Yury Chemerkin Athcon 2013

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THE SANDBOX DIFFERENCES OR HOW AN

INTEGRATION FEATURES AFFECT THE SANDBOX


INDEPENDENT SECURITY RESEARCHER / PhD.
YURY CHEMERKIN
AthCon‘2013
[ Yury Chemerkin ]
www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin http://sto-strategy.com yury.chemerkin@gmail.com

 Experienced in :
 Reverse Engineering & AV
 Software Programming & Documentation
 Mobile Security and MDM
 Cyber Security & Cloud Security
 Compliance & Transparency
 and Security Writing
 Hakin9 Magazine, PenTest Magazine, eForensics Magazine,
 Groteck Business Media
 Participation at conferences
 InfoSecurityRussia, NullCon, CONFidence, PHDays
 CYBERCRIME FORUM, Cyber Intelligence Europe/Intelligence-Sec
 ICITST, CyberTimes, ITA, I-Society
BLACKBERRY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
BLACKBERRY EVALUATESEVERY REQUEST THAT AN APPLICATION MAKES TO ACCESS A CAPABILITY

BLACKBERRY ENTERPRISE SERVICE HELPS MANAGE AND PROTECT BLACKBERRY, IOS, AND ANDROID DEVICES.

UNIFIED COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION SOFTWARE

DESIGNED TO HELP PROTECT DATA THAT IS IN TRANSIT AT ALL POINTS AS WELL IS IN MEMORY AND STORAGE

ENHANCED BY A CONTROL OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DEVICE

PROTECTION OF APPLICATION DATA USING SANDBOXING

MANAGEMENT OF PERMISSIONS TO ACCESS CAPABILITIES

BB EVALUATES EVERY REQUEST THAT APP MAKES – BUT LEAD AWAY FROM ANY DETAILS AND APIs
KNOWN ISSUES
MALWARE BOUNDSBECOME UNCLEAR… COMPLIANCE BRINGS USELESS RECOMMENDATIONS

 BLACKBERRY HANDLES SEVERAL TECHNOLOGIES  USER-MODE MALWARE


 NATIVE  SPYWARE
 BLACKBERRY 10, BLACKBERY PLAYBOOK  ROOTKITS
 OLD BLACKBERRY DEVICES  EXPLOTS & ATTACKS
 THIRD PARTY  REVERSING NETWORK LAYER
 ADOBE AIR FOR NEW BB DEVICES  PARTIALLY RECOVERING DATA VS. SANBOX
 ANDROID APPLICATIONS & DEVICES  MDM vs. COMPLIANCE
 IOS DEVICES  A FEW RECOMMENDATIONS
 EVERY CONTROLLED LIMITED BY  SET IS LESSER THAN SET OF MDM FEATURES
 SANDBOX  YOUNG STANDARDS
 PERMISSIONS  FIRST REVISIONS
 SECURITY FEATURES ON DEVICEs & MDMs  DRAFT REVISIONS
BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES - ANDROID
CONTROLLEDFOUR GROUPSONLY by BlackBerry CONTROLLED 74 OUT 200 APIs ONLY by Android

 CAMERA AND VIDEO  LIMIT PASSWORD AGE


 HIDE THE DEFAULT CAMERA APPLICATION  LIMIT PASSWORD HISTORY
 PASSWORD  RESTRICT PASSWORD LENGTH
 DEFINE PASSWORD PROPERTIES  MINIMUM LENGTH FOR THE DEVICE
 REQUIRE LETTERS (incl. case) PASSWORD THAT IS ALLOWED
 REQUIRE NUMBERS  ENCRYPTION
 REQUIRE SPECIAL CHARACTERS  APPLY ENCRYPTION RULES
 DELETE DATA AND APPLICATIONS FROM THE  ENCRYPT INTERNAL DEVICE STORAGE
DEVICE AFTER  TOUCHDOWN SUPPORT
 INCORRECT PASSWORD ATTEMPTS  MICROSOFT EXCHANGE SYNCHRONIZATION
 DEVICE PASSWORD  EMAIL PROFILES
 ENABLE AUTO-LOCK  ACTIVESYNC
BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES - iOS
CONTROLLED16 GROUPS ONLY by BlackBerry that‘s QUITE SIMLIAR to APPLE MDM SOLUTIONS

 BROWSER  MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)


 DEFAULT APP,  BACKUP / DOCUMENT PICTURE / SHARING
 AUTOFILL, COOKIES, JAVASCRIPT, POPUPS  ONLINE STORE
 CAMERA, VIDEO, VIDEO CONF  ONLINE STORES , PURCHASES, PASSWORD
 OUTPUT, SCREEN CAPTURE, DEFAULT APP  DEFAULT STORE / BOOK / MUSIC APP
 CERTIFICATES (UNTRUSTED CERTs)  MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)
 CLOUD SERVICES  PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, NEW BLACKBERRY DEVICES)
 BACKUP / DOCUMENT / PICTURE / SHARING  PHONE AND MESSAGING (VOICE DIALING)
 CONNECTIVITY  PROFILE & CERTs (INTERACTIVE INSTALLATION)
 NETWORK, WIRELESS, ROAMING  SOCIAL (DEFAULT APP)
 DATA, VOICE WHEN ROAMING
 SOCIAL APPS / GAMING / ADDING FRIENDS / MULTI-PLAYER
 CONTENT
 DEFAULT SOCIAL-GAMING / SOCIAL-VIDEO APPS
 CONTENT (incl. EXPLICIT)  STORAGE AND BACKUP
 RATING FOR APPS/ MOVIES / TV SHOWS / REGIONS
 DEVICE BACKUP AND ENCRYPTION
 DIAGNOSTICS AND USAGE (SUBMISSION LOGS)
 VOICE ASSISTANT (DEFAULT APP)
BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES – BLACKBERRY (QNX)
CONTROLLED7 GROUPS ONLY by BlackBerry that‘s NOT ENOUGH TO MANAGE ALL APIs

 GENERAL  NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL FOR WORK APPS


 PERSONAL APPS ACCESS TO WORK CONTACTS
 MOBILE HOTSPOT AND TETHERING
 SHARE WORK DATA DURING BBM VIDEO SCREEN SHARING
 PLANS APP, APPWORLD
 WORK DOMAINS, WORK NETWORK USAGE FOR PERSONAL APPS
 PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, iOS)
 EMAIL PROFILES
 BES MANAGEMENT (SMARTPHONES, TABLETS)
 CERTIFICATES & CIPHERS & S/MIME
 SOFTWARE  HASH & ENCRYPTION ALGS AND KEY PARAMS
 OPEN WORK EMAIL MESSAGES LINKS IN THE PERSONAL BROWSER  TASK/MEMO/CALENDAR/CONTACT/DAYS SYNC
 TRANSFER THOUGH WORK PERIMETER TO SAME/ANOTHER DEVICE  WI-FI PROFILES
 BBM VIDEO ACCESS TO WORK NETWORK
 ACCESS POINT, DEFAULT GATEWAY, DHCP, IPV6, SSID, IP ADDRESS
 VIDEO CHAT APP USES ORGANIZATION’S WI-FI/VPN NETWORK
 PROXY PASSWORD/PORT/SERVER/SUBNET MASK
 SECURITY
 VPN PROFILES
 WIPE WORK SPACE WITHOUT NETWORK, RESTRICT DEV. MODE
 PROXY, SCEP, AUTH PROFILE PARAMS
 VOICE CONTROL & DICTATION IN WORK & USER APPS
 TOKENS, IKE, IPSEC OTHER PARAMS
 BACKUP AND RESTORE (WORK) & DESKTOP SOFTWARE
 PROXY PORTS, USERNAME, OTHER PARAMS
 PC ACCESS TO WORK & PERSONAL SPACE (USB, BT)
 PERSONAL SPACE DATA ENCRYPTION
BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES – BLACKBERRY (OLD)
INCREDIBLE AMOUNT OF GROUPS, UNITS AND PERMISSIONS ARE CONTROLELD BY MDM AND DEVICE

 THERE 55 GROUPS CONTROLLED IN ALL


 EACH GROUP CONTAINS FROM 10 TO 30 UNITS ARE CONTROLLED TOO
 EACH UNIT IS UNDER A LOT OF FLEXIBLE PARAMs INSTEAD OF A WAY ‘DISABLE/ENABLED & HIDE/UNHIDE’
 EACH EVENT IS
 CONTROLLED BY CERTAIN PERMISSION
 ALLOWED TO CONTROL BY SIMILAR PERMISSIONS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE
 DESCRIBED 360 PAGES IN ALL THAT IN FOUR TIME MORE THAN OTHER DOCUMENTS
 EACH UNIT CAN’T CONTROL ACTIVITY UNDER ITSELF
 ‘CREATE, READ, WRITE/SAVE, SEND, DELETE’ ACTIONS IN REGARDS TO MESSAGES LEAD TO SPOOFING
BY REQUESTING A ‘MESSAGE’ PERMISSION ONLY
 SOME PERMISSIONS AREN’T REQUIRED (TO DELETE ANY OTHER APP)
 SOME PERMISSIONS ARE RELATED TO APP, WHICH 3RD PARTY PLUGIN WAS EMBEDDED IN, INSTEAD OF
THAT PLUGIN
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS - I
USERFULL IDEASAT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEADMAKE NO SENSE

 OLD BB: MERGING PERMISSION UNITS AND GROUPS


 ‘SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS’ SEPARATED (PREVIOUS BB)
 ‘SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS’ MERGED INTO ONE UNIT (LATEST BB)
 QNX-BB: SCREEN CAPTURE
 IS ALLOWED VIA HARDWARE BUTTONS ONLY
 NO EMULATION OF HARDWARE BUTTONS AS IT WAS IN OLD BLACKBERRY DEVICES
 LOCKS WHEN WORK PERIMITER HAS BECOME TO PREVENT SCREEN-CAPTURE LOGGERS
 OLD BB: NO SANBOX HAS NEVER BEEN ANNOUNCED
 ALL DATA ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT APP & SYSTEM DATA DUE TO GENERAL PERMISSION
 QNX-BB: OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED SANBOX
 MALWARE IS A PERSONAL APPLICATION SUBTYPE IN TERMS OF BLACKBERRY’s SECURITY
 SANDBOX PROTECTS ONLY APP DATA, WHILE USER DATA STORED IN SHARED FOLDERS
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS - II
USERFULL IDEASAT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEADMAKE NO SENSE

 OLD BB: SECURE & INSECURE IM CHATS IN THE SAME TIME


 HAS ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION SESSIONS
 STORE CHAT COVERSATION IN PLAIN TEXT WITHOUT ENCRYPTION (EVEN BBM)
 INACCESSIBLE FROM THE DEVICE BECAUSE OF UNKNOWN FILE TYPE (.CSV)
 UPGRADE FEATURE AFFECT EVERYTHING
 UPDATE APP THAT CALLS THIS API – USE GENERAL API
 REMOVE APP THAT CALLS THIS APPS – USE GENERAL API
 REMOVE ANY OTHER APP UNDER THE SAME API WITHOUT NOTIFICATION
 HANDLE WITH PC TOOLS ON OLD BB DEVICES WITHOUT DEBUG / DEVELOPMENT MODE
 OLD BB: CLIPBOARD (HAS NEVER EXISTED ANYWHERE AND MIGHT HAVE EVER)
 REVEAL THE DATA IN REAL TIME BY ONE API CALL
 NATIVE WALLETS PROTECTS BY RETURNING NJULL
 WHILE THE ON TOP || JUST MINIMIZE OR CLOSE IT TO GET FULL ACCESS
 EVERY USER CASE MUST MINIMIZE APP TO PASTE A PASSWORD
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS – III
THE GUI EXPLOITATION (OLD BB) –NATIVE APPs 3RD PARTY SECURE SOLITUINS RUIN THE SECURITY

 INITIALLY BASED ON AUTHORIZED API COVERED  KASPERSKY MOBILE SECURITY PROVIDES


 ALL PHYSICAL & NAVIGATION BUTTONS  FIREWALL, WIPE, BLOCK, INFO FEATURES
 TYPING TEXTUAL DATA, AFFECT ALL APPs  NO PROTECTION FROM REMOVING.CODs & UNDER
 SECONDARY BASED ON ADDING THE MENU ITEMS SIMULATOR
 INTO THE GLOBAL / “SEND VIA” MENU  EXAMING THE TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR
 AFFECT ALL NATIVE APPLICATIONS  JUST SHOULD CHECK API “IS SIMULATOR” ONLY
 NATIVE APPs ARE DEVELOPED BY BLACKBERRY  SMS MANAGEMENT VIA “QUITE” SECRET SMS
 WALLETS, SOCIAL, SETTINGS, IMs,…  PASSWORD IS 4–16 DIGITS,AND MODIFIED IN REAL-TIME
 GUI EXPLOITATION  SMS IS A HALF A HASH VALUE OF GOST R 34.11-94
 REDRAWING THE SCREENS  IMPLEMENTATION USES TEST CRYPTO VALUES AND NO SALT
 GRABBING THE TEXT FROM ANY FIELDs (INCL. PASSWORD  TABLES (VALUEHASH) ARE EASY BUILT
FIELD)  OUTCOMING SMS CAN BE SPOOFED WITHOUT ANY
 ADDING, REMOVING THE FIELD DATA
NOTIFICATION, BECAUSE KMS DELETE THE SENT MESSAGES
 ORIGINAL DATA IS INACCESSIBLE BUT NOT AFFECTED
 OUTCOMING SMS BLOCK/WIPE THE SAME/ANOTHERDEVICE
 ADDING GUI OBJECTS BUT NOT SHUFFLING
CONCLUSION - I
PRIVILEGEDGENERAL PERMISSIONS OWN APPs, NATIVE & 3RD PARTY APPs FEATURES

 DENIAL OF SERVICE  GENERAL PERMISSIONS


 REPLACING/REMOVING EXEC FILES  INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-PERMISSIONS
 DOS’ing EVENTs, NOISING FIELDS  A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT LOGs FOR USER
 GUI INTERCEPT  BUILT PER APPLICATION INSTEAD OF APP SCREENs
 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE  CONCRETE PERMISSIONS
 CLIPBOARD, SCREEN CAPTURE  BUT COMBINED INTO GENERAL PERMISSION
 GUI INTERCEPT  A SCREENSHOT PERMISSION IS PART OF THE
 DUMPING .COD FILES, SHARED FILES CAMERA
 MITM (INTERCEPTION / SPOOFING)  GENERAL PERMISSIONS
 MESSAGES  INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-PERMISSIONS
 GUI INTERCEPT, THIRD PARTY APPs  A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT LOGs FOR USER
 FAKE WINDOW/CLICKJACKING  BUILT PER APPLICATION INSTEAD OF APP SCREENs
CONCLUSION - II
THE VENDOR SECURITY VISION HAS NOTHING WITH REALITY AGGRAVATEDBY SIMPLICITY

 SIMPLIFICATION AND REDUCING SECURITY CONTROLS


 MANY GENERAL PERMISSIONS AND COMBINED INTO EACH OTHER
 NO LOGs ACTIVITY FOR SUB-PERMISSIONS TO PROVE THE TRANSPARENCY
 ANY SECURITY VULNERABILITY ARE ONLY FIXED BY ENTIRELY NEW AND DIFFERENT OS / KERNEL
 A FEW PERMISSIONs ARE CLOSED TO THE USER ACTIONS
 THE SANDBOX PROTECT ONLY APPLICATION DATA
 USERS HAVE TO STORE THEIR DATA INTO SHARED FOLDERS OR EXTERNAL STORAGE
 APPLICATIONS CONTINUE STORE DATA IN PUBLIC FOLDERs BECAUSE GOVERNED BY CHANCE OF AVAILABILITY
 MITM / INTERCEPTION ACTIONS ARE OFTEN SILENTLY
 THE NATIVE SPOOFING AND INTERCEPTION FEATURES
 BLACKBERRY ENTERPRISE SOLUTION / BLACKBERRY MOBILE FUSION IS NOT EFFECTIVE MUCH
 THE BEST SECURITY (PERMISSIONS) RULED BY AMAZON WEB SERVICES
 PERMISSIONS SHOULD RELY ON THE DIFFERENT USEFUL CASES SET INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC PERMISSION LIST
Q&A

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