Journal of Management Studies 34:3 May 1997

0022-2380

'HOW WOULD YOU MEASURE SOMETHING UKE THAT?': QUALITY IN A RETAIL BANK*
DAVTO KNIGHTS DARREN MCCABE Manchester School of Management \

ABSTRACT

In_ this paper we explore a case study of total quality management (TQM) within the financial services sector. We demonstrate that a 'conformance to requiremehls' approach towards TQM is concerned with increasing management's physical and financial control over procedures, documentation, systems and people. Such an approach only partiaUy addresses quality because (a) there can never be a precise 'conformance' and (b) this approach neglects customers and employees. We illustrate that often management do not understand the fiaws/ problematics and underlying philosophy behind TQM. Thus they continue to adopt 'inconsistent' approaches, such as attempting to control costs and employees while espousing the importance of the customer and the need for a trust-based culture. Yet, whether or not they understand the rationale behind TQM and attempt to widen their focus by considering people and customers more directly, we argue that management cannot easily adopt a 'consistent' approach because a preoccupation with controlling costs is bound up with career-based identities and hierarchical power relations. Ultimately we argue that management cannot control 'quality' in any simple top down way, essentially because of the 'indeterminacy' of labour, the 'intangibility' of customer satisfaction, and the complexity of organizational power and identity relations.

INTRODUCTION

Quality initiatives fail not only because of inadequate implementation, but also because management may not understand the implications or appropriateness of the initiatives they adopt. Moreover, labour is rarely the committed robot that the quality gurus assume, nor the shackled subject that quality's critics have identified. Overall these dynamics combined with the internal contradictions which characterize both the employment relationship and quality initiatives renders the outcomes of such strategies contestable and uncertain. One of the quality initiatives that has recently secured a considerable degree of acceptance in financial services is total quality management (TQM). In a survey we have recently completed, it was discovered that more than 90 per cent of banks, building
Address for reprints: David Knights, Manchester School of Management, UMIST, P O Box 88, Manchester M60 l Q D , UK. BlackweU PubUshers Ltd 1997. PubUshed by BlackweU PubUshers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK and 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA.

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societies and insurance companies were at present implementing some form of quality initiative (McCabe et al., 1994a, 1997). Although initially associated with manufacturing where, because of their concrete nature, products are amenable to quality evaluation and measurement, service industries have recently been attracted to the attention that quality gives to customer 'needs'. One company that now subscribes to TQM is Multibank (a pseudonym) and it is here that we carried out extensive cjise study research into the implementation of a TQM progrjimme. A major argument of this paper is that the ideals and objectives of TQM often fail to be realized because of the ways in which it is introduced and implemented. This is hardly a new theme in the literature - many others have argued that quality management programmes fail because they are not implemented properly (Boaden and Dale, 1993; Snape et al., 1993; Wilkinson et al., 1993; Zairi et al., 1993). Similarly, some have noted that the appropriateness of any one form of TQM may vary according to the particular sector in which it is introduced (Reeves and Bednar, 1994) or whether the organization is pursuing other change management initiatives such as 'restructuring' (Grant et al., 1994). While recognizing the plausibility of such accounts, it is our view that the failure of implementation is also a reflection of an essential flaw in the quality programmes themselves. For quality programmes tend to reinforce rather than challenge the mechanistic and hierarchical understanding of organizations subscribed to by a majority of managers (see Kerfoot and Knights, 1995). Thus, a more eflecdve implementation of quality initiatives, as defined by the quality gurus, may generate even more problems in organizations than they solve and, therefore, the unintended outcomes of quality programmes may be a blessing in disguise. This is not to argue that the intentions underlying quality programmes are entirely misguided; however, it is to recognize that TQM is often framed within a conception of organizational life that is too mechanistic for its realization. Moreover, recent commentators (Dean and Bowen, 1994; Grant et al., 1994) fail to explain to our satisfaction how or why this should be the case and how it might be changed. Our case study is concerned to provide some particd empirical support for the view that a more sophisticated understanding of organizations is a necessary prerequisite of successful quality initiatives. On the surface, at least, the TQM doctrine of changing organizational culture in the direction of empowering and trusting employees would appear to offer the alternative to coercive hierarchical control. But not only is this often a rhetoric that is contradicted by other features of TQM (e.g. pricing non-conformance, selection of quality champions, statisticad process control) and by how it is implemented in practice, promoters of TQM often seem oblivious of the highly charged political and career-based hierarchical character of the organizations in which it is to be introduced. In our case study of a major retail bank, an overwhelming concern of their TQM programme was one of constraining costs. When this is combined with the tension of a strictly hierarchical implementation, such quality management programmes may collapse into little more than a sophisticated form of management control. Although the development of employee self-discipline and motivation is a barely concealed objective of quality management progrjimmes (Kerfoot and Knights, 1995; Tuckman, 1995), this collapse into control is not necessarily directly and inten BlackweU PubUshers Ltd 1997

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donally conscious on the part of managers. Rather, it is because control is implicit in everyday management procedures and practices. In the absence of strong counter-tendencies, control then assumes an overwhelming presence and 'chases out' altemadve cultural interventions, such as quality or participative approaches to work and organization. The paper is organized into four main sections. The first section examines critically current conceptions of T Q M , concluding that on the whole they assume that controlling employees is both desirable and unproblematic. It also suggests that some T Q M gurus such as Crosby focus their attendon on quality as a means of eradicating unnecessary costs. This is why he is able to claim that 'quality is free' (Crosby, 1979). In this brief review of the quality literature and its critics, we take issue with commentators at both ends of the political spectrum. In the second section, we present our case study research. First we provide the background contextual material, and the methodological rationale, for the case study. The paper then turns to some 'thick' descriptions of selected aspects of a T Q M initiative in our case study company. We discuss: (1) management's aims and intentions when introducing T Q M and how quality is measured and operadonaJized within the bank's branches; (2) the inability of management to ensure conformance to requirements; (3) the initiative's neglect of the cultural issues; and (4) its neglect of the customer. The third section seeks to locate the findings in a more analytical literature and, in particular, reflects critically on the recent thesis of Grant et al. (1994). A summary and conclusion attempts to puU the arguments of the paper together and to draw out some of the implications of the analysis. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT Before discussing the initiative at Multibank, it is appropriate to provide a broad if brief outline of the features that characterize T Q M and constitute its appeal for several corporations and some classes of manager. For us, T Q M consists of a number of management techniques such as statistical process control (SPC) and quality circles which promise increased control over work processes; but also substantial changes in social relations through the restructuring of work, empowerment, teamwork and delayered hierarchies. Empowerment offers management an opportunity to tap into the previously unchartered terrains of employee creativity, promising to bring these areas of their employees' identity under control. W6 therefore subscribe to a broad-based understanding of T Q M which HiU and Wilkinson (1995) have summarized as having a customer and process orientation, being concerned with continuous improvement. Or as Dean and Bowen (1994) argue, as having three key principles, practices and techniques which include 'continuous improvement', 'team working' and a 'customer focus'.
A Cost Control Focus

Ihe^gurus differed in terms of how they viewed the role of 'cost' in relation to quality programmes. Juran and Crosby were strong advocates of a cost control focus, whUe Deming was critical of the inclusion of financial measures, fearing that they would endanger the spirit of quality programmes. It is important to note that our cridcisms in this paper, although broadly directed at the quality
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gurus, are primarily concerned with the work of P. B. Crosby (1979) since it was his approach that was adopted by our case study company. In contrast to other gurus such as Juran (Juran and Gryna, 1988) who defined quality as 'fitness for use' which importantly meant 'meeting customer needs' (p. 2), or Feigenbaum (1983) who stressed the need to 'meet the expectations of the customers' (p. 7), Crosby tended to neglect the customer and die more cultural issues. This was because he defined quality as 'conformance to requirements' which, although not ruling out attention to customer needs and cultural issues, has a tendency to concentrate on internal procedures of cost control around areas of non-conformance. Thus, in contradistinction to the other gurus, Crosby 'focused on reducing cost through quality improvement' (Dean and Bowen, 1994, p. 394). A conformance to requirements approach, as we shall demonstrate, is problematic when deading widi an 'intangible' (Shostack, 1977) commodity such as financial services, as it tends to exclude human, interpersonal or cultural factors (e.g. courtesy, helpfulness) that are essential to customer judgements but are difficult to quantify (Reeves and Bednar, 1994). Moreover, it 'may cause managers to focus oni internal efficiency while neglecting external effectiveness' (Reeves and Bednar, 1994, p. 435). Thus it tends to exclude customer issues. Quality within this approach is also dependent on the requirements or standards one is conforming to and whether, even when identified, those standards will regularly be met. Given the 'intangible' nature of a service and the 'indeterminacy' of labour, it is questionable whether conformance can routinely be attained. Dale (1992) considers that quality costing provides 'tangible proof of the need for quality improvement', but he emphasized that quality costing is not a 'panacea' or 'an end in itself, nor should reducing 'quality costs . . . be the main reason for starting a process of quality improvement'. Having adopted Crosby as a result of consultancy advice, our case study company could be criticized as making all of these mistakes, as we shall indicate shortly. We would go further than Dale, however, and question not just the difficvdties but the very possibility, not to mention desirability, of measuring quality costs. We are, therefore, highly sceptical of Dale's (1992) claim that 'knowledge of quality-related costs enables business decisions about quality to be made in an objective manner' (p. 96; emphasis added). We not only question this notion of 'objectivity' epistemologically (Knights, 1992), but our research shortly demonstrates empirically its problematic nature with respect to calculations of prices (costs) of non-conformance (PONCs). Although we argue that it is not possible to generate knowledge that is 'objective' regarding costs, nor predictive about the precise outcomes of an innovation such as T Q M , we can examine the design of programmes in relation to observable practices. Our research has identified considerable weaknesses in a T Q M programme that concentrates on 'conformance to requirements', arguing that these, and not just inadequate implementation, account for some of the failures in outcomes. But costs are not the only item of control in quality programmes; a majority also seek to control people.
A Managerial Control Focus: The Gurus

Although the quality gurus such as Deming (1986), Juran (Juran and Gryna, 1988) and Crosby (1979) differed considerably in their prescriptions of TQM (Xu, 1993; Reeves and Bednar, 1994), especially with regard to the people issues
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(Wilkinson, 1994), a pervasive feature within the literature is the assumption that management can control both people and their organizations and, through doing so, improve quality: Quality is an achievable, measurable, profitable entity that can be installed once you have commitment and understanding, and are prepared for hard work ... Requirements must be clearly stated so that they cannot be misunderstood. Measurements are then taken continually to determine conformance to those requirements. The nonconformance detected is the absence of quality. Quality problems become nonconformance problems, and quality becomes definable ... whenever you see the word 'quality', read 'conformance to requirements'. (Crosby, 1979, pp. 615) On the assumption that it is possible to control human behaviour, Deming (1982) argued that organizations should exhibit constancy of purpose; however, as Spencer (1994) points out, he was aware that to achieve this end 'management must give up their sacred cows (e.g. quick profit)'. Deming recognizes that 'variability is inherent to all phenomenon' (Anderson et al., 1994, p. 474), but his 14 points represent 'beliefs regarding how to manage this variability' (p. 474). Although offering a broader approach than Crosby, in common with all the quality gurus, Deming (1986) subscribes to a unitarist conception of organizations. From such a perspective, it is assumed that senior management's concern to reduce waste and/or create a uniformity of output can be achieved unproblematically and without attention to the interests or goals of employees. This simply ignores or denies any confiicts of interest and is, therefore, blind to the possibility that TQM can be 'a source of conflict between competing interest groups and is not necessarily a force for unity' (Hill and Wilkinson, 1995, p. 16). In effect, by assuming value-consensus, the gurus are unable to identify any subtle distinctions between employee compliance, commitment and consent (Sturdy, 1992) nor to understand the political and power-based tensions that pervade most organizations (Knights and Murray, 1994). Similarly, Juran (1991, p. 84) has argued that quality management needs 'a good deal of cultural change', which clearly it does, yet it is assumed that this can be achieved through the active and personal leadership of top management. We question not only the belief that management can readily 'control' their organizations and employees in such a planned and rational way; but also the unitarist assumptions that are either a starting point for gurus (Crosby, 1979) or are perceived as a realizable outcome of a 14-point approach towards management (Deming, 1986).
A Managerial Control Focus: Jhe Critics

Critics of TQM who take a labour process, perspective^have argued that. XQM j? a vehicle_for_inc.r.easing management's control (Delbridge et_al.,...1992; SeweUjind V^Ikinson,1.992a^J)). According to these commentators, such techniques as increased surveillance and monitoring, heightened accountability, peer pressure through teams and customers, and involvement in waste elimination through continuous improvement, leads to a situation which 'pushes back the frontiers of control and intensifies work by eliminating "waste" or "slack" ... Total Quality Control in effect translates into Total Management Control' (Delbridge et al.,
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1992, p. 97). Likewise, according to Sewell and Wilkinson (1992a) such regimes have the 'ability to penetrate to the very core of an individual's work activities, providing a mechanism of power/knowledge which can bring out the minutest distinctions between individuals' (p. 278). From the opposite end of the political spectrum, it may be argued that these authors share the same beUef in the ability of managers to control employees as the quality gurus. Their difference is that, in contrast to the gurus (e.g. Oakland, 1989) who believe that TQM will empower and enrich the work experience of employees, labour process theorists are more inclined to perceive it as just another example of work intensification (Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995). Overall, we have several doubts about the theory of TQM, largely because of its asocial conception of individual employees and its mechanistic assumptions about organizations. But, it is our contention that some of the critics run the risk of following a similar rationale as the gurus in assuming that management can impose their techniques unproblematicaUy on employees/staff. Both sides have a tendency to presume management to be omnipotent, if not omniscient, in their ability to transform rationally planned intentions into realized practical outcomes. Despite the focus of some of these critics on the labour process, they pay scant attention to the power and identity relations that pervade organizations and the possibility that employees may transform, evade or resist strategies and programmes which bear down upon them.'^'^ Though Delbridge et al. (1992) quality their arguments accepting that resistance and conflict will continue, we seek to demonstrate the pervasiveness of such conflict and explore the spaces wherein the interventions of staff may serve to transform the context as well as the impact of a quality programme. While the intangible nature of services renders management control perhaps more diflicult than in manufacturing, we believe that labour process critics have a tendency to overstate the control implications of quality progreimmes (see Knights and McCabe, 1994; McCabe and Knights, 1995; McCabe, 1996; McCabe et al., 1994b). In the case study to follow, we illustrate how hierarchical power relations, control-based structures, and the remorseless drive for profits that pervade capitalist organizations, serve as perennial obstacles to improved quality. Increased profits and improved quaKty are not necessarily mutually exclusive as Heery (1993) has indicated; however, organizations tend to behave in such a way as to reinforce their incompatibility. Cost controls in contemporary organizations have the effect of displacing or undermining customer or staff-oriented concerns. This is because they operate edong polar opposite dimensions; the cost-conscious organization finds it difficult to trust its staff sufliciently to distribute the authority that would support their imaginative and creative skills which would improve customer service. Paradoxiccilly, however, the cost-conscious organizational style is never as effective as anticipated despite the claims of some management gurus and the fears of some labour process commentators. But an overall emphasis on control and costs often undermine the very quality that management endeavours to promote.
THE CASE STUDY

Before detailing the specific activities deployed in carrying out this case study, we provide a rationale for the choice of method. In social and management
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research, it is appropriate to use a multiplicity of methods so as to avoid too heavy a reliance on any single approach (Denzin, 1978). The case study is a vehicle through which this is readily achieved. However, our use of various methods is not designed to produce an exhaustive representative account of the site (see Knights, 1992, 1995). It is simply a means of exploring more deeply certain theoretical insights concerning organizational life and managerial interventions. As we have stated elsewhere (Knights and Willmott, 1993, p. 16), we do not claim statistical generalizability for the findings, since rarely are two situations sufliciently similar to enable this. Rather, we identify insights that may help to understand what has been extensively described as the failure or poor performance of quality management programmes (HUl and Wilkinson, 1995; IRS Employment Trends, 1992; Kearney, 1992; Tilston, 1989; Zairi et al., 1993). The research has involved non-participant observation through attending a number of quality meetings and interviewing a range of personnel to gain an insight into how TQM works in practice. The findings below report on insights gained from primarily branch and cluster level meetings and interviews. We explored TQM within Multibank initially through a number of research visits conducted during 1993 at both regional and head offices. This entailed a number of semi-structured interviews with senior management that helped to establish the extent and nature of T^^M. These visits yielded access to documentation such as company reports, TQM management guides, and newsletters which provided us with considerable further insights. During March and April 1994 visits were made to the St Helens and Wigan branches which are both cluster level branches (see below). Multibank is a major retail bank operating with branches throughout the UK.
TQM's Intentions and Operation

TQ_M was introduced during 1990/91 with the intention of improving customer service: 'We shall provide defect free products and services to our internal and external customers which meet their agreed needs' (Multibank's quality policy). Moreover, management sought to achieve a culture change. According to a corporate quality document TQM aims to change 'the way we all think and work ... it involves a change in attitude and culture'. At the branch level, TQM is the responsibility of a quality sponsor, who ensures that any problems which are generated/identified by the branch staff are discussed. Any problem can be raised by staff in quaility meetings providing that it is 'an incident or circumstance which prevents you from doing your job properly'. A 'price of non conformance' (PONC) is calculated for each problem. Every month the branch quality sponsor in conjunction with the rest of the branch nominates which problems or snags should go forward to the monthly cluster meeting of quality sponsors (a cluster is made up of approximately ten branches). The next level within the TQM structure is the area champions meeting, which nominates which snags should go on to be considered at regional level. One example of the type of problems staff are able to identify concerns the use of counter pens which go missing or do not work. A PONC was calculated for this by studying how many pens went missing and had to be replaced over a month. It was calculated that solving this problem would lead to a saving of one
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million pounds across the branch network. In terms of this 'rough' measure, and according to how 'quality' is specificjilly defined in Multibank, considerable savings may be achieved through TQM. Through the process of measuring the cost of administrative or procedural weaknesses, staff are clearly engaged in a form of self-discipline and control not dissimilar from the kind of work-study conducted in manufacturing. In this sense TQM has a direct bearing on the work processes and employees but not necessarily in exactly the way that the literature anticipates or prescribes.
Management's Inability to Secure Confomumce

In this section we explore two examples of the limits to which management can achieve conformance to an ideal set of standards by controlling employees. It is indicated how, despite its rhetoric, TQM often has little to do with satisfying employee requirements. Although the ethos of quality is voluntarism and employee involvement, management coercion and control are barely concealed beneath the surface. Thus the iron fist of control can be seen behind the velvet glove of employee involvement and customer service at the St Helens cluster meeting of quality sponsors during April 1994. Discussion at this meeting was unusually candid, perhaps because no member of senior management was free to attend. This was in sharp contrast to a similar meeting, where the presence of senior management seemed to constr2iin staff from revealing some of the subjugated knowledges they deployed in subverting the power exercised over them. A discussion at the April meeting on the quality and quantity of snags raised demonstrated the pervasiveness of management's attempts to secure control and their inability to do so. One sponsor commented: 'Sometimes you'll have a couple [of snags] and sometimes you'll only have one, won't you?' A second remarked: 'Well that time we did the minutes, we were threatened, weren't we?' A third sponsor concurred: 'We were threatened, yes that's quite correct.' This comment was followed by some laughter. The branch management's representative, who was attending his first meeting, asked the sponsors how they felt about 'having' to bring in snags, and a fourth sponsor replied: 'Well when they say, you know, that you've got to bring one, well, you know, or else - well that's a bit stupid, isn't it, heca.\isc you just make one up don't you? [laughter] It's not really a problem to you just for the sake of bringing one in' (our emphasis). Managing, like all forms of social control, is more problematic than is often imagined, because of the numerous ways in which staff can undermine controls through resistance (see Jermier et al., 1994). It is not always possible for management to eradicate problems despite the use of elaborate quality procedures, as the difficulties of management control are not unrelated to the problem of knowing, let alone controlling, what is in their employees' minds. A second example of management's inability to control employees and the autonomy of staff was apparent when the St Helens branch calculated the cost savings of its 'snag of the month' on the basis of a busy branch as opposed to the branch where the snag was actually raised. The snag itself concerned staff querying customer accounts because of the inadequate information contained in the computerized account system. A PONC of ^(^ 1,978,618 was presented, and while there was no doubt that the problem was a common one, the way in which the PONC was calculated hardly seems 'precise' (Crosby, 1979) or
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'objective' (Dale, 1992): 'We've based it on one per cashier per day, so that's like ... well, we think it's acceptable [laughter] ... I mean, we get like one every six months, but you know, like in Brown Street [they get more].' Here we can see staff manipulating figures to secure their own career-based interests, which in this case meant winning the snag of the month prize. Staff are required to 'cost' their snags accurately; however, this example gives some indication of their ability to manoeuvre and manipulate events to their own advantage.
The Neglect of Culture

It was discussed earlier that a procedural-based approach towards quality is ill suited to addressing the 'people' or more cultural issues. Moreover, it seems that to some extent the intention behind a conformance to requirements approach, irrespective of management's stated intentions to the contrary, is to exclude such issues. An example of this relates to the divide within the branches between sales and service staff.'^^^ The branch manager at the Wigan branch attributed this divide to company policy including issues such as salary structures, reward and recruitment policies. The deputy quality sponsor at the St Helens branch, reflecting on the day's in-branch quality meeting held on 24 March 1994, remarked: 'I think there is definitely a split between sales and service and they [the company] are trying to close that ... they don't want a divide, but everyone you ask will tell you there definitely is a divide ... with regards to team work in the branch ... So it's not something we could raise a PONC on this issue.' Given that the whole hierarchical structure of TQM is aimed at calculating PONCs, there is less to motivate individuals to address problems such as 'a lack of team spirit' (i.e. intangibles) than, for instance, a systems fault. Moreover, given the hierarchical emphasis on cost saving, it seems that even if problems were raised on these issues (which they rarely are), they would not travel very far up the hierarchy. Neither a PONC nor a snag was raised on the sales-service divide. Yet it is clearly not a local issue and has wider relevance for the company. Another example of the neglect of culture is in the 'TQM manager's guide' document, where it states that TQM is not 'a way of raising a grievance or for personnel issues'. Such 'personnel' issues could involve staffing or remuneration, that may pose an obstacle to staff performing their 'job properly', which raising snags purports to address. Of particular interest is the contradiction between a 'human' solving process being utilized to address work problems and the exclusion of 'human' resource issues from the problem-solving agenda. What is significant in this approach to quality is that while it fails to encompass the human and social problems in collective and co-operative labour, it does have the effect of projecting the company's problems on to employees. When successful, this resiilts in the transformation of individuals into subjects who 'feel' responsible for procedures that go wrong and, thereby, seek to put them right. This is the cascading impact of pushing responsibility down the hierarchy so characteristic of strategic forms of management (Knights and Morgan, 1991) of which TQM is just one small part. None the less, staffing problems are disassociated from and are removed from the quality agenda. Its concern is with controlling and realigning the way that staff think, as can be seen from the following statement in the 'TQM: a user guide' document: 'Quality improvement
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will depend upon everyone identifying where non conformances do exist.' This indicates how management seeks to redefine its problems so as to locate their identification and resolution clearly as the responsibility of employees, and thereby induce self-discipline among them. None the less, as the above examples of non-conformance demonstrate, management are unable to entirely secure this end.
The Neglect of the Customer

TQM does not appear to be well suited to addressing, nor is it focusing directly upon, the customer's needs. This is not to deny, of course, that indirectly an improved system/procedure may have the knock-on effect of improving efficiency and therefore the service delivered. There does seem to be a problem, however, in that the PONC process does not, and cannot, measure customer satisfaction. The number of complaints can be measured, the time spent dealing with these complaints assessed, and a solution can be presented, yet it does not shed any light on whether the customer is any more satisfied. The benefits of service are not only difficult to quantify, they are also invariably longer term. Even if one can measure customer satisfaction via questionnaires or reductions in complaints, it is still difficult to put a precise price on the potential saving of corrective action. Because customer service is generally intangible with respect to potentially quantifiable savings, snags that are customer-focused tend to be devalued by senior management at the area level, where they have to be sanctioned in order to be acted upon. As one manager put it, the area is primarily concerned with 'saving money', which is reflected in the size of the PONC. The problem in calculating a PONC when customer service is involved can be seen in the following case. The Ormskirk quality sponsor at the St Helens cluster meeting suggested a snag that concerned recording on interest rate sheets, which are supplied to the branches, the date that an interest rate will actually be capitalized. It was thought that supplying this date to staff would facilitate easy reference, so that customer requests can be dealt with quickly. Moreover, it was also recommended that the date of the change in interest rate should be recorded on the interest rate board for the customers. The sponsor explained: 'It was just a couple of weeks ago with the interest rate going up from the first of April ... we had a lot of people enquiring ... our cashiers were coming up to me and saying when does the interest rate go up on this. I just thought it would be useful to have it, say, on the interest rate sheet.' The St Helens' sponsor commented: 'I think it would be good for the customer ... they always ask don't they?' Providing us with a perfect tide for this paper, the branch management representative asked:
'How would you measure something like that? I always have a problem in deciding how

to measure it ... there might not be a major PONC on this, but from a service point of view, and an ease of reference point of view, it's a good idea' (our emphasis). It is clear that whenever there is difficulty in providing a financial measure of a snag, the tendency is for it to be marginalized or even ignored. Given that once you get beyond the avoidance of errors in administering customer accounts that ordinarily are corrected through specialist information systems developments, improvements in custonier service are not amenable to calculating a PONC.
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Consequently, this approach to quality has a very limited impact on improving customer service. It could even be argued that the quality programme diverts staff from using their tacit skills in handling customer problems since it focuses their attention on seeking cost savings on administrative matters at one or more stages removed from the customer. As long as management at area or regional level select and progress snags principally on the basis of the size of the PONC or how much it is claimed the company will save, we see only marginal customer service improvements arising from the bank's TQM programme.

DISCUSSION

In this case study we have indicated that management may not always understand the implications or appropriateness of the quality initiatives they adopt. Thus a 'conformance to requirements' approach was adopted at Multibank and it is not just this research that has found it inappropriate to an intangible service (see edso Reeves and Bednar, 1994). Given that the strategic intentions of the company were to improve customer service and to render the organization's culture more consistent with that aim, it would appear that management was unaware of the fiaws in the TQM initiative adopted. A 'conformance to requirements' approach is ill-suited to either of these ends even within manufacturing, precisely because of its neglect of 'culture' and 'customers'. This neglect was very much apparent in the construction of prices of non-conformance, or PONCs, that almost always concerned administrative procedures and rarely, if ever, service or cultural issues. Largely this was because their intangible nature made it difficult to calculate a sizeable PONC. However, calculating sizeable PONCs quickly became the norm, since it enabled the promoters and supporters of TQM to justify the original investment in its introduction. The gurus seem unaware of the political nature of organizations, and neglect that there is rarely a consensus for any particular innovation. Thus, the support of senior executives cannot be guaranteed in the absence of measurable results. No matter how disruptive of customer service improvements, calculating PONCs provides quantitative results and therefore seems a sensible strategy for those whose career has become identified with TQM. Yet it is not until after the event, that they may begin to understand that this approach will fail to deliver on customer service. A rudimentary element of TQM at Multibank is to encourage staff to generate snags. This necessitates a culture change by encouraging workers voluntarily to look for, and suggest ways of addressing, problems they confront in carrying out their tasks. A number of managers commented on the difficulties in achieving this culture change. Part of the problem is that staff often overcome difficulties in their job through using tacit skills (Manwaring and Wood, 1985) that they themselves may be the last to recognize. Consequently, many of the most serious problems at work have been handled through informal means and are therefore no longer recognizable or identified as such. Often, then, only the more trivial problems or those that nobody bothered to use their tacit skills to resolve are raised through the quality process. This could also help us understand how almost all the snags raised involve administrative procedures rather than cultural issues. Management's focus on 'cost' saving also marginalizes consideration of the
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customer, as illustrated by the example on interest rates. Although one might expect TQM's 'focus on external customers to enhance the infiuence of... areas which deal direcdy with customers' (Hill and Wilkinson, 1995, p. 17), our case study confirms that the outcome of this remains uncertain. Eventually the problem of customer service in Multibank was recognized by senior management following compounded evidence from the bank's own customer complaints records and satisfaction surveys, falling retention rates, independent surveys and ombudsman complaints. The bank then set up a customer service campaign independent of the quality programme, designed to have an immediate impact in improving customer satisfaction ratings and retention rates. This campaign, along with a business process re-engineering scheme, has had the effect of eclipsing the TQM programme, further disillusioning management and staff who had been captured by its prescriptions and philosophy. Given our conclusions about the price or cost of non-conformance models of TQM precluding the more intangible cultural and customer-based issues, this may have been a wise shift in strategy. However, by switching from one panacea to another in quick succession, it is not clear that management learns from its mistakes. Rather than recognizing the extent to which its own strategies/policies contribute to the failure of a given innovation, management is inclined to scapegoat the programme and/or those most closely associated with it. One other unintended consequence of such shifts in strategy is that staff begin to question or comply only with cynicism, rather than collaborate and commit themselves fully to any new future managerial fad. Grant et al. (1994, p. 30) have argued diat TQM initiatives frequendy fail because management adopt inconsistent approaches towards their introduction, seeking merely to superimpose them on a traditional economic model of organization that is mechanistic in its allegiance to profit maximization, cost efficiency, economic rational self-interest and contract relations. TQM, they argue, fundamentally conflicts with this model in that it seeks to satisfy a plurality of interests (e.g. shareholders, managers, employees) but only indirectly through first and foremost responding to customers and their expectations. Our case study seems to provide empirical support for this thesis in so far as the concentration on costs and management control dominated the TQM programme and seemed to be a major reason for its demise. However, we are sceptical of Grant et al.'s analysis on a number of grounds. While we have no problem in agreeing that the economic model of the firm and TQM are incompatible. Grant et al.'s representation of these models ignores the broader structure of social and economic relations in which organizations are embedded. This restilts in a somewhat naive optimism regarding the potential for TQM to 'drive out' organizational behaviour that refiects the economic model, or to question the assumptions upon which it is grounded. It has to be remembered that the structure of power, privilege, identity, and inequality is based on the economic model and it would take more than a few well-meaning gurus \sic\ or academics with promises of future long-term benefits to overthrow such a system, especially when it is precisely those exercising the power to do so whose advantages may well be eroded or threatened by such a radical change. Paradoxically, while Grant et al. f2iil to take account of the broader system of capitalism, they draw a more internally coherent picture of firm behaviour and
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of TQM theory than is warranted. Most in-depth empirical research of organizations (Brown, 1993e; Clegg, 1990; Collinson, 1992; Mintzberg, 1994) reveals them to be much less profit-oriented, in control and economically rational than the economic model suggests. The economic model simply leaves out of account a whole range of behaviours that are not purely economic but may be perfectiy rational from the actor's point of view. Similarly, the model of TQM drawn up by Grant et al. is a compositive of the 'best' features of a diverse range of gurus but lacks the coherent theoretical rationale and mechanism of the economic model. Consequentiy, when organizations turn to TQM there is not the clearcut guide to organizational practice provided by the economic model nor, if there were, would it readily be quantified as in the profit and loss account of a company's balance sheet. Indeed, there are conflicting guides, and some such as Crosby - the one chosen by our case study company - may not directiy or strongly challenge the economic model so much as reinforce it. Moreover, whether TQM does or does not challenge this model, in practice what will count is how it is interpreted by those responsible for its implementation and, in the absence of effective pressures to do otherwise, they will incorporate its messages into their existing ways of thinking which are most likely to be informed by individual self-interest and economic rationality. In sum, although identifying a major inconsistency of seeking to implement TQM when the economic paradigm remjiins dominant. Grant et al.'s analysis of organizations and their broader socio-economic context is insufficiendy developed to elaborate the problems, let alone provide solutions to the failure of quality programmes.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to examine two central aspects of the theory and practice of TQM that may readily be summarized as a preoccupation with costs and control. Although we have detected an assumption about the possibility of controlling employees typically to underlie most of the guru literature, our case study company adopted Crosby, whose approach is more cost-oriented than others. In conducting a detailed case study, we have found that the costing or pricing of non-conformance (PONC) which is central to Crosby's approach, conflicted with both the strategy of the company and with the ethos surrounding TQM to improve customer service. A concentration on quantifying cost savings through PONCs resulted in customer service and other less readily quantifiable issues such as changing the culture being marginalized. Perhaps of more general interest because it is widespread across the guru literature is the issue of management control. Despite intimations of an alternative in Grant et al. (1994), we would argue that a majority of the gums reflect conventional assumptions about employee control in their prescriptions. Equally, labour process critics attribute too much coherence, control and rationality to management. Having said that, we are conscious that TQM, along with other managerial innovations, can represent a more sophisticated form of control in so far as it may be seen not merely as entering the body, but also the soul of the labourer (Rose, 1990). It does this by so-called processes of empowerment,'^ which can have the effect of employees identifying with the problems handed
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down to them by management even to the point of forgetting that the rewards from solving such problems continue to be reaped disproportionately by those who own the company or act as their agents (Kerfoot and Knights, 1995). What we have found in our case study, however, is that even when this intemalization of managerial problems by staff has been partly accomplished, a lack of management understanding and/or hierarchical self-interests readily results in the productive potential of their employees' co-operation, commitment and trust being undermined. So, for example, the failure to provide feedback to staiff of the ultimate progress of their specific suggestions, the pressure on staff to increase productivity and reduce costs, and the cavalier way in which managerial support for TQM would be abandoned as quickly as it was initially adopted all tended to leave staff bewildered and more careful about committing themselves body and soul to any future panacea. Where TQM meets with an initial enthusiasm and commitment, as it did for many in Multibank, it can be seen as involving an intensification of management control, since it does result in staff locating and identifying with problems that previously were often seen as management's responsibility. But our research revealed several instances of staff resistance. Control over staff can never be 'total', precisely because it is the freedom and discretion of employees that makes them ultimately irreplaceable by technology. However sophisticated, the computer can never emulate the flexibility of the human encounter and it is this 'embodied labour' (Hochschild, 1983; Kerfoot and Knights, 1995) upon which customer sendee is so dependent. But management would prefer that this freedom and embodiment were directed toward productive rather than unproductive or disruptive ends within the organization. At its most sophisticated, TQM promises such an outcome but, as we have seen, either by design, drift or disaster, its effect frequently leaves staff litde choice but to find spaces in which they can undermine management's objectives. So, for example, they may invent non-existent PONCs merely to avoid management's wrath, and therefore disrupt management's goal of securing a conformance to requirements. The presumed size, of PONCs in Multibank very quickly became steeped in the politics of career and, even if they had ever been plausible calculations in the past, they were no longer. Though this is not the place to enter into a debate about the myth of 'objective' representations (Knights, 1995), it is important to recognize how attaching a mathematical quantity is invariably deployed as a means of exercising power through the authority of 'knowledge' or 'expertise'. Consequently, once described as objective the attachment of a cost or price of non-conformance on to an activity is no longer open to dispute or discourse. No matter how arbitrary or contestable the process of calculating such a cost, its abstract and quantified nature facilitates an illusion of objectivity that is politically effective. Preoccupied with cutting costs, other aspects of quality such as customer service, culture change or empowerment may be displaced by the more tangible and quantifiable objectives of attempting to evaluate the price of non-conformance (PONC). Here we can see something of the dynamics of the employment relationship of which control, power relations and identity are an integral part that management cannot simply shake off by 'relinquishing power', as Grant et al. (1994) suggest. "^ ^^ In conclusion, we would argue that for TQM to address quality more fuUy,
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greater consideration must be attached to both customers and staff, since an approach which is concerned with cost cutting and procedures is unlikely to address these issues. Yet whether or not management attempts to widen its focus and consider more direcdy people and customers, the above case study demonstrates that management cannot control 'quality' in any simple top down way. This is essentially because of the central indeterminacy of labour, the intangibility of customer satisfaction, and the power and identity relations which characterize the employment relationship. We have argued that quadity gurus such as Crosby (1979) take an overly rationalistic view of management and organizations, and assume that outcomes will match management's planned intentions. Such gurus ignore organizational politics, conflicts and power relations. By viewing organizations and the employment relationship in unitarist terms, united under a quality banner, and management as rational and omnipotent, the gurus are unduly optimistic that their prescriptions will be realized. Sinular assumptions are also made by those for whom quality can be 'objectively' measured (Dale, 1992). Such assumptions divorce quality initiatives from the social context within which they exist; and cost savings are invariably constructed Uke 'facts' within a social environment. Moreover, we have illustrated that management rarely understands the appropriateness/fiaws and inconsistencies in the TQM programmes they adopt. Critics of TQM, such as Delbridge et al. (1992) and Sewell and Wilkinson (1992a, b), while making a more realistic assessment of quality initiatives by considering organizational power relations and the tensions that these generate, risk in their criticisms of quality sharing the same assumptions as the gurus. Thus their analysis focuses on the capacity of management to devise structures and strategies of control over employees, and risks confiating management's intentions with the outcomes of their strategies. For us, such an approach tends to overstate management's 'conscious' preoccupation with labour, and it neglects the highly political and uncertain nature of management's strategies, which often lead to unintended consequences. It places labour in a highly reactive powerless light, where staff/workers are simply pawns of management. Our approach, then, has been to avoid the fiaws in such an analysis. We have explored the 'emergent' effects of a TQM initiative in the social context within which it occurred. Much more research of this kind is needed so as to consider how TQM is constituted by organizational power relations, and how it in turn constitutes those same power relations. Doing so also avoids the limitations of many approaches within the quality literature that assume a managerial ability to transform organizations independently of the social context within which power and identity relations are created, sustained and changed.

NOTES *We acknowledge the funding of the ESRC, and thank the anonymous JMS reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. [1] In the case of Sewell and Wilkinson, this is strange given their apparent adoption of Foucault in their analysis since he, like Weher, always drew attention to the unintended consequences of action and how power invariably stimulates resistance BlackweU PubUshers Ltd 1997

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(Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994). See also note 4 for the way in which we perceive power in contrast to the commonsense interpretation of it as a property of people rather than relations. [2] This has a long history and has caused the hank to restructure on many occasions. It originated around the very different cultures of sales staff and professional bankers, hut despite that aspect having been almost eliminated the conflict now occurs in relation to the greater remuneration of sales staff. [3] We are aware that empowerment may be a misnomer in the sense that it is often only 'task' as opposed to 'power' based sharing; the latter being ignored (Dawson and Webb, 1989; McArdle et al., 1995; Wilkinson et al., 1991, 1992). [4] In speaking about 'relinquishing power', we suspect that Grant et al. (1994) subscribe to a concept of power as a property of individuals or groups from which we diverge. In our view, power is not something that can be possessed, but merely exercised on the basis that those whom it is exercised over acknowledge, and are affected by, its exercise. In short, power is exercised by all parties to a relation, albeit not to the same degree. The point is that the exercise of power can never determine its effect since it is dependent on the exercise of power by those over whom it is exercised.

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