HOPE FOR THE HOPELESS

Africa was described as The Hopeless Continent by The Economist in 2000. Is Africa still a hopeless continent? Critically discuss the important political, economic and social progress Africa has made that has largely proven this assessment incorrect.

An Essay by Moritz Hessler. 26 August 2010.

THE HOPELESS CONTINENT?

When, in 2000, the Economist titled Africa as the Hopeless Continent1 , the attitude of the donors towards almost the entire continent began to change. Shortly after the disappearance of the ideological competition in the framework of the Cold War the Western winners began to review more diligently where their money was going to. Since the alternative ideological competitor, and therewith an alternative haven for countries dropped by the West for whatever reason, had vanished there was no reason for Western donors to further spend money like water in order to expand their capitalistic spheres of influence in the face of communism2 . Soon, they savvied, that much aid only went into the pockets of corrupt leaders, patronage systems, and finally, often back into Western corporations. Additionally, the most developed countries found themselves during the 1990s increasingly opposed with new trouble spots. The Near and the Middle East, and the Balkans draw most of their attention since, as it was argued, they threatened the global security and stability and were considered as humanitarian missions. Slowly but surely the African trouble spots had been pushed aside on the agendas of G7, UN, and other main institutions. Disappointed by many failed projects in most Sub-Saharan African countries the leading Western economists and politicians began to treat Africa as not capable to become developed. They dropped African projects like any other project, before it becomes too costly, and turned towards assumedly more exiting playgrounds in Asia, the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and foremost Latin America, which appealed their ego and strategic interests3 . One after another Sub-Saharan state has been dropped by donors and development organizations during the 1990s and seemed to disappear from the visual gaze of global coverage. The only reports left referred to poverty and disease, rebels who terrorize, brutality, rape, cannibalism, failure and despair4 . They referred to an African entity, which is, in reality, not existent. This

1 2

cf. (Anonymous, 2002, p. 17) cf. (Taylor & Williams, Africa in international politics: external involvement on the continent , 2004, pp. 6-8) 3 cf. (Bates, 2006) 4 cf. (Anonymous, 2002, p. 17)

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Africa, they talked about, did in their perspective not need to be examined in distinct regions, because you would find everywhere the same issues. On the other side African intellectuals retorted this image. They affirmed Africa is far from being a Hopeless Continent. A 2007 New York Times article by the South African businessman Nicky Oppenheimer summarized quite accurate the counter-arguments5 raised by many Africanists and Africans. He argues that despite quite depressing figures of electrification, HIV infection and productivity, a five-fold perspective demonstrates more than hope, it shows tangible progress. First, he refers to two momentous governance shifts6 over the past 15 years towards democracy and liberal economic reform. Even though those shifts are far not finished yet and thus the governances are far from perfect, he thinks, the societal dynamics are changing against political complacency and despotism. As second reason for progress he claims the emergence of the BRIC, but especially China and India on the African continent as crucial support for economic change. The Chinese would invest a multiple of what for example the World Bank would bring to Africa in financial terms. But, he confines, China is for African countries also a competitor in many potential industries for economic development. Due to the overpowering predominance e.g. of the Chinese manufacturing sector, aspiring African countries would have to find new industrial niches in the world market. The third and the fourth point he mentions should be, if you bear the Asian crisis of the late 1990s in mind, placed on first positions: the Pan-African trade and collaboration in networks as well as the Pan-African peacekeeping mechanisms. Considering the strong position which the South-East Asian countries developed latest after their financial crisis in the 1990s out of just this regional cooperation one could even identify the formation of the African Union as one of the most decisive points in the recent African history. Last and as fifth reason for steady progress in Africa Oppenheimer lists the catch-up of Africa on globalization. He explains this statement foremost with the increased flows of foreign investment to Africa, which doubled from 2006 to $19 billion in 2007. Striking is the fact that even he, as an African, does not distinct between economically prosperous countries like South Africa, with an high percentage amount of FDI on the African continent, and other, from the global market more excluded regions. The sum of recent improvements on the African continent is, in his opinion, not a result of successful aid, as many Western economists and politicians would claim, but rather constructed by mainly these five explanations. Still, that explanations may sound reasonable in South African or Ugandan business talks, but causes major dissatisfaction in other areas of the African continent. Oppenheimer, like many others dealing with African development, adopts the neocolonial perspective of neglecting diversities and differentiations when talking about Africa. Influence of The Global Opinion Until today you can find the neocolonial heritage of diverse kind in politics, economics, societal dynamics and cultural development. The most obvious attribute are the induced borderlines all over the continent which strongly affect the development of partially radical identities7 , and

5 6

cf. (Oppenheimer, 2007) (Oppenheimer, 2007) 7 cf. (Maalouf, 2000)

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finally result in ethnic conflicts as late effect of the divide and rule politics8 . Beyond this very tangible, long-term impact of colonial times there is another, much subtler, but also much more pervading aspect, which is not less salient: the organization of power structures and the perpetuated strong dependencies to former colonizers. Best example is Oppenheimer, who, as an African, fully adopts Western rhetoric in his basic arguments. With the increasing lack of interest of the African continent in global coverage towards the end of the 1990s the general image worsened. Due to the fact that the only reports sent about Africa showed chaos, conflicts, famine, and desperate people with lack of prospect, the Economist article of 2000 met broad approval throughout the Western world. This again resulted in a further increasing lack of interest, since this continent was hopeless anyway. As Hirst and Thompson already argued in 1995, "the problem for poorer countries is not imperial domination or attempts to annex their resources, it is neglect and exclusion."9 . Even 15 years later this need for external approbation often seems to be very prevalent. If you then look into the panels who are dealing with the development issues in Africa and you realize, there are hardly any Africans participating, you should ask: why is it supposed that Africans can contribute so little in their own cause?10 why do even the Africans adopt this assessment and accept their marginalization? Many academics answer this question with financial, political, ideological and cultural dependencies stemming out of colonial times. I would say they are not wrong. But its just one perspective of a very complex topic. Of course there is a deep dependency of Africa derived from this time and the indoctrination of African elites at Western institutions lasted long time. And of course Africa is, due to immense amounts of Western aid strongly bound to their political conditions. But, how could other global areas escape this heritage and could develop to a modern state? The example of India is maybe not the best comparison, but still, also India had been a British colony. Was there nothing Africa could learn from them? On the other side, why was the African continent, excluding those seldom as Africa addressed regions at the Mediterranean Sea and South Africa, not able to develop something own. How many successful economies are there in Africa, which didnt strictly follow either the Western or another external pattern? Despite the fact that there are at first glance new types of democracy in e.g. Uganda you can ask the same question for the political systems. Is there a new, African Way visible at the horizon? It would maybe be a good idea for Africa to look at South-East Asia. After their financial crisis at the end of the 1990s they strengthened regional cooperation and self-reliance and strivingly refined their own ideologies, continuously adjusting them to be individually accommodated but mainly compatible to the other systems11 . Asian elites went to the West not to copy and adapt ideas, but to understand them in order to be able to interact in the global arena. The Chinese example shows that they respect external opinions but dont allow interference in domestic
cf. (Wesseling, 1996) (Hirst & Thompson, 1995, p. 419) 10 (Lonsdale, 2005, p. 380) 11 cf. (Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 30-35)
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issues. In some extend you can criticize that from a Western perspective. Still, the economic success proved them right. And many economists argue that e.g. the political reforms towards more democracy would closely follow economic success and prosperity. What is needed in Africa is this courage to break the mold, to liberate themselves from the influence of foreign opinion. Not sticking to Western developmentalism, but also not necessarily adopting European or South-East Asian regionalism. Imperialism represents the liberal government of unfreedom - despotic measures are rationalized in terms of liberal ends like self-rule and autonomous development of peoples and populations. Developmentalism involves a social liberalism focused on nation states and the Third World, and reminds us that states are not so much the natural containers of political and economic life but the effects of strategies that sought to organize and normalize on a preconceived basis. Regionalism is liberal not just because it is focused on economic liberalization, but also because of the way in which it governs at a distance. [...] imperialism, developmentalism, and regionalism are by no means the only arts of international government. 12

Geography Examining the specific obstacles for development beyond this socio-political level of emancipation geography is one of the most referred reasons why Africa is trapped in underdevelopment. Many thereby follow the ideas of geographical determination of Jared Diamonds most famous work Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies13 . A countrys prospects are, according to Diamond, strongly limited by geographical factors. Particularizing this comprises for example: I) poor soil quality and unpredictability of rainfall; II) tropical areas with limiting impact life expectancy due to e.g. diseases and hostile conditions for livestock and agriculture14 ; III) landlocked economies with high costs for transport and thus little economic interaction and trade. Those factors again imply further issues for e.g. the demographic development. Low income due to little trade paired with the uncertainty in terms of life expectancy often raises high population growth, because parents need insurance for their seniority. Bad infrastructure due to a hostile environment means little investment and high cost for, in our modern society such important commodity, information. And so on. Oppositely, more recently a new doctrine had been established by leading Western economists like Sachs, Collier, at. al. They argue geography is not a destiny15 . Good governance in from of appropriate policies can change geographical disadvantage into a competitive advantage16 . China, which nowadays exports its knowledge in developing basic infrastructure to many developing countries, could be used as shining example. Political leaders should plead to consider geography as challenge for innovation, not as reason for resignation.

12 13

(Larner & Walters, 2002, pp. 422-424) cf. (Diamond, 1999) 14 cf. (Collier & Gunning, Why Has Africa Grown So Slowly?, 1999, pp. 7-14) 15 cf. (Sachs, 2008, p. 217) 16 cf. (Collier & Gunning, Why Has Africa Grown So Slowly?, 1999, p. 16)

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Political and economic systems One of the main factors, which induced the Economist to write about Africa as the Hopeless Continent, was the gloomy general view of Africas political and economic systems. Failed projects of liberalization, modernization and democratization as well as misled aid left a great disappointment among the Western spheres. Many forgot that most African countries didnt start their proper reform processes not until the 1990s, when they where freed from servicing either the capitalist or the communist bloc and thus from arbitrary interference into the continent. Uganda is a good example for these processes. Still, throughout the 1990s, it was often criticized as being non-democratic. Despite the electoral system there was in fact a noparty-system, something entirely new, which was supposed to be an, at most, insufficient democracy by the self-assigned leading democracies. Still, the democratic process towards an electoral multiparty system on the basis of political, social and economic stability proves, there could be an individual, African Way to democracy17 . Paired with an increasingly regional strategy, not built anymore on fractional networks like before 1990, but integrating the whole region into a broader concept, these successes could fully unfold their strength by Pan-African transfer and cooperation. Since regions are increasingly understood to offer a potential site for the democratization of globalizing processes18 , we could identify the isolated fragmentation of the African continent into the 1990s, also stemming from external interference on the continent, as crucial hindrance for an economical and political kickoff. On the other hand Africa still needs to be cautious. Kicking-off the economy without appropriate political reforms, as we still see it today in resource-rich countries like Angola, often only perpetuates structures of patronage, corruption and external extraction. Required foreign capital has to be balanced with the risk of international ownership and thus with I) resource extraction and a disparity of capital inflow to outflow and II) the fact that non-state entities like global corporations assume due to their size and international importance greater levels of political authority19 . Allowing foreign capital to flow unrestrictedly, like Oppenheimer postulates it and we could watch it in e.g. some Latin American countries in recent past, could turn out to be a great hazard. Productivity Another element of development, and one of the most central ones in the argument about economic development, is to be found in productivity. Collier, Sachs, and Stiglitz agree in their opinion, that lacking productivity is the major obstacle for economic set-off. Again, the challenges are two-fold in an endogenous and exogenous perspective. Productivity is, of course, limited by the natural environment, the availability of technologies, and the geographical neighbors and partners. But it is even more affected by policies. For example, to adopt, invent, maintain, use, and improve technologies you need skilled labor and infrastructure, which are only guaranteed by adequate public services. To be able to import technologies, you have to export

cf. (Mugaju, 2002; Kasfir, 2002) cf. (Barry, 1996) 19 cf. (Taylor & Williams, Africa in international politics: external involvement on the continent , 2004, p. 4)
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commodities into a foreign currency20 . In order to be able to export commodities you have to produce more than you need for subsistence. In order to produce more than you need for subsistence you need to trade. To be able to trade you need infrastructure like roads, ports, electricity, and rules of law. And so on. In Common Wealth Sachs illustrates pretty accurate how the transition from a subsistence economy to an innovation economy could look like with productivity in its center21 . It is obvious that some countries do better in supporting the appropriate policies, others do worse. Ethiopia, for example, retards its economy by exclude the peasant from private property. All land is state-owned. The peasants do not have an incentive to invest, improve their productivity or to specialize since theres no security of ownership. Other countries, mainly resource-rich ones, fully rely on exporting few commodities in its unmanufactured form to the world market. For a few years they may experience prosperity, at least for a small stratum, but there seems to be no long-term strategy on basis of diversification22 . Endogenous or exogenous factors? This brings us to the question, whether the poor economic and political situation in many African countries today is caused by endogenous or exogenous factors. As already argued, you can consider many problems today as endogenous. It doesnt help to complain about the exogenous factors if you can improve things at the same time with the appropriate policies. South-East Asia, which in the 1950s was even behind Africa, at least in economical terms, demonstrated the changeability of destiny. For Collier there are four traps African development countries have to overcome: the conflict trap, the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked, and the bad governance trap23 . All of them already had been discussed, and all of them are mainly endogenous. The Bottom Billion Still, around a billion people and increasing are not able to escape the trap by no means. Called the bottom billion and spread around the globe, still with three quarter of it in Africa, these countries will be the major challenge for international politics throughout the 21st century. What you can argue for many other countries that, with the appropriate reforms they could catch up, is to be seen very unlikely for this bottom billion. Politicians and economists agree they can only escape the trap by foreign help24 . Sure is, this aid is needed not only for the bottom billion, but also to sustain regional and global stability and security. After 9/11 the world realized how dangerous a neglected and desperate bottom billion could become. Chaos and instability would not only jeopardize neighboring countries, but in times of globalization literally everybody on a global scale. This is the point of history where regional networks have to enter the stage. It is the opportunity to show responsibility and legitimacy to the globalized world. In a regional context youre not only more expert than international intervention would be, you have also less opposition than a hegemon like the United States would have. You definitely experience a
cf. (Sachs, 2008, p. 208) cf. (Sachs, 2008, p. 222) 22 cf. (Collier & Gunning, Why Has Africa Grown So Slowly?, 1999, p. 13) 23 cf. (Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 2007, pp. 177-183). 24 Cf. (Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 2007)
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broader acceptance intervening as network in your region for humanitarian reasons than by claiming to be the worlds police. The leadership of Uganda in the African Union peace mission in Somalia raises hope. At the same time not only intervention but also cooperation to draw the bottom billion out of their situation is needed on a regional basis. Why should not rather the AU represented by South Africa or Uganda lead the way for Sub-Saharan Africa than for example the World Bank, which is mainly influenced by US politics?

A BRIGHTER FUTURE?
In the meantime, the are not just few people who think Africa is facing a bright future as long as it can, in cooperation with the international community, solve the issue of the bottom billion. In a more developed Africa these islands of dissatisfaction, chaos, and terror could become the crucial threshold on the way to a control of more income, less conflicts, more tolerance and less ethnic importance. It could be the last cornerstone on the way towards a genuine global citizenry. Intermediately celebrated achievements should not be overestimated. Still, there are many like Oppenheimer, who interprets 5% average economic growth as an achievement for the continent neglecting major differences between for example South Africa and Sierra Leone as well as the unsustainable extraction of resources. Still, economic process is on its way. An increasing amount of countries gained stability throughout the last decade25 , which not only includes economic and political stability in terms of electoral multiparty systems, but foremost the establishment of a more or less vivid civil society. Additionally the rapid spread of modern technologies have to be mentioned as one catalyst of this development equally important for politics and participation, for a vivid civil society, for health issues as well as for the economic development. Along with the emergence of the (Asian) East as strategic partner new approaches and a new source for capital, knowledge and technology had been installed. Paired with the new information and telecommunication technologies ICT there are great opportunities of cooperation, as e.g. projects show, where hospitals in India and Nigeria cooperate and thereby allow cooperative learning and improved health services overcoming traditional hindrances. This is exemplary for the new importance of ICT for development. Regional / Multilateral Cooperation within the global framework Yet, especially highlighted should be the new, integrated Pan-African self-governance strategy, which became visible throughout the last decade. The foundation of the African Union in 200226 was seen as an answer to the Western image of the Hopeless Continent. Rapidly it became more than just a proof of emancipation it became its motor. Even though there is critique whether Africa is for another time just adopting the external ideas of regionalism, the African Union seems to become a success story. The example of the Ugandan-led mission in Somalia27 is just one example. The fact, that the European Union, the World Bank, and other international institutions incrementally realized, they have to rather support the African Union than single
cf. (World Bank, 2010) cf. (Powell & Tieku, 2005) 27 cf. (AMISOM, 2010)
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countries in order to support African development, proves, Africa successfully made the first step out of its situation. contrary to what some have written that ours is a 'hopeless continent the decision taken at Sirte [that is, the creation of the AU and its security architecture] cannot but give hope to the millions of Africans from the confluence of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the South, to the Mediterranean in the North, that the enhancement of African unity will enable all of us to overcome the problems that have confronted us for centuries. (South African President Thabo Mbeki) 28 Beyond this regional cooperation African countries are increasingly engaged in global panels often grouping with other emerging countries all around the globe. The most prominent and active African country in this respective is South Africa, participating in several panels with among others Brazil, China and India29 . The Copenhagen environmental summit of 2009 demonstrated more than ever before the new strength of these South-South cooperations. The Western predominance in international politics seems to end in the face of a new coalition built of emerging and developing countries, which is prepared to reach own goals in global negotiations30 . Next to a more weighty representation in the global arena these achievements and democratic processes of cooperation, negotiation, and mutual esteem reflect on the participating countries. What I described as crucial for African development, the development of more selfreliance and self-responsibility, is fostered in such panels. Furthermore the African countries can study from direct exchange with the South-East-Asian countries how they managed to turn their financial crisis on their behoove. Whatever the actual limits to purely Asian responses to the financial crises of the late 1990s, there has been a significant sense that the region needs to develop a greater sense of its own identity and of its own capacity to deal with economic vulnerability (especially in the financial and monetary field). The African case provides an even more striking example of regionalism launched on the back of crisis, human disasters, and widespread political and economic failure. 31 Soon, we will be able to examine whether Africa could also manage the global economic crisis of 2008 on their behoove. Again, itll be crucial which policies in which framework will be implemented. And, differently to Asia, I think itll be crucial to what extend the civil society will be involved into reform processes. Since the majority of the population on the African continent is rather influenced by Western than Eastern culture it wont be possible just to enforce reforms top-down. In my opinion, African societies tend to rather develop on a more politicized, bourgeois way, than weve seen it in maybe China. A higher income wont be a sufficient achievement for a (Lerner, 1958)n Ugandan citizen.

28 29

(Powell & Tieku, 2005, p. 937) cf. (Payne, 2008) 30 cf. (Vidal, 2010) 31 (Hurrell, 2007, p. 140)

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ICTs in the knowledge society opportunity or risk? Summarizing a broad discourse about ICTs in the knowledge society32 they became the most important variable of development. Not only in empowering the civil society, providing public services like health, education and registration, supporting the economic development, monitoring the elites in order to achieve more accountability and transparency, but especially in stashing away traditional obstacles33 . ICTs allow not only a contraction of time and space, but foremost a reduction of required capital. At the same time they are the biggest risk to trap in a new gap, the already widening knowledge and digital gap respectively. It would be to broad to discuss phenomena like this widening gap, patent or brain drain at this point, but as I annotated with the FDIs, the opportunities and risks of ICTs have to be balanced. This discussion has to be placed centrally in the political discourse, and best case on a Pan-African panel basis. ICTs are not only just another infrastructural factor. Despite their requirement like electricity, devices and connection they can stash away many other factors and can reduce the initial investments for public services. The wide spread of mobile devices and therewith mobile services in Africa throughout the last decade is astonishing and demonstrates, how much technologies can change. Still, while many Africans can access health services, agricultural consultancy and educational services in a pre-Internet technology right on you cell phone in wide parts of Africa, there are still too many excluded. Due to the lack of sea-cable broadband Africa gets its connection thanks to Western satellite communication and demand following innovations, which had been produced only for Africa. The next step would be to produce them in Africa. Not in African-like Special Economic Zones with little exchange with the environment but rather in Asian-like centers of investment and innovation with high penetration towards the environment. Innovations and investment had to be attracted by special conditions, but also limited by constraining policies. These policies have to aim the absorption of knowledge towards the environment as well as they have to guarantee long-term investments with entrepreneurial interest investment, improvement and innovations.

CONCLUSION
Picking up Oppenheimers five reasons for progress, one has to admit, he succeeded in summarizing the main aspects in few explanations. Hes right in claiming there are momentous governance shift over the past 15 to 20 years. Hes also right with his assumption of the stamping importance of the BRIC, foremost China, for the African continent. If you want to tackle his position you have to criticize him in his fifth statement about the importance of foreign capital flows and in his generalization of the African continent. Speaking about governance shifts or Chinas influence would sound entirely different, if theres any discussion at all, in Chad, Somalia or the Darfur region of Sudan, than for example in Zambia and Tanzania. What should be highlighted again is the third and fourth point of Pan-African trade and peacekeeping mechanisms - in short, regionalism in form of the African Union. This institution
32 33

cf. (Lerner, 1958) cf. (Unwin & Kleine, 2009)

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has to further be strengthened, possibly adopting suitable structures from the EU and the SouthEast Asian networks. Yet, it should be carefully balanced what to incorporate. A strengthened and strongly positioned African Union as common representation of all African nations would send an important signal to the world: we are not only not hopeless anymore, we are the opposite. To be able to claim to represent all African nations there are still many steps left. But a working institution can incrementally integrate new members, can aim at equality of its members not only by representation, but also by means of standard of living, can coordinate economic and political reforms as well as position Africa with equal rights on the world market, and could generate required economies of scale, which the fragmentation into small countries in Africa hardly allowed so far. In my perception, the African idea is on the right track. Still, the continent has to be cautious and is far away from catching up, when you consider the average income per capita. Even an African average of around 5% economic growth throughout almost the entire first decade of the 21st century is no reason to celebrate, like some economists do. Too many countries are completely excluded from this growth, trapped in poverty and chaos; some participate in it in an extremely unsustainable and irresponsible manner. The least examples show economic growth fostering the political and societal systems. Mao once used the phrase the long march to freedom as heading for his dubious revolution. Let the long march to prosperity in Africa be more peaceful and bourgeois and, one day, we will find a bright future for this continent.

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