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 Human Rights and
Relative Universalism

Marie-Luisa Frick
Human Rights and Relative Universalism
 Marie-Luisa Frick

Human Rights and

Relative Universalism
Marie-Luisa Frick
Department of Philosophy
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria

ISBN 978-3-030-10784-0    ISBN 978-3-030-10785-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10785-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019931942

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
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mission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
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The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
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 Acknowledgements

Each book has a story and this one is no exception. The first ideas on how
to approach this project emerged in Galway, where I spent an incredibly
rewarding research leave in the spring of 2013. I am especially indebted
to the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the NUI Galway for enabling
me to conceptualize my habilitation thesis in a truly inspiring and care-­
free environment. I kept working on the book throughout the years that
followed, with another period of research leave taking me to Mauritius
before I submitted my habilitation thesis at the end of 2015. A special
thanks goes to my alma mater, the University of Innsbruck, and my col-
leagues at the Department of Philosophy for their reliable support and
solid friendship. My habilitation thesis was published in German by
Velbrück in 2017. I started working on a revised and shortened version in
English in the same year, invigorated by the time I spent as a visiting fel-
low at the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School in 2016. The
experience was simply overwhelming. I never imagined I would find a
place with such a concentration of brilliant minds and wonderful person-
alities. My gratitude for that opportunity (which was the start of many
more visits to the region) cannot be put into words.
All along the road I have traveled, I have been blessed with interactions
with people from different spheres of academic and non-academic life
who have nurtured my mind and heart with their experiences and (differ-
ent) views or have otherwise enabled me to complete this work. I am
v
vi Acknowledgements

afraid I am unable to provide an exhaustive list here, but I would like to

express my sincere gratitude to the following people in particular: Hadeel
Abu Hussein, Rebecca Agule, Ebrahim Afsah, Asma Afsaruddin, Maria
Bertel, Mashood Baderin, Shubhangi Bhadada, Günter Bischof, Yonatan
Brafman, Noelia Bueno-Gomez, Juan Pablo Calderon-Meza, Priyanka
Chirimar, Anna Crowe, Fred Dallmayr, Marzieh Tofighi Darian, Bonnie
Docherty, Jack Donnelly, Dez, Sylvia Eibl, Reinhold&Lydia Frick,
Theresa Frick&Massimo Ligazzolo, Annette Gordon-Reed, Gudrun
Grabher, Sabine&Daniele Trevisani-Farneti, Yasser Latif Hamdani,
Stefan Hammer, Timo Heimerdinger, Henrietta, Henry&Catalina, Yee
Htun, Theo Hug, Aleksey Ihorovych, Joy&Andreas Karabaczek, Emily
Keehn, Stephan Kirste, Manuela Klammer, Hans Köchler, Hans-Herbert-­
Kögler, Antti Korkeakivi, Peter Kügler, Raphael Lepuschitz, Georg
Lohmann, Lukas, Luzi, Reinhard Margreiter, Mario&Molly, Mei, Ulrich
Metschl, Reinhard Merkel, Josef Mitterer, Yasien Mohamed, Monirá,
Sam Moyn, Andreas Th. Müller, Mohd Faizal Musa, Elmar Nass, Joanne
Neenan, Michaela Neulinger, Gerald L. Neuman, Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh,
Pamela Nwakanma, Andreas Oberprantacher, Remigius Orjiukwu,
Pascaline, Pete, Miriam Plaickner, Denise Quistorp, Nani Jansen
Reventlow, Jimena Reyes, Georg Schildhammer, Sean, Ashvin&Pooja
Seetal, Sherene&Ritwik Samsi, Anne Siegetsleitner, Peter Singer,
Jay&Luitgard Soni, Peter Stöger, Zsuzsi&Sarab, Mohammed Mehdi
Taskhiri, Markus Tscharnig, Mostafa Vaziri&Allison Lide, Usama, Caro
Voithofer, Salma Waheedi, Jia Wang, Jürgen Wiebicke, Andreas Wimmer,
Aloisia Wörgetter, Yi-Li Lee, and Hamid Reza Yousefi.
Finally, I would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for the smooth pub-
lication process and in particular Brendan George and Lauriane Piette for
the valuable assistance.
 Contents

1 Introduction  1
1.1 Beyond Catalogs of Rights: The Idea of Human Rights   5
1.2 Human Rights as Assigned Claims  13
1.3 Primacy of Ethics Over Law  17
1.4 Degrees of Universality: Tensions and Incompatibilities  22
References 33

2 The Idea of Human Rights 41

2.1 Universalism: The Equality Dimension of Human
Rights 42
2.2 Individualism: The Liberty Dimension  56
References 79

3 Foundational Paths 87
3.1 Horizontal  92
3.2 Vertical 110
3.3 Towards Foundational Pluralism 128
References143

vii
viii Contents

4 The Idea of Human Rights in Global Contexts: The

Equality Dimension153
4.1 The Religious Other 156
4.2 Citizenship, States, and Nationhood 174
4.3 Woman 192
4.4 “Enemies of Humankind” 207
References218

5 The Idea of Human Rights in Global Contexts: The Liberty

Dimension233
5.1 Cosmo-ontological Collectivisms 234
5.2 Human Rights and Greater Goods 240
References273

6 Conclusion283

Index287
 About the Author

Marie-Luisa Frick born 1983 in Lienz in Austria, works as Associate Professor

at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck. She has pub-
lished extensively on human rights, legal, and moral philosophy. A visiting fel-
low at the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School in 2016, she is also
engaged in cultural diplomacy and upon invitation of the Austrian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has contributed to bilateral religious dialogues with Indonesia,
Iran, and China.

ix
 List of Abbreviations

ACHPR African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charta)

ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
ACRWC African Charter on the Rights and the Welfare of the Child
AI Amnesty International
AL Arab League
ArabCHR Arab Charter of Human Rights
Art. article(s)
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union (formerly: OAU, Organisation of African Unity)
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CDHRI Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
ch. chapter(s)
CoE Council of Europe
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CRSR Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
DDHC Declaration des Droits de l‘Homme et du Citoyen (Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen)
DH (Declaration) Dignitatis Humanae
DI (United States) Declaration of Independence

xi
xii List of Abbreviations

Dt (Book) Deuteronomy
e.g. exempli gratia, for example
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
esp. especially
EU European Union
Ex (Book) Exodus
f., ff., following page(s)
FGM female genital mutilation
fn. footnote
Gal Epistle to the Galatians
GC Grand Chamber
Gen (Book) Genesis
HRC (United Nations) Human Rights Committee
i.e. id est/that is to say
ibid. ibidem/at the same place
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
(I)NGO (International) Non-governmental organization(s)
Jos (Book) Joshua
Lev (Book) Leviticus
LGBT Lesbian, gay, bi and transgender (persons)
Lk (Gospel of ) Luke
MA (National) Margin of Appreciation
MCL Magna Charta Libertatum
Mt (Gospel of ) Matthew
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS Organization of American States
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly: Organization of
the Islamic Conference)
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
p(.p). page(s)
para. paragraph(s)
 List of Abbreviations xiii

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UK United Kingdom
UN(O) United Nations (Organization)
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
(UN)GA (United Nations) General Assembly
UNHCR (United Nations) High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council (formerly: Human Rights
Commission)
(UN)SC (United Nations) Security Council
UNTC United Nations Treaty Collection
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
US(A) United States (of America)
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCLT Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties
vs., v. versus
WHO World Health Organization
 1
Introduction

Human rights resound everywhere: Underpinning a quasi-universal secu-

lar morality they function as a ‘bench mark’ for political decision-making
procedures (discursive legitimacy), for the aims and boundaries of political
actions (outcome legitimacy), and finally for the overall evaluation of polit-
ical systems as such (governmental legitimacy). A “last utopia”1 for the
time being, human rights seem to outshine all rival visions for a better
world and give a name to the age in which we live, the “age of rights”.2
Evidence of the increasing significance of human rights (at least in theo-
retical terms) can also be found in the discursive ‘explosion’ on the matter
filling a vast global human rights library. Its philosophical branch draws
our attention to questions that contrast the widespread common-sense
understanding and rhetoric of human rights: what are human rights
actually? Who decides what is a human right? Are they moral or judicial
norms in the first place? What are their foundations and how can human
rights be justified? What does their non-finalized stipulation, rendering
human rights a medium of continuous intercultural encounters between
scholars, policy makers, and activists, tell us about their nature or their
future? Are human rights really a suitable normative guiding idea for
humankind that, on their road to unification and understanding, faces

© The Author(s) 2019 1

M.-L. Frick, Human Rights and Relative Universalism,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10785-7_1
2 M.-L. Frick

equally strong tendencies of cultural/regional differentiation and identi-

tarian demarcation? Can human rights ever be the ‘moral lingua franca’
for eight billion people on five continents?
Unsurprisingly, answers to questions like these do not come from one
voice but rather hint to different outlooks and approaches in terms of
scholarly disciplines and also worldviews. Human rights are a prescriptive
concept, evidenced by their historic origins in the modern revolutions of
1776 and 1789 as well as their re-birth out of the debris of master-race
ideology and its apocalyptical consequences. They do not simply depict
the world as it is but demand a particular orientation for political com-
monwealths, certain behavior of human beings towards each other, and
put specific constraints on State organs in the way they treat (non-)citi-
zens. Like any other normative concept, human rights are affected by an
increasing pluralization of opinions and convictions, even though this
sometimes tends to be overlooked or belittled. Human rights, as Joshua
Greene laments but rightly observes, often do not enter the stage when
arguments are settled but rather serve are shields we employ to safeguard
“our moral progress from the threats that remain”, as well as weapons to
bring about desired changes (cf. Greene 2013, pp. 306ff.).
The following investigation does not seek to resolve such diversity of
voices in the global discourse on human rights. Rather, it is an attempt to
step back from this discourse and to see the greater picture of what human
rights could be if we assume that their universalization or global accom-
modation is in the making but not yet granted. This ambivalent diagnosis
serving as a starting point can be understood better if we look at what the
globalization (of ideas) almost always amounts to: On the one side,
human rights have started to grow roots in various regional and even local
contexts and it is commonly held that their future is decisively dependent
upon such processes of enculturation.3 On the other side, such develop-
ments of ‘glocalization’ (cf. Robertson 1995) ensure that human rights do
not remain what they ‘originally’ might have been: “When ideas or insti-
tutions expand from their place of origin to other regions, they inevitably
transform their original nature or characteristic features in order to be
accepted by the inhabitants of the regions to which they spread” (Yasuaki
1999, p. 112). Such processes of vernacularization are seldom without
ambivalence. Sometimes, a formal commitment to human rights l­ anguage
 Introduction 3

does not translate into actual relevance of human rights norms and ideals
in practice. This often passes from view where, in the words of Kiran
Kaur Grewal (2017, p. 142), “the appeal to an abstract universalized
morality and a reluctance to engage in more substantial debates about
how such a moral order should be decided upon and what it should con-
tain” are convenient strategies of shielding human rights from potential
critique. Another difficulty, referred to as “the resonance dilemma” by
Sally Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt, also deserves mention in that regard:
“The more extensively the human rights idea is vernacularized, the more
readily it will be adopted but the less likely it is to challenge existing
modes of thinking” (2017, p. 216).
Against this backdrop, I want to address the following interrelated
questions: (1) What is the non-negotiable core of human rights? Which
axiological-normative premises does this idea entail? (2) Which founda-
tional paths do exist to ground (the idea of ) human rights and what is
their relation to each other? Can different grounding strategies coexist?
(3) To what extent do the axiological-normative fundamentals of the
human rights idea resonate with various sets of values and beliefs, or: how
‘stressable’ are they when transplanted into different contexts of world-
view? How should we interpret conflicts over human rights? How should
we maneuver between the universal and the local and what ‘red lines’ can
the idea of human rights draw in that regard?
As this book is situated in the relativity/universality debate on human
rights and my points of view will become clear in the following (sub-)
chapters, it is crucial to briefly sketch the conceptual landscape according
to my own theoretical and terminological account. Understood here as
descriptive terms, relativity and universality pertain to the actual accep-
tance of human rights and their underpinning values. In that sense, say-
ing that human rights are universal would amount to the claim that there
is an effective consensus on the meaning and importance of human rights
norms and values. On the other hand, holding that human rights are in
fact relative suggests that their acceptance is conditioned upon certain
sets of norms and values that are not shared among all people or tradi-
tions alike. There exists, however, a middle position that we can name
relative universality according to which human rights are in fact shared as
general principles whereas their specific meaning, scope, or ­implementation
4 M.-L. Frick

is subject to particularist interpretations. The right to life could serve as

an example: Even if virtually all people would supposedly agree that this
is an important right, they nevertheless might disagree whether or not
abortion or capital punishment, for example, are reconcilable with it. A
different question, yet not independent from empirical acceptance, is the
one of universalizability. To raise it only makes sense once a non-­
universality stance has been taken. In that perspective, human rights may
not (yet) be shared as a universal normative commitment, but could have
the potential to be universal—depending on the cultural/religious condi-
tions they meet in the course of their journey round the globe.
Furthermore, the question of human rights’ relativity/universality can
also be raised on a metaethical level. Here it is the ontological status of
their norms and values that is debated. Are human rights valid indepen-
dently of peoples’ opinions (thesis of ontological absoluteness) or is their
moral validity dependent on human acts of establishing and asserting
them (thesis of ontological relativity)? Those who side with ontological
absoluteness often regard human rights as (embodiments of ) divine com-
mands or unquestionable dictates of an authoritative human nature.
From the perspective of ontological relativity by contrast, human rights
appear as human constructs, not echoing an objective cosmos of rules
and values, but rather represent reactions to contingent historical experi-
ences or to the needs of a non-fixed human condition. Whereas the ques-
tion of factual universality or relativity is a mere empirical one, ontological
absoluteness or relativity is a matter of interpreting that very empirical
reality. I will elaborate on this in Sect. 1.2 in more detail.
Adding to the complexity of the universality/relativity debate is the
fact that it does not only involve a descriptive and an ontological or her-
meneutical dimension, but also a prescriptive one. At the heart of this
dimension lies the question: Should human rights be enforced and their
acceptance requested even where they are not (fully) shared? Certain vari-
eties of (cultural) relativism, for example, repudiate such human rights
universalism. As a more nuanced position, relative universalism intends to
balance universalism and relativism. It thereby makes use of the distinc-
tion between absolutism and universalism: That norms should be accepted
or implemented everywhere on this planet does not yet determine
whether or not this is done in consideration of local traditions, for
 Introduction 5

e­xample. Whereas relative universalism allows for such particularist

inseminations, absolute universalism demands that human rights are uni-
versally recognized and enforced without any deference to other (cul-
tural) normative regimes. The core challenge for any relative universalism,
and this is a main concern of this book, is to decide how far human rights
can be compromised and how limits of legitimate deviances should be
set. Otherwise, human rights run into danger of whateverism and mis-
use. Or, in the words of Stephen Hopgood: they soon will find them-
selves on a road to nowhere (cf. 2017, pp. 295ff.).

1.1  eyond Catalogs of Rights: The Idea

B
of Human Rights
The question what the core of human rights is, rests upon a central meth-
odological distinction: that between the idea of human rights and content-­
laden lists or catalogs of human rights. This distinction between ‘essence’
and ‘forecourt’ is an invitation to focus on a core area that does not yet
determine in detail the precise design of particular rights claims.4 It thus
aligns with those approaches in the human rights field that aim to counter
the rising inflation of ‘rights language’ and exuberant entitlement mental-
ity with an emphasis on a distilled ‘essence’ of human rights.5 Whereas
content designs of human rights are equally numerous and contested, the
idea of human rights only conveys that there are certain claims—yet to be
defined—that all human beings in virtue of being human should enjoy.
The idea of human rights hence amounts to a claim entitlement of the first
order (level I), that is an individual right to human rights which is the
basis for the claim entitlement of the second order (level II).
The idea of setting apart these two dimensions might raise some ques-
tions as to the operability of human rights. Of course, what could count
as a potential human right on the second level is not totally arbitrary.
Already the first level does have, and this will be a main focus of analysis
in the following chapters, important implications for the second. In par-
ticular, the equality dimension of the first order claim entitlement sets
bounds to rights framed in an exclusive manner without a proper justifi-
6 M.-L. Frick

cation. Embodying an individual right to rights, the idea of human rights

also excludes (second order) group entitlements. Apart from restrictions
for the content of a list of claim entitlements on the second order extrap-
olated from the claim entitlement on the first order, there are additional
reasons why not every claim seriously can be incorporated into a human
rights catalog. These reasons may be obvious but it could be helpful to
indicate them in some detail. First, human rights are claims specifically
meaningful for people sharing a commonwealth. They express that an
act, state or service is of particular importance, so important in fact that
it should be guaranteed collectively. We can call this the relevance thresh-
old. Why they are important is to a large degree dependent upon social-­
anthropological foundations: Humans as social beings are on the one side
always exposed to repression by others or their groups, on the other side
(only) these can offer support in terms of shelter from existential threats.
Hence, human rights are never relevant in isolation, but are conceivable
only within a social framing. That also means that human rights cannot
be established by any single human being on their own; they have to be
(re-)negotiated, explained, and affirmed. Further, a possibility threshold
does apply: It is pointless to formulate or demand claims that nobody
ever could guarantee, for example a right to immortality, eternal love, or
sunshine every single day. This may seem like a trivial observation, but it
does have implications for the double-nature of human rights as moral
and legal claims (see Sect. 1.3) for not every entitlement we are maybe
ready to assign to others can be guaranteed as a right in the strict sense.
Just imagine a right to truth or not to be lied to. Finally, there is no point
in designing claims without a certain amount of sincerity. That would
exclude cynical claims, such as the right of everybody to everything,
which is—as Thomas Hobbes taught so well—in fact everybody’s right to
nothing (cf. Sect. 3.2.1).
If the relation between claim entitlements of the first order and claim
entitlements of the second order is not arbitrary, the question could be
raised: Does the idea human rights not already presuppose concrete rights
beyond the abstract right to have rights? Can anybody reflect upon the
idea of human rights and affirm it without enjoying, for example, the
rights to freedom of thought or education? Is not the right to life of such
a fundamental quality that the idea of human rights cannot be detached
 Introduction 7

from it? Here we have to mind the difference between logically deriving
rights claims from the human rights idea and practical needs. Even
though not necessary in the former sense, it is true that certain rights in
fact are indispensable elements of any serious human rights catalog.
However, what sort of rights claims are acknowledged on entitlement
level II is not itself predetermined in a strict sense by entitlement level
I. This finding however, leads to another potential unease with my
approach expressed in terms of the doctrine of the indivisibility of human
rights. In particular, in the time of the confrontation of Soviet and
Western States this concept was supposed to fend off attempts to either
prioritize political-liberal (or: negative) rights over social and economic
(or: positive) rights and vice versa. In general, it serves the purpose of
protecting the integrity of human rights (lists) from trading off some
right(s) for others. Whereas it is true that abundance of one right or some
rights cannot compensate for the lack of others, that does not mean that
all (traditionally accepted) human rights are of equal importance.
Indivisibility applies if, for instance, one State would argue that “In our
country people may not have a right to work but enjoy the right to politi-
cal participation” or another claims that “Our people do not have the
freedom to assembly but enjoy free health care” since there is no general
competition between such rights claims.6 Yet, indivisibility in terms of
interdependency does not equal indivisibility in terms of egality of interests
or goods. That the latter is hardly ever achievable is not only demonstrated
by the way high courts balance and weigh different rights claims when
they clash. Our intuition also suggests that freedom from torture does
not rank in the same category as, for example, the right to “reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay” (UN 1948b,
Art. 24).
In this light, the general refutation of weighing different rights against
each other, as maintained for example by Martha C. Nussbaum in her
capability approach, proves mistaken. None of her capabilities, she
argues, could be subordinated to others below a certain minimum
­threshold.7 Nussbaum puts forward the following argument: Any abun-
dance of rights to free time (and other social amenities) is no compensa-
tion for the total lack of a right to freedom of expression. This might
appear plausible at first glance but it only clouds the reason why we would
8 M.-L. Frick

probably not accept such a trade-off: Simply because to most people a

right to freedom of expression is of greater value than a right to leisure. If
we turn Nussbaum’s example around (“An abundance of the right to free-
dom of expression is no compensation for the right to free time”), this
becomes all the more evident. The right to free speech is important since
only on its basis can any other right, including the right to free time, be
claimed and advertised. Insisting upon the indivisibility of human rights
in terms of their equal value would ultimately result in the creation of a
dogma and neglect the possibilities to improve and further develop (tra-
ditional) human rights catalogs.
With this in mind, we can return to the question of the core of human
rights and what it comprises. I conceptualize the axiological normative
fundamentals of the idea of human rights in the form of two pillars, (a)
universalism and (b) individualism. According to (a), everybody should
enjoy human rights, that is the right to have rights. This is the equality
dimension of human rights. The liberty dimension (b) is connected to the
assumption that human rights are first and foremost rights of the indi-
vidual (and therefore can and often do clash with interests of his or her
larger social group). The nature of such universalism and individualism
becomes apparent if we look at their opposites. Whereas in (a) the benefi-
ciary of the stipulated rights claims is each and every human being,
internal-­universalisms or in-group universalisms only grant rights to
members of a certain in-group. The antagonists of human rights indi-
vidualism are, however, manifold: A cosmo-ontological collectivism accord-
ing to which there is no such thing as a self and hence no individual rights
bearer; a social-ontological collectivism which sees groups as the primary
social phenomena and assigns rights to collective entities; and finally a
functionalist collectivism, often rooted in the social-ontological collectiv-
ism, subordinating individual rights to greater collective goals other than
establishing or maintaining a human rights regime. Usually, in such col-
lectivist frameworks, imposing duties rather than granting rights serves as
the premise of governance.
Prioritizing the idea of human rights over certain specific rights claims
paves the way for a relative universalism, sometimes also called “weak
cultural relativism” (Donnelly 1999, p. 83; 2003, p. 98) or “parametric
universalism” (Scanlon 1998, p. 329). Here it is important to be aware of
 Introduction 9

the two concepts of universalism in the human rights context and not to
confound them. That is, the universalism referring to the beneficiaries of
rights entitlements (‘rights of every single human being’) is not the uni-
versalism aiming for the universal recognition and enforcement of human
rights even though they are of course related: Those who want everyone
to enjoy certain rights cannot but demand that everybody recognizes and
respects them. However, we could still ask if this recognition has to be
absolute, that is detached from local peculiarities, or relative, that is taking
into account particular frameworks of norms and values. That human
rights should be universally respected is the assertion of recognition uni-
versalism; that the way this respect is paid and expressed can look differ-
ent in dissimilar places and times, is the conviction embedded in theories
of relative (recognition) universalism.
The central idea underlying this approach to “the quandary of the uni-
versality and relativity” of human rights (An-Na‘im 2003, p. 4) is that for
a certain normative body—here the idea of human rights—universal
compliance is required whereas outside of it a normative forecourt opens
up for particularities and their respective concretization. To some degree
relative universalism equals the judicial concept of a (national) margin of
appreciation (MA) (cf. ECtHR 1994; Brems 2003). In that sense, rights
are supposed to be valid universally, but their implementation can be
culture-sensitive, for example. The motto of such a relative universalism
then reads: “Within these limits, all is possible. Outside of them, little
should be allowed” (Donnelly 1999, p. 87). Jack Donnelly, most promi-
nent for advocating relative universalism, distinguishes between different
forms of universality: functional, international legal, overlapping consen-
sus, anthropological and ontological (2007). Whereas he rejects the latter
two, he still proposes to work in the direction of the other types of uni-
versality. His relative universalism operates with a top-down approach,
distinguishing between (invariant) concepts, (variant) conceptions, and
(flexible) implementation of human rights: “Concepts set a range of
plausible variations among conceptions, which in turn restrict the range
of practices that can plausibly be considered implementations of a par-
ticular concept and conception” (ibid., p. 300).8
My own version of relative universalism, however, does not build on
these theoretical structures and will, unsurprisingly, arrive at sometimes
10 M.-L. Frick

different conclusions. In the approach suggested here, the idea of human

rights, i.e., the individual right to have rights, is taken as the starting
point for any discussion about concrete human rights designs and devia-
tions, and not a given practice of human rights or international human
rights norms as such. In a first step, this sort of relative universalism opens
up the floor for different traditions and worldviews to take this notion of
human rights and build around it their versions of what human rights
should achieve and what they should look like in concrete terms.
Expecting substantial dissent here, we then have to ask in another step
whether the proposed rights or rights concepts can be brought into gen-
eral conformance with the limits the human rights idea itself entails.
Hence, the purpose of differentiating between the core of human rights
and the content of specific rights is primarily methodological, not cate-
gorical. Setting apart clear-cut incompatibilities from tensions between
certain notions and practices on the one side and the idea of human
rights on the other, enables us to make sense of human rights violations
in a nuanced and principled manner. Furthermore, human rights con-
flicts can be narrowed down by relatively precisely locating where they are
situated within the universalistic pillar of the human rights idea, the indi-
vidualistic, or both. The (sort of ) rights that can(not) be granted from a
certain perspective thus help in understanding where and why the idea of
human rights meets obstacles to its global accommodation. To enhance
our understanding of the complex landscape of (anti-)human rights ide-
ologies is as much an aim of the suggested approach as is the exploration
of the limits of toleration and its different shades.
Apart from the specifics of my own account, the general advantages of
applying such a thin, yet all-but-blank concept of human rights lies in its
potential to cope with the ambivalent processes of globalization men-
tioned above. For human rights, these processes expose the uncomfort-
able truth that with the decline of Western hegemony and also with the
global demographic shifts that have occurred since contemporary human
rights evolved in the middle of the last century, global discourses on
human rights have become more strained and sometimes even frustrating
(cf. also Hopgood 2017). Whereas a great deal has been achieved in uni-
versalizing the language of human rights and in improving actual living
conditions for millions of people, tendencies of resistance to as well as
 Introduction 11

departures from traditional human rights standards are evident in large

parts of the global South and North (cf. Frick 2013a). A pragmatic stance
is preferable when faced with the choice of either imposing a traditional
Western notion of human rights that obviously does not resonate in all
human societies to the same degree, and therefore fails to achieve true
universality, or giving in to unchecked relativism. The third way I pro-
pose amounts to opening up structured spaces for deliberation on what
human rights should look like in the twenty-first century and aspiring for
a relative universality instead.
The pragmatic generosity of middle ground positions between univer-
salism and relativism of course also faces skepticism. Some fear it would
only lead to “a surrender to the universalism of particularism” (O’Sullivan
2000, p. 32). Others ask: “What happens when there are different views
on social and cultural issues, or if there are different definitions of free-
dom? Middle ground approaches seem to have no answers to such ques-
tions […]” (Dahre 2017, p. 618).9 As a matter of fact, the risk of human
rights dissolving into something unrecognizable on the path to a more
pluralistic ethos, has to be taken seriously. To concentrate on the defining
axiological-normative premises of human rights is therefore indispens-
able. It also saves us from falling prey to the often implicitly assumed
identification of consensus and validity. As much as agreement over
human rights standards is desirable, we must not accept as genuine
human rights virtually everything people from different backgrounds
actually come to agree upon.
In addition to rather prudential rationales for a relative universalism,
also an ethical argument can be put forward in its favor. If human rights
are, as stated above, the rights of (wo)man as a social being and if human-
ity as a whole is both their beneficiary and addressee, the imposition of a
certain thick notion of human rights would be—even if it were (still)
possible—highly problematic. Dialogue on human rights between peo-
ple of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds and different ideological
outlooks today is not only unavoidable, it is above all necessary in order
to do justice to the idea that human rights belong to all.
That is not to say, however, as some claim, that human rights do not
have a specific origin in history.10 They are, in fact, a Western concept
insofar as human rights—or originally “the rights of man”—emerged
12 M.-L. Frick

from the paradigm shift brought about by the social contract theories of
the seventeenth century in the British Isles that led to the first rights dec-
larations in human history.11 But does this finding determine Western
societies to be human rights friendly quasi naturally and others to be
inherently hindered from embracing them? This does not at all seem to
be the case. How could human rights resonate in different parts of the
world without respective connecting factors? In this regard, we can draw
on the concept of human rights’ “placeful placelessness” (orthafte
Ortlosigkeit) by the German-Indian philosopher Ram Adhar Mall (1998).
Their origin, which is “a simple historical fact [and] not a matter for
praise (or blame)” (Donnelly 1999, p. 69) does not exclude the possibil-
ity that human rights can find a home in the hearts and minds of people
beyond the Western tradition. Here again the differentiation between
human rights and the idea of human rights can provide some guidance.
In vague contours the idea of human rights flashes up whenever moral
systems (in history) break up the in-group/out-group dichotomy or also
attach (some) importance on individual choices in life, for example in
terms of religious salvation. We can trace it in the moral philosophy of
ancient Sophists like Alkidamas or Hippias, in the cosmopolitanism of
Stoicism, in the humanism of Mencius and many others. Also, today,
various moral systems with inclinations to overcome internal-­universalisms
and at least some avenues for individual liberty offer important resources
for the human rights idea,—“sister notions” as Eva Brems calls them
(2001, p. 302)—even if not necessarily a fully-fledged concept of human
rights itself. It is, however, important not to mistake general values like
equity, benevolence, or peace already for the idea of human rights, much
less modern human rights, as we know them.12 At the same time, we
should keep in mind that for a specific society or culture to not have such
a concept does not imply being inherently alien to it. As we will see, pay-
ing attention to these resources is at least as important as understanding
the hurdles human rights encounter on their way towards what one day
may become a true universal ethos. For this ethos to flourish it is of sec-
ondary importance who ‘invented’ human rights. The decisive test is who
can fully subscribe to its axiological normative substance. Since “all
nations and peoples come to human rights as equal strangers” (Baxi
2002/2007, p. 2), its ultimate outcome cannot be anticipated.
 Introduction 13

1.2 Human Rights as Assigned Claims

Where do people get their human rights from? This question may sound
odd, if not utterly heretical. According to the standard narrative whose
pathos can be found in both modern and contemporary human rights
documents, we do not receive such rights from someone, nor can we ever
lose them. They are “natural,” “self-evident truths,” “unalienable,” “innate”
and so forth. Such rhetoric may be useful or even necessary to introduce
a novel moral idea and to affirm it vis-à-vis reluctant or even more hostile
responses. From a philosophical point of view, however, the objectivity of
human rights norms, that is their validity independent of any one’s judg-
ment, is in fact doubtful. The arguments on each side of this controversy
cannot be summarized in sufficient detail here, but I will focus on a core
challenge to every objectivist account of morality instead: the puzzle of
the diversity of moral systems (argument from plurality). Everybody walk-
ing this earth (or maybe just his or her own society) with open eyes can-
not but be astonished by the antagonistic plurality of moral views and
opinions. If there are such things as true moral norms or objective values,
we have to explain why not everybody is aware of them. In other words:
why do people still disagree about what is right and what is good? Though
such an explanation can be attempted, e.g., with a hypothesis of error or
irrationality, only more questions will arise: In what exactly does such
error or unreasonableness exist? In a lack of facts or in logical flaws? In an
inappropriate interpretation of ‘moral facts’ and what are they anyway?
And more importantly: If moral error is an option, how can I be sure not
to be affected by it myself? As a hypothesis, moral error is a sword that can
easily turn against oneself. Hence, it is startling that those adhering to
moral cognitivism consider the possibility of moral error only when it
comes to others with whom they disagree and almost never for them-
selves. As I have tried to show elsewhere (Frick 2017), a non-­cognitivist
stance evades these difficulties and is able to explain moral diversity
straightforwardly with its thesis of ontological relativity: ‘There is no single
true morality.’13
Of course, the strategy of questioning the existence of fundamental
moral diversity as such, would still be available. Although one may suc-
Another random document with
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eat. It maddened him to hear these old ladies chattering over tiny
pulsations of monotony as it they were events; to hear them
discussing the paltry British weather under an impervious roof; to
hear them talk of burglars in the next parish as if they were tigers on
the lower branches; to learn that Julia’s quarrel with Mrs. Armstrong
had ended in changing her doctor, when he had pictured her tearing
handfuls of fur out of Mrs. Armstrong’s back. He longed to throttle
the smug butcher who brought the daily tray of meat, robbing life of
all the pleasure of desire.
When he first arrived the Prince had been so easily amused. It was
enough for him to sit at a window and watch the men mending the
road; to follow the housemaid from room to room and see her make
the beds; to help to screw a leaf into the dining-room table; to dust
Mr. Cato’s books. It was, therefore, a great surprise to his host when
he blurted this out one evening. Had it been one of his nephews from
the country—his youngest sister married the Rector of Woolcombing
—Mr. Cato would have known what to do; he would have treated him
to some of those amusements which are provided for country
nephews; taken him to the British Museum, South Kensington, the
Tower of London, or the College of Mining in Jermyn Street; he
would have contrived little outings on omnibuses, ending with tea at
an Aërated Bread shop. But the Prince seemed too old for these
things; the weather was bad; Mr. Cato was busy, and he had
determined to keep him at Hampstead till things had settled down
and he knew his proper social value.
 IX
That was one of Mr. Cato’s chief preoccupations. What was the
Prince’s social station in England? How much deference might be
demanded of the world? Who were the people to whose company he
had a natural right? One must neither prejudice his future by
assuming too low a value for him, nor expose him to any rebuff by
claiming too much.
The question was one beyond Mr. Cato’s own competence. His
thoughts turned to his nephew Pendred. Not a country nephew this,
with any implication of humbleness. Quite the contrary; Pendred
Lillico, ex-Lieutenant of the Grenadiers, son of Mr. Cato’s half-sister,
who had married a hitherto obscure baronet in the days of her
beauty. Pendred was a dancing man, a well-known man, a pattern of
manners, an arbiter of fashions. They rarely met: Mr. Cato was
secretly afraid of his nephew; Pendred seldom had occasion to boast
of his uncle.
He arrived on his motor-car—small, fair, translucent, admirable. The
occasion suited him. Appreciation was his métier—appreciation of
frocks, laces, china, women, men. He knew hallmarks, pottery-
marks, marks of breeding, marks of coming success. Mr. Cato
passed the morning before his arrival in a restless state; he was
nervous as to the verdict.
‘How much a year, do you say?’ asked Pendred, in his touching little
glass voice.
‘Two thousand.’
‘H’m ... Borneo.... Can I see him?’
‘But that makes no difference, does it?’
‘It’s everything.’
‘But, surely dukes and millionaires aren’t estimated on their personal
value?’
‘Oh, once you get into big figures!’
‘But a man’s social value....’
‘Social value, my dear uncle, is human value.’
‘Well, I’m delighted to hear it.’
‘On two thousand a year, that is.... Well, let’s see your man. I think I
shall be able to give you an opinion.’
Prince Dwala was seated in an armchair in the library—nursing the
fire, remote, abstracted. So abstracted that he took no notice of their
entrance. Pendred put his head on one side and tried to sketch a
rough estimate; he was puzzled. He put his head on the other side
and attempted a new valuation. Mr. Cato touched the Prince on the
shoulder.
‘I’ve brought you my nephew to make your acquaintance.’
Dwala gave a long sigh and looked up.
‘Nephew ... what’s a nephew?’
‘This is my nephew,’ said Mr. Cato, presenting Pendred, who
stepped delicately forward, smiling, with hand extended.
The Prince drew him towards himself. Then suddenly, without any
warning, as if it were the most natural thing in the world, he took him
up in his arms and carried him to the light to make a better
examination. Mr. Cato stood petrified. Pendred lay perfectly still,
looking up with frightened blue eyes. Dwala seated himself on the
edge of the table by the window, and put Pendred on his knee. It was
the first finished product of civilisation that he had seen, perfect at
every point. He smelt him; he stroked his hair and ears; he felt the
fineness of his clothes; and growled a deep guttural growl of delight.
‘I should like to have a nephew, too.’
‘Put him down, put him down,’ cried Mr. Cato, finding voice: ‘you
mustn’t treat Pendred like that!’
Dwala glided obediently off the table, set Pendred on a chair, and
crouched at his feet looking up.
‘Does it talk?’ he asked.
‘That’s right. Of course he does. Pendred’s a terrible chatterbox. He’ll
talk your head off.’
‘Please make it talk.’
‘How can he talk when you frighten him to death like that?’
‘Don’t be absurd, Uncle Wyndham,’ said Pendred plaintively: ‘I’m not
at all frightened, thank you.’ He pulled out his case of gold-tipped
cigarettes, and lighted one, at which Dwala growled again and
clapped his hands.
‘Did you have a jolly voyage? I hear you were quite a lion on board.
Terrible long journey. Awful bore travellin’. What do you think of
England?’
‘Pretty voice! pretty voice!’ said the Prince, stroking one of his little
boots. ‘Will it eat? He pulled a biscuit out of his pocket and put it up
to Pendred’s lips. Pendred slipped his legs away and jumped up.
‘No, thanks awfully. I must be gettin’ home. People to tea. Awful
bore.’ And with this he bolted straight out of the door and through the
house to his motor-car, which was snorting and jumping up and
down outside, in charge of a man in shiny black surrounded by a
crowd of ragamuffins. He was half-way down the road when Mr. Cato
emerged in pursuit.
The Prince sat by the fire, nodding his head in high spirits, and
ejaculating: ‘Awful bore! Awful bore!’
‘How dare you?’ said Mr. Cato, coming in a moment later, and
shutting the door behind him.
‘Dare what?’
‘How dare you treat my nephew like that? Pendred! A gentleman! A
future baronet! Here am I, working my fingers to the bone to get
justice done to you—at it night and day, spending my substance,
sacrificing everything—and then, when I invite my nephew out here,
who might have helped you in your London career, you treat him like
that! You drive him out of the house—he even forgot his gloves.’
‘I liked him. I wanted to keep him.’
‘You treat him like a child, like a plaything, a doll. You forget that he
is a man.’
‘Is he a man?’
‘He was twenty-eight in June. Of course he’s a man.’
‘I didn’t know. He has no eye.’
‘No eye? What do you mean?’
‘Nothing here.’ The Prince moved his hand over his eyes. ‘Nothing
behind.’
‘I don’t know what you mean. Eye or no eye, I’ll beg you for the
future to be respectful to everybody, mind you—everybody, high or
low. Social position makes no difference. Now you’ve spoilt
everything. Pendred’s offended. He won’t come back. How can you
get on if you behave like that?’
Mr. Cato had heard of a man ‘having a leg,’ but never of a man
having ‘no eye.’ It conveyed nothing to him. But the idea was clear
and even elementary to Dwala. Being a beast, endowed with no
reason, having only instinct and that μονὴ αἰσθήματος, or
persistence of impressions, which takes the place of reason in the
lower animals, he was incapable of the rational classification of
natural things which characterises the human outlook. His criteria of
species were distinct but illogical; his categories did not tally with
human categories; they fell short of them and they overlapped them.
Species was defined for him, not by the grouping of attributes, but by
an abstract something—a spiritual essence inherent in the attributes.
He was guided, to put it in philosophical terms, not by ‘phenomena,’
but by ‘noumena.’ For instance, he knew a horse from a donkey, not
by its size, its ears, or its coat, not on consideration, but abruptly,
instinctively, round the corner, by an effluence of individuality; in
short, by its ‘equinity.’ So too, in the forest, he had always known a
venomous cobra from a harmless grass-snake at any distance, not
by considerations of form or colour—considerations which might
often have led to too late a conclusion—but merely by its ‘cobrinity.’
But this attitude is liable to error; and Prince Dwala had been led
astray by it. His notion of the essence of humanity was formed from
the men he had first met; it was limited and imperfect. It included an
element not essential to humanity, this ‘eye’ of which he spoke: a
thing difficult to define; something revealed in the bodily eye; not
exactly strength of will or power to command; not entirely dignity or
courage; some reflection rather of the spirit of the universe, a self-
completeness and responsibility, a consciousness of individual
independence. This he had known and felt in the American, in the
Soochings, in Mr. Cato, in the housemaid—it was the basis of his
respect and obedience; but it was wanting in Pendred Lillico.
It was fortunate that he was disabused of error so early in his career.
He could afford to laugh at his foolishness later—he saw what
mistakes of behaviour it would have led him into; for when he came
to know London better, he found that the mass of people, both in
drawing-rooms and slums, indubitably men, altogether lacked the
‘eye’ which he had thought essential.
 X
At breakfast next morning Mr. Cato groaned a good deal over his
letters.
‘Well, Wyndham, what does Pendred say?’ asked sister Emily.
Mr. Cato frowned, and shook his head in a menacing aside,
enjoining discretion.
‘I was afraid so,’ he said, after breakfast, when Dwala had retired to
the study fire. ‘Pendred is very pessimistic. Oh dear, oh dear! And
yet, who can say he is not right after the way he was treated? “I am
afraid that the same thing cannot be said of your protégé. Quite
apart from his rudeness to me—of which I will say nothing, if you will
do the same—it is evident that Prince Dwala is not a gentleman. Not
at present, at any rate. There is a brusquerie about him which would
do very well in a Hapsburg or a Hohenzollern, but not in a deposed
Borneo Prince. He doesn’t know how to sit down; nor in fact what to
sit on. He doesn’t know what to do with his hands; all his movements
are too large, and, as Lady Hamish would say, ‘too conclusive.’”
Pendred won’t come to lunch on Tuesday—I was afraid not; he
leaves town on Monday. However, there is a ray of hope. It is really
very generous of Pendred, considering. It is certainly worth trying.
“Gentlemen are made as well as born. Captain Howland-Bowser
acquired it because he was determined to succeed; and now nobody
would know he was not a gentleman, and in fact a very fine
gentleman, and received everywhere. Of course it is a secret. I
should never have known if Warbeck Wemyss had not told me
himself. Present the letter I enclose, and let him see that you mean
perfect discretion.”’
‘Who is Warbeck Wemyss? Not the ...’
‘Of course.’
‘The actor?’
‘Gives lessons in manners, do you mean?’
‘But won’t it be very expensive?’
‘Of course Wyndham means the Prince to pay himself.’
‘Now Clara, once for all, let me hear no more of these hints. The
Prince shall not pay. We have no right to expect it, poor fellow. We
have done very well without going to the country this year, and surely
we can manage to do it again. If the worst comes to the worst we
can move into a smaller house when the Prince leaves us. You must
try to be more economical; the bills come to far more than they ought
to.’ He closed the discussion by leaving the room.
Warbeck Wemyss consented, on terms. It was a ‘wrench,’ as
Traddles would have said; but surely it was worth while. The lessons
were a great amusement for the Prince. The going out into the
passage; the entering the library, hat in hand; the surprise on Mr.
Wemyss’s part; the little interchange on health and weather; the play
with his monstrous gloves: the more elaborate lessons;
introductions; forgetfulnesses; the assumption of grave interest while
a humble Wemyss endeavoured to recall to him where they had met
before; the pretended dinners; the new words; the manner of
gallantry; the manner of confidence; the gestures and ejaculations of
patience under a long anecdote—a thousand situations which
pictured a new and delightful universe before his eyes. Dwala had
the imitative faculty in perfection; he almost cried with humble joy
when Wemyss clapped him on the shoulder, and assured him that
he would make a gentleman of him in no time. Mr. Cato was
delighted with the teacher’s reports: a little slapdash at first; rather
random in the use of ‘rippin’’ and ‘awful bore,’ but quicker progress
than he had ever seen.
 XI
Meanwhile there were other things to raise Mr. Cato’s spirits.
Parliament was back. The Government still held good, it is true, in
spite of all rumours to the contrary; but opposition is exhilarating.
Best of all, the Privy Council was in session. The Crown Officers,
worn out with long obstructive sittings, made a poor fight of it: a
dispute about a bit of land in Borneo was a small matter compared
with the fate of a historic party. The judges were favourably
impressed by the brusque appositeness of Mr. Cato’s counsel.
When Mr. Cato came back one day in a four-wheeler instead of the
omnibus, his sisters knew that something extraordinary had
happened.
‘We’ve won!’ he cried, sinking, smiling and exhausted, into an
armchair.
Everybody shook hands with Dwala.
‘Thank you, thank you,’ he said, pressing each hand delicately, and
laying his left hand on the top of it, in a graceful and engaging way
which Mr. Wemyss had taught him. ‘You’re very kind.’ But he had no
understanding of the news. Only at dinner, when a gold-necked
bottle of Christmas champagne was produced and they all drank his
health, he began to realise that it was something solemn and
important.
 XII
It was more solemn than anybody suspected. The news from the
mines had been good; but it was nothing to what it was going to be.
When Mr. Cato came home in the afternoon, two days later, he found
a smart brougham at the door. On the hall table lay a card: ‘Baron
Blumenstrauss.’ The famous Baron in his house! The drawing-room
was empty. He went into the library. There he beheld an elderly bald-
headed Jewish gentleman in a white waistcoat, with fat little purple
hands clasping his spread knees, gazing with baggy eyes through
dishevelled gold pince-nez at Prince Dwala, who lay back in an
armchair, lids down, breathing heavily. At Mr. Cato’s entrance, the
visitor took off his pince-nez and looked up.
‘It iss an extra-ordinary ting,’ he said: ‘de shendlemann ’as gone to
sleep!’
The Prince awoke at this and leaned forward blinking.
‘Pray continue. It is most interesting.’
‘I am not used to ’ave my beesness bropositions receift in soch a
way. I am Baron Blumenstrauss,’ he said, turning to Mr. Cato, with
gurgling guttural r’s.
‘Yes?... I am Mr. Cato—Mr. Wyndham Cato ... I ... I live here, you
know.’
‘Ah—sit down, Mister Cato. I ’ave read your speeches. You are
cleffer man; you ’ave ideas; wrong ideas, bot cleffer. What can I do
wid a shendlemann dat go to sleep when I make him beesness
bropositions? I offer to make him very rich man, he say “rippin’”; I
say four hunderd tousand pount a year, he shut his eye; I say fife
hunderd tousand pount, he go to sleep.’
‘Five, hundred ... thousand ... pounds!’ ejaculated Mr. Cato faintly,
overwhelmed.
‘Effery year.’
‘Why?’
The Baron winked ponderously, with an effort, and smiled with
exquisite penetration of Mr. Cato’s labyrinthine slyness.
‘Nod for nussing!’
‘What is the proposition?’
‘Are you de shendlemann’s guardian?’ returned the Baron abruptly.
‘Why no,’ reflected Mr. Cato: ‘I suppose I am not. But I’m his principal
adviser.’
‘Ah! I know.’
The Baron rose suddenly, snatching up his white-lined hat and
lavender gloves.
‘Well, goot-bye, shendlemen. I haf laties wait for me at home. Adieu,
mon Prince.’
‘Good-bye, good-bye,’ said Dwala, with careful intonations: ‘I hope
you’ll look in again some time.’
‘Goot-bye, I leaf you to your books, your studies. Goot-bye ... Dis
vay?’ he appealed to Mr. Cato, moving towards the door.
‘I’ll see you out.’
‘Goot! You haf charming leetle house. Man can see dat Madame haf
excellent taste.’
He stopped at the hat-rack, took down a hat and put it into Mr. Cato’s
hand, nodding and smiling.
‘Put him on. You come wid me.’
‘I wasn’t going out.’
‘Come alonk. I make you beesness broposition.’ He hurried him
down the steps. ‘Leedle flower’s all dead,’ he said, half glancing at
the wintry garden. ‘Half-past seex,’ he added, looking at his watch.
As they bowled along in the smooth brougham, night fell. The Baron
talked; Mr. Cato began to see dimly the gigantic outline of the thing
that he had done. His mind was still numbed with the vastness of big
figures; he hardly perceived the order in which things happened. The
Baron had drawn a paper from some recess of the carriage and put
it in his hand; he was fascinated by the purple unconscious
forefinger striding about it, and the continuous voice in his ear. It was
a map, a copy of the map of the Sooching forest made by the
lawyers: ‘As shown in the map appended hereto, and marked C,’ he
repeated to himself. Yellow squares, and circles and figures in black
had grown on the bare centre since he last saw it. The purple blood-
gorged finger was running rapidly from pit to pit; they were all full of
gold, and the finger was peeping and gloating and chuckling,
planning schemes of union and division, conquest and annihilation.
The coachman’s steady back looked in with its two silver eyes from
the box, like the face of a giant Fate, rumbling and gliding them to
inevitable ends.
The burst of a barrel organ brought him to everyday consciousness.
The Baron was still talking.
‘“Are de Government mad?” said my friends to me. “Dey might haf
taken de whole ting wid deir retchiment of men; and dey let it all go
to one shendlemann. An’ now dere can neffer be a war for it; it is
brivate broperty. Dey leaf it to de Soochinks? Goot! Someday de
Soochinks rebel; dey oppose de Ettucation law, de Tynamite law, de
Church law: de Government take it away from dem. Goot! Dat is
Bolitics. But dey have made it Broperty: dere is no Bolitics wid
Broperty. We shall see big row. De Government will fall.”’
‘They have many things to answer for.’
‘It is solid gold!’
‘Ten thousand butchered Bulgarians lie at their door.’
‘Polgarrians? What are your ten tousand Polgarrians to me, ten
hunderd tousand Polgarrians, ten million Polgarrians? A tousand
tons of solid gold, I tell you. Dey know nussing, your Government. All
de land is one big reef. I haf known it tree munt, you haf known it,
efferybody haf known it; but de Government knows nussing, de Brivy
Gouncil knows nussing.’
‘Do you mean that the gold runs right across this map, where these
marks are?’
‘Natürlich.’
‘I never even guessed it.’
‘Is it a choke? Bah! Den why haf you made soch friends of de
Brince?’
‘What’s your proposal?’
‘Wait!’ He put his head out of window and shouted to the driver:
‘Kvicker! Kvicker!’.... ‘I tell you at home. Haf a smoke?’ He held out a
fat cigar-case.
‘No thank you.’
‘Take it! take it! Fifty pount a box.’ Mr. Cato still refused.
Gates opened before them; they drove over a gravel court, and
ascended broad steps on a red carpet rolled down by footmen.
‘To de English room.’
They flew through a monstrous hall, with three footmen after them;
fountains, palms, mosaics, tiles, pillars, galleries, lights; a card-table,
dwarfed by the vastness; card-players, lounging men, thin
contemptuous women smoking cigarettes. As they bowled rapidly by,
the Baron waved flickering red fingers:
‘My exguses laties. Come along Max: beesness!’
A young Jew arose from the table, threw down his cards, made
apologies, and followed quickly.
In the English room the Baron cast rapid gestures at the pictures on
the walls:
‘Reynolds, Cainsborough, Dicksee, Constable, Leader, Freeth.
Come along, Max. Bring champagne,’ he said to the footmen.
‘Not for me, thank you,’ said Mr. Cato.
‘Goot! I will drink it mysailfe.’
They sat in a blaze of electric light, velvet, gold, Venetian glasses;
everything exhaled a fat smell of luxury. This was the stunning
atmosphere in which the Baron preferred to make his ‘broposition.’
Papers flitted about the table; champagne and diamond rings
flickered before Mr. Cato’s eyes.
The Baron planned an amalgamation, a monopoly; harmony and
understanding; big handling and cheap production; the sales
regulated; the market chosen; the rate of exchange manipulated. A
mass of companies, with different names, different directorates, even
different supposititious localities.
‘If I call him Cato Deeps, and say he is in Mexico, who knows? who
cares? De enchineer? I pay him. De public? De diffidends are all in
Treadneedle Street.’
An oscillation of good reports and bad reports, share-prices going up
and down, with the Baron and his friends in the middle of the see-
saw, and money rolling to them from alternate ends of the plank.
‘Gold is goot, but gompanies are better,’ he said.
But the Baron must have a free hand; it amounted to a purchase, a
right to exploit. Everything depended on the Prince, and evidently the
Prince depended on Mr. Cato. For the one there waited the 500,000l.
a year in perpetuity, guaranteed on his own property; for the other,
directorships, fees, shares, pickings at every corner; a safe income
of at least ten thousand to be had for the asking. He had only to get
the Prince’s consent to the bargain.
Mr. Cato flipped aside the personal question without a word. But for
the Prince? 500,000l. a year. No one could reasonably ask more of
life. Had he a right to refuse it? But these companies! tricks of
promotion! all the garbage of the money market. Had he a right to
accept it? He hesitated.
The butler came in, and murmured in the Baron’s ear.
‘Where?’
‘Just outside, sir.’
‘Gif him a smoke, and tell him to vait.’
‘Can I come in?’ said a voice at the door.
‘Aha, cher Duc!’ cried the Baron with brazen-voiced, brutal
bonhomie: ‘go to de pilliard room and vait.’
‘Can’t you spare a moment?’
‘Ne voyez-vous pas?’ The bonhomie passed to imperial fierceness. ‘I
am peezy!’
‘Well?’ he said, as Mr. Cato still sat plunged in thought. ‘For you it is
leetle question—for de Brince, leetle question: it is me or somebody
else. Fife hunderd tousand pount, effery year.’
Mr. Cato still pondered. He thought he saw his duty clearing before
him.
‘Well? De Duke vaits; I vait. You impoverish de world: you widdraw
me from circulation. Is it Yes?’
‘No!’ said Mr. Cato, pushing back his chair. ‘It is No.’
‘Ah?... Who will manage de mines?’
‘The Prince will manage the mines. I will manage the mines.’
‘Goot! You hear, Max? Dis shendlemann will manage de mines.’
Max only stared palely at Mr. Cato. The irony was too great for
laughter. He saw a man putting to sea on a plank, unconscious of
the deep voice of the gathering tornado; a child going out with a
wooden gun to make sport of an angry crowd of sans-culottes.
‘Can I get a copy of the corrected map anywhere?’ asked the Child.
‘Gif him de map, Max,’ said the Baron, with a short, indulgent laugh.
‘My secret achents haf brepared it, Mr. Cato. Gif him de figures, all
de papers. Let him haf efferyting. Goot-bye, Mr. Cato. See him to de
carriage, Max.’
‘I’ll walk, thank you.’
‘Better drive. Goot-bye.’
‘Good-bye.’
‘You will haf deeficulties, Mr. Cato.’
Mr. Cato went home by omnibus. His heart sank as he looked at the
map, divorced from the purple finger.
There is lightheartedness in great conflict: we see the larger outline;
our forces are fed by the consciousness of it. A field of gold, still in
possession; a thing still to sell, if need be: it was an impregnable
position. But courage is needed after the battle; we see partially, at
short range. To have rejected a magnificent offer, to have so little in
its place—some papers, an idea, a consciousness that needed an
atlas to explain it. To have rejected the proposals of confident
authority creates a helpless mid-air terror; that is the power of
religions. Mr. Cato felt like a heretic of the Middle Ages, wondering,
on the way to the stake, if after all the Pope were not right.
He went straight to his bedroom; walked up and down in his slippers,
lay awake for hours in long moods of elation and depression, and fell
asleep at last very cold.
 XIII
The wheel had begun to turn. Nothing could stop it now. Next
morning came a fresh-looking elderly gentleman in grey, who
announced himself as ‘of the Colonial Office.’ He looked about him
as if he meant to buy the place; but modestly, as if for someone else.
Mr. Cato received him in the drawing-room. He hoped the Prince
was well. The Colonial Office had heard of the Prince’s improving
fortunes. His business concerned the Prince, but it could most
conveniently be broached to Mr. Cato. He would see the Prince
afterwards.
It had probably struck Mr. Cato that the time had now arrived for the
Prince to set up a separate establishment. The Colonial Office,
which was ultimately responsible for him, felt that Mr. Cato’s
kindness must not be trespassed on. He must not be allowed to
monopolise the Prince.
Mr. Cato had probably noticed that native potentates always had,
what you might call, for want of a better word, ‘keepers’ attached to
their persons while they were in England. The actual title varied. As
a rule it was some tall muscular military man who was said to be ‘in
attendance on His Majesty the So-and-so.’ It was this functionary’s
duty to keep him generally out of mischief; for these Oriental fellows
would play the very deuce if left alone. Well, as far as Prince Dwala
was concerned, the Colonial Office had decided that a Private
Secretary would meet the case, and they had in fact selected the
man.
‘Who is it?’ asked Mr. Cato, repressing a pang of jealousy.
‘One of the Huxtables—John Huxtable, a son of the Bishop.’
This again smelt of large success. Mr. Cato knew nothing of this
particular John; but he was a Huxtable, and Huxtables are, like
Napoleon, not men but institutions. Nature has such caprices. Out of
many million wild rough briars, one rougher and crabbeder than all
the rest is chosen by her for a fathering stock; whatever is grafted on
it thrives. Another is richer, larger, better-flowered, the pride of the
field—it is wise, courteous, a soldier, a leader of men; it is made a
Duke; it is grafted with the delicatest buds of Paestum. But the bloom
is frail and mean; shelter and fine feeding avail not, it has a good
place in the garden, but it is fragrant only in its name. The Huxtables
came of a rough and crabbed stock. Their great-grandfather was
somebody’s gamekeeper. His sons throve in business. His
grandsons were great men—soldiers, lawyers, priests. His great-
grandsons, an innumerable rising generation, were destined for
greater greatness. It had become an English custom to see large
futures before them. They were big and bony, they played at Lord’s,
they abounded in clubs and country houses; their handsome, strong-
toothed sisters married well, breeding powerful broad-browed babies
that frowned and pinched.
This particular Huxtable had tutored a Prince of the blood. He had
been secretary to a philanthropic commission; he would be a
Cabinet Minister, a Viceroy—anything he pleased. For the present
he would be private secretary to Dwala: he would manage him,
regulate him, assert him, protect him, establish him, marry him
perhaps, and pass on to another broad stage in the regal staircase
of his career.
As for the mines, the gentleman in grey had no advice to offer. It was
a private affair of Prince Dwala’s; no concern of the Colonial Office.
Why not consult some big financier? Baron Blumenstrauss, for
instance.
Mr. Cato made no reply.
‘Well, after all,’ the grey gentleman concluded, ‘it had better be left to
Mr. Huxtable.’
 XIV
The Huxtable came later—a terrifying young man, who said little, but
listened with a tolerant smile—and after him a host of others,
entailed by his plans for Dwala. A house had been found in Park
Lane. The owner, who was travelling in the East, had left the thing
intact; his creditors wished to sell it as it stood. The appointments
were passable; he had been a rather random collector of good things
—some rubbish must be weeded out and replaced, but there was
nothing to delay possession.
However, it must be paid for. If Mr. Cato would produce his accounts,
the Huxtable would be glad to go through them with him.
‘Oh, I have no accounts to show.’
‘Why not?’
‘Dwala has been my guest. There is nothing to account for.’
‘But the property in Borneo—you have an account of that?’
‘No.’
‘This is all very curious. A man has a fortune of some hundreds of
thousands a year, and no account is kept of it!’
‘But he hasn’t got it yet. It lies buried in the earth in Borneo.’
‘Yes; it consists of mines, I know. But, of course, the fortune was
realisable as soon as the Privy Council gave their decision.’
‘Well, it hasn’t been realised.’
‘But the decision was given a week ago. Do you mean to say it has
been neglected all this time?’
‘“Neglected” is a piece of impertinence, Mr. Huxtable.’
‘A week’s income lost means something like 10,000l.’
‘How dare you come to me—me, who has been toiling night and day
in the Prince’s interest—in this authoritative, censorious way—I, who
am old enough to be your grandfather—talking of neglect?’
‘You regard it as an aspersion? Well, and what are the results of all
your labour?’
‘I have secured him justice.’
‘Justice is a matter of law, Mr. Cato: the Privy Council has attended
to that. If you were incapable of realising his fortune yourself, why
not have applied to some big financier—Baron Blumenstrauss, for
instance?’
‘I have seen Baron Blumenstrauss.’
‘Well, what did he say?’
‘He made an offer. He volunteered to buy all the Prince’s rights for
500,000l. a year.’
‘Then, surely, you have realised it?’
‘No, sir, I have not.’
‘You don’t mean that you refused his offer? You weren’t expecting
anyone to offer more, I suppose?’
‘I refused his offer.’
‘On what ground?’
‘I regard Baron Blumenstrauss as an immoral man. I regard his
business methods as immoral. If I had accepted the offer on the
Prince’s behalf, I should have been advising him to lend himself to a
vile system of exploitation, which I regard as one of the most
infamous curses of our modern civilisation. I would rather see Dwala
starve.’
‘You have taken a very great responsibility on yourself, Mr. Cato.’
‘I am quite willing to bear it.’
A smile flickered round the Huxtable’s nose, and Mr. Cato felt that he
was being betrayed into melodrama. Silence ensued.