval
philosophy. It should also be pointed out that Brentano too was a priest, but left the
priesthood around 1870 after contesting the doctrine of papal infallibility.7
It is from the Aristotelian–scholastic tradition that Brentano borrows the theme
of intentionality. This theme already plays an important role in his 1867 study on
Aristotle’s psychology. Brentano addresses it regularly when he discusses psychic
causality, that is, the Aristotelian thesis that thinking is equivalent to a special form
of “being affected” (πάσχειν). Aristotle speaks in the De anima of cognitive states
and activities as a “being affected,” though he takes care to explain that this being-
affected is not a normal “alteration” (ἀλλοίωσις) or qualititative change; that is, it is
not a “destruction by the contrary,” as when the body goes from being healthy to
being sick, or from being sick to being healthy.8 For Aristotle, cognitive activities
and the acquisition of cognitive states are alterations in a special sense. The acquisi-
tion of knowledge as a state (ἕξις), or habitus, is not a destruction resulting from the
action of a contrary, but a modification (μεταβολή) “to the nature” (ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν)
of that which is modified.9 Likewise, going from knowledge as a state to actually
exercised knowledge, as well as from sensation in potency to sensation in act, is not
a destruction by a contrary, but a mere activation of what was in potency or, as
Aristotle puts it, “a preservation of what is in potentiality by what is in actuality, and
of what is like something in the way potentiality is in relation to actuality.”10 Now,
this psychic causal process occurs on the basis of the reception of the form without
the matter.11 Thus, cognition is activated by the reception of the form that is present
in the object. This is the case in sensation no less than in intellection, that is, cogni-
tion of essences12: “for the stone is not in the soul, but rather its form.”13 This model
applies to sense cognition, but also to intellective cognition, since “intellection must
be related to what is thinkable (τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά), as sense is to what is sen-
sible (ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά).”14 To that extent, says Aristotle, “the
soul is in a sense all existing things.”15
In his study on the psychology of Aristotle, Brentano seems to bring together the
object and the cause of cognitive acts:
By the proper object of sense, Aristotle means that property of the perceived object which
is the causal principle of the alteration of the sense, and which we have to use in order to
determine the essence of the sense, since it is the natural correlate of the affected capacity,
as already noted.16
Brentano appears to be saying that the intentionality of the senses is determined by

their causal receptivity, since the object of a sense, or what a sensation is about, is
simply what triggers it causally. However, Brentano maintains that Aristotle’s psy-
chic being-affected, or Leiden (πάσχειν), is not a “true” being-affected, for the alter-
ation that the sense faculty undergoes consists not in “the corruption of an actual
thing by something contrary to it” (die Corruption eines Wirklichen durch etwas
2.1 The Young Brentano as a Reader of Aristotle’s De Anima 17
Entgegengesetzes), but in the activation of the sensitive power, bringing what is

“incomplete” (das Unvollendete)—namely, the power in question—to its “comple-
tion” (Vollendung).17 In short, according to Brentano, the causality at play is not a
standard one. Moreover, when he describes what happens once the psychic causal
process is completed, he uses terminology that is more suited to intentionality than
to causality:
But we do not sense the cold insofar as we become cold; otherwise plants and inorganic
bodies would also sense. Rather, we sense the cold insofar as the cold exists objectively, i.e.
as cognized object within us.18
Here and in the following we do not use the expression “objective” in the sense customary
in recent times, but in the sense usually connected with the word by the medieval
Aristotelians (the scholastic term obiective). It allows a brief and precise characterization of
the Aristotelian doctrine. Materially, as physical quality, coldness is in the cold thing. As
object, i.e., as something that is sensed, it is in him who feels the cold. Cf. De anima 3. 2.
425b25, where Aristotle says that the “sensed object as actuality” [aisthēton kat’energeian]
is in the sense.19
It is not clear from this passage whether the effect of the thing on the soul, which is
explained by the reception of the form without the matter, is or is accompanied by
the “intentional presence” of the sensible form. If the effect is the intentional pres-
ence, one can say that Brentano reduces psychic causality to intentionality, in the
sense that being affected by the object is ultimately nothing more than being inten-
tionally directed towards it; however, if the effect is accompanied by the intentional
presence, then it follows that causality and intentionality are always superimposed
one on the other, not that one is reduced to the other. At any rate, what is clear is that
Brentano deploys the medieval vocabulary of intentionality in his analysis: the form
of the thing in the soul has esse obiective in anima (or esse intentionale in anima);
that is, it has a particular mode of being that is proper to things insofar as they are
taken as objects, in contrast to esse reale, that is, the mode of being that these same
things have in reality.20 Further, it should be noted that the object is, as Brentano
says, “in the one who feels the cold.” In other words, it is immanent.
Myles Burnyeat, who draws on Brentano’s reading of Aristotle, comes to the
conclusion that Aristotle’s psychic causality is reducible to intentionality. Indeed,
on Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle, all of the Aristotelian vocabulary concern-
ing the causal relations between cognition and object boils down to “awareness.”
However, Burnyeat makes no mention of an “intentional” presence of the form
(since “objectively” does not mean the same thing as obiective):
The eye’s taking on a colour is just one’s becoming aware of some colour.21
Extraordinary alteration is an accurate awareness of objectively real sensible qualities in the

environment.22
Burnyeat can certainly appeal to the views of the young Brentano in order to bring
causality and intentionality closer together. In his later writings, however, Brentano
does not maintain the close link between causality and intentionality, either in his
own theory or in his interpretation of Aristotle. In the latter respect, he merely
continues a debate within the Aristotelian tradition about whether psychic causality
as developed by Aristotle in the De anima should be identified with intentionality,
or whether these two ideas should be distinguished. This is an issue that preoccu-
pied medieval philosophers, in particular Thomas Aquinas, for whom cognition is
an action that follows upon the reception of the form of the thing without the matter,
as well as Duns Scotus, for whom intentionality must be strictly distinguished from
any causal relation to the object. Already in antiquity, however, Alexander of
Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonic commentators distinguished between the being-
affected brought about by the object, and the cognitive activity that follows upon it,
which they called “discrimination” (κρίσις).
This chapter will focus in more detail on the connections between causality and
intentionality in the Aristotelian tradition. It will take as its starting point the debate
between Myles Burnyeat and Richard Sorabji about the precise sense in which
Aristotelian psychic causality should be understood, and its connection with inten-
tionality. It will then discuss the ancient concept of “discrimination” (κρίσις) before
addressing the medieval debates about causality and intentionality. Finally, it will
return to the evolution of Brentano’s views on these questions, emphasizing the
similarities of his position with the Aristotelian tradition.
2.2 Causality and Intentionality in the Aristotelian Tradition
2.2.1 The Debate Between Burnyeat and Sorabji
Myles Burnyeat and Richard Sorabji have long debated the question of whether or
not, according to Aristotle, a physiological change is produced when a sensible
form is received without matter.23 According to Sorabji, the reception of the form
should be understood “literally” as reception. Thus, in the case of sight, the matter
of the eye—or more precisely, of the “eye-jelly”—receives the coloured sensible
forms as “patches,” and becomes coloured.24 Sensation is therefore a case of being
affected, though of a special sort, for there is no affection by means of the matter,
but only by means of the form. However, this does not imply that the change is not
a physiological one. In the case of intellection—that is, the cognition of essences—
the reception of the form has to be understood differently, since it does not involve
any physiological change; nevertheless, this too is a case of efficient causality.25
Now, while the being-affected that Aristotle speaks of is a physiological change,
sensing is not reducible to this special kind of being-affected. For there to be sensa-
tion there has to be something more. On this issue Sorabji appeals to De anima 2.12,
424b16–17:
What then is smelling over and above a certain being-affected? Smelling is also exercising
the sensation.26
2.2 Causality and Intentionality in the Aristotelian Tradition 19
This passage is supposed to show that sensation is not reducible to a simple being-
affected: in addition to being-affected, there has to be some kind of exercised sensa-
tion, or “awareness.”27 According to Sorabji, the view that there is no physiological
change when the form is received without the matter originated with Alexander of
Aphrodisias, was adopted by the Neoplatonists, was continued by medieval think-
ers, and finally appears in Brentano, whose interpretation of Aristotle is “the culmi-
nation of a series of distortions.”28 This interpretation consists of making the special
kind of being-affected that Aristotle speaks of in the De anima into a simple “aware-
ness”; in other words, it eliminates the distinction between being-affected and exer-
cised sensation as they are presented in De anima 2.12, 424b16–17. Brentano is
credited with enriching the traditional interpretation of the idea that awareness is
directed towards the form that is received in the soul and which is referred to as an
“intentional object.”29 This discussion thus directly raises the crucial question of the
interaction between causality and intentionality in the Aristotelian tradition, from
Aristotle himself down to Brentano.
Burnyeat rejects Sorabji’s interpretation, and considers the traditional interpreta-
tion, from the Greek commentators to Brentano, the correct one, apart from the fact
that Brentano treats the form as an intentional object. Exercised sensation, or aware-
ness, will then be nothing more than the being-affected itself. In other words, the
being-affected does not involve any physiological process:
The process in the organ is the perceiving and nothing else than the perceiving of scent.30
Given that the cases of actual knowledge and sensation are parallel, Aristotle’s cryp-
tic formulations about the being-affected that pertains to these activities are all
translated by Burnyeat in terms that are purely “intentionalist”: the being-affected
in question is in fact nothing more than an awareness, in both intellection and sensa-
tion. More precisely, “awareness” means “registering, noticing, or perceiving”;31
thus, it seems to be a kind of attentional intentionality. For Burnyeat, we have to set
aside the modern definition of what physics is: in Aristotle, there is a “physics of
pure forms alone,”32 in other words, an immaterial physics, and it is this kind of
physics that he employs in his psychology. According to Burnyeat, in addition to
natural change, which is both formal and material,33 Aristotle allows for a kind of
change that medieval philosophers called “spiritual change” (immutatio spiritualis).
This too is a kind of physical change:
Thus both natural and spiritual change fall within the realm of physics, because both involve
form. The contrast between them is not that spiritual change is (wholly or partly) non-
physical, but that it is a change of form alone. It is a physical, but not a material change.34
As Victor Caston argues, Burnyeat seems to adopt a position—which was already

present in Alexander of Aphrodisias and then continued through the whole tradi-
tion—which posits in Aristotle a kind of change and causal interaction that is spe-
cific to psychism (that is, the realm of psychic powers and their acts):
It is not simply an irreducible type of causal interaction. It is basic, that is, without any
underlying physiological change. Perception, like warming and moistening, would be an
interaction at the lowest level of Aristotle’s natural world.35
Burnyeat in fact concedes at several points that there is a causal interaction between
the external thing and the activity of perception or intellection:
Both intellect and the senses are powers of receptivity. In both intellectual understanding
and (proper object) perception we submit ourselves to being in-formed (as we still say) by
the very objects we receive information about. When a cognitive state is wholly determined
by its object, sensible or intelligible, the result is objective truth.36
Aristotle’s is a world in which […] colours, sounds, smells, and other sensible qualities are
as real as the primary qualities (so called by us). They are real in the precise sense that they
are causal agents in their own right.37
From a reading of these passages together with Caston’s comments, one might well
conclude that Burnyeat allows for a type of causality that is quite peculiar in the
Aristotelian tradition—a primitive causality, but causality nonetheless. In other pas-
sages in Burnyeat, however, this causality turns out not to be causality at all.
Burnyeat several times defuses Aristotle’s causal vocabulary by replacing the dia-
chronic temporal dimension with a synchronic one, and by reversing the bearers of
activity and passivity between object and cognition:
Such is the effect of a colour on a medium which is actually transparent: the colour appears
through it. It is visible through the medium. No more, no less. It is evident, I hope, that this
appearance or visibility of the colour through the transparent is a static condition, a state of
affairs, not an event or process. Nothing happens. Nothing moves from the coloured
object.38
The mediate effect of a colour on the perceiver is simply that the perceiver sees the colour.
The alteration of the eye by a sensible quality is (i) a quasi-alteration only and (ii) identical
with the perceiving of the sensible quality in question.39
Burnyeat’s entire strategy of reduction is expressed in the astonishing phrase, “spiri-

tual change (perceptual awareness).”40 Thus, using what he calls the “more recent
jargon”41 of awareness, he translates the entirety of the causal relations between
object and cognition in terms that we would today call “intentional”:
[T]he effect on the organ is the awareness, no more and no less.42
Form’s presence in the sense-organ without matter is therefore as physical a fact as its pres-
ence with matter in the object perceived. If its presence in the sense-organ is awareness, and
awareness is a mental phenomenon in the modern sense, then for Aristotle and Aquinas
perception is both physical and mental.43
Extraordinary alteration is an accurate awareness of objectively real sensible qualities in the

environment.44
In view of this, Victor Caston has declared that “what happens is described instead
in exclusively phenomenal terms.”45 Caston’s comment is entirely correct, but he
does not go on to ask what then remains of the “irreducible type of causal interac-
tion” that he identifies in Burnyeat. One might say, using a different kind of “recent
jargon” derived from Brentano, that Burnyeat treats all statements in Aristotle
about genetic psychology as statements about descriptive psychology. This
reduction of causality to intentionality is surprising. Burnyeat, who maintains that

we would no longer find “credible” a physics that allows for purely formal causal-
ity—that is, one free of all material causality—ultimately adopts a solution that
seems removed from what is generally held within the Aristotelian tradition (the
distinctive features of which he nonetheless brings out with acuity): by reducing
formal causality to intentionality, Burnyeat seems no longer to leave a place for the
Aristotelian physics of forms. To redescribe the causal processes of this physics in
phenomenological terms is precisely to reject their causal dimension. Burnyeat thus
seems to limit himself to the alternative that structures contemporary psychology:
either a genetic psychology of the material influences that the thing has on the mind,
or a descriptive psychology of the phenomenological relations of the mind to the
object. Perhaps from a historical point of view we should hang onto the claims of
the ancient and medieval philosophers that the reception of the form without matter
is a special type of reception, a causal effect of the world on the soul which is primi-
tive and unanalyzable. Though this causality is left unexplained in Aristotle and
mostly remained so in the tradition, it nonetheless influenced psychological discus-
sions through the centuries. (To be sure, from the point of view of modern physics
one should hold that Aristotelian forms do not exist, and thus do not act on the sense
organs.)
Viewed from the angle of the relational aspect of psychism, Burnyeat’s interpre-
tation leads one to understand all texts by Aristotle on the causal relational aspect of
psychism as texts about awareness, that is, the intentional relation. But even
Brentano, who is an authoritative figure for Burnyeat, ultimately rejects this identi-
fication, and distinguishes two relations in psychism, namely, the relation of the act
to its cause, and the relation of the act to its object:
As we have remarked with regard to the passive affections that are not alterations, [there
are] two relations, one to the cause and the other to the object of thought.46
Brentano bases his discussion on Metaphysics Δ.15.47 There Aristotle divides rela-
tives into three classes. The first class consists of relatives “with respect to number”
(κατ᾽ἀριθμόν), that is, comparative relatives, including the identical, the similar, and
the equal. The second class is of relatives “with respect to power” (κατὰ δύναμιν),
namely, causal relatives, understood according to the relation between an actual
agent and an actual patient as well as between a potential agent and a potential
patient. To these two classes Aristotle adds a third, that of relations between the
“measure” (μέτρον) and the “measurable” (μετρητόν), between “knowledge”
(ἐπιστήμη) and the “knowable” (ἐπιστητόν), between “thought” (διάνοια) and the
“thinkable” (διανοητόν), and between “sensation” (αἴσθησις) and the “sensible”
(αἴσθητόν).48 Thus, in Aristotle there is, on the one hand, a causal explanation of
cognition, understood as a special type of being-affected, and on the other, a triparti-
tion of the relations which seems to separate the cognitive relation from the causal
relation and make it a relation in a class of its own. This tension is eliminated in
Burnyeat’s interpretation. By removing any causal aspect from the vocabulary of
Aristotle’s psychology, and redescribing it in strictly phenomenological terms,
Burnyeat’s interpretation leads one to consider cognitive relations only under their
intentional aspect. But Aristotelian psychology seems to contain not just a phenom-
enological, synchronic account of cognitive relations, according to which the act is
about something, but also a causal, diachronic account, which allows the thing to be
the active generator of the act. At any rate, there has been a tension between a causal
interpretation and an intentionalist one throughout the history of the reception of
Aristotle, from antiquity on. Indeed, both Alexander of Aphrodisias and the
Neoplatonist commentators use the third class of Metaphysics Δ.15 to identify a
special type of psychic relation called “discrimination” (κρίσις), which is distinct
from the being-affected by which sensation and intellection occur.
2.2.2 Thinking as κρίσις: Alexander of Aphrodisias

and the Neoplatonist Commentators49
According to Liddell and Scott, the abstract noun κρίσις can have the following
senses: “distinguishing,” “decision,” “judgement,” and “choice,” while the verb
κρίνειν can mean “to distinguish,” “to pick out,” “to choose between,” “to decide,”
“to judge,” “to adjudge.” In his important article, “Aristotle on What Is Done in
Perceiving,” Theodor Ebert provides a detailed analysis of the concept of κρίσις in
Aristotle. According to Ebert, the words κρίσις and κρίνειν should not be translated
as “judgement” and “to judge,” as they typically are. He draws attention to an
important nuance in the judicial usage of these terms: while κρίσις and κρίνειν are
indeed associated with the delivery of a verdict, and therefore have to do with the
primary function of a judge, they concern only cases in which the judge has to make
a decision. Κρίνειν thus means “to judge” in the sense of “to decide,” and so is dis-
tinct in meaning from the verb δικάζειν:
Although it seems these two expressions are used indiscriminately in non-technical lan-
guage, there is a clear distinction between them in the language of law proper: δικάζειν is
used whenever the outcome of a litigation is, as it were, clear from the very beginning and
the judge only spells out the application of the law to the particular case. Κρίνειν, however,
is the term used in those cases which leave room for judicial discretion, either because there
is no formally established evidence at hand or because the law provides that in such and
such a case the decision is up to the judge anyway. This connection, in the technical lan-
guage of Greek civil law, between the act denoted by κρίνειν and the discretional power of
judges is, I think, very strong evidence to the effect that κρίνειν, as a term of law, means “to
decide.”50
In other words, even in a judicial context κρίσις and κρίνειν have a meaning that is
similar to “to separate,” “to distinguish,” or “to choose.” Moreover, according to
Ebert, κρίσις and κρίνειν would never mean, in Aristotle, “to judge” in the sense of
“to assert”—for this Aristotle uses the verb ἀξιοῦν, as he does throughout the
Organon.51 Ebert therefore proposes to reserve for κρίσις and κρίνειν not the sense
of “judgement” and “to judge,” but of “discrimination” and “to discriminate.” On
the basis of a detailed analysis of the Aristotelian corpus, Ebert argues that κρίσις
and κρίνειν have to do with the active dimension of sensation:
Κρίνειν is indeed the term used to describe what is done when somebody is perceiving or
thinking, in opposition to what may be undergone on these occasions.52
This is supported by Aristotle’s frequent use of the verb and its abstract noun in
combination with an instrumental dative that refers to a power of the soul.53 Thus, it
seems that there is something which rules out identifying cognition in Aristotle with
the mere causal effect of the object. More precisely, according to Ebert, κρίσις and
κρίνειν in Aristotle have to do with cases in which a psychic faculty distinguishes
one thing from another. Ebert maintains that for sensation the two entities that are
distinguished must be members of two species at the same level in the same genus;
for example, two colours, two sounds, etc. What sight does actively is to distinguish
blue from red, while hearing distinguishes flat from sharp, etc.54 But Ebert also
mentions a passage from the De anima in which Aristotle speaks of a “discrimina-
tion” performed by the “intellect” (νοῦς) between a thing, such as water or flesh,
and its “essence” (εἶναι).55 Here the distinction is not between members of two spe-
cies in the same genus. Moreover, Ebert seems to maintain that κρίσις, in Aristotle,
can be extended to cover cases in which a man is distinguished from the wall behind
him, or more precisely, a coloured shape from the background against which it
appears.56 Whatever the exact meaning of κρίνειν is in Aristotle, let us keep in mind
for now, following Ebert, that it is a psychic activity, that it is not the same as “judg-
ing,” and that it consists in distinguishing one element from others, whether they are
of the same genus or have some other sort of connection, as in the case of a shape
and its background.
Let us now turn from κρίσις in Aristotle to how it is discussed in his Greek com-
mentators. The concept is used by these commentators—specifically, Alexander of
Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonists—to characterize the active aspect of the psychic
faculties, as well as the relation that Aristotle identifies by means of his third class
in Metaphysics Δ.15. The examples of cognitive acts that he mentions in this text are
“knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη), “thought” (διάνοια), and “sensation” (αἴσθησις).
Alexander seems to consider this list to have a wider extension: as an example of a
relative that falls under this class he mentions “opinion” (δόξα).57 Thus, it seems to
be possible for a non-existent object to be the term of a psychic relation.58 Rather
than examining Alexander’s exegesis of the passage in Metaphysics Δ.15 about the
third class of relatives,59 let us instead consider the general meaning that he assigns
to this class. Alexander subsumes relatives of the third class under the concept of
κρίσις or discrimination:
He [sc. Aristotle] gives a third meaning of relative: as the measurable is related to the mea-
sure and the knowable to knowledge and the perceptible to perception, and this meaning
would come under the power of discriminating and the object that is discriminated; for the
measure discriminates what is measured, and both perception and knowledge are discrimi-
natory powers and acts of discrimination, the former of perceptible, the latter of intelligible,
objects.60
Thus, the characteristic shared by the relation of the measure to the measurable and
the relation of the psychic faculties to their objects is that the measure and the psy-
chic faculties are what discriminate that to which they are related. How should this
be understood? In his De anima, Alexander contrasts κρίσις (or κρίνειν) with the
passive dimension of the process of sensation: “For even if sensing arises from cer-
tain bodily affections, it is not a being-affected, but a discriminating.”61 Sensation
arises from a certain being-affected, but this being-affected pertains only to the
bodily organs; to sense is in itself to discriminate. As Alexander also holds in his
commentary on the De sensu and in the Mantissa, sight is relative in the sense that
it is a combination of a power and a “relation” (σχέσις), and is therefore not an affec-
tion.62 However, it should be noted that in his De anima Alexander is not content to
classify just sensation under κρίνειν. He explicitly maintains that the “rational
power” (λογική δύναμις) is “discriminative” (κριτική).63 He also says that imagina-
tion (or “representation,” φαντασία) is a κρίνειν.64 Thus, κρίσις once again has a
broad extension. The contrast between κρίνειν and πάσχειν as Alexander draws it
suggests that κρίσις has to do with the active aspect of cognition, or with “what is
done in perceiving.” Though he does not mention them explicitly, he may have in
mind the passages in which Aristotle treats cognitive acts as activities—more pre-
cisely, as immanent activities or actions (actio manens, as the scholastics later say),
that is, actions from which no “product” (ἔργον) results other than the activity itself:
While in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is
seeing, and no other product besides this results from sight), but from some things a product
follows (e.g. from the art of building there results a house as well as the act of building).
[…] Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing
that is being made, e.g. the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weav-
ing in the thing that is being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the
movement is in the thing that is being moved; but when there is no product apart from the
actuality, the actuality is in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that
of theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the soul.65
In his commentary on Metaphysics Δ.15, Alexander compares cognition and action,

and sometimes even seems to treat them as parallel, in particular when he empha-
sizes that the faculties are related to their objects with a dative which seems to be
instrumental.66 In short, he considers Aristotle’s third class of relatives to be the
class of κρίσις: every cognitive act is accompanied by an apparently active and rela-
tive discrimination. Already for Alexander, cognition in Aristotle is not merely the
causal effect of the object.
We find in the Neoplatonists the idea that every act has a correlate: it is not just
“intellection” (νόησις) that is relative to an “intelligible” (νοητόν), and “sensation”
(αἴσθησις) to a “sensible” (αἰσθητόν), but also “opinion” (δόξα) that is relative to an
“opinable” (δοξαστόν), as well as “imagination” (or “representation,” φαντασία)
that is relative to “what is imagined” (or “what is represented,” φανταστόν). This is
especially clear in various passages from Philoponus’s commentary on Aristotle’s
De anima.67 Once again, acts directed towards non-existent objects are relative.
Moreover, the active dimension of psychism plays an important role in
Neoplatonism.68 Simplicius seems to maintain in his commentary on the Categories
that “intelligizing” (i.e. having an act of intellection) and seeing are as much
instances of doing (ποιεῖν) as of being affected (πάσχειν):
But it is worth raising the question whether perhaps thinking and seeing are not merely
undergoing and being impressed, but also possess some sort of operation awakened inside
them, by which apprehension comes about. I do not think it would be at all astonishing if
something commingled obtained in their case. For it is consistent that some things be an
acting alone, others an undergoing alone, and still others, such as thinking and seeing, an
acting and an undergoing simultaneously.69
Cognitive acts, which were previously considered relatives, are all characterized
as activities: “intellection” (νοῦς), “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη), “sensation” (αἴσθησις),
“opinion” (δόξα), and “imagination” (or “representation,” φαντασία).70 Admittedly,
the active aspect that the Neoplatonists attribute to cognition is very much depen-
dent on a Platonic framework. Thus, the causal influence exercised by the object is
not suitable for explaining sensation: according to the Neoplatonists, when this
influence occurs, the soul “projects” (προβάλλεται) a λόγος that it already pos-
sesses, and thanks to which the external sensible form is known.71 In other words, as
Ilsetraut Hadot emphasizes, “to perceive is to recall oneself.”72 Such a position obvi-
ously has no equivalent in the De anima.73 Nonetheless, the active dimension that
the Neoplatonists attribute to cognition is based on elements derived from Aristotle.
When Pseudo-Simplicius says that “cognition” (γνῶσις) is not “passive” (πάσχουσα)
but “active” (ἐνεργοῦσα), he adds that this activity should definitely not be under-
stood as “productive “(ποιητικῶς),74 which recalls the Aristotelian account of
immanent action.75 Moreover, cognitive action is uniformly called “κρίσις,” or dis-
crimination, by Neoplatonist authors. Priscian, for example, states:
Sensation takes in an indivisible manner the beginning, middle, and end of the sensible
object, it is activity and discrimination that is complete, it is whole altogether in the present
moment, and it is in a state of conformity with the form of the sensible object.76
In the eyes of the Neoplatonists, this doctrine is basically Aristotelian. Indeed, it is

directly connected with their interpretation of Aristotle’s third class of relatives.
Admittedly, Asclepius’s commentary on Metaphysics Δ.15 does not mention
κρίσις77; however, important information can be found elsewhere, in Simplicius’s
commentary on the Physics. In his discussion of Physics 3.1, 200b28–31, Simplicius
explicitly subsumes third-class relatives under the concept of κρίσις:
There are also many other species of relatives, some of equality, some of similarity, some
of discrimination, such as vision and the visible, and knowledge and the knowable.78
Moreover, according to Simplicius in his commentary on the Categories, Iamblichus

too held that the third class in Metaphysics Δ.15 is that of discrimination (κρίσις).79
Thus, for the Neoplatonists, just as it seems to have been for Alexander, Aristotle’s
third class of relatives, under the name κρίσις, makes room for the “active”
(ἐνεργοῦσα) dimension of cognition. In support of this claim, it can be noted that
Plotinus also uses the concept of κρίσις, and that for him it serves precisely to attri-
bute an active dimension to sensation, which he refuses to reduce to a mere being-
affected. According to Eyjólfur K. Emilsson, this move by Plotinus—which is
fundamental for later Neoplatonism—was directly inspired by Alexander’s views
on κρίσις.80 It thus appears that one of the sources for the active and relational
dimension attributed to cognitive acts in Neoplatonism is Alexander’s interpretation
of Metaphysics Δ.15. At any rate, both Alexander and the Neoplatonists seem to
interpret κρίσις in Aristotle as an active and relative psychic entity which is distinct
from the passive causal relation between the object and the soul: to think is not just
to be affected, but is also to discriminate. In short, in the oldest commentaries that
we have on Aristotle, his interpreters were already distinguishing cognition from the
mere causal effect of the object, just as Brentano will do much later.
It remains to be explained more precisely what κρίσις is. Since Ebert’s analysis,
contemporary interpreters generally no longer translate κρίσις as “judgement,” but
prefer “discrimination.” Among scholars of Aristotle, this is the case with Frans A.J.
de Haas and Klaus Corcilius, whereas Michel Narcy rejects Ebert’s argument and
continues to use “judgement” (jugement).81 “Discrimination” also is found frequently
in scholars of Alexander of Aphrodisias and of the Neoplatonists, especially in the
English translation of Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics by
W.E. Dooley, and sometimes in Martin Bergeron and Richard Dufour (who neverthe-
less also use jugement), as well as in H.J. Blumenthal, who explicitly relies on Ebert.82
Ilsetraut Hadot, on the other hand, prefers “discernment” (discernement), as does
Miira Tuominen.83 Mark Eli Kalderon and Emilsson keep the term “judgement,” but
in the sense of “cognition.” Emilsson means by this to indicate that discriminating
activities are “cognitive” in a broad sense and are distinct from “practical” activities.84
“Judgement” has to be understood in a broad sense as referring to cognition, also
understood in a broad sense. This contrast between cognitive and practical activities is
also taken up by Victor Caston, for whom the term κριτικόν in Alexander is equivalent
to “cognitive.” However, as Caston emphasizes, Alexander’s inclusion of φαντασία
among the activities that fall under κρίσις rules out the latter being a judgement.
According to Caston, judgement has to do with “endorsement or rejection,” but this
aspect is absent in a cognitive act of φαντασία. One could add that since the content
of φαντασία is not always propositional,85 this cognitive activity is distinct not only
from existential judgement (to which Caston’s “endorsement” and “rejection” seem to
refer) but also from categorial judgement. Thus, Caston does maintain, like Emilsson,
that κριτικόν means “cognitive,” but rejects any identification of κρίσις with judge-
ment.86 Tuominen seems also to identify κρίσις in Philoponus with cognition.87
What view should one take of this “cognitivist” interpretation? Certainly, for
Alexander κρίσις is distinct from the practical faculties of the soul: he differentiates
between “discriminating” (κριτικαί) activities and “practical” (πρακτικαί) or “pro-
ductive” (ποιητικαί) activities. In particular, κρίσις is distinguished from “desire”
(ὄρεξις), which is defined as “impulse” (ὁρμή).88 Thus, it seems that for Alexander
κρίσις applies to all the cognitive faculties, with the adjective “cognitive” taken
broadly. However, the term κρίσις seems to have an additional sense. In Alexander
and the Neoplatonists, κρίσις is contrasted with πάσχειν, the passive aspect of psy-
chology. When Alexander asserts that sensation is not merely a being-affected but
also a κρίνειν, does he mean simply that it is also a “cognition” (γνῶσις)? It should
be maintained that κρίσις is not simply equivalent to cognition, but rather describes,
following Ebert’s expression, “what is done in cognizing.” This “doing” cannot,
however, be understood as—or at least, not exclusively as—a distinction between
two members of two species at the same level in the same genus, such as red and
blue, or flat and sharp: for both Alexander and the Neoplatonists, κρίσις applies to
psychic faculties which do not “discriminate” their objects in this way, such as
φαντασία for example. Already in Aristotle, the distinction between a thing and its
essence, as well as, according to Ebert, between a coloured shape and its back-
ground, are cases of κρίσις.
A somewhat different interpretation is given by Pamela Huby, who translates
κρίσις in Priscian as “awareness.”89 The contrast between κρίσις/awareness on the
one hand and πάσχειν on the other recalls the debate between Burnyeat and Sorabji
about the structure of sensation in Aristotle. As discussed above, this debate has to
do with the question whether πάσχειν, as used by Aristotle in a psychological con-
text, is equivalent to being aware, or whether being aware is a supplementary event
that is added to the πάσχειν. Burnyeat maintains that πάσχειν is equivalent to being
aware in the sense of “registering, noticing, perceiving,” whereas according to
Sorabji, being aware is in Aristotle distinct from πάσχειν, which pertains to the
sense organ.90 At De anima 2.12, 424b16–17, Aristotle asks, “What then is smelling,
over and above a certain being-affected?” He replies: “Smelling is also exercising
the sensation (αἰσθάνεσθαι).”91 According to Sorabji, αἰσθάνεσθαι here means
“being aware.”92 This passage from Aristotle can be compared with the passage in
which Alexander affirms that sensation is not reducible to being affected (πάσχειν),
but that it also requires a κρίνειν. Following Sorabji’s terminology, Alexander
should here be read as follows: “Sensing is not only being affected, but also being
aware.” Klaus Corcilius also seems to interpret κρίσις in Aristotle in this way. In an
interpretation that he proposes as an alternative to Ebert’s, though it is restricted to
sensation, Corcilius maintains that κρίσις is equivalent to the famous “reception of
the form without matter,” in the sense that “to discriminate” amounts to creating a
“phenomenal content”—which is precisely the form without matter—and that it
should in some way be thought of as awareness.93 Thus, a possible interpretation of
κρίσις in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonists, and perhaps also in
Aristotle, would consist simply in identifying it with awareness. However, the char-
acteristics of awareness that bring it close to the central idea that κρίσις conveys
should be emphasized, namely discrimination and the selection of one element
from among others. One way to do this would be to follow Burnyeat in understand-
ing “awareness” in the sense of “noticing.” Eyjólfur K. Emilsson claims that κρίσις
is a “picking out,” though he translates it as “judgement”:
In the ancient literature on perception, however—and this is particularly clear in the writ-
ings of Aristotle and Alexander—krinein and krisis most often retain an association with the
notion of difference, reflecting the original sense of “picking out”: the work of the senses is
seen as that of picking out objects or features of objects in the environment. This picking
out is in turn possible by virtue of there being differences in the environment that are some-
how “taken in” by the senses.94
Pavel Gregoric also speaks of κρίσις as a “picking out.”95

All this seems to converge on an interpretation of κρίσις in terms of attention or
“selective attention,” that is, as Victor Caston puts it (in an article that is not about
κρίσις), “our ability to focus, at will, on various objects in our environment or in our
thoughts.”96 On Caston’s interpretation, attention is not limited to sensation, but also
has to do with thought. This is also the position of Husserl, for whom, in Logical
Investigations, “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit) is a mode which can accompany any
“consciousness of something”:
The range of the unitary concept of attention is therefore so wide that it doubtless embraces
the whole field of intuitive and cogitative aiming, the field of presentation in a well-defined
but sufficiently wide sense, which comprehends both intuition and thought. Ultimately it
extends as far as the concept: Consciousness of something.97
Now, the notion of selective attention clearly has a connection with the active
dimension of psychism. In other words, it is an action. In short, the term κρίσις
might designate the discriminating or selective nature of cognitive acts, that is, their
aspect of focalization, which is eminently active and not much different from what
is today commonly called “attention.” Following Brentano, one could say that when
κρίσις is used to distinguish awareness from causality, it does so on the basis of an
active conception of intentionality, not as a “simple seeing” (bloß sehen), but as a
“noticing” (bemerken) or a “being clear about what is seen” (sich klar sein über das
Gesehene).98 Just as for Alexander and the Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle,
the discriminating dimension of cognitive acts is important enough to become the
general head subsuming all acts, so too for Husserl, in his later works, attentional
intentionality or “active intentionality” (aktive Intentionalität) is specified as “inten-
tionality in the narrow sense” (Intentionalität im engeren Sinne) and is equivalent to
“being-directed-at-something in general” (Auf-etwas-Gerichtetsein überhaupt).99
The comparison with Husserl is all the more useful, since one aspect in particular
that he attributes to attention could help to explain how the “measure” (μέτρον) falls
under Aristotle’s third class of relatives. Husserl asserts the following:
Once again, it seems that the meaning of the term “aim” is connected with attention, or even
means something identical. That to which one pays attention is that which is aimed at in a
special way, in contrast with that to which one does not pay attention. […] What am I atten-
tive to in this way? Well, to what I am occupied with in particular, that is, to what I possess
objectively in a clearly delimited particular act. The act that delimits is the aiming, and that
which is aimed at is “that which is noticed.”100
In his commentary on the Metaphysics, Alexander maintains that the psychic facul-
ties discriminate their objects as the measure discriminates the measurable.101 If
κρίσις is equated with cognition without qualification, it is difficult to see in what
sense the “measure” (μέτρον) is supposed to be κριτικόν. By contrast, if κρίσις is
connected via awareness to attention, and if attention is connected to the notion of
delimitation, it is possible to propose an explanation: to measure something is, so to
speak, to fix the contours, to fix its estimated size at this precise size, its estimated
weight at this precise weight, etc.—in other words, to determine or delimit it. In that
case, there would be some analogy with attentional focalization.
Aristotle has been criticized for reducing sensation to an effect of the object, and
thus missing a fundamental aspect of intentionality, namely, its active attentional
aspect.102 According to Burnyeat, the criticism is groundless, since the reception of
the form without matter is in no way an effect of the object, but is an awareness;
when Aristotle speaks of πάσχειν, he should be understood as saying “registering,
noticing, perceiving”—in other words, or so it seems, an attentional aiming. Sorabji
too considers this criticism groundless: although there is an effect produced by the
object in the organ of sensation, “sensing” (αἰσθάνεσθαι) is not this effect itself, but
something that follows upon it. According to this interpretation as well, sensing in
the strict sense is, for Aristotle, being aware. Ancient interpreters did not see in
Aristotle a reduction of intentionality to causality; on the contrary, both Alexander
of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonists explicitly contrast the πάσχειν of the De anima
with κρίνειν, which might be treated as similar to awareness, in the sense of “notic-
ing,” “selective attention,” bemerken in Brentano, or Aufmerksamkeit in Husserl,
also called intentionality “in the strict sense” (im engeren Sinne). In other words,
ancient interpreters of Aristotle seem to allow for the active dimension of cognitive
acts, including acts of sensation, in opposition to a causal explanation. As Ebert has
emphasized, κρίσις is firmly grounded in Aristotle’s own writings, and according to
Alexander and Neoplatonists it is found in Metaphysics Δ.15. Being an Aristotelian,
Brentano will follow a similar path, distinguishing the intentional relation from the
causal relation on the basis of the tripartition of relations in Metaphysics Δ.15,
although it is not clear if intentionality in general is active for him (as we shall see
below103). Now, Brentano’s move has not just ancient precedents, but medieval ones
as well: for Thomas Aquinas, cognition is not reducible to a being-affected, but
involves an active dimension—more precisely, it is an action—while for Duns
Scotus, the intentional relation must be strictly distinguished from the causal
relation.
2.2.3 The Medieval Position
Influenced by the De anima, medieval authors attributed an important role to causal-

ity in explaining cognition in Aristotle. This is the case, at the beginning of the
scholastic era, with Albert the Great. It is true that Albert holds that for Aristotle
psychic causality is not an “alteration” (alteratio), or a normal qualitative change,
and that it does not involve any physiological change.104 The sense faculty and the
intellect receive not the forms themselves, but rather the “spiritual intention” (inten-
tio spiritualis) or the “species” (species) corresponding to these forms, which is a
“representation” of these forms.105 Nevertheless, the fact remains that this account
is based on efficient causality: the thing is the agent and the soul is the patient. This
causalist reading of Aristotle did not get a unanimously positive reception. Peter
John Olivi criticizes Aristotle for devising a passive theory of cognitive acts, in
which the object plays the role of efficient cause of the act, while the act itself has
no active dimension.106 According to Olivi, cognitive acts are not passions resulting
from the activity of the object, but actions. Mental activity is, for Olivi, a kind of
gaze or aspectus, which tends towards the object:
For a cognitive act and attention is fixed on an object and intentionally has it absorbed
within itself. On this account a cognitive act is called an apprehension of and apprehensive
extension toward the object. Through this extension and absorption the act is intimately
conformed and configured to the object.107
The metaphorical character of Olivi’s aspectus has presented many problems for
interpreters.108 Robert Pasnau translates aspectus as “attention,” while Dominik
Perler speaks of Aufmerksamkeit.109 On this interpretation, Olivi’s aspectus refers to
attentional intentionality. In any case, it is clear that if the cognitive act is not under-
stood as an effect of the object, the object can no longer be considered an efficient
cause of the act. Olivi makes the object the “terminative cause” of the act, where
“terminative” indicates that the object is that at which cognitive action terminates:
“Thus a terminative cause truly has the character of a cause, although it is not prop-
erly the efficient cause of the action terminated in it.”110 Olivi maintains that even
those who defend a causal understanding of cognition have to concede the active
dimension of psychology. The object is given to the cognitive act as a terminus ad
quem, while the cause plays, with respect to the effect, the role of the terminus a
quo, such that psychology is not reducible to its causal dimension:
Unless the object in itself is present to them [sc. the intellect and the will] through either a
species of imagination or a species of memory, they cannot actually consider or will some-
thing. The very essence of the aforesaid acts shows this, since being related to something as
the principle of its being and being related to something as the external terminus of its being
and its inclination are relations that are distinct from each other, such that in the first relation
the principle itself has the nature of the extreme or terminus a quo, and the act itself,
together with what can receive it, has the nature of an extreme or terminus ad quem, whereas
in the second relation, the opposite is true, since the act, together with what can receive it,
has the nature of an extreme or terminus a quo and the term of its inclination has the nature
of an extreme or terminus ad quem. However, it is certain that apprehensive and appetitive
acts have a relation and inclination to their objects as their terminus ad quem, as we prove
by what we experience within ourselves. Thus, even if it is posited that objects produce the
acts themselves or their habitus, they will still be required for the production and continua-
tion of their acts as their terms, that is, as the objects that are apprehended or willed by those
acts and their powers, and not merely as the principles that generate those acts.111
Nonetheless, as discussed above, it is not clear that Aristotle’s psychology can be

understood in strictly causal terms. According to Brentano, “[Aristotle] divided
relations into three classes: comparative, causal, and intentional.”112 Now, as we
have seen,113 already in antiquity the third class had apparently been assigned an
active aspect: the relation between the act and the object is not one of effect to cause,
but is understood in terms of “discrimination” (κρίσις), or, so it seems, in terms of
attentional intentionality. Thus, Olivi could perhaps criticize Aristotle for under-
standing cognition in a passive way, but it would be more difficult to use his objec-
tions against Aristotelianism as a whole. What holds for ancient readers of Aristotle
holds equally for certain medieval authors, starting with one of the most important
scholastic philosophers, and a convinced Aristotelian—namely, Thomas Aquinas,
who thinks that cognition is not a passion but, following Aristotle, that it is an
action, or more precisely, an immanent action (actio manens).
2.2.3.1 Thomas Aquinas
Efficient causality plays a fundamental role in Aquinas’s psychology. As Aquinas

explains in his commentary on the De interpretatione, cognition is dependent on
“passions of the soul” (passiones animae):
A passion results from the impression of some agent, and thus the passions of the soul have
their origin in things themselves. […] The meaning of words is related to a conception of
the intellect, inasmuch as it [sc. a conception of the intellect] arises from things in the mode
of a certain impression or passion.114
Psychic causality is explained in terms of the “reception” (receptio), in the soul, of

the form of the thing without the matter. This kind of causality involves a “physics
of form alone” quite different from modern physics, which deals only with material
interactions.115 Like Albert the Great, Aquinas holds that the form in the soul has not
“natural being” (esse naturale), but “intentional being” (esse intentionale); more
precisely, it has “spiritual being” (esse spirituale) in the case of sensation, and
“intelligible being” (esse intelligibile) in the case of intellection.116 In the case of
sensation, the form is received without its matter in the organ, which is material.117
With the exception of sight—a “more spiritual” (spiritualior) sense faculty—formal
causality is combined with material causality: the sensation of heat, for example,
cannot be produced without the hand also being materially heated.118 Intellection,
however, is explained in terms of formal causality only.119 The forms of things act
on the intellect through the intermediary of the effect they produce in the senses.
More precisely, intellection is caused by an image, or “phantasm”—that is, by the
representation of a particular object, such as Socrates or Plato, which is synthesized
from the data of sensation. The causality of the image is combined with the activity
of the agent intellect, which abstracts from the images that which is intelligible in
them, that is, the intelligible “species” (species), in order to impress it in the possi-
ble intellect, that is, the receptive part of the intellect.120 Thus, because of the agent
intellect, the active causality of the thing is of reduced importance, since its image
is treated as a merely “instrumental or secondary agent” (agens instrumentale vel
secundarium), or as the “matter of the cause” (materia causae) rather than as the
cause of the intellection. The “primary and first agent” (agens principale et primum)
is the agent intellect, which is responsible for abstraction.121 However, the fact that
the image of the thing is a secondary agent, and that intellection requires the abstrac-
tion of the species by the agent intellect maintains the causal link between the act
and reality: “The [likeness] which is in our intellect is received from the thing inas-
much as the thing acts on our intellect by first acting on the sense.”122 In this way the
activity of the thing and the activity of the agent intellect are combined. Thus, in
Aquinas’s theory there is a causal chain that joins material and formal causality; this
causal chain is responsible for cognition at every level, without which cognizing
could not be explained in terms of the reception of the likeness of the real thing in
the cognitive faculty. It thus is difficult to maintain that efficient causality in

Aquinas’s psychology has to do only with the material causation undergone by the
sense organs, while the causality of the form—or formal causality—in no way
involves a being-affected, but simply an awareness. In other words, since the soul
receives the form of the thing, and awareness cannot account for this, there is reason
to cast doubt on the equivalence that Burnyeat draws—“spiritual change (perceptual
awareness)”—which, however, he claims can also be detected in Aristotle and in
some of his interpreters, including the young Brentano.123 Admittedly, the reception
of the form without matter remains mysterious, as emphasized by Peter King:
What is it for a form to be present only “intentionally”? Aquinas never says, or, to the extent
that he does, his account was opaque to his disciples and detractors alike, then and now.124
Nonetheless, it seems that there really is reception, and there really is causality.
However, there is no denying the active dimension of cognition in Aquinas.
Though cognition presupposes a being-affected, or a being-activated of the faculty
by the cognitive form,125 Aquinas nonetheless also attributes an active dimension to
cognition, as an “operation” (operatio), which is sometimes specified, echoing the
Greek κρίσις, as “judgement” (iudicium).126 Again, it seems that in the Aristotelian
tradition, cognition is not a mere passive product. It should probably be conceded
that there are two “acts” of the cognitive faculty: a first act, which is the faculty’s
being activated by the cognitive form, and is passive, and a second act, which is
active. This second act, which is an action, has as a precondition the first act, in
which the same faculty is affected by a form.127 Note that there is a clear distinction
in Aquinas between acts and actions: acts are events, states, or processes, and can
both be passive (e.g., being heated) or active (e.g., heating); active acts are “actions,”
which in turn are divided into immanent and transitive ones. Admittedly, Aquinas
sometimes seems to rule out an active interpretation of cognition, especially in texts
where he identifies “psychic being-affected” and “operation”: “Motion of this kind
is properly called operation, such as sensing, understanding, and willing.”128 But he
also seems sometimes to accept this interpretation, especially in passages where he
says that cognitive action is produced by way of the form of the thing in the soul,
this form being the “principle” (principium) of the action, which leads one to sup-
pose that the activation of the faculty by the form of the thing is prior to the cogni-
tive action. In support of this, he refers explicitly to Aristotle’s account of immanent
action:
As is said in book 9 of the Metaphysics, action is of two kinds, one which remains in the
agent, such as seeing and understanding, another which goes over to an external thing, such
as heating and cutting, but both are produced according to some form. And just as the form
according to which there arises the action that tends towards an external thing is a similitude
of the object of the action (as the heat of the thing that heats is a similitude of what is
heated), similarly the form according to which there arises the action that stays in the agent
is a similitude of the object. Thus, a similitude of the visible thing is that according to which
sight sees, and a similitude of the understood object—that is, the intelligible species—is the
form according to which the intellect understands.129
As Aquinas puts it in the second redaction of chapter 53 of book 1 of the Summa

contra Gentiles, immanent action is “a certain emanation of the agent according to
which it is in act” (quaedam agentis emanatio secundum quod est actu), with regard
to both sensation, which is in act “by a similitude of the sensible thing” (per simili-
tudinem sensibilis), and intellection, which is in act “by a similitude of what is intel-
ligized” (per similitudinem intellecti).130 Immanent action thus seems to follow
upon the activation of the faculty by the form of the thing. In this way, Aquinas, like
other Aristotelians, seems to distinguish psychic being-affected from the exercise of
cognition, anticipating Brentano’s later distinction between intentionality and
causality.
As Giorgio Pini has rightly emphasized, there are two distinct versions of imma-
nent action in Aquinas. The first consists of a “pure activity” that follows the activa-
tion of the faculty by the form of the thing, whereas the second, which Aquinas
developed later, consists of the production of an intra-psychic entity called a “con-
ception” (conceptio).131 It is the productive immanent action of the intellect—the
result of which is called a “mental word” (verbum mentis), a “conception of the
intellect” (conceptio intellectus), or an “understood intention” (intentio intel-
lecta)—that has attracted the attention of commentators. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Aquinas also assigns a productive dimension to the imagination:
In the sensitive part there are found two kinds of operation. One is according to a change
alone; in this way, the operation of the sense is perfected by the fact that it is changed by the
sensible thing. The other operation is a formation, according to which the imaginative
power forms for itself a kind of image of a thing that is absent or even has never been seen.
Both of these operations are joined in the intellect. For in the first way, a passion of the pos-
sible intellect is considered inasmuch as it [i.e. the possible intellect] is informed by an
intelligible species. When it has been informed by the latter, it forms, secondly, either a defi-
nition or division or composition, which is signified by a word.132
Despite Aquinas’s words, we should not interpret him in this passage to be reducing
the operation of the sense faculty to a modification, for the sense faculty operates by
a “pure activity” that follows the reception of the sensible form, whereas the imagi-
nation operates by producing a form. This point is emphasized by Cajetan in his
commentary on Aquinas’s text:
There arises a doubt, since in this passage it is said explicitly that the external sense operates
only according to a change [caused] by the object; consequently, the sense faculty seems to
sense in a purely passive way. […] The reply is very clear from the text. For it is not said
there that some sensitive part is perfected only by a change, but rather that it operates only
according to a change; there it is clear that an operation is posited in addition to change.
Therefore, the difference lies not in operating actively or passively, but in operating accord-
ing only to a form that is produced from the outside or according to a form that the sensitive
faculty generates for itself.133
Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the active operation that produces no form from
the active operation that does produce a form.134 In light of the parallel that Aquinas
establishes between sense and imagination on the one hand, and the intellect on the
other, the two kinds of operation in question should be attributed to the intellect: the
possible intellect can perform an operation that consists in a “pure activity” as well
as an operation that consists in the production of a form or “concept.”135 When he

presents his theory of the concept, Aquinas takes care to distinguish the concept
from the thing of which it is the concept, from the act of intellection, and from the
species.136 The difference between the concept and the thing itself is not difficult to
grasp. As for the distinction between the concept and the intellective action, this
depends on the idea that the concept is the “term” (terminus) of the action, in the
sense of “product,” which distinguishes it from the productive activity itself. The
species on the other hand is the “principle” (principium) of the production of the
concept. However, there remains a problem to consider. If we admit that the intellect
has an operation of “pure activity” that follows upon the activation of the intellec-
tive faculty by the intelligible species, how are we to explain that Aquinas posits yet
another operation, which also is based on the activation of the intellective faculty by
the intelligible species but is productive of a concept? In short, why two intellective
operations? It seems that we have to admit that, in Aquinas’s opinion, the species
and the concept play different cognitive roles. Aquinas states:
It must furthermore be maintained that once the intellect is informed by the species of the
thing, then by understanding, it forms in itself a certain intention of the understood thing,
which is its notion, which is signified by the definition.137
Alain de Libera emphasized the “componential mode” of the concept according to

Aquinas. Thus, the concept should be understood as “an ordered ensemble of traits
of types p, q, r,” in other words, as the equivalent of the definition of a thing, for
example, “animal, mortal, rational” for “human.”138 Likewise, according to Fabrizio
Amerini, the difference between the species and the concept consists in the fact that
the species provides a “confused” cognition, whereas the concept provides a “dis-
tinct” cognition. Thus, on these grounds it would have to be said that, thanks to the
concept, “human” is present in the intellect under the form “animal, mortal, ratio-
nal,” that is, with its definitional components or logical parts strictly “distinguished,”
whereas in the species the logical parts of “man” are not distinguished.139 The pro-
ductive act of intellection would then lead to a definitional knowledge of the thing,
which is not possible for the non-productive act to do, since it has available to it only
the species.
Whatever the raison d’être for the concept in Aquinas, the idea of an action lead-
ing to a product in the agent adds something that is not present in Aristotle, for
whom the result of an immanent action is just the activity itself. In other words,
Aristotle’s immanent action is strictly non-transitive, that is, it is neither (so to
speak) “exoproductive” nor “endoproductive.” The Latin text of Aristotle is clear, in
the translatio media as well as in the recension of William of Moerbeke, both of
which say: “There is no product besides the action.”140 Rather, Aquinas’s source as
regards the production of an interior word is more Augustinian than Aristotelian.
Augustine’s view is that one acquires knowledge through the production of a “verb”
(verbum), which, as Bernard Lonergan says, is “not primitive but derived: gignitur,
exoritur, nasicitur.”141 It is this idea of engendering that is taken up by Aquinas: the
“concept” (conceptus) is that which is “conceived” by the soul, and can be com-
pared to an “offspring” (proles).142
To sum up, Aquinas seems to maintain in his mature work that cognition, which
is active, is brought about in two ways: either by “pure activity” or by productive
activity. While productive activity is more Augustinian than Aristotelian, the cogni-
tion that is understood as a “pure activity” is derived, for Aquinas, from texts of
Aristotle about immanent action. Admittedly, one might find it strange that Aquinas
attributes an active dimension to sensation. Sensation requires the presence of the
thing as the cause of the sensitive act, unlike intellection, for example, which can
take place even when the thing intelligized is absent: according to Aristotle, whom
Aquinas follows, intellection depends on the will of the one who understands, which
is not the case with sensation.143 Thus, it seems that sensation is passive, and not
active. How then should we interpret what Aquinas says? One solution would be to
maintain that for Aquinas sensitive immanent action serves to provide an account of
attention. The same could probably be said about non-productive intellective action,
and one could even accept that productive immanent action also has an active
moment of attention in addition to its moment of production. Such an interpretation
would bring Aquinas’s immanent action closer to his notion of intentio.
Every cognitive act is accompanied, in Aquinas, by an intentio: “The cognitive
power does not know anything actually unless an intention is present.”144 Likewise,
every cognitive act has attributed to it a conversio:
No power can cognize something except by turning itself towards its object, as sight does
not cognize anything except by turning itself towards colour; thus, since the phantasm is
related to the possible intellect in the same way that sensibles are related to the sense (as is
clear from the Philosopher in De anima 3), then however much the intellect has some intel-
ligible species with itself, still it never actually considers something according to that spe-
cies except by turning itself towards the phantasm.145
Robert Pasnau asserts that intentio, which he translates as “attention,” is identical to

what Aquinas calls “turning towards” (conversio):
I would suggest that the attention Aquinas discusses in these passages is no different from
what he refers to more often as a turning (conversio) of the cognitive power to the object.146
But do intentio and conversio in fact refer to attention? The term intentio has various
meanings in Aquinas, beginning indeed with volition, but it can also be used to
characterize the ontological status of “species” (species), namely, “intentional
being” (esse intentionale); or it can function as a synonym of “concept” when
Aquinas is talking about an “understood intention” (intentio intellecta).147 In any
case, when Aquinas speaks of intentio as accompanying cognitive acts, he seems to
be adopting a position from Augustine: “For the act of any cognitive power an inten-
tion is required, as Augustine shows in De Trinitate.”148 According to Augustine,
sensation, like any activity of the soul, has a trinitarian structure. On this model,
sensation is made up of the thing, the act of sensation that receives the “form”
(forma) of the thing—in a way very reminiscent of the reception of the form without
the matter in Aristotle—and the intention of the soul:
When we see a body we have to consider and to distinguish the following three things, and
this is a very simple task: first, the thing which we see, whether a stone, or a flame, or any-
thing else that can be seen by the eyes, and this could, of course, exist even before it was
seen; secondly, the vision, which was not there before we perceived the thing that was
presented to the sense; thirdly, the power that fixes the sense of sight on the thing that is seen
as long as it is seen, namely, the intention of the mind.149
Victor Caston, following Sofia Vanni Rovighi, argues that Augustine’s intentio can
be likened to (selective) attention.150 The identification of intentio with attention
becomes still more plausible if we follow Jean-Luc Solère in identifying Augustine’s
concept of intentio in De Trinitate with that of adtentio in De musica 6.5.151 Thus, if
Augustine’s intentio includes the idea of attention, then, to the extent that Aquinas
interprets it in the same way, it is possible to maintain that Aquinas’s intentio and
conversio have to do with the idea of attention, which is an active dimension of
psychology.152 At any rate, what is clear is that cognition, for Aquinas, is not a mere
causal effect of the object. This echoes other distinctions between intentionality and
causality that have been made in the Aristotelian tradition from Alexander of
Aphrodisias to Brentano.
Before turning to Brentano specifically, let us delve further into the genealogy
that lies behind his views. If we maintain—as do Solère and Caston, for example—
that Augustine’s intentio, an active dimension of psychology, comes from the
Neoplatonic tradition, in particular from Plotinus’s Enneads,153 this may allow us to
trace the influence one step further back, to Alexander of Aphrodisias and the
Aristotelian tradition. Plotinus’s refusal to reduce sensation to a being-affected is
combined with the identification of sensitive activity with “discrimination” (κρίσις).
Now, as discussed above, Plotinus most likely, according to Eyjólfur K. Emilsson,
borrowed the contrast between being affected (πάσχειν) and discriminating (κρίνειν)
from Alexander.154 Moreover, as Jean-Luc Solère has pointed out, Augustine speaks
in De Genesi ad litteram of a “discerning” (discernere) in order to characterize the
active dimension of sensation, or “sensitive life” (vita sentiens), which recalls the
idea of discernere that is present in Marius Victorinus.155 Ilsetraut Hadot connects
this concept in Marius Victorinus with the Greek κρίσις.156 Admittedly, as Caston
points out, the idea of an act understood as intention is more Stoic than Aristotelian,
inasmuch as the Stoics attributed to sight a “tending towards” (ἐντείνειν, literally
tendere in), which is found in Augustine, perhaps by way of Marius Victorinus’s
intentio. Nevertheless, if this ἐντείνειν is connected with the Stoic idea that there is
a relation between sensation and that which it senses, as suggested by Pierre Hadot,
where “relation” is understood as “being related in some way to something” (πρός
τί πως ἔχειν), then it is literally Aristotle’s second definition of relations, or πρός τι,
that the Stoics use to explain sensation.157 What these considerations show is that
interpretations that treat Aristotle’s psychology as a passive psychology, which the
medieval reception of Augustine rendered active by way of Neoplatonist or possibly
Stoic ideas, have to be qualified. If Plotinus’s psychic activity and Marius Victorinus’s
discernere influenced Augustine, then the Greek κρίσις, which goes back, via
Neoplatonism, to the reception of Aristotle’s psychology by Alexander of
Aphrodisias—a radical Aristotelian—probably also played a role in the develop-
ment of Augustine’s thought. Admittedly, for the Neoplatonist tradition, which was
so influential for Augustine, “to perceive is to remember,”158 and this aspect is absent
in Aristotelianism. Nonetheless, Alexander’s theory of κρίσις is firmly grounded in

Aristotle’s texts, as is shown by his interpretation of Metaphysics Δ.15. Thus, given
that Plotinus adopted Alexander’s account of κρίσις, and that he deeply influenced
Augustine, Augustine’s intentio most likely has some historical connection with a
broadly Aristotelian active psychology that is perhaps based, in Alexander, on non-
transitive action, or “immanent action” (actio immanens) as medieval philosophers
called it. This active psychology was then transmitted to medieval philosophy, as
can be seen with Aquinas’s intentio-conversio, understood as attention.
Thus, in Aquinas intentional aiming appears to be attentional, and to follow upon
a special sort of psychic being-affected that results from the reception of a form
without its matter. Just as in Brentano, intentionality and causality seem to be dis-
tinct notions for Aquinas, and in this he is not necessarily betraying Aristotle.
Nevertheless, it is possible to remain faithful to Aristotle on these issues, that is, to
distinguish intentionality from causality, without thereby treating cognitive acts as
actions. This is the path pursued by Duns Scotus.
2.2.3.2 Duns Scotus
Duns Scotus maintains that cognition is an immanent action, but he refuses to clas-
sify this kind of action among “true” actions. He does acknowledge the similarities
that exist between cognition and volition on the one hand, and action on the other:
It is not intelligible that there should be intellection or volition and that it is not of some
term: it belongs to action properly so called to go across to something as to its term.159
Even so, despite this similarity, he does not identify cognition (or volition) with
action, but assigns cognition (and volition) to the Aristotelian category of quality:
“[Intellection and volition] are not actions of the genus of action, but are absolute
forms in the genus of quality.”160 Scotus thus attributes a static aspect to cognitive
acts: as Giorgio Pini emphasizes, to be thinking is to have a thought.161 According to
Scotus, when Aristotle says that cognition is an immanent action, he is not referring
to a species in the category of action that he is distinguishing from another species,
that of transitive action, which produces an effect (examples of transitive actions
include building, heating, etc.). Admittedly, cognitive acts “are signified grammati-
cally by active verbs” (significatur grammatice per verbum activum), but this does
not reflect the ontology:
Thus understood, the distinction of action into transitive and immanent is not of a genus
into species, but of a word into its meanings. For transitive action is true action in the genus
of action, [whereas] immanent action is a quality, but it is called action equivocally on
account of the previously mentioned characteristics.162
One of the “previously mentioned characteristiscs” is, in particular, the “tending

towards a term,” which is indeed not alien to cognition.163 True actions, however,
produce an effect, which cognition does not.164 Scotus thus maintains that the pro-
duction of an effect is a necessary condition for there to be an action. One point that
should be emphasized is that when Scotus considers whether cognition is an action,
he means by “cognition” the cognitive act in the strict sense, that is, intentional
items such as sensing, understanding, etc. It is the active dimension of this act that
he is considering, not the internal events leading to the existence of the act.165 For
Scotus, both sensation and intellection follow from a series of internal actions pro-
duced by the soul in cooperation with the species of the object. The object first
exercises a causal activity on the organ of sensation by impressing a sensible species
in it. As regards sensation, the soul and the species of the object in the organ of
sensation together produce a sensitive act; in other words, the soul and the object,
through its species, work together to cause sensation. As regards intellective activ-
ity, the object is first given to the soul either in itself or by way of its image or
“phantasm.” The agent intellect and the object (or its image) generate in the possible
intellect a species representing the object. Following this, the soul and the species of
the object in the intellect together produce an intellective act; in other words, the
soul and the object (by way of its species) concur to cause the intellection.166 Now,
actions that are internal and thus “immanent,” though not in Aristotle’s sense, are
true actions insofar as they lead to the production of cognitive acts:
Action in the genus of action can be divided into immanent and transitive action, as the
higher can be divided into what is lower. For action in the genus of action not only has to
do with the form induced in some other passive [thing] through motion by an agent, but also
with a form induced through change in the agent itself. For that absolute form, when it is
new, is the term of some action, properly so called, through which it receives being.
Therefore, when the form that terminates an action is external to the agent itself, then that
action is transitive; but when that form is in the agent itself, then the action is
immanent.167
Thus, although the generation of a cognitive act consists of a series of actions, the
act itself is not an action. Moreover, just as cognition itself is not an action, so the
actions that cause the act are not cognitions, since to know is not to cause a cogni-
tion, but to have a cognition.168 Thus, cognition results from an action, but it is not
the action itself. As for “attention” (attentio), it does not pertain to cognition itself,
but to the will. The fact that it accompanies cognition does not mean that cognition
taken in itself has any active dimension.169
Like other Aristotelians before him, and in an anticipation of Brentano, Scotus
does not reduce cognition to a mere effect of the object, despite his rejection of the
interpretation of cognition in terms of action. Indeed, for Scotus, not only are cogni-
tive acts not actions, they are also not passions. Even though they depend on internal
causal processes, these acts are understood rather as qualities that result from these
processes.170 As regards the causal influence exercised on psychism by external real-
ity, Scotus holds that cognitive acts can have an object without being causally
related to it. It is true that the usual model of cognition is based, as discussed earlier,
on a causal process that proceeds from the external object to the faculty concerned;
nonetheless, this causal process can be interrupted without the cognitive act being
deprived of an object. One way in which this can happen, Scotus says, is divine
intervention: God can bypass the causal power exercised by the object. As Pini has
explained, God can cause a cognitive act in the soul even when there is no species
in the soul, or he can cause the species. In this case, the object is not the cause of the
act, since its species, which is what allows for the causal process, either is not pres-
ent in the intellect, or is not there by means of the object. Thus, what the act is about
is an object which is not the cause of the intellection:
If God caused an act of intellection without the species existing in the intellect, it is still
necessary that there be an object present to terminate the act of intellection, since it is con-
tradictory for there to be an act of intellection but for it not to be related to some present
object that terminates it; yet in this case, by [divine] power there is not a species that is the
starting point of this act.171
The cognitive power not only has to receive the species of the object, but also has to tend
towards the object by its own act. The latter is more essential to the power, since the former
is required on account of the imperfection of the power. The object is the object more
because the power tends towards it than because it impresses the species. This is clear: if
God impressed a species on the intellect or on the eye, they would be drawn to the object in
the same way as they are now, and the object would thus [still] be the object. But God would
not be the object, since the power does not tend towards him; and yet he impresses it, just
as he impressed in the angel the species of creatures. The following is therefore true: “For
anything passive there is something that in itself causes motion.” But in apprehensive pow-
ers it is not necessary that that motive thing be the proper object of the power under the
aspect in which it causes motion, but it is necessary that it terminate the act of the power
under the aspect in which it is an object.172
Scotus does not restrict the absence of a causal relation to cases in which God inter-
venes. He maintains that there are also cases in natural psychology in which the
causal relation is absent. In a discussion in which he investigates whether that which
signifies is modified when that which is signified is modified, Scotus presents the
following argument: “When the cause is destroyed, the effect too is destroyed; the
thing is the cause of the species; therefore the species is destroyed when the thing is
destroyed.”173 However, he then rejects it:
Something that does not exist can be intelligized through a species: not one that it makes
but one that it has made in the intellect, since this species can remain the same as what it
was previously.174
Scotus here emphasizes the essential point that even if it is conceded that causality
grounds cognition, it does not entail the existence of the cause of the act for every
cognition, since a species can still be employed when its cause has disappeared. The
idea that the cause need only have been and not be in order for the cognitive act to
be is explicitly mentioned by Scotus in a discussion about the intellection of
relations:
If [the intellect] merely considers [a relation], then this thing in itself either is or was, and
at some moment moves the intellect, like a rose, even if it does not now exist.175
In addition to the case in which something has caused a species but no longer exists,
one should also mention the case in which something has caused an image but no
longer exists. For Scotus, intellective abstraction is brought about in the presence of
a particular object, or on the basis of its image: “In a first moment of nature, the
object is present to the agent intellect in itself or in an image.”176 Once the image has
been stored in memory, it can enter into the production of an intellection when the
particular object no longer exists. In other words, the agent intellect can begin the
process of abstracting the species on the basis of the image of an entity that has
ceased to exist.
Since the cognitive act can exist when its cause no longer exists, the causal rela-
tion is, in Scotus’s terminology, not “identical” (identica), that is, it is not ontologi-
cally identical with the act.177 This point is developed in the De imagine178:
It is clear that [intellection] can be caused by God immediately; therefore, it does not
depend essentially on it [sc. the object] alone. Even when the object causes [the intellec-
tion], it does not depend identically, since the same [intellection] could be caused by some-
thing else (it also is often about a non-being).179
In this text, Scotus mentions two natural situations in order to explain the non-
identity between the causal relation and the act of intellection. In the first, the act of
intellection is caused by the object. Scotus affirms that even when the object is the
efficient cause of the act, the causal relation could fail to be the same, since the same
act could have been caused by another object.180 The causal relation is therefore not
really identical with the act. Nevertheless, one point seems difficult to understand:
though Scotus says that the causal relation is not identical, he maintains that the rela-
tion to the object understood as “term” (terminus)—in other words, the relation of
termination or the intentional relation—is identical, which is to say that “no act that
is by nature about an object could stay the same and not terminate in the same
object” (nullus actus natus esse circa obiectum, posset esse idem et non terminari ad
idem obiectum).181 Thus, the same act could have been caused by another object, but
it would nonetheless have the same terminative object. How is this to be explained?
The answer will depend on the type of act in question. Scotus’s text has to do with
intellection. In principle, intellection is directed at a “common nature” (natura com-
munis), which is the “what it is” (quod quid est) of a thing, in other words its essence
or “quiddity” (quidditas), understood according to the ontological status that it has
in itself, that is, existing neither as a particular thing in reality nor as a universal in
the intellect, but prior to both these states.182 Scotus adopts Avicenna’s theory of the
“indifference of the essence,” according to which “horseness itself is nothing but
horseness alone” (ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum),183 which in
itself is neither universal nor particular. In individuals the nature is particular, but it
remains nonetheless common in them, and so can be described as a “repeatable”
entity, even though it is not universal.184 Now, as Scotus says:
With respect to this natural priority the “what it is” is the per se object of the intellect, is
considered in itself and as such by the metaphysician, and is expressed by a definition.185
Thus, the intellection of human is directed at the common nature human. When
Scotus says that the same intellection could be caused by something else, he does
not mean a common nature, but rather a particular thing that has that nature; indeed,
it is always a particular that is at the origin of the intellective causal process.186 Now,
an act that is about the common nature human could be caused by Plato just as well
as by Socrates, since they are both particular human beings. As a result of the
abstractive activity of the agent intellect, the particularity of the nature is erased,
such that any human at all is apt to cause the intellection of the common nature
human. Scotus hopes to show that the act of intellection is in a specific relation of
causal dependence with any given human, and not in a particular relation of causal
dependence with this or that human; this implies that the causal relation is not iden-
tical to the cognitive act.
In the second natural situation mentioned by Scotus, the causal relation is con-
sidered non-identical because the act can be about a non-existent object. A modern
reader might be tempted to see here a case of aiming at an impossible object, a
problem extensively discussed in the school of Brentano, by Husserl especially:
though the round square does not exist, one can have the round square as an object.187
However, it would be a mistake to interpret Scotus this way, and the reason why is
again the type of cognitive act that he is talking about, namely, intellection. For
Scotus, intellection is about existent being or possible being, and this applies both
to human intellection and to divine intellection.188 Thus, an impossible being is
never the object of intellection. Among impossible beings are composites of the
most specific species within a genus—the goat-stag, for example, but also the round
square—because their specific differences mutually exclude each other.189 These
chimerical entities are given only to imagination and opinion, but never to intellec-
tion.190 Thus, when Scotus says that intellection is about a non-existent thing, he
cannot be referring to an impossible object, which seems to be confirmed when he
explains that “the object may have no existence in act.”191 In an article commenting
on question 13 of Scotus’s Quodlibet, Richard Cross gives as an example of what
Scotus means by a possible but non-existent object, the land of Oz, that is, an indi-
vidual but fictional land.192 However, Cross’s example is probably not a suitable
one, since Scotus seems to deny that humans can have intellectual cognition of
individuals before death; in other words, the “individual difference” or “haecceity”
(haecitas) is not accessible to the human intellect in via.193 Thus, the land of Oz is
not the sort of thing that Scotus has in mind when he speaks of the intellection of
non-existent objects. Pini, on the other hand, gives as an example of an object a
common nature—mermaids, to be precise.194 With this example, Pini means to pick
out a possible being, and not one that is impossible. However, it seems that for
Scotus a mermaid is an impossible being: if by “mermaid” we understand a being
that is a composite of the natures of humans and of fish, then a mermaid would
involve two parts that are mutually incompatible, since the specific difference of
humans, “rational,” is incompatible with the essential characteristics of the nature of
a fish, which is an irrational animal. Admittedly, a mermaid is not a composite of
two most specific species of the same genus, since fish is a subspecies of the species
non-rational animal, which is opposed to the species human or rational animal, but
the case seems close enough to entail the same consequence. However, we should
focus on Pini’s central point: the object that Scotus is talking about is a common
nature that is possible but non-existent. Moreover, whether we agree with Pini that
the non-existent object is a possible common nature, or with Cross that it is a pos-
sible particular, Scotus maintains in the De imagine that the act of intellection is
always related to an object understood as a term, whether the relation to the cause is
given or not. When the object does not exist, there cannot be any causal relation to
the object, but the absence of a causal relation does not entail the absence of a rela-
tion of termination, that is, an intentional relation.
For Scotus, as for the ancient commentators and for Aquinas before him, as well
as for Brentano after him, the distinction between intentionality and causality comes
from Aristotle. Indeed, in his commentary on book 5 of the Metaphysics, Scotus
distinguishes between the relation to an object or “term” and the causal relation on
the basis of the classes of relation laid out by Aristotle:
How are the three modes that Aristotle posits constituted? Reply: every relation of the term
and the terminated belongs to the third mode. For, first, the term is related as the object is
the term of an act or habit or power; secondly too, every term of quantified things and
motion [is related]. To the second mode belongs every relation of cause and effect, espe-
cially of the efficient and material [causes]. To the first mode belongs every relation of any
whole to a part, and in general of the greater and the lesser.195
In contrast to the causal relation, the relation to the object as a term is assigned to
Aristotle’s third class of relations. It should be noted that in Scotus, the term of a
cognitive act is distinguished not just from the efficient cause: Scotus takes care to
reject every sense in which it could be said that the object is the cause of the act.196
It is not the formal cause of the act, for it is not the form of the act, that is, its essen-
tial constituent.197 It is not the final cause of the act, for the intellection has as its end
not the object “but knowing.”198 Nor is it the material cause of the act, for intellec-
tion “is ‘about’ the object, but it is not ‘in’ the object or made ‘from’ the object” (est
enim “circa,” sine “in” et “ex”).199 Moreover, the object is neither the “terminative
cause,” as Olivi says, nor the “excitative cause,” as James of Viterbo says, for Scotus
maintains, staying faithful to Aristotle, that there are no such causes.200 In short, the
object is neither that “to which” (in quod) the intellection goes, nor that “in which”
(in quo) the intellection is, nor that “from which” (ex quo) the intellection is made,
but that about which the intellection is:
Intellection is not only from the object as from the efficient cause, whether total or partial,
but is relative to it as to that which terminates it, that is, as that which it is about.201
2.3 he Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality

T
in Brentano
As indicated previously, there may be in Brentano’s 1867 study on the psychology

of Aristotle, a superimposition of the intentional and the causal—in the sense that
psychic causality and the intentional presence of the object always come together—
if not a pure and simple reduction of causality to intentionality, in the sense that
being affected by the object is nothing more than being intentionally directed
towards it.202 However, readers of Brentano should not stop at this text of his youth,
for in his later works Brentano not only clearly distinguishes between causality and
intentionality within his own account but also identifies a similar distinction in
Aristotle.
2.3 The Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality in Brentano 43
With regard to the ontological status of cognitive acts, Brentano seems usually to
count them among the “passions” (Erleidungen) or “passive affections” (passive
Affektionen). In his later writings he distinguishes “passive affections that lead to a
result” (passive Affektionen, die zu einem Werke führen) from passive affections
without a result, that is, those which have no other product than the passion itself,
which persists only as long as the causal process that generates it.203 Brentano
assigns cognitive acts to the second category: “We think a thing only as long as we
are moved to the thinking.”204 It should be noted that, despite the apparent similarity,
Brentano’s distinction is not the same as the Aristotelian-scholastic contrast between
immanent and transitive action.205 Brentano distinguishes not between actions that
have no result other than the activity and those that do produce some other result,
but between passions from which something results—or, let us say, “which leave
something behind them”—and those from which nothing results.
Though cognitive acts are usually understood passively, Brentano seems some-
times to attribute to them an active dimension, or more precisely, a productive
dimension, which is reminiscent of Aquinas’s theory (derived from Augustine) of
the production of a “word” (verbum). Thus, in manuscript Ps 34, which is about
relations, in a passage dated 1908, Brentano states:
The fact that the one who presents is called the subject can easily lead to misunderstand-
ings; one ought to call it that which objectifies or that which objectizes, since the object is
a correlatio insofar as it is objectified or objectized.206
Furthermore, in his courses on metaphysics given in Wurzburg beginning in 1867,

Brentano maintains that “the presented” (das Vorgestellte) and “the asserted” (das
Behauptete) are “mental words” (verba mentis); this idea is also mentioned in his
Psychology.207 Moreover, it should be noted that the distinction he makes between
“simply seeing” (bloß sehen) and “noticing” (bemerken) or “being clear about what
is seen” (sich klar sein über das Gesehene) seems to introduce an element of activ-
ity into his theory of cognitive acts, inasmuch as this distinction emphasizes the
attentional mode of intentionality.208
Ultimately, whether Brentano thinks of cognitive acts as passions or as actions,
he draws a clear distinction between the relation of the act to its cause and the rela-
tion of the act to its object. At the time of his Habilitationsschrift, Brentano was not
well informed about contemporary psychology, and when discussing intentionality
and causality in Aristotle he was mainly interested only in exegesis. However, as he
developed his own psychological theory, he came back to this textual material with
theoretical demands based on his own views, and although he was influenced by the
De anima and other texts of Aristotle, he did not hesitate to disagree with Aristotle
on some specific points. Thus, in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, when
commenting once more on the passages from De anima 3.2 on psychic causality,
but now with a more developed theoretical stance of his own, Brentano states that
“calling the pair of concepts, hearing and sounding, instances of action and passion
is completely mistaken.”209 In this passage, Brentano criticizes Aristotle for treating
the sound as the cause of the act of hearing. What bothers Brentano about this iden-
tification is the fact that cause is a relative notion. But according to Brentano, “the
concept of sound is not a relative concept.”210 His concern will not be understood
unless we take into account his theory of inner perception. According to Brentano,
every act of outer perception is accompanied by a concomitant inner perception. In
this complex structure, two objects have to be taken into account: the primary object
is the physical phenomenon, which is the object of the act of outer perception; the
secondary object, the object of inner perception, is the total structure made up of the
act of outer perception, its correlate, and the inner perception itself.211 Clearly then,
the act of outer perception could not be the object of outer perception, since in that
case the distinction between outer and inner perception would be erased. Now, if
sound were a relative concept, says Brentano, “the act of hearing would not be the
secondary object of the mental act, but instead it would be the primary object along
with the sound.”212 This argument has been developed in detail by Werner Sauer. If
sound were something relative, the proposition “Sound is the primary object of the
psychic act of hearing-of-the-sound” would mean “The sound-heard is the primary
object of the act of hearing-of-the-sound.” Now, for Brentano, correlatives are epis-
temologically interdependent; that is, one cannot be known without the other.213 The
consequence would then be: “The hearing-of-the-sound is the primary object of the
psychic act of the hearing-of-the-sound.”214 The physical phenomena are therefore
not essentially the causes of the psychic phenomena. If one still wanted to follow
Aristotle and concede that the “proper object” of a sense faculty is “that property of
the perceived object which is the ‘causal principle’ (das wirkende Princip) of the
alteration of the sense,”215 one would have to clarify that being a “causal principle”
is not an essential constituent of the property in question (colour, sound, etc.).
In fact, there are various systematic considerations that drive Brentano to making
a distinction between causality and intentionality. Following the lead of modern
philosophers, Brentano is not a realist about secondary qualities. Colours, sounds,
and so on, do not exist as such in the world:
We have seen what kind of knowledge the natural scientist is able to attain. The phenomena
of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which he studies are not things which
really and truly exist. They are signs of something real, which, through its causal activity,
produces presentations of them. They are not, however, an adequate representation of this
reality, and they give us knowledge of it only in a very incomplete sense. We can say that
there exists something which, under certain conditions, causes this or that sensation. We can
probably also prove that there must be relations among these realities similar to those which
are manifested by spatial phenomena, shapes and sizes. But this is as far as we can go. We
have no experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experi-
ence is not true. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth.216
But that which these mental activities [enjoyed in dreams] refer to as their content and
which really does appear to be external is, in actuality, no more outside of us than in us. It
is mere appearance, just as the physical phenomena which appear to us in waking life really
correspond to no reality although people often assume the opposite.217
Now, even if psychic phenomena—colours, sounds, etc.—do not exist in the world,
they are no less known “in themselves,” in the sense that, even though they are
2.3 The Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality in Brentano 45
described as “signs” (Zeichen), they do not make their cause known, but are them-
selves that which is known. Against the Kantian theory of the phenomenon, Brentano
writes:
We do not know a thing when we do not know it as what it is, that is, in itself. Someone who
knows a phenomenon that is the effect of a cause that is unknown to him does not know the
cause at all, but he does know the phenomenon as what it is, that is, in itself. It is foolishness
to say that when we know the phenomenon we do not know that phenomenon in itself, but
rather that we know phenomenally the thing which is the cause of the phenomenon, and
which remains unknown to us despite the knowledge of the phenomenon, because of its
lack of resemblance to the phenomenon.218
What Brentano seems to be saying is that perceptual acts have an intentional scope
which is restricted by the phenomenon that is given to them. Even if colours do not
exist in reality but are mere effects produced by the interaction between the environ-
ment and our physiological apparatus, it is nonetheless true that we see (i.e. visually
experience) colours. It would be an inaccurate description of our seeing to say that
when we see colours, we are “in fact” seeing atomic particles (or whatever other
item is the cause of the seeing). This does not mean that when we see colours we
cannot infer the existence of those particles, imagine them, etc.; however, it remains
true that they are not seen. Thus, the object at which the intentional relation is
directed is perceived as such, even if it does not exist, whereas the cause, which does
exist, is not perceived. The object and the cause are therefore strictly distinct, and so
the intentional relation and the causal relation do not have the same term:
In some cases, that which moves us to think is noticeable in respect of its distinctive char-
acter; for example, when we infer something, or when our will is motivated, or when an
axiom is known to be true ex terminis, or when love arises from the idea of its object. In
other cases, however, the efficient or moving cause is noticeable only in an entirely general
way, so that the passive affection has merely the character of being produced by something
or other. This seems to be the case with seeing, hearing, and other sensations. It is not cor-
rect to say that we are acted upon by the primary object of sensation, although ordinarily we
are inclined to assume it, since we perceive that something is the cause of the sensation and
we identify this cause with the primary object, which is different from the cause of the
sensation, though its appearance is simultaneous with this cause. Even after experience has
long taught us, in the clearest way possible, that the primary objects cannot exist in reality
in the way in which they appear to us, we have great difficulty in freeing ourselves from this
illusion.219
Moreover, Brentano accepts not only that the same act of sensation can be brought
about by different causes, but also by God, in which case the object and the cause of
the psychic activity are radically distinct. This point is defended in manuscript Ps
34, quoted previously:
That which is affected cannot be affected without an agent, even though it seems to be still
thinkable that it is the same affected thing while the agent is not the same. Thus, someone
could receive the same sensitive impression that he received from one body from another
body as well, or at any rate from God. That which is affected would thus be the same, but
the agent would no longer be the same.220
Here we find an echo of the medieval arguments distinguishing between the inten-
tional and causal relations, as they are understood by Duns Scotus:
It is clear that [intellection] can be caused by God immediately; therefore, it does not
depend essentially on it [sc. the object] alone. Even when the object causes [the intellection],
it does not depend identically, since the same [intellection] could be caused by something
else (it also is often about a non-being).221
As Scotus says at the end of this passage, the object towards which an act is directed
is not always existent. Brentano too upholds the idea that there are some acts that do
not have a cause, such as those that are about impossible objects, but also “halluci-
nations” (Halluzinationen). About hallucinations he says:
[These experiences and those peripheral ones] are, taken by themselves, evidently homoge-
neous, indeed they are indiscernibly equal experiences. This is why one commonly counts
these [non-peripheral] experiences as sensations. And justifiably so; they do not form a
separate class, in particular from the descriptive standpoint.222
Hallucinations are intentionally related to an object, in the same way that “true”
sensations are, whereas a causal relation to the object could not be, even if the real-
ity of secondary qualities were conceded. Thus, the intentional relation and the
causal relation cannot be identified with each other.
After first criticizing the supposed identification of intentionality with causality
in the De anima, Brentano later sees in Aristotle himself a distinction between the
intentional relation and the causal relation. In 1889, in Vom Ursprung sittlicher
Erkenntnis, where he presents his theory of intentionality, Brentano does not refer
to De anima 3.2. It is rather Metaphysics Δ.15 that he appeals to: “A suggestion of
this view may be found in Aristotle; see especially Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter
15, 1021 a 29.”223 Since psychic and causal relations are distinguished in Metaphysics
Δ.15, Brentano will be able from now on to rely on the authority of Aristotle:
“[Aristotle] divided relations into three classes: comparative, causal, and inten-
tional.”224 In the passage from manuscript Ps 34 quoted above, Brentano takes up
Aristotle’s tripartition of relations into comparative, causal, and intentional, and
says that the “being affected” (Leiden) that is generative of a “sensitive impression”
(Sinneseindruck) is related to the object by a causal relation. In other words, the
relation of psychic being-affected to its cause is distinct from the intentional rela-
tion, which belongs to Aristotle’s third class of relations.
In the De anima, Aristotle seems to treat cognition as an effect of the object,
since he speaks of both sensation and intellection as a particular “being affected”
(πάσχειν). One might see here a reduction of intentionality to causality, and a purely
passive theory of cognition. This interpretation of Aristotle was followed in the
Middle Ages by Olivi, but critically; Olivi himself defends an active understanding
of cognition. One alternative way of interpreting Aristotle consisted not in treating
intentionality as causality, but in understanding causality in terms of intentionality.
Such a reading has been defended by Myles Burnyeat, according to whom “being
affected” (by the object) refers in Aristotle to nothing other than “being aware,” in
the sense of “registering, noticing, or perceiving.” According to Burnyeat—as well
as Richard Sorabji, who, contrary to Burnyeat, defends the view that in Aristotle
Notes 47
psychic affection precedes awareness—the reduction of the causal to the intentional

has its origin in the ancient reception of Aristotle, is continued in the Middle Ages,
and finds its “culmination” in Brentano, for whom the reception of the form without
matter is equivalent to the aiming at an intentional or immanent object. Now, if
ancient interpreters of Aristotle in effect recognized an account of awareness in his
psychology, they did so not so much by treating the being-affected in the De anima
as intentionality, but more by contrasting with psychic causality a pure aiming,
understood as κρίσις, or “discrimination.” In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas
likewise seems to leave room for an element of activity in his explanation of cogni-
tion: the reception of the form without the matter seems not to be identified with the
cognitive act, but to precede it, with the cognitive act understood in itself as action.
Duns Scotus on the other hand takes care to distinguish the intentional relation from
any causal relation to the object: whether or not cognitive acts are related to an
object understood as cause, they are nonetheless still related to an object understood
as term. In short, the Aristotelian tradition neither reduced causality to intentionality
nor intentionality to causality, but tried to draw a clear distinction between these two
aspects of cognition. This is true as much for ancient and medieval authors as for
Brentano. Admittedly, the young Brentano, in his 1867 study of the psychology of
Aristotle, brings psychic causality closer to intentionality, to the point that one
might be tempted to see in it a pure and simple identification of the former with the
latter. In his later works, however, he takes care to distinguish between intentional-
ity and causality, with regard to both his own theory and Aristotle’s. In this sense, he
is clearly part of the same tradition as the ancient and medieval readers of Aristotle
who, on the basis of Metaphysics Δ.15, contrast the causal relation to the object and
the intentional relation. While this text of Aristotle has a fundamental role in the
history of philosophy with regard to the distinction between causality and intention-
ality, it has also focused attention, together with the chapter in the Categories about
relation or πρός τι, on the question of the distinctive characteristics of the inten-
tional relation. Is it a relation with two correlatives of which one is non-real? Is it a
relation with two relata, but with only one relative? Or is it a relation with only one
relatum? On these questions, to which Brentano devoted a great deal of attention,
precedents for his reflections can once again be found in the Aristotelian tradition,
in both antiquity and the Middle Ages.
Notes
1. On these issues, see Mulligan, Wittgenstein et la tradition austro-allemande.

2. Brentano, Die Habilitationsthesen.
3. On this, see Brentano, Psychologie and Deskriptive Psychologie.
4. There is an abundant scholarly literature on the context in which Brentano
developed and on the nature and influence of his thought. See especially Smith,
Austrian Philosophy; Albertazzi et al. (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano;
Mulligan, Introduction: De la philosophie autrichienne et de sa place; Benoist,

Représentations sans objet; Fisette and Fréchette (eds.), À l’école de Brentano;
Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School;
Kriegel, Brentano’s Philosophical System. For an overview of the Brentano
school, see Dewalque, Schema of the Brentano School Intellectual Progeny, as
well as Dewalque, The Rise of the Brentano School, and The Unity of the
Brentano School. For a general history of phenomenology, see Spiegelberg and
Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement.
5. On the renewal of Aristotelianism in the German-speaking world, and on the
importance of Trendelenburg, see Thouard (ed.), Aristote au XIXe siècle, and
Hartung et al. (eds.), Aristotelian Studies in 19th Century Philosophy.
Trendelenburg edited and commented on Aristotle’s De anima, and wrote a
Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, in which Aristotle plays a central role.
6. Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, and
Die Psychologie des Aristoteles.
7. See Brentano, Über den Creatianismus des Aristoteles, Aristoteles Lehre vom
Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes, and Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung.
See also the lecture courses collected in Geschichte der griechischen
Philosophie and Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im christlichen
Abendland.
8. Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b2–3: “τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου.” My
translation. On alteration, see De gen. et corr. 1.4, 319b6–320a7. Note that the
causality in question is efficient causality. On Aristotle’s doctrine of the four
causes, see Met. Δ.2, 1013a24–1014a25.
9. Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b14–16.
10. Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b3–5: “τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν.”
Trans. Shields, in De anima, 33.
11. Aristotle, De anima 2.12, 424a17–24.
12. Aristotle, De anima 3.8, 431b26–432a2.
13. Aristotle, De anima 3.8, 431b29–432a1: “οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ
εἶδος.” Trans. Shields, in De anima, 65.
14. Aristotle, De anima 3.4, 429a17–18.
15. Aristotle, De anima 3.8, 431b21: “ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα.” Trans.
Shields, in De anima, 65.
16. Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 82–83: “Unter dem eigenthümlichen
Sinnesobjecte versteht Aristoteles jene Eigenschaft des wahrgenommenen
Gegenstandes, welche das wirkende Princip für die Alteration des Sinnes ist,
und nach der wir, weil sie das natürliche Correlat des leidenden Vermögens ist,
wie schon bemerkt, das Wesen des Sinnes zu bestimmen haben.” Trans. George,
in The Psychology of Aristotle, 56 (slightly modified).
17. Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 79–81. Trans. George, in The Psychology
of Aristotle, 54 (modified).
Notes 49
18. Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 80: “Allein nicht insofern wir kalt
werden, empfinden wir das Kalte, sonst würden auch Pflanzen und unor-
ganische Körper empfinden, sondern insofern das Kalte objectiv, d. h. als
Erkanntes, in uns existirt.” Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle,
54–55.
19. Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 80n6: “Wir gebrauchen den Ausdruck
‘objectiv’ hier und im Folgenden nicht in dem Sinne, der in neuerer Zeit der
übliche ist, sondern in jenem, den die Aristoteliker des Mittelalters damit (mit
dem scholastischen objective) zu verbinden pflegten, und der eine sehr kurze
und präcise Bezeichnung der Aristotelischen Lehre ermöglicht. Materiell, als
physische Beschaffenheit, ist die Kälte in dem Kalten; als Object, d.h. als
Empfundenes, ist sie in dem Kältefühlenden. Vgl. De Anim. III, 2. §. 4 ff.
p. 425, b, 25, wo Aristoteles sagt, dass das αἰσθητὸν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν in dem
Sinne sei.” Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 210 (slightly modi-
fied). On these two passages, see Courtine, La cause de la phénoménologie,
57–59.
20. As indicated previously, I will return in Sects. 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2 below to the
medieval theory of esse obiective.
21. Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 18.
22. Burnyeat, ‘De anima’ II 5, 76.
23. There is a vast scholarly literature on this debate, and I will limit myself to the
work of Sorabji and Burnyeat, since they are the principal antagonists, as well
as an article by Victor Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, which summarizes,
discusses, and finally rejects both the positions already mentioned; however, I
will not discuss Caston’s own position. Two monographs have been devoted to
this debate: Everson, Aristotle on Perception, and Johansen, Aristotle on the
Sense-Organs, which defend the positions of Sorabji and Burnyeat respec-
tively. For an extensive bibliography on the debate, see Caston, The Spirit and
the Letter, 246nn3–5 and 247n7. In a recent, original interpretation of
Aristotle’s theory of the reception of sensible forms without matter, Kalderon
rejects the causal reading in favour not so much of awareness, but rather of
“constitution.” This is reminiscent of contemporary disjunctivist theories of
perception, inasmuch as he argues that the sensible form of the thing as it
exists outside is a constituent of sensory experience; see Kalderon, Form
Without Matter, esp. ch. 9.
24. Sorabji, Body and Soul in Aristotle, revised version, 49–50; Intentionality and
Physiological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception, 209–210;
Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality, 49, 53, and 59.
25. Sorabji, Intentionality and Physiological Processes, 214. On the fact that the
intelligible form is nonetheless the efficient cause of the act, see Sorabji,
Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality, 60; The Philosophy of the
Commentators I, 131–132; and The Philosophy of the Commentators III,
324–325.
26. “τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι
[…].” My translation.
27. Sorabji, Body and Soul in Aristotle, 47, and Intentionality and Physiological
Processes, 219.
28. Sorabji, From Aristotle to Brentano, 248.
29. Sorabji, Intentionality and Physiological Processes, 210–211, and From
Aristotle to Brentano, 247–248.
30. Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 18, 24–25.
32. Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?
Remarks on De Anima 2.7–8, 430.
34. Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 149.
35. Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, 257–258 (Caston’s emphasis). For Alexander
of Aphrodisias, see his De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 61.30–62.15, but also
38.20–39.2 and 84.13–14.
36. Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 141 (Burnyeat’s
emphasis).
38. Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle
C?, 426.
39. Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?,
429 (Burnyeat’s emphasis).
42. Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 22 (Burnyeat’s
emphasis).
45. Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, 260 (Caston’s emphasis).
46. Brentano, M 88, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31011 (Kategorienlehre, 241):
“Wie wir bei den passiven Affektionen, die keine Umwandlungen sind, eine
Doppelheit der Beziehung bemerkt haben, eine—zum Wirkenden und die
andere—zum Objekte des Denkens […].” My translation; cf. trans. Chisholm
and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 174.
47. See Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117 (quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1]
above).
48. See Aristotle, Met. Δ.15, 1020b26–1021b11. For a division that omits the third
class, see Aristotle, Phys. 3.1, 200b28–32. There is also a division proposed in
Top. 4.4, 125a33–b4. For commentary on these divisions, see Ross in Aristotle,
Physics, ad 3.1, 200b28–32, and Vuillemin, La théorie des relations mixtes,
Notes 51
145–147. For general studies on relations in Aristotle, see especially Caujolle-

Zaslawsky, Les relatifs dans les Catégories; Mignucci, Aristotle’s Definitions
of Relatives in Cat. 7; Morales, Relational Attributes in Aristotle; Sedley,
Aristotelian Relativities; Hood, Aristotle on the Category of Relation; Jansen,
Aristoteles’ Kategorie des Relativen zwischen Dialektik und Ontologie; Harari,
The Unity of Aristotle’s Category of Relatives; Duncombe, Aristotle’s Two
Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7.
49. This section incorporates material published in Taieb, Intentionnalité et κρίσις
dans la réception antique de Métaphysique Δ, 15.
50. Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 185–186.
51. Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 187.
54. Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 192–194.
55. Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 195, and Aristotle, De anima
3.4, 429b10–13.
57. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 407.20–25.
58. On the fact that opinion can be about a non-existent object, see Aristotle, De int.
11, 21a32–33 and Top. 4.1, 121b1–4.
59. Alexander has some difficulties with this text, especially when he tries to
explain why there is an asymmetry between the correlates of the third class,
that is, when he wonders why one of the correlates is relative because the other
is relative to it. See especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1:
409.25–36, and Dooley’s critical remarks in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On
Aristotle Metaphysics 5, ad 409.32–33. For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s
text, see Sect. 3.1 below. On Alexander’s exegesis, see the remarks at the begin-
ning of Sect. 3.2.2 below.
60. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 402.8–13: “τρίτον σημαινόμενον
ἐκτίθεται, ὡς τὸ μετρητὸν πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ ἐπιστητὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην καὶ
αἰσθητὸν πρὸς αἴσθησιν· καὶ εἴη ἂν τὸ σημαινόμενον τοῦτο τοῦ πρός τι ὑπὸ τὸ
κριτικόν τε καὶ κρινόμενον· τό τε γὰρ μέτρον τὸ μετρούμενον κρίνει, ἥ τε
αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη κριτήρια καὶ κρίσεις, ἡ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν
ἐπιστητῶν.” Trans. Dooley, in On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5, 82.
61. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 84.4–6: “καὶ γὰρ εἰ διά
τινων παθῶν σωματικῶν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεται, ἀλλ’αὐτό γε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
οὐ πάσχειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κρίνειν.” My translation.
62. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In De sensu, CAG 3.1: 127.12–128.6 and Mantissa,
CAG Suppl. 2.1: 144.29–145.7. These passages are quoted and discussed by
Ierodiakonou, in Alexander of Aphrodisias on Seeing as a Relative; this article
also discusses the Stoic background of Alexander’s position. Interestingly,
Alexander already uses the term σχέσις to talk about the relation of sight to its
object, before the Neoplatonist adoption of this term in their commentaries on
Aristotle’s theory of relation (see for example Porphyry, In Cat., CAG 4.1:
125.16–19, and Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 201.34–203.13). Alexander also
uses it in his discussion of Aristotle’s πρός τι. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In
Met., CAG 1: 83.25–26: “Relatives have their being in the relation that they
have one to another” (τὰ δὲ πρός τι ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν;
my translation). For more on the notion of σχέσις in Neoplatonism, see Harari,
Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change.
63. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 80.20–22. On this issue,
see Moraux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, 75.
64. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 78.10–21.
65. Aristotle, Met. Θ.8, 1050a23–37: “ἐπεὶ δ’ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (οἷον
ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ οὐθὲν γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), ἀπ’
ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεταί τι (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν).
[…] ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν
ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ
καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ
κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν,
ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ
θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).” Trans. Ross, in Complete Works of Aristotle.
Dooley emphasizes that the action that Alexander might be appealing to in his
discussion of the third class of relatives in Met. Δ.15 could only be Aristotelian
immanent action, and not “transitive” action, which results in something exter-
nal to the agent; see Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, ad
409.23–25. For detailed discussion of immanent action in medieval philosophy,
see de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double
révolution, 295–577.
66. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 407.3–12; cf. 409.18–25.
67. John Philoponus, In De anima, CAG 15: 39.12–13, and 39.18.
68. Numerous passages about the active dimension of psychism in the Neoplatonists,
especially as regards sensation, are cited by Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la
théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens, and Sorabji, The Philosophy
of the Commentators I, section 1(b), which I follow here. See also Tuominen,
On Activity and Passivity in Perception: Aristotle, Philoponus, and
Pseudo-Simplicius.
69. Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 312.32–37: “ἐπιστάσεως δὲ ἄξιον, μήποτε τὸ
νοεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ ἔστιν πάσχειν μόνον καὶ τυποῦσθαι, ἀλλ’ἔχει τινὰ καὶ
ἔνδοθεν ἀνεγειρομένην ἐνέργειαν, καθ’ ἣν ἡ ἀντίληψις γίνεται. καὶ οὐδὲν
οἶμαι θαυμαστόν, εἰ συμμιγές τι ἐπὶ τούτων συμβαίνει· καὶ γὰρ ἀκόλουθον τὰ
μὲν ποιεῖν μόνως, τὰ δὲ πάσχειν μόνως, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἅμα καὶ πάσχειν, ὥσπερ
τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν.” Trans. Gaskin, in On Aristotle Categories 9–15, 39
(slightly modified). For a discussion of this passage, in the medieval context,
Notes 53
see Côté, L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines,

415n25.
70. Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 165.31–166.8.
71. See Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 126.1–16, as well as Priscian,
Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, CAG Suppl. 1.2: 2.26–3.9, and the comments
in Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néopla-
toniciens, 47–49, and Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception,
70–75.
72. Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens,
55. For recalling or reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις) in Plato, see Meno 81d4–5 and
Phaedo 72e5–6.
73. For a general account of the differences between Neoplatonic psychology and
Aristotle’s, see Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity,
121–125 (quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).
74. Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 165.31–166.8 (quoted above).
75. For a comparison of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists on this active dimension of
cognition, see Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception.
76. Priscian, Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, CAG Suppl. 1.2: 2.12–14: “ἡ δὲ
αἴσθησις ἀμερίστως τε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ
περιλαμβάνει, καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ κρίσις τελεία καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν ἅμα ὅλη, καὶ
κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἤδη τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἕστηκε.” My translation, following the French
translation in Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les
néoplatoniciens, 46; cf. trans. Huby, in On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception,
10. See also John Philoponus, In De anima, CAG 15: 104.8–11 and 309.15–29;
Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 166.5.
77. See Asclepius, In Met., CAG 6.2: 337.21–33.
78. Simplicius, In Phys., CAG 9: 401.31–33: “καὶ ἄλλα δὲ εἴδη πολλὰ τοῦ πρός τι
ἐστί, τὰ μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι, τὰ δὲ ἐν ὁμοιότητι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ κρίσιν, ὡς τὸ ὁρατικὸν
καὶ ὁρατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἐπιστητόν.” Trans. Urmson, in On Aristotle’s
Physics 3, 18 (modified).
79. See Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 161.16–17 and 161.22–24.
80. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 121 and Plotinus, Enneads 3.6.1.
81. De Haas, The Discriminating Capacity of the Soul in Aristotle’s Theory of
Learning; Corcilius, Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in
Aristotle; Narcy, ΚΡΙΣΙΣ et ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ (De anima, III, 2). For references to con-
temporary interpreters who discuss Aristotle’s κρίσις, see De Haas, The
Discriminating Capacity of the Soul, 326n23, and Corcilius, Activity, Passivity,
and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle, 40n26.
82. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, trans. Dooley;
Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity, 124; Alexander of
Aphrodisias, De l’âme, trans. Bergeron and Dufour.
83. Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens;
Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception.
84. Kalderon, Priscian on Perception; Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception,

121–125.
85. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 67.20–22.
86. See Caston, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Soul: Part I, ad 39.4–5.
87. Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception, 64–70; but see p. 71 for a
parallel between κρίσις and the notion of judgement.
88. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 78.23.
89. Huby, in Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, ad 2.13.
91. “τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ
αἰσθάνεσθαι.”
92. Sorabji, Body and Soul in Aristotle, 47.
93. Corcilius, Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle.
94. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 122.
95. Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense, 145.
96. Caston, Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality, 39.
97. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II, §23, Husserliana 19.1: 168.21–27 (1913
ed., 164): “Der Umfang des einheitlichen Begriffes Aufmerksamkeit ist also
ein so weiter, daß er zweifellos den ganzen Bereich des anschauenden und
denkenden Meinens umfaßt, also den des Vorstellens in einem fest begrenzten,
aber hinreichend weit gefaßten Sinne, der Anschauen und Denken gleichmäßig
begreift. Schließlich reicht er überhaupt soweit als der Begriff des Bewusstseins
von etwas.” Trans. Findlay, in Logical Investigations 1: 275 (slightly modified).
Admittedly, certain cognitive acts apparently cannot be attentionally modu-
lated, judgement for example: there is no inattentive judgement (I thank Kevin
Mulligan for suggesting this to me). Nevertheless, this would not rule out
attributing attention to any “consciousness of something,” as Husserl does.
Indeed, one might say that cognitive acts which cannot be attentionally modu-
lated always come with attention, e.g., judgements. For discussion of the
Husserlian notion of attention and its complex and changing connections with
intentionality, see Begout, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Attention;
Dwyer, Husserl’s Appropriation of the Psychological Concepts of Apperception
and Attention; Depraz, Where Is the Phenomenology of Attention That Husserl
Intended to Perform?; Wehrle, L’attention: Plus ou moins que la perception?;
Arvidson, Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality. Many passages on
attention from Husserl’s corpus are listed and discussed in Vermesch, Husserl
et l’attention, Phénoménologie de l’attention selon Husserl: 2/ la dynamique de
l’éveil de l’attention, and Husserl et l’attention. 3/ les différentes fonctions de
l’attention.
98. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 23–24 (trans. Müller, in Descriptive
Psychology, 26); see also Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 31–65, and
Grundzüge der Ästhetik, 38–40, all quoted in the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
Notes 55
99. Husserl, Die Lebenswelt, nn. 11 and 24, Husserliana 39: 101.23 and 250.29.
These two passages date from 1933. On attention in the late Husserl, see
Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §§17–20.
100. Husserl, Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit, Husserliana 38: 73.12–15 and
117.6–11: “Wieder scheint der Sinn der Rede von Meinung zur Aufmerksamkeit
Bezug zu haben oder gar etwas mit ihr Identisches zu besagen. Das Beachtete
ist das speziell Gemeinte im Gegensatz zum Unbeachteten. […] Worauf bin
ich in diesem Sinn aufmerksam? Nun, womit ich mich besonders beschäftige,
d. h. hier, was ich in einem besonderen, abgegrenzten Akt gegenständlich
habe. Der abgrenzende Akt ist das Meinen, das Gemeinte ist das ‘Bemerkte’.”
My translation, following the French translation of Depraz, who quotes and
discusses this passage in Depraz, Introduction, 14–16.
101. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 402.8–13, quoted above in this
section. Admittedly, at Met. Ι.1, 1053a31–b3 and Ι.6, 1057a7–12 Aristotle
suggests reversing the order of comparison between thought/measure and
object/measurable so that the thought is the measurable and the object is the
measure. However, this does not rule out that the order in Met. Δ.15, 1021a26–
b3 has its own meaning and remains legitimate; in any case, this is how
Alexander reads Aristotle.
102. See in particular Caston, Connecting Traditions, 37, and Leijenhorst, Attention
Please!, 205–206. For a critique of the view that Aristotle’s psychology is
strictly passive, see also Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception.
103. See Sect. 2.3 below.
104. On the fact that the sense organ does not become coloured when it senses, see
Albert the Great, In De anima 2.3.3 (ed. Geyer, 7.1: 101.21–25), quoted in
Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 14.
105. Albert the Great, In De anima 2.3.3–4 (ed. Geyer, 7.1: 101.32, 101.65, and
102.28–33). On the Avicennian origins of intentio understood as “concept”
and on its history in general, see Engelhardt, Intentio; Knudsen, Intentions
and Impositions; de Libera, Intention; Solère, Tension et Intention (I will
return to this idea in more detail in Sect. 2.2.3.1 below). For a history of spe-
cies, see Spruit, Species intelligibilis.
106. Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 13–14).
107. Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 35): “Nam actus et aspectus
cognitivus figitur in obiecto et intentionaliter habet ipsum intra se imbibitum;
propter quod actus cognitivus vocatur apprehensio et apprehensiva tentio obi-
ecti. In qua quidem tentione et imbibitione actus intime conformatur et con-
figuratur obiecto.” Trans. Pasnau, in Questions on Book II of the Sentences.
108. See Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche de Pier di Giovanni Olivi, 429–466;
Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, 39–54; Spruit, Species
intelligibilis, 215–224; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle
Ages, 168–181; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 127–138.
109. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 170; Perler, Theorien
der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 135–136.
110. Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 37): “Sic causa terminativa
habet vere rationem causae, quamvis non sit proprie causa efficiens actionis
terminatae in ipsa.” Trans. Pasnau, in Questions on Book II of the Sentences.
111. Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 420): “[…] nisi obiectum per
se aut per speciem imaginariam aut per speciem memorialem sit eis praesens,
quod non possunt aliquid actu considerare et velle. Ipsa etiam essentia actuum
praedictorum hoc ostendit, quoniam referri ad aliquid ut ad principium sui
esse et referri ad aliquid ut ad terminum extrinsecum sui esse et suae inclina-
tionis sunt respectus ita diversi quod in primo respectu ipsum principium tenet
rationem extremi seu termini a quo, ipse vero actus cum suo susceptibili
tenent rationem extremi seu termini ad quem. In secundo vero respectu est e
contrario, quoniam ipse actus cum suo susceptibili tenet rationem extremi seu
termini a quo, et terminus suae inclinationis tenet rationem extremi seu ter-
mini ad quem. Certum est autem quod actus apprehensivi et appetitivi habent
respectum et inclinationem ad sua obiecta tanquam ad terminum ad quem,
sicut experimento intimo in nobis ipsis probamus. Unde posito quod obiecta
efficiant actus ipsos aut eorum habitus, adhuc praeter hoc exigentur ad pro-
ductionem et continuationem ipsorum actuum tanquam termini eorum seu
tanquam obiecta ab ipsis actibus et eorum potentiis apprehensa et volita et non
solum tanquam principia ipsos actus generantia.” My translation. On the
connnections between Olivi’s psychology and his theory of relations, see also
Demange, Accidents et relations non convertibles selon Thomas d’Aquin,
Pierre Olivi et Jean Duns Scot (I thank Dominique Demange for sending me
the text of the talk from which his article originates), as well as Boureau, Le
concept de relation chez Pierre de Jean Olivi. On the lost works of Olivi on
relations, see Piron, Les oeuvres perdues d’Olivi, 386–387. For a comparison
between Olivi and Robert Kilwardby, see Silva and Toivanen, The Active
Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception.
drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen,
die dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt.” Trans. Chisholm et al., in The
True and the Evident, 70.
113. See Sect. 2.2.2 above.
114. Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias 1.1.2, nn. 2 and 6 (Leonina 1*.1: 9.23–25
and 11.130–133): “Nam passio est ex inpressione alicuius agentis, et sic pas-
siones anime originem habent ab ipsis rebus. […] significatio uocum refertur
ad conceptionem intellectus secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuius-
dam inpressionis vel passionis.” My translation.
115. On the “physics of form alone,” see Burnyeat, How Much Happens When
Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?, 430–431.
116. See especially Thomas Aquinas, In De anima, 2.24, and Quodl. VIII, q. 2, art.
2, corp., and Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 46 and 70–71.
Notes 57
117. See Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 42–52.

118. See Thomas Aquinas, In De anima 2.14, and ST I, q. 78, art. 3, corp., together
with Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 131–137, and
Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 44. For a detailed discus-
sion of perception in Aquinas, see Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Perception.
119. Thomas Aquinas, In De anima 2.11, 2.24, 2.26, 3.1 (Leonina 45.1: 111.85–
113.199, 168.1–171.195, 180.146–218, 202.63–90, 205.237–274); more gen-
erally, see QQ. disp. de anima, art. 13, corp.
120. Thomas Aquinas, QQ. disp. de veritate, q. 18, art. 5, corp., and ST I, q. 79, art.
3, corp. On the agent intellect generally, and on Aquinas’s polemics against
Averroes and Averroism, see Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra
Averroistas, and the discussion by Alain de Libera in his French translation in
Thomas Aquinas, Contre Averroès; see also de Libera, Archéologie du sujet,
tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution.
121. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, art. 6, ad 7 (Leonina 22.2.1: 314.277–
292), and ST I, q. 84, art. 6, corp. (Leonina 5: 324a).
122. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 2, art. 5, corp. (Leonina 22.1.2: 63.286–289):
“Illa enim quae est in intellectu nostro est accepta a re secundum quod res agit
in intellectum nostrum agendo per prius in sensum.” My translation.
123. Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 146. I have discussed
Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology in more detail in Sect.
2.2.1 above.
124. King, Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages, 85.
125. I treat the “reacquisition” in the possible intellect of the intelligible forms that
constitute the intellective habitus as similar to “acquisitive” psychic being-
affected. On this “reacquisition” as a condition of “episodic” or “occurrent”
thought, see Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
126. Indeed, Aquinas affirms that there follows upon a sensitive undergoing an
activity or “operation” (operatio), a “judgement” (iudicium) about the proper
sensibles (see Thomas Aquinas, Quodl. 8, q. 2, art. 1, corp.; for a different
interpretation, according to which Aquinas’s iudicium is “introspective con-
sciousness” and not “perceptual consciousness,” see Pasnau, Theories of
Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 138–142). Iudicare, along with discer-
nere, is a translation of Aristotle’s κρίνειν; κρίνει at Aristotle, De anima 2.6,
418a14 is translated as iudicat (trans. James of Venice, ed. Gauthier, 294;
trans. William of Moerbeke, ed. Gauthier, 119), whereas at De anima 3.2,
427a11 it is translated as discernunt or discernit (trans. James of Venice, ed.
Gauthier, 409; trans. William of Moerbeke, ed. Gauthier, 182). Aquinas dis-
cusses the issue in his commentary on De anima (see Thomas Aquinas, In De
anima II, lect. 23, 27). However, it does not seem to me that there is in Aquinas
any systematization of the notions of iudicare and discernere comparable to
those to which κρίσις was subjected by Alexander and the Neoplatonists. For
them, it seems to identify the active dimension of all cognitive acts and is at
the head of the third class of relations in Met. Δ.15, but it does not seem to me
that Aquinas uses iudicium or discretio as the mark of the active aspect of
cognition; on discretio in Aquinas, see Thomas Aquinas, In De anima II, lect.
27 (Leonina 45.1: 182.15). Moreover, Aquinas makes no use of these notions
to explain the third class in Met. Δ.15.
127. See Pini, Two Models of Thinking, who argues that the psychic (intellective)
action follows upon the undergoing that results from the reception of the form,
as does Bonino, in Thomas Aquinas, De la vérité: Question 2, 154. See also
de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double
révolution, 326–327 and 554.
128. Thomas Aquinas, In De anima III, lect. 6 (Leonina 45.1: 230.33–34): “Et
huiusmodi motus dicitur proprie operatio, ut sentire, intelligere et uelle.” My
translation.
129. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 5: 334a): “Cum enim sit
duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre
et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare;
utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam prove-
nit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor
calefacientis est similitudo calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit
actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est
secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species
intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit.” My translation.
See Aristotle, Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2.
130. See Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, 53, 2nd redaction (Leonina 13: 21*a.6–35;
Marietti 2: 323a–b). On the different redactions of this chapter, see Geiger,
Les rédactions successives de Contra Gentiles I, 53 d’après l’autographe,
which I follow for the reading of the text, and Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
131. See Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
132. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, ad 3 (Leonina 5: 334b–335a): “In parte
sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem: et
sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio
est formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei
absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in
intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secun-
dum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format
secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem
significatur.” My translation.
133. Cajetan, In ST, ad loc. (Leonina 5: 335b): “Occurrit dubium, quia hoc in loco
expresse dicitur quod sensus exterior secundum solam immutationem ab
objecto operatur; et consequenter pure passive sensus videtur sentire. […]
facillime patet ex littera responsio. Non enim ibi dicitur quod aliqua pars sen-
sitiva perficiatur sola immutatione, sed dicitur quod operatur secundum solam
immutationem: ubi manifeste praeter immutationem operatio ponitur. Est igi-
tur differentia non in operando active, vel passive; sed in operando secundum
Notes 59
solam formam quae producitur ab extra, et secundum formam quam ipsamet

virtus sensitiva sibi ipsi parit.” My translation.
134. One might be surprised that Aquinas affirms that the imagination produces a
form both when it imagines a thing that is now absent, and when it imagines
something it has never seen. If the cognition of a thing that has never been
seen seems really to necessitate the production of a form, that of something
that is absent but has already been seen seems able to be entertained simply by
recalling a form that lies within the soul, as Aquinas himself seems to main-
tain in the first redaction of chapter 53 of Summa contra Gentiles 1. See
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53, 1st redaction (Leonina 13: 20*b.2–6 and
24–27; Marietti 2: 322a, b).
135. This also seems to be maintained in the third redaction of SCG I, c. 53, nn.
2–3.
136. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia q. 8, art. 1, corp. (ed. Marietti, 215a). See also
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53, 3rd redaction.
137. Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53 (3rd redaction), n. 3, (ed. Marietti §443):
“Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei forma-
tus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae
est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio.” My translation.
138. De Libera, La querelle des universaux, 274–275.
139. Amerini, Confused vs. Distinct Cognition. On the distinction between species
and concept, see the detailed discussion in Taieb, Intellection in Aquinas,
where this question is also treated in connection with Aquinas’s account of
habit. See Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 322 and 326–328, who
likewise maintains that intellection by means of the intelligible species alone
and intellection by means of the concept coexist in Aquinas’s mature work.
140. Aristotle, Met. 9.8, 1050a34–35. Translatio media, AL 25.2: 179.1–2: “non
est aliud quid opus preter actionem.” Recensio Guillelmi, AL 25.3.2: 190.307:
“non est aliquod opus preter actionem.”
141. Augustine, De Trinitate 15.12.2, quoted in Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea
in Aquinas, 7. For the progressive development of the notion of verbum in the
thought of Augustine, see Panaccio, Le discours intérieur, 108–118. On all
these issues, see also Paissac, Théologie du Verbe.
142. See Thomas Aquinas, De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, c. 3, and
Panaccio, Qu’est-ce qu’un concept?, 9.
143. See Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b24–25, and Thomas Aquinas, In De anima,
lib. 2, lect. 12 (Leonina 45.1: 115.37–63).
144. Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 55, n. 4 (ed. Marietti, §458): “Vis cognoscitiva
non cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit intentio.” My translation.
145. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 10, art. 2, ad 7 (Leonina 22.2.1: 302.216–
226): “nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere nisi convertendo se ad obiec-
tum suum, sicut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem; unde
cum phantasma hoc modo se habeat ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia
ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in III De anima, quantumcumque ali-

quam speciem intelligibilem apud se intellectus habeat, numquam tamen actu
aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem nisi convertendo se ad phan-
tasma.” My translation
146. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 135. See also Hayen,
L’intentionnel selon Saint Thomas, 197–198. For a different reading, accord-
ing to which the act of intentio precedes and “triggers” the turning, see Pini,
Two Models of Thinking, 90.
147. On the concept of intentio in Aquinas, see Simonin, La notion d’intentio dans
l’oeuvre de saint Thomas d’Aquin; Hayen, L’intentionnel selon Saint Thomas;
Gilson, Le thomisme, 313–319; Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to
Saint Thomas Aquinas, 94–129; Hamesse and Portalupi, Approche lexi-
cographique de l’intentionnalité et de la finalité dans l’oeuvre de Thomas
d’Aquin. The Latin word intentio is used for at least two different ideas: (1)
volition and (2) concept, the latter meaning arising from the Latin translations
of the Arabic ma’nā, a term used by Avicenna especially, as noted in the intro-
ductory remarks of Sect. 2.2.3 above. See Engelhardt, Intentio; Knudsen,
Intentions and Impositions; de Libera, Intention; Solère, Tension et intention.
There is interesting research to be done on the connection between the ethical
meaning of intentio, that is, meaning (1), and its cognitive meaning, that is,
meaning (2). However, this would go beyond the scope of the present work.
“ad actum alicuius cognoscitivae potentiae requiritur intentio, ut probat
Augustinus in libro De Trinitate.” My translation. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 11.
149. Augustine, De Trinitate 11.2.2: “Cum igitur aliquod corpus uidemus, haec
tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dinoscenda. Primo ipsa res
quam uidemus siue lapidem siue aliquam flammam siue quid aliud quod
uideri oculis potest, quod utique iam esse poterat et antequam uideretur.
Deinde uisio quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus.
Tertio quod in ea re quae uidetur quamdiu uidetur sensum detinet oculorum,
id est animi intentio.” Trans. McKenna, in On the Trinity, 61–62 (slightly
modified). For the influence of Aristotle on Augustine, see Caston, Connecting
Traditions, 37–38. For the connections between the Trinity and psychology in
Augustine, as well as Aquinas’s interpretation of Augustine, see the discus-
sions in de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 1: Naissance du sujet.
150. See Caston, Connecting Traditions, 39; Vanni Rovighi, La fenomenologia
della sensazione in Sant’Agostino. Note that selective attention is not, accord-
ing to Caston, the most restricted sense of intentio for Augustine, since this
idea is connected above all with the “transcendent” character of cognitive
acts, that is, the fact that they can “go beyond themselves” and be about their
object.
151. Augustine, De musica 6.5; Solère, Tension et intention, 76.
152. Pasnau is not alone in maintaining that intentio in Aquinas is attentional. See
Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 97–98;
Notes 61
Hayen, L’intentionnel selon Saint Thomas, 170–174, 195–201; de Libera,

Intention, 610–611. A recent detailed analysis of attention in Aquinas is found
in Cory, Attention, Intentionality, and Mind-Reading in Aquinas’s De malo
16.8. For a justification of the assimilation of psychic action, intentio, and
attention in Aquinas, see the discussion in Taieb, Intellection in Aquinas. On
the active dimension of cognition in Augustine, see also Augustine, De
Trinitate 11.12.18.
153. Solère, Tension et intention, 77; Caston, Connecting Traditions, 40.
154. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 121; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De
anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 84.4–6; Plotinus, Enneads 3.6.1. On κρίσις in
Alexander and in the Neoplatonists, see Sect. 2.2.2 above.
155. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber 5.24, quoted in Solère,
Tension et intention, 78–79.
156. Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium 3.5 (ed. Henry and Hadot, 199.5; ed.
Locher, 119.8–33); Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception
chez les néoplationiciens, 49.
157. For this second definition, see Aristotle, Cat. 7, 8a32. For the influence of
Aristotle’s theory of relations on the Stoics, see Mignucci, The Stoic Notion
of Relatives, 166. For the connections between the Stoics and Augustine, see
Caston, Connecting Traditions; see also Solère, Tension et intention, 85,
which also partially links Augustine’s concept of intentio with Stoic thought.
For the connections between Marius Victorinus and the Stoics, see Pierre
Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 236; Pierre Hadot, in Marius Victorinus,
Traités théologiques 2, ad Adversus Arium 3.5.12. Note that Augustine’s the-
ory of attention also played an important role in the early Middle Ages, in
Abelard in particular, as shown by Rosier-Catach, Understanding as Attending.
158. See Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néopla-
toniciens, 55.
159. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 603 (Vat. 3: 356.6–9): “non est
enim intelligibile quod sit intellectio vel volitio, et quod non sit alicuius ter-
mini; hoc autem competit actioni proprie dictae, ut transeat in aliquid ut in
terminum.” My translation.
160. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I. d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 601 (Vat. 3: 354.6–7): “ergo non
sunt actiones de genere actionis, sed sunt formae absolutae de genere qualita-
tis.” My translation.
161. See Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
162. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §27, n. 81 (ed. Alluntis, 481): “Et ita ista
distinctio actionis sic intellecta in transeuntem et immanentem non est generis
in species, sed vocis in significationes. Nam actio transiens est vera actio de
genere actionis, actio immanens est qualitas, sed aequivoce dicitur actio prop-
ter conditiones praedictas.” My translation. For similar considerations, see
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XIII, q. 3, discussed in Côté, L’objet et la cause
de la c onnaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines, 415.
163. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §27, n. 81 (ed. Alluntis, 480–481), and Ord.
I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 603 (Vat. 3: 355.6–356.2).
164. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §25, n. 72 (ed. Alluntis, 477).
165. On this point, see also Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
166. On this topic see especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn.
401–553 (Vat. 3: 245–330), and Quodl., q. 15. For a detailed description of the
causal process in the psychology of Duns Scotus, see Gilson, Jean Duns Scot,
511–543; Boulnois, Être et représentation, 78–88; de Muralt, L’enjeu de la
philosophie médiévale, 112–127; Sondag, Introduction, in John Duns Scotus,
L’image; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 185–230; Pini,
Two Models of Thinking. For the various protagonists in the story about how
to explain the genesis of cognitive acts, see the Sect. 2.2.3.1 on Aquinas just
above.
167. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §27, n. 81 (ed. Alluntis, 482–483): “Potest
actio de genere actionis dividi in actionem immanente, et transeuntem, sicut
superius in inferiora. Nam, non solum ad formam inductam per motum in pas-
sum aliud ab agente est actio de genere actionis sed etiam ad formam inductam
per mutationem in ipsomet agente. Illa enim forma absoluta, cum sit nova, est
terminus alicuius actionis proprie dictae per quam accipit esse; quando igitur
forma terminans actionem est extra ipsum agens; tunc actio illa transit; quando
vero forma illa est in ipso agente, tunc actio est immanens.” My translation.
168. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §28, n. 84 (ed. Alluntis, 482–483), and Ord.
I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 537 (Vat. 3: 320.15–321.17).
169. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 470 (Vat. 3: 282.13–16).
170. The reasons that Scotus appeals to for not classifying these acts as passions in
general, including passions due to internal processes, are discussed in John
Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 6, n. 171 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov, 235–236),
and quoted in Pini, Two Models of Thinking, 97n50.
171. John Duns Scotus, Lect. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 3, n. 392 (Vat. 16: 377.13–18): “Si
Deus causaret actum intelligendi, specie non existente in intellectu, necessa-
rio adhuc est ibi obiectum praesens ut terminans actum intelligendi, quia
includit contradictionem quod sit actus intelligendi et non respectu alicuius
obiecti praesentis terminantis, et tamen, per potentiam, non est ibi species
inchoans istum actum.” My translation.
172. John Duns Scotus, In Met. 7, q. 14, n. 29 (OPh 4: 290.1–14): “Nam potentia
cognitiva non tantum habet recipere speciem obiecti, sed etiam tendere per
actum suum in obiectum. Et istud secundum est essentialius potentiae, quia
primum requiritur propter imperfectionem potentiae. Et obiectum principalius
est obiectum quia in ipsum tendit potentia, quam quia imprimit speciem.
Quod patet: si Deus imprimeret speciem intellectui vel oculo, eodem modo
ferretur in obiectum sicut modo, et obiectum ita esset obiectum. Sed Deus non
esset obiectum, quia in ipsum non tendit potentia, et tamen ipse imprimit,
sicut impressit angelo species creaturarum. Haec ergo est vera ‘cuiuslibet
passivi est aliquod motivum per se.’ Sed non oportet in potentiis apprehensivis
Notes 63
quod illud motivum sit proprium obiectum potentiae sub ratione qua est moti-
vum, sed oportet quod ipsum, sub ratione qua obiectum, terminet actum
potentiae.” My translation, for which I have consulted, here and below,
Etzkorn and Wolter’s translation of Scotus’s commentary on the Metaphysics.
Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, distinguishes in greater detail between
the creation by God of an “occurrent thought” in the Lectura and the creation
of a “representational form” in the commentary on the Metaphysics. On the
latter text, see also Gilson, Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot, 144–
145; Boulnois, Être et représentation, 85; Pasnau, Cognition, 288.
173. John Duns Scotus, In primum librum Perihermeneias, q. 3, n. 4 (OPh 2:
61.23–62.1): “Quia destructa causa destruitur et effectus; res est causa speciei;
igitur destruitur species, destructa re.” My translation.
65.5–7): “Non-existens potest intelligi per speciem, non quam facit sed quam
fecit in intellectu, quia illa species potest manere eadem quae et prius.” My
translation.
175. John Duns Scotus, In Met. 5, q. 11, n. 42 (OPh 3: 580.19–21): “Si tantum
considerat, ergo illa in se res est vel fuit, et quandoque movet intellectum sicut
rosa, licet nunc non exsistat.” My translation.
176. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 382 (Vat. 3: 233.6–8): “In primo
signo naturae est obiectum in se vel in phantasmate praesens intellectui
agenti.” My translation.
177. On the relatio identica, see Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 54.
178. By De imagine, I mean John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, where Scotus
examines in detail questions connected with the theme of intentionality.
179. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481 (Vat. 3: 287.7–11): “Patet
enim quod ipsa est causabilis a Deo immediate, ergo ab ipso solo non dependet
essentialiter; quando etiam obiectum causat, non dependet identice, quia posset
eadem aliunde causari (frequenter etiam est de non-ente).” My translation, fol-
lowing Sondag’s French version, in L’image, 184; for a different interpretation
of this passage, according to which the antecedent of ipso in “ab ipso solo non
dependet” is Deo and not obiectum, and in which the non is removed, as in the
majority of the manuscripts, see Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 58n55.
180. I take Scotus to exclude God as an alternative cause on this hypothesis, where
he seems to turn to cases in which the act indeed bears a relation of natural cau-
sality. Moreover, the indeterminacy of aliunde seems to exclude God: would
God be counted as the only non-natural cause in a list with “anything else”?
181. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.11–12). For
more on the relation of termination, or the intentional relation, in Scotus, see
the discussion below; and for the contrast with reference, see Sect. 4.1.2 below.
182. See John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1 (Vat. 7: 391.4–410.14).
183. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, V–X, 5.1 (ed. Van
Riet, 228.32–33). My translation.
184. On the common nature in Scotus, see Owens, Common Nature; Boulnois,
Réelles intentions; King, Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the
Individual Differentia; de Libera, La querelle des universaux, 329–343;
Sondag, Universel et natura communis dans l’Ordinatio et dans les Questions
sur le Perihermeneias; Tweedale, Scotus vs. Ockham; Noone, Universals and
Individuation; Pini, Scotus on Universals.
185. John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 32 (Vat. 7: 403.8–10): “Et secun-
dum prioritatem naturalem est ‘quod quid est’ per se obiectum intellectus, et
per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimitur per definitionem.”
186. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 380–381 (Vat. 3:
231.9–232.11).
187. See especially Husserl, Intentionale Gegenstände.
188. See John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dd. 36 and 43 (Vat. 6: 271.1–298.15 and 351.1–
361.18), and Lect. I, d. 36 (Vat. 17: 461.1–476.7), as well as Quodl., q. 3, §2,
n. 7 (ed. Alluntis, 93). On these questions, see Boulnois, Être et représenta-
tion, 432–452; Honnefelder, Die Lehre von der doppelten ratitudo entis und
ihre Bedeutung für die Metaphysik des Johannes Duns Scotus; Honnefelder,
Scientia transcendens, 45–56.
189. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 58 (Vat. 6: 294.21–295.5).
58.16–21), and In duos libros Perihermeneias I, q. 4, n. 18 (OPh 2: 161.1–2).
See also John Duns Scotus, Add. Magnae I, d. 43, §14 (Wadding 11.1: 229b),
quoted in Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 109.
191. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 480 (Vat. 3: 287.5–6): “Obiectum
potest non esse actu exsistente.” My translation and emphasis, supplying obi-
ectum, which appears in some manuscripts. Thus, the case that Scotus is talk-
ing about in the De imagine seems not to be one in which the causal object no
longer exists, as in the previously mentioned examples of the rose or the rela-
tion, but one in which the causal object never existed in the first place, and is
only possible.
192. Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and
Species, 148.
193. On this question, see Pini, Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts.
194. Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 58.
195. John Duns Scotus, In Met. 5, q. 11, n. 57 (OPh 3: 585.17–586.7): “Quomodo
sumuntur tres modi quos ponit Aristoteles? Responsio: omnis relatio termini et
terminati pertinet ad tertium modum. Primo enim refertur terminus, sicut obi-
ectum est terminus actus vel habitus vel potentiae; secundo omnis terminus
etiam quantorum et motus. Ad secundum modum pertinet omnis relatio causae
et effectus, maxime efficientis et materiae. Ad primum modum: omnis relatio
totius cuiuscumque et partis, et universaliter magis et minus.” My translation.
196. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.7–17).
197. See also Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 209.
Notes 65
198. This position is defended by Sondag in John Duns Scotus, L’image, ad q. 2,

n. 479.
199. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.17).
200. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 415–416 (Vat. 3: 252.1–253.7).
On Olivi’s terminative cause, see the introductory remarks of Sect. 2.2.3 above.
On the excitative cause in James of Viterbo, see James of Viterbo, Quodl. I, q.
12, ed. Ypma, 172.521–522; Côté, Introduction, in James of Viterbo, L’âme,
l’intellect et la volonté; Côté, Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities.
201. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 478 (Vat. 3: 286.4–6): “Non enim
tantummodo intellectio est ab obiecto ut a causa efficiente, totali vel partiali,
sed est ad ipsum ut ad terminans, sive ut circa quod ipsa est.” My translation.
On the rejection of in quod, see John Duns Scotus, In Met. 5, q. 11, n. 92 (OPh
3: 595.14–596.8). Scotus himself does not always observe these distinctions:
see, e.g., In Met. 7, q. 14, n. 29, OPh 4: 290.1–14, and Quodl., q. 13, §11, n. 35
(ed. Alluntis, 459), where he describes the cognitive object as in quod, and
especially Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 6, n. 191 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov, 241–242),
where circa quod is used for both cognition and transitive action.
202. See Sect. 2.1 above.
203. See Brentano, M 88, Über die Kategorien, 1916, nn. 31008–31011
(Kategorienlehre, 239–242), and M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046
(Kategorienlehre, 275–277). On the fact that in Brentano cognitive “activi-
ties” are always passions, see Mulligan, Brentano on the Mind, 70. I thank
Guillaume Fréchette for informing me that the edition of the Kategorienlehre
made by Alfred Kastil is not trustworthy, since some of the original texts
have been altered. Therefore, for quotations from the texts published in the
Kategorienlehre I will almost always rely on the original manuscripts. As a
precaution, I will do the same for texts drawn from Brentano, Philosophische
Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, which, though it was edited
by Stephan Körner and Roderick Chisholm, relies on work begun by Kastil.
On Brentano’s Nachlaß, see Mayer-Hillebrand, Franz Brentanos wissen-
schaftlicher Nachlaß; J.C.M. Brentano, The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano;
Binder, Franz Brentanos philosophischer Nachlass. On debates about the
editorial choices concerning the posthumous works of Brentano, see
Srzednicki, Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of
Franz Brentano, and A Reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand, along with
Mayer-Hillebrand, Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy
of Franz Brentano: A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki.
204. Brentano, M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046 (Kategorienlehre, 275–
277): “[W]ir denken etwas nur so lange, als wir zum Denken bewegt werden.”
Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 195.
205. See Aristotle, Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2, together with the
discussion in Sect. 2.2.3.1 above.
206. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51001–51002: “Das
Vorstellende wird sehr mißverständlich Subjekt genannt; man sollte es das
Objektivierende oder Objizierende nennen, denn das Objekt als objektiviertes

objiziertes correlatio ist.” My translation.
207. See Brentano, M 96, Ontologie (Metaphysik), from 1867 onwards, lecture 39,
quoted and dated in Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen
Brentano, 79; Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 125n1; ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 106n67.
208. See Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 23–24 (trans. Müller, Descriptive
Psychology, 26). See also Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 31–65, and
Grundzüge der Ästhetik, 38–40, all quoted in the Introduction (Chap. 1)
above. On the possibility that Brentano has an active notion of mental act, but
especially on the fact that further inquiry is needed on this topic, see Sheredos,
Brentano’s Act Psychology Was Not Aristotelian (Or Else, Not Empirical); in
my opinion, this further work will depend to a large extent on the discovery of
relevant texts in the Nachlaß.
209. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 185; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 150:
“die Unterordnung des Begriffspaares, Hören und Tönen, und das des Leidens
und Wirkens [ist] gänzlich verfehlt.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint, 101.
“Der Begriff Ton ist kein relativer Begriff.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 101.
211. See Antonelli, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionelle,’ 477. On the
grasping by inner perception of the whole of which that perception is a part,
see Textor, Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness,
425–430. On consciousness in Brentano more generally, see Fugali, Die Zeit
des Selbst und die Zeit des Seienden. On the unity of consciousness, see
Dewalque, Brentano’s Mind, and Textor, Brentano’s Mind, 246–272.
“[…] so würde nicht das Hören ein secundäres, sondern mit dem Tone
zugleich das primäre Object des psychischen Actes sein […].” Trans.
Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 101.
213. Brentano, M 32, Vom Relativen, 1889, n. 30285: “They cannot be thought
without each other” (my translation: [Sie können] ohne einander nicht gedacht
werden). See also Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, 45: “The one not
only cannot be without the other, but also cannot be known without the other”
(my translation: das Eine [kann] nicht bloß nicht ohne das Andere sein,
sondern auch nicht ohne dasselbe erkannt werden), quoted in Sauer, Die
Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 5.
214. See Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 11: “Der
Ton ist primäres Objekt des psychischen Aktes Hören-des-Tones. […] Der
gehörte-Ton ist primäres Objekt des psychischen Aktes Hören-des-Tones.
[…] Das Hören-des-Tones ist primäres Objekt des psychischen Aktes Hören-
des-Tones.” See also Antonelli, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton
Marty, xxxiv.
Notes 67
215. Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 82–83, quoted in Sect. 2.1 above.
Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 56 (slightly modified).
216. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 28; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 35: “Wir
haben gesehen, von welcher Art die Erkenntniss ist, welche der Naturforscher
zu erringen vermag. Die Phänomene des Lichtes, des Schalles, der Wärme,
des Ortes und der örtlichen Bewegung, von welchen er handelt, sind nicht
Dinge, die wahrhaft und wirklich bestehen. Sie sind Zeichen von etwas
Wirklichem, was durch seine Einwirkung ihre Vorstellung erzeugt. Aber sie
sind desshalb kein entsprechendes Bild dieses Wirklichen, und geben von ihm
nur in sehr unvollkommenem Sinne Kenntniss. Wir können sagen, es sei etwas
vorhanden, was unter diesen und jenen Bedingungen Ursache dieser und jener
Empfindung werde; wir können auch wohl nachweisen, dass ähnliche
Verhältnisse wie die, welche die räumlichen Erscheinungen, die Grössen und
Gestalten zeigen, darin vorkommen müssen. Aber dies ist dann auch Alles. An
und für sich tritt das, was wahrhaft ist, nicht in die Erscheinung, und das, was
erscheint, ist nicht wahrhaft. Die Wahrheit der physischen Phänomene ist, wie
man sich ausdrückt, eine bloss relative Wahrheit.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in
“Das aber, worauf sich diese psychischen Thätigkeiten als auf ihren Inhalt
beziehen, und was uns in Wahrheit als Aeusseres erscheint, besteht in
Wirklichkeit eben so wenig ausser uns als in uns, es ist ein blosser Schein; wie
ja eigentlich auch die physischen Phänomene, die uns im Wachen erscheinen,
ohne Wirklichkeit sind, die ihnen entspräche, obwohl man häufig das
Gegentheil annimmt.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint, 136.
218. Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, 44: “Wir erkennen etwas nicht, wenn
wir es nicht als das, was es ist, also an sich, erkennen. Wer ein Phänomen
erkennt, welches die Wirkung einer ihm unbekannten Ursache ist, der erkennt
die Ursache gar nicht, das Phänomen aber als das, was es ist, also an sich. Es
ist ein Unfug, zu sagen, daß wir, wenn wir das Phänomen erkennen, nicht das
Phänomen an sich erkennen, sondern das Ding, welches Ursache des
Phänomens ist, und das uns bei seinem Mangel an Ähnlichkeit mit dem
Phänomens trotz der Erkenntnis des Phänomens ganz unerkannt bleibt, phän-
omenal erkennen.” My translation. It is in Auguste Comte, among others, that
Brentano finds a theory of the phenomenon opposed to that of Kant; see
Brentano, Auguste Comte und die positive Philosophie. On these questions,
see Benoist, Le naturalisme de Brentano; Fisette, Franz Brentano et le positiv-
isme d’Auguste Comte; and Seron, Brentano’s ‘Descriptive’ Realism.
219. Brentano, M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046 (Kategorienlehre,
276): “In manchen Fällen macht sich das, wovon das Denken bewirkt wird in
seiner Besonderheit bemerklich, wie z.B. beim Schliessen, beim motivierten
Wollen, bei der Erkenntnis eines Axioms ex terminis, bei der Liebe von
etwas, die aus der Vorstellung des Objektes selbst entspringt. Anderemal
macht sich dagegen das Wirkende oder Bewegende nur ganz im allgemeinen
bemerklich, sodass der Erleidung nur der Charakter eines von irgendetwas
Bewirktem anhaftet. So scheint es z. B. beim Sehen, Hören und anderem
Empfinden der Fall zu sein. Dass wir von dem, was das primäre Objekt der
Empfindung ist, bewegt werden, ist nicht richtig, allein gemeiniglich neigt
man zu dieser Annahme, indem man wahrnimmt, dass man von etwas zum
Empfinden bewegt wird, und damit das primäre Objekt des Empfindens, das
selbst von diesem verschieden ist und zugleich mit ihm erscheint, identifi-
ziert. Sogar nachdem die Erfahrung längst aufs deutlichste gezeigt hat, dass
die primären Objekte nicht so wie sie uns erscheinen in Wirklichkeit sind,
finden Viele Schwierigkeit sich von dem Wahne freizumachen.” Trans.
Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 195–196 (slightly
modified). Brentano’s source here is perhaps Descartes, Le Monde, AT 11:
3.1–4.19, or Locke, Essay, II, 8, 15.
220. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51041–51042: “Das Leidende
kann nicht leidend sein ohne Tätiges, wenn es auch denkbar scheint, daß es
dasselbe Leidende sei, während das Tätige nicht dasselbe ist. So könnte einer
den selben Sinneseindruck, den er von einem [Körper empfangen hat,] gewiß
auch von einem anderen Körper und jedenfalls von Gott empfange[n;] das
Leidende wäre dann dasselbe, das Tätige aber nicht mehr.” My translation.
221. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481, Vat. 3: 287.7–11: “Patet
enim quod ipsa est causabilis a Deo immediate, ergo ab ipso solo non depen-
det essentialiter; quando etiam obiectum causat, non dependet identice, quia
posset eadem aliunde causari (frequenter etiam est de non-ente).” My transla-
tion, following Sondag’s French version, in L’image, 184.
222. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 136: “Offenbar [sind dies], in sich selbst
genommen, homogene, ja ununterscheidbar gleiche Erscheinungen.
Gemeiniglich [zählt man sie] darum zu den Empfindungen. Und mit recht;
besonders vom deskriptiven Standpunkt [sind sie] keine andere Klasse” (edi-
tor’s additions). Trans. Müller, in Descriptive Psychology, 146 (slightly
modified).
223. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntis, ed. Kraus, 54n19; ed. Binder
and Chrudzimski, 62n19: “Auch von dieser Lehre finden sich die ersten Keime
bei Aristoteles, vgl. insbes. Metaph. Δ 15 p. 1021 a 29.” Trans. Chisholm and
Schneewind, in The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, 9n19.
Chapter 3
Intentionality as a Relation
In his discussion of the different classes of relations in Metaphysics Δ.15, Aristotle

assigns the connection between psychic activities and their objects to a separate
third class, which establishes a relational asymmetry between the correlates: while
activities are in themselves related to their objects, these objects are related to those
activities because the activities are related to them.1 In a text from 1911, Brentano
claims that in this class of relations, according to Aristotle, only one of the corre-
lates is real, and the other is unreal:
What is characteristic of every psychic activity is, as I believe I have shown, the relation to
something as an object. In this respect, every psychic activity seems to be something rela-
tive. And in fact, where Aristotle enumerates the various main classes of his category of
πρός τι he mentions psychic relation. But he does not hesitate to call attention to something
which differentiates this class from the others. In other relations both terms—both the foun-
dation and the terminus—are real, but here only the first term—the foundation—is real. Let
us clarify his meaning a little! If I take something relative from among the broad class of
comparative relations, something larger or smaller for example, then, if the larger thing
exists, the smaller one must exist too. If one house is larger than another house, the other
house must also exist and have a size. […] It is entirely different with psychic relation. If
someone thinks of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of
his thinking need not exist at all. In fact, if he is denying something, the existence of the
object is precisely what is excluded whenever his denial is correct.2
One also finds in Brentano the idea that there is in Aristotle’s third class a real rela-
tion to an object that has “objective being” (esse obiective). In Vom Ursprung sit-
tlicher Erkenntnis from 1889, Brentano states:
The common feature of everything psychological, often referred to, unfortunately, by the
misleading term “consciousness,” consists in a behaviour of the subject, in a relation that
we bear to an object. The relation has been called intentional; it is a relation to something
which may not be actual but which is internally given in an objective manner.3

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_3
70 3 Intentionality as a Relation
Now, in a note accompanying this passage, he declares:

A suggestion of this view may be found in Aristotle; see especially Metaphysics, Book V,
Chapter 15, 1021 a 29. The expression “intentional,” like many other terms for our more
important concepts, comes from the scholastics.4
In other words, Brentano seems to consider his intentional object, which is an unreal
entity, to be the Aristotelian correlate in Metaphysics Δ.15:
Hence, the peculiarity which, above all, is generally characteristic of consciousness, is that
it shows always and everywhere, i.e. in each of its separable parts, a certain kind of relation,
relating a subject to an object. This relation is also referred to as “intentional relation.” To
every consciousness belongs essentially a relation. As in every relation, two correlates can
be found here. The one correlate is the act of consciousness, the other is that which it is
directed upon: seeing and what is seen, presenting and what is presented, wanting and what
is wanted, loving and what is loved, denying and what is denied, etc. As highlighted already
by Aristotle, these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, [whereas] the
other is not something real.5
In a letter to Brentano on 6 October 1904, Oskar Kraus writes: “We were already
saying earlier that with regard to the psychic there is a one-sided real relation, and
thus something entirely unique.”6 Thus, in Brentano, and through him in his school,
the concepts of intentional relation and intentional object are closely connected with
the reception of Metaphysics Δ.15. Now, this text, together with chapter 7 of the
Categories, played a fundamental role in antiquity and the Middle Ages when the
issue was to determine the distinctive features of the intentional relation and its cor-
relate. Yet, in Aristotle himself the status of Metaphysics Δ.15 is not clear, since this
text could be understood as dealing as much with the referential character of cogni-
tive acts as with their intentional aiming. This oscillation is present throughout the
reception of Aristotle, so before we begin our examination of the historical role that
this text has played in theorizing about intentionality stricto sensu, it will be helpful
to explain its equivocal character.
3.1 Contemporary Readings of Metaphysics Δ.15
In order to discuss Metaphysics Δ.15, it is necessary first to understand Aristotle’s

general views on relations. Aristotle distinguishes between “relations,” that is, rela-
tional properties themselves, and “relatives,” that is, “accidental compounds” made
up of the bearer of a relational property and the property itself.7 The bearer of a
relational property too is, as a general rule, an accidental compound made up of an
“essence” (οὐσία) and an accident on which the relational property in question
depends.8 The fact that relational properties can be borne by composites of essence
and accident is established in Metaphysics Ν.1, 1088a24–25: “The relative is a cer-
tain affection of the quantified.”9 The phrase πρός τι in Aristotle bears the senses
both of “relative” and of “relation.” Admittedly, this is not evident from Categories
3.1 Contemporary Readings of Metaphysics Δ.15 71
7, which deals with the category of πρός τι, but it is possible to derive it from a pas-
sage in the Metaphysics. At Metaphysics Δ.15, 1021b6–8, Aristotle states:
In addition, everything in virtue of which those that have it are called πρός τι [is also a πρός
τι]. For example, equality [is a πρός τι] because the equal [is called πρός τι in virtue of it],
and similarity [is a πρός τι] because the similar [is called πρός τι in virtue of it].10
Thus, πρός τι by itself plays the roles attributed to the substantives ποιόν (“the
qualified”) and ποιότης (“quality”) in chapter 8 of the Categories; however, the lack
of a terminological distinction should not lead us to suppose that there is no onto-
logical distinction.11
With regard to “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη), “sensation” (αἴσθησις), etc., when
Aristotle says in Categories 7 and Metaphysics Δ.15 that they are πρός τι, it is not
clear in which sense one should understand πρός τι. It would be tempting to equate
it with “relation,” since the abstract grammatical form of the words “knowledge”
(ἐπιστήμη) and “sensation” (αἴσθησις) recalls the examples of “equality” (ἰσότης)
and “similarity” (ὁμοιότης) from Metaphysics Δ.15, 1021b6–8. Nonetheless, in both
Categories 7 and Metaphysics Δ.15, knowledge and sensation fall under the same
logical-ontological framework as πρός τι items such as “the double” (τὸ διπλάσιον)
and “the master” (ὁ δεσπότης), which are relatives. This seems to force the reader to
find a sense in which knowledge and sensation are akin to the cases of the double
and the master. In fact, Aristotle problematically classifies psychic states and activi-
ties in accidental categories other than relation, namely, the categories of quality,
passion, and action.12 Now, it seems to me that when he speaks of them as πρός τι,
he means that these states or activities are necessarily accompanied by a relation,
whether as qualities or as passions or actions. This brings these states and activities
closer to relatives, in the sense that they are thought of as complex entities made up
of a non-relational accident and a relation. In short, if we want to speak of knowl-
edge, sensation, etc. as “relatives” in Aristotle, we should probably understand by
that term “a non-relational accident necessarily accompanied by a relation.”
It is usually maintained that relations in Aristotle are monadic. A polyadic prop-
erty is a many-place property, that is, a property that belongs to two or more sub-
jects. Now, for Aristotle, an accident can inhere only in a single subject, in the sense
of ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι in Categories 2, 1a20–b9, which is why its relations seem
to be fundamentally monadic. Under the influence of Aristotle, it is said, the philo-
sophical tradition failed to allow for polyadic relations until Russell corrected the
mistake.13 However, even if it is clear that for Aristotle an accident can inhere only
in a single subject, it should be emphasized that inherence is not the only way avail-
able to him to explain how an accident depends on a subject: precisely because rela-
tives, as a rule, have correlatives, a particular relation requires for its own existence
the existence of two subjects. As Pamela Hood maintains:
So, at the very least, if Aristotle wants to insist that every relative has its correlative
(Categories 6b28), then he must think that the true predication of a relational attribute of its
subject implies the existence of the correlative’s subject.14
In this minimal sense, relations for Aristotle are polyadic—that is, they ontologi-
cally depend on two subjects—as they will also be for the medievals, for whom
every relation requires the existence of two relata.15
One might follow Kevin Mulligan in wondering whether relations in the
Aristotelian tradition are relations in the weak sense, or “thin relations”—that is,
“topic-neutral” properties, or more precisely, mere general implications, such as “If
there is a father, there is a son”—rather than “thick relations,” that is, “topic-partial”
properties that depend on two singular subjects and make true “singular” and “con-
tingent” propositions, such as “Socrates is the son of Sophroniscus,” and “Socrates
sees Sophroniscus.”16 It is clear that for Aristotle and his readers, a relative normally
requires a correlative, and since this type of mutual implication is general, it does not
allow for the identification of thick relations. However, if the mutual implication
between relatives is thin, the relatives themselves seem to be made up of thick rela-
tions. As indicated above, a relative is, for Aristotle and his interpreters, an acciden-
tal compound made up of an essence, for example, Sophroniscus, and a particular
relation, for example, his fatherhood, which relates it to another essence, for exam-
ple, Socrates; in the example used here, what makes the proposition “Sophroniscus
is the father of Socrates” true is the existence of Sophroniscus, Socrates, and the
particular relation of fatherhood that goes from the former to the latter.17
It is in Metaphysics Δ.15 that Aristotle presents the different classes of relations,
and distinguishes the third class, which includes thought, from the other two:
Relative terms which imply number or capacity, therefore, are all relative because that
which precisely they are is said to be that which it is, in relation to something else, not
because something else is related to it; but that which is measurable or knowable or think-
able is called relative because something else is related to it. For the thinkable implies that
there is thought of it, but the thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought; for we
should then have said the same thing twice. Similarly sight is the sight of something, not of
that of which it is the sight (though of course it is true to say this); in fact it is relative to
colour or to something else of the sort. But according to the other way of speaking the same
thing would be said twice: “it is the sight of that which is the object of sight.”18
Though Aristotle seems in this text to hold that cognition plays the role of mea-
sure with respect to the object, understood as the measurable, he suggests in
Metaphysics I.1 and I.6 that the order of the correlates should be reversed, so that
cognition is the measurable and the object is the measure:
Knowledge also, and perception, we call the measure of things, for the same reason, because
we know something by them, while as a matter of fact they are measured rather than mea-
sure other things. But it is with us as if some one else measured us and we came to know
how big we are by seeing that he applied the cubit-measure a certain number of times to us.
But Protagoras says man is the measure of all things, meaning really the man who knows or
the man who perceives, and these because they have respectively knowledge and percep-
tion, which we say are the measures of objects. They are saying nothing, then, while appear-
ing to be saying something remarkable.19
But though knowledge is similarly spoken of as related to the knowable, the relation does
not work out similarly, for while knowledge might be thought to be the measure, and the
knowable the thing measured, the fact is that all knowledge is knowable, but not all that is
knowable is knowledge, because in a sense knowledge is measured by the knowable.20
What is at stake here seems to be the rejection of Protagorean relativism. The asym-
metry of relativity in Metaphysics Δ.15 is ultimately supposed to hold between cog-
nition as the measurable and the object as the measure: it is not the thought that
measures reality, but reality that measures the thought. It is tempting to connect this
asymmetry with the passages in Categories 7 where Aristotle states that the object
is “prior by nature” to cognition—in other words, that the cessation of the object
leads to the cessation of cognition, while the reverse is not the case.21 In the same
spirit, Aristotle states in Metaphysics Γ.5:
And, in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate things were
not; for there would be no faculty of sense. The view that neither the objects of sensation
nor the sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver), but
that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is
impossible. For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond
the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is prior in nature
to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case.22
On this basis, it would be possible to claim that in Metaphysics Δ.15 Aristotle rejects
the relativity of the object because the relation in question is a relation of the act’s
one-sided ontological dependence with respect to reality. In short, the relational
asymmetry of the third class is explained by the fact that thought is ontologically
dependent on reality, but not vice versa, and thus only thought is truly relative to
reality, and not vice versa. This is the interpretation that W.D. Ross adopts in his
commentary on this chapter:
At the bottom of Aristotle’s thought, though not very satisfactorily expressed, is the convic-
tion that knowledge and perception are relative to reality in a way in which reality is not
relative to them (ll. 29, 30). This is brought out more clearly elsewhere, where the argument
takes a less logical and a more metaphysical turn, in Γ. 1010b30, Θ. 1051b6, Ι. 1053a32,
1057a7.23
This is in fact the dominant view, and is defended by Klaus Oehler, as well as Paula
Gottlieb and John P. Casey.24 Similarly, Jules Tricot maintains that Metaphysics
Δ.15 is an explication of Categories 7 and Metaphysics Γ.5: the sensible and the
intelligible are prior to cognition and thus ontologically independent of it. In other
words, these relatives are not in fact relative to cognition, despite their being called
“relatives.”25 Though in Categories 7 and Metaphysics Γ.5 Aristotle seems, strangely,
to accept relatives without correlatives—since the sensible and the intelligible,
apparently taken as causes, are said to be naturally prior to cognition—Metaphysics
Δ.15 corrects the position by “de-relativizing” these so-called “relatives.” Note that
when Aristotle says that there is only one relative, we should, according to Ross and
Tricot, understand this to mean that only the converse relation is absent, whereas the
relatum opposite to the bearer of the cognitive relation persists: there are two relata
but only one relation. The more general idea is that the relation of ontological
dependence in question expresses nothing more than the veridicality of the psychic
activity; this is shown by the passage quoted by Ross and Tricot from Metaphysics
Θ.10, 1051b6–9, which reads: “It is not because we think truly that you are white
that you are white, but because you are white that we who say this have the truth.”26
Thus, by conceding that it is possible to reverse the order of the measure and the
measurable in Metaphysics Δ.15, one can say that the third class of relatives accounts
for the one-sided ontological dependence of knowledge and sensation, understood
as cognitive activities that are veridical, with respect to reality. In short, if inter-
preted this way Metaphysics Δ.15 is not concerned with what I am calling “inten-
tionality”—that is, the aboutness of cognitive acts—but rather with reference, that
is, the relation that belongs to acts whose objects exist.27
This interpretation is persuasive, but it is not immune to criticism. First, it seems
difficult to defend the suggestion that Metaphysics Δ.15 is an explication of
Categories 7 and Metaphysics Γ.5. At the very least, the priority of the cause over
the effect as presented in Metaphysics Γ.5 seems not to be specific to cognition, but
applies to causal relations in general. Now, if Metaphysics Δ.15 were an explication
of Metaphysics Γ.5, the passages on the third class of relations would not in fact be
about a third class of relations, but would be meant to explain the connections
between the correlates in the second class, which is clearly contradicted by the
structure of the chapter on the πρός τι.28 Second, the examples of objects that
Aristotle gives in Metaphysics Δ.15 may not have to do with just veridical activities,
since along with the ἐπιστητόν and the αἰσθητόν, he also mentions the διανοητόν,
which is the correlate of διάνοια or “thought,” and can also include the δοξαστόν,
which is not necessarily existent.29 Moreover the Ross–Tricot interpretation fails to
explain in what sense we should understand the central formula in Metaphysics Δ.15
about repetition: “The same thing would be said twice” (δὶς γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἰρημένον
ἂν εἴη). Now, it is clearly this formula that serves to justify the non-relativity of the
object with respect to cognition. If Aristotle’s motivation were based on the fact that
“knowledge conforms to reality and not reality to knowledge,” why would he not
have simply appealed to this as the reason for the onesidedness of the relation,
rather than to the point about repetition?
Thus, an alternative interpretation has been defended, notably by Christopher
Kirwan.30 This interpretation distinguishes the model of natural priority in
Categories 7 and Metaphysics Γ.5 from the text of Metaphysics Δ.15. It does not
deal with cognitive acts from the perspective of their causal or referential connec-
tions, but rather attempts to bring out the logical characteristics that are specific to
intentional verbs and can explain the relational asymmetry. Thus, it tackles directly
the formula, “The same thing would be said twice.” According to Kirwan, the asym-
metry of the third class is explained as follows: contrary to other relatives, which are
not necessarily “identified” by the mention of a “different entity,” that is, by the
mention of that to which they are relative, thought and sensation can be identified
only if one mentions that to which they are relative, or, as Victor Caston says in sum-
marizing Kirwan, only by means of “descriptions in which their correlatives fig-
ure.”31 Thus, thought and sensation are relative “in a strong sense.” Now, even
though that at which thought and sensation are directed are “that about which there
is thought” and “that of which there is sensation”; nevertheless, if one were to con-
sider thought and sensation as directed at “that about which there is thought” and
“that of which there is sensation,” one would fail to achieve the desired identifica-
tion, since these formulations are circular and merely repeat that there are thought
and sensation. For this reason, the entities to which thought and sensation are rela-
tive should not be considered under the relative descriptions “that about which there
is thought” and “that of which there is sensation,” but from the angle of non-relative
descriptions, such as “a colour,” etc.
As Caston points out, Kirwan’s interpretation does not explain why the entities
to which thought and sensation are relative are not themselves relative to the thought
or sensation. Rather than saying why “that about which there is thought” and “that
of which there is sensation” are not true relatives, Kirwan tries to show why thought
and sensation should not be related in a circular way to the correlatives “that about
which there is thought” and “that of which there is sensation.” In other words, his
interpretation does not show that that to which thought or sensation is relative is not
itself relative to thought or sensation, but only that thought and sensation are not
directed at these correlates considered from the perspective of their relativity. He
himself admits that his explanation makes thought and sensation into “special” rela-
tives, whereas it is of the thinkable and the sensible that Aristotle wants to identify
the specificity. According to Caston, this observation causes Kirwan’s entire inter-
pretation to collapse, since the explanandum is left unexplained.32
An additional strategy in arguing against Kirwan’s position would be to give
other examples of relatives that can be identified only by mentioning that to which
they are relative, or only by means of “descriptions in which their correlatives fig-
ure.” This would show that this property is not specific to thought and sensation, and
thus does not distinguish them as a special sort of relative. One such example would
be the singleton {1}, which is relative “in a strong sense” (to use Kirwan’s expres-
sion) to 1.33
Another way of understanding Aristotle’s text consists in discerning in it a
description of thought understood as an action. When Aristotle affirms that knowl-
edge and sensation are relative to their objects (the knowable and the sensible) he
uses an objective genitive, whereas the objects are relative by the intermediary of
what seems to be an instrumental dative. This grammatical difference is noted in
Categories 7:
Sometimes, however, there will be a verbal difference, of ending. Thus knowledge is called
knowledge of what is knowable, and what is knowable knowable by knowledge; sensation
sensation of the sensible, and the sensible sensible by sensation.34
In other words, the objects of cognition seem to have, from a logical-linguistic point
of view, the role not of agents but of patients. Moreover, as has previously been
pointed out, knowing and sensing are for Aristotle immanent actions.35 According to
him, immanent action is characterized by the fact that the “end” of the action
(ἔσχατον) is identical to its “exercise” (χρῆσις); in other words, there is “no product
[ἔργον] over and above the act.”36 Thus, while in the case of an ordinary action
something other than the action itself results—namely, a passion—nothing results
from an immanent action other than the action itself. For example, from living,
which is a case of immanent action mentioned by Aristotle, there results only the act
of living—in other words, living itself and nothing else. As a consequence, beyond
that which performs the action, there is no need for some other thing to exist, either
as that which undergoes the action or as that which is produced by it. Nonetheless,
the immanent actions that Aristotle gives as examples are of a distinct logical nature.
While living is monovalent, seeing is divalent.”37 This divalence is similar to that of
ordinary action: just as to heat is to heat something, so to know is to know some-
thing, and to sense is to sense something. However, it is clear that knowing and
sensing, inasmuch as they are immanent actions, do not result in something that is
“known” or “sensed” ontologically speaking; that is, nothing in the object corre-
sponds to “known” or “sensed” taken as effects of knowing and sensing, in contrast
to “heated,” which is something that happens to the object. In other words, there is
no true passion. Thus, the passive relation is not a relation ontologically speaking,
but only a logical-linguistic one, since the “being affected” that it joins with the
action has no existence. The activity is therefore not directed at something that is
ontologically relative to it.
On the basis of these considerations, it is possible to paraphrase Metaphysics Δ.15
as follows.38 A thought is not related, ontologically speaking, to “what is being
thought about,”39 and this is because, although thought is divalent and thus is in every
case “about something,” it does not produce a passion in the thing. The thing at which
the thought is directed, and which is thus called “thought about,” is therefore not
related as a patient to an agent. In fact, “being thought about” is not a true property
of that at which thought is directed. Ontologically speaking, thus, there is nothing
that is “thought about,” and therefore there is no relation that goes from that at which
thought is directed to the thought itself. From an ontological perspective, when we
say “thinking being” and “thing thought about” we are saying the same thing twice,
since we are referring to only one relative—namely, the thinking being, from which
there is projected a logical-linguistic relation in that at which it is directed.40
Such a reading of Metaphysics Δ.15 paves the way for interesting philosophical
developments concerning intentionality. Aristotle asserts in De interpretatione:
As Sten Ebbesen maintains:

Whichever interpretation is correct, I think he wanted to say that the very point of saying
“the non-being is opinable” is to make it clear that one will not suscribe to the unqualified
“the non-being is.”42
An interpretation of Metaphysics Δ.15 based on immanent action makes it possible

to explain how “is opined” can be predicated without having to accept the existence
of something other than the thought: “x is opined” does not indicate that anything
really inheres in x, nor consequently the existence of x, but rather means “There is
an opinion directed at x.” Likewise, one can understand the sentence, “‘The think-
able’ implies that there is thought of it” (τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν
αὐτοῦ διάνοια) as: “‘x is thought about’ means ‘There is thought about x.’” In other
words, the only thing the existence of which is asserted is the thinking being.43
When non-being is the term of an intentional relation, the negation, “It is not” is not
contradicted by the assertion, “It is thought about,” since “is thought about,” and so
“is,” do not concern the non-being but rather the being that thinks. As mentioned
above, for an immanent action to occur, nothing other than that which performs the
action needs to exist. Thus, on this interpretation of Metaphysics Δ.15, Aristotle is
not saying that cognition implies two relata and one relation, as the Ross–Tricot
reading holds, but only a single relative, that is, one relatum and one relation.
This interpretation might appear to be incompatible with Categories 7. As noted
above, Aristotle maintains in this text that the object is by nature prior to cognition.44
At Categories 7, 7b25–27, however, he says—admittedly, with some hesitation—
that the knowable sometimes comes to be simultaneously with the knowledge of it:
“In few cases, if any, could one find knowledge coming into existence at the same
time as what is knowable.”45 If it is accepted that this text is about ficta and impos-
sibilia,46 then it comes into conflict with the third interpretation of Metaphysics
Δ.15. Indeed, in the Categories Aristotle maintains that there are two relatives: that
is, he sets up a correlation.47 The second relative seems to be an entity produced by
the soul. Since Aristotle asserts in this text that there are two relatives, contrary to
what he says in Metaphysics Δ.15, one might see here the emergence of a proto-
theory of the intentional object, according to which the knowable—or in this case,
the known—has existence as a being produced by the soul. Here “is known” involves
an ontological commitment, seemingly one of production, in contrast with texts
where psychic activities are treated as actions in which “there is no product apart
from the actuality.”48 Perhaps one should say that in Metaphysics Δ.15 Aristotle
modifies his doctrine with regard to ficta and impossibilia: in the Categories he
attributed to them an existence as entities fashioned by thought, but in the
Metaphysics he gives up on this theory, and reduces the being of the thing as it is
thought about to the being of the psychic activity. We would thus find in Aristotle
the seeds of the two main solutions available to defenders of relational intentionality
when confronted with the problem of non-existent objects: introducing intentional
objects, or allowing a relation to a term that does not exist. Moreover, it may be that
we find here the first example of the existence of intentional objects being initially
accepted and then abandoned; Ockham will do the same with the fictum, as will
Brentano and Marty, perhaps in response to Husserl’s criticisms, with the so-called
“immanent object.”49
An interpretation of Metaphysics Δ.15 based on the idea of immanent action
must still make sense of the appearance of the correlatives “measure” (μέτρον) and
“measurable” (μετρητόν), which Aristotle gives as examples of relatives of the third
class. One solution might be to treat “to measure” as a synonym for “to cognize,”
and to treat the noun formed from it as a synonym for “cognition,” as Aristotle him-
self implies in Metaphysics I.1, 1053a31–b3. Now, as discussed above, Alexander
of Aphrodisias maintains that “measure” should be understood here in connection
with “that which discriminates” (κριτικόν): just as the measure “discriminates”
(κρίνει) the measured, thinking discriminates that which is thought.50 On this basis,
one could perhaps say that the act is considered as that which actively and, as it
were, attentionally distinguishes one thing rather than another, inasmuch as it “picks
out” one thing rather than another. The psychic relation in Aristotle will be under-
stood as measure or discrimination, and as similar to Brentano’s “noticing”
(Bemerken), or, as Husserl would put it, a sort of “delimitation” (Abgrenzung) of, or
focusing on the object.51
According to the Ross–Tricot interpretation, Metaphysics Δ.15 has to do with the
veridicality of cognitive acts, or their reference to reality. On a reading following
Christopher Kirwan, Aristotle’s text is meant rather to explain the identification of
cognitive acts, and concerns the logic of intentional verbs. Finally, according to a
third interpretation, which I hope is at least plausible, Metaphysics Δ.15 is about the
logical-ontological characteristics of intentional acts understood as actions without
products and of their correlates. While Kirwan’s reading is distinctly contemporary,
ancient and medieval interpreters of Metaphysics Δ.15 opted for either the Ross–
Tricot interpretation or the third interpretation; when they opt for the latter, this text
then becomes the basis for discussion of the logical-ontological properties of inten-
tionality. The referentiality of cognitive acts, which is tied to the Ross–Tricot inter-
pretation, will be dealt with in the final chapter of this work; the rest of the present
chapter on the other hand will investigate the role played, at the core of the
Aristotelian tradition, by Metaphysics Δ.15, as well as other texts from the corpus,
Categories 7 in particular, in the discussion of the logical-ontological characteris-
tics of intentionality and its correlate. The next section will include a discussion of
the ontological status of intentional objects. The chapter will then turn to cognitive
acts themselves, in order to examine the characteristics of their intentional relation
to the object.
3.2 Objects and Correlates from Aristotle to Brentano
3.2.1 Intentional Objects: Antiquity and the Middle Ages

3.2.1.1 The Neoplatonist Reading of Categories 7, 7b25–27
The Neoplatonists hold that Categories 7, 7b25–27 is about objects produced by

cognitive acts. In other words, they see in it a theory of what the school of Brentano
will call intentional objects. However, they interpret this text broadly: the items
produced by thought are not limited to ficta and impossibilia, but also include the
so-called “common items.” Simplicius makes this point in his commentary on
Categories 7:
This is the more evident [argument]. But what are the few things where the knowledge is
simultaneous with the knowable? Intelligible entities, which are without matter, exist
simultaneously with the knowledge which always exists in actuality, whether there is some
such knowledge in us, always remaining above (as Plotinus and Iamblichus think), or
whether it is in the actualised intellect—if anyone chooses to call that intellection knowl-
3.2 Objects and Correlates from Aristotle to Brentano 79
edge. It is also possible to call it [knowledge] because of the abstract existence of common
items; for knowledge of them is simultaneous with their existence. It is true also in the case
of figments—both those in the imagination and those of artists; for the chimaera and knowl-
edge of the chimaera are simultaneous. Why, then, did he add “or in no case”? Either
because some people tried to remove generalisations, intelligibles and anything conceived
in any way at all, or else because even if these things exist in nature, we acquire our con-
cepts of them later, and for that reason it happens that in their case too the knowable pre-
exists the knowledge. So in this way, then, according to the earlier proof he seems to have
shown that the knowable is prior to the knowledge and not simultaneous by nature.52
It should be noted that the Neoplatonist commentators not only say that ficta and
impossibilia can be coherently discussed—that is, they can be signified53—but also
explicitly attribute to them a mode of being. Thus, Ammonius states:
Among beings, some exist, but others are found only in bare thoughts, such as the hippo-
centaur and goat-stag, which exist when they are thought, and when not thought do not
exist, but when the thought ceases they too cease with it.54
These entities, which are constructed synthetically by thought combining the natu-
ral entities of which they are composed (horse, man, etc.), do not exist in the strong
sense, that is ἐν ὑποστάσει, but, Ammonius asserts, they nevertheless have being: τὸ
εἶναι ἔχει.55 Thus, with its acceptance of two relatives, one of which has a dimin-
ished mode of being, namely an εἶναι that is not ὑπόστασις, the framework is a
correlational one.56
Now, “the hippocentaur and the goat-stag, which exist when they are thought,
and when not thought do not exist,” are seemingly constituted by thought just as
much as are the “common items” that come from abstraction. Indeed, in view of the
passage from Simplicius quoted above, there is a similar treatment of fictive or
impossible entities, which depend on knowledge, and “common items,” which arise
from abstraction and also depend on knowledge. But shouldn’t they be distinguished
from one another? In effect, the common items are the so-called post rem universals,
which have a close connection with reality, in contrast to ficta and impossibilia.57
The Neoplatonists allowed three states for the universal: “prior to plurality” (πρὸ
τῶν πολλοῖς, or ante rem), “in plurality” (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, or in re), and “posterior
to plurality” (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, or post rem).58 As Philippe Hoffman explains:
Les universaux antérieurs à la pluralité correspondent aux Modèles (παραδείγματα) qui
sont aussi les Idées platoniciennes ou les “raisons démiurgiques”: ce sont les genres et les
espèces qui subsistent, séparés de la matière, dans l’Intellect démiurgique, et ils sont le
contenu même de la connaissance divine. Les universaux dans la pluralité sont, par exem-
ple, l’εἶδος (Forme-espèce) de l’Homme engagé dans les hommes individuels: c’est la
forme ‘participée’ (au sens platonicien), inséparable de la matière. Les universaux postéri-
eurs à la pluralité sont par exemple l’εἶδος de l’Homme conçu par abstraction à partir de la
considération des hommes individuels et postérieur à ceux-ci: ils sont le produit propre de
la connaissance humaine et subsistent dans notre âme.59
As Christophe Erismann points out, universals ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς combine “the

Aristotelian immanent form” with “the Platonic participated form.”60 The impres-
sion in the soul that is the universal is described by Ammonius as ὑστερογενής: it
comes to be afterwards by abstraction from universals in re.61 Since the universal

post rem is posterior to the universal in re, it too is forged by knowledge, just as the
chimera is.
However, the Neoplatonists wanted to distinguish between these two types of
knowable. To do so, they contrasted two cognitive modes: ἐπίνοια, or “thought,”
and ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια, or “simple thought.”62 This is how Elias proceeds when distin-
guishing the thought of the triangle from the thought of the goat-stag:
Thought differs from simple thought because thought makes the being be understood in
another way—for example, it separates the shape of the bronze triangle and thinks of the
triangle itself in itself—whereas simple thought is that which fashions things that are
impossible by nature, like the goat-stag and the like.63
On this issue, Sten Ebbesen writes:

Abstract, post-rem, universals are (concepts) derived from extramentally existing things,
and so they “are in constructive thought,” but not “merely”; whereas the concept of a chi-
mera “is in mere constructive thought” for lack of an extramental correlate.64
Admittedly, in both cases the knowable is derived from real entities. However, while
the concept of the triangle concerns a single real entity that is given in a general way,
what is conceived of in the case of the goat-stag is an unreal combination of real
entities. Although the triangle in general and the goat-stag are both produced by
cognition, the difference in their connection with reality entails a difference in their
“cognizability”: the triangle in general is a correlate of ἐπίνοια but the goat-stag is
a correlate of ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια. Apart from this difference, however, both of these types
of entity are produced by thought. Presumably, though they are correlates of distinct
kinds of psychic activities, they remain correlates of thought, and thus have the
same, diminished mode of being. To that extent, long before medieval philosophers
or Brentano and his followers introduced such beings into their philosophy, the
Neoplatonist philosophers were clearly accepting intentional objects: ficta, impos-
sibilia, and even post rem universals (as such) are productions of the mind and exist
only in it in a diminished way. Furthermore, according to the Neoplatonist philoso-
phers, such objects are present already in Aristotle, as shown by the Neoplatonist
reading of Categories 7, 7b25–27.
3.2.1.2 Cognized Being: Duns Scotus and Others
During the Middle Ages, anticipating the views of the school of Brentano, scholas-
tic philosophers assigned a special ontological status to objects of thought. One of
the first extensive discussions of these questions is found in Duns Scotus.65 Scotus
maintains that the object of intellection has “intelligized being” (esse intellectum).
The intellect “produces” (producit) the object in this mode of being.66 According to
Scotus, “intelligized being is distinct from all real being, both quidditative and exis-
tential.”67 Now, intelligized being is one case among others of “cognized being”
(esse cognitum), or “intentional being” (esse intentionale).68 Cognized being is the
property attributed to objects of thought in general. Scotus affirms that the
distinction between real being and cognized being is that established by Aristotle
between “being outside the soul” (esse extra animam) and “being within the soul”
(esse in anima).69 He cites book E of the Metaphysics,70 where Aristotle distin-
guishes between “being according to the figures of the categories” (ὄν κατὰ τὰ
σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν) and “being as the true” (ὄν ὡς ἀληθές).71 For medieval
authors, this distinction in Aristotle lines up with the distinction between “real
being” (esse reale) and “being of reason” (esse rationis),72 which suggests that
Scotus identifies cognized being with being of reason.73 Cognized being is a “dimin-
ished” (diminutum) mode of being. The model, for Scotus, is “being in opinion”
(esse in opinione), which is also taken from Aristotle:
The determination “being in opinion” is one that diminishes (according to the Philosopher,
as previously quoted), and just as for being in opinion, the same applies to being in intellec-
tion, or reproduced being, or cognized being, or represented being, which are all
equivalent.74
The text that Scotus has in mind is De interpretatione 11, 21a32–33, where Aristotle
says that it is wrong to conclude that if something is opinable then it is.75 Scotus
holds that to go from “is in opinion” to “is” would be a “sophism of ‘taken abso-
lutely’ and ‘in a certain respect’” (fallacia simpliciter et secundum quid).76 Indeed,
when one asserts that something is in opinion, one is asserting its existence with
respect to the act of opinion (i.e. secundum quid), not its existence taken absolutely
(simpliciter): “Being in opinion does not imply being, but allows for being and non-
being.”77 Thus, when something exists intentionally in opinion, this does not entail
that it exists in the absolute sense. We must distinguish the object ut cognitum—
something in opinion, which always exists—from the object taken absolutely—
something, which can exist or not exist. The same applies to intellection. That
something exists as an intelligized object does not entail that it exists as an object
taken absolutely. In short, as Scotus says, “that which is an object of the intellect has
only diminished being in the intellect.”78
Now, when Scotus attempts further on to explain the nature of cognized being,
he says that it is a “relation of reason” (relatio rationis).79 At first sight, his claim
seems to be based on the medieval thesis that relations of the third class in
Metaphysics Δ.15 are “non-mutual” (non mutua): the relation that goes from the act
to the object is a “real relation” (relatio realis), whereas the relation that goes from
the object to the act is a relation of reason. It is in this way that medieval authors,
notably Aquinas, understood Aristotle’s statement that “that which is measurable or
knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else is related to it.” The
standard explanation was as follows: the measure, knowledge, and thought are
really relational, whereas their correlates are not, but are nonetheless thought of as
relational, since one cannot think of something as related to something else without
thinking of this second thing as related to the first.80 The claim found in Scotus that
“cognized” or “intentional being” is a relation of reason is common in medieval
philosophy. For example, we find in Hervaeus Natalis the view that objects of intel-
lection have “objective being in the intellect” (esse obiective in intellectu). For
Hervaeus, this mode of being is distinct from real being—which belongs to objects
insofar as they exist outside the intellect—but is rather “being of reason.”81 Hervaeus
too affirms that objective being in the intellect is a relation of reason.82
According to Giorgio Pini, the fact that Scotus makes cognized being a relation of
reason rules out seeing it as a mode of being. Indeed, if we follow the standard inter-
pretation of the theory of non-mutual relations, when a relation of reason is attributed
to something in the relational situations under discussion, this is done by an
“observer”—as Pini puts it—who considers the two relata in question as well as the
real relation that goes from one of the relata to the other. Thus, when an observer
considers someone who is thinking, and the real relation that this thinker has to an
object, she adds a relation of reason to the object insofar as the object is the term of the
relation that goes from the act: in grasping the act and its relation to the object, the
observer considers the object as “being cognized.” Likewise, when the observer ceases
to think about the situation, the relation of being-cognized disappears. Thus, the addi-
tion of this relation is purely logical, since there is nothing at the ontological level that
corresponds to cognized being, which therefore is not in fact a mode of being.83
Though this interpretation is particularly interesting, especially since it is remi-
niscent of the way Brentano’s theory of the immanent object has been read by
Werner Sauer, Mauro Antonelli, and Guillaume Fréchette,84 it nonetheless seems to
me that it is possible to cast doubt on it. The fact that Scotus says that cognized
being is a relation of reason does not necessarily rule out discerning in it a mode of
being. Admittedly, a relation of reason is dependent on a thinker; however it is not
required that the relation of reason “being cognized” be brought about indirectly by
an observer who is considering a cognitive act. Rather, this relation can be directly
brought about by this cognitive act itself. In other words, every cognitive act, by
“producing” its object, as Scotus puts it, also produces a relation of reason from the
object to the act. The fact that being-cognized is a relation of reason seems to be, in
scholastic thought, a sort of philosophical stopgap. Indeed, for medieval philoso-
phers cognized being is not only a mode of being, but also a relational property.
Now, it is clear that this property could not be real unless the object to which it
belongs is also real. As William of Alnwick maintains:
A real relation requires a real foundation, because a relation does not have more perfect
being than its foundation, and in this way a created being that has represented being from
eternity would have real being from eternity, which is false.85
The solution thus consists in “diminishing” the ontological status of this relational
property. For an author like James of Ascoli, who distinguishes among real being,
intentional being, and being of reason, the relation that belongs to objects that have
intentional being, itself has intentional being.86 In contrast, for an author like Scotus,
who seems to equate intentional being and being of reason, the relation in question
has being of reason; in other words, it is a relation of reason. In my opinion, Scotus’s
claim that being-cognized is a relation of reason has more to do with this philo-
sophical stopgap than with the standard medieval reading of Metaphysics Δ.15, that
is, the observer theory as set out by Pini. Admittedly, when discussing cognition,
Scotus says that the relation from the object to the act is “non-real.” This is what
medieval authors normally conclude from their reading of Metaphysics Δ.15, but
Scotus’s motivation for saying it is different from what one finds in the usual inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s text. When Scotus says that “being thought” is a relation of
reason, if he means to base this claim on Metaphysics Δ.15, then his interpretation
of it is unorthodox. The same may hold for other medieval authors as well, for
example Hervaeus Natalis.
Besides Pini, both Dominik Perler and Peter King also defend the view that
Scotus’s cognized being is not a mode of being. Their reading relies on two texts of
Scotus, one from the Ordinatio, in which he affirms that “the object is nothing”
(obiectum nihil est), the other from the Reportatio, in which he affirms that “the
stone in cognized being is simply nothing with respect to reality” (lapis in esse
cognito tantum nihil est secundum rem).87 Now, one could ask what precisely Scotus
means by these statements. It is true that he asserts that the being of the object
depends on the being of the act of cognition: the being of the object is secundum
quid, and as such is relative to an esse simpliciter, which is the act of cognition.88
This seems to support his statements that the object is a nihil. However, when he
says that the object is nothing, he specifies that it is nothing with respect to reality
(secundum rem), which does not rule out its having a mode of being that is distinct
from that of real beings.89 This is indeed what Scotus seems to say when he asserts
that “intelligized being is distinct from all real being, both quidditative and existen-
tial.”90 As well, he asserts at least twice that esse cognitum is an esse verum.91
Moreover, the object is something which is in act, even though in this case it is only
secundum quid, since the property or “form” which is the cognized being is in act:
“Formally, cognized being is not possible being, since ‘cognized being’ is an actual
being secundum quid.”92 It is therefore not obvious that the object ut cognitum is
nothing simpliciter: rather, the object is nothing secundum quid, that is, secundum
rem. Thus, in Scotus the objects of cognitive acts seemingly have “cognized being”
(esse cognitum), that is, their own mode of being, and are actual in relation to cogni-
tive acts. Therefore, objects that have cognized being are, precisely as objects that
have this kind of being, the existent correlates of cognitive acts, whereas as objects
taken absolutely they can either exist or not exist. If this interpretation is correct,
Scotus thus opens the way to a theory that was subsequently influential in medieval
philosophy, namely, the theory of intentional objects, echoes of which are found not
only in Hervaeus Natalis and James of Ascoli, but also William of Ockham (in his
early writings)93 as well as Peter Auriol, who, as a kind of proto-phenomenologist,
rechristens cognized being as esse apparens.94 Brentano seems to be quite right in
holding, in his famous definition of intentionality in the Psychologie, that his theory
of the intentional object has scholastic origins.95
3.2.2 “Being Thought About” as an Extrinsic Denomination
According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the asymmetry between the pairs of psy-

chic correlates in Metaphysics Δ.15 is explained by the fact that cognition is called
cognition of that of which it is cognition, in the genitive, whereas the object is called
“cognoscible” by cognition, in the dative.96 The issue, however, is the exact signifi-
cance of the difference in grammatical case. The use of the dative to indicate that the
object is relative does not by itself explain the asymmetry in the third class; that is,
it does not give a reason why the object is relative in virtue of something else, rather
than relative in its own right. For example, something is said to be similar to some-
thing else using the dative, but it is nonetheless related in its own right to that to
which it is similar:
For, although in saying that one thing is similar to another we use the same case as when we
say that something is knowable by knowledge or perceptible by perception (for both ideas
are expressed by the dative case), none the less the two statements are not the same. For it
is because one thing is like another B that it is called “like” the other, not because the latter
B is like the former A, even though it is certainly true that the latter B is likewise referred to
the former A; and this holds for “equal” and “same.” But the perceptible is said to be per-
ceptible by perception, not because it is the thing that it is of perception, but because that
thing [perception] to which it is referred is of it. For because there is perception of it, the
perceptible is said to be perceptible by perception, [just as] “the visible” signifies that there
is sight of it.97
Though the dative alone does not explain the relational asymmetry, the distinction
that Alexander makes is nonetheless in the use of cases. He seems to distinguish the
dative of accompaniment used in comparative contexts (to speak of similarity,
equality, and identity, instead of the genitive that is normally used for the term of the
comparison) from the instrumental dative. One possible hypothesis is that it is thus
the active aspect of cognition that Alexander appeals to: it is because cognition is an
action that its term gets its relational aspect, for it is by the action of cognition, in
virtue of undergoing that action, that its term is relative to it; this is not the case with
something that is similar, which is not acted upon by its correlate. In other words,
relations of the third class would have action or passion as their foundation.98
However, Alexander does not go into detail on these issues. In particular, he does
not explain in what sense cognitive action, as immanent action, would have to be
distinguished from other actions.99 He never says that there is nothing at the onto-
logical level to which the effect of thinking, namely “being thought about,” corre-
sponds, unlike in the case of other actions. This question will be developed in
medieval philosophy and in later scholasticism, and will lead—from Radulphus
Brito to Suárez, by way of Ockham—to making the predicate “thought about” an
“extrinsic denomination,” as an alternative to the theory of intentional objects; this
anticipates the later Brentano’s reist position on “being thought about.”
Though Ockham initially defended the existence of intentional objects, which he
called ficta, he did so only for universal cognition, in order to avoid positing the real
existence of the so-called “common natures.”100 In his later work, however, he
strongly rejected the idea that an object can have intentional being. For such an
object, which he explicitly calls a “being of reason” (ens rationis),101 would be
“some third intermediary” (quoddam tertium medium) which would hinder access
to reality, and indeed to any object at all, including God:
Such a fictum will impede cognition of the thing; therefore it should not be posited on
account of cognition. The premise is clear, since it is neither the cognition, nor the cognized
external whiteness, nor both at the same time, but some third intermediary between the
cognition and the thing. Therefore, if that fictum is intelligized, then the external thing is not
intelligized. And so when I form the mental proposition “God is threefold and one,” I do not
intelligize God in himself, but that fictum, which seems absurd.102
The example of God shows that Ockham is not targeting just universal cognition,
but also thinks that intentional being should be rejected for any type of cognition,
for to think about an intentional object is to think about something other than the
thing itself. Ockham contrasts the idea of intentional being with that of extrinsic
denomination.103 An extrinsic denomination is a linguistic phenomenon: it is the
naming of something on the basis of a feature that does not belong to the thing itself,
but to some other thing with which it has some connection.104 This phenomenon can
be best understood by contrasting it with intrinsic denomination: “white” is an
intrinsic denomination, in the sense that it names something on the basis of a prop-
erty that belongs to the thing itself, namely, whiteness. By contrast, “seen” is an
extrinsic denomination: it is not said of something because of a feature that belongs
to it, but on the basis of a property that belongs to something else, namely, the prop-
erty of seeing. In discussions of intentionality, this notion is used to argue that we
are misled by language when we conclude from the attribution of “being seen,” or
more generally “being cognized,” that there is some property or mode of being—
variously called “seen being” or “cognized being”—that truly belongs to the object.
In a passage arguing against Scotus’s thesis of the production of the object by the
intellect, Ockham maintains that thinking about something does not entail that any
particular mode of being is attributed to it, but simply that it is denominated as
“thought about” on the basis of the cognitive act:
That which through some act formally receives no being, but is merely denominated by an
extrinsic denomination, is not produced through such an act. But a created thing does not
receive anything formally as a result of being intelligized by God, but is only denominated
by some extrinsic denomination, just as the object of a created intellect is not produced as
a result of being intelligized, but is only denominated by some extrinsic denomination.
Therefore, a created thing is not produced in intelligible being of this kind.105
The great opponent in the Middle Ages of treating “being cognized” as simply an
extrinsic denomination was Peter Auriol. For Auriol, every cognitive act is directed
at an object that has “cognized,” “intentional,” or “apparent being” (esse appar-
ens).106 In a text that was probably responding to Radulphus Brito, Auriol denies
that “being cognized” is an extrinsic denomination, on the basis of the phenomeno-
logical experience of aiming at an object, and uses circumlocutions meant to refer
to this experience and to distinguish it from a denomination:
To be denominated by something is not to be present or apparent to the one who denomi-
nates, nor to be in his gaze or view, nor to be an object to or presented to him, as, for
example, a painted Caesar is not present or apparent to the painting, nor is he in its gaze or
sight, nor is he an object to it or present to it. But experience teaches that a cognized thing
is apparent, present, an object to the one who intelligizes, and also in his gaze or sight.
Therefore, it here does not have just denominated being, but also a certain intentional
being.107
If “being cognized” were merely an extrinsic denomination, says Auriol, it would

have to be conceded that “painted Caesar” is for the painting exactly what “thought-
about Caesar” is for a thinking being. However, there is a major difference between
the two cases: “thought-about Caesar” appears to the thinking being, which is not
the case for “painted Caesar” with respect to the painting. Nonetheless, Auriol’s
arguments will not prevent other authors, beginning with Ockham, from defending
the view that “being cognized” is an extrinsic denomination: it names the object not
on the basis of some property or mode of being that is supposed to belong to it,
namely, cognized being, but on the basis of a property that belongs to some other
thing, namely, cognizing. The most elaborate discussion of this issue is found not in
a medieval thinker, but in a modern one—more precisely, one belonging to the so-
called “Second scholasticism,” namely, Francisco Suárez.
Suárez might give the impression that he defends the view that cognized being is
a mode of being. On the subject of the intentional relation, which is included among
what he calls “transcendental” relations, he states:
When it is said that there can sometimes be a transcendental relation to a being of reason,
this is certainly true when that relation is to something that is in the mode of an object, in
which case objective being is enough for it to have the nature of the term of a transcendental
relation.108
It is insofar as it has “objective being” (esse obiective) that the object terminates the
relation. Thus, at first sight Suárez seems to be defending a correlational theory of
intentionality.109 Nonetheless, it is not certain that he considers objective being a
mode of being at all. Contrary to a strong defender of objective being like Peter
Auriol, who makes a clear distinction between objective being and extrinsic denom-
ination, Suárez, like Ockham, often speaks of objective being in terms of extrinsic
denomination.110 He develops a complex theory of denominations like “being cog-
nized,” warning the reader: “We should be wary of equivocation when we are deal-
ing with being-cognized or other similar denominations of the intellect.”111 He
seems to hold that in a first sense, “thought about” is the passion-like, “absolute”,
that is, non-relational, extrinsic denomination of that which a cognitive act is about.
In other words, an object is said to be “thought about” as if it were suffering an
effect. This denomination is not made on the basis of any passive property that
belongs to the object itself, but on the basis of an active property that belongs to
something else, namely, the property of “thinking.” This extrinsic denomination is
“real,” not because it denominates the object on the basis of a real passion that it
possesses, but because it denominates it on the basis of the real cognitive act pos-
sessed by the one who thinks. To this primary denomination there is added a second
one, also called “thought about,” which is not extrinsic but intrinsic. The second
denomination is drawn from the converse relation that the object, as the term of the
relation that goes from the cognitive act to it, has with respect to the cognitive act.
This converse relation is founded on the object’s passive property of “being thought
about,” as if it were a real passion, given that real passions always bear a relation to
their cause. But since this relation is founded on a “property” that is ultimately noth-
ing more than an extrinsic denomination—namely, the passive denomination
“thought about” drawn from the cognitive act—it is a relation of reason: a real rela-
tion could not be founded on a property that is nothing other than an extrinsic
denomination. The second denomination is therefore a relative denomination and a
denomination of reason.112 Thus, primarily and fundamentally, the object has “cog-
nized being” because of a real extrinsic denomination which is drawn from the
cognitive act and denominates the object “as if undergoing a passion” (quasi pas-
sive).113 In short, cognized being is not a mode of being, but is explained in terms of
a denomination, that is, in linguistic terms.
Now, “to be objectively in the soul” (esse obiective) seems to be nothing more
than this denomination. To express it using the “popular distinction” (vulgaris dis-
tinctio) mentioned by Suárez at the beginning of his second Disputatio metaphysica,
the “objective concept” (conceptus obiectivus), that is, the thought-about object, has
no other being than that of being denominated on the basis of the “formal concept”
(conceptus formalis), that is, the cognitive act.114 Indeed, Suárez asserts that “to be
objectively is only to be cognized,”115 and “to be objectively only in reason is not to
be, but to be thought or fashioned.”116 Since an extrinsic denomination is not based
on a property belonging to the thing that is denominated, it does not necessitate the
existence of that thing: it can be applied to real beings and to negations or priva-
tions.117 (Compare this with the intrinsic denomination “white”: it requires that
whiteness belong to the thing called “white,” and thus requires the existence of the
thing as the bearer of whiteness.) In his Objections to Descartes’s Meditations on
First Philosophy, Caterus summarizes this when he questions the proof for the exis-
tence of God based on the objective presence of the idea of God in the
understanding:
But what is “objective being in the intellect”? According to what I was taught, this is simply
to terminate an act of the intellect under the mode of an object. And this is merely an extrin-
sic denomination which adds nothing to the thing itself. Just as “being seen” is nothing
other than an act of vision’s tending towards myself, so “being thought of,” or having objec-
tive being in the intellect, is to stop and terminate in itself a thought of the mind. And this
can occur without any movement or change in the thing itself, and indeed without the thing
in question existing at all. So why should I look for a cause of something which is not
actual, and which is a mere denomination, and a nothing?118
Anything can “be thought of,” whether it exists or not and whether it is real or not.
To say that it “is thought of” is to denominate it on the basis of a property that
belongs not to it, but to something else, and so one is not saying that it “is.” As
Aristotle emphasizes:
Admittedly, the complex system of extrinsic and intrinsic denominations that

Suárez uses to explain the attribution of cognitive predicates to objects is not explic-
itly mentioned by Aristotle. Nevertheless, the fact that Aristotle treats cognitive acts
as actions in which “there is no product apart from the actuality,”120 and asserts in
Metaphysics Δ.15 that the correlates of cognitive acts are relatives because the acts
are relative to them, encourages one (or at at any rate allows one) to follow Suárez
in detecting in Aristotle a theory that treats objectual cognitive predicates as extrin-

sic denominations. When Aristotle states that “‘the thinkable’ implies that there is
thought of it” (τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια), it is possible
to read it as: “‘x is thought about’ means ‘There is thought about x,’” and to under-
stand: “Ontologically, ‘x is thought about’ does not posit anything in addition to
what is posited by ‘There is thought about x.’”121 The object is called “thought
about” not in virtue of a property that belongs to the object itself, but in virtue of the
property “thinking” that belongs to the thinker; “thought about” is thus an extrinsic
denomination. This is basically how Suárez proceeds when, in speaking of his the-
ory of psychic denomination, he states: “This too can be gathered from the doctrine
on non-mutual relatives given by Aristotle in Metaphysics book 5, chapter 15.”122
Metaphysics Δ.15 plays a central role in the Aristotelian tradition with regard to the
logical-ontological status of the predicate “thought about,” and thus with respect to
the theory of the object. It is fundamental also for understanding Brentano’s theory
of intentional objects.
3.2.3 The Intentional Object in Brentano
According to a widely held interpretation, the distinguishing characteristic of inten-

tionality for Brentano was for a long time the ontological status of its term, that is,
the “intentional” or “immanent object.” On this view, Brentano believed that the
intentional object had a special ontological status, namely, that of objective being.
Indeed, he seems to maintain—in a way that recalls the scholastic reception of
Metaphysics Δ.15 and the theory of non-mutual relations—that the correlate of the
cognitive act is an “unreal” entity.123 Furthermore, according to this interpretation,
during the final period of his philosophy, referred to as his “reist” period, he no
longer accepted irrealia, and rejected the existence of intentional objects; as a corol-
lary, he treated intentionality as a quasi-relation, and the thinking being as a quasi-
relative (etwas “Relativliches”), since a true relative cannot exist without an existing
term (terminus or target).124 This discontinuist interpretation of Brentano’s theory of
intentionality has been dominant, but has recently been contested by Mauro
Antonelli, Werner Sauer, and Guillaume Fréchette.125 Their main objection has to do
precisely with Metaphysics Δ.15. According to these scholars, the traditional inter-
pretation of Brentano has wrongly treated the intentional object and the psychic
correlate as identical, leading to the conclusion that there was a break in Brentano’s
psychology, where in fact there was continuity. On their view, Brentano’s inten-
tional object is the term of the cognitive act of external aiming, and has no mode of
being either before or after the turn to reism. Brentano’s psychic correlate will be in
effect an irreale, or being of reason, but will be distinct from the intentional object.
This correlate will be given only to the reflexive act, and will be required from the
reflexive point of view only as the counterpart of the act of external aiming, since
this latter act, as a relative, cannot be thought about in the reflexive act without a
correlative. On this view, Brentano develops this theory of a correlate given to the
reflexive act in his reading of Metaphysics Δ.15, the importance of which (on this
view) has been neglected by Brentano’s commentators and the meaning of which
has been misunderstood. The rejection of irrealia in Brentano’s reist period entails
the rejection of the psychic correlate, but not of the intentional object, which
remains, as before, the term of the act of external aiming.
It is of great importance for the study of Austro-German philosophy to have an
accurate evaluation of this new interpretation of Brentano. Following the narrative
that is usually accepted, the theory of intentionality in the Austro-German tradition
initially gave pride of place to immanent objects, which are found not only in
Brentano but also in some of his students, beginning with Marty. Later, these objects
were indeed abandoned by Brentano and Marty, but under pressure from someone
else: that is, Brentano and his students found themselves driven to reject them by the
decisive critique made by Husserl in his Logical Investigations.126 However, if the
interpretation proposed by Antonelli, Sauer, and Fréchette turns out to be correct,
Brentano never accepted immanent objects, either before or after the Logical
Investigations, but from the beginning had a theory of intentionality like Husserl’s:
it is always the thing itself that is aimed at, whether it is real or unreal, existent or
non-existent, possible or impossible. This would be a significant qualification of the
importance usually assigned to Husserl in the history of intentionality.
Metaphysics Δ.15 is at the heart of debates that are fundamental for the under-
standing of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and thus for the historiography of
the Austro-German tradition in general. This section will present and then evaluate
the discontinuist and continuist interpretations of Brentano. This will make it pos-
sible to give an accurate account of the concepts of intentional object and psychic
correlate in Brentano, both before and after his turn to reism.127
3.2.3.1 The Discontinuist Interpretation
In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, intentionality is for Brentano a “rela-

tion to an object.” In his well-known definition of intentionality, he speaks of a
“relation to a content” (Beziehung auf einen Inhalt) and a “directedness towards an
object” (Richtung auf ein Object); several pages further, however, he crosses the
definitions when he mentions a “relation to something as an object” (Beziehung auf
etwas als Object), which is expressed more simply in the table of contents as “rela-
tion to an object” (Beziehung auf ein Object).128 Now, if the cognitive act bears a
relation to an object, there is necessarily a converse relation from the object to the
cognitive act. Every cognitive act would be a relative, that is, something that has a
relation, in this case to an object, and would thus have a correlative, namely, an
object, which also has a relation, in this case to the cognitive act. For the pre-reist
Brentano, relatives and correlatives are ontologically and epistemologically interde-
pendent. As he asserts in manuscript M 32 from 1889 concerning relations:
Correlative concepts are those of which one cannot be thought without the other, and the
objects of which cannot subsist one without the other, even though neither one includes the
other and neither is equal to the other in terms of content.129
In his lectures of 1890/1891 on descriptive psychology, he seems to grant this

correlational aspect of intentionality, since he goes from mentioning a relation to an
“object” (Objeckt) to discussing a correlation between the act and that at which the
act is directed:
Hence, the peculiarity which, above all, is generally characteristic of consciousness, is that
it shows always and everywhere, i.e. in each of its separable parts, a certain kind of relation,
relating a subject to an object. This relation is also referred to as “intentional relation.” To
every consciousness belongs essentially a relation. As in every relation, two correlates can
be found here. The one correlate is the act of consciousness, the other is that at which it is
directed: seeing and what is seen, presenting and what is presented, wanting and what is
wanted, loving and what is loved, denying and what is denied etc. As highlighted already by
Aristotle, these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, [whereas] the
other is not something real.130
Thus, cognitive acts, but also volitional acts, seem to be directed at entities that are
referred to using adjectives that relate them to the acts: sight is directed at something
“seen,” presentation at something “presented,” will at something “willed,” love at
something “loved,” denial at something “denied,” and so on. Now, these relational
terms are “modifiers.” For Brentano, a modifier is an adjective that completely
changes the meaning of the term to which it is added, that is, the conceptual content
expressed by the term, such that nothing that falls under the concept expressed by
the term taken by itself falls under the concept expressed by the term taken with that
adjective. Thus, while, “educated” adds a logical part to the concept expressed by
“human,” and reduces the extension of human to those human beings who are edu-
cated, “dead” modifies the concept expressed by “human” and gives it an entirely
different extension.131 Now, for Brentano intentional adjectives are modifiers, such
that a thought-about human being is not a human being at all:
A person who is being thought is as little something real as a person who has ceased to be.
The person who is being thought hence has no proper cause and cannot properly have an
effect. But, when the act of consciousness (the thinking of the person) is effected, the person
who is being thought (the non-real correlate of the person) is co-present.132
When “thought about” and similar adjectives are added to realia, they make them
irrealia. For the pre-reist Brentano, a reale, or Reales—a thing (res, Ding), sub-
stance, or concrete accident—also called “effective” (i.e. actual: Wirkliches,
Wesenhaftes), is anything that is generated or corrupted as a result of a causal effect
that it itself undergoes and which can act from itself and be affected itself. An irreale
or Nichtreales, also called “ineffective” (i.e. non-actual: Unwirkliches,
Unwesenhaftes), is anything that is generated or corrupted not because of a causal
effect that it undergoes itself, but concomitantly with the generation or corruption of
something that undergoes a causal effect, and which cannot act from itself or be
affected itself.133 For Brentano, the distinction between real and unreal lines up with
the scholastic distinction between “real being” (ens reale) and “being of reason”
(ens rationis): “The distinction that we made above between effective and ineffec-
tive corresponds to the one that the scholastics made between ens reale and ens
rationis.”134 Thus, whereas a human being is a real being that has its own generation
and corruption, a thought-about human being is an unreal being that is generated
and corrupted along with the generation and corruption of the cognitive act of which
it is the correlate.
This idea of an entity that accompanies the cognitive act is precisely what seems
to describe best the Brentanian object. Indeed, Brentano states that the term “object”
(Objekt, Gegenstand) is misunderstood when it is taken as a synonym of “thing”
(Ding), or if one takes “objective” to mean “subsisting in reality” (in Wirklichkeit
bestehend). The expression “object” is to be understood only “in connection with
our psychic activities” (mit unserer psychischen Betätigung in Zusammenhang).135
If the object is tied to psychic activities, there is reason to think that it accompanies
them, that is, that it comes to be and ceases to be when they come to be and cease to
be. The object would then be something unreal which is “co-present” (mit da) as
soon as a cognitive act comes to be. The relation of the object to the act therefore
seems not to be accidental to the object, but essential, such that if there is no relation
to the act there is no object: the object is the correlate of the act. Thus, the object
will have the “objective” or “intentional” mode of being—which, as Roderick
Chisholm remarks, makes it something that is “short of actuality but more than
nothingness”136—and the status of an unreal being. In other words, the object
according to Brentano will both have a particular mode of being and be a particular
type of entity. As Barry Smith summarizes:
The intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the
(real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed.
The latter, for example experienced sounds and colours, have a diminished sort of exis-
tence, an existence “in the mind.” Certainly they are not real, but this does not mean that
they are merely nothing. Rather, they are entia rationis, non-real parts of a real, mental
substance.137
The identification of object with correlate is widespread in Brentano scholarship;

among those who have defended it are Anton Marty, Alfred Kastil, Oskar Kraus,
Roderick Chisholm, Wilhelm Baumgartner, Kevin Mulligan, Barry Smith, and
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski.138
If every act has an internal object, it remains to be understood how this object
allows for external entities to be known. This question has been explored in detail
by Chrudzimski. The object contains in itself colours, sounds, etc., that is, real prop-
erties, but in a modified way; however, these colours, sounds, etc. can be demodi-
fied.139 Brentano states: “‘Seen colour’ contains, in a manner of speaking, colour,
not as a distinctional part in the strict sense, but as a part to be obtained from it by
modifying distinction.”140 Demodification will therefore lead one to aim not at a
“seen colour” but at a colour tout court. However, the notion of demodification
might seem not to provide a philosophical solution to the problem at stake, but only
to give it another name: if the object of my thinking is something ontologically
special compared to standard things, how is it that I can ultimately be turned towards
the things themselves and not just their mental substitutes? According to
Chrudzimski, however, Brentano’s notion of demodification answers this question,
for it refers precisely to a specific apprehension of the object. Demodification is an
apprehension of the intentional object as if it were not an intentional object. More
precisely, this specific apprehension is effected at the level of the act of judge-
ment.141 Thus, presentation will be directed at the “seen colour”, that is, at the inten-
tional object as such, whereas judgement will be about the colour tout court, and it
is this which will be accepted or rejected. In every case, acts will be directed at an
intentional object, sometimes apprehended with its intentional aspect and s ometimes
without it. This perspectival theory of an unreal intentional object given as such to
the act of presentation, but as real to the act of judgement, is applied by Chrudzimski
only to certain texts of Brentano, mainly the lectures on descriptive psychology
from 1890–1891. According to Chrudzimski, in Brentano’s Psychologie a perspec-
tival distinction is already introduced at the level of presentation, depending on
whether intentional objects are the terms of outer or inner perception: outer percep-
tion will see real objects, whereas inner perception will see them as objects having
intentional existence. On Chrudzimski’s view, the Psychologie does not yet contain
the more complex account of irrealia, or of modification and demodification.142 On
the basis of Brentano’s manuscripts, Chrudzimski attributes a different role to the
intentional object in the cognitive process, and holds that, whereas in the Psychologie
and the lectures on descriptive psychology the intentional object is the sole “target
object” (Zielobjekt) of the cognitive act, Brentano also defended, in particular in
some of his lecture on logic, a theory of intentionality with two target objects: an
intentional object, which plays the role of “intermediary” (Vermittler), and an exter-
nal object.143 On this theory, according to Chrudzimski, when an external object
exists, aiming at the intentional object leads to aiming at the external object, and the
two objects are “phenomenologically fused” (phänomenologisch zusammenge-
schmolzen), such that even if the act is about both of them, it “sees” (so to speak)
only one object. When the external object does not exist, only the intentional object
is aimed at, but not as an intentional object—a position which is reminiscent of the
perspectival interpretation attributed to the Brentano of the Psychologie and the
lectures on descriptive psychology.144
One can guess the rest of the story: confronted with the various problems posed
by his concept of the intentional object, and the impossibility of assigning it a clear
role in his psychology, Brentano decided to abandon it.145 This is supposed to have
happened during his so-called “reist” period, running from 1904 to his death in
1917. Reism is a theory according to which, ontologically speaking, only realia—
that is, “things” (res, Dinge), substances, and concrete accidents—can exist, and
psychologically speaking, only realia can be presented.146 Thus, with irrealia aban-
doned, the Brentanian intentional object is also abandoned. The locus classicus for
this is the first chapter of the 1911 Appendix to the second volume of the Psychologie.
Here Brentano asserts that, contrary to other relations, which require the existence
of two entities, the intentional relation does not require the existence of anything
other than the thinking being:
It is entirely different with mental relation. If someone thinks of something, the one who is
thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not exist at all.147
As noted previously, for Brentano every relative requires a correlative.148 The inten-
tional object provided a correlative to every cognitive act, since the act was always
directed at such an object.149 Now, since reism entails the abandoning of intentional
objects, cognitive acts lose their correlative, and so they can no longer be considered
to be relatives. This is why Brentano says that thinking beings are “quasi-relatives”
(etwas “Relativisches”).150 Brentano will thus have passed from a relational theory
of intentionality to an “adverbial” one.151 Nevertheless, intentionality will remain
“grammatically” relational. As Chrudzimski and Smith state:
The solution that we propose is to assume that the true Brentanian ontology of intentionality
is indeed an adverbial ontology as outlined above, but to insist at the same time that the only
specification of the meaning of the corresponding adverbial determinations which a human
being would be able to give is in terms of putative objects of presentation. According to this
interpretation, the ontology of intentionality is at bottom adverbial, but the “ideology” of
intentionality must for cognitive agents like ourselves refer to the putative objects of
intentions.152
This interpretation of Brentano is thus a discontinuist one, according to which

Brentano accepted intentional objects during his pre-reist period, then abandoned
them after his turn to reism; this abandonment is supposed to have brought with it
the renunciation of a relational theory of intentionality, at least from an ontological
perspective.
3.2.3.2 The Continuist Interpretation
The “continuist” interpretation of Brentano, defended mainly by Werner Sauer,

Mauro Antonelli, and Guillaume Fréchette, but also on certain points by Klaus
Hedwig, Linda McAlister, and Otis Kent,153 is entirely different. According to this
interpretation, Brentano never treated intentional object and correlate as identical,
just as he never attributed a special ontological status to the intentional object.
The distinction between correlate and intentional object is based on two passages
from the Psychologie. They both concern the attribution of the predicate “being
perceived” to objects. In the first passage, Brentano discusses Alexander Bain’s the-
sis that outer perception leads only to knowledge of things “as perceived,” since it is
impossible to have knowledge of something by way of outer perception without that
thing being perceived. Brentano rejects this thesis, mainly because he thinks that
physical phenomena such as colours, sounds, etc., do not include “being perceived”
as one of their “moments” (Moment):
Only if the state of being presented were contained in the color as one of its moments, as a
certain quality and intensity is contained in it, would a color which is not presented imply a
contradiction, since a whole without one of its parts is indeed a contradiction. But this is
obviously not the case.154
Physical phenomena such as colour are not perceived as perceived. The conse-
quences of this passage for the distinction between object and correlate are impor-
tant. Since colours are physical phenomena, they are, according to the Psychologie,
“intentional” or “immanent objects” of outer perception.155 As for correlates, we
have seen that they are always described as things “seen,” “presented,” etc. Thus, if
colour does not have “seen,” “presented,” etc. as a moment, the objects of outer
perception are not correlates.156
In the second passage in question, Brentano asserts about sound, which is a phys-
ical phenomenon, and therefore an intentional object of outer perception: “The
concept of sound is not a relative concept.”157 This assertion is tied to an important
argument about inner perception, which was already mentioned above: if sound
were essentially relative to the cognitive act, as Aristotle seems to maintain, then the
hearing of sound would have as its concomitant object the hearing itself, since one
relative cannot be known without the other. This would amount to making the act of
outer perception an object of outer perception.158 This consequence is unacceptable
for Brentano, and is supposed to be the reason why he rejected the idea that inten-
tional objects of outer perception, that is, physical phenomena, are relative. He
makes this point in his famous letter to Marty on 17 March 1905:
The “thought-about horse” considered as object would be the object of inner perception,
which the thinker perceives whenever he forms a correlative pair consisting of this “thought-
about horse” along with his thinking about the horse; for correlatives are such that one
cannot be perceived or apprehended without the other. But what are experienced as primary
objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves
the objects of inner perception. Had I equated “object” with “object of thought,” then I
would have had to say that the primary thought relation has no object or content at all.159
The intentional object on this interpretation is thus not the “seen colour,” the unreal
correlate that Brentano speaks of in his lectures on descriptive psychology. As
Fréchette says, “object” and “correlate” are not coextensive.160
According to the defenders of the second interpretation, the object likewise is not
an entity with a special mode of being. The reason for this is Brentano’s thesis of the
univocity of existence.161 Existence is a concept discussed by Brentano in the con-
text of his theory of judgement. When someone judges that “A exists,” she accepts
A. The acceptance of A can be correct or not. If it is correct, A is existent. Thus,
“existent” means “something accepted correctly” (richtig Anerkanntes)162:
Let us say that the area to which affirmative judgement is appropriate is the area of the
existent, a concept to be sharply distinguished from that of thing, effective, real; and that the
area to which the negative judgement is appropriate is the area of the non-existent.163
For the defenders of the second interpretation, there is no other sense of “to exist”
in the work of Brentano, and so one will not find in his work any notion of “semi-
existence,” according to which the object is a thing “short of actuality but more than
nothingness.” The pre-reist Brentano accepts realia and irrealia in his ontology,
both of which can therefore exist, but according to one and the same sense of “to
exist.” Thus, according to this interpretation, Brentano does accept special types of
entity, but does not accept a special mode of existence.
So what about the “intentional object”? What does this expression refer to in
Brentano? According to the defenders of the second interpretation, the pre-reist
Brentano accepts both realia and irrealia as intentional objects,164 which can be
objects whether they exist or not. Thus, an intentional object is nothing more than
what an act is about, whether it is real or unreal, existent or non-existent, possible or
impossible, and the fact that it is an object does not give it any special ontological
mode. As Kent affirms, the intentional object is “ontologically neutral,” that is, it is
an object “tout court” (also called an “object per se”).165 One could say that
Brentano’s concept of “object” is a psychological concept rather than an ontological
one. After the turn to reism, only realia can be intentional objects, since only what
is real can be presented.
It remains to be considered just what the Brentanian correlate is. It is here that
Metaphysics Δ.15 becomes relevant. According to the defenders of the second inter-
pretation, the psychic correlate is an element that Brentano imported from his read-
ing of Metaphysics Δ.15. Sauer believes that relations in Aristotle should not be
understood according to a polyadic logical-ontological model, standardly expressed
in the form aRb. When a and b are related, this means for Aristotle that two monadic
predicates expressing two monadic relational properties are involved, namely R1b
and R2a; for example, “is bigger than b” and “is smaller than a,” attributed respec-
tively to the relata a and b. Thus, the logical-ontological structure of a normal rela-
tional situation is the following: a(R1b) < — > b(R2a), where a(R1b) and b(R2a) are
two correlatives, each constituted by a relatum—a and b respectively—and two
monadic relational properties expressed respectively by R1b and R2a. For R1b to be
truthfully predicated of a, it is necessary that R2a be truthfully predicated of b. In
other words, for a to bear the relational property R1b, it is necessary that b bear the
relational property R2a, which is possible only if b exists.
If one applied this model as it is to psychic relations, the existence of a thinking
being a(R1b) would entail the existence of the object at which it is directed, namely,
b. Thus, regarding psychic relations, one should avoid attributing a property to b.
Now, when Aristotle states that “that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable
is called relative because something else is related to it,”166 this is precisely what it
is claimed he is doing: the predicate that is the converse of R1b, “thinking of b,” will
be not R2a, “thought of by a,” but bR2, “b thought of by,” which pertains to a. The
predicate “b thought of by” expresses nothing other than what is expressed by
“thinking of b,” for it expresses passively the same thing that is expressed by “think-
ing of b.” Thus, “There is a b(thought of by a)” will be equivalent to “There is a (b
thought of by)a,” and therefore also to “There is a an a(thinking of b).” The two
correlatives that are supposedly in play, namely, a(R1b) and (bR2)a, are in fact only
one, namely, a(Rb). It is exactly this interpretation that Brentano is supposed to have
adopted in his reist period:
We thus speak as though we were concerned with a relation between two things. We may
suppose that the relation has a converse and then use the active voice to express the one and
the passive voice to express the other. But actually there is no distinction of doing and
undergoing here. Our language in these cases treats the object of thought as though it were
a thing along with the person who is thinking. And thus we have an extended sense of
being.167
Put more simply, “‘The thinkable’ implies that there is thought of it” (τό τε γὰρ
διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια) will be translated as: “‘x is thought
about’ means ‘There is thought about x.’”168 This is indeed what Brentano seems to
maintain: “When I say, ‘There is something red thought about’ and ‘There is some-
one thinking-about-something-red,’ I am saying the same thing.”169 To sum up, the
situation is as follows: there is only one entity, namely, the thinking being, which is
the bearer of a relational property pointing to something else, namely, the object
tout court, that is, the other relatum, which can exist or not, and the existence or
non-existence of which has no bearing on the existence or non-existence of the
thinking being. As Sauer summarizes:
Was [Brentano] dagegen schon immer gehabt hatte, waren Relativa ohne ein Paar von
Relata: eben die intentionalen Relativa wie das Zentaur-Denkende oder jede äußere
Wahrnehmung, gibt es doch auch für den Brentano von 1874 keine Sinnesqualitäten, keine
Farben, Töne usw. in der physischen Welt (cf. PeS I p. 13f.).170
Nevertheless, even if the pre-reist Brentano accepts that cognitive acts can exist
without a “pair of relata,” he does not concede that these acts can exist without a
correlative, and so (bR2)a is not reduced to the act, but is posited as its counterpart.
In order to come to an adequate understanding of Brentano’s theory of the correlate,
we need, according to Hedwig, Antonelli, and de Libera, to turn to the medieval
interpreters of Metaphysics Δ.15, Thomas Aquinas in particular.171 The Brentanian
correlate, which is a “being of reason” (ens rationis), is said to be derived from the
scholastic thesis, maintained by Aquinas and others,172 of the presence of a “relation
of reason” (relatio rationis) in the object at which the cognitive relation is directed.
When the intellect thinks about the cognitive faculties, it cannot think of them as
related to their objects without thinking of these objects as related to the faculties. It
therefore posits in the objects of the faculties a relation of reason that goes from
those objects to the faculties. In this sense, it sets up, as a correlative for the act, a
being of reason to which the act is related and which is related to the act. Brentano,
it is argued, took inspiration from this idea. His “thought-about horse” will then be
a being of reason in the same way a “thought-about thing” is for Aquinas, since as
Alain de Libera says, “c’est l’intellect qui appréhende les choses connaissables et
sensibles comme connaissables et sensibles.”173
Here we find a theory of intentionality similar to the one attributed to Duns
Scotus by Giorgio Pini, one in which “cognized being” is not a mode of being, but
a relation of reason created by an “observer” considering a cognitive act and its rela-
tion to the object.174 However, there is a significant difference between the medieval
theory of the correlate and Brentano’s theory, for Brentano’s analysis of the corre-
late is made from the perspective of the reflexive act. According to Antonelli, when
inner perception takes as its object outer perception, which is a relative directed at
an object such as a colour or a horse, it constitutes a correlative of the act of outer
perception, a “seen colour” or a “thought-about horse,” without which the act of
outer perception, as a relative, could not be represented.175 The Brentanian correlate
will thus be an “accompanying appearance” (Begleiterscheinung) of the act of outer
perception for the inner perception.176 In the correlates “seen colour” and “thought-
about horse,” “colour” and “horse” are necessarily modified, because inner percep-
tion does not have access to the object of outer perception, since aiming at this
object is reserved precisely for outer perception. In short, the correlate will be the
result of the reflexive apprehension of the act of outer perception by inner percep-
tion, and this correlate will contain a “modified” substitute for the object of the act
of outer perception, to which object reflexive apprehension does not have access. In
the pre-reist Brentano, according to the second interpretation, the intentional relation
is about the object tout court, namely, the relatum, whereas the correlate is given at
the level of the reflexive act. According to this interpretation, the defenders of the
first interpretation have confused the relatum, which is ontologically neutral, and
the correlate, which is unreal, and have attributed to the former the ontological prop-
erties of the latter. As Sauer summarizes:
Es ist nun leicht, das hinter der ontologischen Deutung der Intentionalitätsthese beim vor-
reistischen Brentano stehende Mißverständnis herauszustellen: Es ist einfach die
Verwechslung der Korrelate mit den Relata.177
Before his turn to reism, Brentano had not yet come to the radical solution of
reducing the being of “that which is thought” to the being of “that which thinks,”
and therefore had accepted an unreal correlate in his ontology—the “seen colour.”
After reism, the unreal correlate is supposed to have disappeared, since Brentano
retained only a single relative, namely, the thinking being a(Rb). This interpretation
is continuist in the sense that it holds that the reist Brentano abandoned the corre-
late, which is unreal, but maintained throughout his works the concept of the inten-
tional object, which is ontologically neutral.
3.2.3.3 In Favour of the Discontinuist Interpretation
What should we conclude from these debates? Following Sauer, we should accept
that on the basis of Metaphysics Δ.15, Brentano adopted a reductionist translation of
intentional sentences: “There is a thought-about man” is equivalent to “There is
someone thinking about a man.”178 Nevertheless, it seems that before reism, the
“thought-about man” not only was not reduced to the psychic activity of the think-
ing being, but was at once an unreal correlate and an intentional object. In effect, it
is the first, discontinuist interpretation that must be maintained, above all on the
basis of a series of passages drawn from various texts of Brentano, where he equates
the intentional object and the unreal correlate, without any indication of the possi-
bility that they are not the same179:
Bearing in mind brevity and clarity, we shall call [the activity of the soul] having-an-object,
and the correlate being-an-object.180
[…] objectives (such as that which is thought, that which is loved).181
[…] no thinker without something thought, no subject without an object.182
Then, one should distinguish the main classes of what is called unreal: […] all objectives
(objects as objects).183
Instead of the term “intentional” the Scholastics very frequently used the expression “objec-
tive.” This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject,
and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought
of or also desired, shunned, etc.184
[…] objects as objects, as for example, the affirmed, the denied, the loved, the hated, the
presented […].185
Above all, we there find the group made up of that which is as an object, such as that which
is presented, that which is accepted or rejected by judgement, that which is loved or hated,
in the most varied ways.186
What is common to all these texts is that either they explicitly equate object and
correlate, or they assimilate the object with “something thought about” or an unreal
entity, which are standard descriptions of Brentano’s correlate.
A clear passage is found in manuscript M 76, “Zur ‘Metaphysik’,” from 1915,
where Brentano maintains that the intentional object is “something thought about”
and an unreal entity:
What is called the ens rationis. 24. Its various classes. […] 29. Similarly, the expressions
“that which is thought,” “that which is accepted,” “that which is denied,” “that which is
denied rightly,” “that which is loved,” “that which is loved rightly,” and the like, designate
entia rationis. One cannot present something as thought about, but as thinking, on account
of which the thing that the thinker thinks about is presented in modo obliquo. One would be
mistaken to think that the object thought of in modo obliquo is the thought-about thing as
thought about; for example, when someone thinks about a table, a thought-about table, it is
in fact a table. Using a term already current in the Middle Ages, we can designate these
classes as the class of the “intentional” (another designation then current, the class of
“objectives,” that is, of that which subsists as an object of the one who thinks, would these
days lend itself to serious misunderstandings […]).187
In light of the passages quoted above, it seems difficult to maintain that the inten-
tional object and the unreal correlate are distinct entities for Brentano. However, the
defenders of the continuist interpretation convincingly argue that in Brentano exis-
tence is univocal, so that the intentional object is a special kind of entity, that is, an
irreale, but with a normal mode of being.
But in that case, how are we to explain the texts of Brentano in which he main-
tains that “being perceived” is not a moment of colour, or that sound is not a relative
concept, leading one to think that the object is not relative to the act? As regards
colour and the predicate “being perceived,” Brentano rejects Alexander Bain’s the-
sis that it is contradictory to say that we can know physical phenomena in them-
selves, since it is only by perception that we know them:
But the tree is known only through perception; what it may be anterior to, or independent
of, perception, we cannot tell; we can think of it as perceived, but not as unperceived.188
Brentano rejects this thesis:

In the first place, not every act of thinking is a perception. Secondly, even if this were the
case, it would only follow that we can think only of trees that are perceived by us, but not
that we can think only of trees as perceived by us. To taste a piece of white sugar does not
mean to taste a piece of sugar as white.189
If every thought were a perception, physical phenomena could be thought about

only if they are perceived. But even in this case they would not be perceived as
perceived, not because they do not have “perceived being,” but because being per-
ceived is not one of their “moments” (Momente), that is—or so it seems—their
“essential constituents.” Similarly, the white sugar that one tastes is white, but one
does not taste the sugar as white, because one tastes the flavour of sugar and white
is not an essential constituent of the flavour. In other words, “to be perceived” is not
included among the essential constituents of colour, and this is why it is possible to
perceive colour without perceiving it as perceived—which does not mean that it
does not have “perceived being” when one perceives it. To put it differently, colour
as an object can be thought of without also thinking of its “being an object,” since
colour does not include “being an object” among its essential constituents. The case
is similar with sound. As noted above, Brentano criticizes Aristotle for having sub-
sumed the pair, hearing and sound, under the conceptual pair, passion and action:
“classifying the pair of concepts, hearing and sound, under action and passion is
completely mistaken.”190 This text should be taken literally: “die Unterordnung des
Begriffspaares, Hören und Tönen, und das des Leidens und Wirkens […].” If sound
were assigned to the category of action, it would contain the attribute “causing hear-
ing” among its essential constituents. In this case, it could not be known without
hearing being known, since knowing a relative entails knowing the correlative. This
would make every instance of hearing sound a hearing of itself. Thus, when Brentano
asserts that “the concept of sound is not a relative concept,”191 what he means is not
that sound taken as an object is not relative to the act, but that the essential constitu-
ents of sound do not include a relation to the act. Brentano says “The concept of
sound is not a relative concept,” but not “The concept of object is not a relative
concept.” Sound as an intentional object is relative to the act, but sound tout court is
not. In general, in Brentano, realia are not relative to cognitive acts. As he will
maintain from 1893 onwards, the distinction between entia realia and entia irrealia
(or entia rationis) rests precisely on the way in which they are related to cognitive
acts. Entia realia do not have “being thought about” among their essential constitu-
ents, unlike entia irrealia: “What is common to the unreal? I believe I can say: an
intentional objective moment in the concept.”192 This does not mean that when
realia are objects they do not have an “intentional objective moment,” but only that
they do not have it “in the concept” (im Begriff).
On this basis, it can be said that before reism Brentano accepted the existence of
intentional objects, which are relative to the act, at which the act is directed, and by
the intermediary of which the act is about entities that are not relative to it, that is,
objects tout court. We should therefore say, in agreement with Chrudzimski, that
outer perception sees objects that do not have a relation to the act, whereas inner
perception sees irrealia.193 It is more difficult to agree with Chrudzimski when he
asserts that for the Brentano of the lectures on descriptive psychology it is only at
the level of judgement that the act is aiming at an entity that is not relative to it. This
would entail that objects of presentation and judgement are aimed at as ontologi-
cally different items, which is incompatible with the idea in Brentano that “nothing
is an object of judgement which is not an object of presentation” ([n]ichts wird auch
beurteilt, was nicht vorgestellt wird),194 that is, that which a judgement is about is
given to presentation before it is judged.195 Thus, it certainly should be maintained
that already at the level of presentation the act is aiming at an object which does not
have the status of an irreale, and that only the reflexive act aims at an irreale. It is
already at the level of presentation that the intentional object permits an object tout
court to be seen. In short: the pre-reist Brentano has a concept of the intentional
object understood as the unreal correlate of the act; this intentional object permits
an object tout court to be seen; the object tout court can exist or not exist; if the
object exists, the act has what Brentano calls an “external object” (äußerer
Gegenstand).196 When Brentano asserts in his famous letter to Marty that he never
identified the “intentional object” with the “thought-about object,” he can be under-
stood as meaning that he never claimed that the first-order act aims at the “object as
object” (Gegenstand als Gegenstand), or unreal correlate, since this aiming had
always been reserved for inner perception.197
One finds in Marty a distinction between “immanent object” (immanenter
Gegenstand) and “object tout court” (Gegenstand schlechtweg): the former is the
unreal correlate of the act, whereas the latter is independent of the act and is able to
exist or not exist. The distinction between immanent or intentional object and object
tout court matches that between “the presented as such” (das Vorgestellte als sol-
ches), that is, as presented, and “the presented tout court” (das Vorgestellte
schlechtweg):
The immanent object exists whenever the corresponding act of consciousness really is. For
there is no consciousness without an object that is immanent to it; the one is the correlate of
the other. The object tout court, by contrast, for example, the presented tout court, can exist
or not exist. If my presentation is the concept horse for example, the object exists. If it is the
presentation of a centaur, the presented does not exist, even though as presented it must of
course be accepted also in this case: if not, we would lack exactly the “presentation of the
centaur,” by which is meant nothing more than the fact that the centaur is in us as presented.
[…] when I say, “A horse is,” “A circle is,” it is not a presented horse that is recognized, but
a horse—not the presented object as such, but the object tout court.198
It seems that there is in Brentano a distinction similar to the one that Marty makes
between “the presented as such” (das Vorgestellte als solches), that is, as presented,
also called “immanent object” (immanenter Gegenstand), and “the presented tout
court” (das Vorgestellte schlechtweg), also called “object tout court” (Gegenstand
schlechtweg).199 Indeed, in some of his lectures on logic, Brentano distinguishes
between “the presented as presented” (das Vorgestellte als Vorgestelltes) and “the
presented as that as which it is presented” (das Vorgestellte als das, als was es vor-
gestellt wird), which is another way of saying the object tout court.200 Thus, the
object as presented is to be distinguished from the object tout court. Reism is pre-
cisely the rejection of “that which is as an object” (das als Gegenstand Seiende), and
of “objectives (such as that which is thought, that which is loved)” (die Objektiva
[wie Gedachtes, Geliebtes]), or in short, of “objects as objects” (Gegenstände als
Gegenstände).201 The object is now just the “object tout court” or “the presented as
that as which it is presented.”202
It has often been asserted that accepting intentional objects would lead to philo-
sophical problems that are difficult to resolve; this would explain the rejection of
this type of object by the reist Brentano, but also by Marty in his later writings. If
we hold, as Brentano seems to, that the intentional object “vanishes” when there is
a psychic relation directed towards it, such that it allows one purely and simply to
see the object tout court, the very idea of an intentional relation to the intentional
object becomes incomprehensible: if the relation of the act to the “seen colour” does
not lead the act to aim at a seen colour at all, but at a colour tout court, in what sense
is there still an intentional relation to a seen colour? The seen colour is not in fact
intended. A similar problem arises if one says that when an external object exists,
the intentional and external objects are “phenomenologically fused” (phänomenolo-
gisch zusammengeschmolzen), so that although the act is about both of them, it
“sees” only the external object. It is not clear in what sense one would still be aim-
ing at an intentional object, nor is it clear (to approach the problem from the other
end) why the existence of the object should have any influence on the act’s directed-
ness. If, by contrast, we hold that the act first “knows” (in some way or other) the
intentional object as such, and only then, thanks to this first knowing, knows the
object tout court, a whole series of other problems arise: in particular, it is not easy
to explain how one could go from knowledge of a “seen colour” to knowledge of a
colour tout court, for the seen colour is a so-called “modified” colour, that is, it is
unreal—it is a colour only in name, and thus does not resemble a true colour at all.
This point seems to have been raised by Marty, who holds that intentional objects
are named after objects tout court only “equivocally” (äquivok). It therefore has to
be asked: “Is it not likewise an illusion to think that what is called a mental object is
an intermediary leading to consciousness of the real object?”203 As Marty further
asserts, if we accept intentional objects, we might find ourselves forced to acknowl-
edge that they are what our affirmations are about, which would make all affirmative
judgements true, since every judgement has an intentional object.204 One finds simi-
lar considerations in Brentano, in a letter to Oskar Kraus:
When I say that the one who presents always presents something and that it is included in
the concept of the one who presents, and when I say that in order for this concept to be
unitary this “something” must also be univocal, you have already previously wanted to give
this something the sense of “object,” that is, in this case, the sense of presented, which I
have shown does not work. Nonetheless, you now return to that point. Perhaps my earlier
refutation will make a more lasting impression if I say that someone who presents some-
thing presents something as something. You will then recognize that at least the latter some-
thing cannot have the sense of something presented. There is a difference between someone
accepting a devil as a devil and as a presented devil. The latter should in no way be taken as
acceptance of the devil.205
There are thus many reasons to abandon intentional objects.

Before closing this section, I would like to turn once again to Brentano’s inter-
pretation of Metaphysics Δ.15, in order to see exactly what role this text played for
him with respect to intentionality. Brentano seems to believe that this passage of
Aristotle is meant to provide a unitary theory of intentionality, including not just
acts whose objects exist, but also, and above all, those whose objects do not exist.206
For the pre-reist Brentano, every cognitive act, as relative, requires a correlative.
However, since some acts are directed at non-existent objects, it seems that they
cannot have a correlative, since the other relatum, that is, the bearer of the converse
relation, or the object tout court, does not exist. Brentano’s solution before reism
consists in making the predicate “is thought about” an unreal predicate; this recalls
the scholastic doctrine of non-mutual relations, which is connected with the medi-
eval reception of Metaphysics Δ.15. As Brentano states clearly in manuscript Ps 34:
In the case of the one who presents and that which is presented, we are dealing with some-
thing real and something unreal. The one is called a relatio realis, the other a relatio
rationis.207
The correlative of a cognitive activity is not a real correlate, made up of a real bearer
and a real converse relation, but an unreal correlative, or one “of reason,” made up
of an unreal bearer and an unreal relation. Though this solution does not presuppose
the real existence of the object tout court as a part of a real correlative, it nonetheless
does presuppose its unreal existence as a part of an unreal correlative.208 Thus,
“when the act of consciousness (the thinking of the person) is effected, the person
who is being thought (the non-real correlate of the person)” or intentional object, “is
co-present.”209 The unreal correlate seems to be produced by the first-order act, and
not by the reflexive act. This emerges from another passage in manuscript Ps 34
(already quoted):
The fact that the one who presents is called the subject can easily lead to misunderstand-
ings; one ought to call it that which objectifies or that which objectizes, since the object is
a correlatio insofar as it is objectified or objectized.210
The same point applies to Brentano as to Scotus: it is the first-order act that pro-
duces the “thought-about being” of the thing, and not some other act, be it one of
“observing” or a reflexive act. Thus, Brentano initially reads Metaphysics Δ.15 in a
way that recalls the unorthodox medieval interpretation that is perhaps defended by
Scotus and other scholastics.211
Dissatisfied with the acceptance of intentional objects, and more generally reject-
ing the existence of irrealia, Brentano turned in his reist period to a “translation” of
the predicate “is thought about”: it no longer expresses the attribution of a property
to the counterpart of the act, and so no longer implies the existence of a correlate,
but instead becomes a synonym of “is thinking.” In short, for the pre-reist Brentano,
when there is a thought, there is necessarily someone who thinks and also “some-
thing that is thought about” whereas for the reist Brentano the only thing that neces-
sarily is, is someone who thinks. The predicate “is thought about” has explicitly
become an “extrinsic denomination” which ascribes a property no longer to that
which is denominated, but to something else, namely, the thinking being:
What distinguishes a relative determination from an absolute determination? The answer is
this. Whenever one thinks a relative determination in recto, then one also thinks of some-
thing in obliquo at the same time. Thus, one who thinks of a person seeing is also thinking
in obliquo of something colored that is thus seen. If that which is thought of in recto is a
relative determination of real significance for some substance, then the correlative attribute
3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before 103
can be a mere denominatio extrinseca. For example, the correlative of that which is thinking
is that which is thought, and nothing is changed in the thing by reason of its being thought;
indeed, the thing need not even exist in order to be thought.212
As Werner Sauer has shown, this second solution is also based on Metaphysics Δ.15:
“‘x is thought about’ means ‘there is thought about x’” (τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν
σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια).213 In this case, it is no longer in Scotus that
Brentano’s theory finds a precedent, but in Ockham, in Suárez, for whom “being
thought about” is merely an extrinsic denomination, and in Caterus, a precursor
whose objections to Descartes are incorporated almost word for word into the text
from Brentano quoted just above: “This can occur without any movement or change
in the thing itself, and indeed without the thing in question existing at all” (quod, re
immota immutataque, quin et non existente, fieri potest).214
A question then arises: if in Brentano’s reism there is no longer an unreal corre-
late, how are we to understand his claims about the “real signification for a sub-
stance” of the “relative determination ‘someone who sees’”? Is the “someone who
sees” for whom there is no corresponding object a true relative? In other words,
does Brentano accept relatives without an existing term (terminus or target), or does
he treat these supposed relatives as what he calls (following medieval philosophers)
“absolute,” that is, non-relational, entities? Should we accept the discontinuist inter-
pretation of Brentano, and hold that his reist theory of intentionality is an adverbial
one? Or should we hold rather that, under pressure from Aristotle, for whom inten-
tionality is a relation (πρός τι), Brentano concedes the irreducibility of the relational
aspect of aboutness? These questions, as well as this pressure, already played a role
in the Aristotelian tradition, not just in the Middle Ages, when the relational aspect
of cognitive acts was at issue, but also in Suárez, who holds that the relational
dimension of intentionality is not threatened by the absence of a term.
3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before
3.3.1 ranscendental Relations in Suárez (and

T
the Background Scholastic Discussions)
The debate about the relational or non-relational nature of intentionality did not
begin with the school of Brentano. Scotus’s decision to assign cognitive acts to the
category of quality left an important legacy for late medieval philosophy.215 Both
Auriol and Ockham insist on the “absolute”—that is, non-relational—character of
cognitive acts. Following Scotus, Ockham holds that intuitive cognition—the kind
of cognition which aims at a present and existent object as present and existent—is
absolute.216 However, there is an important point on which he disagrees with Scotus.
In question 13 of his Quodlibet, Scotus maintains that, although this type of cogni-
tion is absolute, it is necessarily accompanied by a real relation of termination, or
intentional relation, to the object. He further maintains that abstractive cognition—

the kind of cognition which is directed at an absent object as absent217—is always
accompanied by a non-real relation of termination, or intentional relation, to the
object; that is, it is accompanied by a “relation of reason” (relatio rationis). Thus,
although he assigns cognitive acts to the category of quality, he nonetheless attri-
butes to them a relational aspect by maintaining that they are always accompanied
by relations, whether real or of reason.218 Ockham on the other hand rejects this
position. Regarding intuitive cognition, he notes that “a real relation, according to
these [authors], cannot terminate in non-being.”219 However,
It is also clear that a non-existent thing can be known intuitively, even if the first object of
that act does not exist (against the opinion of some [authors]), because the sensitive vision
of colour can be conserved by God when the colour does not exist; however, that vision
terminates at colour as its first object; and for the same reason [the same applies to] intel-
lective vision.220
Moreover, Ockham does not refer to a relation of reason that accompanies acts of
abstractive cognition. In other words, for Ockham, cognitive acts, whether intuitive
or abstractive, are purely absolute.221
Before Ockham, Peter Auriol questioned whether intuitive cognition is necessar-
ily accompanied by a real relation to its object. For Auriol, as for Ockham, intuitive
cognition can take place whether the object exists or not. Contrary to Ockham,
however, Auriol does not limit intuitive cognition directed at a non-existent object
to cases of divine intervention, but accepts that there are also some purely natural
cases. In the second question of the prologue to his Scriptum (i.e. his commentary
on the Sentences), Auriol lists five cases of sensible experience directed at non-
existent objects: (1) colours that persist in vision after exposure to a strong light, (2)
entities perceived in dreams, (3) objects hallucinated by someone terrified, (4) enti-
ties perceived by someone mistaken, and (5) colours that persist in the field of vision
of someone who has “soft” (molles) eyes.222 As Jean-François Courtine emphasizes,
it is the overall point that matters more than the details:
Cette argumentation qui s’appuie sur des “expériences” reprises de la tradition sceptique,
demeure ici assez remarquable dans la mesure où elle quitte le plan purement théologique
de la réflexion centrée sur la puissance absolue de la volonté divine, pour essayer de fonder
ex puro naturalibus la thèse selon laquelle même l’intuition sensible (intuitio sensitiva) peut
faire abstraction de la présence réelle de son objet.223
By insisting that sensitive intuition can be directed at non-existent objects, Auriol

can conclude that sensitive cognition is not accompanied by a real relation, since
such a relation cannot be directed towards something non-real.224 Auriol has a
complex theory of cognition. He holds that cognition is “something by virtue of
which things appear to someone.” He claims that the “something” in question is
ontologically indeterminate: it can be anything, provided that it makes an object
appear. In other words, there is not necessarily only one way, ontologically speak-
ing, in which cognition can occur. Now, in creatures, Auriol holds that cognition is
something absolute; more precisely, it is a complex item made up of a cognitive
power and a “likeness” of the object.225 Auriol again defends the thesis that
cognition cannot be ontologically relational when he comments on the third class of

relations in Metaphysics Δ.15. In this context, he discusses cognition in creatures:
The relation of knowledge to the knowable, of sensation to the sensible, and likewise for
everything that is related as measured to measure, do not exist in reality. For it is impossible
for something to depend on a non-thing, for then a thing would depend on nothing, which
is the same as not depending on another, or not depending on anything, and thus the same
thing would be dependent and not dependent. But it is clear that the relation of knowledge
to the knowable, or of the act of the intellect to the intelligible, or of vision to the visible,
and so on for other measured things, depends on a non-thing, since a knowable does not
have to be in act while the knowledge remains, nor does an intelligible [have to be in act]
when it is intelligized, nor a sensible when it is sensed; rather, the knowledge can remain
when the thing is destroyed and entirely annihilated, and the act of intellection is directed
towards something which is in no way existent, and similarly vision could, at least through
divine power, remain when the visible [thing] is annihilated, as was shown above in the
Prologue, question 2. Therefore, it is impossible for the relation of knowledge to the know-
able, of intellection to the intelligible, or of vision to the visible to be something that exists
in reality.226
This text reveals that Auriol rejects the existence of a real relation to the object, but
it also seems to indicate that he holds that there is a non-real relation between cogni-
tion (in creatures) and its object. Admittedly, the relation of cognition to its object is
for Auriol “only in apprehension” (in sola apprehensione), as are all relations for
him—on this issue he is a “conceptualist.”227 Therefore, there is ontologically no
relation to the object.228 It is nonetheless the case that even if cognition (in creatures)
is absolute, it can be understood only as accompanied by a relation: Auriol seems to
hold that no cognition (in creatures) is thinkable without a relation to an object.229
The question of whether all cognitive acts are relative—and if so, in what sense—
was of major concern in scholasticism after Scotus. Thus, Hervaeus Natalis, in his
long treatise on second intentions, says of the relation of knowledge that bears on
negativa:
It is perhaps not universally true that knowledge is really related to its object, or even that
the act of intellection is really related to its formal object; otherwise something may be
really related to a privation. […] But to treat of how knowledge is related to the knowable,
and how it is not, will require a very large treatise.230
Francis of Prato, a student of Hervaeus, accepts a relation of reason to the object

when the object is not real, which is reminiscent of Scotus’s position on abstractive
cognition:
Knowledge is really related to its knowable when the knowable is a real being. But when
the knowable is a being of reason, then knowledge is related by a relation of reason.231
Francis of Meyronnes also considers the same question, and adopts Scotus’s idea
that the act of intellection is a quality. By contrast, however, he holds that cognition
is a relation to an object:
The act of intellection and cognition are two things: the act of intellection is a quality and
is not a perfection in the unqualified sense, whereas cognition is a relation to the object and
is a perfection in the unqualified sense.232
When he raises the question of what happens to the relation when the acts are about
impossibilia or negativa, he answers in an awkward fashion:
And if it is said that it is a positive act by which prohibited beings are intelligized, it will be
said that this act terminates at their parts insofar as they are beings that are used for the
composition, which is in non-prohibited [things]. And perhaps [the act] does not intelligize
pure nothingness in itself.233
Gregory of Rimini on the other hand accepts in his ontology real relations without
two real relata, and gives as an example a cognitive act of memory aimed at a non-
existent object.234 He thus seems to maintain that cognitive acts that have non-
existent objects are nevertheless really related to those objects.
After the Middle Ages, but long before Brentano, the question of the relationality
of intentionality was discussed again, in late scholasticism. Suárez argues for the
irreducibility of the relational aspect of cognitive acts: every cognitive act is really
related to an object, whether it exists or not and whether it is possible or not. The
relation he argues for is a “transcendental” relation.235 Transcendental relations are
contrasted with “categorical” or “predicamental” relations. The distinction between
transcendental and categorical relations is posited within the class of real relations:
“Relations which are real and ‘according to being’ are divided into transcendental
and predicamental.”236 Transcendental relations are so called because they transcend
the categories:
Transcendental relations, even if they are truly in things according to their proper being, do
not belong to some one special category, because those things or natures or essences to
which they belong are ordered to various tasks that are sometimes utterly diverse, and there-
fore they are found in various categories, according to their diverse conditions and natures.237
According to Suárez, these relations are such that they express an essential aspect of
the entities to which they belong: “The transcendental relation is always intrinsic
and essential to some entity.”238 A standard example of a transcendental relation is
the relation of inherence that every accident has to the substance that bears the acci-
dent.239 The distinction between categorical and transcendental relations is not easy
to understand. Suárez seems to maintain, adopting a thesis from Cajetan, that tran-
scendental relations manifest a “function” (munus) that the bearer of the relation
exercises with respect to the term of the relation, which is not the case with categori-
cal relations:
It universally belongs to a form or to an absolute mode that includes a transcendental rela-
tion that it exercises some real function in regard to that to which it entails a relation, either
by causing, or uniting, or representing that thing, or by doing some other similar thing.240
Whatever the precise meaning of this explanation, what is clear from it is that cogni-
tive acts are essentially relative, and are relative inasmuch as they are always related
to a term that they represent. Here there is an acceptance of a relation of representa-
tion, which seems to say nothing more about the act than its having an object. As
Courtine has emphasized, the intentional relation in Suárez finds its fullest expres-
sion in the concept of the transcendental relation.241 The irreducibility of the rela-
tional character of cognitive acts becomes part of their essence.
Now, since the transcendental relation is a real relation, and since some cognitive
acts are directed at non-existent or impossible objects, the question arises: how can
the relationality of such acts be preserved? Suárez believes that categorical (or “pre-
dicamental”) relations always need a term that is real and actual in order to be: “For
a predicamental relation a term that is real and really existing is always neces-
sary.”242 Following Aristotle’s texts on psychic relations, Suárez accepts that between
cognitive acts and their objects there are causal relations, as well as measurable-
measure relations “founded in things which have their perfection commensurated
with others” (fundantur in quibusdam rebus quae perfectionem suam habent aliis
commensuratum).243 The relation of commensuration seems to express the act’s cor-
respondence to reality, that is, its referential nature.244 Causal relations and relations
of commensuration are categorical, and do not hold if one of the terms is not real
and existent. In such a case, the relation of commensuration is still present, but as a
relation of reason.245 The idea may be that the act remains related to the object
understood as that which must exist in order for the act to refer to reality, and that a
real relation could not fulfil this role. Thus, there is no real categorical relation
between the act and the object if the object is not real and existent. By contrast,
transcendental relations, which are real, do not need a term that is real and actual in
order to be; the same is thus true for intentional transcendental relations. When it is
not a case of natural acts of sensation or intuitive cognition (where “natural” means
“produced without divine intervention”), cognitive acts can be related by a transcen-
dental relation to a non-being or to beings of reason:
It is not repugnant that a real being have a transcendental order to a non-actual being. First,
because a power can have an order to a possible being, although it is not related to that
according to its possibility alone, but by an order to its act, in such way, however, that the
very relation of the power is prior to and independent of the actual existence of the act or of
the object. Likewise, non-being, insofar as it can be thought, can also terminate a transcen-
dental relation of thought or of knowledge toward itself. And in this way, although non-
being of itself does not seem apt to be a term of a real relation, nevertheless, insofar as some
action can be exercised with respect to it, that action itself, or a habit or a power, which are
principles ordered to that action, can entail a transcendental relation to a thing that does not
exist. And for a similar reason some act of the intellect can entail a transcendental relation
to some being of reason, because this can certainly be a sufficient object of such an act. And
therefore for a relation of this kind not only is there no problem that a being of reason is
something fashioned by the intellect, but also in this very fact that transcendental relation is
founded. But it is correctly proven by that argument that no other things can have transcen-
dental relations toward beings of reason besides those acts of the mind by which those very
beings of reason are thought or fashioned, under which I include some acts of the imagina-
tion insofar as through them imaginary and impossible beings can be fashioned and
represented.246
As this passage shows, a non-actual being can be the term of a transcendental rela-
tion, especially as regards cognitive powers; the relation can hold either between
two possibilia, namely the power and a possible object, or between the very act of
cognition and a possible object. This is also the case for the relation of thought to
non-beings and to beings of reason, including the relation of imagination to impos-
sible objects. The idea seems to be that as long as a cognitive power can produce an
object, which is thus “in thought,” the power or the act itself has a transcendental
relation to that object. Now, as argued above, it could be that in Suárez intentional
being—or more precisely “being cognized”—is reducible to a mere extrinsic
denomination, which would amount to treating the object of thought “as if undergo-
ing a passion” (quasi passive), though there is nothing in the object that corresponds
to such a description.247 If we follow this interpretation, “being cognized” will not
be a mode of being, and the fashioned or represented objects that Suárez speaks of
in the text quoted above will not have any existence. Intentional transcendental rela-
tions will thus be present not only when their term has no real existence, but even
when their term has no existence at all. Such a view would obviously constitute a
precedent for the later theory of Brentano, in which intentionality is understood as
a relation without a term (terminus or target).
3.3.2 I ntentionality and Relations According to the Reist

Brentano248
For the reist Brentano, the thinking being is a relative that can exist without the
object existing, and without a substitute intentional object. Brentano thus appears to
accept “abnormal” or “non-extensional” relations, that is, relations without an exist-
ing term (terminus or target).249 In fact, he never stopped describing intentionality as
a relation, as shown, for example, by the following text dated 29 March 1916:
Whoever presents in recto a thinking being as a thinking being also presents in obliquo
something to which the thinking being is related as the object of his thinking. This is called
an intentional relation.250
Mark Textor holds that Brentano’s relational talk about intentionality is not to be
taken seriously, since the mind’s aboutness is “primitive” and its description in
terms of a relation is not a definitional analysis, but rather a “suggestive meta-
phor.”251 It is true that Brentano often uses metaphors to make intentionality under-
standable, for example, when he talks of it as a “directedness.”252 However, it seems
to me that since Brentano took intentionality to be a property, he wanted it truly to
fit with the very general characteristics of properties—to begin with, their being
either relational or non-relational—even if it led him into difficult philosophical
problems. Now, many interpreters of Brentano have refused to acknowledge that he
accepted relations without a term, and have maintained that his later theory of inten-
tionality is not relational but “adverbial”; in other words, they hold that for the reist
Brentano, intentionality is an absolute, that is, non-relational, property of its
bearer.253 The main source for this interpretation is the Appendix to the 1911 second
edition of the Psychologie, in which Brentano affirms that the thinking being is not
a relative, but a “quasi-relative” (etwas “Relativliches”).254 Ever since Roderick
Chisholm, interpreters—Chrudzimski and Smith have been the most influential,
along with Uriah Kriegel—have held that Brentano treats intentionality as, onto-
logically speaking, an absolute property, and that he retained its relational aspect
only with respect to the “grammar” of cognitive activities.255 As noted previously,
the pre-reist Brentano maintains that relatives are ontologically and epistemologi-
cally interdependent, which means that every relative has a correlative, whether real
or unreal. Thus, the existence of a relative entails the existence of a term, whether
real or unreal, and the cognition of a relative entails the cognition of a term, whether
real or unreal.256 However, after Brentano’s turn to reism and his abandonment of
intentional objects, a thinking being who thinks about a non-existent object has no
term to be related to, for the object she is thinking about does not exist, and there is
no unreal correlative to fill in for the non-existent object. Nonetheless, even though
there is no longer an intentional object, the presentation in modo recto of a thinking
being is, according to the reist Brentano, impossible without the presentation of an
object in modo obliquo.257 Thus, in Brentano’s reism, the thinking being is an entity
that can exist without anything else existing, even though it cannot be presented
without something else being presented. Now, in 1911, Brentano holds, as he did in
his pre-reist theory of relatives, that entities whose existence does not entail the
existence of something else are not ontologically relative. From an ontological point
of view, therefore, intentionality is not a relation. Nevertheless, in terms of “gram-
mar,” that is, from a logical-linguistic point of view, it is still akin to a relation: as is
the case with relatives, the presentation of a thinking being entails the concomitant
presentation of the object at which the thinking being directs itself. By this reason-
ing, Brentano is led to say in 1911 that intentionality is quasi-relational (or more
precisely, that the thinking being is quasi-relative), and according to the standard
interpretation, ‘“quasi-relational,” ontologically speaking, does not mean anything
other than “absolute.”258
This interpretation is certainly plausible, but it faces an important problem,
which is that Brentano seems never to have maintained that intentionality is an
absolute property. This is shown in particular by a text from the Nachlaß, dating
from May 1908 and drawn from manuscript Ps 34, in which it is precisely the inter-
actions between intentionality and the absolute properties of the thinking being that
he discusses. The text is as follows:
Relative determinations are of two classes. The first are based on a comparison of absolute
entities, neither of which as such contains an indication of the other. Thus, I compare one
blue with another and I say that they are the same, or a red with a blue and I say that they
are different. This sameness and difference characterize, relative to each other, two absolute
things that have nothing to do with each other with respect to their existence: rather, each is
given as totally independent. The case is entirely different when something is acted upon by
something else, or is affected by it. The patient cannot be affected without an agent, even
though it seems thinkable that it is the same patient when the agent is not the same. Thus,
someone could receive the same sensitive impression that he received from one body, from
another body, or at any rate from God. The patient would then be the same, but the agent
would no longer be the same. There would therefore no longer be the same relation, though
there would be the same passion. But some relation to some agent would subsist, and it
would just as much be grounded on the passion of one and the activity of the other, just as
the difference between red and blue [is grounded] on the characteristics of these absolute
colours. What distinguishes these two cases is only the fact that that which underlies is
absolute, such that it does not indicate in either a determinate or indeterminate way another
without which it could not be, whereas in the case of passion this is the case, at least in an
indeterminate way. A particular case, distinct from either class, in which one tends to speak
of a relation has to do with what is called the “psychic relation to an object.” We say that a
thinker thinks something thought, and that something thought is thought by the thinker, just
as we say that there is not something bigger without something smaller and that something
smaller is smaller than something bigger. But what else but something absolute or indicat-
ing indeterminately would here underlie the thinker? Obviously, nothing; rather, it is always
a particular modification of what we call a thinker that makes it a thinker, and it can never
happen as it happens with something bigger, that it ceases to be bigger without itself under-
going a change, because something else has changed by getting bigger. If one looks more
closely, one notices that here some such other thing does not exist at all in the proper sense.
Inasmuch as the thinker comes to be thinking, it happens that one can also use the expres-
sion that says that what, by thinking, he has as an object is thought about by him, whether
it exists or does not exist. For example, when someone thinks about Jupiter, it can be said
that Jupiter is thought about by him, even though he [i.e. Jupiter] does not exist. If Jupiter
were not something imaginary, but something real and actually existent, he could indeed
enter into a relation with the thinker, and this relation could be described as a kind of cor-
respondence; however, it would not be the so-called psychic relation of the thinker with that
which is thought, but a correspondence between the thinker and the thing, grounded on the
characteristics of the thinker and those of the thing. This would be a relation that should be
classified as a subspecies of sameness and similarity in the usual sense. Thus, unlike rela-
tions founded on comparison, or those founded on passion and action, this is not a true
relation, but it is more like that of the patient, in the sense that one can still have the same
patient while the agent changes; as we have said, it remains as the very same patient, and
only an agent in general seems to be required. Just as that which is thought can in itself be
something that is in no way existent, it can also be something indeterminate, since we some-
times think general thoughts. We see in this that the case of passion, just like the case of
thought, even though neither should as such be counted among relations, nevertheless has a
similarity to them, in that the one who thinks about the patient or about the thinker is con-
cerned with several objects simultaneously; the one who thinks about the patient is also
concerned with an agent, though it is indeterminate, and the one who thinks about the
thinker is also concerned with that which is the object of the thought, whether it exists or
not. And it will also be necessary to give a verbal expression to this similarity, and we do so
by saying that the patient is related to an agent, and that the thinker is related to something
thought. This causes no harm, as long as one keeps clearly in mind the essential distinction
between the two cases.259
In this text, Brentano considers Aristotle’s three classes of relations: relations of

comparison, causal relations, and intentional relations. According to the text, it
seems that a relation can be based on three types of foundation. The first type is
made up of absolute properties that do not contain any “indication” (Hinweis) of
something else; this means that with respect to their existence they are not dependent
on something else. The second type is made up of absolute properties that contain an
“indeterminate indication” (unbestimmter Hinweis) of something else; this means
that with respect to their existence they are dependent on some individual of a certain
species. The third type is made up of absolute properties that include a “determinate
indication” (bestimmter Hinweis) of something else; this means that with respect to
their existence they are dependent on a determinate individual. As an example of the
first type, Brentano gives colours: colours do not depend on something else in order
to exist. As an example of the second type, Brentano gives “passion” (Leiden): an
effect depends for its existence on something else, namely, a cause, though this
dependence is indeterminate in the sense that the same effect can be produced by
different individual causes. Brentano does not give an example of the third type of
foundation, that is, an absolute entity that includes a determinate ontological depen-
dence on something else. The three types of relation mentioned above are analyzed
according to the different types of foundation. Relations of comparison are founded
on absolute properties that do not contain any indication of something else, such as
colours or sizes: each colour or size can exist without any other. The relation of an
effect to its cause is founded on something that requires something else in order to
exist, as is the case for passion: every effect requires a cause.
The text becomes more complicated when Brentano discusses the intentional
relation. He seems to set up the following disjunction: either the intentional relation
is founded on something that is absolute in the strong sense, in other words, an
entity that does not include an indication of something else, or this relation is
founded on an absolute entity that includes an indeterminate indication of some-
thing else. Let us begin with the first term of the disjunction. Why does Brentano
say that the intentional relation is founded on something that is absolute in the
strong sense, that is, on something that does not depend on something else in order
to exist? He maintains that what makes something a thinking thing is always a “par-
ticular modification” (besondere Veränderung) of this thinking being itself. What
the text apparently is meant to emphasize is that cognitive activities do not depend
on something external in order to exist, as is shown by those that are about non-
existent objects (impossibilia, hallucinations, etc.). Thus, a cognitive activity is a
combination of an absolute property that depends only on its subject, and an inten-
tional relation that is grafted onto this absolute property. What about the other term
of the disjunction? In what sense could the intentional relation be founded on an
absolute entity that contains an indeterminate indication of something else? It seems
that an indeterminate indication understood in the strict sense would entail an onto-
logical dependence: according to this text, everything that indicates something inde-
terminately is dependent, with respect to its existence, on an individual of a given
species. However, it also seems clear that a cognitive activity, for Brentano, is never
dependent on something else in order to exist. Thus, when he says that the founda-
tion of an intentional relation has an indeterminate indication of something else, it
cannot mean that this foundation has an indeterminate ontological dependence. In
fact, he explains further on in the text in what sense the indeterminate indication
should be understood: asserting that there is such an indication amounts to saying
that a cognitive activity can be directed at indeterminate objects, namely, universals.
Therefore, contrary to what is the case with the indication by an effect of an indeter-
minate cause, one should not take cognitive activity to be dependent with respect to
its existence on an individual of a certain species: on both sides of the disjunction,
the intentional relation is founded on an absolute property which does not depend
with respect to its existence on something else. As regards the intentional relation
itself, unlike other relations it occurs even when its term does not exist. This obser-
vation leads Brentano to maintain that the intentional relation is not a “true relation”
(eine wahre Relation). The “grammar” of intentionality, however, remains rela-
tional: Brentano asserts at the end of the text that the presentation of a thinking
being entails the concomitant presentation of the object at which it is directed,
exactly as he does in 1911.
What should be concluded from all this? Apparently, even though the intentional
relation is not a true relation, Brentano distinguishes it from the absolute properties
of its subject. He maintains that this so-called “relation,” is founded, as true rela-
tions are, on an absolute property. When he summarizes his theory of relatives a few
pages further on in the same manuscript, he reduces relatives of comparison, from
an ontological point of view, to absolute accidents of their subjects, that is, to their
foundations. But he does not speak of such a reduction as regards intentionality:
2. Correlatives or correlates founded on a determination of the comparative type. Each thing
that is compared can be something absolute. And if the comparative determination is indi-
vidual, it coincides as regards reality with individual absolute determinations. But correla-
tive determinations seem usually to be general. […] 3. Thoughts of which the object is a
thought. They are not possible without the object of this thought also being thought. In fact,
correlates are not what is at issue here. That which thinks can be thought about individually,
whereas the object to which it is related is general, and the latter does not have to exist in
reality to be the object of a real thought.260
This does not prove that there is no reduction, but it does suggest it. Admittedly, one
might find this system odd, and wonder why Brentano needs his theory of intention-
ality to include a sui generis relation-like entity that is added to the absolute proper-
ties of the thinking being. On this point, one may refer to the Introduction (Chap. 1)
to the present work, which mentions the difficulties connected with the rejection of
the relational aspect of intentionality: intentionality seems to be relational both from
a logical-linguistic point of view, since intentional verbs are divalent (“x thinks of
y”), and from a phenomenological point of view, since it presents its object as “for-
eign” or “other.”261 This might lead one—unduly—to draw ontological conclusions
from these logical-linguistic and phenomenological features. At any rate, what
should be emphasized here is that in 1908, intentionality is for Brentano a sui
generis entity, which, though not “a true relation” (eine wahre Relation), is distinct
from the absolute properties of the thinking being.
In April 1908—that is, 1 month before he composed the passage quoted above—
Brentano had already considered in a text about Aristotle the relationship between
intentionality and the absolute properties of the thinking being, but arrived at differ-
ent conclusions. In this text too, he holds that intentionality is a relation of a special
type. However, he takes this relation to be founded not on something absolute, but
on itself:
Among relations, the “psychic relation to the object” is not a link between one thing and
another; nor is there here any doubt that this sort of relative itself undergoes a causal effect.
It is not a relative that has something “absolute” for a foundation. Rather, it is itself its own
foundation, so to speak.262
The awkwardness of making a relation, even a special one, its own foundation
seems to have led Brentano 1 month later to found this relation on absolute proper-
ties of the thinking being.
In 1908, and so perhaps in 1911 as well, intentionality, from an ontological point
of view, is neither a true relation nor an absolute property, but a sui generis relation-
like entity founded on absolute properties. The reason that led to the rejection of the
strict relational aspect of intentionality was the absence of a term for certain cogni-
tive activities. In other words, Brentano holds in 1908 and 1911 that an entity is
truly relative only if its existence entails the existence of a term. However, it seems
that things change in 1915–1916. In his last writings,263 Brentano comes to affirm
that an entity can be relative even if its term does not exist. Thus, he maintains on
29 March 1916:
It is clear that the terminus to which the relative determination is related need not exist in
order for the relative determination to exist. This is quite obviously the case with the
intentional relation between the person thinking and that which he is thinking, between the
person denying and that which he denies, and between the person desiring and that which
he desires.264
Brentano extends his list of relatives without terms beyond intentional relatives.
Thus, causal relatives, which in 1908 and 1911 he contrasts with intentional “quasi-
relatives,” are no longer considered in 1915–1916 as necessarily directed at existent
terms. They are nonetheless true relatives. Admittedly, Brentano maintains in a text
of 13 February 1915 that as a rule the relation of effect to cause requires an existent
term, even though there is no converse real relation:
[E]fficient cause and effect must be at the same time, at least in the sense that they coincide
temporally as ending and beginning. […] To bring the causal relation in closer approxima-
tion to the relation of thought, one might point rather to the fact, that just as thinking posits
something only in the thinker and not in that which is thought, so the causal relation posits
something only in that which is effected, not however in that which acts.265
Note that since there is no converse relation, the term of the relation of effect to
cause is not a correlative but a relatum. In his reist period, Brentano considers case
by case whether a relation requires as its term a correlative, a relatum only, or noth-
ing at all. Thus, although the relation between effect and cause requires, as a rule,
two relata and thus a term, there are some exceptions in which the absence of a term
does not mean that the effect no longer has a relational aspect. Just as the object of
a thought does not need to exist for the cognitive act to take place, so the cause of a
“delayed effect” (Nachwirkung) does not need to exist for the effect to take place, as
Brentano maintains on 2 March 1916:
What distinguishes a relative determination from an absolute determination? The answer is
this. Whenever one thinks a relative determination in recto, then one also thinks of some-
thing in obliquo at the same time. Thus, one who thinks of a person seeing is also thinking
in obliquo of something coloured that is thus seen. If that which is thought of in recto is a
relative determination of real significance for some substance, then the correlative attribute
can be a mere denominatio extrinseca. For example, the correlative of that which is thinking
is that which is thought, and nothing is changed in the thing by reason of its being thought;
indeed, the thing need not even exist in order to be thought. The same holds for the agent
which is correlative to the patient. Nothing changes in the agent insofar as it is active, and
a thing that produces after-effects need not exist at all when these effects are produced. And
this is why the correlatives here are denominationes extrinsecae.266
There is thus a turn in Brentano’s ontology of relatives to the acceptance of relatives

without terms.
One point of some philological importance should be noted. A turn in Brentano’s
ontology of relatives has been recognized by some interpreters—among them Lucie
Gilson, Barry Smith, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Werner Sauer, and Mauro

Antonelli267—but it is often considered to be established in a text entitled “Von dem
zu Etwas sich Verhaltenden” (On That Which Is Related to Something), in the
Kategorienlehre, pages 166–176, specifically on page 169:
The question is easily answered if we take care to avoid mere verbal disputes and if we
attend to the distinctive characteristic which holds of all relational thinking. Whether this
thinking is merely presentational, or whether it involves judgment or emotion, it always
involves a multiplicity of presentations, a presentation having different modes. One thing is
thought of in modo recto and another in modo obliquo. The thing thought of in modo recto
must exist, if the relation is to exist. But the thing thought of in modo obliquo need not
exist—except in such special cases as that of someone who accepts something as evident,
who cannot exist unless the thing that is accepted by him also exists. Thus we have suc-
ceeded in finding the unitary concept for everything that is relative: when we are concerned
with that which is relative to something else, we are concerned with nothing other than
determinations which are such that, in thinking of them, one thinks of something in recto
and of something in obliquo.268
Now, this text is one that was assembled by Alfred Kastil, who combined two dif-
ferent manuscripts in his edition: manuscript Ps 8, entitled “Von dem zu Etwas sich
Verhaltenden,” dated 8 January 1915, and manuscript M 76, “Zur ‘Metaphysik,’”
dated 16 December 1915.269 The text in the Kategorienlehre seems to say that the
necessity for the term to exist should be rejected for all relatives. After rejecting this
necessity for intentional relatives, it is asserted: “Thus we have succeeded in finding
the unitary concept for everything that is relative” (Und damit haben wir auch schon
den gesuchten einheitlichen Begriff für alles Relative gefunden). However, this sen-
tence, which Kastil uses to join the texts of the two manuscripts, is most likely his
own addition, since it is not present in either manuscript. In manuscript M 76, just
before the passage edited by Kastil, Brentano discusses relatives of comparison and
seems to say that they do not always need to have a term; immediately following it,
the manuscript has a passage that Kastil has moved five pages further in the book
(Kategorienlehre, 174). The second part of the passage on page 169 of
Kategorienlehre is from manuscript Ps 8, which says only that it is likely that some
relatives do not have a term. Thus, even though Brentano seems to say in these two
texts that intentional relatives and relatives of comparison are relatives without
terms, he does not explicitly extend this rule to all relatives, and does not speak of a
“unitary concept” (einheitlicher Begriff). Thus, when the passage on page 169 of
Kategorienlehre is traced back to the original manuscript, it is not as decisive as it
seems. It is nevertheless true that Brentano modified his theory of relatives at the
end of his life: there are many relatives without a term, and they are true relatives.
Though Brentano apparently accepts these strange relatives that lack a term, one
might object that this does not entail that those relatives are real; it could rather be
maintained that Brentano generally holds that relatives are not real entities. This
would save Brentano’s account, in some sense: since as a rule he is not a realist
about relatives, he also does not accept as part of his ontology these strange relatives
without a term. Among those who defend the view that Brentano is an antirealist
about relations are Barry Smith and Arkadiusz Chrudzimski.270 Smith holds that
Brentanian relations, or “relative determinations” (relative Bestimmungen), are not
real properties, but are subjective. He insists on the idea that a relation, or relative
determination, is a point of view on something. Thus, something absolute can be
presented as the absolute that it is really, or it can be presented as something rela-
tive, that is, it can be mentally related to something else. Smith claims that he is
following the correct interpretation of Brentano put forward by Marty. However,
Smith seems to have misinterpreted Marty. Marty does indeed maintain in Raum
and Zeit that relations in Brentano are not real. However, he does not conclude from
this that they are subjective: for Brentano, relations are “modes of presentation”
(Vorstellungsmodi), but they are still objective. This means that relations are ways
of connecting two entities in thought, that is, according to the in recto and in obliquo
modes of presentation, but with the possibility of having true or false judgements
based on these complex presentations. If relations were subjective, there would be
no possibility of true or false judgements.271 Thus, Smith’s interpretation of Marty’s
reading of Brentano must seemingly be qualified. Furthermore, and most impor-
tantly, Brentano rejects Marty’s antirealist interpretation of his theory. Indeed, he
writes to Oskar Kraus that it is wrong to think that relations—or, in reist, and thus
concrete terms, “relatives”—are for him “modes of presentation” (Vorstellungsmodi),
but maintains instead that they are real:
Thus, according to me, a relation (I would prefer to say a relative) is supposedly not an
object of presentation, but a certain mode of presentation. This is entirely false. A relative
can be presented in modo recto and in modo obliquo, as an absolute can be. It also has
existence, as an absolute does, for I count it, like an absolute, among real things. It is not the
relative that is a mode of presentation; but it is true that the one who presents in modo recto
the foundation of a relative presents in obliquo the term that is correlative with it.272
This text from 5 July 1916 seems to prove that Brentano is a realist with regard
to relations. However, it contradicts other texts, which appear to cast doubt on the
reality of relations. Indeed, Brentano says that something can become relative or
cease to be relative as a result of a modification in something else; in particular, he
says this in a text edited in Kategorienlehre, 120–121, and appealed to by
Chrudzimski in support of his antirealist interpretation.273 Thus, since relatives do
not meet the criterion of causality which defines the real, it can be inferred that
Brentano rejects their reality: real entities have their own generation and corruption
and can themselves enter into causal interactions, whereas unreal entitities have a
generation and corruption that depend on the generation and corruption of some-
thing else, and cannot themselves enter into causal interactions.274 However, it is not
certain that Brentano continued to maintain in his last writings that something
becomes relative or ceases to be relative as a result of a modification in something
else. In manuscript M 76, “Zur ‘Metaphysik,’” dated 16 December 1915, he main-
tains that certain relative entities—namely, relatives of comparison and intentional
relatives—persist even if their correlates change or cease to be:
But it often happens in other cases that the linguistic expression also indicates more than
mere relating, and also contains an acceptance about something that lies outside of what is
thought in modo recto. This is what happens if I say “Gaius is bigger than Titus,” which
amounts to the same thing as “is bigger than Titus is.” Just this fact, that an assertion is here
being made about something entirely external to the subject, explains clearly why what
seems to be a purely relative attribute can be lost without any modification in the subject.
But it is also clear that once we identify the purely relative attribute, this possibility disap-
pears. But along with it also disappears therefore any illusion that leads one to believe that
the relative determinations that we add to a thing should not be thought of as just as real as
any absolute determination.275
What is peculiar is that in distinguishing several classes of relatives, Aristotle teaches about
one of them that it is indeed real, but that it does not have a real correlate. This is the relation
of the thinker to that which is thought. That which is thought is a mere being of reason. If
one looks carefully, one notices that what Aristotle asserts about the other classes does not
hold for this class, namely, that the relative attribute can be acquired or lost without a modi-
fication to the subject.276
In a letter to Oskar Kraus on 3 April 1915, Brentano states that Gaius does not cease
to be taller than Titus when Titus ceases to exist, because Gaius is still taller than
Titus was when the comparison was made.277 The point seems to be that Titus’s
ceasing to be does not make Gaius something shorter or taller than something of the
height that Titus had before he ceased to be. As for the intentional relation, it does
not vanish when the object changes, in the sense that something can still be thought
of as this or that even if it undergoes a change and no longer is as it is thought of.
Moreover, it can be argued that after his turn to reism Brentano abandoned the
causal definition of reality, and treats the concept of the real as a primitive concept.
In a letter to Kraus on 8 November 1914, Brentano disputes the thesis, supposedly
proposed by Marty, that “real” is equivalent to “capable of having a causal effect”
(wirkungskräftig). “Real,” or “thing” (Ding), says Brentano, is the highest and most
simple concept, and cannot be analyzed using an accidental category, which is sub-
ordinate to the concept of the real—as every accidental category is.278 Thus, the
concept of the real does not logically include causality. One can conclude from this
that even if the acquisition or loss of a relation occurs without its bearer undergoing
a causal effect, it is not certain that this would rule out the reality of relations for the
late Brentano.
However, there is another argument against accepting real relations in Brentano.
It could be maintained that Brentano is a “moderate realist” about relations, and
therefore that for him relations are real, but reducible to absolute properties of their
bearer. Brentano himself sometimes asserts that relatives are constituted by nothing
more than a collection of absolute properties; see, for example, the passage from
Kategorienlehre, 120–121, quoted above. In the notes to his edition of the
Kategorienlehre, however, Kastil maintains that the passage in question is part of
Brentano’s antepenultimate theory of categories, his final theory being that of
1916.279 This chronology seems to work for the question of relations, since in 1916
Brentano does indeed refuse to reduce all relations to absolute properties of their
bearer. In manuscript M 76, “Zur ‘Metaphysik,’” dated 16 December 1915, Brentano
holds that relations, or “relative determinations” (relative Bestimmungen), are real,
but can be assigned to the categories of the absolute accidents on which they depend.
They therefore do not form their own category of accidents:
From what has been discussed, it emerges that even if relative determinations are just as real
as absolutes, a distinct class of relative accidents should not be accepted.280
Categories of their own should not be admitted for “How big?”, nor for “Where?”, nor for
“When?”, nor for doing, nor for wearing, nor for position, nor for relation.281
It is false that relative determinations are not real determinations, but also that they are real
determinations of a category other than the absolute to which they belong.282
Nevertheless, in a text drawn from manuscript M 88, “Über die Kategorien,” dated
2 March 1916, and published in Kategorienlehre, 239–242, Brentano maintains that
relative determinations form their own category of accidents. There he speaks of
“accidental relative determinations” (relative akzidentelle Bestimmungen), and this
is not an interpolation by Kastil.283 Brentano thus rejects what he defended in 1915,
and now accepts classes of relational accidents. This seems to rule out a general
reduction of relations in Brentano’s philosophy. Moreover, in a passage also drawn
from manuscript M 88 and published in the Kategorienlehre, Brentano provides the
following list of relations: categorical, causal, bounding, intentional, and compara-
tive. Now, he asserts that relations of the last class, namely relations of comparison,
are reducible to absolute properties: a relation of comparison is nothing more than
an absolute property given indeterminately (for example, “shorter than 185 cm” is a
height given indeterminately).284 Thus, by contrast, reduction does not occur for the
other classes of relations:
These modes of real relation further include the previously mentioned relations of patient
to agent, of boundary to that which is bounded, and of thinker to that which is thought.
Comparative determinations are also possible in all cases. As we have seen, such determina-
tions apart from the denominatio extrinseca they may contain, coincide with the substantial
or accidental entity which is their underlying foundation, just as the entity designated by a
universal attribute coincides with the individual entity.285
In 1916, relations without a term (terminus or target) are accepted and are real,
relations constitute their own accidental category, and only relations of comparison
are reducible to absolute properties of their bearer; it is therefore difficult to explain
how the intentional relation could be anything other than a real relation that is onto-
logically irreducible. It seems therefore that the adverbialist interpretation of
Brentano’s reist theory of intentionality must be rejected. One finds in Brentano the
position that seems to be outlined by Aristotle in Metaphysics Δ.15: ultimately,
thinking involves only a single relative.286 The intentional relation in Brentano, like
Suárez’s transcendental relation,287 is essential to all cognition, it is real, and it is
irreducible. In the late Brentano, intentionality—the “mark of the mental,” described
in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint as a “relation to an object” (Beziehung
auf ein Objekt)—is, once again and still, a relation.
Notes
1. Aristotle, Met. Δ.15, 1021a26–b3.

2. Brentano, Psychologie II, Appendix, ed. Kraus, 133–134; ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 391: “Das charakteristische für jede psychische Tätigkeit
besteht, wie ich gezeigt zu haben glaube, in der Beziehung zu etwas als
Objekt. Hienach scheint jede psychische Tätigkeit etwas Relatives. Und in der
Tat hat Aristoteles, wo er die verschiedenen hauptklassen seines πρός τι
aufzählt, auch der psychischen Beziehung Erwähnung getan. Doch versäumt
er nicht auf etwas aufmerksam zu machen, was diese Klasse von anderen
unterscheide. Wenn bei anderen Relationen sowohl Fundament als Terminus
real sind, sei es hier nur das Fundament. Verdeutlichen wir uns ein wenig
seine Meinung! Wenn ich ein Relativ aus der weiten Klasse von
Vergleichsverhältnissen nehme, z.B. ein Größeres oder Kleineres, so muss,
wenn das Größere ist, auch das Kleinere sein. Ist ein Haus größer als ein ande-
res Haus, so muss auch das andere Haus sein und eine Größe haben. […] Ganz
anders ist es dagegen bei der psychischen Beziehung. Denkt einer etwas, so
muß zwar das Denkende, keineswegs aber das Objekt seines Denkens existie-
ren; ja, wenn er etwas leugnet, ist dies in allen Fällen, wo die leugnung richtig
ist, geradezu ausgeschlossen.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint, 211–212 (slightly modified).
3. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, ed. Kraus, 16; ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 39: “Der gemeinsame Charakterzug alles Psychischen besteht in
dem, was man häufig mit einem leider sehr mißverständlichen Ausdruck
Bewußtsein genannt hat, d.h. in einem subjektischen Verhalten, in einer, wie
man sie bezeichnete, intentionalen Beziehung zu etwas, was vielleicht nicht
wirklich, aber doch innerlich gegenständlich gegeben ist.” Trans. Chisholm and
Schneewind, in The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, 8–9 (modified).
4. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, ed. Kraus, 54n19; ed. Binder
and Chrudzimski, 62n19: “Auch von dieser Lehre finden sich die ersten Keime
bei Aristoteles, vgl. insbes. Metaph. Δ 15 p. 1021 a 29. Der Terminus ‘inten-
tional’ stammt, wie so manche andere Bezeichnung wichtiger Begriffe, von
den Scholastikern her.” Trans. Chisholm and Schneewind, in The Foundation
and Construction of Ethics, 9n19.
5. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 21: “Vor allem also ist es eine Eigenheit,
welche für das Bewußtsein allgemein charakteristisch ist, daß es immer und
überall, d.h. in jedem seiner ablösbaren Teile eine gewisse Art von Relation
zeigt, welche ein Subjekt zu einem Objekt in Beziehung setzt. Man nennt sie
auch ‘intentionale Beziehung.’ Zu jedem Bewußtsein gehört wesentlich eine
Beziehung. Wie bei jeder Beziehung finden sich daher auch hier zwei Korrelate.
Das eine Korrelat ist der Bewußtseinsakt, das andere das, worauf er gerichtet
ist. Sehen und Gesehenes, Vorstellen und Vorgestelltes, Wollen und Gewolltes,
Lieben und Geliebtes, Leugnen und Geleugnetes, usw. Bei diesen Korrelaten
Notes 119
zeigt sich, wie schon Aristoteles hervorhob, die Eigentümlichkeit, daß das eine
real, das andere dagegen nichts reales ist.” Trans. Müller, in Descriptive
Psychology, 23–24 (slightly modified).
6. Oscar Kraus, letter of 6 October 1904, in Brentano, Abkehr, 119: “Sagten wir
doch schon früher, es handele sich beim Psychischen um eine einseitige reale
Relation, und somit um etwas ganz Eigenartiges.” My translation.
7. For the concept of an “accidental compound,” I rely on Lewis, Substance and
Predication in Aristotle, 85–140.
8. I translate the term οὐσία in Aristotle as “essence,” following Ildefonse and
Lallot’s glossary in their French translation of Aristotle, Catégories, 187: “ousia:
substantif féminin, de formation parfaitement limpide pour un locuteur grec, qui
y reconnaît immédiatement un dérivé abstrait (suffixe -ia) sur la base du parti-
cipe présent du verbe ‘être’. Une traduction-calque littérale serait ‘étance’, nous
traduisons par le substantif ‘essence.’” See also the entry “essence,” in Ildefonse
and Lallot’s glossary, 192–207; Courtine, Essence, 406.
9. “καὶ πάθος τι τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ πρός τι.” My translation.
10. “ἔτι καθ’ὅσα τὰ ἔχοντα λέγεται πρός τι, οἷον ἰσότης ὅτι τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁμοιότης
ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον.” My translation.
11. On this subject, see the commentaries by Oehler in Aristotle, Kategorien, ad
ch. 7, and Ackrill in Aristotle, Categories, ad ch. 7. See also Morales,
Relational Attributes in Aristotle, 256; Hansen, Strange Finds, 143.
12. See Aristotle, Cat. 7, 6a36–8b24 and Met. Δ.15, 1020b26–1021b11; Cat. 8,
8b29–32, 9b33–10a10 and De int. 1, 16a3–9; De anima 2.5, 417b2–18a6,
Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2.
13. On this traditional account, see especially Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation,
and Induction, 61–63, 69; Descombes, La relation, 163; Mulligan, Relations –
Through Thick and Thin, 334; Brower, Aristotelian vs Contemporary
Perspectives on Relations; Penner, Why Do Medieval Philosophers Reject
Polyadic Accidents?
14. Hood, Aristotle on the Category of Relation, 96.
15. See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, art. 7, corp., and the other texts cited in
Henninger, Relations, 7.
16. See Mulligan, Relations – Through Thick and Thin, and the discussion in
MacBride, Relations.
17. “The son of Sophroniscus” is not Aristotle’s example, but in another context
(admittedly, not directly dealing with relations) he speaks of the “son of Diares”
(Διάρους υἱός): see De anima 2.6, 418a21. See also Cat. 7, 6b8–9, where he
says that “a mountain is called large relative to something” (οἷον ὄρος μέγα
λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον, − πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος), and where the rela-
tion seems not to be a mutual implication between relatives. For the present
purpose, it seems to me that the question of whether particular relations in
Aristotle are instances of universals or are tropes can be left open. On the onto-
logical status of particular accidents in Aristotle, see the debate between

Ackrill, in Aristotle, Categories, ad ch. 2, and Owen, Inherence.
18. Aristotle, Met. Δ.15, 1021a26–b3: “τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ’ἀριθμὸν καὶ δύναμιν
λεγόμενα πρός τι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι τῷ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλου λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ὅ
ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο· τὸ δὲ μετρητὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ τὸ
διανοητὸν τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι πρός τι λέγονται. τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν
σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια, οὐκ ἔστι δ’ἡ διάνοια πρὸς τοῦτο οὗ ἐστὶ
διάνοια (δὶς γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἰρημένον ἂν εἴη), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τινός ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις
ὄψις, οὐχ οὗ ἐστὶν ὄψις (καίτοι γ’ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο εἰπεῖν) ἀλλὰ πρὸς χρῶμα ἢ
πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. ἐκείνως δὲ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ λεχθήσεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστὶν
ἡ ὄψις.” Trans. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle (modified: for the
phrase ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλου λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν, I follow the literal translation
found in Ross’s commentary in Aristotle, Metaphysics, ad loc.). For a possible
source in Plato for Aristotle’s views, see Plato, Rep. 4, 438e4–8.
19. Aristotle, Met. I.1, 1053a31–b3: “καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην δὲ μέτρον τῶν
πραγμάτων λέγομεν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ αὐτό, ὅτι γνωρίζομέν τι αὐταῖς,
ἐπεὶ μετροῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ μετροῦσιν. ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
ἄλλου ἡμᾶς μετροῦντος ἐγνωρίσαμεν πηλίκοι ἐσμὲν τῷ τὸν πῆχυν ἐπὶ
τοσοῦτον ἡμῶν ἐπιβάλλειν. Πρωταγόρας δ’ἄνθρωπόν φησι πάντων εἶναι
μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· τούτους
δ’ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, ἅ φαμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν
ὑποκειμένων. οὐθὲν δὴ λέγοντες περιττὸν φαίνονταί τι λέγειν.” Trans.
Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle.
20. Aristotle, Met. I.6, 1057a7–12: “ὁμοίως δὲ λεγομένη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς τὸ
ἐπιστητὸν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδωσιν. δόξειε μὲν γὰρ ἂν μέτρον ἡ ἐπιστήμη
εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ μετρούμενον, συμβαίνει δὲ ἐπιστήμην μὲν πᾶσαν
ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητὸν μὴ πᾶν ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἡ ἐπιστήμη
μετρεῖται τῷ ἐπιστητῷ.” Trans. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle.
21. See Aristotle, Cat. 7, 7b23–8a12.
22. Aristotle, Met. Γ.5, 1010b30–11a2: “ὅλως τ’εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον,
οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντων τῶν ἐμψύχων· αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη. τὸ μὲν οὖν
μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως ἀληθές (τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου
πάθος τοῦτό ἐστι), τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ
ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ’αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἀλλ’
ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς
αἰσθήσεως· τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι, κἂν εἰ
λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἧττον.” Trans. Ross, in The Complete
Works of Aristotle.
23. Ross, in Aristotle, Metaphysics, ad Δ.15, 1021a31.
24. Oehler, in Aristotle, Kategorien, ad ch. 7, 7b22–8a12; Gottlieb, Aristotle ver-
sus Protagoras on Relatives and the Objects of Perception, 113–114; Casey,
Ontology and Intentionality in Medieval Theories of Relation from Boethius to
Aquinas, 63.
25. Tricot, in Aristotle, Métaphysique, ad Γ.5, 1010b30–1011a2; Δ.15, 1021a29–
b3; I.1, 1053a31–b3; I.6, 1057a7–12.
Notes 121
26. “οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἶ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ
τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.” Trans. Ross, in The
Complete Works of Aristotle (slightly modified). See Ross, in Aristotle,
Metaphysics, ad Δ.15, 1021a31; Tricot, in Aristotle, Métaphysique, ad Δ.15,
1021a29–b3 and I.1, 1053a31–b3. Although in Aristotle truth and falsity have
to do mainly with “composition” (σύνθεσις) and “division” (διαίρεσις), as
noted in De int. 1, 16a12–13, “veridical” in a broad sense is also applied to
sensation and intellection, as seen in De anima 2.5, 418a11–16; 3.6, 430a26–
28 and 430b27–31; Met. Θ.10, 1051b17–52a4. For a detailed discussion of
truth in Aristotle, see Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth.
27. On this distinction, see the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
28. On the fact that the causal connections between the cognitive faculties and
their objects fall under the second class of relations in Met. Δ.15, see also
Marmodoro, Aristotle on Perceiving Objects, 30–31 (though she does not dis-
cuss the third class).
29. See Aristotle, An. post. 2.19, 100b5–11 for the inclusion of δόξα in διάνοια,
as well as De int. 11, 21a32–33 and Top. 4.1, 121b1–4 on the fact that the
object of opinion does not necessarily exist. Casey, Ontology and Intentionality
in Medieval Theories of Relation from Boethius to Aquinas, 59–60 and 61n54,
also notes that the inclusion of διάνοια in the list of psychic correlates seems
to extend this list beyond activities that have objects that necessarily exist. For
a classification of cognitive activities in Aristotle, see Granger, La théorie
aristotélicienne de la science, 20, 26.
30. See Kirwan, in Aristotle, Metaphysics: Books Γ, Δ, and Ε, ad loc. For similar
interpretations, see Bonitz, In Met., ad loc.; Caston, Aristotle and the Problem
of Intentionality, 255n13; Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, 38n21;
Broakes, Aristotle, Objectivity and Perception, 61; De Rijk, Aristotle:
Semantics and Ontology, vol. 1, 413; Bodeüs and Stevens, in Aristotle,
Métaphysique: Delta, ad loc. See also Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Abstraction,
31, who thinks that the text is only about “ordinary language.” Kirwan’s inter-
pretation is adopted by Casey, Ontology and Intentionality in Medieval
Theories of Relation from Boethius to Aquinas, 66–69. Note that Kirwan’s
interpretation could also appeal to Plato, Rep. 4, 438e4–8, as the source for
Aristotle’s text.
31. Caston, Aristotle on Intentionality, 144.
32. See Caston, Aristotle on Intentionality, 144–145.
33. I thank an anonymous referee for the example of the singleton {1}.
34. Cat. 7, 6b33–36: “πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ
ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν,
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.” Trans.
Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle (modified). On the importance of
inflection or case (πτῶσις) in chapter 7 of the Categories, see de Libera, Le
direct et l’oblique, 326–328, and the reference to Courtine, Brentano et
l’ontologie, 202.
35. Aristotle, Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 et Θ.8, 1050a23–b2. See also especially NE
10.4, 1174b14–31. On the fact that the phenomena described by Aristotle in
these passages are actions and not states, see Hagen, The ἘΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ-ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ
Distinction and Aristotle’s Conception of ΠΡΑΞΙΣ, 269–273, who emphasizes
that these phenomena are to be explained in terms of “exercise” (χρῆσις), and
that they are also called praxis (πρᾶξις). See also Ross, in Aristotle, Metaphysics,
ad Θ.6, 1048b18, who speaks of “action.” On Metaphysics, Θ.6, 1048b18–36,
see Ackrill, Aristotle’s Distinction between Energeia and Kinêsis, and espe-
cially Burnyeat, Kinêsis vs. Energeia, who discusses the origin of this passage
and whether it is correctly included in Met. Θ.6, as well as the distinctiveness
of the positions it maintains as compared to the rest of Aristotle’s teaching.
36. Aristotle, Met. Θ.8, 1050a34–35: “μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν
ἐνέργειαν.”
37. On the divalence of intentional verbs, see again Ebbesen, A Porretanean and a
Nominalis on Relations. For the two examples, see Aristotle, Met. Θ.8,
1050a30–b1.
38. For the difference between the action of heating and cognitive activity, I rely
on Thomas Aquinas; see in particular SCG I, c. 53, 1st redaction (Leonina 13:
20*a.52–69; ed. Marietti, 2: 322a); In Met. V, lect. 17 (ed. Marietti, §1027).
See also Francisco Suárez, DM 6.6.10 (Opera 25: 228a), DM 47.15.13 (Opera
26: 842b–843a), DM 54.2.15–16 and 4.9 (Opera 26: 1022a–1023a,
1030b–1031a), among other passages. I also draw on the interpretation of
Aristotle’s psychic correlates in Sauer, Die Einheit der
Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 20–24. See also de Libera,
Dénomination extrinsèque et ‘changement cambridgien’, and Le direct et
l’oblique.
39. At 1021a32, Aristotle is undoubtedly using οὗ ἐστὶ διάνοια to mean τὸ
διανοητόν. See the gloss by Bonitz, In Met., ad loc.: “οὐκ ἔστι δ’ἡ διάνοια
πρὸς τοῦτο οὗ ἐστὶ διάνοια, i.e. πρὸς τὸ διανοητόν.” See also Tricot, in
Aristotle, Métaphysique, ad Δ.15, 1021a29–b3.
40. It could be objected to such a theory that “being thought about” does function
as a property, since one could say, for example, that two things a and b resem-
ble each other by having been thought about, whereas a third thing c has not.
The answer to such objection would be that the resemblance in question is
accounted for at the level of acts of thinking: there has been a thinking of the
objects a and b, but not of c.
41. Aristotle, De int. 11, 21a32–33: “τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς
εἰπεῖν ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.” Trans.
Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle (slightly modified).
42. Ebbesen, The Chimera’s Diary, 36.
43. See Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 22. Note
that a similar interpretation of this sentence can be found in Gregory of Rimini,
In I Sent., dd. 28–32, q. 3 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 177.14–178.7). It is impor-
tant to underscore that this is meant as a theory of intentionality, in the sense
described in the Introduction (Chap. 1) to this book, that is, as the aboutness or
Notes 123
pure aiming-at of mental activities, which is independent of the object’s exis-

tence. The interpretation developed here does not hold for what I called “refer-
ence,” that is, the relation that a cognitive act acquires when its object exists. As
regards this relation, “x is referred to” does entail “x exists.”
44. Aristotle, Cat. 7, 7b23–8a12. See also Met. Γ.5, 1010b30–1011a1.
45. “ἐπ’ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ’οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
γιγνομένην.” Trans. Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle.
46. The idea that this text is about ficta and impossibilia (among other items) is
found in Porphyry, In Cat., CAG 4.1: 121.4–15 and Simplicius, In Cat., CAG
8: 191.7–21. See also the distinctions and qualifications introduced by
Boethius, In Cat., PL 64: 229B–D. For more on the Neoplatonist interpreta-
tion of Aristotle’s text, see Sect. 3.2.1.1 below.
47. On the idea of correlational intentionality, see Cesalli, Objects and Relations
in Correlational Intentionality, 270.
48. Aristotle, Met. Θ.8, 1050a34–35: “μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν
ἐνέργειαν.” Trans. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle.
49. On these issues, see Sects. 3.2.2, 3.2.3.3 and 4.1.2 below.
50. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 402.8–13.
51. On “delimitation” (Abgrenzung) and its connection with “attention”
(Aufmerksamkeit), see Husserl, Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit,
Husserliana 38: 117.6–11. For a description of κρίσις in terms of “picking
out,” see Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 122 and Gregoric, Aristotle
on the Common Sense, 145. For more on all this, see the discussion of κρίσις
in Sect. 2.2.2 above.
52. Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 191.7–21: “ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐναργέστερον. τίνα
δὲ τὰ ὀλίγα ἐστίν, ἐφ’ ὧν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη; τὰ ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ
νοητὰ ἅμα τῇ κατ’ἐνέργειαν ἀεὶ ἑστώσῃ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐστίν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν
ἐστίν τις τοιαύτη ἀεὶ ἄνω μένουσα, ὡς Πλωτίνῳ καὶ Ἰαμβλίχῳ δοκεῖ, εἴτε
καὶ ἐν τῷ κατ’ἐνέργειαν νῷ, εἴ τις καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἕλοιτο
καλεῖν. δύναται δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ὑπόστασιν εἰρῆσθαι τὴν ἐξ
ἀφαιρέσεως· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τούτων καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· ἀληθὲς δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπλασμάτων τῶν τε ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν· ἅμα
γὰρ χίμαιρα καὶ ἐπιστήμη τῆς χιμαίρας. διὰ τί οὖν προςέθηκεν τὸ ἢ
ἐπ’οὐδενός; ἢ ὅτι τινὲς ἀνῄρουν καὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ ὁπωσοῦν
ἐπινοούμενα ἢ ὅτι κἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰς ἐπινοίας αὐτῶν ὕστερον
ἐλάβομεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων προϋπάρχειν τῆς
ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἐπιστητόν. οὕτως μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον ἐπιχείρημα δοκεῖ
δεῖξαι ὅτι πρότερον τῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ οὐχ ἅμα τῇ φύσει.”
(Italics are from the edition, indicating Simplicius’s references to Aristotle’s
text.) Trans. Fleet, in Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 7–8, 48 (slightly
modified). See also Porphyry, In Cat., CAG 4.1: 121.4–15. On the Neoplatonist
theory of the undescended soul, which I will not discuss here, see the texts and
references provided in Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators I, section
3(e).
53. See Aristotle, De int. 1, 16a16–18, and An. post. 2.7, 92b5–8; see also, among
other passages, Simplicius, In Phys., CAG 10: 696.6–8, 696.19–21 (where he
appeals to Alexander), as well as Pseudo-Philoponus, In An. post., CAG 13.3:
359.26–360.9. On all this, see Ebbesen, The Chimera’s Diary, 37–38.
54. Ammonius, In Isag., CAG 4.3: 39.14–40.2: “τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ὑφέστηκε, τὰ
δὲ ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις ὑπάρχει οἷον ἱπποκένταυρος τραγέλαφος, ἅτινα
ἐπινοούμενα μὲν ὑφίσταται, μὴ ἐπινοούμενα δὲ οὐχ ὑφίσταται, ἀλλὰ
παυσαμένης τῆς ἐπινοίας καὶ αὐτὰ συμπαύεται.” My translation. See also
David, In Isag., CAG 18.2: 108.24–109.5 and 113.29–114.6, as well as Elias,
In Isag., CAG 18.1: 47.3–9.
55. Ammonius, In Isag., CAG 4.3: 40.2–6.
56. On correlational intentionality, see Cesalli, Objects and Relations in
Correlational Intentionality, 270.
57. Post rem universals should not be confused with the “formal reasons” (λόγοι)
that the soul already possesses and are projected by it. As explained by De
Libera, La querelle des universaux, 108: “il y a en l’âme deux types de λόγοι:
l’un (λόγοι-1) est acquis par induction et ‘rassemblement’ à partir du singu-
lier, c’est, par exemple, la ‘notion abstraite universelle du cheval’, manipulée
dans la pensée discursive ou ‘logique’; l’autre (λόγοι-2) est ‘connaturel’ à
l’âme humaine et ‘possédée’ par elle en vertu de son essence, c’est l’Universel
substantiel ‘Cheval’ qui sert de point de départ à la remontée vers la forme
séparée, contenue sur un mode transcendant dans l’intellect du Démiurge.” It
is “λόγοι-2” that are “projected.”
58. See De Libera, La querelle des universaux, 103–109 and Erismann, L’homme
commun, 46–58.
59. Hoffman, Résumé, 242, quoted by de Libera, La querelle des universaux,
104–105.
60. See Erismann, L’homme commun, 47; Chiaradonna, Plotino e la teoria degli
universali, 3, cited by Erismann, L’homme commun, 48n1.
61. Ammonius, In Isag., CAG 4.3: 41.20, quoted in Erismann, L’homme commun,
51.
62. On the role of this concept in the Neoplatonists, see Ebbesen, The Chimera’s
Diary, 38–39. See also Hoffmann, Catégories et langage selon Simplicius, 76;
Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 23–48, who traces the Stoic origins of ψιλὴ
ἐπίνοια. In what follows I rely on the references provided by Ebbesen. While
ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια is translated by Ebbesen as “mere constructive thought” and by
Hoffmann as “pensée,” I adopt Kobusch’s solution of “das blosse Denken.”
63. Elias, In Isag., CAG 18.1: 49.17–20: “διαφέρει ἐπίνοια ψιλῆς ἐπινοίας, ὅτι ἡ
ἐπίνοια τὸ ὂν ἄλλως ποιεῖ νοεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τριγώνου χωρίζουσα
τὸ σχῆμα καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ ἐπινοοῦσα τὸ τρίγωνον, ψιλὴ δὲ ἐπίνοια ἡ τὰ
ἀδύνατα τῇ φύσει ἀναπλαττομένη ὡς τραγέλαφον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.” My
translation. On the contrast with universals, see also David, In Isag., CAG
18.2: 116.10–15.
Notes 125
64. Ebbesen, The Chimera’s Diary, 38.

65. On the medieval notion of “object” (obiectum) more generally, see Dewan,
Obiectum; Kobusch, Objekt; Boulnois, Être, luire et concevoir.
66. See John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 28 (Vat. 6: 281.16–282.12).
67. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 66 (Vat. 6: 298.13–15): “‘esse intellectum’
est esse distinctum contra totum esse reale, tam quiditativum quam existen-
tiae.” My translation.
68. See John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 4, n. 260 (Vat. 3: 158.4–5),
quoted in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 227; see also
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 34 (Vat. 6: 284.10–13).
69. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 36 (Vat. 6: 285.6–19).
70. John Duns Scotus, Lect. I, d. 36, n. 26 (Vat. 17: 468.24–469.1).
71. Aristotle, Met. E.4, 1027b17–1028a6. See also Met. Δ.7, 1017a22–35.
72. See, for example, Francis of Prato, Tractatus de ente rationis, §3 (ed. Amerini
and Rode, 286–287): “[I]n books V and VI of the Metaphysics the Philosopher
divides being spoken of generally into being within the soul and being outside
the soul; by ‘being within the soul’ all philosophers and theologians under-
stand being of reason, and by ‘being outside the soul’ they understand real
being” (“Minor patet per Philosophum V et VI Metaphysicae, qui dividit ens
communiter dictum in ens in anima et ens extra animam, et per ens in anima
intelligunt omnes philosophi et doctores ens rationis, et per ens extra animam
intelligunt ens reale”). My translation.
73. On this difficult question, see especially Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 109–
110, and Biard, Intention et signification chez Guillaume d’Ockham, 202,
who both accept the identification. See also Maurer, Ens diminutum;
Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 40–41; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität
im Mittelalter, 223. Contrary to the position defended by Maurer, the fact that
cognized being is equated with being of reason does not entail that only sec-
ond intentions, or “concepts of concepts,” such as genus, species, etc., can be
cognized. As Perler rightly emphasizes, every item can be cognized: a stone, a
chimera, etc. What Scotus seems to maintain is that second intentions have
“being of reason” in the strong sense, since they cannot have real existence,
whereas the stone as thought about has “being of reason” in the weak sense,
since a stone can have real existence. For Scotus’s acceptance of degrees in
being of reason, see John Duns Scotus, In Isag., q. 6, n. 12 (OPh 1: 32.5–9), In
Met. 5, q. 4, n. 33 (OPh 3: 446.1–4), Ord. IV, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 184 (Vat. 11:
64.64–72), quoted and discussed by Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 109–110. On
second intentions in Scotus, see Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus.
74. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 34 (Vat. 6: 284.10–13): “Haec autem deter-
minatio ‘esse in opinione’ est deminuens (secundum Philosophum, ubi prius),
et sicut esse in opinione, ita et esse in intellectione, sive esse exemplatum, sive
esse cognitum, sive representatum – quae omnia aequivalent.” My translation.
75. On the medieval debates on the different senses of esse opinabile, see Ebbesen,
The Chimera’s Diary, 43–45.

77. John Duns Scotus, Lect. I, d. 36, n. 30 (Vat. 17: 471.1–3): “‘esse in opinione’
non concludit esse, sed permittit secum esse et non-esse.” My translation.
78. John Duns Scotus, Lect. I, d. 36, n. 26 (Vat. 17: 469.7–8): “illud quod obicitur
intellectui, tantum habet esse deminutum in intellectu.” My translation. See
also Lect. I, d. 36, n. 26 (Vat. 17: 469.1–8) and Ord. I, d. 36, n. 28 (Vat. 6:
281.18–282.2).
79. See John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, nn. 36, 44, and 54 (Vat. 6: 285.6–19,
288.10–12, 292.13–18), and Lect. I, d. 36, n. 30 (Vat. 17: 471.6–10). See also
In Met. 7, q. 18, n. 58 (OPh 4: 354.13–17), quoted in Pini, Scotus on Objective
Being, 354.
80. See Aristotle, Met. Δ.15, 1021a26–b3 (trans. Ross, in The Complete Works of
Aristotle) and Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, art. 7. On non-mutual relations,
see Henninger, Relations, 31–39; Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to
Saint Thomas Aquinas, 150–156; Vuillemin, La théorie des relations mixtes;
Demange, Accidents et relations non convertibles selon Thomas d’Aquin,
Pierre Olivi et Jean Duns Scot; Girard-Cédat, Is God Really Related to
Creatures?; Girard-Cédat, Le réalisme des relations. For a possible parallel
Augustinian source of the theory of non-mutual relations, see Augustine, De
Trinitate 5.16.17, quoted in Peter Lombard, Sententiae I, d. 30 (ed. Brady, 1:
220.1–222.25) and discussed in Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace, 108–112.
On relations more generally in medieval philosophy, see Schönberger,
Relation als Vergleich, 63–236; Brower, Medieval Theories of Relations
before Aquinas; Brower, Medieval Theories of Relations; Marmo, The
Theories of Relations in Medieval Commentaries on the Categories; Hansen,
Strange Finds; Girard-Cédat (ed.), Relations.
81. See especially Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus, q. 1, art. 4 (ed.
Dijs, 152.20–153.10, 154.12–23; ed. Doyle, 359–360, 361), q. 3, art. 1 (ed.
Doyle, 421), and q. 3, art. 2 (ed. Doyle, 430).
82. Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus, q. 4, art. 3 (ed. Doyle, 494). On
this question, see Taieb, The ‘Intellected Thing’ (res intellecta) in Hervaeus
Natalis. On intentionality in Hervaeus, see Amerini, Realism and Intentionality;
Dijs, Intentions in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century, and Hervaeus
Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic; Doyle, Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d.
1323) on Intentionality; Koridze, Intentionale Grundlegung der philoso-
phischen Logik, and Primae et secundae intentiones; Perler, Theorien der
Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 294–313; Piché, L’intuition du non-existant
selon Gérard de Bologne et Hervé de Nedellec.
83. See Pini, Scotus on Objective Being.
84. On this interpretation, see Sect. 3.2.3.2 below.
85. William of Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili, q. 1 (ed.
Ledoux, 13): “Relatio realis requirit fundamentum reale, quia relatio non est
perfectioris entitatis quam suum fundamentum et sic creatura habens ab aeterno
Notes 127
esse representatum, haberet ab aeterno entitatem realem, quod falsum est.” My

translation.
86. See James of Ascoli, Esse obiectivum, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Yokoyama, 50.197–
51.240). On James’s theory of intentionality, see Perler, Theorien der
Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 230–239.
87. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 35, n. 51 (Vat. 6: 267.8–9) and Rep. I-A, d. 36,
qq. 1–2 (ed. Noone, n. 54, 418.16–17; ed. Wolter and Bychkov, n. 65, 402).
Cf. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 228–230; King, Duns
Scotus on Mental Content, 82–85.
89. On the various meanings of res in Scotus, see John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 3,
§§2–6, nn. 6–26 (ed. Alluntis, 92–101).
90. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 66 (Vat. 6: 298.13–15): “‘esse intellectum’
est esse distinctum contra totum esse reale, tam quiditativum quam existen-
tiae.” My translation.
91. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 44 (Vat. 6: 288.9) and Lect. I, d. 36, n. 26
(Vat. 17: 468.23).
92. John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 1, q. 2, n. 93 (Vat. 7: 49.7–8): “Formaliter esse
cognitum non sit esse possibile, quia ‘esse cognitum’ est esse in actu secun-
dum quid.” My translation. The passage is quoted in Kobusch, Sein und
Sprache, 522 n188.
93. Ficta are accepted in William of Ockham, Ord. I, d. 2, q. 8 (OTh 2:
271.14–281.18).
94. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 3, sec. 14, art. 1, n. 31 (ed. Buytaert, 698.90–91).
95. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 124–125; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski,
106–107.
96. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 406.29–407.12.
97. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 407.4–12: “τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον, εἰ καὶ
ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πτῶσιν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ
καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει (πρὸς γὰρ δοτικὴν πτῶσιν ὁμοίως καὶ ταῦτα καὶ
ἐκεῖνα), ἀλλ’οὐχ ὡσαύτως λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι ὅμοιον
αὐτῷ λέγεται, ἀλλ’οὐ τῷ ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα κἀκεῖνο πρὸς
τοῦτο ὁμοίως λέγεται· ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν. τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν
αἰσθήσει αἰσθητὸν λέγεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ἐκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, τούτου εἶναι. τῷ γὰρ αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ εἶναι λέγεται τὸ
αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν· τὸ γὰρ ὁρατὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ὄψις.”
Trans. Dooley, in On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5, 88–89. See also Alexander of
Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 324.33–34.
98. On Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle’s third class of relations as account-
ing for “discrimination” (κρίσις), which is active, see Sect. 2.2.2 above.
99. See Dooley, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5, ad
409.23–25.
100. See William of Ockham, Ord. I, d. 2, q. 8 (OTh 2: 271.14–281.18). On this

issue, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 23–25, 37n17. See also Read, The
Objective Being of Ockham’s ficta; Adams, William Ockham, 75–83; Karger,
Théories de la pensée, de ses objets et de son discours chez Guillaume
d’Occam; Biard, Intention et signification chez Guillaume d’Ockham.
101. William of Ockham, Phys., q. 1 (OPh 6: 398.24) and Exp. in Perih., Prooemium,
§7 (OPh 2: 361.36).
102. William of Ockham, Quodl. IV, q. 35 (OTh 9: 473.84–88): “Tale fictum
impediet cognitionem rei; igitur non est ponendum propter cognitionem.
Assumptum patet, quia illud nec est cognitio nec albedo extra cognita nec
ambo simul, sed quoddam tertium medium inter cognitionem et rem; igitur si
illud fictum intelligitur, tunc res extra non intelligitur. Et tunc quando formo
hanc propositionem mentalem ‘Deus est trinus et unus’, non intelligo Deum
in se sed illud fictum, quod videtur absurdum.” My translation. The passage is
quoted in Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 38n30.
103. See also William of Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili, q. 1
(ed. Ledoux, 15–16); Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter,
239–245.
104. My description here is inspired by Doyle, Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic
Denomination in the Works of Francis Suárez, S.J., 125, quoted in de Libera,
Archéologie du sujet, tome 2: La quête de l’identité, 345.
105. William of Ockham, Ord. I, d. 43, q. 2 (OTh 4: 646.10–17): “Quia illud quod
per aliquem actum nullum esse formaliter recipit sed tantum denominatur
denominatione extrinseca, non producitur per talem actum. Sed creatura per
hoc quod intelligitur a Deo, nihil formaliter recipit sed tantum denominatur
quadam denominatione extrinseca. Sicut obiectum intellectus creati non pro-
ducitur per hoc quod intelligitur, sed tantum denominatur quadam extrinseca
denominatione. Igitur creatura in tali esse intelligibili non producitur.” My
translation. The passage is quoted in Hedwig, Über die moderne Rezeption
der Intentionalität, 226. On extrinsic denomination in Ockham’s psychology,
see also De Libera, Le direct et l’oblique, 337; on extrinsic denomination in
the history of intentionality more generally, De Libera, Dénomination extrin-
sèque et ‘changement cambridgien’; Archéologie du sujet, tome 2: La quête
de l’identité, 341–402. On Scotus, see Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
106. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 3, sect. 14, art. 1, n. 31 (ed. Buytaert, 698.90–91).
For a discussion of Auriol’s psychology, see Vanni Rovighi, L’intenzionalità
della conoscenza secondo Pietro Aureolo; Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the
Age of Ockham, esp. 85–112; Denery, The Appearance of Reality; Friedman,
Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars, and Act, Species, and
Appearance; Biard, La notion de presentialitas au XIVème siècle; Perler,
Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 255–294; Amerini, Realism and
Intentionality; Adriaenssen, Peter Auriol on the Intuitive Cognition of
Nonexistents. More generally, see Roos, Zur Begriffsgeschichte des Terminus
‘apparens’ in den logischen Schriften des ausgehenden 13. Jahrhunderts.
Notes 129
107. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 23, art. 2, n. 59 (ed. De Rijk, 714.1–7): “Denominari
ab aliquo non est esse presens aut apparens denominanti, sed nec esse in con-
spectu aut prospectu ipsius, et nec illi obici aut offerri; sicut patet quod Cesar
pictus non est presens aut apparens picture nec in conspectu aut prospectu
illius nec sibi obicitur aut offertur. Sed experientia docet quod res cognita est
apparens, presens, obiecta intelligenti necnon et in prospectu aut conspectu
illius. Ergo non habet ibi solum denominari, ymo aliquod esse intentionale.”
My translation. On these questions, see De Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome
3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution, 452–461. The fact that
Auriol is writing against Radulphus Brito is defended by, notably, Tachau,
Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, 188.
108. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.4.5 (Opera 26: 800a): “Quod vero ulterius dicitur,
transcendentalem respectum interdum esse posse ad ens rationis, est quidem
verum, quando ille respectus est ad aliquid, quod se habet per modum objecti,
in quo sufficit esse objectivum, ut possit habere rationem termini transcenden-
talis habitudinis.” My translation. On the intentional relation as a “transcen-
dental” relation, see Sect. 3.3.1 below.
109. On this theory, see Cesalli, Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of
Intentionality, 270.
110. On these issues, see especially Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphy-
sique, 157–182; Doyle, Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles; Doig, Suárez,
Descartes and the Objective Reality of Ideas; Gracia, Suárez’s Conception of
Metaphysics and Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism; Honnefelder, Scientia
transcendens, 215–217; Wells, Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited.
111. Francisco Suárez, DM 54.2.13 (Opera 26: 1021b): “Cavenda est aequivocatio,
quando agimus de esse cognito, aut aliis similibus denominationibus intellec-
tus.” My translation.
112. See especially Francisco Suárez, DM 6.6.10 (Opera 25: 228a), 47.15.13
(Opera 26: 842b–843a), 54.2.15–16 (Opera 26: 1022a–1023a), and 54.4.9
(Opera 26: 1030b–1031a), as well as the numerous other passages quoted in
Doyle, Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Works of
Francis Suárez, S.J. On beings of reason in Suárez, see Cantens, Suárez on
Beings of Reason; Novotný, Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel.
113. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.15.13 (Opera 26: 842b).
114. See Francisco Suárez, DM 2.1.1 (Opera 25: 64a–65b). For an interpretation
that rejects the reduction of esse obiective to an extrinsic denomination, see
Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, 182.
115. Francisco Suárez, DM 23.4.11 (Opera 25: 862a): “[…] esse obiective tantum
est cognosci.” My translation.
116. Francisco Suárez, DM 54.1.10 (Opera 26: 1018a): “[…] esse obiective tantum
in ratione non est esse, sed est cogitari aut fingi.” My translation.
117. Francisco Suárez, DM 31.2.7 (Opera 26: 231a). See also Doyle, Prolegomena
to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Works of Francis Suárez, S.J.,
147–148.
118. Caterus, Primae objectiones, AT 7: 92.14–22: “Sed quid est esse objective in
intellectu? Olim didici: est ipsum actum intellectus per modum objecti termi-
nare. Quod sane extrinseca denominatio est, et nihil rei. Sicut enim videri nihil
aliud est quam actum visionis in me tendere, ita cogitari, aut objective esse in
intellectu, est mentis cogitationem in se sistere et terminare; quod, re immota
immutataque, quin et non existente, fieri potest. Quid ergo causam ejus
inquiro, quod actu non est, quod nuda denominatio et nihil est?” Trans.
Cottingham et al., in Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2:
66–67 (modified). On Caterus, see Armogathe, Caterus’ Objections to God.
119. Aristotle, De int. 11, 21a32–33: “τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς
εἰπεῖν ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.” Trans.
Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle (slightly modified).
120. Aristotle, Met. Θ.8, 1050a34–35: “[…] μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν
ἐνέργειαν.” Trans. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle.
121. On Aristotle, see the discussion in Sect. 3.3.1 above. As I explained there,
when I hold that “x is thought about” does not posit x, this is true for intention-
ality understood as aboutness or as the pure aiming-at of mental activities.
This does not hold for the relation of reference, which accounts for the veridi-
cality of the act: “x is referred to” entails “x exists.”
122. Suárez, DM 54.4.9 (Opera 26: 1031a): “Quod etiam colligi potest ex doctrina
de relativis non mutuis data ab Aristotele V Metaph., c. 15.” My translation.
123. See especially Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 21.
124. On the “quasi-relative,” see Brentano, Psychologie II, Appendix, ed. Kraus,
134; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 392.
125. On the “discontinuist” and “continuist” interpretations of Brentano, see
Cesalli and Taieb, The Road to ideelle Verähnlichung.
126. See especially Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen V, §11 (Husserliana 19.2:
384.3–389.12; 1913 ed., 370–375); Logische Untersuchungen V, “Beilage zu
den Paragraphen 11 und 20” (Husserliana 19.2: 436.1–440.8; 1913 ed., 421–
425). On the connections between Husserl and Brentano regarding intention-
ality, see Morrison, Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality; Føllesdal,
Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception; Prechtl, Die
Struktur der Intentionalität bei Brentano und Husserl; Rigal, Les deux para-
digmes husserliens de l’objet intentionnel (Husserl et Brentano); English,
Pourquoi et comment Husserl en est venu à critiquer Brentano; Rollinger,
Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano; Seron, Intentionnalité, idéalité,
idéalisme; Fisette, Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences, and Brentano
et Husserl sur la perception sensible.
127. The following presentation of the two interpretations of Brentano’s theory of
intentionality takes up some elements from the first part (of which I was the
author) of Cesalli and Taieb, The Road to ideelle Verähnlichung.
128. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 124, 137, vi; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski,
106, 115, 9. My translation.
Notes 131
129. Brentano, M 32, Vom Relativen, 1889, n. 30285: “Correlative Begriffe sind
solche, welche ohne einander nicht gedacht werden können und von welchen
die Gegenstände ohne einander nicht bestehen können, obwohl keiner den
anderen einschließt und keiner den anderen inhaltlich gleich ist.” My transla-
tion. See also Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, 45 (quoted in Sauer, Die
Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 5); Aristoteles und seine
Weltanschauung, 34–35; Abstraktion und Relation, 469–470.
130. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 21: “Vor allem also ist es eine Eigenheit,
welche für das Bewußtsein allgemein charakteristisch ist, daß es immer und
überall, d.h. in jedem seiner ablösbaren Teile eine gewisse Art von Relation
zeigt, welche ein Subjekt zu einem Objekt in Beziehung setzt. Man nennt sie
auch ‘intentionale Beziehung’. Zu jedem Bewußtsein gehört wesentlich eine
Beziehung. Wie bei jeder Beziehung finden sich daher auch hier zwei
Korrelate. Das eine Korrelat ist der Bewußtseinsakt, das andere das, worauf er
gerichtet ist. Sehen und Gesehenes, Vorstellen und Vorgestelltes, Wollen und
Gewolltes, Lieben und Geliebtes, Leugnen und Geleugnetes, usw. Bei diesen
Korrelaten zeigt sich, wie schon Aristoteles hervorhob, die Eigentümlichkeit,
daß das eine real, das andere dagegen nichts reales ist.” Trans. Müller, in
Descriptive Psychology, 23–24 (slightly modified). On the notion of correla-
tional intentionality, see again Cesalli, Objects and Relations in Correlational
Theories of Intentionality, 270.
131. See Brentano, Psychologie II, ed. Kraus, 61n1; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski,
240n255. On these issues, see also Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und
Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, 12–13; Twardowski, Issues in the Logic of
Adjectives, 28–30. Cf. the discussion in Benoist, Modes temporels de la con-
science et réalité du temps, 13, which I follow here. On modifying terms in the
Austro-German tradition, see Van der Schaar, Kazimierz Twardowski, 35–49;
Claas and Schnieder, Determining and Modifying Attributes.
132. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 21: “So wenig ein gewesener Mensch, so
wenig ist ein gedachter etwas Reales. Der gedachte Mensch hat darum auch
keine eigentliche Ursache und kann nicht eigentlich eine Wirkung üben,
sondern indem der Bewußtseinsakt, das Denken des Menschen gewirkt wird,
ist der gedachte Mensch, sein nichtreales Korrelat, mit da.” Trans. Müller, in
Descriptive Psychology, 24 (slightly modified).
133. See Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, not dated, n. 51075, and Abstraktion
und Relation, 466–467. Cf. Chrudzimski, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos,
138–139. This part of manuscript Ps 34 is not dated, but since it is in Brentano’s
own hand it is probably not from later than 1904, since at this time Brentano,
who was apparently still writing, began to dictate because of increasing prob-
lems with his sight (see the letter from Marty of 18 September 1904, in
Brentano, Abkehr, 110); because of these problems, he was barely able to read
in 1905–1906 (see Chisholm and Marek, Einleitung der Herausgeber, 1). In
view of the materials used (pen, ink, and paper), Guillaume Fréchette (whom
I thank for his help) dates this manuscript to the end of the 1890s or the begin-
ning of the 1900s.
134. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, not dated, n. 51076: “Den Unterschied
den wir oben zwischen wirklichen und unwirklichen Seienden machten,
entspricht dem, welchem die Scholastiker zwischen ens reale und ens rationis
machten.” My translation; the underlining is Brentano’s. This passage of manu-
script Ps 34 is not dated, but given its similarity to manuscript Ps 21,
“Abstraktion” (Brentano, Abstraktion und Relation, ed. Fréchette; see p. 470 for
the present passage), which is dated to 1899, it must be from the same period
(note that Ps 21 is identical to EL 87, “Gegenstand – Wirklichkeit – Seiendes –
Relation: Vor 1903,” as pointed out by Fréchette, Editorial Remarks, 421).
135. Brentano, Abkehr, 340.
136. Chisholm, Intentionality, 201.
137. Smith, Austrian Philosophy, 44. The distinction between specific mode of
being and specific type of entity, as well as the interdependent character of
these two in Brentano, are discussed by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski; see espe-
cially Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 119–120.
See also Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano.
138. See Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie, part 1, §1, 9; Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand,
Anmerkungen der Herausgeber, 262; Kraus, Anmerkungen des Herausgebers,
192; Chisholm and Baumgartner, Einleitung der Herausgeber, xiii; Mulligan
and Smith, Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind, 637; Smith, Austrian
Philosophy, 55–56; Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen
Brentano, 21–22, and Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, 155–156.
139. I borrow the expression “demodify” from Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie
beim frühen Brentano, 82, and Antonelli, Franz Brentano et l”inexistence
intentionnelle’, 482.
140. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 27: “‘Gesehene Farbe’ enthält gewisser-
maßen Farbe in sich, nicht als distinktioneller Teil im eigentlichen Sinn,
sondern als ein durch modifizierende Distinktion daraus zu gewinnender
Teil.” Trans. Müller, in Descriptive Psychology, 29.
141. See Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 82. On the
non-predicative theory of judgement in Brentano, according to which judg-
ment is a specific mode of relation to the object, namely, one of either “accep-
tance” (Anerkennung) or “rejection” (Verwerfung), see Brandl, Brentanos
Urteilslehre, and Brentano’s Theory of Judgement; Simons, Judging Correctly;
Parsons, Brentano on Judgement and Truth.
142. Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 106.
143. Cf., in the notes for the lectures on logic, Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger,
35. For a precise dating of these notes, which were first drafted in Würzburg
in 1869–1870, but parts of which were composed later, see Rollinger, Editor’s
Preface. See also Brentano, Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, 47 and Abstraktion
und Relation, 467–468. On Thomas Reid’s role in the development of the
distinction between “external object” and “immediate object,” see de Libera,
Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution,
600–607.
Notes 133
144. Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 33–37 and 39–41.

145. Among his contemporaries, Alois Höfler reproached Brentano for confusing
between content and object (cf. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 87 and
Abkehr, 119). According to Höfler, content and object must be strictly distin-
guished: the former is relative to the act, the latter is not. See Höfler, Sind wir
Psychologisten?, 327: “But ‘content’ is clearly correlative with ‘act.’”
(“‘Inhalt’ aber ist schlechterdings korrelativ zu ‘Akt’”). See also Höfler, Logik,
6: “To every presenting or judging, or act of presentation or of judgement,
there corresponds something presented or judged, or a content of presentation
or judgement.” (“Jedem Vorstellen und Urteilen, oder Vorstellungs- und
Urtheils-Act, entspricht ein Vorgestelltes und Geurtheiltes, oder Vorstellungs-
und Urtheils-Inhalt”). According to Höfler’s testimony, Brentano rejected this
distinction. See Höfler, Sind wir Psychologisten?, 327n2: “Despite Brentano,
who not only takes ‘content’ and ‘intentional object’ as synonymous, but also
at that time explicitly rejected the thoughts I expressed against this, with the
words ‘In what would there be any difference?’” (“Trotz Brentano, der nicht
nur überall ‘Inhalt’ und ‘intentionales Objekt’ gleichbedeutend nimmt,
sondern meine schon damals hiergegen geäusserten Bedenken mit den Worten:
‘Was sollte das für ein Unterschied sein?’ ausdrücklich zurückwies”). My
translations.
146. The ontological and psychological aspects of reism are distinguished by
Antonelli, Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz
Brentano, 267. On Brentano’s reism, see Kotarbinski, Franz Brentano comme
réiste; Körner, Über Brentanos Reismus und die extensionale Logik;
Chrudzimski, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos; Chrudzimski and Smith,
Brentano’s Ontology; Courtine, Brentano et l’ontologie.
147. Brentano, Psychologie II, Appendix, ed. Kraus, 134; ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 391: “Ganz anders ist es dagegen bei der psychischen Beziehung.
Denkt einer etwas, so muß zwar das Denkende, keineswegs aber das Objekt
seines Denkens existieren.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint, 212 (slightly modified).
149. Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 21–22 and 234;
see also Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 21.
150. See Brentano, Psychologie II, Appendix, ed. Kraus, 134; ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 392. It should be noted that Brentano modifies the identity of
the “thinking correlate”: in his lectures on descriptive psychology he says that
this correlate is “the cognitive act” (der Bewußtseinakt; see Brentano,
Deskriptive Psychologie, 21), but here he asserts that the correlate is “the
thinking being” (das Denkende).
151. Chisholm, Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional, 15 and
Intentionality, 202; Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen
Brentano, 235 and Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, 190; Chrudzimski and
Smith, Brentano’s Ontology, 215.
152. Chrudzimski and Smith, Brentano’s Ontology, 216. On the “grammar” of

intentionality, see Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano,
240.
153. See Hedwig, Über das intentionale Korrelatenpaar; McAlister, Brentano’s
Epistemology; Kent, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness.
154. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 130–131; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski,
110: “Nur wenn das Vorgestellt-sein als ein Moment in der Farbe enthalten
wäre, so etwa wie eine gewisse Qualität und Intensität in ihr enthalten ist,
würde eine nicht vorgestellte Farbe einen Widerspruch besagen, da ein Ganzes
ohne einen seiner Theile in Wahrheit ein Widerspruch ist. Dieses aber ist
offenbar nicht der Fall.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint, 93 (slightly modified).
“[…] with the immanent object of sensation, i.e. with the physical phenome-
non to which the act of sensation is referred as to its primary object” (“[…]
mit dem immanenten Gegenstande der Empfindung, mit dem physischen
Phänomene […], auf welches der Empfindungsact als auf sein primäres
Object gerichtet ist”). Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
156. See Antonelli, Franz Brentano et l”inexistence intentionnelle,’ 475–476 and
Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, xxxiv–xxxv; Sauer, Die
Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 12n10.
“Der Begriff Ton ist kein relativer Begriff.” Trans. Rancurello et al, in
158. For the development of this argument, see Sect. 3.2.3 above.
159. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 88–89 and Abkehr, 120: “Das ‘gedachte
Pferd’ als Objekt genommen, wäre Gegenstand der inneren Wahrnehmung,
die das Denkende wahrnimmt, wenn dies mit dem Gedachten ein Paar
Korrelative bildete, da Korrelative ohne einander nicht wahrnehmbar sind.
Das, was als primäres Objekt empfunden oder vom Verstand universell als
primäres Objekt gedacht wird, ist aber doch nicht Gegenstand der inneren
Wahrnehmung. Entweder müßte ich der primären Vorstellungsbeziehung gar
kein Objekt und gar keinen Inhalt zugeschrieben haben, oder ich konnte ihn
nicht = ‘gedachtes Objekt’ gleichgesetzt haben.” Trans. Chisholm et al., in
The True and the Evident, 53 (slightly modified).
160. Fréchette, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited).
161. See Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 10.
Antonelli, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, xxxix, and Franz
Brentano et l”inexistence’ intentionnelle, 79.
162. See Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 79.
163. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 24: “Das Gebiet, für welches die bejahende
Beurteilungsweise die passende ist, nennen wir nun das Gebiet des
Notes 135
Existierenden, ein Begriff, der also wohl zu unterscheiden ist von dem Begriffe
des Dinglichen, Wesenhaften, Realen; das Gebiet, für welches die verneinende
Beurteilungsweise die passende ist, nennen wir das des Nichtexistierenden.”
Trans. Chisholm et al., in The True and the Evident, 14 (slightly modified).
According to Mauro Antonelli, this does not entail the reduction of existence
to psychic acts. Antonelli, Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk
von Franz Brentano, 411n149: “Das Gebiet des Existierenden, worunter die
Urteilsinhalte als Wahrmacher der jeweiligen Urteile fallen, ist natürlich
ontologisch von der Urteilsfunktion als solcher unabhängig. Der Begriff des
Existierenden kann allerdings nur durch Reflexion auf ein wahres affirmatives
Urteil gebildet werden.” On existence in Brentano, see also Vallicella,
Brentano on Existence; Kriegel, How to Speak of Existence; Textor, Towards
a Neo-Brentanian Theory of Existence.
164. Antonelli, Franz Brentano et l”inexistence intentionnelle’, 479.
165. Kent, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, 44 and 33. Cf.
Antonelli, Franz Brentano et l’inexistence intentionnelle, 483–484, who refers
to this interpretation and accepts it. It seems to me that Sauer and Fréchette
would also accept it.
166. Aristotle, Met. Δ.15, 1021a29–30. Trans. Ross, in Complete Works of Aristotle.
167. Brentano, Kategorienlehre, 15: “Daraufhin behandelt man sprachlich den Fall
so, als ob es sich um eine Relation zwischen zwei Dingen handelte, und kehrt
diese Relation um, indem man den Unterschied der aktiven und passiven
Verbalform benützt, obwohl es sich um kein Tun und Leiden handelt. So ers-
cheint denn sprachlich das, was einer denkt, ganz so behandelt, als wäre es
wie er selbst, und es kommt zu dem Gebrauche des Seienden im uneigentli-
chen Sinne.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 22.
168. Cf. Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 22. Note
that a similar interpretation of this sentence from Aristotle is found in Gregory
of Rimini, In I Sent., dd. 28–32, q. 3 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino,
177.14–178.7).
169. Brentano, Abkehr, 369: “Sage ich: ‘Gedachtes Rotes ist’ und ‘ein Rotdenkendes
ist’, so sage ich dasselbe.” My translation, with hyphens used to mark that Rot,
in Rotdenkendes, seems to refer to a qualification of the thinking, and not to an
object. Cf. Brentano, Abkehr, 339. This idea can already be found in the young
Brentano in the lectures on metaphysics given in Würzburg starting in 1867.
Brentano, M 96, Ontologie (Metaphysik) (1867 or after), lecture 38 (quoted
and dated in Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 242,
and Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, 78 and 70): “And for ‘A dog is thought
about’ I cannot say in its place ‘There is a thought-about dog’, but I can say
‘There is someone thinking about a dog.’” (“Auch bei ‘Ein Hund ist gedacht’
kann ich nicht statt dessen ‘Ein gedachter Hund ist’, wohl aber ‘Ein einen Hund
Denkender ist’ sagen”; my translation). In these lectures, the non-existence of
the term or its “objective” aspect entails the unreality of the relation that is
directed at it. Brentano, M 96, Ontologie (Metaphysik) (1867 or after), lecture
47 (quoted and dated in Chrudzimski, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, 110):

“Distinction between real and non-real relations. The non-real ones a) on
account of the absence of a term, b) of which the term is an objective.”
(“Scheidung realer und nicht realer Relationen. Die nicht realen a) wegen
Mangels eines Terminus, b) deren Terminus Objektivum […]”; my
translation).
170. Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 24, and more
generally 21–25. My reading of Met. Δ.15 in Sect. 3.3.1 above is based on
Sauer’s interpretation.
171. Hedwig, Über das intentionale Korrelatenpaar, 57n12 and 58n23; Antonelli,
Franz Brentano et l”inexistence intentionnelle’, 484n48; de Libera, Le direct
et l’oblique, 330–333. The text of Aquinas that is referred to is ST I, q. 13,
art. 7.
172. See Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
173. De Libera, Le direct et l’oblique, 332.
174. See Pini, Scotus on Objective Being, discussed in Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
175. Antonelli, Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz
Brentano, 390–395 and 398. See also Sauer, Die Einheit der
Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 23.
176. Antonelli, Thoughts Concerning Anton Marty’s Early Conception of
Intentionality.
177. Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 23.
178. On Brentano’s critical analysis of language, see Haller, Brentanos Sprachkritik;
Benoist, Sprachkritik ou sémantique.
179. In addition to Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 80n6; Psychologie I, ed.
Kraus, 125n1 and ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 106n67; Vom Ursprung sittli-
cher Erkenntnis, ed. Kraus, 54n19 and ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 62n19, all
quoted at the beginning of this chapter.
180. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 146: “Wir wollen es der Kürze und
Deutlichkeit Rechnung tragend Gegenständlichhaben und das Korrelat
Gegenständlichsein nennen.” Trans. Müller, in Descriptive Psychology, 155
(my addition).
181. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 81: “[…] die Objektiva (wie Gedachtes,
Geliebtes).” My translation.
182. Brentano, Abkehr, 339: “[…] kein Denkendes ohne Gedachtes, kein psy-
chisches Subjekt ohne Objekt […].” My translation.
183. Brentano, Abkehr, 350: “Dann wären die Hauptklassen des sog. Nichtrealen
zu scheiden: […] alle Objektiva (Gegenstände als Gegenstände).” My
translation.
184. Brentano, Psychologie II, ed. Kraus, 8n3; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 303n8:
“Die Scholastiker gebrauchen weit häufiger noch statt ‘intentional’ den
Ausdruck ‘objektiv’. In der Tat handelt es sich darum, daß etwas für das psy-
chisch Tätige Objekt und als solches, sei es als bloß gedacht oder sei es auch als
Notes 137
begehrt, geflohen oder dergleichen, gewissermaßen in seinem Bewußtsein

gegenwärtig ist.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, 180.
185. Brentano, Psychologie II, ed. Kraus, 162; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 412:
“[…] die Objekte als Objekte, wie Anerkanntes, Geleugnetes, Geliebtes,
Gehaßtes, Vorgestelltes […].” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an
186. Brentano, Abkehr, 393: “Vor allem finden wir da die Gruppe des als
Gegenstand Seienden, wie das Vorgestellte, urteilend Anerkannte und
Verworfene, Geliebte und Gehaßte, in mannigfachsten Modifikationen.” My
translation.
187. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik’, 1915, nn. 30874–30876: “Das sog. ens
rationis. 24. Verschiedene Klassen desselben. […] 29. Ebenso bezeichenen
die Ausdrücke ‘Gedachtes’, ‘Anerkanntes’, ‘Geleugnetes’, ‘Mit recht
Geleugnetes’, ‘Geliebtes’, ‘mit recht Geliebtes’ u. drgl. – entia rationis. Man
kann nicht etwas als gedacht vorstellen, sondern als Denkendes, wobei dann
das Ding, das das Denkende denkt, in modo obliquo vorgestellt wird. Man
würde irren, wenn man meinte, das in modo obliquo Gedachte Objekt sei das
gedachte Ding als Gedachtes, z.B. wenn einer einen Tisch denkt, ein gedachter
Tisch, vielmehr ist es ein Tisch. Wir können diese Klassen nach einem schon
im Mittelalter üblichen Ausdruck als die Klasse des ‘Intentionalen’ bezeich-
nen. (Eine andere, damals übliche, Bezeichnung als Klasse des ‘Objektiven’
d.h. als Gegenstand eines Denkenden Bestehenden, würde heutzutage sehr
missverständlich sein. […]).” My translation. For other unpublished texts of
Brentano where the correlate and the intentional object are explicitly identi-
fied, see Ierna, Improper Intentions of Ambiguous Objects. In the article “The
Road to ideelle Verähnlichung,” of which I was co-author with Laurent Cesalli,
we defended the strict distinction between correlate and intentional object in
Brentano, but here I wish to distance myself from that conclusion.
188. Bain, Mental and Moral Science, 198. On the importance of Brentano’s cri-
tique of Bain in the overall development of the Psychologie, see de Libera,
L’ouverture écossaise.
“[…] denn einmal ist nicht jedes Denken eine Wahrnehmung; und dann, selbst
wenn dies der Fall wäre, würde nur folgen, dass einer nur an von ihm wahr
genommene Bäume, nicht aber, dass er nur an Bäume als von ihm wahrgenom-
mene denken könne. Ein weisses Stück Zucker schmecken, heisst nicht, ein
Stück Zucker als weisses schmecken.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint, 71 (slightly modified; Brentano’s emphasis).
“[…] die Unterordnung des Begriffspaares, Hören und Tönen, und das des
Leidens und Wirkens [ist] gänzlich verfehlt.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 101 (slightly modified).
“Der Begriff Ton ist kein relativer Begriff.” Trans. Rancurello et al, in
192. Brentano, T S 14, Realität und Intentionalität (Neue Theorie der Zeit, Neue
Theorie der Relation), n. 85283 (quoted in Chrudzimski, Die Ontologie Franz
Brentanos, 199; the manuscript is dated to 1893): “Was ist das Gemeinsame
des Nichtrealen? – Ich glaube sagen zu können: ein intentional objektives
Moment im Begriff.” My translation.
193. Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 106.
194. Brentano, Psychologie II, ed. Kraus, 38; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 223.
Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 201.
195. Note that the priority here is logical, not temporal.
196. On the external object, see Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger, 35, quoted
in Sect. 3.2.3.1 above.
197. See Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 87–89; Abkehr, 119–121.
198. Marty, Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik
und Psychologie, 5th art., 443–445 (Gesammelte Schriften 2.1: 165–166):
“Der immanente Gegenstand existiert, so oft der betreffende Bewußtseinsakt
wirklich ist. Denn es gibt kein Bewußtsein ohne ein ihm immanentes Objekt;
das eine ist ein Korrelat des anderen. Der Gegenstand schlechtweg dagegen,
z.B. das Vorgestellte schlechtweg kann existieren oder auch nicht existieren.
Ist meine Vorstellung z.B. der Begriff Pferd, so existiert der Gegenstand. Ist es
die Vorstellung eines Zentaurs, so existiert das Vorgestellte nicht; obwohl es
als Vorgestelltes natürlich auch in diesem Falle anzuerkennen ist—hätten wir
ja sonst eben nicht ‘die Vorstellung des Zentaurs’, womit doch nichts anderes
gemeint ist, als daß der Zentaur als Vorgestelltes in uns sei. […] wenn ich
sage: ein Pferd, ein Kreis ist. Es ist nicht ein vorgestelltes Pferd, sondern ein
Pferd anerkannt—nicht der vorgestellte Gegenstand als solcher, sondern der
Gegenstand schlechtweg.” My translation. On Marty’s theory of intentional-
ity, see Smith, Austrian Philosophy, 111–115; Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in
the School of Brentano, 209–220; Chrudzimski, Die Intentionalitätstheorie
Anton Martys; Antonelli, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty,
xxix–xlviii, and Thoughts Concerning Anton Marty’s Early Conception of
Intentionality; Majolino, Talking about Intentionality. See also Cesalli and
Taieb, The Road to ideelle Verähnlichung, in which this passage of Marty is
quoted and discussed.
199. On similar distinctions and discussions, see Höfler, Logik, 6–7; Kerry, Ueber
Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung, 8th art., 135; Hillebrand, Die
neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse, 36–38; Twardowski, Zur Lehre
vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, 4, 29–34, and 40; Meinong,
Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren
Wahrnehmung, 186–187 (Gesamtausgabe 2: 382–383). For a detailed presen-
tation, see Taieb, Austro-German Transcendent Objects before Husserl.
200. Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger, 28.
Notes 139
201. Brentano, Abkehr, 393; Wahrheit und Evidenz, 81; Abkehr, 350 (quoted in
Sect. 3.2.3.3 above).
202. Here I leave open a difficult question: Brentano’s “object tout court,” or “the
presented as that as which it is presented,” does not seem to me to be an extra-
psychic entity taken with all its determinations, but rather an extrapsychic
entity taken with the determinations that correspond to the content of a given
presentation (see Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger, 41), which also
explains the meaning of the phrase “as that as which” (als das, als was). For
example, for Napoleon the “object tout court” or “the presented as that as
which it is presented” can be, for example, “the victor at Jena,” “the one
defeated at Waterloo,” or “a thing,” which correspond respectively to the psy-
chic contents “the thought-about-victor-at-Jena,” “the thought-about-one-
defeated-at-Waterloo,” or “a thought-about-thing.” One should therefore
consider what differences there are as such between Brentano’s “object tout
court” or “the presented as that as which it is presented,” and Marty’s “object
tout court” or “the presented tout court.” For information about Brentano’s
descriptivism, see Brentano, Abstraktion und Relation, 467–468; Chrudzimski,
Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 37–39.
203. Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und
Sprachphilosophie, 395: “Aber ist es nicht ebenso eine Täuschung, zu meinen,
daß der sog. mentale Gegenstand das Bewußtsein vom wirklichen vermittle?”
My translation; the emphasis is Marty’s. This text is discussed in Cesalli and
Taieb, The road to ideelle Verähnlichung, 199.
204. Marty, Raum und Zeit, 57. On this text, see also Cesalli and Taieb, The Road
to ideelle Verähnlichung, 199.
205. Brentano, Abkehr, 282: “Wenn ich sage, jeder Vorstellende stelle Etwas vor
und das liege im Begriff des Vorstellenden, und wenn ich sage, damit dieser
Begriff ein einheitlicher sei, müsse auch das ‘Etwas’ eindeutig sein, so haben
Sie schon früher dem Etwas den Sinn von ‘Objekt’, das heisst also hier von
Vorgestelltes geben wollen, worauf ich gezeigt habe, daß das nicht angehe.
Nichtsdestoweniger fallen Sie jetzt wieder darauf zurück. Vielleicht wird
meine frühere Widerlegung nachhaltigeren Eindruck machen, wenn ich sage,
wer Etwas vorstelle, stelle Etwas als Etwas vor. Dann werden Sie doch wohl
erkennen, daß dieses letzte Etwas wenigstens nicht die Bedeutung von
Vorgestelltes haben kann. Es ist ja doch auch ein Unterschied, ob einer einen
Teufel als Teufel oder als vorgestellten Teufel anerkennt. Das letztere ist gar
nicht Anerkennung des Teufels zu nennen.” My translation.
206. This emerges especially in Brentano, Psychologie II, Appendix, ed. Kraus,
133–134; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 391. On the problem of the intentional
relation to a non-existent object, which preoccupied the whole school of
Brentano, see Benoist, Représentations sans objet; Fréchette, Gegenstandslose
Vorstellungen. On the notion of “presentations without an object,” see
Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre I, §67. For a recent defence of Bolzano on this
question, see Centrone, Relational Theories of Intentionality and the Problem
of Non-Existents.
207. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, not dated [around 1899], n. 51076: “Im
Fall des Vorstellenden und Vorgestellten haben wir es mit einem Wirklichen
und einem Unwirklichen zu thun. Man nennt die eine eine relatio realis, die
andere eine relatio rationis.” My translation.
208. Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 22, rightly
insists that the converse of the intentional relation, namely, “is thought about,”
should not involve positing the existence of the object or relatum. Brentano at
first succeeded only in avoiding positing its real existence.
209. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 21: “[…] indem der Bewußtseinsakt, das
Denken des Menschen gewirkt wird, ist der gedachte Mensch, sein nichtreales
Korrelat, mit da.” Trans. Müller, in Descriptive Psychology, 24 (slightly
modified).
210. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51001–51002: “Das
Vorstellende wird sehr mißverständlich Subjekt genannt; man sollte es das
Objektivierende oder Objizierende nennen, denn das Objekt als objektiviertes
objiziertes correlatio ist.” My translation. It should be noted however that this
passage is taken from the part of the manuscript dating from Brentano’s reist
period.
211. On this issue in Scotus, see the discussion in Sect. 3.2.1.2 above on Pini,
Scotus on Objective Being.
238): “Wenn man fragt, was eine relative Bestimmung im unterschied von
einer absoluten sei, so ist zu antworten, dass wenn man eine relative
Bestimmung in recto vorstellt, immer auch etwas in obliquo vorgestellt wird,
so stellt einer, der einen Sehenden denkt in obliquo auch ein Farbiges vor, das
von dem Sehenden gesehen wird. Wenn das in recto Vorgestellte eine relative
Bestimmung ist, welche für die Substanz reale Bedeutung hat, so kann die
korrelative Bestimmung eine blosse denominatio extrinseca sein. So z.B. ist
das Korrelat des Denkenden das Gedachte und an dem gedachten Ding wird
dadurch, dass es gedacht wird, nichts geändert; ja, es braucht nicht einmal zu
sein, um gedacht zu sein.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of
Categories, 171.
213. On this interpretation of Aristotle, see Sect. 3.3.1 above.
214. Caterus, Primae objectiones, AT 7: 92.14–22. Trans. Cottingham et al., in
Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2: 66–67. On the notions
of “precedent” and “precursor,” see Longworth, Grice and Marty on
Expression, quoted in the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
215. For discussion of this question in Scotus, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.
216. On intuitive cognition, see Day, Intuitive Cognition; Bérubé, La connaissance
de l’individuel au Moyen âge, 176–224; Wolter, Duns Scotus on Intuition,
Memory and Knowledge of Individuals; Dumont, Theology as a Science and
Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition; de
Libera, La querelle des universaux, 324–329; Boulnois, Être et représentation,
133–150; Pasnau, Cognition; Chabada, Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva;
Notes 141
Sondag, Jean Duns Scot sur la connaissance intuitive intellectuelle; Pini,

Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts.
217. For more on intuitive vs. abstractive cognition, see Sect. 4.1.2 below.
218. See John Duns Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 13, discussed in Sect. 4.1.2 below.
219. William of Ockham, Ord. I, prologus, q. 1 (OTh 1: 37.11–12): “relatio realis,
secundum istos, non potest terminari ad non-ens.”
220. William of Ockham, Ord. I, prologus, q. 1 (OTh 1: 39.11–16): “Patet etiam
quod res non exsistens potest cognosci intuitive, quantumcumque primum
obiectum illius actus non exsistat, − contra opinionem aliquorum, − quia visio
coloris sensitiva potest conservari a Deo ipso colore non exsistente; et tamen
ista visio terminatur ad colorem tamquam ad primum obiectum, et eadem
ratione visio intellectiva.” My translation.
221. For a presentation of late medieval debates on the absolute or relational status
of cognitive acts, see Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham.
222. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 2, art. 3, nn. 82–86 (ed. Buytaert,
198.48–199.85). See also Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 3, sect. 14, art. 1, n. 31
(ed. Buytaert, 696.3–698.94), discussed in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität
im Mittelalter, 274–283.
223. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, 163.
224. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, q. 2, art. 3, nn. 93–94 (ed. Buytaert,
201.139–202.176).
225. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 35, pars 1, art. 1 (ed. Friedman, 7.316–10.506).
226. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 30, pars 1, art. 2 (Rome ed., 672aB–D): “Relatio
scientiae ad scibile, et sensus ad sensibile, et sic de omnibus, quae referuntur,
ut mensuratum ad mensuram, non sunt in rebus. Impossibile est enim, ali-
quam rem dependere a non re, alioquin dependeret res a nihilo, quod idem est
cum non dependere ab alio, vel a nullo, et ita eadem res esset dependens, et
non dependens: sed manifestum est, quod relatio scientiae ad scibile, vel actus
intellectus ad intelligibile, aut visionis ad visibile, et sic de aliis mensuratis
dependet a non re, quoniam scibile non oportet, quod sit in actu, scientia man-
ente, nec intelligibile, dum intelligitur, nec sensibile, dum sentitur, immo sci-
entia potest manere re destructa, et penitus adnihilata, et actus intellectionis
transit super res nullo modo existentes, similiter et visio saltem per divinam
potentiam posset manere adnihilato visibili, ut supra in Prologo dictum extitit
quaest. 2. Ergo impossibile est, quod relatio scientiae ad scibile, intellectionis
ad intelligibile, et visionis ad visibile sit aliquid in re existens.” My transla-
tion. On the fact that the discussion is restricted to cognition in creatures, see
Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 35, pars 1, responsio (ed. Friedman, 29.1486–1491).
I will not consider Auriol’s account of divine cognition (on this question, see
also the last text quoted).
227. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 30, pars 1, art. 2 (Rome ed. 673aF). On Auriol’s
conceptualism about relations, see Henninger, Relations, 150–173; Henninger,
A Medieval Debate over Relations. On relations in Auriol, see also Dewender,
Der ontologische Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St.-Pourçain,

Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli; Girard-Cédat, Le réalisme des
relations.
228. See Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 264–266.
229. On these questions, see especially Peter Auriol, Scriptum, d. 30, pars 2, art. 1
(Rome ed., 698aC–699aC). These analyses are developed in more detail in my
paper “What is Cognition? Peter Auriol’s Account.”
230. Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus, q. 5, art. 1 (ed. Doyle, 543, 545):
“Forte non habet semper veritatem universaliter, quod, scilicet, scientia reali-
ter referatur ad suum objectum, vel etiam quod iste actus intelligendi referatur
realiter semper ad suum obiectum formale, alioquin aliquid referatur realiter
ad privationem. […] Tractare autem de hoc, quomodo scientia referatur ad
scibile, et quomodo non, requirent valde magnum tractatum.” Trans. Doyle, in
On Second Intentions, 272, 273 (slightly modified).
231. Francis of Prato, Tractatus de ente rationis, §83 (ed. Amerini and Rode, 306):
“Scientia refertur realiter ad suum scibile quando scibile est ens reale. Sed
quando scibile est ens rationis, tunc scientia refertur secundum rationem.” My
translation. On Francis of Prato, see Amerini, Introduzione; Amerini and
Rode, A Brief Historical Sketch of the Concept of Being of Reason. On
Scotus, see the discussion in Sect. 4.1.2 below.
232. Francis of Meyronnes, Conflatus, prologus, q. 18 (Venice ed., 10P): “Actus
intelligendi et notitia sunt duo: actus autem intelligendi est qualitas et non
dicit perfectionem simpliciter; notitia autem dicit respectum ad obiectum et
est perfectio simpliciter.” My translation. This passage is quoted in Cesalli,
Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality, 271. On
Francis of Meyronnes, see, in addition to Cesalli’s article, Maurer, Francis of
Meyronnes’ Defense of Epistemological Realism; Möhle, Formalitas und
modus intrinsecus.
233. Francis of Meyronnes, Quodl. VII, punctus 16 (ed. Novák and Cuhrová,
236.7–10): “Et si dicitur, quod ille est actus positivus, quo intelliguntur entia
prohibita, dicitur quod ille terminatur ad partes, ut sunt entia ad compositio-
nem, quae est in non prohibitis. Et forte puram nihilitatem per se non intel-
ligit.” My translation. “Prohibited beings” are those whose parts cannot be put
together in reality, that is, impossible beings. On this question, see Francis of
Meyronnes, Quodl. VII, punctus 7 (ed. Novák and Cuhrová, 228.13–229.12).
234. See Gregory of Rimini, In I Sent., dd. 28–32, q. 3 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino,
166.16–169.10).
235. The notion of the transcendental relation has been studied, in Albert the Great,
by Marinozzi, La relazione trascendentale in S. Alberto Magno; its presence
in Thomas Aquinas is denied by Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez
Saint Thomas. On the transcendental relation in late scholasticism and Suárez,
see Schmutz, La querelle des possibles; Castellote Cubells, Grundzüge der
Disputationes Metaphysicae des Suárez; Secada, Suárez on the Ontology of
Notes 143
Relations; and Penner, Suárez on the Reduction of Categorical Relations, who

deplores the lack of studies on this topic.
236. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.3.10 (Opera 26: 797b): “[…] dividitur relatio realis
et secundum esse, in transcendentalem et praedicamentalem.” Trans. Doyle,
in On Real Relation, 87 (modified).
237. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.4.16 (Opera 26: 803a–b): “[…] respectus transcen-
dentales, etiamsi vere sint in rebus secundum proprium esse eorum non perti-
nere ad unum aliquod speciale praedicamentum, quia res illae, seu naturae,
vel essentiae quibus conveniunt, ad varia munera, et interdum primo diversa
ordinantur, ideoque ad varia praedicamenta revocantur, juxta diversas eorum
conditiones et naturas.” Trans. Doyle, in Suárez, On Real Relation, 100
(modified).
238. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.4.15 (Opera 26: 803a): “[…] respectus transcenden-
talis semper est intrinsecus et essentialis alicui entitati.” Trans. Doyle, in On
Real Relation, 100 (modified.)
239. See Francisco Suárez, DM 47.3.10–13 (Opera 26: 797b–799a) and Penner,
Suárez on the Reduction of Categorical Relations, 6.
240. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.4.10 (Opera 26: 802a): “Universaliter convenit for-
mae, vel modo absoluto includenti respectum transcendentalem, aliquod reale
munus exercere circa illum, ad quem dicit respectum, vel causando, vel uni-
endo, vel repraesentando illum, vel aliquid aliud simile efficiendo.” Trans.
Doyle, in On Real Relation, 97 (modified). Suárez bases this definition of the
transcendental relation on Cajetan, In De ente et essentia, c. 7, q. 16.
241. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, 180. See also Courtine,
Présentation, 44–45.
242. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.8.7 (Opera 26: 817a): “[...] ad relationem praedica-
mentalem necessarius semper est terminus realis, et realiter existens.” Trans.
Doyle, in On Real Relation, 138 (modified).
243. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.15.8 (Opera 26: 837a–838a, 841a–b).
244. On the contrast between intentionality and reference, see the Introduction
(Chap. 1) above, as well as Chap. 4 below.
245. Francisco Suárez, DM 54.6.4 (Opera 26: 1040a).
246. Francisco Suárez, DM 47.8.5–6 (Opera 26: 816a): “[…] non repugnat ens reale
habere transcendentalem ordinem ad non ens actu. Primum, quia potentia
potest habere ordinem ad ens possibile, quamvis non respiciat illud secundum
solam possibilatem ejus, sed in ordine ad actum, ita tamen ut habitudo ipsa
potentiae prior sit et independens ab actuali existentia actus vel objecti. Similiter
non ens, quatenus cogitari potest, terminare etiam potest habitudinem transcen-
dentalem cogitationis, vel scientiae ad ipsum; atque ita non ens, quamvis ex se
videatur ineptum, ut sit terminus realis habitudinis, tamen quatenus aliqua actio
circa illum exerceri potest, etiam actio ipsa, vel habitus aut potentia, quae sunt
principia ordinata ad illam actionem, possunt dicere habitudinem transcenden-
talem ad rem quae non est. Atque ob similem rationem potest actus aliquis
intellectus respectum transcendentalem dicere ad aliquod ens rationis, quia,
nimirum, illud potest esse sufficiens objectum talis actus. Et ideo ad hujusmodi
habitudinem non solum non obstat quod ens rationis sit quid fictum ab intel-
lectu, verum etiam in hoc ipso fundatur illa transcendentalis habitudo. Recte
vero probatur illa ratione, nullas alias res posse habere transcendentales habitu-
dines ad entia rationis, praeter ipsosmet actus mentis, quibus ipsa entia rationis
cogitantur aut finguntur, sub quibus comprehendo actus aliquos imaginationis
quatenus per illos fingi possunt et repraesentari entia imaginaria et impossi-
bilia.” Trans. Doyle, in On Real Relation, 136 (modified). On the exception
regarding natural acts of sensation and intuitive cognition, see Francisco
Suárez, DM 47.4.5 (Opera 26: 800a).
247. On these questions, see Sect. 3.2.2 above.
248. This section incorporates material previously published in Taieb, Relatives
and Intentionality in Brentano’s Last Texts.
249. On the “abnormal relation,” see Grossmann, Non-Existent Objects, 31–32;
Grossmann, Phenomenology and Existentialism, 50–51; Grossmann, The
Existence of the World, 94–95. On the “non-extensional relation” or “nicht-
extensionale Relation,” see Chrudzimski and Smith, Brentano’s Ontology,
216; Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 239.
“Wer ein Denkendes als Denkendes, in recto vorstellt, stellt auch etwas in
obliquo vor auf welches sich das Denkende, als Gegenstand seines Denkens,
bezieht. Man nennt das eine intentionale Beziehung.” Trans. Chisholm and
Guterman, in The Theory of the Categories, 199 (slightly modified). Contrary
to what is often thought, the term Intentionalität was not invented by Husserl,
since it is found in Brentano’s writings from around 1870, in a list of relations.
See Brentano, EL 81, Fragmente, n. 13508, quoted and dated in Rollinger,
Philosophy of Language and Other Matters in the Work of Anton Marty,
24n50. See also Brentano, Ps 50, Psychognosie (Inhaltsangabe), undated, n.
52149, quoted in Rollinger, Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, 263n7, and Brentano, T S 14, Realität und Intentionalität (neue
Theorie der Zeit, neue Theorie der Relation), dated to 1893. However, it is
indeed to Husserl that the term owes its fame.
251. See Textor, Brentano’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality, and
the developments of this interpretation in Brentano’s Mind.
252. Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 124; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 106.
253. On adverbialism, see the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
254. See Brentano, Psychologie II, Appendix, ed. Kraus, 134; ed. Binder and
Chrudzimski, 392.
255. Chrudzimski and Smith, Brentano’s Ontology, 216; Chrudzimski,
Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 236–246; Kriegel, Brentano’s
Mature Theory of Intentionality. Chrudzimski and Kriegel envisage, but ulti-
mately do not accept, the possibility that the late Brentano made intentionality
a relation without a term.
Notes 145

257. As explained by Körner and Chisholm, Einleitung der Herausgeber, xvi, a
presentation in modo obliquo is an indirect presentation that accompanies
another presentation, which is direct or “normal,” that is, in modo recto, when
the latter is the presentation of something relative: a relative cannot be pre-
sented unless that to which it is relative is also presented in a concomitant
presentation. According to Brentano, these two modes are independent as
regards belief: it is possible to believe that the entity presented in recto exists,
and at the same time to believe that the entity presented in obliquo does not
exist, as, for example, when one presents someone thinking about a phantom
(Brentano, Abkehr, 311–312). Historically, the distinction between modus
rectus and modus obliquus finds its source in chapter 7 of Aristotle’s
Categories, where the terms of relatives are considered according to the gram-
matical case (or πτῶσις) they take in the correlation, with some of them being
said in the genitive, others in the dative (Aristotle, Cat. 7, 6b33–36). On this
basis, one finds in medieval philosophy the idea that only the use of the oblique
cases—that is, all cases other than the nominative, which is the “direct” (rec-
tus) case—permits the “transition” (transitio) or “diversity” (diversitas) that is
proper to relatives: “For if one said ‘Knowledge is the knowable,’ the affirma-
tion would be false, and vice versa” (“Si enim sic diceretur, scientia est sci-
bile, falsa esset locutio, et e conuerso”; Albert the Great, In Cat. 7, tract. 4, c.
6 [ed. Borgnet, 232B], my translation; cf. Albert the Great, Tractatus quartus
libri Praedicamentorum, De ad aliquid, ed. Marinozzi, 220.2–4). Knowledge
is not the knowable, but of the knowable. On inflection in the Categories, see
de Libera, Le direct et l’oblique, 326–328, with the citation to Courtine,
Brentano et l’ontologie, 202.
258. Chrudzimski and Smith, Brentano’s Ontology, 215–216; Chrudzimski,
Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 235, 240; Kriegel, Brentano’s
Mature Theory of Intentionality.
259. My translation. For the German text, see the Appendix.
260. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51058–51060: “2. Correlativa
oder Correlate auf vergleichsweiser Bestimmung beruhend. Was verglichen
wird, davon mag jedes etwas Absolutes sein. Und ist die vergleichsweise
Bestimmung individuell, so fällt sie mit den individuellen absoluten sachlich
zusammen. Doch scheinen die [c]orrelativen Bestimmungen gemeiniglich
allgemeinen zu sein. […] 3. Gedanken, deren Objekt ein Denken ist. Sie sind
nicht möglich ohne daß auch das Objekt dieses Denkens gedacht wird. Um
Correlate handelt es sich hier in Wahrheit nicht[.] Das Denkende kann indivi-
duell gedacht werden, während das Objekt, auf welches es sich bezieht allge-
mein ist, und dieses muß nicht wirklich sein, um Objekt eines wirklichen
Denkens zu sein.” My translation.
261. On the divalence of intentional verbs, see Ebbesen, A Porretanean and a
Nominalis on Relations. On the foreignness or otherness of the object, see
Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality, 158, and Frey, Phenomenal Presence.
For more on this, see the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
262. Brentano, Über Aristoteles, 211–212: “Von den Relationen ist die sogenannte
psychische Beziehung zum Objekt kein Verhalten von einem Ding zu einem
andern Ding; hier ist denn auch kein Zweifel, daß das in solcher Weise Relative
als solches bewirkt werde. Es ist nicht ein Relatives, welches ein sogenanntes
Absolutes zum Fundament hätte. Es ist vielmehr selbst sozusagen sein
Fundament.” My translation.
263. Recall that Brentano died in 1917.
“Es ist klar, dass nicht immer der Terminus, zu welchem die relative
Bestimmung in Beziehung setzt, bestehen muss, damit die relative Bestimmung
selbst Bestand habe. So ganz offenbar bei der intentionalen Beziehung des
Vorstellenden zu dem, was er vorstellt, des Leugnenden zu dem, was er leug-
net, des Begehrenden zu dem, was er begehrt u. dgl.” Trans. Chisholm and
Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 200. But cf. Brentano, T 24, Zur
Zeitlehre, 1915, n. 71399 (Brentano, Philosophische Untersuchungen zu
Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, 126), from 13 February 1915, in which relatives
without a term are still called relativlich.
265. Brentano, Zur Zeitlehre, 1915, nn. 71415–71416 (Brentano, Philosophische
Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, 125–126): “[…] wirkende
Ursache und Wirkung [müssen] zugleich sein, wenigstens in dem Sinne, dass
sie wie Endigendes und Anfangendes zeitlich coincidieren. […] Eher könnte
das zur Annäherung auch der Kausalen Relation an die Denkrelation gesagt
werden, dass wie das Denken nur etwas in dem Denken setzt, nicht aber in
dem Gedachten, auch die Kausalrelation nur etwas in dem Gewirkten setzt,
nicht in dem Wirkenden.” Trans. Smith, in Philosophical Investigations on
Space, Time, and the Continuum, 75 (slightly modified).
238): “Wenn man fragt, was eine relative Bestimmung im unterschied von
einer absoluten sei, so ist zu antworten, dass wenn man eine relative
Bestimmung in recto vorstellt, immer auch etwas in obliquo vorgestellt wird,
so stellt einer, der einen Sehenden denkt in obliquo auch ein Farbiges vor, das
von dem Seheden gesehen wird. Wenn das in recto Vorgestellte eine relative
Bestimmung ist, welche für die Substanz reale Bedeutung hat, so kann die kor-
relative Bestimmung eine blosse denominatio extrinseca sein. So z.B. ist das
Korrelat des Denkenden das Gedachte und an dem gedachten Ding wird dadu-
rch, dass es gedacht wird, nichts geändert; ja, es braucht nicht einmal zu sein,
um gedacht zu sein. Und ähnliches gilt vom Wirkenden, das dem Leidenden,
als Korrelat entspricht; am Wirkenden ändert sich nichts, insofern es wirkend
ist und ein Nachwirkendes braucht selbst gar nicht zu sein, wenn es nachwirkt.
So sind denn hier die Korrelate – denominationes extrinsecae.” Trans. Chisholm
and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 171 (modified).
267. See Lucie Gilson, La psychologie descriptive selon Franz Brentano, 139, who
makes a detailed study of the evolution of Brentano’s views on the question of
relatives, and rightly insists on his acceptance of real relatives without a term;
Notes 147
Smith, Austrian Philosophy, 100; Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim

frühen Brentano, 239; Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei
Brentano, 21, and 24–25 for a brief summary of the evolution of Brentano’s
thought on relatives; Antonelli, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty,
xlvi.
268. Brentano, Kategorienlehre, 169: “Die Frage löst sich leicht, wenn man Sorge
trägt, allen Wortstreit zu vermeiden und auf die Eigentümlichkeit achtet,
welche dem beziehenden Denken allgemein zukommt. Mag dieses ein bloß
vorstellendes oder auch ein urteilendes oder sich gemütlich beziehendes sein,
immer handelt es sich dabei um eine Mehrheit von Vorstellen, um ein
Vorstellen mit verschiedenen Modis. Es wird ein Ding in modo recto und
eines in modo obliquo vorgestellt. Das in modo recto Vorgestellte muß sein,
wenn das Relative sein soll, das in modo obliquo Vorgestellte aber nicht, außer
in ganz besonderen Fällen, wie z.B. ein evident Anerkennender nicht sein
kann, ohne daß das von ihm anerkannte Ding existiert. Und damit haben wir
auch schon den gesuchten einheitlichen Begriff für alles Relative gefunden:
Es handelt sich bei dem zu etwas sich Verhaltenden um nichts anderes als um
solche Bestimmungen, wo man, indem man sie vorstellt, etwas in recto und
etwas in obliquo vorstellt.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of
Categories, 127 (slightly modified).
269. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik’, 1915, nn. 30877–30878: “Die Streitfrage
löst sich leicht, wenn man Sorge trägt[,] alle Wortstreitigkeiten zu vermeiden.
[…] Um volle Klarheit in die Sache zu bringen, wird es gut sein auf die
Eigentümlichkeit des Denkens aufmerksam zu machen, welche dem beziehen-
den Denken allgemein zukommt. Mag dasselbe ein bloss Vorstellendes oder
auch ein Urteilendes oder sich gemütlich Beziehendes sein. Immer handelt es
sich dabei um eine Mehrheit von Vorstellen und um ein Vorstellen mit ver-
schiedenen Modis. Es wird ein Objekt in modo recto und ein Objekt in modo
obliquo vorgestellt. Das in modo recto Vorgestellte Objekt muss sein, wenn
das [R]elativ[e] sein soll, das in modo obliquo Vorgestellte aber nicht, ausser
in ganz besonderen Fällen, wie z.B. ein evident Anerkennender nicht sein
kann, ohne dass das von ihm anerkannte Objekt existiert.” Brentano, Ps 8,
Vom dem zu etwas sich Verhaltenden, 1915, n. 50028: “Wenn man nur alles
das erwägt, so möchte man vielleicht sagen, dass es sich bei de[m] zu etwas
sich Verhaltenden um nichts anderes als solche Bestimmungen handle, bei
welchen man, wenn man sie vorstellt[,] etwas in recto und etwas in obliquo
vorstellt.”
270. Smith, Austrian Philosophy, 100–102; Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie
beim frühen Brentano, 243–247; Chrudzimski, Die Ontologie Franz
Brentanos, 183–188. On Brentano’s theory of relations, see also Grossmann,
Acts and Relations in Brentano, and Brentano’s Ontology; Kamitz, Acts and
Relations in Brentano: A Reply to Prof. Grossmann, and Acts and Relations in
Brentano: A Second Reply to Prof. Grossmann.
271. See Marty, Raum und Zeit, 148–150.
272. Brentano, Abkehr, 310–311: “So soll nach mir eine Relation (ich würde lieber
sagen ein Relatives) kein Vorstellungsgegenstand, sondern ein besonderer
Modus des Vorstellens sein. Dies ist durchaus falsch. Ein Relatives kann in
modo recto und in modo obliquo vorgestellt werden, wie ein Absolutes. Auch
kommt ihm Existenz zu, wie einem Absoluten, ja ich rechne es wie ein
Absolutes zum Realen. Nicht das Relative ist ein Modus des Vorstellens; wahr
ist nur, daß, wer das Fundament eines Relativen in modo recto, den ihm kor-
relativen Terminus in obliquo vorstellt.” My translation.
273. Chrudzimski, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, 184n177. I have been unable to
find the manuscript that corresponds to Kategorienlehre, 120–121.
274. See Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, not dated [around 1899], n. 51075;
Brentano, Abstraktion und Relation, 466–467.
275. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik’, 1915, n. 30878 (Kategorienlehre, 174):
“Allein es geschieht oft, dass der sprachliche Ausdruck auch in anderen Fällen
mehr sagt, als das blosse Beziehen und auch noch über etwas, was ausserhalb
des in modo recto Gedachten liegt, eine Anerkennung enthält. Und so ist es,
wenn ich sage, Cajus ist grösser als Titus, was ja soviel heisst: ist grösser als
Titus ist. Damit dass hier auch noch über etwas, was ganz ausser dem Subjekte
liegt, eine Aussage gemacht wird, ist klar, warum das scheinbar bloss relative
Attribut verloren gehen kann, ohne Änderung an dem Subjekte. Es ist aber
ebenso klar, dass sobald wir das, was bloss relatives Attribut ist, rein her-
ausheben, diese Möglichkeit entfällt. Damit entfällt dann aber auch jeder
Schein, als ob die relativen Bestimmungen, die wir einem Dinge beilegen,
nicht ebensogut als real gelten sollten, als irgendein Absolutes.” My transla-
tion; cf. the translation by Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of
Categories, 130–131.
276. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik’, 1915, nn. 30876–30877 (Kategorienlehre,
167): “Eigentümlich ist da, dass Aristoteles, indem er mehrere Klassen von
Relativen unterscheidet, bei einer von ihnen lehrt, dass sie zwar real sei, aber
kein reales Korrelativ habe. Es ist dies die Relation des Denkenden zum
Gedachten. Das Gedachte ist ja blosses ens rationis. Sieht man genau zu, so
gilt von dieser Klasse nicht, was Aristoteles von den anderen behauptet, dass
das relative Attribut ohne Änderung am Subjekt gewonnen oder verloren
werden könne.” My translation; cf. the translation by Chisholm and Guterman,
in The Theory of Categories, 126.
277. Brentano, Abkehr, 284–285.
278. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 107–109; Brentano, Abkehr, 250–252. Cf.
Antonelli, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, xli, who argues that
Brentano maintains this causal understanding, despite the 1914 letter.
279. Kastil, Anmerkungen des Herausgebers, 336 (note 1 on p. 113), 334 (note 1
on p. 101), 349 (note 1 on p. 153).
280. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik,’ 1915, n. 30888: “Aus dem bereits
Erörterten ergibt sich, dass wie immer die relativen Bestimmungen ebensogut
Notes 149
real sind, wie die absoluten, doch keine besondere Klasse von relativen
Akzidenzien angenommen werden darf.” My translation.
281. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik,’ 1915, n. 30896: “Weder für das “Wie
gross?”[,] noch für das “Wo?”[,] noch für das “Wann?”, noch für das Tun,
noch für das Anhaben, noch für die Lage, noch für die Relation sind eigene
Kategorien anzunehmen.” My translation.
282. Brentano, M 76, Zur ‘Metaphysik,’ 1915, n. 30906: “Dass die relativen
Bestimmungen nicht reale Bestimmungen seien, ist falsch, aber auch, dass sie
reale Bestimmungen von anderer Kategorie seien, als das Absolute, dem sie
zukommen.” My translation.
283. Brentano, M 88, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31008. My translation.
284. See Brentano, M 88, Über die Kategorien, 1916, nn. 31011–31012
(Kategorienlehre, 242–243); Brentano, Abkehr, 284–285.
“Zu diesen Weisen realer Beziehung kommen dann noch die schon genannten
des Leidenden zum Tuenden, der Grenze zum Begrenzten und des Denkenden
zum Gedachten. Die Vergleichsbestimmungen waren auch überall möglich.
Sie fielen, wenn man von dem absah, was sie von denominatio extrinseca
enthielten, mit dem ihnen als Fundament unterliegenden substanziellen oder
akzidentellen Realen zusammen, ähnlich wie das Reale einer universellen
Bestimmung mit der individuellen Realität.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman,
in The Theory of Categories, 185 (modified).
Chapter 4
Reference
One might well be tempted to follow Myles Burnyeat, and see the young Brentano
as treating the psychic causality in the De anima as identical to intentionality. As
shown above, however, Brentano in his later writings does not maintain this inter-
pretation, but finds in Aristotle a distinction between causality and intentionality.
For Brentano, this distinction is based on Metaphysics Δ.15, where Aristotle assigns
the causal connections and intentional connections between cognitive acts and their
objects to two different classes of relation. Brentano adopts this distinction, and
contrasts psychic “affection” (Leiden) and intentionality.1
However, Brentano is not content just with distinguishing between intentionality
and causality, but thinks that, in addition to the intentional relation and the causal
relation to the object, a third psychic relation has to be taken into account. This rela-
tion is present when the object at which the cognitive act is directed exists, and it
accounts for the “correspondence” (Übereinstimmung) between the thinker and that
which is thought; in other words, it is a relation of (mental) reference.2 Now, in
Brentano this relation is not a member of Aristotle’s third class, which is reserved
for the intentional relation, but of the first, that of relations of comparison. Indeed,
for Brentano, the relation of reference is a “subspecies of those of sameness and
similarity in the usual sense” (eine Abart denen der Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im
gewöhnlichen Sinne).3 More precisely, it seems to be a sui generis relation of “simi-
larity” (Ähnlichkeit). In other words, Brentano’s three psychic relations are distrib-
uted among Aristotle’s three classes of relation. Though the view that the
correspondence between act and object belongs in Aristotle’s first class of relations
is Brentano’s own, the idea that a relation of similarity between act and object is
present when the object exists is standard in the Aristotelian tradition. In particular,
we find in Thomas Aquinas the thesis that a cognitive act directed towards an exist-
ing object is “assimilated” to it, and for Aquinas this “assimilation” (assimilatio)
entails precisely the existence, between act and object, of a relation of “similarity”
(similitudo) that belongs to Aristotle’s third class. Likewise, for Duns Scotus, when
the object of a cognitive act exists, there is present, between act and object, a r elation

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_4
152 4 Reference
of reference understood as “similarity” (similitudo). According to Scotus, this simi-

larity belongs to Aristotle’s third class of relations. However, for Scotus, unlike for
Aquinas, the third class must be divided into two subclasses, since in addition to the
relation of reference it also contains a relation of termination, or an intentional rela-
tion. Since Scotus distinguishes these two relations from the causal connection
between act and object,4 his position is a clear precedent for Brentano’s
tripartition.
4.1 Reference as Similarity: The Medieval Origins
4.1.1 The Assimilation Theory: Thomas Aquinas
Does Thomas Aquinas identify a theory of the intentional relation in Metaphysics

Δ.15? The answer seems to be no. The relation that he finds in that text expresses
the conformity of cognitive acts to reality; in other words, it is a relation of (mental)
reference.
As noted above, Aquinas assigns an important role to causality in his explanation
of cognition.5 Often, however, when he speaks of the object as a cause of cognition,
he adds that it is also the “measure” (mensura) of cognition:
Things themselves are the cause and the measure of our knowledge.6
Since the speculative intellect is receptive with regard to things, it is in a certain way moved
by the things themselves, and thus the things are the measure of it. From this it is clear that
natural things, from which our intellect gains knowledge, are the measure of our intellect,
as is said in book 10 of the Metaphysics.7
According to Aquinas, this relation of the measured, or measurable, to the measure

is precisely what distinguishes Aristotle’s third class of relations from the other
classes: “The third mode is that according to which the measurable is said to be
related to the measure.”8 In conformity with the structure of Aristotle’s third class,
the measurable and the measure are related asymmetrically, in the sense that the
measurable is really related to the measure, but not the measure to the measurable.
Aquinas sometimes explains the asymmetry of the third class in terms of a differ-
ence of “order” (ordo) between the relata, where “order” is understood in the sense
of “realm of things”9:
Among relatives there is a threefold diversity. […] Some are such that one [relative] has a
real relation and the other only a relation of reason, as with knowledge and the knowable.
The reason for this diversity is that that on which a relation is founded is sometimes present
only in one [relative], and sometimes in both; for example, it is clear that the relation of
knowledge to the knowable is founded on an apprehension according to spiritual being. But
the spiritual being on which the relation of knowledge is founded is only in the knower and
not in the knowable, for the form of the thing is in it with natural being; and so there is a
real relation in the knowledge, but not in the knowable.10
4.1 Reference as Similarity: The Medieval Origins 153
Sometimes a relation in one of the extremes is a thing in nature, and in the other it is only a
thing of reason. This happens whenever the two extremes are not of the same order. For
example, sensation and knowledge are related to the sensible and the knowable, which,
insofar as they are things that exist in natural being, are outside the order of sensible and
intelligible being, and so in knowledge and sensation there is a real relation inasmuch as
they are ordered to knowing or sensing things; but the things themselves, considered in
themselves, are outside this order. Thus, in them there is a relation to knowledge and sensa-
tion not in reality, but only according to reason, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them
as the terms of the relations of knowledge and sensation. This is why the Philosopher says
in book 5 of the Metaphysics that they are spoken of relatively not because they are them-
selves related to other things, but because other things are related to them.11
Thus, the thought and the thing thought about belong to different realms: the former
to the spiritual order, the latter to the natural order. This difference of order explains
the one-sidedness of relations of the third class. Aquinas seems to claim that the
immanent aspect of psychic action preserves this difference of order, and so also
preserves the one-sidedness of the relation, since thinking, as an immanent action,
does not produce its effect in the object of the action, and therefore does not make
the object something spiritual.12 Independently of this last assertion, what explains
the asymmetry of the third class of relations is that the extremes belong to distinct
orders.
Now, it seems that the distinction of order tracks a hierarchical distinction: one
of the orders is lower than the other, in the sense that it has to adapt itself to the other
in order to be perfected, whereas the converse is not the case. In the present case,
thought is lower than reality: to be perfected, it has to adapt to reality, in the sense
that it has to conform itself to it. In other words, the reason for its subordination is
to be sought in Aquinas’s realism: perfected thought is thought that is conformed to
reality. Thus the perfection of thought is measured by reality, in the sense that reality
is the standard against which the perfection of thought is evaluated. Now, since a
thought that is perfected and conformed to reality is what is called a “veridical”
thought, reality is the measure of the veridicality of the thought, that is, the standard
against which this veridicality is evaluated. In short, according to Aquinas, Aristotle’s
third class of relations has to do with (mental) reference. Note that, for Aquinas,
reference pertains to both judicative and non-judicative psychic activities, since this
relation is borne not only by knowledge, but also by sensation.13 Aquinas’s reading
is similar to the Ross–Tricot interpretation, according to which Metaphysics Δ.15 is
about the adequation of thoughts to reality.14 Aquinas writes:
The third mode is that according to which the measurable is said to be related to the mea-
sure. But this measure and measurable are not taken according to quantity (for this pertains
to the first mode, in which both [extremes] are said to be related to the other: indeed, double
is said in relation to half, and half in relation to double), but according to the measuring of
being and truth. For the truth of knowledge is measured by the knowable. For from the fact
that a thing is or is not, the statement about what is known is true or false, but the converse
is not the case, and likewise for the sensible and sensation. Because of this, measure and
measurable are not said to be mutually related to each other, as is the case in the other
modes, but only the measurable is said to be related to the measure. Similarly, an image too
is said to be related to that of which it is an image, as measurable is related to measure. For
the truth of an image is measured on the basis of the thing of which it is an image.15
154 4 Reference
Just as a thing is called true by comparison with its measure, so too are sensation and intel-
lect, the measure of which is the thing outside the soul. Thus, sensation is called true when
it is conformed through its form to the thing that exists outside the soul.16
Following De interpretatione, where Aristotle speaks of “affections of the soul”

(παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) as “similitudes” (ὁμοιώματα) of “things” (πράγματα),17
Aquinas makes the relation of reference a relation of “similarity” (similitudo).
Indeed, for Aquinas, the conformity of thought to reality is equivalent to its “assimi-
lation” to reality. As he asserts at the beginning of De veritate, “Every cognition is
perfected by the assimilation of the cognizer to the thing cognized.”18 Now, if there
is assimilation, it is because the cognitive activity is produced by way of a similitude
of the thing, where “similitude” (similitudo) should probably be understood as indi-
cating metonymically a form together with a relation of similarity (given that “simi-
larity [similitudo] is a relation”19):
Though there cannot be corporeal qualities in the mind, there can be in it similitudes of
corporeal qualities, and it is according to these that the mind is assimilated to corporeal
things.20
In general, in Aquinas, psychic activities whose objects exist are related to them on
the basis of a similitude:
The thing is cognized by the soul only through some similitude of itself that exists in the
sense or in the intellect. […] But in the passions of the soul, it is necessary to attend to the
notion of similitude for the expression of things, because they indicate them naturally, not
by institution.21
Thus, in Aquinas, Aristotle’s third class contains a relation of similarity that

expresses the conformity of psychic activities to reality, that is, their veridicality. In
other words, the text is not concerned with intentionality, understood as the mere
aboutness of cognitive acts, but with reference, that is, the relation that belongs to
acts whose objects exist.
What remains to be examined in more detail is the concept of similarity. There
are two considerations that suggest that Aquinas’s relation of reference is not a true
similarity. The first has to do with the foundation of this relation. In Aquinas, simi-
larity is founded on quantity, or more precisely, on the (specific) unity of a quality:
“Those things are similar of which the quality is one.”22 However, Aquinas seems to
found his cognitive relation on the cognitive act understood as an immanent action.23
It thus becomes difficult to treat this relation as a true similarity, since it is not based
on a unity of quality. However, Aquinas accepts a broadening of the concept of simi-
larity: “Something is said to be similar to another thing when it has one of its quali-
ties or forms.”24 Thus, in the case of cognition, similarity will be based on a kind of
“formal identity” (formale Identität) insofar as it holds between the same form that
is present in two ontological modes: the intentional form of the thing in the soul and
the natural form of the thing in the external world.25 Since immanent psychic action
is performed on the basis of the intentional form, which is in some way the content
of cognitive activity, the action bears, thanks to its content, a relation of similarity to
the object.
There is another problem still to be solved. Normally, similarity holds in both

directions: if a resembles b, then b resembles a. However, since Aquinas maintains
that the third class in Metaphysics Δ.15—the class of one-sided relations—contains
a relation of similarity, it seems that it must be conceded that he also accepts a one-
sided relation of similarity: a resembles b but b does not resemble a. However, this
observation does not affect my interpretation. On the contrary, Aquinas explicitly
discusses a one-sided kind of similarity: the similarity between the cognizer and
what is cognized is likened, as regards theoretical cognition, to the way an image
reflects its model.26 As Aquinas asserts:
The word that is conceived internally is a certain idea and similitude of the intelligized
thing. But a similitude of something existing in something else either has the nature of a
model, if it is taken as a principle; or it has instead the nature of an image, if it is related to
that of which it is a similitude as to its principle. Examples of both are seen in our intellect.
For since the similitude of the artefact, which exists in the mind of the artisan, is the prin-
ciple of the activity by which the artefact is made, it is compared with the artefact as the
exemplar is compared with the thing exemplified. But the similitude of a natural thing that
is conceived in our intellect is compared to the thing of which there exists a similitude as to
its principle, since our intelligizing takes its principle from the senses, which are affected
by natural things. […] Therefore, the word conceived in our intellect is the image or the
model of the substance of the intelligized thing.27
Now, there is a sense in which depictive similarity can be described as a one-sided

similarity: it is correct to say that a portrait resembles its model, but it is incorrect to
say that the model resembles its portrait. This is thus a case in which a resembles b
without b resembling a. Aquinas explicitly accepts this one-sidedness:
Though it is conceded in a certain way that a creature is similar to God, it should in no way
be conceded that God is similar to a creature, since, as Dionysius says in chapter 9 of On
the Divine Names, “In things of the same order, a mutual similarity is received, but not in a
cause and what is caused.” For we say that an image is similar to a man, but not the con-
verse. Likewise, it can be said in a certain way that a creature is similar to God, but not that
God is similar to a creature.28
According to Aquinas, a similarity is either a two-sided “similarity of equiparence”

(similitudo aequiparentiae), such as is found between two instances of white, or a
one-sided “similarity of imitation” (similitudo imitationis), which holds between a
creature and God.29 The similarity of depiction, which is a one-sided relation, seems
to be a similarity of imitation.30 In any case, with the idea of imitation it is possible
to give an adequate account of the one-sidedness of the relation of depiction.
Imitation is a one-sided relation, in the sense that a imitates b without b imitating a.
Imitation can succeed or fail. It succeeds when a reproduces certain properties of b;
b on the other hand does not reproduce any properties of a, and so does not imitate
anything. For an image a to be similar to its model b means that it imitates b, that is,
it reproduces certain properties of b. In this sense—that is, when similarity is under-
stood in terms of imitation—a is similar to b without b being similar to a.31 Thus, b
is the standard, or measure, against which the imitative (similar) character or non-
imitative (non-similar) character of a is assessed: if a does not reproduce the proper-
ties of b—or at least some of them—a does not imitate (is not similar to) b. Now,
156 4 Reference
since, when a imitates b, it reproduces certain properties of b, one could say—per-

haps making more distinctions than Aquinas himself does—that a and b have a
similarity of equiparence or isomorphism, founded on precisely those properties
that they have in common. It is this isomorphism that ensures the fidelity of the
image to its model and allows us to consider the image an imitation of its model.
Nevertheless, when isomorphism is taken into account, the entities in question are
not thought of in terms of their relation of image and model—that is, the relation of
imitation—but as two ordinary entities with properties that are being compared (the
oval shape of the face in the painting and the oval shape of the face itself, etc.). It
should be emphasized that according to their similarity of equiparence, a and b
resemble each other. This mutual resemblance explains why one could use a picture
to identify one person among many others, for example, at the airport, or or one
could take that person to the art gallery to see which picture is in fact a portrait of
her.32 However, this two-sided resemblance does not pick out what is specific to the
image–model resemblance, which is one-sided and, as ordinary language shows,
rules out saying (at least in standard cases): “Wow, you really resemble your por-
trait!”33 In likening thoughts to images, Aquinas seems to hold that a thought is of
such a nature as to reproduce reality, or to imitate it, just as an image does; insofar
as it does so, it is assimilated or conformed to reality, and is thus veridical.
Presumably, this entails that it has a relation of similarity with reality that is isomor-
phic, and thus equiparent.34 However, Aquinas does not focus on this two-sided
relation, but on the one-sided similarity, because it is primarily the latter that gives
the image or imitative entity its special status as an image or imitation: “The image
is that which is made to be similar to some other thing, as the model is that to which
some other thing is made similar.”35 It is thus explained why relations of the third
class, having to do with the referential aspect of thought, can include a similarity
that is nonetheless a one-sided relation: thought is relative to reality without reality
being relative to thought, in the sense that thought imitates reality without reality
imitating thought. The veridicality of thought is measured by reality inasmuch as
thought is veridical if it reproduces certain properties of reality. Reality is the mea-
sure of the referential character of thought.
Although Aquinas likens the similarity between the cognizer and the thing cog-
nized to the relation of an image to its model, this likeness should be strictly circum-
scribed. What is borrowed from the concept of image is the one-sided character of
the similarity, but not any other characteristics, in particular, not its status as repre-
sentative or (even more precisely) as intermediary. Thus, when Aquinas speaks of
“images,” he does not mean to refer to some intra-psychic content that cognitive
acts supposedly need to “contemplate” (so to speak) before they can direct them-
selves towards external things. As he emphasizes in various texts, representations
are for him not that which (id quod) is thought, but that by which (id quo) one
thinks.36 In short, although Aquinas accepts representations in his theory, he does
not accept an awareness of these representations. Aquinas thus seems to be more a
direct realist, as Dominik Perler and Cyril Michon maintain, than a representation-
alist, as Robert Pasnau and Claude Panaccio maintain.37 John Haldane provides a
very judicious explanation of how to understand Aquinas’s notion of
representation:
The intellect is certainly productive but the representations issuing from it are “perfor-
mances” the character of which in any given case is determined by the species that inform
them. We tend in philosophical contexts to think of representations as objects somehow
bearing significance which have to be interpreted—their being conceived of as intermediate
objects of attention. But if I perform a series of movements this might succeed in represent-
ing the display of a pheasant, say, directly and without the event standing between thought
and its reference. Certainly the movements are distinct from what they represent but the
case is different to that involving a picture. I do not put myself into an “of-a-pheasant” state
of mind by first thinking of the dance. It is not an object of thought rather the movements
embody my thinking. […] Taking the case, then, as being in some respects similar to
thought one can see both the role of concepts or species and also why they are necessary.
They are what choreograph mental activity.38
It should be noted that Aquinas’s relation of reference does not account for the
causal and genetic aspect of thought, for this latter type of relation, according to
Aquinas, belongs to Aristotle’s second class.39 Still, if this relation is not causal,
why does Aquinas assert in the previously quoted passage where he cites Pseudo-
Dionysius40 that the one-sided similarity of depiction has to do with the “cause” and
“that which is caused”? The answer most likely is that this is not a case of efficient
causality; this emerges from the example that he offers as an explanation (“dicimus
enim”) of the relational one-sidedness. The terms taken as examples of caused and
cause are an image and a man. Now, a man is certainly not the efficient cause of its
image, except accidentally in the case of a self-portrait; the causality that Aquinas
has in mind is therefore of another kind. Antoine Krempel, who made a detailed
study of non-mutual relations in Aquinas, tried to bring out the general significance
of the asymmetry of the third class.41 According to Krempel, the third class of rela-
tions expresses, for Aquinas, “la dépendance par excellence, réelle, d’ordre efficient
et exemplaire à la fois. En effet, la relation mixte lie la copie et le modèle.”42 Krempel
cites a passage from the Sed contra objections in De veritate, question 21, article 6,
where Aquinas says that God is the efficient cause, the final cause, and the “exem-
plary formal” (formalis exemplaris) cause of the creature, that is, the paradigmatic
form after which the creature is made (think of Genesis 1:27: “God created man in
his own image”).43 Following Krempel’s analysis, one might say that for Aquinas,
reality is the exemplary formal cause of thought: thought is formally assimilated to
reality understood as its model, inasmuch as thought reproduces the form of a real
thing.44 Reality is also the efficient cause of the thought: it is through a series of
efficient causes that the thought receives the form of the thing. The thought is thus
understood according to a necessary conjunction of efficient causality and exem-
plary formal causality. In other words, while efficient causality and exemplary for-
mal causality do not come together in the relationship between image and model,
except when the painter makes a self-portrait, they necessarily go hand in hand in
the relationship between thought and reality, such that the thought is, metaphori-
cally speaking, reality’s self-portrait. On the basis of the De veritate, Jean-François
Courtine has emphasized that exemplarity in Aquinas cannot be understood without
efficient causality:
158 4 Reference
Le sens d’être de l’ens creatum est intimement lié à son statut créaturel: pour lui, l’être
s’entend nécessairement comme être-crée, être-causé. Ainsi l’unité analogique est toujours
fondée sur la dépendance causale des êtres à l’égard de Dieu: la causalité ici à l’oeuvre est
indissociablement efficiente et exemplaire (selon le principe: omne ens agit sibi simile).
Certes, il est légitime de dire que l’être crée provient de l’être divin qu’il imite, mais c’est
encore le concept de causalité efficiente qui permet d’établir un rapport direct entre les
étants crées et Dieu.45
I do not intend to discuss the links between efficient causality and the analogy of
being, nor the importance of Aquinas’s text for the history of metaphysics. Rather, I
wish to emphasize a point that has to do only with psychology: although Aquinas
establishes a strong connection between efficient causality and exemplary formal
causality, this does not prevent him from distinguishing between these two types of
causality. Besides its dependence on its efficient cause, thought also has a relation
to its formal model, namely, a one-sided relation of depictive similarity or imitation.
The fact that this relation goes hand in hand with efficient causality should not lead
us to reduce it to efficient causality. Certainly, Aquinas does identify a non-causal
relation in psychology, though this relation is admittedly not an intentional relation,
but a relation of reference, and it attests not to the fact that the object of the act is
aimed at, but that it exists.
The idea that act and object stand in a relation of similarity that is distinct from
the causal relation will be very influential for later medieval philosophers. It is
found in James of Viterbo, for example, and also in Godfrey of Fontaines, who
nonetheless lays great importance on causality in psychology.46 Surprisingly, even
Ockham, despite the fact that he likens cognitive acts to linguistic signs, which usu-
ally do not resemble what they designate, takes care, as Dominik Perler has shown,
to emphasize that the relation between acts and their objects is not only natural, but
also a relation of similarity.47 Ockham was no doubt influenced by Duns Scotus,
who, like Aquinas and others, accepts a relation of similarity between act and object.
However, the point on which Scotus is highly original is his clear distinction
between this relation of similarity and the relation to the object understood as “term”
(terminus); he thereby anticipates Brentano in emphasizing the difference between
reference and intentionality.
4.1.2 Thought or Assimilation: Duns Scotus
In his commentary on book 5 of the Metaphysics, Duns Scotus, following the stan-
dard scholastic view, asserts that the object of cognitive acts is the “measure” (men-
sura), that is, the model, of the acts, or, when it is an artefact, is “measurable”
(mensurabile) by them, that is, a copy:
Our knowledge is caused by things, and so the knowable thing measures knowledge. But
artefacts are caused by practical knowledge, and in that case the knowable is the measur-
able, and knowledge the measure.48
In Scotus, the relation of the measured to its measure is a relation of similarity. This
similarity is not a similarity “by sharing of the same form” (per communicationem
eiusdem formae), but a similarity “by imitation” (per imitationem):
Since something can participate in various ways in the perfection of something else, the act
of cognition is related participatively to the object, as a similitude with respect to that of
which [it is a similitude]. I am not speaking of a similarity by sharing of the same form,
such as that of a white thing to a white thing, but of a similarity by imitation, such as that of
what is ideated to the idea.49
Both the cognitive act and the species are similitudes,50 where the term “similitude”
seems to name metonymically an entity that has a relation of similarity.51 Scotus
also says that the relation between a cognitive act or species and an object is a rela-
tion of “representation” (repraesentatio). Now, the relation of representation is pre-
cisely a similarity of imitation: “In this relation, there is not only similarity, but
imitation and passive reproduction.”52 This quote apparently shows that, for Scotus,
similarity of imitation is a combination of isomorphic similarity and imitation. This
is also what Olivier Boulnois seems to maintain: “[La représentation] n’est pas
seulement une ressemblance, mais l’imitation d’un modèle: elle s’y rapporte comme
une de ses copies.”53 This is confirmed by Scotus’s theory of the image. For Scotus,
the relation of representation is akin to the relation of depiction. Now, the image is
made up of both isomorphic similarity and imitation:
But that conformity that is expressive of the “whole” is not sufficient, but an imitation is
required, since, according to Augustine in question 74 of the 83 Questions, “however much
two eggs are similar, one is not an image of the other,” since one is not designed by nature
to imitate the other; and so it is required that the image be designed by nature to imitate that
of which it is an image and that it express it.54
Even if similarity of imitation is a combination of isomorphic similarity and imita-

tion, and even if isomorphic similarity is like what Scotus calls “similarity by shar-
ing of the same form,” which belongs to Aristotle’s first class of relations, it is the
aspect of imitation which predominates, such that the similarity between act and
object is assigned to Aristotle’s third class.55 Note that the similarity of imitation
seems itself to be based on efficient causality, in the sense that what imitates is
caused by what it imitates.56 Thus, in Scotus the relation of measured to measure is
like Aquinas’s similarity of depiction, which goes from the image to the model or
from the imitator to that which is imitated, and is grounded in efficient causality.
Once again, the self-portrait metaphor applies: thought is a self-portrait of reality.57
Scotus’s relation of representation is not an intentional relation, but a relation of
(mental) reference: according to what Scotus himself says, an act that has this rela-
tion is “true” (verus) by being “conformed” (conformis) with reality, or “natural
things” (res naturales).58
As explained above, Scotus distinguishes between the relation of causality to the
object and the relation of termination.59 However, he maintains in addition that acts
of cognition have a relation of imitative similarity to their object. The difference
between the causal relation and this relation of similarity, or relation of reference,
can be brought out by appeal to the hypothesis (already mentioned above) of divine
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intervention: if God caused an act of cognition directed at some given existent

object, the causal relation would be to God, whereas the act would refer to the
object in question; and if God created an act of cognition directed at a non-existent
object, there would be a causal relation to God, but no relation of reference.60 As for
the distinction between the relation of termination and the relation of imitative simi-
larity, whereas the latter accounts for the conformity of cognitive acts with reality—
that is, it accounts for reference—the former seems to be similar to what is today
called the “intentional relation.”
Though the issue here is not terminological, it should be noted that Scotus him-
self does not speak of an “intentional” relation. He states that intentio is an equivo-
cal term that has four senses: an “act of the will” (actus voluntatis), the “formal
principle in a thing” (ratio formalis in re), a “concept” (conceptus), and the “prin-
ciple of tending towards the object” (ratio tendendi in obiectum). This last sense has
to do with the connection between a “similitude” and that of which it is the simili-
tude. This is certainly reminiscent of the contemporary notion of intentionality;
however, Scotus’s intentio apparently can be borne by the species of a thing when it
travels from the thing to the mind (the so-called “species in medio”), and thus does
not pertain exclusively to cognitive acts; moreover, since intentio is close to the
notion of “similitude,” it seems to require the real existence of the object, which is
not the case with intentionality.61 Scotus’s name for the intentional relation is not
intentionality, but rather termination; and for the relation of reference, it is not refer-
ence, but imitation.
Now, although these two relations are different, Scotus does not always draw a
strict distinction between them. In his commentary on book 5 of the Metaphysics,
which is one of his earlier writings,62 he sometimes maintains that Aristotle’s third
class of relations includes relations of the terminated to the term, and sometimes
that it includes relations of measure, but without really explaining the difference
between these two types of relation.63 In the De imagine, which is a later work, he
appeals to a distinction within the third class of Metaphysics Δ.15 between the rela-
tion to a term and the relation to a measure, though he does not explain how these
two relations interact. Scotus seems to combine a “Ross–Tricot” interpretation with
an intentionalist reading of Aristotle’s text:
The relation of measured to measure is not the only relation of the third mode, but all simi-
lar relations, that is, non-mutual ones, such as the previously mentioned relation of the ter-
minated to its term, also belong to it.64
Now, if the relation of termination is not identical to the relation between measur-
able and measure, this is because practical cognition (that of the artisan), as well as
volition, which cause their objects, are not that which is measured, but are measures,
although they still always take their objects as their term. As Scotus maintains in
question 13 of his Quodlibet:
An act of the will or intellect which is the total cause of its object seems to have a relation
of tending to it as the term of the act of intellection or volition, whether this relation is real
or only one of reason; however, such an act of intellection or volition does not have a rela-
tion of the measurable to such an object, but rather a relation of the measure.65
In other words, for the practical intellect and the will, it is the object that is the
image and the act that is the model, and it is the object that is similar to the act, not
the act to the object. In short, it is the object that is conformed to the act or “refers”
to it, not the reverse. Nevertheless, the practical intellect and the will still have the
object as their term, in spite of the reversed direction of the similarity of imitation.
This relation to the object as a term, or relation of termination—which is sometimes
a real relation, sometimes a relation of reason—expresses the pure aiming, and can
be called an “intentional relation.”66 Thus, in question 13 of his Quodlibet Scotus
will give the definitive account of his theory of psychic relations, in which, antici-
pating Brentano, he distinguishes between intentionality and reference.
Question 13 of Scotus’s Quodlibet is one of the richest medieval texts on the
problem of the relations between cognitive acts and their objects.67 The discussion
is centred on the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, and thus
provides an account of the interactions of the relations of imitative similarity and
termination with sensation (which is intuitive), with imagination (which is abstrac-
tive), with intuitive intellection, and with abstractive intellection:
There is some cognition that is by itself about an existent thing, such as that which attains
its object in its own actual existence; for example, the seeing of colour and in general the
sensation of the external senses. There is also some cognition that is not about an object as
existent in itself, but either the object does not exist, or at any rate the cognition is not of
that object as actually existent; for example, the imagination of colour, since it happens that
a thing is imagined when it does not exist just as when it does exist. A similar distinction
can be shown in intellective cognition.68
Although Scotus does not insist on the point in this passage, intuitive cognition is
not merely about an existent thing, but also about a present object. This is more
clearly stated in question 6 of his Quodlibet, where this kind of cognition is said to
be “of a present object as present, and of an existent object as existent” (obiecti
praesentis ut praesentis et exsistentis ut exsistentis).69 By contrast, abstractive cog-
nition is of an absent object, which thus may be non-existent. In question 13 of his
Quodlibet, Scotus further explains the distinction between intuitive and abstractive
cognition as follows:
These cognitions will therefore be called distinct, and this is on the basis of the species
because of the formal characters that move [the intellect], since by intuitive cognition it is
the thing in its own existence that is in itself the mover as object, whereas by abstractive
cognition it is something in which the thing has cognoscible being that is in itself the mover,
whether as a cause that virtually contains the thing as cognoscible, or as an effect, such as
a species or similitude that representatively contains that of which it is a similitude.70
What distinguishes intuitive cognition from abstractive cognition is that the former
has as its “mover in itself” the thing itself, whereas the latter has as its “mover in
itself” a species, which is an effect of the thing.71 Should one understand from this
that intuitive cognition occurs without the species? If this were the case, its object
would then not be something that “shines forth” (relucet) in the species, as Scotus
says, and has “cognized being” (esse cognitum).72 This might seem surprising, since
concerning sensation, which is a form of intuitive cognition, Scotus is faithful to the
162 4 Reference
Aristotelian tradition, and maintains that for there to be a cognitive act a species is
required.73 Moreover, as Olivier Boulnois affirms:
Duns Scot parle de l’être objectif pour désigner le statut de tout objet, qu’il s’agisse de
l’objet d’une perception, d’un souvenir, d’un concept, d’un savoir, ou même de l’objet de la
préscience divine.74
The notion of species and the thesis that this means of cognition contains an object
in intentional being is important in Scotus’s theory; it also anticipates crucial dis-
tinctions in later scholastics and in modern philosophy. The species could be likened
to a “formal (cognitive) reality” and the object appearing in it to an “objective (cog-
nitive) reality,” which would then prefigure the opposition between “formal con-
cept” and “objective concept” found in later authors such as Suárez.75 So, did Scotus
abandon these central distinctions with respect to sensation in question 13 of his
Quodlibet? Perhaps it should be maintained that he accepts that a species is involved
in sensation, but that the sensible object nevertheless remains a “mover in itself,” in
the sense that the sensible species is constantly generated by the object, and there-
fore cannot move the faculty of sensation without the activity of the object, which
would distinguish sensation from imagination and abstractive intellection. Moreover,
this species would make available an object that has cognized being; but in that
case, rather than being set in opposition to real being, as is normally the case in
Scotus, cognized being would coincide with it, such that the act, even though it has
an object that “shines forth” in a species, would nonetheless be about a present and
existent thing that is attained as such.76
Let us now turn to the two relations that Scotus examines in question 13 of his
Quodlibet, which in the De imagine he assigns to the third class in Metaphysics
Δ.15: the relation of “measured to measure” (mensurati ad mensuram) and the rela-
tion of “the terminated to the term” (terminati ad terminum).77 Scotus begins by
discussing these psychic relations in connection with intuitive cognition:
With this distinction of the act of cognition presupposed, it can be said that the first, namely,
that of an existent thing, necessarily in itself has an accompanying real and actual relation
to the object itself. The reason is that there cannot be such a cognition unless the cognizer
actually has a connection to such an object; this connection necessarily requires extremes
that are actual and really distinct, and also results necessarily from the natures of the
extremes. More precisely, however, that act seems to have two actual relations to the object.
One can be called the relation of the measured (or more accurately, the measurable) to the
measure. The other can be called the relation of union, formally understood as a middle, to
the terminus with which it unites; this relation of the uniting middle can be named more
precisely as the relation of attaining the other as a term, or of tending towards the other as a
term.78
In a case of intuitive cognition, both of these relations are given. First, the cognitive
act is measured by the existent object, that is, it is related to it by a relation of imita-
tive similarity. Second, the cognitive act attains the object in its presence and its
very existence. The various formulations that Scotus uses to describe the second
relation seem to be meant to express the primitive fact of the act’s aiming at an
object, which in the case of intuitive cognition is present “in the flesh,” so to speak.
The distinction between the two relations becomes clearer when Scotus dis-
cusses abstractive cognition:
The second act of cognition, namely, the one that is not necessarily of the existent as exis-
tent, does not necessarily have an actual relation to the object, since an actual real relation
requires in itself a real and actual term. However, it can be posited that this second act has
a potential real relation to the object—and this is the first one that was spoken of in the
previous section, namely, that of the measurable or of dependence—but not the second,
namely, that of union or attaining. This cognition can also have an actual relation of reason
to the object, and it requires it necessarily in order to be of this object.79
Thus, in the case of abstractive cognition, the first relation, namely, that of imitative
similarity, is not necessarily actual but can be merely potential, whereas the second
relation is never real, not even potentially. Scotus explains this as follows:
That which has an actual relation to an existent term, and by itself is always uniformly
related to it, has an aptitudinal relation to that term when it is not existent. An operation is
like this, because it is something that is measurable by the object; that is, it is in its being
naturally apt to depend on the object by the specific dependence that is the similarity of
imitation or participation to that of which it is a similitude. As regards the foundation, all of
this would be actual if the term were actual.80
About the relation of attainment to the term that is attained, it can be said that such a rela-
tion, whether real or aptitudinal, is not compatible with abstractive cognition. The proof is
that in itself it does not suit the foundation, nor would it suit it in actuality if the term were
posited in actuality, because the term is not naturally such as to be attained by that act as
actually existent.81
Scotus here maintains that acts of abstractive cognition have a relation of imita-
tive similarity which is either actual or potential. It is clear that this passage is only
about intellective abstractive cognition. Indeed, intellection is only about possibilia,
whereas the imagination can be about impossibilia.82 Now, if it were the imagina-
tion that were at issue here, Scotus would not say that there is always at least one
potential relation of imitative similarity of the act to the object, since an act that
aims at something impossible could not be potentially conformed to something.
Thus, when the act of abstractive intellection is about an existent thing—for exam-
ple, man—it has an actual relation of imitative similarity to the thing; in other
words, the act is “true,” that is, it is conformed to the thing. When the act of abstrac-
tive intellection is about something possible—for example, a non-existent but pos-
sible common nature, or the land of Oz83—the act has a potential relation of imitative
similarity to the thing; in other words, the act is potentially true, that is, it is poten-
tially conformed to the thing. That towards which the relation of similarity is
directed is not an object ut cognitum, but an object taken absolutely, that is, under-
stood as a thing, whether existent or potential.84 Further proof of this is that the
object ut cognitum, precisely as such, is always in actuality, and so the act of intel-
lection could never be about the merely possible.85 Crucially, Scotus is also clear
about the fact that the relation of similarity does not hold between the object ut
cognitum and the object taken absolutely, but between the act and the object taken
absolutely: it is the act itself which is related to reality.86 It should be noted that on
these questions, Scotus’s theory is a major precedent not so much for Brentano as
164 4 Reference
for Marty, according to whom intentionality is a possible or actual “ideal similarity”

(ideelle Ähnlichkeit) between an act and an object which is correspondingly possi-
ble or existent.87
The situation is more complicated for Scotus with regard to the relation of termi-
nation. In cases of abstractive cognition, this relation is never real, even if the object
taken absolutely is existent. At first glance, it is difficult to understand why this
relation would fail to exist when the object exists. This may become clearer if one
considers the situation from the first-person point of view. Scotus seems to want to
emphasize that in the context of abstractive cognition the cognitive act is phenom-
enologically such that it does not attain the object in its existence, independently of
whether the object exists or not. Thus, even when the object exists, the act does not
have a real relation of termination to the object. Admittedly, the abstractive act can
represent to itself a thing as existent, whether it exists or not; nevertheless, it will
never experience its existence.88 Now, to say that in an act of abstractive cognition
the object is not phenomenologically attained or experienced in its existence
amounts to recalling that abstractive cognition is by definition never about an object
that is present. In contrast to intuitive cognition, which is “of a present object as
present, and of an existent object as existent,”89 abstractive cognition does not grasp
the existence of the thing because it does not grasp the thing as there before the eyes.
In short, the relation of termination seems to depend on the phenomenological
nature of cognitive acts; for this reason it is never a real relation in abstractive cogni-
tion, which does not grasp the object in its existence, since it never experiences it as
being there. Thus, when the object of an act of abstractive intellection is an existent
thing—for example, the common nature man—the act has an actual real relation of
imitative similarity to it, but not an actual real relation of termination, for the act
does not attain it in its existence. When the object of the act of abstractive intellec-
tion is something possible—for example, a non-existent but possible common
nature, or the land of Oz—the act has a potential real relation of imitative similarity
to the thing, but not a potential real relation of termination, for even if this common
nature existed or Oz existed, the act would not attain them in their existence.
The complications do not stop there. Indeed, Scotus does not give up attributing
a relation of termination to acts of abstractive cognition: even if the object is not
attained in its presence and existence, or “in the flesh,” there is still, from a phenom-
enological point of view, an object that is attained by the act, that is, precisely the
one which is aimed at abstractively and which has cognized being. Scotus says that
although abstractive cognition does not have a real relation of union with the object,
it does have a relation of reason with it: “This cognition can also have an actual rela-
tion of reason to the object, and it requires it necessarily in order to be of this
object.”90 Thus, this relation of reason necessarily accompanies the act.91 It guaran-
tees that the act is indeed directed at the object at which it is directed. Since this
relation cannot be real (as explained just above), it must be a relation of reason. Yet
Scotus considers how it is possible for a real being to be necessarily accompanied
by a being of reason:
Against this: a real being does not require something non-real as if it were consequent to or
concomitant with its own nature; therefore, a real act of cognition does not have a relation
of reason that is consequent to it from its own nature.92
His reply seems to be that since the appearance of the act implies the appearance of
an object ut cognitum, there must also be a relation that connects them, and since the
object is a “being of reason,”93 this latter relation can only be a relation of reason:
I reply: through the act of cognition the object has cognized being, and so there can follow
upon the nature of the act a connection that is to the object as having such being.94
Every act has an object, even an act of abstractive cognition. However, this kind of
act has a relation of reason to its object, for the object of such an act has cognized
being. This relation is a relation of termination or of union. Indeed, every act is in a
sense “united” with its object; in other words, every cognitive act necessitates an
intentional relation to an object. This relation is present even in a case of abstractive
cognition, and relates the act to an object in cognized being, that is, an intentional
object. Although Scotus seems to limit his discussion in question 13 of his Quodlibet
to abstractive intellection, there is no reason to think that acts of imagination are not
governed by the same principles: every cognitive act entails at least a relation of
reason of termination to an object that has cognized being.
To sum up, Scotus distinguishes two sorts of non-causal psychic relation, which
are discussed with respect to two types of cognitive act. The two relations are refer-
ence and intentionality; the two types of cognitive act are acts of intuitive and
abstractive cognition. In intuitive cognition, since the object is always attained in its
presence and existence, the relation of reference is real and actual, and the inten-
tional relation is real and actual. In abstractive cognition, there is a distinction to be
made between the object taken absolutely and the object ut cognitum. The relation
of reference is always directed at the object taken absolutely. This relation is real,
but can be either actual or potential, according to whether the object is actual or
potential. The intentional relation by contrast is directed at the object ut cognitum.
Thus, this relation is never real, but is always a relation of reason. In short, for
Scotus, the act is always intentionally related to an object: aboutness is understood
in relational terms. However, this is not the only psychic relation that has to be con-
sidered. According to Scotus, one should make a distinction between the act’s aim-
ing at the object and its veridicality, that is, its conformity with reality. On this
reading, Scotus draws a strict contrast, long before Brentano, between intentionality
and reference.
Admittedly, one might ask how successful Scotus’s account is. Scotus makes the
ontological status of his relation of termination dependent on the existence of the
object, whereas this relation, to the extent that one accepts that it expresses the
aboutness of the act, is indifferent to this existence. The relation of reference is by
itself enough to account for the existence of the object, in both abstractive and intui-
tive cognition. To be sure, one could see in Scotus an anticipation of the more recent,
disjunctivist theory of perception, according to which the real object is a constituent
of the experience, such that a relation to this object would already be required at the
level of intentionality. But if this is what Scotus has in mind, then it becomes diffi-
166 4 Reference
cult to see what the ratio essendi of his relation of similarity is, since reference
would already be warranted by the intentional relation.95 It is in this spirit that Peter
Auriol criticizes Scotus:
The reality of the act of seeing does not require the real presence of an existent object,
although it is required by the truth of the act of seeing, inasmuch as truth adds, over and
above the reality of the act of seeing, a relation of conformity to the thing.96
For Auriol, intuitive cognition is that which, phenomenologically speaking, gives

the object as present, and abstractive cognition is that which, phenomenologically
speaking, gives the object as absent, and every cognitive act, whether intuitive or
abstractive, is directed towards an object that has “intentional being” (esse intentio-
nale). To the intentional directedness of the act is added a relation of reference, or
“conformity” (conformitas), if the object exists.97 This version of the distinction
between intentionality and reference may be more convincing than Scotus’s, but it
mostly presupposes Scotus’s analysis in question 13 of his Quodlibet.
Another problem in Scotus’s theory is that in the case of abstractive cognition, it
seems to entail a doubling of the object, parallel to the doubling of the psychic relation
into intentionality and reference, with the intentional relation being directed towards
an object that is dependent on the act, and the relation of reference towards an object
that is independent of it. The object as thought is therefore not the same as the object
which, if it existed, the cognition would resemble. The same objection could perhaps
also be made, mutatis mutandis, against Auriol. Ockham noticed this problem when
he criticized Scotus for making the object of abstractive cognition something given
“in a certain diminished similitude” (in quadam similitudine diminuta),98 whereas
according to Ockham, “the objects of intuitive and abstractive [cognition] are entirely
the same thing and under the same aspect.”99 This brings us to the similar objections
by the early Husserl to Brentano’s theory of the intentional object. That which is
thought is the object itself, regardless of whether the thing exists or not: it could be
Jupiter, Bismarck, the Tower of Babel, the Cologne Cathedral, a regular chiliagon, a
regular chiliedron, etc.100 As Husserl maintains: “The transcendent object would not
be the object of this presentation, if it was not its intentional object.”101 In other words,
in order for the act to be conformed to reality, it has to be possible for it to be inten-
tionally directed towards reality, not towards a non-real object.
4.2 Reference in Brentano
For Brentano, Aristotle makes it possible to draw a clear separation between the
intentional relation and the causal relation, on the basis of Metaphysics Δ.15 and its
tripartition of relations. As Brentano emphasizes, “[Aristotle] divided relations into
three classes: comparative, causal, and intentional.”102 Now, the reason Brentano did
not appeal to Metaphysics Δ.15 from the beginning—in particular, in his 1867 study
of Aristotle’s psychology—in order to distinguish the intentional and the causal
relations is because he interpreted the third class of relations as having to do not
with intentionality, but with correspondence, or the referential relation between
4.2 Reference in Brentano 167
thoughts and reality. In his 1862 dissertation on being in Aristotle, where Brentano
comments on Metaphysics Δ.15, he sets out to show that one of the relations
between thought and being is real, and the other a relation of reason. In other words,
he takes inspiration from the medieval interpretation of the third class of relations,
according to which this class contains “non-mutual” (non mutua) relations.103 He
writes:
It is easy to understand the basis of this doctrine, which we find in Met. V. 15. The harmony
or disharmony between our thought and the thing has no influence whatever upon the exis-
tence of the latter; they are independent of our thought and remain untouched by it. He says
in Met. IX. 10: “you are not white because we believe truly that you are white.” Conversely,
our thought depends upon things, and must agree with them in order to be true: “Rather
because you are white, we who say it, speak the truth.” Similarly, in the fifth chapter of the
Categories: “we say of a statement that it is true or false because something is or is not the
case.” It is not the case that the things are images of our thoughts, rather, our thoughts are
fashioned after them, as the words after the thoughts (De int. I. 16a6), and our understand-
ing achieves its aim only if it arrives, through science, at this conformity with things, at
truth.104
There are many aspects to this passage that could be commented on: the implicit
mention of immanent psychic action, the comparison—not obvious, to say the
least—between the thought–reality and word–thought relations, as well as the
assimilation of truth to finality. But rather than going into the details, let us empha-
size one point: Brentano finds the reason for the one-sidedness of the relation
between thought and reality in the fact that thought’s “conformity with things”
(Conformität mit den Dingen) and its “truth” (Wahrheit) depend on reality, and not
vice versa, which Brentano illustrates by saying that thought is an “image” (Abbild)
of reality and is “fashioned after” (nachgebildet) it. Thus, we find in Brentano a
variant of the “Ross–Tricot” reading of Aristotle’s text.105 Brentano was probably
influenced by medieval interpretations of this text, especially that of Aquinas, for
whom the text is about the “truth” (veritas) of cognitive acts. Furthermore, one
hears in Brentano echoes of the view that the relation discussed in the text is a rela-
tion of similarity close to the relation that is proper to the image: thought is under-
stood as an “image” or “copy” (Ab-bild), reminiscent of the medieval “similarity of
imitation” (similitudo imitationis) which exists between a copy and its model.106
Thus, in his dissertation on Aristotle, Brentano does not interpret Metaphysics Δ.15
as raising the problem of non-existent objects, but as expressing the adequation, or
conformity, of thought to reality. However, once he asserts in 1889 in Vom Ursprung
sittlicher Erkenntnis that the doctrine of the intentional relation can be found already
in Metaphysics Δ.15,107 he no longer attributes the same meaning to this text: it is no
longer a matter of restricting it to true thoughts, but of finding in it a conceptual tool
for explaining intentionality in a unified way and allowing one to “bracket” the real
existence of the object. One and the same text can say two entirely opposite things!
However, Brentano does not cease to accept that there is a relation of conformity
between thought and reality, but merely moves it from the third of Aristotle’s classes
to the first, namely, the class of relations of comparison. In a series of lectures on
logic dating to the 1880s, Brentano proposes to distinguish two sorts of relation:
those that belong only to psychic entities, and those that belong to both psychic and
physical entities.108 Relations that belong only to psychic entities are intentional
168 4 Reference
relations, the objects of which, according to Brentano in this period, are immanent.
The relations that are common to the psychic and the physical are relations of
“sameness” (Gleichheit) and “difference” (Verschiedenheit). The conformity
between thought and reality belongs to this class of relations. Brentano speaks of
this conformity as a “quasi-sameness” (Quasigleichheit). However, since he
accepted immanent objects as part of his account during this period, they must play
some role in explaining our cognitive access to reality. He thus understands the
conformity in question as “relations of quasi-sameness between that which subsists
as an immanent object and that which subsists, in an intentionally unmodified way,
as corresponding to that object.”109 Marty, in his own lectures on descriptive psy-
chology in the late 1880s,110 is faithful to his teacher, and adopts the thesis of a
quasi-sameness between immanent object and external object. In his lectures on
logic from the same period, in order to explain what sameness is, Marty asserts:
“Two places are the same as places, two judgements as judgements; a colour and a
sound as qualities, a judgement and an emotion as psychic phenomena, etc.”111
Sameness thus seems to refer to specific or generic identity. Similarity on the other
hand, says Marty, applies when there is “a small specific gap (more exactly, an infi-
nitely small gap)” (einen kleinen [namentlich einen verschwindend kleinen] spezi-
fischen Abstand) between things, such as between “two shades of orange” (zwei
Nuancen von Orange).112 Thus, if one were to transpose this to Brentano, one could
say that quasi-sameness is a kind of non-numerical identity between an immanent
object and an external object; this position would then be reminiscent of the thesis
defended by Aquinas of the “formal identity” between thought and reality, accord-
ing to which cognition depends on one and the same form being present both in the
soul and in rerum natura, but in two modes of being, namely, “intentional being”
(esse intentionale) and “natural being” (esse naturale).113 At any rate, for Brentano
before his turn to reism, just as for Marty, the conformity between thought and real-
ity is explained not as a relation that goes from the act to the external object, but as
one that goes from the immanent object to the external object. In this respect, one
might wonder whether at this point there is in effect already a relation of reference
in the strict sense: one might rather expect that such a relation, to the extent that it
is supposed to guarantee cognitive access to reality, would go from the acts them-
selves to external objects.
Even after he abandons immanent objects, Brentano continues to speak of a rela-
tion of conformity between thought and reality, but it now goes directly from the act
to the external object. This can be seen in a passage dated 1908, from manuscript Ps
34, which has been previously quoted:
If Jupiter were not something imaginary, but something real and actually existent, he could
indeed enter into a relation with the thinker, and this relation could be described as a kind
of correspondence; however, it would not be the so-called psychic relation of the thinker
with that which is thought, but a correspondence between the thinker and the thing,
grounded on the characteristics of the thinker and those of the thing. This would be a rela-
tion that should be classified as a subspecies of sameness and similarity in the usual sense.114
It will be noticed that “correspondence” (Übereinstimmung) applies to acts of imag-

ination, which according to Brentano belong to the class of presentations, not
judgements.115 It should also be noted that the relation in question here is no longer
a one-sided relation: as Brentano states, it is “based on the characteristics of the
thinker on the one hand and the thing on the other.” This is confirmed a few pages
further on in the same manuscript:
Very different from the case of a thinker related to an object is the correlativity that is
grasped through a comparison between the thinker and the real thing that is concordant with
the thought, when, for example, we recognize the two of them as corresponding.116
There is no longer a real relation over against which there would be a relation of
reason, but a correlation of mutual correspondence. Thus, the one-sidedness
Brentano still maintained in his dissertation with the idea of an “image” (Abbild)—
akin to the “similarity of imitation” in medieval philosophy—disappears at the same
time as the classification of the relation of reference in the third class in Metaphysics
Δ.15: from this point on, there is a two-sided correspondence between thought and
reality.
Unfortunately, Brentano does not provide much detail about the precise nature of
this two-sided correspondence. He assigns it to the same class as relations of com-
parison, and he says that it is of a special type:
[Relations of comparison] are quite various. We have already noticed not only the distinc-
tion between sameness and difference, but also that between correspondence in terms of
sameness properly speaking and correspondence in terms of the species of sameness
according to which a thinker and a reality that is concordant with that which is thought can
be said to correspond with each other.117
Although Brentano is still speaking here of “sameness” (Gleichheit), his later view
may be that the relation of reference is a sort of “similarity” (Ähnlichkeit). Brentano’s
understanding of reference in terms of similarity may in fact go hand in hand with
his abandonment of immanent objects in 1904. Apparently, this relation first appears
in a text dating from the same year:
In saying that every thinker has an object, a content, one does not say that it is a relative over
against which there is a correlative. It is directed towards something as an object. When the
latter subsists, there subsists a sort of relation, which can be called a similarity in a specially
modified sense, between the being that is the object and the thinker.118
Brentano does not explain what could lead him to renounce the thesis of an “same-
ness” (Gleichheit), or more precisely a “quasi-sameness” (Quasigleichheit),
between thought and reality, and instead to favour the notion of “similarity”
(Ähnlichkeit). Perhaps the reason is that sameness, in the sense of non-numerical
identity, works—in an admittedly peculiar way—between an immanent object and
a real object, since these two entities have a sort of definitional overlap despite the
difference in their ontological status. For example, between a thought-about unreal
man and a real man there is a definitional overlap, in the sense that both of them are
to be described as “rational mortal animal,” even though one is an unreal rational
mortal animal and the other a real rational mortal animal. Something similar holds
between, say, thought about Socrates and Socrates himself. By contrast, in the rela-
tion between a cognitive act and its object, there is seemingly no such definitional
170 4 Reference
overlap.119 This difference would explain why Brentano might prefer the concept of
similarity to account for reference after he abandoned immanent objects.
In 1916, one year before his death, Brentano wrote again to Oskar Kraus that a
relation that expresses the “concordance” (Entsprechung) of the act with the object
is added to the intentional relation when the object at which the act is directed
exists, and that this occurs even at the level of presentation. Brentano here rejects
Marty’s theory that presentation is an actual relation of similarity when the object
that it is about exists, and is a potential relation, or “relative determination” (relative
Bestimmung), of similarity when the object does not exist120:
I cannot accept what you say about the one who presents, namely, that in a case where the
presented thing exists, the relation becomes a different one, since it belongs to those of
which the correlate also exists. It is rather the case that to the relation of the one who pres-
ents, there is added a second relation, insofar as the one who presents has as an object
something that is concordant with it in reality.121
To sum up, whether it is a matter of “correspondence” (Übereinstimmung), “concor-

dance” (Entsprechung), or, more precisely, “similarity” (Ähnlichkeit), presentations
whose objects exist have a special relation to those objects, namely, a relation of
reference, which is in addition to the intentional relation. The intentional relation on
the other hand is present in every case, whether the object exists or not.
To go by the passages quoted above, the relation of reference in Brentano seems
to belong to presentations, not to judgements.122 For Brentano, a presentation is
simply an aiming at an object, without any ontological commitment. Judgements,
by contrast, are cognitive acts that either acknowledge or reject the existence of an
object. Judgements are truth-bearers in the strict sense, whereas presentations are,
properly speaking, neither true nor false. There is a logical and ontological priority
of presentations over judgements: it is possible to present something to oneself
without making a judgement about it, but it is impossible to make a judgement
about something without presenting it to oneself. Now, there is one point that should
be noted: since reference for Brentano is given at the level of presentations, the fact
that a cognitive act refers to reality is independent of whether the thinking being
judges that the object of her presentation exists or not. As Marty asserts, when “an
object corresponds to a presentation,” “the object can be given without me judging
that it is given.”123 Nevertheless, there is a close connection between the truth or
falsity of judgements and the relation of reference that is present at the level of pre-
sentations: if one judges of the object of a presentation that refers to reality, “that
this object exists,” then the judgement is true, and if one judges, “that this object
does not exist,” then the judgement is false. As Brentano himself says (though while
discussing the relation of quasi-sameness between immanent object and external
object):
Judgements of acknowledgment are true where something real corresponds to that which is
thought, and judgements of rejection where this is not the case; they are false in the opposite
situation.124
At first glance, Brentano’s acceptance of a relation of reference understood as

similarity might seem to be in conflict with his position on the theory of truth as
correspondence.125 Brentano was especially critical of the correspondence theory of

truth in its classical, medieval form, that is, the theory of the “adequation of the
thing and the intellect” (adaequatio rei et intellectus). According to this theory, truth
is a relation of similarity that holds between acts of cognition and reality, or more
precisely, between acts of judgement and reality.126 Now, Brentano maintains that
this definition of truth cannot apply to true negative existential judgements such as
“Centaurs do not exist,” for in such cases there is simply nothing in the world with
which the judgement could enter into a relation of similarity (Brentano does not
accept negative truth-makers such as “the non-existence of centaurs”).127 One might
therefore wonder whether there is a conflict between Brentano’s acceptance of a
relation of reference understood as similarity and his criticism of the theory of truth
as adequation. Yet it seems that there is no conflict; for Brentano, as noted above, the
relation of reference is given at the level of presentations, not of judgements. But the
problem that true negative existential judgements pose for the adequation theory has
no equivalent at the level of presentations; indeed, for Brentano there are no nega-
tive presentations such as “non-centaur.”128 Consequently, it is not even possible to
make the objection that a relation of similarity could not hold between this kind of
presentation and reality. Moreover, as Brentano himself says (in the context of his
theory of the quasi-sameness between immanent object and real object):
[Adequation] applies only to judgements of acknowledgement, but not to judgements of
rejection, for which precisely the opposite is the case, namely, that in the case of a sameness
between what is thought and what is real, the judgement is false, whereas it is true where it
is absent.129
In sum, it is right to hold, following Kevin Mulligan, that the correctness of judge-
ments in Brentano is not explained in terms of an intentional relation. However, it is
also true that this correctness is closely linked to the presence or absence of a rela-
tion of reference at the level of the presentations that underlie the judgements.130
Brentano’s views on reference are reminiscent of Marty’s late position on inten-
tionality. For Marty, who follows Brentano in rejecting immanent objects, intention-
ality becomes a possible or actual “ideal similarity” (ideelle Ähnlichkeit)—sometimes
also described as an “ideal assimilation” (ideelle Verähnlichung)—between a cogni-
tive act and its object. He presents his theory as follows:
We have discovered the true meaning of the theory that every presentation (or every con-
sciousness in general) is a relation to an object, in that each is an actual or possible ideal
assimilation to something (which is precisely what is called the object).131
Now, it is important to note that Brentano criticizes Marty’s position. According to

Brentano there is in that case not just a single relation, which is possible when the
object is possible, and actual when the object exists. As Brentano explicitly states in
the previously quoted letter to Kraus,132 every cognitive act has an intentional rela-
tion to an object, and if the object exists, a second relation, one of similarity, is
added to the act. One of the reasons that might have led Brentano to reject Marty’s
theory is connected with the difference between the first-person point of view and
the objective point of view in a cognitive context. To take a standard example, if
someone is hallucinating and sees on the table in front of him a cup of coffee that
172 4 Reference
does not in fact exist, there is, from the first-person point of view, a cup of coffee on
the table, whereas from the objective point of view there is not. In Brentano’s terms,
one would say that the act is intentionally directed at a cup of coffee but there is no
relation of reference to such a cup. In a situation in which the cup of coffee did exist,
nothing would change from the first-person point of view, since there would still be
the visual experience of a particular cup of coffee; from the objective point of view,
however, there would in this case be a cup on the table. In Brentano’s terms, one
would say that the act is intentionally directed at a cup of coffee, but that it also has
a relation of reference to that cup. From the first-person point of view, there is no
difference between the hallucinatory case and the non-hallucinatory one; it is only
from the objective perspective that there is a difference. In Brentano’s terms, it is
easy to give an explanation: the cases are identical in terms of intentionality, but
different with regard to the relation of reference. According to Marty, the cognitive
act in the hallucinatory case has a possible relation of similarity to the cup, but an
actual relation in the non-hallucinatory case. However, Marty explicitly assigns his
relation of similarity to the level of consciousness. This seems to force him to con-
clude that the structure of the cognitive act is different from the first-person point of
view between the hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory cases. However, this conclu-
sion is incorrect: there is a difference only from the objective point of view. Thus,
Brentano’s strict distinction between intentionality and reference gives a satisfac-
tory explanation from both the first-person and the objective point of view, unlike
Marty’s amalgam of intentionality and reference.
It would be possible to defend Marty, since he sometimes seems to contrast, for
each presentation or for every consciousness, an underlying “mental process” (psy-
chischer Vorgang) and a relation founded on this process.133 In that case, intentional-
ity would be a non-relational property of the underlying psychic process. In other
words, only this process would be responsible for aboutness. The relation of simi-
larity would be in addition to aboutness, and would serve to express the fact that the
mental process in question refers, or can refer, to reality.134 It should be noted, how-
ever, that defending Marty in these terms amounts to attributing to him a position
very close to Brentano’s. In other words, Marty’s theory can be accepted only to the
extent that it adopts Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference.
Alternatively, one might be tempted to praise Marty for his anticipation of the
theory of disjunctivism, according to which “the mind-independent objects of per-
ception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one’s experience.”135 In disjunc-
tivism, perceptions on the one hand, and illusions and hallucinations on the other,
are experiences of distinct natures, due precisely to the inclusion of the external
object in the perceptual experience itself. Similarly, in Marty’s account the existence
or non-existence of the object seems to have an influence on the structure of con-
sciousness itself. However, although Marty’s position may be correct for percep-
tion—provided that disjunctivism is correct—it remains problematic for thoughts
about absent objects (that is, objects that are not given “in the flesh” to the cognizer).
Suppose, for example, that while travelling I am thinking of my copy of Brentano’s
Psychologie and that my apartment is destroyed by a gas explosion at that exact
moment: does it make sense to say that my experience changed after the explosion
because the book was no longer part of it? In Marty’s account, the answer would be
yes. His account seems somehow to extend disjunctivism to thoughts about absent
objects; however, such an extension would need a separate justification.
As has emerged from the discussion to this point, Brentano does not just distin-
guish between intentionality and reference, but also contrasts reference and causal-
ity: reference is a relation of similarity, not a causal relation. It is not easy to find
justification for this distinction in Brentano’s writings. One argument that could be
used is based on the hypothesis—originally scholastic but also appealed to by
Brentano—of a cognitive act caused by divine intervention.136 Translating this case
into non-supernatural terms, one could imagine a stimulation of the brain, which, by
substituting for the object’s causal power, would produce an act of perception
directed at some given object that is also truly present: the causal relation and the
relation of reference would thus not have the same terms, and so they could not be
identified with one another. More broadly, so-called “veridical hallucinations”
would become incomprehensible if causality and reference were not distinguished
from each other, since these are precisely cases where a perceptual act conforms to
the object without having a causal relation to it.137 The hypothesis of an act of per-
ception caused by a neurological intervention but directed at a non-existent object
again makes it clear that causality and reference are not identical, for in such a case
there would be causality but no reference. Cases of perceptual error could also moti-
vate the distinction between causality and reference: for example, someone tricked
by a trompe-l’oeuil façade representing a tree-lined lane is causally related to the
façade, but his act does not refer to anything, since there is before him no lane and
no trees.
Another consideration that leads Brentano to distinguish between causality and
reference seems to be based on his position on sensible qualities. As indicated
above, Brentano is not a realist about secondary qualities.138 According to him, in
perception there is a causal relation between the cognitive act and the world, but the
act does not refer to reality, since the sensible quality that appears as an object of
perception does not exist in reality:
In some cases, that which moves us to think is noticeable in respect of its distinctive char-
acter; for example, when we infer something, or when our will is motivated, or when an
axiom is known to be true ex terminis, or when love arises from the idea of its object. In
other cases, however, the efficient or moving cause is noticeable only in an entirely general
way, so that the passive affection has merely the character of being produced by something
or other. This seems to be the case with seeing, hearing, and other sensations. It is not cor-
rect to say that we are acted upon by the primary object of sensation, although ordinarily we
are inclined to assume it, since we perceive that something is the cause of the sensation and
we identify this cause with the primary object, which is different from the cause of the
sensation though its appearance is simultaneous with this cause. Even after experience has
long taught us, in the clearest way possible, that the primary objects cannot exist in reality
in the way in which they appear to us, we have great difficulty in freeing ourselves from this
illusion.139
One might wonder whether Brentano’s position in fact “cuts off” our cognitive
access to the external world. However, although our sensible presentations do not
174 4 Reference
refer to reality, Brentano would perhaps admit that our scientific conceptual presen-
tations do. At any rate, such a defence of physical science is explicitly developed by
Marty, who asserts that some presentations of the external world—namely, those of
the physicist—have a relation of similarity to this world. According to Marty, some-
one who denies this would be a “semanticist” or “nominalist,” who treats all our
presentations of the external world as signs that are dissimilar to reality, as if, from
a semiotic point of view, they were words, that is, arbitrary signs. Such a position
would lead to scepticism. Marty writes:
If it were ruled out regarding abstract thoughts that in a certain sense they reproduce what
is thought and are conformed to it, in my opinion this would also have to apply to concrete
intuitions, and one would then be confronted with an extreme form of nominalism or
semanticism, which would make all of our presentations something in no way similar to or
conformed to that which is presented, but rather signs that are entirely dissimilar to them,
and, in this sense, arbitrary. And it seems to me that such a theory, defended consistently,
destroys all possibility of cognizing reality. Certainly, it makes sense to say, for example,
that sensations of colour are not conformed to something real; in other words, what exists
in reality are waves, or something that exhibits certain properties analogous to waves, and
sensations of colour are for this reason mere signs that are dissimilar to what they designate.
[…] [However,] it is only if [we have certain presentations that are adequate to reality] that
it makes sense to say that we know that even if sensible extended coloured bodies do not
exist, there do exist tiny invisible atoms, that even if sounds do not exist, there do exist
waves in the air, etc.140
Like Brentano, Marty maintains that sensible qualities do not exist in reality. Thus,
our sensations, which are directed at such objects, do not give us cognitive access to
the real structure of the world. If to this it is added that our conceptual presentations
are not similar to reality, then we would no longer have any cognitive access at all to
reality, either by sensation or by conceptual thought. Marty rejects this consequence:
even if sensations do not refer to reality, scientific conceptual presentations do.
Note that these accusations of semanticism are aimed primarily at Husserl, whom
Marty criticizes for assimilating conceptual intentionality to a linguistic sign’s rela-
tion to what it designates. Admittedly, Husserl does characterize conceptual and
propositional contents as “significations” (Bedeutungen), which is more a logical-
linguistic concept than a psychological one. However, he also emphasizes that
intentionality in language is, to use Searle’s expression, “derived.” Primitive inten-
tionality for Husserl is thus psychological, or phenomenological, rather than logi-
cal-linguistic.141 Independently of this debate, it should be noted that the accusation
of semanticism is originally made not by Marty but by Brentano, and it is directed
not at Husserl but at Ockham. Indeed, for Brentano, Ockham is a sceptic: “According
to him, all our presentations will have to be mere signs, which, like smoke with fire,
have no similarity to the object of which they are signs.”142 Brentano’s verdict on
Ockham is probably mistaken: although Ockham likens cognitive acts to linguistic
signs, he seems nonetheless, as Dominik Perler has pointed out, to accept a relation
of similarity between acts and objects.143 Even so, these comments reveal Brentano’s
faithfulness to Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and other medieval philosophers, and
through them to Aristotle, who considers cognitive acts “similitudes” (ὁμοιώματα)144:
as long as one understands the connection of thought to the world as semiotic in
Notes 175
nature, it will have to be said that cognitive acts are signs that are similar to reality.
In short, in the Aristotelian tradition, to which Brentano unmistakably belongs, acts
refer to reality by way of a relation of similarity. Moreover, at least as far back as
Scotus it is clear that this relation is distinct from both causality and intentionality.
Notes
1. On these questions, see Sects. 2.1 and 2.3 above.

2. On the distinction between “being intentionally directed towards something”
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, 529; for the expres-
sion “mental reference,” see Kriegel, Brentano’s Mature Theory of
Intentionality (both quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).
3. See Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, n. 51046. My translation.
4. On psychic causality in Scotus, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.
6. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 7, art. 10, ad 5 (Marietti ed., 211a): “Ipsae
autem res sunt causa et mensura scientiae nostrae.” My translation.
“[…] intellectus speculativus, quia accipit a rebus, est quodam modo motus ab
ipsis rebus, et ita res mensurant ipsum; ex quo patet quod res naturales, a qui-
bus intellectus noster scientiam accipit, mensurant intellectum nostrum, ut
dicitur in X Metaphysicae.” My translation.
8. Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1003): “Tertius modus
est secundum quod mensurabile dicitur ad mensuram.” My translation.
Aquinas explains the reversal of the order between measure and measurable in
Metaphysics Δ.15 by appeal to Aristotle, Met. I.1, 1053a31–b3 and I.6,
1057a7–12; see especially Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 10, lect. 8 (Marietti
ed., §2095). The idea is to reject Protagoras’s relativistic claim that “man is
the measure of all things.” On the concept of a measure in Aquinas’s theory of
cognition, see Seidl, Bemerkungen zu Erkenntnis als Maßverhältnis bei
Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin.
9. Note that “order” in the technical scholastic sense used here must be distin-
guished from the notion of order as found in contemporary discussions of
asymmetric relations. For more on the contemporary notion, see MacBride,
Relations.
10. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3 (Lethielleux ed., 708):
“[…] relativorum invenitur triplex diversitas. […] Quaedam vero quorum
alterum importat relationem realem, et alterum relationem rationis tantum,
sicut scientia et scibile. Et hujusmodi diversitatis ratio est, quia illud supra
quod fundatur relatio, quandoque invenitur in altero tantum, et quandoque in
utroque; ut patet quod relatio scientiae ad scibile fundatur supra apprehensio-
176 4 Reference
nem secundum esse spirituale. Hoc autem esse spirituale in quo fundatur rela-
tio scientiae, est tantum in sciente et non in scibili, quia ibi est forma rei
secundum esse naturale; et ideo relatio realis est in scientia, non est in scibili.”
My translation.
11. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, art. 7, corp. (Leonina 4: 153a): “Quandoque vero
relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res rationis tantum.
Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis. Sicut
sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem, inquantum
sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis
et intelligibilis: et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum
quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se con-
sideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est aliqua relatio
realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum
intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde
Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa
referantur ad alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa.” My translation.
12. See Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 7, art. 10, corp. (Marietti ed.,
210A–B).
13. For Aquinas, the “true” does not pertain just to judgements, but is also said, in
a broad sense, of sensation and intellection. See Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib.
5, lect. 17; Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 9. On the different senses of “true”
and the priority among them, see Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1; see also
Wippel, Truth in Thomas Aquinas, and Truth in Thomas Aquinas, Part II. On
what I call “reference,” see again the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
14. On this interpretation, see Sect. 3.1 above.
15. Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1003): “Tertius modus
est secundum quod mensurabile dicitur ad mensuram. Accipitur autem hic
mensura et mensurabile non secundum quantitatem (hoc enim ad primum
modum pertinet, in quo utrumque ad utrumque dicitur: nam duplum dicitur ad
dimidium, et dimidium ad duplum), sed secundum mensurationem esse et
veritatis. Veritas enim scientiae mensuratur a scibili. Ex eo enim quod res est
vel non est, oratio scita vera vel falsa est, et non e converso. Et similiter est de
sensibili et sensu. Et propter hoc non mutuo dicuntur mensura ad mensurabile
et e converso, sicut in aliis modis, sed solum mensurabile ad mensuram. Et
similiter etiam imago dicitur ad id cuius est imago, tamquam mensurabile ad
mensuram. Veritas enim imaginis mensuratur ex re cuius est imago.” My
translation. See also Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 2, c. 12, n. 3.
16. Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 9 (Leonina 1*.1: 16.149–
153): “Et, sicut dicitur res uera per comparationem ad suam mensuram, ita
etiam et sensus uel intellectus, cuius mensura est res extra animam: unde sen-
sus dicitur uerus quando per formam suam conformatur rei extra animam
existenti.” My translation. See also Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1,
lect. 3, n. 7 and De veritate, q. 1, art. 2, corp. Note also that in De veritate, q.
4, art. 5, ad 1 (Leonina 22.1.2: 132.177–187), Aquinas maintains that the
intellect and volition, when their object is not “actually existent” (actu
Notes 177
existens), have a “habitual relation” (respectus habitualis) with their object.

According to the online Index Thomisticus, this is the only occurrence of this
expression in Aquinas’s writings. The concept of a potential relation of refer-
ence to the possible object will be important for Scotus, as we shall see in the
next section.
17. Aristotle, De int. 1, 16a3–9.
“Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem
cognitam.” My translation.
19. Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 2, c. 11, n. 3 (Marietti ed., §907): “Similitudo est
relatio quaedam.” My translation. This text is quoted in Schmidt, The Domain
of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 156. On the connection between
the form in the soul and its relational aspect, see Thomas Aquinas, De veritate,
q. 10, art. 4, corp.
20. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, art. 4, ad 5 (Leonina 22.2.1: 308.176–
180): “[…] quamvis qualitates corporales non possint esse in mente, possunt
tamen in ea esse similitudines corporearum qualitatum, et secundum has mens
rebus corporeis assimilatur.” My translation.
21. Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 2, n. 9 (Leonina 1*.1: 12.199–
201, 12.206–208): “[…] res non cognoscitur ab anima nisi per aliquam sui
similitudinem existentem uel in sensu uel in intellectu. […] in passionibus
autem anime oportet attendi rationem similitudinis ad exprimendas res, quia
eas naturaliter designant, non ex institutione.” My translation. See also espe-
cially Thomas Aquinas, In De anima, lib. 2, lect. 12 (Leonina 45.1:
115.76–94).
22. Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti ed., §1022): “Similia, quo-
rum qualitas est una.” My translation.
23. On this point, see especially Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17 (Marietti
ed., §1027) and Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas
Aquinas, 140–160. On Aquinas’s understanding of cognition as an immanent
action, see Sect. 2.2.3.1 above.
24. Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 1, c. 29, n. 5 (Marietti ed., §273): “Simile enim
alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam.” My translation.
25. On the theory of formal identity (formale Identität), see Perler, Theorien der
Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 31–105. As indicated by Brower and Brower-
Toland, Aquinas on Mental Representation, 212–218, Perler’s position has
also been defended by Joseph Owens and Anthony Kenny: see Owens,
Aristotle and Aquinas on Cognition; Kenny, Aquinas: Intentionality and
Aquinas on Mind. Note that Kenny, in Aquinas: Intentionality, 87, criticizes
Geach, Form and Existence, for holding that intentionality in Aquinas is
explained by “two different existences of the same individualized form,”
whereas, according to Kenny, the form does have two different modes of
being, but there are also “two different individualizations of the same form” in
reality and in the mind. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 85,
speaks of “two modes of existence” (zwei Existenzweisen) depending on
178 4 Reference
whether the form is “instantiated” (instantiiert) in reality or in the mind, and

is thus rather on the side of Kenny. On Geach’s exact place in the debate,
however, see Brower and Brower-Toland, Aquinas on Mental Representation,
208.
26. On the origins of the identification of the Aristotelian “similitude” (ὁμοίωμα)
with “image” (εἰκών), see Ammonius, In De int., CAG 4.5: 18.23–20.31, and
the commentary by Brunschwig, Le chapitre 1 du De Interpretatione. Aquinas
possessed William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of Ammonius’s commen-
tary when he composed his own commentary; see Couillaud and Couillaud, in
Thomas Aquinas, Commentaire du Traité de l’interprétation d’Aristote, xvi–
xviii; Ammonius, In De int., trans. William of Moerbeke, CLCAG 2. However,
in his reading of Aristotle he does not associate similitude with image, despite
the brief comparison in Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 4.
For an “iconist” reading of Aristotle, see also Stephanus, In De Int., CAG
18.3: 5.37–6.13.
27. Thomas Aquinas, SCG, lib. 4, c. 11, nn. 14–15 (Marietti ed., §§3474–3475):
“Verbum autem interius conceptum est quaedam ratio et similitudo rei intel-
lectae. Similitudo autem alicuius in altero existens vel habet rationem exem-
plaris, si se habeat ut principium: vel habet potius rationem imaginis, si se
habeat ad id cuius est similitudo sicut ad principium. Utriusque autem exem-
plum in nostro intellectu perspicitur. Quia enim similitudo artificiati existens
in mente artificis est principium operationis per quam artificiatum constituitur,
comparatur ad artificiatum ut exemplar ad exemplatum: sed similitudo rei
naturalis in nostro intellectu concepta comparatur ad rem cuius similitudo
existit ut ad suum principium, quia nostrum intelligere a sensibus principium
accipit, qui per res naturales immutantur. […] Verbum igitur in intellectu con-
ceptum est imago vel exemplar substantiae rei intellectae.” My translation.
28. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 4, art. 3, ad 4 (Leonina 4: 54b): “licet aliquo modo
concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, nullo tamen modo concedendum est
quod Deus sit similis creaturae: quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom.,
in his quae unius ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa
et causato; dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e converso. Et
similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit similis Deo: non tamen
quod Deus sit similis creaturae.” My translation. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, c. 9, §6 (Corpus Dionysiacum 1: 211.13–
212.8). For Aquinas’s commentary on this text, see Thomas Aquinas, In De
divinis nominibus (Marietti ed., §832).
29. See Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II, q. 163, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 10: 329b–330a),
and the reference to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus,
c. 9. On similarity of imitation as a one-sided relation, see also Bonaventure,
In I Sent., d. 31, pars 1, art. 1, q. 3, corp.; I thank Charles Girard-Cédat for this
reference.
30. On the closeness between “image” (εἰκών) and “imitation” (μίμησις), see
Aristotle, Top. 6.2, 140a14–15, quoted in Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 263.
See also Aristotle, De mem. 1, 450b20–451a17.
Notes 179
31. One might prefer not to speak of “similarity” at all here, and instead use only
the vocabulary of “imitation”; but this would go against Aquinas’s explicit
statements.
32. I thank an anonymous referee for the airport–art gallery comparison.
33. Readers familiar with contemporary debates on representation will recognize
here the discussions generated by Nelson Goodman’s strict distinction
between representation and resemblance. Goodman holds that representation
cannot be understood in terms of resemblance, since representation is an
asymmetric relation, whereas resemblance is a symmetric relation; see espe-
cially Goodman, Languages of Art. In response to this, some authors have
pointed out that there are cases of asymmetric resemblance, especially in the
relation between image and model; see Blanc-Benon, Logique des relations
et/ou psychologie de la perception. On the idea that the model is a “standard”
against which the conformity of the image is evaluated and that the image
reproduces certain properties of its model, see Van Gerwen, Art and
Experience, 20–21, quoted in Soszynski, How Do Pictures Represent?; on the
idea that, despite the one-sidedness of the relation between image and model,
a two-sided similarity between them must be admitted, see Jonas, The
Phenomenon of Life, 159. For a discussion of similar issues in Wittgenstein
and his followers, as well as in Husserl, see Mulligan, Wittgenstein et la tradi-
tion austro-allemande, 107–108; see especially Anscombe, Cambridge
Philosophers II: Ludwig Wittgenstein, 398, who wonders how isomorphism,
which is “two-way,” could explain the one-sidedness of depiction.
34. For a discussion of representation, similarity and isomorphism in Aquinas, see
also Panaccio, Aquinas on Intellectual Representation, 196–200.
35. Thomas Aquinas, In Liber de causis, lect. 14 (ed. Saffrey, 85.11–13): “Imago
enim est quod fit ad similitudinem alterius, sicut exemplar est id ad cuius
similitudinem fit aliud.” My translation.
36. See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 5: 334a) and SCG, lib.
4, c. 11, n. 6 (Marietti ed., §3466).
37. On these debates, see, for the first position, Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität
im Mittelalter, 80–89; Michon, L’espèce et le verbe and Les représentations
rendent-elles indirecte la connaissance des choses?. For the second position,
see Panaccio, Le discours intérieur, 184–185 and Aquinas on Intellectual
Representation; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 195–
219 and 256–262. For a defence of Panaccio, see Băltuţă, Remarks on Thomas
Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind. On the origins of the categories “direct real-
ism” and “representationalism” in William Hamilton, see De Libera,
Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution,
162–163.
38. Haldane, Brentano’s Problem, 25–26.
39. For Aquinas’s reception of Aristotle’s three classes, see especially Thomas
Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17.
40. See above.
180 4 Reference
41. In addition to Thomas Aquinas, In Met., lib. 5, lect. 17, see also In I Sent., d.
30, art. 1.
42. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas, 476.
43. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 21, art. 6, sed contra 3 (Leonina 22.3.1:
608.76), quoted in Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas,
477.
44. For references on the connection between exemplarity and truth, see Cesalli,
Le réalisme propositionnel, 46–47. Cesalli mentions in particular the Platonist
influences on medieval philosophy transmitted through Augustine’s “Question
on Ideas” (Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus, q. 46). On
the role of exemplarity in Albert the Great, see the discussion in de Libera,
Métaphysique et noétique. For more general accounts, see Courtine, Inventio
analogiae, and especially Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image.
45. Courtine, Inventio analogiae, 279–280 and more generally 257–282. For
more on exemplary causality in Aquinas, see Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine
Ideas as Exemplar Causes. On the connection between causality and image in
Aquinas, see also Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 270.
46. See James of Viterbo, Quodl. IV, q. 25 and Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XII,
q. 1, both discussed in Côté, L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon
Godefroid de Fontaines. For other medieval discussions on the distinction
between cause and object, see Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX, q. 2 (ed. Macken,
26.24–27) and Matthew of Aquasparta, De cognitione, q. 1, ad 12 (ed.
Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 237), both quoted in Pini, Can God Create My
Thoughts?, 48n43, 49. On this distinction, see also Étienne Gilson, Avicenne
et le point de départ de Duns Scot.
47. See especially William of Ockham, Summa Logicae I, c. 1 (OPh 1: 7.1–9.65)
and In De int., prol., §6 (OPh 2: 351.1–358.206), both quoted and discussed
in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 361–374. For arguments
in favour of a distinction between reference and causality, see Sects. 4.1.2 and
especially 4.2 below.
48. John Duns Scotus, In Met., lib. 5, q. 11, n. 92 (OPh 3: 638.11–13): “Scientia
nostra causatur a rebus, et ideo scibile mensurat scientiam. Sed artificialia
causantur a scientia practica, et ibi scibile est mensurabile, et scientia men-
sura.” My translation; in place of Scientia practica nostra causatur, as found
in the manuscripts, I read Scientia nostra causatur: first, because Scotus says
nowhere else in his commentary on Metaphysics 5 that practical cognition is
measured by things; second, because there is no trace of such a claim in the
parallel passages in his commentary on the Categories (see John Duns Scotus,
In Cat., c. 7, q. 27 [OPh 1: 447.1–453.7]); and finally, because it is common-
place in scholastic philosophy to maintain that practical cognition is the mea-
sure of artefacts, whereas theoretical cognition is measured by things.
49. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §12, n. 39 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “Cum aliquid
possit multipliciter participare perfectionem ab alio, actus cognoscendi sic
participative se habet respectu obiecti sicut similitudo respectu cuius est. Non
dico similitudo per communicationem eiusdem formae, sicut est albi ad
album, sed similitudo per imitationem, sicut est ideati ad ideam.” My transla-
Notes 181
tion. On this passage, see Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir,
235–236. See also John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 122 (Vat. 3:
75.2–3) and Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 479 and 490 (Vat. 3: 286.22–287.2
and 490.5).
50. On the species as a similitude, see John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2,
n. 544 (Vat. 3: 325.3).
51. See also Sect. 4.1.1 above on Thomas Aquinas.
52. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 356 (Vat. 3: 215.9–10): “[…] in
ista relatione […] non est tantum similitudo sed imitatio et exemplatio pas-
siva.” My translation.
53. Boulnois, Être et représentation, 98, and more generally 88–105.
54. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 575 (Vat. 3: 340.19–341.5):
“Sed illa conformitas expressiva ‘totius’ non sufficit, sed requiritur imitatio,
quia secundum Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 74, ‘quantumcumque
duo ova sint similia, unum non est imago alterius’, quia non est natum imitari
ipsum; et ideo requiritur quod imago nata sit imitari ipsum cuius est imago, et
exprimere illud.” My translation. Cf. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus
octoginta tribus, q. 74. On the image in Augustine, see Boulnois, Au-delà de
l’image, 25–53.
55. For the inclusion in the third class, see, among others, John Duns Scotus, Ord.
I, d. 3, pars 2, n. 297 (Vat. 3: 180.15–181.2).
56. See John Duns Scotus, In Met., lib. 5, q. 11, n. 92 (OPh 3: 638.11–13), quoted
above, which seems to admit a causality both from the object to the act and
from the act to the object. For Scotus on intellectual efficient causality, which
is what the term “exemplary causality” refers to according to him, see Ord. I,
d. 36, n. 23 (Vat. 6: 279.22–280.8).
57. On the self-portrait metaphor, see Sect. 4.1.1 above.
58. See John Duns Scotus, In duos libros Perihermeneias, lib. 1, q. 3, n. 8 (OPh 2:
154: 8–25), quoted in Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 231–
232. More generally, my analysis in Sect. 4.1.1 above of the one-sidedness of
depictive similarity in Aquinas applies also to Scotus.
60. See especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481. See also
Sect. 4.2 on Brentano below for a longer discussion of the difference between
causality and reference.
61. On the four senses of intentio, see John Duns Scotus, Rep. II, d. 13 (ed.
McCarthy, 39), quoted and discussed in de Libera, Intention, 610–613.
62. See Williams, Introduction, 8, and the editors’ introduction to volume 3 of the
Opera Philosophica of Scotus (OPh 3: xlii–xlvi). See also Pini, Can God
Create My Thoughts?, 44n14.
63. See John Duns Scotus, In Met., lib. 5, qq. 12–14, n. 98 (OPh 3: 638.5–9) and
In Met., lib. 5, q. 11, n. 57 (OPh 3: 585.17–586.7).
64. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.21–22): “Nec
sola relatio mensurati est tertii modi, sed omnis similis, scilicet non mutua,
qualis est terminati—modo praedicto—ad terminans.” My translation. On the
different interpretations of Aristotle’s text, see Sect. 3.1 above.
182 4 Reference
65. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §11, n. 36 (ed. Alluntis, 459): “[…] actus
etiam voluntatis vel intellectus totaliter causantis obiectum videtur habere
relationem tendentiae respectu eius ut termini intellectionis vel volitionis, sive
ista relatio sit realis sive tantum rationis, non tamen talis intellectio vel volitio
habet respectu talis obiecti relationem mensurabilis, sed magis relationem
mensurae.” My translation.
66. For a contrary reading, see Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of
Cognitive Acts and Species, and Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 153–167.
Cross holds that Scotus’s psychic relation of similarity serves as an account of
intentionality. But it seems to me that this view is difficult to defend, espe-
cially because, in the case of practical cognition, the object is measured by the
thought, such that there would have to be an intentional relation from the
object to the thought. Cross sees the problem, and concludes that objects are
sometimes “signs” of thoughts. However, it is not clear to me what this means.
On this question, see Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive
Acts and Species, 143, and Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 155.
67. As a guide to the reading of this question, one can consult the chart in Day,
Intuitive Cognition, 64–65, which lists the various psychic relations that
Scotus mentions.
68. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §8, nn. 27–28 (ed. Alluntis, 455): “Aliqua
ergo cognitio est per se exsistentis, sicut quae attingit obiectum in sua propria
exsistentia actuali. Exemplum: de visione coloris et communiter in sensatione
sensus exterioris. Aliqua etiam est cognitio obiecti, non ut exsistentis in se,
sed vel obiectum non exsistit vel saltem illa cognitio non est eius ut actualiter
exsistentis. Exemplum: ut imaginatio coloris, quia contingit imaginari rem
quando non exsistit sicut quando exsistit. Consimilis distinctio probari potest
in cognitione intellectiva.” My translation.
69. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 6, §8, n. 19 (ed. Alluntis, 213). My translation.
Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species,
and Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition insist on the importance of the pres-
ence of the object for the distinction between intuitive and abstractive
cognition.
70. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §10, n. 33 (ed. Alluntis, 458): “Dicentur
igitur cognitiones distinctae; et hoc secundum speciem, propter rationes for-
males motivas hinc inde; quia cognitione intuitiva res in propria exsistentia est
per se motiva obiective, in cognitione autem abstractiva est per se motivum
aliquid in quo res habet esse cognoscibile, sive sit causa virtualiter continens
rem ut cognoscibile; sive ut effectus, puta species vel similitudo repraesenta-
tive continens ipsum cuius est similitudo.” My translation.
71. I leave aside the hypothesis of the cause virtually containing the object, which
has to do with the production of intelligibles by the divine essence. For the
stages of the production by God of the intelligibles, see especially John Duns
Scotus, Ord. I, d. 35, n. 32 (Vat. 6: 258.4–18).
Notes 183
72. On the idea that the object “shines forth” in the species, see John Duns Scotus,
Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 386 (Vat. 3: 235.4–9) and Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 4, nn.
118–119 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov, 218).
73. See especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 388–390 (Vat.
3: 236.2–238.3 and 242.10–243.13).
74. Boulnois, Être et représentation, 99.
75. On this distinction, see Sect. 3.2.2 above. I thank Olivier Boulnois for sug-
gesting this comparison to me; for more on these questions, see his Être et
représentation, esp. 432–438.
76. On the contrast between cognized being—or more precisely, “intelligized
being” (esse intellectum)—and real being, see John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36,
n. 66 (Vat. 6: 298.13–15). I thank Dominik Perler for suggesting this “coinci-
dentalist” reading of sensation in Scotus.
77. John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.21–287.2).
78. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §11, nn. 34–35 (ed. Alluntis, 458–459): “Ista
distinctione actus cognoscendi supposita, potest dici quod primus, scilicet, qui
est rei exsistentis, in se necessario habet annexam relationem realem et actu-
alem ad ipsum obiectum; et ratio est, quia non potest esse talis cognitio nisi
cognoscens habeat actualiter ad obiectum talem habitudinem, quae necessario
requirit extrema in actu et realiter distincta et quae etiam naturam extremorum
necessario consequitur. In speciali autem videtur esse duplex relatio actualis
in isto actu ad obiectum. Una potest dici relatio mensurati vel verius mensura-
bilis ad mensuram. Alia, potest dici relatio unientis formaliter in ratione medii
ad terminum ad quem unit, et ista relatio medii unientis specialiori nomine
potest dici relatio attingentiae alterius ut termini vel tendentiae in alterum ut
in terminum.” My translation.
79. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §13, n. 40 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “Secundus
actus cognoscendi, qui scilicet non est necessario exsistentis, ut exsistentis,
non necessario habet relationem actualem ad obiectum, quia relatio realis
actualis requirit per se terminum realem et actualem; tamen iste secundus
actus potest poni habere ad obiectum relationem realem potentialem; et hoc
primam de qua in praecedenti membra dictum est, scilicet mensurabilis vel
dependentiae, non autem secundam, scilicet unionis vel attingentiae. Potest
etiam ista cognitio habere ad obiectum relationem rationis actualem, sed illam
necessario requirit ad hoc quod sit ipsius obiecti.” My translation; for the last
sentence, I follow the text in the edition of Alluntis and in that of Wadding (12:
320), which are accepted in Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of
Cognitive Acts and Species, 147, then rejected in Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory
of Cognition, 165n2, where he follows Alluntis and Wolter’s translation in
God and Creatures, 294.
80. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §13, n. 41 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “[…] illud
quod habet relationem actualem ad terminum exsistentem, et quantum est ex
parte sui semper uniformiter se habet ad illum, habet relationem aptitudinalem
ad illum terminum, quando non est exsistens; operatio est huiusmodi, quia est
aliquid mensurabile per obiectum, hoc est, aptum natum in entitate sua depen-
184 4 Reference
dere ad obiectum, hoc in speciali tali dependentia qualis est eius quod est
similitudo per imitationem vel participationem ad illud cuius est similitudo.
Haec omnia quantum est ex parte fundamenti essent in actu, si terminus esset
in actu.” My translation. On this passage, see Demange, Accidents et relations
non convertibles selon Thomas d’Aquin, Pierre Olivi et Jean Duns Scot.
81. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §14, n. 42 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “[…] de rela-
tione attingentiae ad terminum qui attingitur, potest dici quod cognitioni
abstractivae non convenit talis relatio realis vel aptitudinalis. Probatur: Quia
non convenit fundamento quantum est ex parte eius, nec sibi competeret in
actu si terminus poneretur in actu, quia terminus non est natus per illum actum
attingi ut actu exsistens.” My translation.
82. On this subject, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.
83. On these two examples, see Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.
84. On the distinction between object ut cognitum and object taken absolutely, see
again Sect. 2.2.3.2 above.
85. See John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 1, q. 2, n. 93 (Vat. 7: 49.7–8) and Kobusch,
Sein und Sprache, 522n188, both quoted in Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
86. I thank Olivier Boulnois for drawing my attention to this point.
87. For more on Marty, see Sect. 4.2 below.
88. The case of an act of abstractive intellection directed at the existential being
of something that does not exist is mentioned by Scotus at Lect. I, d. 36, n. 26
(Vat. 17: 469.1–8) and Ord. I, d. 36, n. 28 (Vat. 6: 281.18–282.2), both quoted
in Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
89. See John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 6, §8, n. 19 (ed. Alluntis, 213), quoted
above.
90. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §13, n. 40 (ed. Alluntis, 461): “Potest etiam
ista cognitio habere ad obiectum relationem rationis actualem, sed illam
necessario requirit ad hoc quod sit ipsius obiecti.” My translation; see the
remarks above on the translation of this sentence. On the acceptance of this
relation of reason, see also Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of
Cognitive Acts and Species, 147, who completely changes his mind in Duns
Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 165. Against Cross’s book, see the recent criti-
cism made by Pini, Duns Scotus on Material Substances and Cognition, 777,
who holds that in Scotus, even abstractive cognition has an object, in the sense
that “any thought is about or directed at something, even though it may well
be the case that no extramental individual corresponds to that thought.”
91. See also John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §15, n. 45 (ed. Alluntis, 463–464).
In this passage, Scotus affirms that the non-referential relation attributed to
abstractive cognition is a real relation, which contradicts the rest of his text.
Here I follow Cross, who holds that Scotus’s claims mean “that it is a (neces-
sary) feature of a real item; not that it falls under the technical category of real
relation” (Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and
Species, 150; see also Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 167).
92. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §15, n. 46 (ed. Alluntis, 464): “Contra hoc:
Ens reale non requirit tanquam ad naturam eius consequens vel concomitans,
Notes 185
aliquod non reale; igitur actus cognoscendi realis non habet relationem ratio-
nis consequentem ipsum ex natura sui.” My translation.
93. On the fact that in Scotus, “cognized being” is the same as “being of reason,”
see Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
94. John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §15, n. 46 (ed. Alluntis, 464): “Respondeo:
Per actum cognitionis obiectum habet esse cognitum, et ideo potest naturam
actus sequi aliqua habitudo, quae sit ad obiectum ut habens tale esse.” My
translation. Note that later in the text, Scotus says that when the intellect
thinks of an act of abstractive cognition, it cannot but think of it as having a
relation of reason of termination to the object; see John Duns Scotus, Quodl.,
q. 13, §33, n. 100 (ed. Alluntis, 491). In my opinion, however, this does not
mean that the relation is posited in the act by the intellect. As Scotus affirms,
the relation in question is “consequent to or concomitant with” the act.
95. For the idea that the sensible form is a constituent of sensory experience in
Aristotle, see Kalderon, Form Without Matter, quoted in Sect. 2.2.1 above. For
more on disjunctivism, see Sect. 4.2 above.
96. Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 2, art. 3, n. 91 (ed. Buytaert,
200.123–126): “Realitas visionis non exigit realem praesentiam obiecti exis-
tentis, quamvis exigat eam veritas visionis pro eo quod veritas addit super
realitatem visionis respectum conformitatis ad rem.” My translation.
97. See Peter Auriol, Scriptum, prooemium, sect. 2, and the discussion in Sect.
3.3.1 above.
98. William of Ockham, Ord. I, prologus, q. 1 (OTh 1: 34.2–3). My translation.
99. William of Ockham, Ord. I, prologus, q. 1 (OTh 1: 36.15–16): “idem totaliter
et sub eadem ratione a parte obiecti est obiectum intuitivae et abstractivae.”
My translation.
100. See especially Husserl, Intentionale Gegenstände, and Logische
Untersuchungen V, §11 (Husserliana 19.2: 387.12–15; 1913 ed., 373): “Jupiter
stelle ich nicht anders vor als Bismarck, den Babylonischen Turm nicht anders
als den Kölner Dom, ein regelmäßiges Tausendeck nicht anders als einem
regelmäßigen Tausendflächner.” My translation.
101. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen V, “Beilage zu den Paragraphen 11 und
20” (Husserliana 19.2, 439.15–17; 1913 ed., 425): “Der transzendente
Gegenstand wäre gar nicht Gegenstand dieser Vorstellung, wenn er nicht ihr
intentionaler Gegenstand wäre.” Trans. Findlay, in Logical Investigations,
127.
103. On this point, see Sect. 3.2.1.2 above.
104. Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles,
29; ed. Sauer, 35: “Der Grund dieser Lehre, die wir Metaph. Δ, 15. finden, ist
leicht einzusehen. Die Harmonie oder Disharmonie unseres Denkens mit den
Dingen ändert durchaus nichts an dem Bestande derselben, sie sind unabhän-
186 4 Reference
gig von unserem Denken und bleiben davon unberührt. “Nicht deshalb,” heißt
es Metaph. Θ, 10, “bist du weiß, weil wir mit Wahrheit glauben, daß du weiß
seiest.” Dagegen hängt unser Denken von den Dingen ab und muß sich, um
wahr zu sein, nach ihnen richten: “vielmehr weil du weiß bist, sagen wir, die
wir es sagen, die Wahrheit.” Ebenso im fünften Kapitel der Kategorien:
“Darum weil die Sache ist oder nicht ist, wird auch von der Rede gesagt, sie
sei wahr oder falsch.” Nicht die Dinge sind Abbilder unserer Gedanken, unsere
Gedanken sind ihnen nachgebildet, wie die Worte den Gedanken (De Interpr.
1. p. 16, a, 6.), und unser Verstand erreicht eben sein Ziel nur, indem er durch
die Wissenschaft zu dieser Conformität mit den Dingen, zur Wahrheit gelangt.”
Trans. George, in On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 19.
107. See Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, ed. Kraus, 16 and 54n19;
ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 39 and 62n19 (quoted in the introductory
remarks of Chap. 3 above).
108. See Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, nn. 12540–12543 (transcription: B03488–
B03490). These lectures were given in Vienna at the beginning of the 1880s.
For a more precise dating, see Rollinger, Editor’s Preface. I thank Thomas
Binder from the Franz Brentano Archiv Graz for provided me with the typed
transcription of these lectures.
109. Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, nn. 12542–12543 (transcription: B03490):
“Verhältniße der Quasigleichheit zwischen dem was als immanentes Object
besteht, und dem was ihm entsprechend nicht intentional modifiziert besteht.”
My translation.
110. Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie II, §§20–21, 109–113. For a more precise dat-
ing of these lectures, see Antonelli and Marek, Editorische Vorbemerkungen.
111. Marty, Deduktive und induktive Logik, notebook 1, 196 (quoted in Marty,
Deskriptive Psychologie II, §20, 109): “Zwei Orte sind als Orte, zwei Urteile
als Urteile gleich; eine Farbe und ein Ton als Qualitäten, ein Urteil und eine
Gemütsbewegung als psychische Phänomene usw.” My translation. On the
dating of these lectures, see again Antonelli and Marek, Editorische
Vorbemerkungen. On quasi-sameness in Marty, see Cesalli and Taieb, The
Road to ideelle Verähnlichung.
112. Marty, Deduktive und induktive Logik, notebook 1, 202, quoted in Marty,
Deskriptive Psychologie II, §20, 111.
113. On “formal identity” (formale Identität), see Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität
im Mittelalter, 31–105, quoted in Sect. 4.1.1 above.
Notes 187
des Dinges andrerseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen
der Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre.”
My translation. See Sect. 3.3.2 above.
115. On Brentano’s tripartition of psychic phenomena into presentations, judge-
ments, and emotions, see Brentano, Psychologie. On Brentano’s theory of
imagination, see especially Brentano, Grundzüge der Ästhetik. It should be
noted that Husserl severely criticized Brentano and his students for not distin-
guishing between presentation and imagination; in particular, he reproached
Brentano and Twardowski for accepting immanent objects understood as
mental images (I thank Kevin Mulligan for drawing my attention to this point).
This criticism, which appears already in Husserl’s 1894 paper “Intentionale
Gegenstande,” is taken up again in the Logical Investigations; see especially
Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen V, “Beilage zu den Paragraphen 11 und
20” (Husserliana 19.2: 436.1–440.8; 1913 ed., 421–425). For remarks directed
more specifically at Twardowski, see Husserl’s review of Twardowski’s Zur
Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Clearly, the criticism
will no longer apply once Brentano and his students abandon immanent
objects. On Husserl’s theory of imagination, see Husserl, Phantasie,
Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung. For a comparison between Brentano and Husserl
on imagination, see Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology, 29–50.
116. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51060–51061: “Sehr ver-
schieden von dem Denkenden sich beziehend auf ein Objekt ist die
Correlativität, welche durch den Vergleich zwischen einem Denkenden und
dem betreffenden wirklichen Ding, das dem Denken entspricht, erfaßt wird,
wenn wir zum beispiel beide als übereinstimmend erkennen.” My
translation.
117. Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, n. 51050: “Sie sind sehr mannig-
faltig. Wir bemerkten schon nicht bloß die Differenz von Gleichheit und
Verschiedenheit sondern auch die von Übereinstimmung in eigentlicher
Gleichheit und in jener Art, wie Denkendes und eine dem Gedachten entspre-
chende Wirklichkeit übereinstimmend genannt werden könne[n].” My
translation.
118. Brentano, Abkehr, 324: “Damit, daß jedes Denkende einen Gegenstand, einen
Inhalt hat, ist nicht gesagt, daß es ein relativ ist, dem ein Korrelativ gegenüber-
steht. Es ist auf etwas als Gegenstand gerichtet. Wenn dies besteht, dann
besteht eine Art von Beziehung, die man Ähnlichkeit in besonders modifizier-
tem Sinne nennen mag, zwischen dem Seienden, welches Gegenstand ist, und
dem Denkenden.” My translation.
119. Thoughts about mental acts are perhaps a problematic case, but I will not dis-
cuss this here.
120. On relations in Marty, see Cesalli, Relative Bestimmung. For a discussion of
Marty’s theory, see below in this section.
121. Brentano, Abkehr, 309: “Was Sie von dem Vorstellenden sagen, daß im Fall,
das vorgestellte Ding sei, die Relation eine andere werde, indem sie zu jenen
gehöre, bei welchen auch das Korrelat existiert, kann ich nicht billigen.
188 4 Reference
Vielmehr kommt hier zu der Beziehung des Vorstellenden noch eine zweite
Beziehung hinzu, insofern der Vorstellende etwas zum Gegenstand hat, dem
dieses in Wirklichkeit entspricht.” My translation.
122. See Brentano, Psychologie; Simons, Judging Correctly. The following four
paragraphs incorporate and (slightly) expand upon material in Taieb,
Intentionality and Reference.
Sprachphilosophie, 417n1: “[…] der Gegenstand kann gegeben sein, ohne das
ich urteile, er sei gegeben.” My translation; the emphasis is Marty’s.
124. Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, n. 12549 (transcription: B03493): “Wahr sind
die anerkennenden Urtheile, wo und die verwerfenden wo nicht dem
Gedachten ein Wirkliches entspricht; falsch umgekehrt.” My translation; the
underlining is Brentano’s. See also Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung
der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 417. This theory may be
of interest to philosophers who want to get rid of facts in their ontology, since
it accounts for judicative truth and reference to reality without positing facts.
For a recent rejection of facts, see Betti, Against Facts.
125. On Brentano’s (complex) theory of truth and the evolution of his position on
it, see Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz. See also Srzednicki, Franz Brentano’s
Analysis of Truth; Baumgartner, Die Begründung von Wahrheit durch Evidenz;
Rojszczak, Wahrheit und Urteilsevidenz bei Franz Brentano; Chrudzimski,
Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 50–89; Parsons, Brentano on
Judgement and Truth; Soldati, Brentano über innere Wahrnehmung, intrin-
sische Wahrheit und Evidenz.
126. See especially Thomas Aquinas, De veritate.
127. Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 124.
128. See Brentano, Psychologie; Seron, Adolf Reinach’s Philosophy of Logic, 170;
Richard, Marty against Meinong on Assumptions.
129. Brentano, EL 72, Logikkolleg, n. 12548 (transcription: B03493): “[…] näm-
lich daß [die adäquatio] nur auf die anerkennenden, nicht aber auf die verwer-
fenden Urtheile Anwendung findet, bei welchen gerade das Gegentheil gilt,
nämlich daß im Falle einer Gleichheit von Gedachtem und Wirklichem das
Urtheil falsch ist, während es wahr ist, wo sie fehlt.” My translation. Note
however Brentano, EL 80, Logik, ed. Rollinger, 132, where “correspondence”
(Übereinstimmung) is used more broadly for all true judgements.
130. See Mulligan, Brentano’s Knowledge, Austrian Verificationisms, and
Epistemic Accounts of Truth and Value, 89–90, and Incorrect Emotions in
Ancient, Austrian and Contemporary Philosophy. Note that this interpretation,
according to which the correctness of a judgement depends on the stance taken
towards the object of an underlying presentation also provides a possible
explanation of what Brentano means when he says that one judges truly when
one judges as one ought to judge (see, for example, Brentano, EL 80, Logik,
ed. Rollinger, 132): when judging, one ought to acknowledge the object of a
presentation that refers to reality and reject the object of a presentation that
does not refer.
Notes 189

Sprachphilosophie, 421: “Wir fanden den wahren Sinn der Lehre, daß jedes
Vorstellen (resp. Bewußtsein überhaupt) eine Objektsbeziehung sei, darin,
daß jedes eine wirkliche oder mögliche ideelle Verähnlichung mit etwas (was
eben das Objekt genannt wird) sei.” My translation. On the nature of this type
of similarity and its relationship to isomorphism, see Mulligan, Marty’s
Philosophical Grammar, 18–19; on the historical roots of Marty’s theory, see
Cesalli, Mental Similarity: Marty and the Pre-Brentanian Tradition.
132. See Brentano, Abkehr, 309 (quoted above).
133. Marty, Raum und Zeit, 58.
134. On the attribution to Marty of a non-relational theory of intentionality, see
Chrudzimski, Marty on Truth-Making.
135. Soteriou, The Disjunctive Theory of Perception, whose presentation of dis-
junctivism I follow here.
136. See Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51041–51042, and for a
similar case in medieval philosophy, see especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I,
d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481 (Vat. 3: 287.7–11). Both passages are discussed in
Sects. 2.2.3.2 and 2.3 above.
137. For a discussion of the difference between veridicality (which I call “refer-
ence”) and causality based on the problem of veridical hallucinations, see
Kriegel, The Perception/Cognition Divide. I consider here the standard case
of veridical hallucination, in which the object does not cause the act at all; I
thus neglect cases in which the act is produced by the object via abnormal
causal chains. For a detailed discussion of veridical hallucinations and its vari-
eties, see Lewis, Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision, as well as his
Postscript to the paper.
“In manchen Fällen macht sich das, wovon das Denken bewirkt wird in seiner
Besonderheit bemerklich, wie z.B. beim Schliessen, beim motivierten Wollen,
bei der Erkenntnis eines Axioms ex terminis, bei der Liebe von etwas, die aus
der Vorstellung des Objektes selbst entspringt. Anderemal macht sich dagegen
das Wirkende oder Bewegende nur ganz im allgemeinen bemerklich, sodass
der Erleidung nur der Charakter eines von irgendetwas Bewirktem anhaftet.
So scheint es z. B. beim Sehen, Hören und anderem Empfinden der Fall zu
sein. Dass wir von dem, was das primäre Objekt der Empfindung ist, bewegt
werden, ist nicht richtig, allein gemeiniglich neigt man zu dieser Annahme,
indem man wahrnimmt, dass man von etwas zum Empfinden bewegt wird,
und damit das primäre Objekt des Empfindens, das selbst von diesem ver-
schieden ist und zugleich mit ihm erscheint, identifiziert. Sogar nachdem die
Erfahrung längst aufs deutlichste gezeigt hat, dass die primären Objekte nicht
so wie sie uns erscheinen in Wirklichkeit sind, finden Viele Schwierigkeit sich
von dem Wahne freizumachen.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The
Theory of Categories, 195–196 (slightly modified). This text is quoted in Sect.
2.3 above.
190 4 Reference
140. Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeine Grammatik und

Sprachphilosophie, 421–422: “Wenn es bei den abstrakten Gedanken ausge-
schlossen wäre, daß sie in gewissem Sinne das Gedachte abbilden und ihm
konform sind, müßte es meines Erachtens auch von den konkreten
Anschauungen gelten, und wir ständen also vor einem extremen Nominalismus
oder Semantizismus, der die Vorstellungen insgesamt zu etwas machte, was
dem Vorgestellten in keiner Weise ähnlich oder konform sondern ein bloß
unähnliches und in diesem Sinne willkürliches Zeichen desselben wäre. Und
eine solche Lehre scheint mir—konsequent festgehalten—überhaupt jede
Möglichkeit einer Erkenntnis des Wirklichen zu zerstören. Wohl hat es einen
Sinn zu sagen, es seien z.B. die Farbenempfindungen nicht etwas Wirklichem
konform; mit anderen Worten, was in Wirklichkeit existiert, seien nicht Farben
sondern Schwingungen oder etwas, was gewisse den Schwingungen analoge
Gegensätze aufweist, und dafür seien die Farbenempfindungen nur Zeichen,
die dem Bezeichneten unähnlich sind. […] Und wie schon bemerkt, hat es nur
in dem Falle einen Sinn zu behaupten, wir erkannten, daß, zwar nicht merk-
lich ausgedehnte farbige Körper, wohl aber unsichtbar kleine Atome, daß
zwar nicht Töne, wohl aber Luftschwingungen existieren usw.” My
translation.
141. See especially Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, 423n1; Husserl, Logische
Untersuchungen; and Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano,
217–226, who defends Husserl against Marty. See also Searle, Intentionality,
27 (quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).
142. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie, 15: “[…] alle unsre Vorstellungen
sollen nach ihm nur Zeichen sein, die, wie der Rauch mit dem Feuer, mit dem
Gegenstande, dessen Zeichen sie sind, keine Ähnlichkeit haben.” My transla-
tion. See also Brentano, Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im
christlichen Abendland, 82.
143. See especially William of Ockham, Summa logicae I, c. 1 (OPh 1: 7.1–9.65)
and In De int., prologus, §6 (OPh 2: 351.1–358.206), both quoted and dis-
cussed in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 361–374.
144. Aristotle, De int., 1, 16a3–9.
Chapter 5
Conclusion: Intentionality and History
The goal of this work has been to examine Brentano’s distinction between intention-
ality, causality, and (mental) reference, not just in its own right but also in terms of
its connection with the Aristotelian tradition. The point of departure was the follow-
ing: for Brentano, intentionality is a relation that is distinct both from the relation of
reference, which accounts for the “correspondence” (Übereinstimmung) between a
cognitive act and its object, and from the causal relation, which explains the genera-
tion of cognitive acts. Brentano attributes such a tripartition of psychic relations to
Aristotle. At first sight, his interpretation seems to be justified. In Metaphysics Δ.15,
Aristotle distinguishes three classes of relation: relations “with respect to number”
(κατ᾽ἀριθμόν), or “relations of comparison,” as Brentano calls them; relations “with
respect to power” (κατὰ δύναμιν), or causal relations; and, in the rather mysterious
third class, relations of the kind that holds between a “measure” and the “measur-
able” (μέτρον and μετρητόν), a class which includes relations between psychic
powers and their objects. If it is accepted that the causal relations mentioned in
Metaphysics Δ.15 include the peculiar kind of “being affected” (πάσχειν) that
Aristotle uses in De anima 2.15 to explain how acts of cognition come about, then
the division in the Metaphysics seems to rule out treating the relations between
faculties and their objects as identical to causal relations. If to this it is added that
Aristotle elsewhere counts among these psychic correlates activities whose objects
do not exist (δόξα–δοξαστόν), and if one wishes to give the third class in Metaphysics
Δ.15 the greatest possible extension, then the views expressed in that text on the
relations between powers and their objects cannot be understood as having to do
with the referential aspect of psychic activities. There is therefore a “surplus” in the
relations to the object in Metaphysics Δ.15, and Brentano calls this surplus the
“intentional relation” (intentionale Relation).
The point has been not so much to identify Brentano’s actual sources, but more
to test his interpretation by inquiring whether others before him had recognized
in Aristotle a distinction between intentionality, causality, and reference. In
other words, the aim has been to see whether Brentano’s interpretation has any

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_5
192 5 Conclusion: Intentionality and History
precedents in the Aristotelian tradition—that is, in the Rezeptionsgeschichte (his-

tory of reception) of Aristotle’s writings, or to be more precise, in the reception of
Metaphysics Δ.15. Though Brentano’s sources have not been the main issue, taking
Brentano as the starting point was an invitation to turn to the Middle Ages: given his
avowed affinities with medieval philosophy, one might expect to find in scholastic
authors an anticipation of his tripartition, beginning with the attribution to Aristotle
of a relation to the object that accounts for nothing more than the mere aboutness of
a thought. However, an examination of the reception of Aristotle has shown that
medieval philosophers were not the first to detect in the Aristotelian corpus a psy-
chic relation that simply expresses the grasping of an object: as shown by Alexander
of Aphrodisias’s extension of the third class of relatives to all cognitive acts, even
those whose objects do not exist, as well as their subsumption under the general
concept of “discrimination” (κρίσις), Metaphysics Δ.15 had led, already at the
beginning of the history of Aristotelian psychology, to the theorization of a relation
that seems very similar to what we now call “intentionality.” Nor was it medieval
philosophy that first drew the contrast between cognition and causality: it is pre-
cisely with the psychic “affection” (πάσχειν) discussed in the De anima that
Alexander and the Neoplatonists contrasted the discriminating activity of cognition.
Medieval thinkers were, however, the first to explicitly state the Brentanian triparti-
tion. Duns Scotus takes care to distinguish from one another the causal relation
between act and object, the relation of imitative similarity between them, and the
relation “of what is terminated to what terminates” (terminati ad terminans), where
what terminates, or the “term” (terminus), is simply “what the intellection is about”
(circa quod est), that is, the object. In other words, Scotus keeps causality, refer-
ence, and intentionality distinct. To do so, he has to divide the third class of relations
in Metaphysics Δ.15 into two, in order to draw a contrast between reference and
intentionality. Before him, Thomas Aquinas interpreted Metaphysics Δ.15 as being
about the veridicality of psychic activities, that is, their conformity with reality, and
did not develop a theory of the intentional relation to the object. In this respect,
Scotus is the most Brentanian of the medieval philosophers—or conversely,
Brentano, despite his own stated preference for Aquinas, is a Scotistic psychologist,
all this showing incidentally that the Brentanian tripartition of intentionality, causal-
ity, and reference is firmly rooted in the Aristotelian tradition.
For a relational theory of intentionality, the following question arises: what,
ontologically speaking, is the term (terminus or target) of the intentional relation,
insofar as it does terminate in something? Before his turn to reism, Brentano allows
two senses of “object,” namely, the object as object, understood as the correlate of
the act, and the object tout court, that is, considered in itself rather than as relative
to the act of which it is the object. However, he then abandons the first, “mental”
sense and keeps only the second: to have something as an object no longer entails
the existence of an intentional object. For Brentano after his turn to reism, the think-
ing being is a relative without an existing term (terminus or target), in an ontological
structure that posits nothing more than the having of something as an object, that is,
5 Conclusion: Intentionality and History 193
the directedness of the act; this is similar to Suárez’s theory (defended long before
Brentano) of the intentional transcendental relation, a real relation without a term.
Now, if it turns out that Brentano’s late theory of intentionality is a faithful interpre-
tation of Metaphysics Δ.15—with Brentano translating “‘the thinkable’ implies that
there is thought of it” (τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια) as
“‘x is thought about’ means ‘There is thought about x’”—then there is already in
Aristotle a theory of intentionality that posits, when an object is aimed at, nothing
more than the thinking being and its relational directedness.
However, this is not the only possible interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of psy-
chic correlates. Indeed, the predicate “is thought” seems to have two meanings in
Aristotle. According to Metaphysics Δ.15, it seems to posit only the thinking being,
whereas according to Categories 7, 7b25–27, it seems to indicate the existence of a
correlative, since Aristotle maintains there that some cognitive acts have correla-
tives that are naturally simultaneous with them. It is possible to see here a “correla-
tional” theory that allows for the existence in the soul of ficta or impossibilia as
objects that are essentially relative to acts.1 These beings, which are purely in
thought and internal to the soul, could be considered as existing differently from
real beings, and as having an εἶναι that is distinct from ὑπόστασις. This is probably
how Aristotle was read by the Neoplatonists. Likewise in the Middle Ages, for
Scotus “cognized being” (esse cognitum) attributes some minimal mode of being to
the object; a model very similar to the correlational schema in Categories 7 thus
seems to be in play, once more with an object in anima. In adopting the medieval
theory of “objective being,” Brentano did not succeed in avoiding this correlationist
understanding of intentionality, which posits an object that is essentially relative to
the act inasmuch as it is an irreale present in the soul. In his reist period, he draws
on another scholastic interpretation of Aristotle, according to which “is thought” is
an extrinsic denomination, as maintained by Suárez, for example; Brentano has thus
in some sense leapt from Categories 7 to Metaphysics Δ.15, and freed the object
from its essential relation to the act. Here too, Brentano and the Aristotelian tradi-
tion reflect one another.
In order to lay out the methodological assumptions that have informed the pre-
ceding pages, I will conclude with a few remarks on the philosophy of the history of
philosophy. Since the analysis in the present work is meant as an examination of the
reception of a philosophical corpus, it has been necessary to include a certain
amount of “explanatory narrative” (récit explicatif). The method of explanatory nar-
rative, as Claude Panaccio conceives it, is a kind of genetic analysis. Such an account
“sets up a diachronic and causal story which provides an explanation for the occur-
rence at a given moment of a given intellectual phenomenon.” This might be done
in sociological terms, especially by establishing the “diachronic interplay of influ-
ences and reactions, and the description of the currents of thought in a given period,
and so on.”2 The present study, however, has been concerned not just with narrative
but also with philosophical argument. More specifically, it has aimed at combining
a focus on the longue durée, as in the work of Jean-François Courtine and Alain de
Libera, with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy, as exemplified by the

work of Dominik Perler.3 Thus, it has been directed more towards what Panaccio
calls “doctrinal reconstruction,” that is, descriptive analysis aimed at revealing the
content of the philosophical positions of a given author. Following a distinction
drawn from Richard Rorty, this can take two forms. The first is “rational
reconstruction”:
[La reconstruction rationnelle] consiste, pour l’essentiel, à présenter les doctrines du passé
dans un idiome d’aujourd’hui, ce qui permet, une fois qu’elles sont ainsi reformulées, de les
intégrer de plein droit à la discussion contemporaine et de les traiter comme des réponses,
erronées peut-être mais à tout le moins rationnelles et dignes d’intérêt sur le plan théorique,
à des problèmes que nous tenons pour pertinents.4
The second is “historical reconstruction”:

[La reconstruction historique] recherche avant tout la fidélité aux doctrines étudiées et s’en
tient autant que faire se peut au langage dans lequel elles ont été originairement formulées,
ou du moins à une traduction littérale de ce langage. L’historien veut ici s’approcher au plus
près de la compréhension même qu’avaient un Aristote, un Abélard ou un Kant de leurs
propres écrits.5
The objective of historical reconstruction is “fidelity” to the author in question.

Though rational reconstruction also aims at fidelity, it must first of all be “relevant,”
that is, it should be done in such a way that the positions it explains are made avail-
able to be discussed by contemporary philosophers: “le recours aux auteurs du
passé prétend contribuer à la réflexion philosophique du lecteur moderne.”6 Thus, in
a rational reconstruction the philosophical positions of the past are detached from
the context in which they arose and are integrated into contemporary discussions.
Panaccio is therefore opposed to holistic arguments, at least in the strong sense.7 As
he maintains: “une thèse donnée (ou un ensemble de thèses) est séparable, d’un
point de vue philosophique, de tout ce qu’elle n’implique pas logiquement.”8
Panaccio follows Kevin Mulligan in maintaining that philosophical problems have
“their own life”; though not eternal, they can arise in distinct historical periods.9
Though the present work is meant to examine the philosophical dimension of
texts from the past, it has done so more from the perspective of historical recon-
struction than of rational reconstruction. Admittedly, in preferring conceptual over
lexical analysis, I have sometimes chosen not to follow the original vocabulary of
authors of the past.10 However, when I have used a contemporary term, this was
done not to make relevance prevail over fidelity, nor to proceed to a “triumphant
anachronism,” as Bernard Williams would put it,11 but to facilitate understanding by
replacing terms not familiar to present-day readers with synonyms drawn from
more recent philosophical discussions. In this respect, the present work has kept in
view the need to recontextualize philosophical statements, as called for by Alain de
Libera, who debated these topics with Panaccio.12 According to de Libera, there is
no reason to deny that philosophical positions of the past can be reconstructed and
evaluated:
[J]e ne nie évidemment pas qu’il soit possible et même infiniment souhaitable d’“évaluer”
une thèse une fois celle-ci rendue accessible par une quelconque forme de reconstruction et
je précise que je n’exclus par principe d’avance aucun type de reconstruction.13
However, what de Libera rightly insists on, against the privileging of relevance over
fidelity, is that establishing the meaning of a philosophical position of the past is a
prerequisite to any evaluative or comparative work:
Avant d’extraire une thèse d’un corpus, de la prélever, de la traduire ou de la retraduire, bref
de l’isoler et de la discuter dans les termes d’une quelconque théorie moderne, il faut
s’assurer que nous avons saisi exactement de quoi elle parle.14
De Libera, whose sympathies are rather holistic, stresses that a philosophical posi-
tion is a response to a particular question, and can be understood and evaluated only
by relating it to that question. However, this question can itself be understood only
as a reaction to other positions, which in turn are responses to other questions, and
so on. In short, every philosophical position is part of a “question–answer complex”
(complexe questions-réponses, CQR)—a concept that de Libera borrows from
R.G. Collingwood15—and no position can be understood or evaluated indepen-
dently of the complex of which it is a part. Nevertheless, this does not rule out
accepting that there can be a “local commensurability of certain complexes of ques-
tions and answers” based on “certain limited continuities within structures of
changeable assemblages”16:
Étant donné deux CQR: CQR1 et CQR2, composés respectivement des questions {a, b, c, d}
et {w, x, y, z} et des réponses {a*, b*, c*, d*} et {w*, x*, y*, z*}, diverses solutions peuvent
être observées: 1/ CQR1 et CQR2 n’ont aucune question en commun; 2/ CQR1 et CQR2
partagent les mêmes questions; 3/ CQR1 et CQR2 ont en commun certaines questions. Dans
le cas 2/: les questions maximalement semblables peuvent soit être données dans le même
ordre d’enchaînement (ou d’implication ou de présupposition), en sorte que l’on ait {a, b,
c, d} = {w, x, y, z}, soit être données dans un ordre différent, par exemple {a, b, c, d} = {x,
y, w, z}, où la question {a} commandant la série ordonnée {a, b, c, d} dans CQR1 n’intervient
plus, comme lex seriei, dans CQR2, où {w} apparaît au troisième rang. Dans le cas 3/: plu-
sieurs questions de CQR1 peuvent être reprises par une seule dans CQR2, par exemple {a,
d} par {y}, et réciproquement. Les mêmes répartitions peuvent être observées dans le cou-
plage des questions et des réponses: dans l’hypothèse précédente, ce qui, dans CQR1, est
épelé en deux réponses distinctes {a*, d*} sera, dans CQR2, nécessairement donné en une
seule {y*}. Cependant, on peut aussi trouver des situations où les réponses sont simplement
permutées: si, par exemple, CQR1 et CQR2 apportent la même réponse à des questions dif-
férentes—comme dans le cas de {c*} = {w*}. Dans cette seconde hypothèse, si CQR1 et
CQR2 n’ont aucun autre élément en commun, la “ressemblance” entre les deux CQR pourra
être considérée comme minime ou nulle, et il n’y aura aucune raison valable de les inscrire
dans la même épistémé. Ce type de description pouvant être appliqué aux concepts et aux
thèses, il semble qu’on ait là un cadre structurel propice au “traçage” et à la “traçabilité.”17
Thus, two distinct question–answer complexes can share a certain number of

questions, to which they may have the same responses or different ones; or they
can be made up of all the same questions, with only the responses changing. In
short, the same problems sometimes appear at different historical moments, and
all the responses accompanying them become useable concurrently, regardless of
the particular eras in which they appeared. These “epistemic continuities” (conti-
nuités épistémiques) do not necessarily entail a “factual historical relation”
(relation historique factuelle).18 However, they can sometimes be based on such a

relation. When they are, one author counts as a “precursor” for another, as Guy
Longworth puts it; when they are not, that author counts as a “precedent.”19 And
when several authors who are either precursors or precedents to one another with
respect to a certain topic all claim to follow one and the same position, text, or
thinker on this topic, they form a tradition. This way of attempting to identify a
tradition has been the focus of the present work, proceeding from Brentano to
Aristotle, and back again.
Though the primary objective of this work has been historical reconstruction—
that is, to reveal the philosophical content of texts of the past—it cannot be denied
that the positions of Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, and Suárez, as well as those of
Brentano, can make valuable contributions to current debates. As Perler empha-
sizes, authors of the past are useful for contemporary discussion not only when they
deal with problems similar to ours, but also when they ask questions which are dif-
ferent, since this may help us to make explicit some of our background assumptions
and to consider whether they are legitimate.20 In the historical reconstruction that I
have made in the preceding pages, I mentioned some fundamental differences
between ancient and medieval authors on the one hand and ourselves on the other,
for example on Aristotelian formal causation21 or the theological origin of the scho-
lastic concept of imitation.22 However, in the concluding paragraphs of this work, I
would like to focus on some commonalities between past and present philosophical
questions in order to point out some interesting historical distinctions that could be
brought into contemporary discussions on intentionality.
Admittedly, theories that treat intentionality as a real relation without a term
(terminus or target), as is perhaps the case with Aristotle, and certainly with Suárez
and the late Brentano, will probably be rejected today: in the “conflict” mentioned
by Tim Crane among “(1) All thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things
which they are about,” “(2) Relations entail the existence of their relata” and “(3)
Some thoughts are about things which do not exist,” it is probably (1) that will be
sacrificed.23 However, (2) is not always maintained: recall that, among contempo-
rary philosophers, J.N. Findlay and Reinhardt Grossmann attributed a relational
character to all cognitive acts, even those aimed at non-existent objects.24 Another
solution would be to qualify (3), either by accepting intentional, mind-dependent
objects, as do, for example, certain Neoplatonist authors, as well as Scotus and
Brentano, or by assigning to possible and even impossible objects a special mind-
independent “there is” (es gibt), as Meinong does, so that any object would retain a
“residue of positional character” (ein Rest von Positionscharakter).25
Whether or not one accepts that there can be real relations without a term, the
distinctions made in the context of the reception of Metaphysics Δ.15 in the
Aristotelian tradition continue to be highly relevant to the questions found in con-
temporary debate on intentionality. Thus, a philosopher who, in addition to a psy-
chology carried out “from the genetic point of view” (in genetischer Hinsicht),
wants to explain “from the structural point of view” (in struktureller Hinsicht) in
what sense cognitive acts are related to objects will be especially interested in the
different relations that philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition posited in their psy-
chological theories. As summarized by Perler at the end of his study on intentional-

ity in medieval philosophy:
Die mittelalterlichen Ansätze sind des Weiteren immer noch anregend, weil sie einen Punkt
betonen, der in den gegenwärtigen Debatten nicht immer gebührend Beachtung findet:
Eine adäquate Intentionalitätstheorie muss in zweifacher Hinsicht eine Erklärung für die
verschiedenen Typen von intentionalen Zuständen geben. Einerseits muss sie in gene-
tischer Hinsicht erklären, wie intentionale Zustände überhaupt entstehen können. Welche
physiologischen und psychologischen Vorgänge sind erforderlich, damit in uns so unter-
schiedliche Zustände wie das Vorstellen einer Chimäre oder das Denken an den morgigen
Regen entstehen? Andererseits muss eine adäquate Theorie auch in struktureller Hinsicht
erklären, was den intentionalen Zuständen ihre spezifische “Gerichtetheit” verleiht. Was
macht mein Denken zu einem An-den-morgigen-Regen-Denken: eine Abbildrelation, eine
Kausalrelation, eine Zeichenrelation oder irgendeine andere Relation? […] Die scholast-
ischen Details der einzelnen Antworten mögen heute veraltet erscheinen, aber die Suche
nach einer strukturellen Erklärung hat kaum an Aktualität eingebüßt. Denn selbst wenn
heute im Zuge der “Naturalisierung” des Geistes die genetische Frage viel präziser beant-
wortet werden kann als im Mittelalter, ist damit die strukturelle Frage noch nicht beantwor-
tet. Selbst wenn also nur auf neuronale Zustände und nicht auf intellektuelle Akte rekurriert
wird, und selbst wenn die Entstehung dieser Zustände genau beschrieben wird, ist damit
noch nicht erklärt, was denn nun den neuronalen Zuständen eine “Gerichtetheit” verleiht:
eine Kausalrelation, eine Abbildrelation oder eine Zeichenrelation? Genau mit dieser Frage
muss sich eine Intentionalitätstheorie auseinandersetzen.26
What Aristotelian authors emphatically stress is that aboutness has to be clearly

distinguished not just from causal psychic relations but also from the conformity of
cognitive acts to reality. The relation of the act to its object is not the relation of the
act to this object to the extent that it exists. Thus, when Scotus discusses abstractive
cognition, which has an object that is not present, he seems to distinguish between
the relation to the object ut cognitum and the relation to the object taken absolutely.
The relation to the object ut cognitum is not real, but is still given under the form of
a relation of reason: there is no psychic activity that does not have an intentional
relation to an object. In contrast, the relation to the object taken absolutely is a real
relation, either potential or actual, depending on whether the object is possible or
existent. The former relation is, as Perler puts it, “some other relation” (irgendeine
andere Relation), for it is primitive and does not express anything other than about-
ness, that is, the directedness of the act towards what terminates it, or its “terminus,”
whereas the latter is an Abbildrelation, or relation of “similarity by imitation”
(similitudo per imitationem), which is a one-sided relation that accounts for the
conformity of thought to reality. A similar distinction is found in Brentano, accord-
ing to whom the aboutness of the act is handled by a primitive relation called the
“intentional relation,” and the referential aspect of the act by a relation of
similarity:
If Jupiter were not something imaginary, but something real and actually existent, he could
indeed enter into a relation with the thinker, and this relation could be described as a kind
of correspondence; however, it would not be the so-called psychic relation of the thinker
with that which is thought, but a correspondence between the thinker and the thing,
grounded on the characteristics of the thinker and those of the thing. This would be a rela-
tion that should be classified as a subspecies of sameness and similarity in the usual sense.27
Thus, in both Scotus and Brentano there is a well-developed theory of psychic rela-
tions which distinguishes between the causal and non-causal relations of the cogni-
tive act to the object, and divides the non-causal relations into an intentional relation
and a relation of similarity. This tripartition of the connections of the act to its object
has by no means ceased to be of contemporary relevance, inasmuch as it emphasizes
that “being intentionally directed towards something” is not equivalent to “referring
to something,” and that neither intentionality nor reference is a causal relation.28
Thus, rather than reducing intentionality to causality, the theories of Scotus and
Brentano develop a complex schema, drawing a broad map of what one might mean
when talking of a “relation to the object.”
Behind this tripartition of relations with the object, there is still Aristotle making
himself heard through his texts on psychic correlates: not just the De anima, but also
Categories 7 and (above all) Metaphysics Δ.15, all of which can thus be brought into
contemporary discussions. In the end, this should not be surprising. The theorizing
of non-causal relations of the cognitive act to its object over and above an account
of the causal influences on the subject by its environment, and the distinction of
these non-causal relations into intentionality and reference—theorizing that lies at
the origin of the fundamental divisions of contemporary psychology into descriptive
psychology vs. genetic psychology and psychophysiology; or phenomenology vs.
philosophy of mind and cognitive science—all this finds its starting point in
Brentano. Brentano himself, however, claims to revive an Aristotelian–scholastic
concern in his theory of intentionality. If Aristotelian psychology is “still credible”
(independently of its “physics of forms”), it is because early on—probably already
with Aristotle himself, but certainly since Alexander of Aphrodisias in late antiquity,
and then throughout medieval philosophy—it refused to reduce the cognitive act to
an effect produced by the object, and because Brentano adopted this refusal and
built it up into a science, variously called “descriptive psychology,” “psychognosy,”
or “phenomenology.” Aristotelian psychology has not just a Rezeptionsgeschichte
(history of reception), but also an Einflußgeschichte (history of influence); under
various names, this psychology has persisted to our day, thus making Aristotle into
our contemporary, or rather, making us into Aristotelians.29
Notes
1. On the correlational theory of intentionality, see Cesalli, Objects and Relations

in Correlational Theories of Intentionality, 270.
2. See Panaccio, De la reconstruction en histoire de la philosophie. 174–175: “Le
récit explicatif, dans son sens le plus général, met en place un scénario diachro-
nique et causal qui rend compte de l’occurrence à tel moment de tel ou tel
phénomène intellectuel. […] La causalité en question, d’ailleurs, pourra, elle
aussi, se situer à bien des niveaux différents: de la détermination sociologique
des historiens dits externalistes à l’explication intentionnelle la plus standard
Notes 199
[…], en passant par l’explication psychanalytique individuelle, le jeu diachro-

nique des influences ou des réactions, la description des courants de pensée
d’une époque donnée, et ainsi de suite.”
3. On the longue durée, see Courtine, Inventio analogiae and De Libera,
Archéologie du sujet, as well as the papers in honour of Courtine collected in
Büttgen and Rauzy (eds.), La longue durée. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität
im Mittelalter is a paradigmatic work of systematic analysis in the history of
philosophy. An exemplary combination of longue durée investigation with sys-
tematic analysis can be found in Angelelli, Studies on Gottlob Frege and
Traditional Philosophy.
4. Panaccio, Philosophie analytique et histoire de la philosophie, 327.
5. Panaccio, Philosophie analytique et histoire de la philosophie, 327–328.
Panaccio borrows the distinction between “rational” and “historical reconstruc-
tion” from Rorty’s “The Historiography of Philosophy.”
6. Panaccio, Philosophie analytique et histoire de la philosophie, 342; see also De
la reconstruction en histoire de la philosophie, 180.
7. For a defence of (very) strong holism in the history of philosophy, see Della
Rocca, Meaning, the History of Philosophy, and Analytical Philosophy.
8. Panaccio, De la reconstruction en histoire de la philosophie, 184.
9. See Mulligan, Sur l’histoire de l’approche analytique de l’histoire de la phi-
losophie, 64, quoted in Panaccio, Philosophie analytique et histoire de la phi-
losophie, 332. See also Panaccio, Les mots, les concepts et les choses; for a
position similar to Panaccio’s, see Engel, La philosophie peut-elle échapper à
l’histoire?, as well as La dispute, 184–196.
10. As I indicated in the Introduction (Chap. 1), I owe to Laurent Cesalli the strict
distinction between lexicography and history of philosophy. For a critique spe-
cifically of histories of intentionality focused on terminology, see Caston,
Connecting Traditions.
11. Williams, Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy, 20, quoted and dis-
cussed in Van Ackeren, On Interpreting Historical Texts and Contributing to
Current Philosophy.
12. See de Libera, Retour de la philosophie médiévale?, L’art des généralités, 609–
636, Le relativisme historique, and Archéologie et reconstruction. For a cri-
tique of Panaccio’s position, see also Flasch, Wie schreibt man Geschichte der
mittelalterlichen Philosophie?; Robert, Relativismes et jurisprudence.
13. De Libera, Archéologie et reconstruction, 561. See also de Libera, L’art des
généralités, 635.
14. De Libera, L’art des généralités, 634.
15. See Collingwood, An Autobiography, and An Essay on Metaphysics.
17. De Libera, Le relativisme historique, 489–490.
19. Longworth, Grice and Marty on Expression (quoted in the Introduction

[Chap. 1] above).
20. Perler, The Alienation Effect in the Historiography of Philosophy. For a similar
position, see Antognazza, The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History
and Van Ackeren, On Interpreting Historical Texts and Contributing to Current
Philosophy.
21. See Sect. 2.2 above, esp. 2.2.1.
22. See Sect. 4.1 above, esp. 4.1.1.
23. Crane, Elements of Mind, 23.
24. See the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
25. Meinong, Selbstdarstellung, 109 (Gesamtausgabe 7: 19). See also Courtine,
Présentation, 29 and 37. For an overview of the contemporary debate about
Meinongian objects, see Reicher, Nonexistent Objects.
26. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 409–410.
des Dinges andrerseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen der
Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre.” My
translation.
28. On the distinction between “being intentionally directed towards something”
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, 529 (discussed in
the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).
29. On the contrast between Rezeptionsgeschichte and Einflußgeschichte, which
are the two components of Wirkungsgeschichte (history of effect), see
Mandelkow, Probleme der Wirkungsgeschichte, 83, quoted in Jauss, Racines
und Goethes Iphigenie, 383 and 398n42.
Appendix
Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51040–51048:

Die relativen Bestimmungen sind von zwei Klassen[. D]ie einen beruhen auf Vergleich von
absolut [G]egebenen, von welchen keines als solches einen Hinweis auf das andere enthält.
So vergleiche ich ein Blau mit dem andern und sage, sie seien gleich[,] oder ein Rot mit
einem Blau, und sage sie seien verschieden. Jene Gleichheit und diese Verschiedenheit
charakterisieren zwei absolute Dinge, die in ihrer Existenz nichts miteinander zu tun haben,
vielmehr jede<s> ganz unabhängig gegeben, relativ zu einander. Ganz anders ist es, wenn
es sich um einen Fall handelt, wo etwas von etwas gewirkt wird oder von ihm leidet[.] Das
Leidende kann nicht leidend sein ohne Tätiges, wenn es auch denkbar scheint, daß es das-
selbe Leidende sei, während das Tätige nicht dasselbe ist. So könnte einer den selben
Sinneseindruck, den er von einem [Körper empfangen hat,] gewiß auch von einem anderen
Körper und jedenfalls von Gott empfange[n ;] das Leidende wäre dann dasselbe, das Tätige
aber nicht mehr. Man hätte darum auch nicht mehr dieselbe Relation, obwohl dasselbe
Leiden. Aber irgend welche Relation zu irgend welchem Tätigen würde bestehen und diese
würde ebenso auf dem Leiden des einen und d[er] Tätigkeit des andern beruhen wie die
Verschiedenheit des Roten und Blauen auf der Eigentümlichkeit dieser absoluten Farben.
Der Unterschied ist also nur der, daß, was zugrunde liegt, <nicht> in der Art absolut ist, daß
es weder in bestimmter noch unbestimmter Weise auf ein anderes ohne welches es nicht
sein kann, hinweist, während dies im Falle des Leidens, wenigstens in unbestimmter Weise
geschieht. Von der einen wie andern Klasse ist ein eigentümlicher Fall unterschieden, in
welchem man von einer Beziehung zu sprechen pflegt, nämlich der der s.g. psychischen
Beziehung zu einem Objekte. Wir sagen, ein Denkendes denkt ein Gedachtes, und ein
Gedachtes wird von einem Denkenden gedacht, ganz ähnlich wie wir sagen, ein Größeres
ist nicht ohne ein Kleineres und ein Kleineres ist kleiner als ein Größeres. Aber was läge
hier anderes dem Denkenden als absolutes oder nur unbestimmt Hinweisendes unter?
Offenbar nichts, vielmehr ist es immer eine besondere Veränderung dessen was wir denk-
end nennen, die es zum Denkenden macht und nie kann es geschehen, daß es ähnlich wie
bei dem Größeren geschieht, daß es ohne selbst ein[e] Änderung zu erfahren, aufhört größer
zu sein, weil ein anderes durch Wachstum sich verändert hat. Sieht man aber näher zu, so
findet man, daß ein solches andere hier überhaupt gar nicht im eigentlichen Sinne existiert[.
I]ndem der Denkende denkend wird, geschieht es daß man sich auch des Ausdrucks bedi-
enen kann, das was e[r] denkend<e> zum Objekt habe, werde von ihm gedacht, möge es
nun sein oder nicht sein[,] wie ja z.B. auch wenn einer Jupiter denkt, gesagt werden kann,
daß Jupiter von ihm gedacht werde, obwohl derselbe nicht sei. Sollte es sich nicht um etwas

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202 Appendix
Imaginäres in Jupiter handeln, sondern um etwas Reelles und wirklich Existierendes, so

würde zwar von diesem gelten, daß es mit dem Denkenden in einer Relation sei, die als eine
Art Übereinstimmung bezeichnet werden könnte, allein diese wäre nicht die s.g. psychische
Beziehung des Denkenden zum Gedachten, sondern eine Übereinstimmung des Denkenden
mit dem Dinge aufgrund der Eigentümlichkeit des Denkenden einerseits und des Dinges
andrerseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen der Gleichheit und
Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre. Man hat es also nicht wie bei den auf
Vergleich beruhenden Relationen und bei den auf Leiden und Tun [b]eruhenden mit einer
wahren Relation zu tun, vielmehr hat der Fall noch eher Ähnlichkeit mit dem des Leidenden
in dem Sinn, in welchem es sich um denselben Leidenden handeln kann, während das
Tätige wechselt[;] er bleibt ja wie wir sagten als Leidender dasselbe, nur freilich erscheint
im allgemeinen ein Tätiges gefordert. Wie das Gedachte etwas an sich gar nicht Existierendes
[sein kann], so kann es, da wir ja manchmal allgemeine Gedanken denken[,] auch etwas
unbestimmtes sein. Indeß sehen wir, daß der Fall des Leidens sowohl als der des Denkens,
wenn auch beide nicht als solche zu den Relationen zu rechnen sind, doch insofern eine
Ähnlichkeit damit haben, als auch hier der, welcher am Leidenden oder Denkenden denkt,
sich als solcher mit mehreren Objekten zugleich befaßt[;] der[, welcher] den Leidenden
denkt, befaßt sich auch mit einem Tätigen[,] wenn auch unbestimmt<,> (welcher)[,] und
wer den Denkenden denkt auch mit dem, was Gegenstand des Denkens ist, mag es nun
existieren oder nicht. Und dieser Ähnlichkeit wird es ein Bedürfnis sein, auch sprachlich
Ausdruck zu geben und so tun wir indem wir sagen, es beziehe sich das Leidende auf ein
Tätiges und das Denkende auf ein Gedachtes[.] Dies kann keinen Schaden bringen, so
lange man sich die wesentliche<n> Verschiedenheit der betreffenden Fälle klar im
Bewußtsein erhält.
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Index
A Aiming at, v, vi, 6–8, 13, 41, 47, 85, 92, 96,
Aboutness [being about], v, vi, 1–6, 13, 74, 99, 101, 162, 165, 170
103, 108, 122, 130, 154, 165, 172, Alteration, 16, 17, 20, 21, 29, 44, 48
192, 197 Artefact, 155, 158, 180
Absolute, 81, 83, 86, 103–106, 110, 115, 140, Assimilation, vi, 61, 151–167,
141, 145, 146, 148, 149, 163–165, 184, 174, 177
197, 203 ideal assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung),
absolute determination, 102, 112, 113, 116 130, 137–139, 171, 186, 188
absolute form, 37, 38 Attention, 2, 7, 9, 14, 19, 22, 28–30, 35–38,
absolute property, 108, 109, 111, 112, 117 43, 54, 55, 60, 61, 69, 123, 157,
Act 184, 187
cognitive act, 4–7, 10, 16, 23–25, 28, 29, Awareness (being aware), 17, 19–21, 27–29,
35, 37, 38, 43, 47, 54, 57, 60, 62, 64, 32, 46, 47, 156
70, 74, 78, 83, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99,
103–107, 141, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158,
160, 161, 164, 167, 170, 174, 182–184, B
191–193, 196, 197 Being
mental act, v, 1, 2, 10, 11, 44, 66, 187 according to the figures of the categories,
Action, 10, 12, 16, 18, 24, 28, 29, 47, 56, 58, being (ὄν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν
61, 71, 78, 87, 99, 107, 110, 122, 167 κατηγοριῶν), 81
immanent action, 25, 30, 32–35, 37, 52, apparent being (esse apparens), 83, 85
75–77, 84, 153, 154, 177 cognized being (esse cognitum), vi, 80–83,
non-transitive action, 7, 34, 37 85–87, 96, 125, 162, 164, 165, 183,
transitive action, 37, 38, 43, 65 184, 193
Activity [active], 18, 20, 23–26, 31, 33–36, 38, diminished being (esse diminutum)
40, 43–45, 47, 52–55, 57, 69, 73, 76, (diminished mode of being), 79–81
77, 97, 102, 109, 111, 122, 154, 155, existential being (esse existentiae), 184
157, 162, 192, 197 intelligible being (esse intelligibile)
Adequation (adaequatio rei et intellectus), (intelligized being (esse intellectum)),
153, 167, 171 31, 80, 83, 85, 125, 127, 153, 183
Adverbialism (adverbial), 4, 11, 93, 103, intentional being (esse intentionale), vi, 5,
108, 144 17, 31, 35, 80–82, 84, 85, 108, 129,
Affection (being affected), vi, 6, 8, 16–18, 21, 162, 166, 168
24, 27, 36, 42, 43, 45–47, 70, 151, 154, natural being (esse naturale), 31,
173, 191, 192 152, 168, 176

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0
230 Index
Being (cont.) intuitive cognition, 128, 140, 144, 161,

objective being (esse obiective), 5, 12, 17, 162, 164, 165, 182
49, 69, 81, 86–88, 129, 193 practical cognition, 160, 180, 182
opinion, being in (esse in opinione) (being theoretical cognition, 155, 180
opinable (esse opinabile)), 81, 125, 126 Common item (κοινόν), 78, 79
outside the soul, being (esse extra Common nature, 40, 41, 64, 84, 163, 164
animam), 81, 125, 154 Concept (conceptus)
quidditative being (esse quiditativum), formal concept (conceptus formalis),
80, 83 87, 162
real being (esse reale), 80–83, 87, 90, 105, objective concept (conceptus obiectivus),
107, 125, 162, 164, 183, 193 87, 162
reason, being of (esse rationis), 81, 82, 84, Consciousness, 1, 2, 15, 28, 54, 57, 66, 69,
86, 88, 90, 96, 105, 107, 116, 125, 142, 70, 90, 98, 100–102, 134, 135,
164, 165, 184 171, 172
reproduced being (esse exemplatum), Content, 2–4, 24, 26, 27, 44, 89, 90, 94, 133,
81, 125 139, 151, 154, 156, 169, 174, 194
spiritual being (esse spirituale), 31, Conversion (conversio), 35, 36
152, 176 Correctness (correct), 3, 20, 45, 69, 76, 89, 94,
within the soul, being (esse in anima), 59, 115, 155, 171, 173, 188
81, 125 Correlate (correlative), 1, 6, 16, 24, 44, 47, 51,
as the true, being (ὄν ὡς ἀληθές), 81 69–75, 77–103, 109, 112, 113, 115,
116, 131, 133, 137, 145, 169, 170,
191–193
C psychical correlate, 121, 122, 198
Cause, v, 2, 3, 7, 16, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43–49, 53, Correlational intentionality, 123, 124, 131
61, 63, 73–75, 86, 87, 90, 110, 111, Correspondence, 3, 5, 107, 110, 151, 166,
113, 152, 155, 160, 161, 173, 182, 189 168–171, 191, 197
efficient cause (efficient causality), 18,
29–32, 40, 42, 48, 49, 157–159, 181
excitative cause, 42, 65 D
exemplary formal cause (exemplary cause; Demodification, 91, 92
exemplary formal causality; Denomination
exemplarity), 157, 158, 180 extrinsic denomination, 83–88, 102, 103,
final cause, 42, 157 108, 128, 129, 193
formal cause (formal causality), 21, 31, 32, intrinsic denomination, 85, 87
42, 157 Depiction, 155, 157, 159, 179
material cause (material causality), 21, Directedness (being directed at), 1, 4, 11, 101,
31, 42 108, 166, 193, 197
terminative cause, 30, 42, 65 Discrimination (κρίσις) (to discriminate
Change (κρίνειν)), 6, 7, 18, 22–27, 30, 36, 47,
formal change (change of form), 19 54, 78, 127, 192
natural change, 19 Disjunctivism, 172, 173, 189
physical change, 19 Divalence (divalent), 12, 76, 122, 145
physiological change, 18, 19, 29
qualitative change, 29
spiritual change, 19, 32, 57 E
Cognition, 8, 14, 16–18, 20, 21, 23–26, 28–39, Existence, v, 3, 5, 14, 38, 39, 45, 71, 72,
41, 46, 47, 53, 55, 57–61, 63, 65, 76, 77, 79, 81, 84, 87, 88, 91, 92,
72–75, 77, 80, 82–85, 103, 107, 109, 94–96, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108–111,
117, 142, 152, 154, 159, 168, 171, 175, 113, 115, 123, 125, 135, 144, 160–162,
177, 179, 183, 189, 191, 192 164, 165, 167, 170, 172, 177, 192,
abstractive cognition, 104, 105, 140, 141, 193, 196
161, 163–166, 182, 184, 185, 197 Explanatory narrative, 193
Index 231
F Knowledge, 16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 34, 37, 44, 45,
Foreignness of the object (otherness of the 71–75, 77–81, 84, 93, 101, 105, 107,
object), 4, 5, 145 140, 145, 152, 153, 158, 188
Form
reception of the form without the matter,
16–18, 21, 27, 28, 32, 35, 47 L
Longue durée, vii, 9, 193, 199
H
Hallucination, 2, 46, 111, 172, 173, 189 M
History Measurable (measured), 6, 21, 23, 28, 55, 72,
history of effect (Wirkungsgeschichte), 200 74, 77, 81, 95, 152, 153, 158, 160, 162,
history of influence (Einflußgeschichte), 163, 175, 191
198, 200 Measure, 6, 7, 21, 23, 28, 72, 77, 81, 152, 158,
history of reception 162, 191
(Rezeptionsgeschichte), 192, 198, 200 Model, 16, 38, 58, 81, 95, 155–158, 161,
Holism, 199 179, 193
Modification (modifier), 14, 16, 33, 90, 92,
110, 111, 115, 116
I Modus obliquus, 145
Identity Modus rectus, 145
formal identity, 154, 168, 186 Monovalence (monovalent), 76
Images, 2, 31, 33, 38, 39, 62, 153, 155–157,
159, 161, 167, 169, 178–181, 187
Imagination, 6, 24, 25, 30, 33, 41, 59, 79, 107, O
161–163, 165, 168, 186, 187 Object
Imagined (represented) (φανταστόν), 24 absolutely, object taken, 81, 163, 165,
Intellect 184, 197
agent intellect, 31, 38–40, 57 cognitum, object ut, 81, 83, 163, 165,
possible intellect, 31, 33, 35, 38, 57 184, 197
Intellection, 6, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 31, external object, 38, 92, 100, 101, 132, 138,
33–35, 37–42, 46, 59, 80, 81, 105, 121, 168, 170, 172
160–165, 176, 184, 192 immanent object, 5, 47, 82, 88, 89, 93,
Intelligible, 4, 6, 20, 23, 24, 31–35, 49, 57, 59, 100, 134, 168–171, 187
73, 78, 85, 105, 153, 182 impossible object, 5, 41, 46, 107, 196
Intentionality intentional object, 5, 12, 70, 77–80, 92–94,
attentional intentionality, 7, 19, 28, 30 97–102, 108, 109, 130, 133, 165,
grammar of intentionality, 4, 12, 111, 134 166, 192
perspectival theory of intentionality, 92 non-existent object, 6, 7, 12, 23, 24, 41, 51,
Intentional verb, 4, 12, 74, 78, 112, 122, 145 77, 104, 106, 109, 111, 139, 144, 160,
Intention (intentio), 1–14, 18–42, 69–104, 167, 196
106–124, 126–149, 166, 167, 191–200 present object, 39, 161, 164
second intention, 105, 125 primary object, 44, 45, 94, 134, 173
Intermediary, 31, 75, 84, 85, 92, 99, 101, 156 proper object, 16, 20, 39, 44
Irreale, 88, 90, 98, 100, 193 secondary object, 44
target object, 92
terminative object, 40
K tout court, object (object per se), 95–97,
Knowable, 21, 23, 25, 72, 75, 77–81, 84, 95, 99–102, 139, 192
105, 145, 152, 153, 158 transcendent object, 5, 138, 166
232 Index
Operation, 25, 32–34, 57, 163 R

Opinable, 6, 24, 76 Reale, 90
Opinion, 6, 7, 23–25, 121 Realism
Order (ordo) direct realism, 179
natural order, 153 Reconstruction
spiritual order, 153 doctrinal reconstruction, 194
historical reconstruction, 8, 14, 194,
196, 199
P rational reconstruction, 8, 14, 194
Passion, 7, 29–31, 33, 43, 62, 71, 75, 76, 86, Reference (relation of reference), v–vi, 3, 8,
99, 108–110, 154 130, 151, 152, 154, 157–160, 165, 166,
Passive affections, 21, 45, 173 168–173, 177, 191
with a result, passive affections, 43 Reism, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 102,
without a result, passive affections, 43 103, 109, 116, 133, 168, 192
Passivity (passive), 6, 20, 52–55 Relation
Perceptible, 23, 84 abnormal relation, 5, 12, 144
Perception, v, 2, 9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23, 27, 49, categorical relation (predicamental
50, 52–57, 61, 72, 73, 84, 98, 120, 121, relation), 106, 107, 143
123, 130, 162, 165, 172, 173, 179, 189 causal relation (causal relative), v, vi, 2, 3,
inner perception, 3, 15, 44, 66, 92, 94, 96, 5, 6, 8, 10, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, 29,
97, 99, 100 39–42, 45–47, 74, 107, 113, 151, 158,
outer perception, 44, 91–94, 96, 99 159, 166, 173, 191, 192, 198
Phantasm, 31, 35, 38 class of relation (class of relative), viii, 6,
Phenomenology (phenomenological), vi, 1, 7, 23, 24, 28, 42, 46, 52, 58, 69, 74,
3–5, 9–12, 15, 21, 22, 48, 85, 112, 164, 105, 117, 121, 127, 151–153, 157, 159,
174, 175, 187, 198, 200 160, 166, 167, 192
Phenomenon comparative relation (of comparison,
physical phenomenon, 44, 94, 134 relation) (comparative relative (of
psychical phenomenon, 3, 44, 168, 186 comparison, relative)), 5–6, 21, 69, 117
Physics of forms, 21, 31, 56, 198 habitual relation (respectus habitualis),
Precedent, 8, 9, 29, 47, 103, 108, 140, 152, 176
163, 192, 196 intentional relation (intentional relative),
Precursor, 9, 103, 140, 196 v–vi, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 21, 29, 40, 42,
Presented 45–47, 63, 70, 76, 78, 86, 90, 92, 97,
the presented as such (das Vorgestellte als 101, 104, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 116,
solches), 100, 138 117, 129, 140, 151, 152, 158–161,
the presented tout court (das Vorgestellte 165–168, 170, 171, 182, 191, 192,
schlechtweg), 100 197, 198
Property measured to measure, relation of (relatio
monadic property, 4, 95 mensurati ad mensuram), 159, 160, 162
polyadic property, 71 non-extensional relation, 5, 12, 144
Psychology non-mutual relations, 82, 88, 102, 126, 157
descriptive psychology, 2, 9, 10, 14, 20, 54, one-sided relation, 12, 155, 156, 158, 169,
66, 68, 90, 92, 94, 99, 119, 131, 133, 178, 197
140, 168, 198 potential relation, 163, 170, 177
genetic psychology, 2, 9, 20, 21 quasi-relation (quasi-relative ), 88, 93, 108,
109, 113, 130
real relation, 7, 69, 70, 82, 87, 103–107,
Q 113, 116, 117, 143, 144, 152, 153, 161,
Quality, 7, 17, 25, 36–38, 61, 71, 91, 93, 163, 164, 169, 184, 193, 196, 197
103–105, 115, 154, 168, 174 reason, relation of (relatio rationis),
secondary quality, 11, 44, 46, 173 81–83, 87, 96, 104, 105, 107,
sensible quality, 20, 173 152, 161, 163–165, 167, 169,
Question–answer complex (CQR), 195 184, 185, 197
Index 233
termination, relation of (relation of the equiparence, similarity of (similitudo

terminated to the term (relatio terminati aequiparentiae) (isomorphic
ad terminum); relation of union (relatio similarity), 155, 156
unionis); relation of attaining (relatio ideal similarity (ideelle Ähnlichkeit),
attingentiae)), 40, 42, 63, 104, 152, 164, 171
159–161, 164, 165 imitation, similarity of (similitudo
thick relation, 72 imitationis) (similarity by imitation
thin relation, 72 (similitudo per imitationem)), 155,
transcendental relation (relatio 159, 161, 163, 167, 169, 178, 180,
transcendentalis), 7, 86, 103–108, 117, 183, 197
142, 193 one-sided similarity, 155–157
with respect to number (κατ᾽ἀριθμόν), Similitude, 6, 32, 33, 154, 155, 159–161, 163,
relation (with respect to number, 166, 174, 178, 181
relative), 5, 21 Species, 3, 4, 6, 11, 23, 25, 26, 29–33, 35, 37,
with respect to power (κατὰ δύναμιν), 39–41, 55, 58, 61–64, 110, 111, 125,
relation (with respect to power, 128, 157, 159, 161, 169, 181–184
relative), 6, 21, 191 intelligible species, 34, 59
without a term, relation (without a term, in medio, species, 160
relative), 12, 108, 114, 117, 144, 146, sensible species, 38, 162
193, 196
Relative
determination, relative (relative T
Bestimmung), 102, 103, 109, 112–114, Term (terminus), 5, 7, 30, 34, 40, 69, 88, 103,
116, 117, 140, 146, 170, 187 108, 113, 117, 118, 143, 158, 162, 192,
Relativism, 73 196, 197
Relatum (relata), 5, 47, 72, 73, 77, 95–97, Thinkable, 16, 21, 45, 72, 75, 76, 81, 88, 95,
102, 106, 113, 140, 152 105, 109, 193
Representation, 6, 24, 25, 29, 159 Thought (διάνοια; ἐπίνοια), 21, 23, 74, 88,
Representationalism, 179 103, 124
simple thought (ψιλὴ ἐπίνοια), 80
Truth, 7, 20, 44, 73, 95, 153, 166, 167, 176,
S 180, 188, 189
Sameness, 3, 109, 110, 151, 197 truth-bearer, 170
quasi-sameness, 168–171, 186 truth-maker, 171
Scepticism, 174
Semanticism, 174
Sensation (sensing), 6, 10, 16, 18, 19, 21–25, U
27, 28, 31, 35, 36, 38, 44–46, 71, Universal, 40, 64, 84, 85, 94, 105, 106, 111,
73–75, 107, 121, 134, 144, 153, 161, 117, 119, 142, 143
162, 173, 174, 176, 183 ante rem universal, 79
Sense, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26–29, in re universal, 80
31–34, 36, 38, 42, 44, 47, 55, 56, post rem universal, 79, 80, 124
71–74, 76, 77, 81, 85, 86, 91, 95, 97, Unreal, 69, 70, 80, 88–90, 94, 97, 98,
101, 105, 110, 111, 114, 121, 122, 125, 100–103, 109, 115, 169
151–153, 155, 159, 160, 162, 168–170,
174–176, 184, 192–194, 196
Sensible, 6, 16–18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 33, 35, 38, V
57, 73, 75, 96, 104, 105, 130, 153, 162, Veridicality (veridical), 3, 73, 74, 78, 121, 130,
173, 174 153, 154, 156, 165, 189, 192
Similarity, vi, 3, 6, 7, 9, 18, 25, 37, 43, 71, 84,
110, 132, 151–154, 160, 162, 165, 166,
168, 170, 172–175, 179, 182, 188, 189, W
192, 198 Word (verbum) (mental word), 33, 34, 37,
depictive similarity, 155, 158, 181 43, 178

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Primary Sources in Phenomenology

Franz Brentano Studies

Franz Brentano Studies

More information about this subseries at http://www.springer.com/series/15615

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953185

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

The word “intentionality” brings to mind a tangle of philosophical notions. The

Salzburg, Austria Hamid Taieb

Cavenda est aequivocatio, quando agimus de esse cognito, aut

τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια.

1 Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation?............................................ 1

3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before  103

Searle describes intentionality in terms of “directedness” or “aboutness”: thoughts

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 1

a content” (Beziehung auf einen Inhalt), and as a “relation to something as an

various psychic phenomena; descriptive psychology, on the other hand—also called

An important point of disagreement between Kriegel and Brentano is that Kriegel

In the adverbial theory, the property of “being intentionally directed towards F”

However, though adverbialism adequately translates the logical-linguistic structure,

performing a phenomenological reduction of the object to a way of being of the

In other words, Alexander seems to distinguish between intentionality and causality.

8. See Jacquette, Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation.

21. On the “divalence” of intentional verbs, see Ebbesen, A Porretanean and a

attention to the importance of making a strict distinction between lexicography,

2.1 The Young Brentano as a Reader of Aristotle’s De Anima

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 15

Aristotelian theory of categories in 1862, and his Habilitationsschrift on Aristotles’s

Brentano appears to be saying that the intentionality of the senses is determined by

Entgegengesetzes), but in the activation of the sensitive power, bringing what is

Extraordinary alteration is an accurate awareness of objectively real sensible qualities in the

2.2 Causality and Intentionality in the Aristotelian Tradition

2.2.1 The Debate Between Burnyeat and Sorabji

As Victor Caston argues, Burnyeat seems to adopt a position—which was already

Burnyeat’s entire strategy of reduction is expressed in the astonishing phrase, “spiri-

Extraordinary alteration is an accurate awareness of objectively real sensible qualities in the

reduction of causality to intentionality is surprising. Burnyeat, who maintains that

2.2.2 Thinking as κρίσις: Alexander of Aphrodisias

In his commentary on Metaphysics Δ.15, Alexander compares cognition and action,

In the eyes of the Neoplatonists, this doctrine is basically Aristotelian. Indeed, it is

Moreover, according to Simplicius in his commentary on the Categories, Iamblichus

Pavel Gregoric also speaks of κρίσις as a “picking out.”95

2.2.3 The Medieval Position

Influenced by the De anima, medieval authors attributed an important role to causal-

Nonetheless, as discussed above, it is not clear that Aristotle’s psychology can be

2.2.3.1 Thomas Aquinas

Efficient causality plays a fundamental role in Aquinas’s psychology. As Aquinas

Psychic causality is explained in terms of the “reception” (receptio), in the soul, of

the cognitive faculty. It thus is difficult to maintain that efficient causality in

As Aquinas puts it in the second redaction of chapter 53 of book 1 of the Summa

as an operation that consists in the production of a form or “concept.”135 When he

Alain de Libera emphasized the “componential mode” of the concept according to

Robert Pasnau asserts that intentio, which he translates as “attention,” is identical to

in Aristotelianism. Nonetheless, Alexander’s theory of κρίσις is firmly grounded in

2.2.3.2 Duns Scotus

One of the “previously mentioned characteristiscs” is, in particular, the “tending

2.3  he Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality

As indicated previously, there may be in Brentano’s 1867 study on the psychology

Furthermore, in his courses on metaphysics given in Wurzburg beginning in 1867,

psychic affection precedes awareness—the reduction of the causal to the intentional

Salzburg, Austria Hamid Taieb

1 Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation?............................................ 1

3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before  103

2.1 The Young Brentano as a Reader of Aristotle’s De Anima

2.2 Causality and Intentionality in the Aristotelian Tradition

2.2.1 The Debate Between Burnyeat and Sorabji

2.2.2 Thinking as κρίσις: Alexander of Aphrodisias

2.2.3 The Medieval Position

2.2.3.1 Thomas Aquinas

2.2.3.2 Duns Scotus

2.3 he Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality

3.1 Contemporary Readings of Metaphysics Δ.15

3.2 Objects and Correlates from Aristotle to Brentano

3.2.1 Intentional Objects: Antiquity and the Middle Ages

3.2.1.2 Cognized Being: Duns Scotus and Others

3.2.2 “Being Thought About” as an Extrinsic Denomination

3.2.3 The Intentional Object in Brentano

3.2.3.1 The Discontinuist Interpretation

3.2.3.2 The Continuist Interpretation

3.2.3.3 In Favour of the Discontinuist Interpretation

3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before

3.3.1 ranscendental Relations in Suárez (and

3.3.2 I ntentionality and Relations According to the Reist