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Current Chinese Economic Report Series
China’s
Macroeconomic
Outlook
Quarterly Forecast and Analysis Report,
October 2018
Current Chinese Economic Report Series
Editorial Board
Editorial Staff
Lianshui Li, Zhanyuan Du, Zaiwu Gong, Caihua Yu, Caihong Zhou, Jun Lin,
Wei Sun, Changping Xu, Minjie Wu, Nian Zhong, Feixue Zhou, Changkai Wang,
Mingyang Zhang, Yulin Chen, Zhonghua Cheng
China’s Macroeconomic
Outlook
Quarterly Forecast and Analysis Report,
October 2018
By the China’s Quarterly Macroeconometrtic
Model (CQMM) Team
123
Center for Macroeconomic Research
Xiamen University
Xiamen, Fujian, China
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Preface
v
Acknowledgements
According to the Chinese Pinyin order of their names, the 110 experts who joined
this questionnaire survey were: Bai Peiwen, Chang Xin, Chen Changbing,
Chen Gong, Chen Heng, Chen Jianbao, Chen Jinmei, Chen Kunting, Chen Langnan,
Chen Lei, Chen Menggen, Chen Shoudong, Chen Yanbin, Chen Zhiyong,
Dai Kuizao, Deng Xiang, Dong Ximiao, Dong Zhiyong, Fan Conglai, Fan Ziying,
Gao Bo, Guo Qiyou, Guo Xibao, Guo Xiaohe, Guo Zhiyi, Han Zhaozhou, He
Jingtong, Hu Ridong, Huang Jianhui, Huang Xianfeng, Jian Xinhua, Jiang Yongmu,
Li Chunqi, Li Haizheng, Li Jianwei, Li Jun, Li Junsheng, Li Shi, Li Xuesong,
Li Yingdong, Lin Xuegui, Liu Jianping, Liu Jinquan, Liu Qiongzhi, Liu Shiguo,
Liu Xiaoxin, Liu Zhibiao, Ma Ying, Peng Shuijun, Peng Suling, Chu Wan-wen,
Ren Baoping, Ren Ruoen, Shao Yihang, Shen Kunrong, Shen lisheng, Shi Jinchuan,
Su Jian, Sun Wei, Qin Wei, Tang Jijun, Wang Tongsan, Wang Yida, Wang
Guocheng, Wang Jiping, Wang Junbo, Wang Liyong, Wang Shusheng, Wang
Yanxing, Wang Yuesheng, Wen Chuanhao, Wu Kaichao, Wu Xinru, Xian
Guoming, Xie Pan, Xu Bin, Xu Wenbin, Yan Ping, Yang Chengyu, Yang Cuihong,
Yao Huiqin, Ye Chusheng, Yi Xianrong, Yin Xingmin, Yu Li, Yu Zuo, Yuan
Fuhua, Zang Xuheng, Zeng Wuyi, Zhang Fan, Zhang Hongliang, Zhang Liqun,
Zhang Liancheng, Zhang Long, Zhang Mingzhi, Zhang Ping, Zhang Shuguang,
Zhao Changhui, Zhao Xindong, Zhao Zhenquan, Zhao Zhijun, Zheng Chaoyu,
Cheng Yuk-Shing, Zhong Chunping, Zhou Liqun, Zhou Zejiong, Zhu Baohua, Zhu
Jianping, Zhu Qigui, and Zhuang Zongming.
The experts who joined this questionnaire survey are from institutions like
Department of Macroeconomic Research of DRC (Development Research Center
of the State Council), Center for Forecasting Science of CAS (Chinese Academy
of Sciences), Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science of CAS, Institute of
Finance and Banking of CASS, Institute of Economics of CASS, Institute of
Quantitative and Technical Economics of CASS, National Academy of Economic
Strategy of CASS, Institute of World Economy and Politics of CASS, Ministry of
Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Hengfeng Bank, Minsheng Bank, The
Export-Import Bank of China, China Banking Association, Taiwan Academia Sinica,
vii
viii Acknowledgements
ix
x Contents
Min Gong
xi
Executive Summary
In the first half of 2018, China’s real GDP grew by 6.8% YoY, indicating that the
Chinese economy continued its steady growth. Driven by the rapid growth of
exports, manufacturing investment and private investment maintained a good
momentum of development, and consumption continued to be the main driving
force for economic growth. On the supply side, in addition to the steady GDP
growth, the growth rate of the industrial value added also stays stable in the range of
6.6*6.9%. The Chinese economy showed considerable resilience. In the first half
of 2018, China’s economic performance was manifested in the following aspects:
(a) GDP growth declined slightly, and consumption was still the main driver;
(b) consumption growth slowed down, and motor vehicles consumption became the
main factor; (c) the growth of investment in manufacturing edged up, while the
growth of infrastructure investment declined significantly and that of investment in
real estate development maintained stable; (d) the trade surplus shrunk significantly,
while the trade surplus with the USA kept rising; (e) the CPI remained low, and the
PPI rebounded slightly; (f) The growth rate of broad money (M2) hit a new low,
and shrinking nonstandard financing suppressed social financing; (g) the growth
rate of fiscal revenue was relatively high, and that of land transfer income continued
to rise.
However, since the third quarter of 2018, the downward pressure on the Chinese
economy has begun to increase. First, in terms of investment, the growth of
investment continued to drop sharply. Affected by strengthening financial super-
vision and rectifying the financial order, contracting credit supply, and almost
closing of sources of funds other than domestic loans, the growth rate of infras-
tructure investment fell sharply to 7.3% in the first half of 2018, down 13.8% points
compared with the same period of the previous year. And that of real estate
development dropped to only 4.6%, down 6.6% points over the same period last
year. As the growth of manufacturing investment continued to slow down, the
investment in fixed assets (excluding farmers) in the whole society increased by
6.0%, a sharp decline of 2.6% points from the same period of the previous year.
Second, in terms of foreign trade, the trade dispute unilaterally provoked by the
USA has not only disrupted the world trade order, but also begun to impact China’s
xiii
xiv Executive Summary
foreign trade. Although in the short run the Sino-US trade dispute would have
limited negative impact on China’s GDP growth through trade channels, in the long
run it would have a relatively significant impact on private investment oriented by
manufacturing exports and even reverse the upward trend of the private investment
growth.
Finally, in terms of consumption, as the growth of residents’ real income con-
tinued to edge down, coupled with the rapid increase in housing loans in the past
two years and markedly increasing household debt ratio, it would be difficult for the
growth of household consumption spending to improve quickly.
In view of the current complicated international economic situation, we design
two different scenarios of Sino-US the trade disputes: Namely, Scenario 1: from the
end of the year to next, the Sino-US trade disputes would no longer escalate. As a
result, China and the USA implement the scale of duties and the tariff rates that
have been announced; and Scenario 2: the trade disputes would further escalate.
And thus, both sides would not only expand the scale of duties, but also increase the
punitive tariff rates. Based on the China’s Quarterly Macroeconometric Model
(CQMM), we conduct forecasts on the key indicators of China’s macroeconomics
this year and next. The results show that, due to the trade transfer effect, China’s
current foreign trade with the characteristic of processing trade, and China’s
macroeconomic policies to stabilize economic growth, the negative impact of
Sino-US the trade disputes on China’s GDP growth via trade channels in the short
run would be limited, and the downward pressure on China’s economic growth
would be largely due to slowdown in the growth of investment and consumption.
In the above two scenarios, the prediction results of the CQMM are given as
follows:
1. In 2018, China’s GDP growth rate is expected to fluctuate in the range of
6.58*6.64%, 0.26*0.32% points lower than that in 2017. In 2019, it is pro-
jected to drop further to the range of 6.42*6.48%. Quarterly, in the fourth
quarter of 2018 it is set to fall back to the range of 6.23*6.46% and in the first
quarter of 2019 drop further to the range of 6.20*6.36%. In these two quarters
China’s GDP growth is anticipated to be most affected by the trade shocks.
Since then, due to the trade transfer effect, the corresponding decline in the
growth of imports induced by the fall in the growth of exports, and China’s
macroeconomic stabilizing policies, the GDP growth is expected to edge up.
2. In 2018, the growth rate of the value of exports measured by the current RMB
prices is projected to remain in the range of 8.72*9.08%, down 1.72*2.08%
points compared with 2017. In 2019, it is forecast to stay at the interval of
9.08*10.02%. In 2018, the growth rate of the value of imports measured at
current RMB prices is anticipated to fluctuate in the range of 16.99*17.13%,
down 1.57*1.71% points compared with that in 2017. In 2019, it is set to drop
to the interval of 14.04*14.88%.
3. It is noteworthy that since exports from non-SOEs (including private enterprises
and foreign-invested enterprises) account for nearly 90% of China’s total
exports, the Sino-US trade disputes would directly impact investment by
Executive Summary xv
non-SOEs that are oriented toward manufacturing exports. The CQMM predicts
that under the above two scenarios, the growth rate of investment by non-SOEs
is projected to remain in the range of 7.95*8.14% in 2018. In 2019, it is
expected to drop significantly to the interval of 4.12*4.62%. Since private
investment accounts for over 60% of total investment in the whole society, the
Sino-US the trade disputes would curb and reverse the rapid rebound in the
growth of private investment since 2017. As a result, the growth rate of
investment in fixed assets (excluding farmers) in the whole society measured at
current prices in 2018 is forecast to stay in the range of 5.49*5.61%, lower than
the level of 7.2% in 2017. In 2019, it is anticipated to further drop to the interval
of 4.15*4.45%.
4. In 2018, the CPI is expected to rise by 2.09%, an increase of 0.49% points over
2017. In 2019, the relatively loose monetary policy is projected to boost the
increase of CPI to 2.50%. In 2018, the increase of PPI is forecast to rise by
3.09%, down 3.21% points over 2017. In 2019, it is set to further fall to 1.16%.
Overall, the inflation rates would still be controllable this year and next.
5. Due to the slowdown in the growth of labor productivity, the residents’ real
income growth is still in the downward trend. In 2018, the per capita disposable
income of urban residents is expected to go up by 5.73%, a decrease of 0.77%
points compared with that in 2017. In 2019, it is projected to rebound to 6.06%.
Meanwhile, the per capita cash income of rural residents in 2018 is anticipated
to pick up by 9.21, 0.75% points lower than that in 2017, and further decline to
8.18% in 2019. The total retail sales of social consumer goods measured at
current prices are set to expand by 9.34%, down 0.96% points over 2017. In
2019, it is forecast to rebound to 9.74%, but still lower than that in 2017.
In addition, in view of the rapid expansion of China’s household debt scale and
the rapid increase in debt ratio, based on the CQMM, we conducted a counterfactual
analysis of the impact of changes in the household debt ratio on China’s household
consumption, investment, and economic growth. The transmission mechanism is
described as follows: The change in the household debt ratio will directly affect
both the household loans and the household deposits. On the one hand, changes in
the household deposits will change the price of funds, i.e., interest rate, through
changes in demand for funds, and thus change the investment demand of enterprises
with different ownership. This is the so-called investment channel that changes the
household debt ratio and affects investment demand. On the other hand, changes in
household debt ratios will directly affect household consumption and household
deposits; this is the so-called consumption channel that changes in household debt
ratio affect consumer spending. And when changes in the household debt ratio
affect household deposits, the loan-to-deposit ratio of the funds market will change
the price of funds, which in turn will affect the investment.
Assume that the household debt ratio in 2016 and 2017 remains at the level of
38.8% in the fourth quarter of 2015, which are 5.6 and 9.6% points lower than those
in the actual situation. The counterfactual analysis based on the CQMM shows that
the consumption channel effect of changes in the household debt ratio would be
xvi Executive Summary
stronger than the investment channel effect, indicating that suppressing the increase
in the household debt ratios would be conducive to accelerating the growth of
consumer spending. Nonetheless, the decline in the household debt ratio would
result in a decline in the growth of household saving deposits, which in turn would
reduce the supply of credit funds and increase the price of funds, resulting in a
decline in investment growth, especially of private enterprises lacking diversified
financing instruments. Combining the above two effects, the decline in the
household debt ratio would eventually increase the economic growth rate slightly.
In 2016 and 2017, China’s GDP growth would increase by 0.01 and 0.06% points,
respectively, compared with the baseline value. Although reducing the household
debt ratio would have only a weak effect on economic growth, it would be con-
ducive to promoting the structural adjustment of the economy.
In summary, in the face of the downward pressure on China’s current economy,
there are two issues that deserve high attention: The first is the negative impact
of the current trade disputes on private investment and manufacturing investment,
and the second is the negative impact of the rapid rise in the household debt ratio to
household consumption growth.
First, we should pay much attention to the negative impact of the current
Sino-US trade disputes on private investment and manufacturing investment.
If the growth of private investment would not substantially rebound, the slowdown
in the growth of investment in fixed assets in the whole society would curb eco-
nomic growth. With the economic slowdown, the local government’s demand for
infrastructure expansion and its dependence on land finance, as well as the financial
sector’s preference for SOEs and the real estate industry, would come back. And it
would be difficult to reverse the situation that credit resources are deviating from the
real economy to the virtual economy or idling within the financial system.
Therefore, if the Sino-US trade war continued to escalate, while preventing and
controlling financial risks, it would be necessary to effectively stimulate private
investment, improve resource allocation efficiency, promote the transformation and
upgrading of China’s manufacturing industry, and improve labor productivity.
To this end, we propose the following suggestions:
a. While controlling the total amount, monetary policy should pay attention to
maintaining a reasonable and sufficient liquidity and focus on adjusting the
credit structure to ensure that the proportion of loans to non-financial enterprises
and government organizations is stable at more than 50%, so as to we reverse
the situation that credit resources are deviating from the real economy to the
virtual economy.
b. Full consideration should be given to the financial risks and market tolerance
faced by de-leveraging policies. While grasping the supervision efforts, we
should coordinate the timing of the introduction of various policies and improve
the linkage of financial supervision systems at all levels. Preventing financial
risks and serving the real economy should be parallel. In addition, effectively
improve the ability and willingness of financial services to the real economy.
Executive Summary xvii
c. Continue to implement active fiscal policy, adopt measures such as tax cut and
fee reduction, and cooperate with monetary policy to ensure that liquidity
actually enters the real economy. Meanwhile, stimulate the development of
small- and medium-sized enterprises and promote the upgrading of industrial
structure.
Second, we should pay much attention to the negative impact of the rapid
rise in the household debt ratio to household consumption growth. China’s
household debt ratio has surpassed the average of emerging economies in 2011 and
has since gradually widened the gap. The difference with developed countries has
also shrunk dramatically. Under the background of China’s aging population, the
far from perfect social security system, and the still grim urban-rural income gap,
especially as the growth of the residents’ real income edges down due to the
slowdown in labor productivity growth, the rapidly rising household debt ratio will
slow the growth of household consumption and hinder the transformation of eco-
nomic growth patterns.
To this end, we put forward the following suggestions:
a. As the unprecedented expansion of the current housing loan scale is the main
reason for the sharp increase in the household debt ratio, we should vigorously
rectify various irregularities in loans for real estate development. While limiting
domestic loans flow into real estate investment, we should continue developing
the housing leasing market and promote the equilibrium of supply and demand
in the regional housing market.
b. Further promote the reform of the fiscal system to help local governments get rid
of their dependence on land finance. In the past decade, as the impact of the
global financial crisis led to a sharp decline in the growth rate of profits of
industrial enterprises, the growth rate of fiscal revenues with the industrial tax as
the main source of taxation also fell sharply. Local governments have therefore
begun to increase their reliance on land finance, which directly pushed up the
bubble in real estate. In order to reverse the current situation that local gov-
ernments depend on land finance, the implementation of real estate tax is
imperative. In addition, the reform and improvement of the fiscal system should
ensure the matching of the local government financial resources and expenditure
responsibilities.
Chapter 1
China’s Economic Performance
in the First Half of 2018
In the first half of 2018, China’s real GDP grew by 6.8% YoY, showing that the
Chinese economy continued its steady growth. Although the growth rate of invest-
ment and consumption, which are measured by the investment in fixed assets (FAI)
in the whole society and the total retail sales of social consumer goods, respectively,
dropped to the lowest in recent years, the domestic demand reflected by total asset
formation and final consumption expenditure was not weak.1 On the supply side, in
addition to the steady GDP growth, the growth rate of the industrial added value also
stayed stable at the interval of 6.6–6.9%. The Chinese economy showed considerable
resilience.
Specifically, in the first half of 2018, China’s economic performance was mani-
fested in the following aspects.
In the first half of 2018, China’s GDP reached 41.96 billion yuan, a real increase
of 6.8% and 6.7% YoY in the first and second quarter, respectively, showing a
slight decline. For the twelve consecutive quarters, China’s real GDP growth rates
1 Typically, the growth of the total retail sales of social consumer goods has continued to fall, while
the contribution of final consumption expenditure to GDP growth has increased rapidly since 2015.
The main reason is that, though both of them are taken as measurement of consumption, they have
different specifications. Compared with the final consumption expenditure, the total retail sales
of social consumer goods include consumption by social groups, but do not include residents’
service consumption and government service consumption. Due to the slowdown of the growth
of the total retail sales of consumer goods by social groups and accelerating growth of residential
service consumption and government service consumption, there has been a divergence between
the growth rate of the total retail sales of social consumer goods and the contribution of final
consumption expenditure to GDP growth (Huang and Dong 2008).
100.0
77.4 79.4 77.8 78.5
80.0
64.1 66.2 63.6 66.5 64.3 64.0
62.2 59.7
58.2 58.8
60.0
42.5 41.6 43.5 44.0 43.1
36.9 34.6 34.7
40.0 33.0 32.1 31.3 31.4
19.2 19.2
16.7
20.0 9.1
4.8
-0.7 -1.3 1.4 1.1 1.3
0.0 -9.7 -7.6 -9.6 -9.1 -9.9
-14.3
-20.0
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
2016Q4
2017Q1
2017Q2
2017Q3
2017Q4
2018Q1
2018Q2
Final consumption expenditure Gross capital formation Net exports
Fig. 1.1 Shares of the three components of GDP by expenditure approach to GDP growth: cumu-
lative, YoY, %. Source CQMM team calculations on CEIC data
In the first half of 2018, the total retail sales of social consumer goods reached
18.08 trillion yuan, a nominal increase of 9.4% YoY, and a real increase of 7.7%,
down 1.0 and 1.6 percentage points from the same period of the previous year (see
Fig. 1.4). Of the total retail sales of consumer goods above designated size, the six
largest categories are: motor vehicles; petroleum and related products; food, bever-
age, tobacco, and liquor; textiles, wearing apparel and household articles; household
electric appliances and electronic products; medicines and medical appliances. The
decline in consumption growth is mainly related to the rapid decline in the growth
1.2 Consumption Growth Slowed Down, and Motor Vehicles … 3
25.0 7.1
7.0
20.0 7.0
6.9
15.0 6.9
6.8
10.0 6.8
6.7
5.0 6.7
6.6
0.0 6.6
03-2015
06-2015
09-2015
12-2015
03-2016
06-2016
09-2016
12-2016
03-2017
06-2017
09-2017
12-2017
03-2018
06-2018
Manufacturing Real estate Infrastructure GDP(RHS)
Fig. 1.2 Growth rates of GDP and three major sectors: cumulative, YoY, %. Source CQMM team
calculations on CEIC data
100.0
90.0
80.0
52.4 51.3 50.2 54.0 52.8 51.6 54.0 52.8 51.6 54.3
70.0 54.6 56.5 56.3 56.6
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0 41.0 40.9 39.6 39.9 40.5
40.2 41.3 39.5 40.2 40.2 40.4
38.0 38.9 39.0
20.0
10.0
6.3 7.7 8.8 5.5 6.5 7.6 8.6 5.8 7.0 7.9 5.3
0.0 5.1 4.8 4.5
03-2015
06-2015
09-2015
12-2015
03-2016
06-2016
09-2016
12-2016
03-2017
06-2017
09-2017
12-2017
03-2018
06-2018
Fig. 1.3 Contribution of the three industries to GDP growth: cumulative, %. Source CQMM team
calculations on CEIC data
4 1 China’s Economic Performance in the First Half of 2018
16.00
15.00
14.00
13.00
12.00
11.00
10.00
9.00
8.00
02-2012
05-2012
08-2012
11-2012
02-2013
05-2013
08-2013
11-2013
02-2014
05-2014
08-2014
11-2014
02-2015
05-2015
08-2015
11-2015
02-2016
05-2016
08-2016
11-2016
02-2017
05-2017
08-2017
11-2017
02-2018
05-2018
Total Urban area Rural area
Fig. 1.4 Growth rates of total retail sales of social consumer goods: cumulative, YoY, %. Source
CQMM team calculations on CEIC data
of motor vehicles consumption. In the first half of 2018, motor vehicles consump-
tion decreased by 7% YoY, down 16.8 percentage points from the same period of
the previous year (see Fig. 1.5). Subjected to changes in tariffs on July 1, the sales
of motor vehicles in May and June dropped significantly. As motor vehicles con-
sumption accounts for 28 and 13% of the total retail sales of enterprises above the
designated size and the total retail sales of consumer goods, respectively, the decline
in motor vehicles consumption lowered the growth of total consumption.
In the first half of 2018, the total retail sales of urban consumer goods reached
15.41 trillion yuan, a nominal increase of 9.2% YoY, down 0.9 percentage points from
the same period of the previous year. The total retail sales of rural consumer goods
reached 2.59 trillion yuan, a nominal increase of 10.5% YoY, down 1.8 percentage
points from the same period of the previous year (see Fig. 1.4).
Consumption depends mainly on income. In the first half of 2018, the real dispos-
able income of urban residents increased by 5.8% YoY, which was 1.0 percentage
point lower than GDP growth rate, 0.7 percentage points lower than the same period
of the previous year. The real disposable income of rural residents went up by 6.8%
YoY, which was equal to GDP growth rate, down 0.6 percentage points from the
same period last year. The national per capita real disposable income picked up by
6.6% YoY, 0.2 percentage points lower than the GDP growth rate by 0.2 percentage
points, indicating that China’s current income distribution is not conducive to the
increase of residents’ income (see Fig. 1.6).
1.2 Consumption Growth Slowed Down, and Motor Vehicles … 5
20.00
15.00
10.00 9.80
8.10 7.90 7.90
6.90
5.00 4.20 3.50 3.50
2.20
0.00
-1.00
-5.00
-7.00
-10.00
06-2017
07-2017
08-2017
09-2017
10-2017
11-2017
12-2017
01-2018
02-2018
03-2018
04-2018
05-2018
06-2018
Automobiles Petroleum and related products
Food, beverages, tobacco and liquor Clothings, shoes, hats, and textiles
Household appliances and video appliance Traditional Chinese and Western medicines
Fig. 1.5 Growth rates of total retail sales of enterprises above designated size by category of main
commodities: cumulative, YoY, %. Source CQMM team calculations on CEIC data
11.00
10.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
03-2014
05-2014
07-2014
09-2014
11-2014
01-2015
03-2015
05-2015
07-2015
09-2015
11-2015
01-2016
03-2016
05-2016
07-2016
09-2016
11-2016
01-2017
03-2017
05-2017
07-2017
09-2017
11-2017
01-2018
03-2018
05-2018
Fig. 1.6 Growth rates of residents’ per capita real disposable income: cumulative, YoY, %. Source
CQMM team calculations on CEIC data
6 1 China’s Economic Performance in the First Half of 2018
In the first half of 2018, the total FAI of the whole society (excluding rural household)
went up by 29.73 trillion yuan, a nominal increase of 6.0% YoY, down 2.6 percentage
points from the same period of the previous year. The private FAI increased by 8.4%
YoY, 1.2 percentage points higher than the same period of the previous year. The
difference between the growth rate of total FAI and that of private FAI has been
gradually narrowed from 5.4 percentage points in October 2016 to −0.2 percentage
points in January 2018. Since February 2018, the growth rate of total FAI has been
lower than that of private FAI. And the gap between them expanded from −0.2
percentage points in February to −2.4 percentage points in June (see Fig. 1.7).
That the growth rate of private FAI in the first half of 2018 is higher than that
of total FAI in the whole society is mainly due to the significant decline in the
growth rate of investment by state-owned and state-holding enterprises and the sharp
decline in the growth rate of infrastructure investment in the tertiary industry (see
Fig. 1.8). The change in the growth gap of between the total and private investment
in the tertiary industry shows that the problem of institutional entry barriers faced
by private investment has relatively eased. Nonetheless, the growth rate of private
investment in the secondary industry was still at a low level in the past decade.
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
01-2016
02-2016
03-2016
04-2016
05-2016
06-2016
07-2016
08-2016
09-2016
10-2016
11-2016
12-2016
01-2017
02-2017
03-2017
04-2017
05-2017
06-2017
07-2017
08-2017
09-2017
10-2017
11-2017
12-2017
01-2018
02-2018
03-2018
04-2018
05-2018
06-2018
Fig. 1.7 Growth rates of total and private FAI: cumulative, YoY, %. Source CQMM team calcula-
tions on CEIC data
1.3 The Growth of Investment in Manufacturing Edged up, While … 7
40.00
35.00
30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
01-2016
02-2016
03-2016
04-2016
05-2016
06-2016
07-2016
08-2016
09-2016
10-2016
11-2016
12-2016
01-2017
02-2017
03-2017
04-2017
05-2017
06-2017
07-2017
08-2017
09-2017
10-2017
11-2017
12-2017
01-2018
02-2018
03-2018
04-2018
05-2018
Primary industry: total FAI Secondary industry: total FAI
Tertiary: total FAI Primary industry: private FAI
Secondary industry: private FAI Tertiary industry: private FAI
Fig. 1.8 Growth rates of total and private FAI by industries: cumulative, YoY, %. Source CQMM
team calculations on CEIC data
In the first half of 2018, manufacturing investment increased by 6.8% YoY, 1.3
percentage points higher than the same period of the previous year. Manufacturing
accounted for 31.2% of the total FAI of the whole society. In recent years, although
manufacturing investment still plays an important role in the total FAI of the whole
society, its proportion continued to fall. As the proportion of private investment in
manufacturing investment was 87.1%, the growth of private investment in manu-
facturing directly determines the direction of the total investment in manufacturing.
Since the third quarter of 2016, due to the global economic recovery, the growth
of private investment in manufacturing has reversed the previous downward trend
and gradually stabilized. However, in the second half of the year, the impact of
Sino-US trade disputes is expected to pull down the growth of private investment in
manufacturing (see Fig. 1.9).
In the first half of 2018, investment in infrastructure construction went up by
7.3% YoY, down 13.8 percentage points from the same period of the previous year.
Such a sharp drop was because that, on the one hand, since 2017, holding against
systemic risks has been taken as the focus of economic work of China’s central gov-
ernment. Regulating financing and debt-raising of local governments and cleaning
up non-compliant and illegal projects has the restricted local government’s financing
channels. Not only the lack of funding sources, but also the suspension and mitiga-
tion of some major projects, have slowed the growth of infrastructure investment. On
the other hand, from the perspective of demand for infrastructure investment, after
years of rapid development in infrastructure construction, the need to substantially
increase infrastructure investment has relatively diminished.
8 1 China’s Economic Performance in the First Half of 2018
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
06-2015
08-2015
10-2015
12-2015
02-2016
04-2016
06-2016
08-2016
10-2016
12-2016
02-2017
04-2017
06-2017
08-2017
10-2017
12-2017
02-2018
04-2018
06-2018
Total investment Private investment
Fig. 1.9 Growth rates of total and private investment in manufacturing: cumulative, YoY, %. Source
CQMM team calculations on CEIC data
In the first half of 2018, the total investment in real estate development picked
up by 7.4% YoY, an increase of 1.9 percentage points over the same period of the
previous year, showing a good momentum. As to the several sub-indicators of real
estate, from January to June, the growth rate of new construction area of commercial
housing increased from 2.95 to 11.78%, and the land acquisition area went up from
−1.23 to 7.2%, reflecting that real estate investment still maintained relatively high
growth. However, affected by strict regulation and control policy on real estate,
the growth rate of the sales area of commercial housing fell slightly from 4.11 to
3.32% (see Fig. 1.10). Under strict financial supervision, the growth rate of domestic
loan for investment in real estate development dropped sharply to −7.9%, down 30
percentage points from the same period of the previous year. In terms of sources
of funds, investment in real estate development only increased by 4.6%, down 6.6
percentage points over the same period last year. Meanwhile, the growth of the source
of real estate development funds continued to decline, and the pressure on real estate
enterprises increased, indicating that the good momentum of real estate investment
began to weaken (see Fig. 1.11).
1.3 The Growth of Investment in Manufacturing Edged up, While … 9
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
01-2015
03-2015
05-2015
07-2015
09-2015
11-2015
01-2016
03-2016
05-2016
07-2016
09-2016
11-2016
01-2017
03-2017
05-2017
07-2017
09-2017
11-2017
01-2018
03-2018
05-2018
New construction area of commercial housing Commercial housing sales area
Land purchase area
Fig. 1.10 Changes in sub-indicators of real estate: cumulative, YoY, %. Source CQMM team cal-
culations on CEIC data
20
15
10
-5
01-2015
03-2015
05-2015
07-2015
09-2015
11-2015
01-2016
03-2016
05-2016
07-2016
09-2016
11-2016
01-2017
03-2017
05-2017
07-2017
09-2017
11-2017
01-2018
03-2018
05-2018
Fig. 1.11 Investment in real estate development and sources of real estate development funds:
cumulative, YoY, %. Source CQMM team calculations on CEIC data
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
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Meyer (Mt. Zool. Stat. Neapel, vii. 1887, p. 669, note) suggests
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Closely allied is Manayunkia Leidy, which occurs in fresh-water
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