Republic oI the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC


ATU MICHAEL ABAS KIA,
in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINANAO
FEERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HAI MUHMINA .
USMAN, OHN ANTHONY L. LIM,
AMILON T. OIN, ASRIN
TIMBOL AIYARI, MUIB M.
KALANG, ALIH AL-SAII . SAPI-
E, KESSAR AMSIE ABIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,
Petitioners,


- versus -


SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President UAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru
SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, R.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, R., Office of
the President Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 196271

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 18, 2011





FLORENCIO ABA, R., Secretary
of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,
Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
BASARI . MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,


- versus -


SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his
capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections,
FLORENCIO ABA, R. in his
capacity as Secretary of the
epartment of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA,
R., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, UAN PONCE ENRILE,
in his capacity as Senate President,
and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in
his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

REP. ECEL C. LAGMAN,
Petitioner,


- versus -


PAQUITO N. OCHOA, R., in his





G.R. No. 196305






















G.R. No. 197221







capacity as the Executive Secretary,
and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, ATU
CASAN CONING CANA, and
PARTIO EMOKRATIKO
PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
(PP-LABAN),
Petitioners,


- versus -


THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, R., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, R., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABA, R.,
in his capacity as Secretary of the
epartment of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO
B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer
of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ATTY. ROMULO B.
MACALINTAL,
Petitioner,








G.R. No. 197280
























G.R. No. 197282




- versus -


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, R.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

LUIS ~BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,


- versus -


THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, R.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,


- versus -


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, R., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.











G.R. No. 197392













G.R. No. 197454



x--------------------------------------------x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM,
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.




E C I S I O N

BRION,


On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA No. 10153, entitled 'An Act Providing
for the Synchroni:ation of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections Irom the 8
th
oI
August 2011, to the second Monday oI May 2013 and every three (3 years
thereaIter, to coincide with the country`s regular national and local elections. The
law as well granted the President the power to 'appoint oIIicers-in-charge (OICs
Ior the OIIice oI the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members oI the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perIorm the Iunctions
pertaining to the said oIIices until the oIIicials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualiIied and assumed oIIice.

Even beIore its Iormal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions Iiled with this Court. These petitions multiplied
aIter RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X oI the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation oI autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting oI provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the Iramework oI
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity oI the
Republic oI the Philippines.

Section 18 oI the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an
organic act Ior these autonomous regions to concretely carry into eIIect the granted
autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act Ior each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation oI the regional consultative commission
composed oI representatives appointed by the President Irom a list oI nominees
Irom multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall deIine the basic structure oI
government Ior the region consisting oI the executive department and legislative
assembly, both oI which shall be elective and representative oI the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide Ior special courts with
personal, Iamily and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions oI
this Constitution and national laws.

The creation oI the autonomous region shall be eIIective when approved
by a majority oI the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called Ior the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
Iavorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years aIter the eIIectivity oI the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA No. 6734 entitled 'An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section
18(2, Article X oI RA No. 6734, thus Iully establishing the Autonomous Region
oI Muslim Mindanao (ARMM. The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the Iirst regular
elections Ior the regional oIIicials oI the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days
nor later than 90 days aIter its ratiIication.

RA No. 9054 (entitled 'An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as Amended was the next legislative act passed. This law
provided Iurther reIinement in the basic ARMM structure Iirst deIined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular elections Ior the ARMM regional
oIIicials to the second Monday oI September 2001.

Congress passed the next law aIIecting ARMM RA No. 9140
|1|
- on June
22, 2001. This law reset the Iirst regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratiIy RA No.
9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratiIied in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province oI Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333
|2|
was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2
nd
Monday oI August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereaIter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratiIied in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations Ior these
elections and had accepted certiIicates oI candidacies Ior the various regional
oIIices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections oI the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House oI Representatives as House Bill
( No. 4146, seeking the postponement oI the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House oI Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191 Members voting in its Iavor.

AIter the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756, on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13 Senators voted
Iavorably Ior its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House oI Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition
Iiled with this Court G.R. No. 196271
|3|
- assailing the constitutionality oI both
HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity oI RA No. 9333 as
well Ior non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. ThereaIter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 Iiled another petition
|4|
also
assailing the validity oI RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law oI RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations Ior the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the Iiling oI the
Iollowing petitions against its constitutionality:

a Petition Ior Certiorari and Prohibition
|5|
Iiled by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member oI the House oI Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197221;

b Petition Ior Mandamus and Prohibition
|6|
Iiled by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c Petition Ior Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction
|7|
Iiled by Louis 'Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and

d Petition Ior Certiorari and Mandamus
|8|
Iiled by Jacinto Paras as a member
oI the House oI Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters Irom the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas
ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections
scheduled Ior August 8, 2011, also Iiled a Petition Ior Prohibition and
Mandamus
|9|
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the
constitutionality oI RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement Iiled their own Motion Ior
Leave to Admit their Motion Ior Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention
dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation oI all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality oI HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,
2011. ThereaIter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda
within twenty (20 days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation oI RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective oIIicials oI ARMM to continue to perIorm their Iunctions should these
cases not be decided by the end oI their term on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII oI RA No. 9094 in order to become eIIective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 Iurther maintain that it is
unconstitutional Ior its Iailure to comply with the three-reading requirement oI
Section 26(2, Article VI oI the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations oI the right oI suIIrage oI the people oI ARMM, as well as the Iailure to
adhere to the 'elective and representative character oI the executive and
legislative departments oI the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant
to the President oI the power to appoint OICs to undertake the Iunctions oI the
elective ARMM oIIicials until the oIIicials elected under the May 2013 regular
elections shall have assumed oIIice. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power oI
appointment also gave the President the power oI control over the ARMM, in
complete violation oI Section 16, Article X oI the Constitution.

The Issues


From the parties` submissions, the Iollowing issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments oI August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization oI
elections

II. Whether the passage oI RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2,
Article VI oI the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage oI RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority
vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement oI the ARMM regular elections
constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII oI RA
No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement oI a supermajority vote Ior
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2, Article VI oI the 1987 Constitution and
the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement oI a plebiscite apply only in the
creation oI autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section
18, Article X oI the 1987 Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the
ARMM

V. Whether the grant oI the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X oI the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X oI the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X oI the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.


OUR RULING

We resolve to ISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOL the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. $nchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent OIIice oI the Solicitor General (OSG argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support oI this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions oI the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:

Section 1. The Iirst elections oI Members oI the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday oI May, 1987.
The Iirst local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election oI the Members
oI the Congress. It shall include the election oI all Members oI the city
or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members oI the House oI Representatives and
the local oIIicials Iirst elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
OI the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the Iirst twelve obtaining
the highest number oI votes shall serve Ior six year and the remaining
twelve Ior three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term oI the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchroni:ation of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The Iirst regular elections Ior President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday oI May, 1992.

e agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned Irom the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII oI the
Constitution,
|10|
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms oI the incumbent oIIicials, sought to
attain synchronization oI elections.
|11|


The objective behind setting a common termination date Ior all elective
oIIicials, done among others through the shortening the terms oI the twelve
winning senators with the least number oI votes, is to synchronize the holding oI
all Iuture elections whether national or local to once every three years.
|12|
This
intention Iinds Iull support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.
|13|

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions oI the
Transitory Provisions oI the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators oI the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday oI May, 1992 and Ior all the Iollowing elections.

This Court was not leIt behind in recognizing the synchronization oI the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission
on Elections,
|14|
we explained:

It is clear Irom the aIorequoted provisions oI the 1987
Constitution that the terms oI oIIice oI Senators, Members oI the House
oI Representatives, the local oIIicials, the President and the Vice-
President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year
noon oI June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident Irom the wording oI the above-mentioned
Sections that the term oI synchroni:ation is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their OIIice Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize Iuture elections to once every
three years (Bernas, the Constitution oI the Republic oI the Philippines,
Vol. II, p. 605.
That the election Ior Senators, Members oI the House oI
Representatives and the local oIIicials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII will
have to be synchronized with the election Ior President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII is likewise evident Irom the x x
x records oI the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
|Emphasis supplied.|

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a 'local election based on the
wording and structure oI the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
signiIicance thus attached to them prevails.
|15|
As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,
|16|
'|a|s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer`s document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word 'local reIers to something that
primarily serves the needs oI a particular limited district, oIten a community or
minor political subdivision.
|17|
Regional elections in the ARMM Ior the positions
oI governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously Iall
within this classiIication, since they pertain to the elected oIIicials who will serve
within the limited region oI ARMM.

From the perspective oI the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered
one oI the Iorms oI local governments, as evident Irom Article X oI the
Constitution entitled 'Local Government. Autonomous regions are established
and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 oI this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a Iorm oI local
government is also reIlected in Section 1, Article X oI the Constitution, which
provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions oI the Republic oI
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinaIter provided.


Thus, we Iind the contention that the synchronization mandated by the
Constitution does not include the regional elections oI the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall reIer to synchronization in the course oI our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration oI the various issues posed in
this case and must be recalled time and again Ior its complete resolution.


II. %he President's Certification on the Urgenc of RA Ao 1153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity oI RA No.
10153 Ior its alleged Iailure to comply with Section 26(2, Article VI oI the
Constitution
|18|
which provides that beIore bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.
The exception is when the President certiIies to the necessity oI the bill`s
immediate enactment.

The Court, in %olentino v. Secretary of Finance,
|19|
explained the eIIect oI
the President`s certiIication oI necessity in the Iollowing manner:

The presidential certiIication dispensed with the requirement not only oI
printing but also that oI reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certiIies to the necessity oI its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26|2| qualiIies the two stated conditions beIore a bill can become
a law: |i| the bill has passed three readings on separate days and |ii| it has been
printed in its Iinal Iorm and distributed three days beIore it is Iinally approved.

xxx
That upon the certiIication oI a bill by the President, the
requirement oI three readings on separate days and oI printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight oI
legislative practice. For example, the bill deIining the certiorari
jurisdiction oI this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings
in the House oI Representatives on the same day |May 14, 1968| aIter
the bill had been certiIied by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
oI the House oI Representatives to certiIy the necessity oI the immediate
enactment oI a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.
|20|
Following our %olentino ruling, the President`s certiIication exempted
both the House and the Senate Irom having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.

On the Iollow-up contention that no necessity existed Ior the immediate
enactment oI these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had
to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in %olentino:

The suIIiciency oI the Iactual basis oI the suspension oI the writ oI habeas
corpus or declaration oI martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence oI a
national emergency justiIying the delegation oI extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2 is subject to judicial review because basic
rights oI individuals may be oI hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. |Emphasis
supplied.|



The House oI Representatives and the Senate in the exercise oI their
legislative discretion gave Iull recognition to the President`s certiIication and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short oI grave
abuse oI discretion on the part oI the two houses oI Congress can justiIy our
intrusion under our power oI judicial review.
|21|


The petitioners, however, Iailed to provide us with any cause or justiIication
Ior this course oI action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are
not bound by the acceptance oI the President's certiIication by both the House oI
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise oI our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches oI government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay oI the judicial hand.
|22|


In any case, despite the President`s certiIication, the two-Iold purpose that
underlies the requirement Ior three readings on separate days oI every bill must
always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending
bills to intelligently respond to them. SpeciIically, the purpose with respect to
Members oI Congress is: (1 to inIorm the legislators oI the matters they shall vote
on and (2 to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process.
|23|


We Iind, based on the records oI the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents oI the proposed measure had suIIicient opportunities
to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nulliIy RA No. 10153 on the
cited ground.

III. A. RA Ao 9333 and RA Ao 1153 are not amendments to RA Ao 954
The eIIectivity oI RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII oI RA No. 9054
in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions oI the Constitution, this Organic Act
may be reamended or revised by the Congress oI the Philippines upon a vote oI
two-thirds (2/3 oI the Members oI the House oI Representatives and oI the
Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision oI this Organic Act shall become
eIIective only when approved by a majority oI the vote cast in a plebiscite called
Ior the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60 days or later than
ninety (90 days aIter the approval oI such amendment or revision.

e find no merit in this contention.

In the Iirst place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination oI these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides Ior
the schedule oI the first ARMM elections and does not Iix the date oI the regular
elections. A need thereIore existed Ior the Congress to Iix the date oI
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333
and thereaIter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA Ao 9333
and RA Ao 1153 cannot be considered amendments to RA Ao 954 as the
did not change or revise an provision in the latter law; they merely Iilled in a
gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date oI the
subsequent regular elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination oI the
date oI succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion Iinds support in
ARMM`s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the Iirst law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not Iix the
date oI the subsequent elections; it did not even Iix the speciIic date oI the Iirst
ARMM elections,
|24|
leaving the date to be Iixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,
|25|
RA No. 8176,
|26|
RA No. 8746,
|27|
RA No.
8753,
|28|
and RA No. 9012
|29|
were all enacted by Congress to Iix the dates oI the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modiIy any part or provision
oI RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite Ior ratiIication.

The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March
31, 2001, provided that the Iirst elections would be held on the second Monday oI
September 2001. ThereaIter, Congress passed RA No. 9140
|30|
to reset the date oI
the ARMM elections. SigniIicantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite Ior the ratiIication oI the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054, the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. ThereaIter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333,
|31|
which Iurther reset the date oI the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratiIied through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention oI Congress to treat
the laws which Iix the date oI the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct Irom the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII oI RA No. 9054.

III. B. $upermajorit voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA Ao
954 the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in Iact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3 voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII oI RA No. 9054
|32|
has to be struck down Ior giving RA No. 9054 the
character oI an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.

Section 16(2, Article VI oI the Constitution provides that a 'majority oI
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as
majority oI the members oI the House oI Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote oI majority is generally suIIicient to enact laws
or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII oI RA No. 9054 requires a vote oI no
less than two-thirds (2/3 oI the Members oI the House oI Representatives and oI
the Senate, voting separately, in order to eIIectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,
this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires Ior the
passage oI bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers oI Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court`s pronouncement in City of
Davao v. GSIS
|33|
on this subject best explains the basis and reason Ior the
unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles Ior a
legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions oI Iuture legislative body,
considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal Iooting, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce
new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
Iederal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itselI or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modiIy or abolish the acts passed by itselI or its predecessors.
This power oI repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act
was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and beIore it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.
|34|
(Emphasis ours.


Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess oI what the Constitution requires on the passage oI bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it signiIicantly constricts the Iuture legislators`
room Ior action and Ilexibility.
III. C. $ection 3, Article XJII of RA Ao 954 excessivel enlarged the plebiscite
requirement found in $ection 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements oI RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its
Section 3, Article XVII oI that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,
we Iind the enlargement oI the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18,
Article X oI the Constitution to be excessive to point oI absurdity and, hence, a
violation oI the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X oI the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only Ior the creation oI autonomous regions and Ior determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the
settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become eIIective,
|35|
questions on the extent oI
the matters requiring ratiIication may unavoidably arise because oI the seemingly
general terms oI the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result iI a
plebiscite were to be required Ior every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X oI the Constitution plainly states that 'The creation oI
the autonomous region shall be eIIective when approved by the majority oI the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called Ior the purpose. With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions oI, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation oI autonomous regions i.e., those aspects speciIically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide Ior in the Organic Act require
ratiIication through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a the basic structure oI the regional government; (b the region`s
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, Iamily, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c the grant and extent oI the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X oI the
Constitution.
|36|


The date oI the ARMM elections does not Iall under any oI the matters that
the Constitution speciIically mandated Congress to provide Ior in the Organic Act.
ThereIore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date oI elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment oI the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.

IV. %he snchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization oI national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide Ior and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in Iact already
exists RA No. 7166 as the Iorerunner oI the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides Ior the synchronization oI local elections with the national
and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter
Ior local governments (with the exception
oI barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided and is technically a reiteration oI what is already
reIlected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by
express constitutional recognition.
|37|


To achieve synchronization, Congress necessaril has to reconcile the
schedule oI the ARMM`s regular elections (which should have been held in
August 2011 based on RA No. 9333 with the Iixed schedule oI the national and
local elections (Iixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013.

During the oral arguments, the Court identiIied the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1 to allow the
elective oIIicials in the ARMM to remain in oIIice in a hold over capacity,
pursuant to Section 7(1, Article VII oI RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume oIIice;
|38|
(2 to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms oI those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume oIIice; or (3 to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 oI RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume oIIice.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing
to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. asic Underling Premises

To Iully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material
premises must be Iully understood. The first is the extent oI the powers oI
Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate Ior the
synchronization oI elections; and the third is on the concept oI autonomy as
recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant oI legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.
|39|
The legislative body possesses plenary power Ior all purposes oI
civil government.
|40|
Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.
|41|
Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters oI general
concern or common interest.
|42|


The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or
implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions oI the
Declaration oI Principles and State Policies (Article 2 and in the provisions Bill oI
Rights (Article 3. Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
reIerendum clause oI Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions oI
Article X provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are Iound
'in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment oI the particular provision as a part oI organic
law.
|43|


The constitutional provisions on autonomy speciIically, Sections 15 to 21
oI Article X oI the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative
power as they deIine autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
what is otherwise the unlimited power oI Congress to legislate on the governance
oI the autonomous region.

OI particular relevance to the issues oI the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure oI government i.e., that the government
must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both oI which must
be elective and representative oI the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reIlected in Section 17, Article
X, 'all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.`

The totality oI Sections 15 to 21 oI Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
aIIairs oI the autonomous regions. The terms oI these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea oI selI-rule or selI-government, in
particular, the power to legislate on a wide array oI social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.
|44|
In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion oI imperium et imperio
|45|
in the relationship between the national
and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization oI
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other. II their compelling Iorce diIIers at all,
the diIIerence is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and aIIects the
whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a
narrower regional eIIect although its national eIIect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations oI
Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal
situation that Iaced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save
Ior barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections leIt it with the problem oI how
to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the
expiration oI the term oI those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to oIIice
twenty-one (21 months away oI those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was Ior interim measures Ior this period,
consistent with the terms oI the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept oI autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal
landscape. The Constitution`s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures Ior transition Irom the old constitution to the new
|46|
and Ior the
introduction oI new concepts.
|47|
As previously mentioned, the adjustment oI
elective terms and oI elections towards the goal oI synchronization Iirst transpired
under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, Iailed to look Iar
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing
regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us
today.

The creation oI local government units also represents instances when
interim measures are required. In the creation oI Quezon del Sur
|48|
and Dinagat
Islands,
|49|
the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members oI the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive oIIicials were to
serve until a new set oI provincial oIIicials shall have been elected and
qualiIied.
|50|
A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition oI a local
government Irom a sub-province to a province.
|51|


In all these, the need Ior interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-oI-
the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to
the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice
oI measures was a question oI wisdom leIt to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion oI the options available to Congress to
address the problems brought about by the synchronization oI the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding oI the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA Ao 1153
should be measured, ie.,given the constitutional objective of snchronization
that cannot legall be faulted, did Congress gravel abuse its discretion or violate
the Constitution when it addressed through RA Ao 1153 the concomitant
problems that the adjustment of elections necessaril brought with it?

Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the Iirst option holdover Ior those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as
an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X oI the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
oIIicials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
oIIicial shall serve Ior more than three consecutive terms. |emphases ours|


Since elective ARMM oIIicials are local oIIicials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v.
COMELEC.
|52|


It is not competent Ior the legislature to extend the term oI oIIicers by
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualiIied
where the constitution has in eIIect or by clear implication prescribed the term
and when the Constitution Iixes the day on which the oIIicial term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the oIIice beyond that period, even
though the successors Iail to qualiIy within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as Iollows:

'It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by
an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which
is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution.
|Emphasis ours.|

Independently oI the Osmea ruling, the primacy oI the Constitution as the
supreme law oI the land dictates that where the Constitution has itselI made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated
should be respected until the Constitution itselI is changed by amendment or repeal
through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none oI
the three branches oI government can deviate Irom the constitutional mandate
except only as the Constitution itselI may allow.
|53|
II at all, Congress may only
pass legislation Iiling in details to Iully operationalize the constitutional command
or to implement it by legislation iI it is non-selI-executing; this Court, on the other
hand, may only interpret the mandate iI an interpretation is appropriate and called
Ior.
|54|


In the case oI the terms oI local oIIicials, their term has been Iixed clearly
and unequivocally, allowing no room Ior any implementing legislation with respect
to the Iixed term itselI and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation Irom
this Court. Thus, the term oI three years Ior local oIIicials should stay at three (3
years as Iixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

II it will be claimed that the holdover period is eIIectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is Ior Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant Ior the new term. This view like the extension oI the
elective term is constitutionally inIirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would eIIectively extend the
term oI the incumbents. Indeed, iI acts that cannot be legally done directly can be
done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
|55|
Congress cannot also create a
new term and eIIectively appoint the occupant oI the position Ior the new term.
This is eIIectively an act oI appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power oI the President.
|56|
Hence,
holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally inIirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, oI course, is not without examples oI cases where the
question oI holdover was brought beIore, and given the imprimatur oI approval by,
this Court. The present case though diIIers signiIicantly Irom past cases with
contrary rulings, particularly Irom Sambarani v. COMELEC,
|57|
Adap v.
Comelec,
|58|
and Montesclaros v. Comelec,
|59|
where the Court ruled that the
elective oIIicials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases reIer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan oIIicials whose terms oI oIIice are not explicitly provided Ior
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, reIers to local elective
oIIicials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members oI
the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms Iall within the three-year term
limit set by Section 8, Article X oI the Constitution. Because oI their
constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term Ior which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis Ior it (namely Section 7, Article VII oI RA No. 9054 in the
past,
|60|
we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
|61|


Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention oI suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion oI Congress to make in the exercise oI its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon 6uestions oI wisdom, justice or expediency oI
legislation,
|62|
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse oI
discretion results.

C. %he COMELEC has no authorit to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is Ior this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 oI Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP 881.
The power to Iix the date oI elections is essentially legislative in nature, as
evident Irom, and exempliIied by, the Iollowing provisions oI the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election oI the
Senators and the Members oI the House oI Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday oI May. |Emphasis ours|


Section 4(3, Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President
and Vice-President, states:
xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election Ior
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday oI May.
|Emphasis ours|


while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide Ior xxx the qualiIications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and Iunctions and duties oI local officials.| |Emphases ours|

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on
any other date Ior the positions oI President, Vice President, Members oI Congress
and local oIIicials, except when so provided by another Act oI Congress, or upon
orders oI a body or oIIicer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power
or the authority to ascertain or Iill in the details in the execution oI that power.
|63|


Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 Ior
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itselI has made a polic decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

AIter Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call oI the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and eIIectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act oI Congress null and void Ior
being unconstitutional or Ior having been exercised in grave abuse oI
discretion.
|64|
ut our power rests on ver narrow ground and is merel to annul
a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges,
we cannot compel COMELEC to call Ior special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power oI the
COMELEC, in contrast with the power oI Congress to call Ior, and to set the date
oI, elections, is limited to enIorcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct oI an election.
|65|
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call Ior the holding oI special elections unless pursuant to a speciIic statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 oI BP 881, COMELEC with
the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to,
and can only be exercised within, the speciIic terms and circumstances provided
Ior in the law. We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When Ior any serious cause
such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes oI such a nature that the holding oI a Iree, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a veriIied petition by any interested
party, and aIter due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are
aIIorded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days aIter the cessation oI the cause Ior
such postponement or suspension oI the election or Iailure to elect.

Section 6. Failure oI election. - II, on account oI force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended beIore the hour Iixed by law Ior the closing oI the voting, or aIter the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission oI the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereoI, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any oI such cases the Iailure or suspension oI election would aIIect the result oI
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis oI a veriIied petition by any
interested party and aIter due notice and hearing, call Ior the holding or
continuation oI the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a Iailure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date oI the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a Iailure to elect but not later than thirty days aIter the cessation
oI the cause oI such postponement or suspension oI the election or Iailure to elect.
|Emphasis ours|


A close reading oI Section 5 oI BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address
instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have to
be postponed because oI (a violence, (b terrorism, (c loss or destruction oI
election paraphernalia or records, (d force mafeure, and (e other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle
oI efusdem generis, the term 'analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding oI the scheduled
elections. These 'analogous causes are Iurther deIined by the phrase 'of such
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible.

Similarly, Section 6 oI BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because oI (a force
majeure, (b violence, (c terrorism, (d fraud, or (e other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended beIore the hour Iixed by law Ior the closing oI the
voting, or aIter the voting and during the preparation and the transmission oI the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereoI, such election results in a
failure to elect. As in Section 5 oI BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where
the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
oI unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law
i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization oI national and local elections. By no stretch oI the imagination
can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated
by Section 5 or Section 6 oI BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that
obstruct the holding oI elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope oI a
statute under the guise oI interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.
|66|
Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 oI BP 881
can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel
the COMELEC to hold special elections.

. %he Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials


Even assuming that it is legally permissible Ior the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the
newly elected ARMM oIIicials shall hold oIIice only until the ARMM oIIicials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed oIIice.
In the Iirst place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms oI elective
oIIicials. Based on the Constitution, the power to Iix the term oI oIIice oI elective
oIIicials, which can be exercised only in the case oI barangay oIIicials,
|67|
is
speciIically given to Congress. Even Congress itselI may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms oI twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,
|68|
and extended the terms oI the President and the Vice-President
|69|
in
order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms Iixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.
|70|
More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to Iix the terms oI elective local oIIicials in the ARMM Ior less, or
more, than the constitutionall mandated three ears
|71|
as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X oI the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term oI elective ARMM oIIicials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen - a term of less than two years - if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost oI a violation oI an express provision oI the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure oI those oIIicials to be
elected in the ARMM elections instead oI acting on their term (where the 'term
means the time during which the oIIicer may claim to hold oIIice as oI right and
Iixes the interval aIter which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the 'tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the oIIice.
|72|
As with the Iixing oI the elective term, neither Congress nor
the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure oI elective ARMM oIIicials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion iI
they do so.

E. %he President's Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress` chosen interim measure
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President oI OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 oI this law
as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itselI, however, should
be examined Ior any attendant constitutional inIirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualiIications to the exercise oI this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualiIications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.
|73|
The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII oI the
Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent oI
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads oI the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or oIIicers
oI the armed Iorces Irom the rank oI colonel or naval captain, and other
oIIicers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment oI other oIIicers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads oI departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. |emphasis ours|

This provision classiIies into Iour groups the oIIicers that the President can
appoint. These are:

First, the heads oI the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; oIIicers oI the Armed Forces oI the Philippines, Irom the
rank oI colonel or naval captain; and other oIIicers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other oIIicers oI the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided Ior by law;

%hird, those whom the President ma be authorized b law to appoint; and

Fourth, oIIicers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
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Since the President`s authority to appoint OICs emanates Irom RA No.
10153, it Ialls under the third group oI oIIicials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII oI the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

II at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 oI RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative oIIicials to be
'elective and representative oI the constituent political units. This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment oI OICs constitutionally deIective.

AIter Iully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only iI RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenl read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law oI the ARMM (RA No. 9054 sets outs in terms oI
structure oI governance. What RA No. 10153 in Iact only does is to 'appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Jice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have 6ualified and assumed office.` This power is Iar
diIIerent Irom appointing elective ARMM oIIicials Ior the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to oIIice oI the oIIicials elected in the May 2013 elections.

As we have already established in our discussion oI the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA
No. 9054. RA Ao 1153, in fact, provides onl for snchronization of elections
and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail And this is
how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous Iacial terms.
|75|
Aside from its order for snchronization, it is purel
and simpl an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
snchronization requires

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an
unreasonable move Ior Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on
the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionalit of providing for a
holdover and the unavailabilit of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the
President's power to appoint - for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under $ection 1, Article JII of the Constitution - an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant oI the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adfustment
period for synchroni:ation would be to Ioster a government that is not 'democratic
and republican. For then, the people`s right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to be sstemicall withdrawn to the point oI Iostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would Irontally breach the 'elective and
representative governance requirement oI Section 18, Article X oI the
Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is Iixed and, more importantly,
the terms oI governance both under Section 18, Article X oI the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 will not sstemicall be touched nor aIIected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,
with Iull eIIect in accordance with the Constitution, save only Ior the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization oI elections requires.

Viewed Irom another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt
the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community`s
choice oI leaders, but this will take place under a situation oI necessity and as an
interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used
in the creation oI local government units
|76|
and the adjustments oI sub-provinces
to the status oI provinces.
|77|
These measures, too, are used in light oI the wider
national demand Ior the synchronization oI elections (considered vis-a-vis the
regional interests involved. The adoption oI these measures, in other words, is no
diIIerent Irom the exercise by Congress oI the inherent police power oI the State,
where one oI the essential tests is the reasonableness oI the interim measure taken
in light oI the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the 'representative character oI the chosen leaders need not
necessarily be aIIected by the appointment oI OICs as this requirement is really a
Iunction oI the appointment process; only the 'elective aspect shall be supplanted
by the appointment oI OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 signiIicantly seeks to
address concerns arising Irom the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 oI the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment oI OIC, the Manner
and Procedure oI Appointing OICs, and their QualiIications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its
proper context is a law that is not violative oI the Constitution (speciIically, its
autonomy provisions, and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside oI the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments
that upholding the constitutionality oI RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent oI giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the
country, thus allowing him to replace elective oIIicials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation
oI elections is a matter Ior Congress, not Ior the President, to address. It is a power
that Ialls within the powers oI Congress in the exercise oI its legislative
powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.

II RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was Ior a
very speciIic and limited purpose the synchronization oI elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization oI elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
speciIic, and cannot be transIerred or applied to any other cause Ior the
cancellation oI elections. Any other localized cancellation oI elections and call Ior
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective oIIicials cannot continue to act in
a holdover capacity upon the expiration oI their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma oI a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be Iorgotten
that a period oI 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes Irom the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective oIIicials` terms expired and the time the new ARMM
elective oIIicials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons oI our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many developments, some oI them critical and
adverse, can transpire in the country`s Muslim areas in this span oI time in the way
they transpired in the past.
|78|
Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the
presence oI an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a Iully
Iunctioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment oI OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.

SigniIicantly, the grant to the President oI the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the Iunctions oI the elective members oI the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Men:on v. Petilla, etc., et al.:
|79|


It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code oI 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public oIIices, in case oI any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members oI the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem
ruling in Iavor oI the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and Iinds no approbation under
the law Ior it deprives the constituents oI their right oI representation and
governance in their own local government.

In a republican Iorm oI government, the majority rules through their
chosen Iew, and iI one oI them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management oI
governmental aIIairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people
of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
|80|
(Emphasis ours.

As in Men:on, leaving the positions oI ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members oI the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant Ior 21 months, or
almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery oI basic
services to the people, in the proper management oI the aIIairs oI the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When
viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise oI his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our
judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

B. Autonom in the ARMM

It is Iurther argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to deIeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conIlict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one
over the other.

We Iind this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in
constitutional construction ut magis valeat 6uam pereat: that the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole,
|81|
and one mandate should not be given importance
over the other except where the primacy oI one over the other is clear.
|82|
We reIer
to the Court`s declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,
|83|
thus:

A provision oI the constitution should not be construed in isolation Irom
the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a
manner that may give to all of them full force and effect.|Emphasis supplied.|

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give eIIect to, in
the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit
to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that
must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead oI
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modiIy its
governing Ieatures, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by
the attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy oI the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes Irom the rough
and tumble oI nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us Iar Irom
convinced oI its merits.

As heretoIore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are
granted political autonomy, the Iramers oI the Constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger Iramework oI the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only Ior those speciIic areas reserved
by the Constitution Ior regional autonomous determination. As reIlected during the
constitutional deliberations oI the provisions on autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation Irom the
central government, but rather an eIIicient working relationship between the
autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an eIIective
partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. ThereIore, complete autonomy is not really thought oI as
complete independence.

Mr. Ople. e define it as a measure of self-government within the
larger political framework of the nation.
|84|
|Emphasis supplied.|

This exchange oI course is Iully and expressly reIlected in the above-quoted
Section 17, Article X oI the Constitution, and by the express reservation under
Section 1 oI the same Article that autonomy shall be 'within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.`

Interestingly, the Iramers oI the Constitution initially proposed to remove
Section 17 oI Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light oI the enumeration
oI powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X oI the
Constitution. Upon Iurther reIlection, the Iramers decided to reinstate the provision
in order to 'make it clear, once and Ior all, that these are the limits oI the powers oI
the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised
by the national government|.|
|85|
OI note is the Court`s pronouncement
in Pimentel, Jr. v. on. Aguirre
|86|
which we quote:

Under the Philippine concept oI local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local aIIairs are delegated
to political subdivisions. The purpose oI the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and eIIective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country
to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-
setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. |Emphasis ours.|

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to
deIeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization oI elections is not
just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region Irom having
to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.


Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization oI national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions oI wisdom, justice or
expediency oI legislation.
|87|
As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law
and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.
|88|


Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Court`s power
to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty oI usurping the
exclusive prerogative oI Congress.
|89|
The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack oI authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm oI judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one oI the most basic principles oI a republican and democratic
government the separation oI powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with
grave abuse oI discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse oI discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise oI judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion oI a positive duty or to a virtual reIusal to perIorm a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation oI the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason oI passion and
hostility.
|90|


We Iind that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array oI choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light oI the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, thereIore, cannot be accused
oI any evasion oI a positive duty or oI a reIusal to perIorm its duty. We thus Iind
no reason to accord merit to the petitioners` claims oI grave abuse oI discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only
reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.
|91|
Congress, thus,
has in its Iavor the presumption oI constitutionality oI its acts, and the party
challenging the validity oI a statute has the onerous task oI rebutting this
presumption.
|92|
Any reasonable doubt about the validity oI the law should be
resolved in Iavor oI its constitutionality.
|93|
As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:
|94|


The policy oI the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts oI the political departments are valid in the absence oI a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine oI separation oI powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect Ior the acts oI the other departments. The
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
|95|
|Emphasis ours.|

Given the Iailure oI the petitioners to rebut the presumption oI
constitutionality in Iavor oI RA No. 10153, we must support and conIirm its
validity.
HEREFORE, premises considered, we ISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity oI RA No. 10153 Ior lack oI merit,
and UPHOL the constitutionality oI this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution oI September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORERE.