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Neutrals as brokers of peacebuilding ideas?

Laurent Goetschel Cooperation and Conflict 2011 46: 312 DOI: 10.1177/0010836711416957 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cac.sagepub.com/content/46/3/312

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CAC46310.1177/0010836711416957GoetschelCooperation and Conflict

Article

Neutrals as brokers of peacebuilding ideas?

Laurent Goetschel

Cooperation and Conflict 46(3) 312333 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0010836711416957 cac.sagepub.com

Abstract
Neutral and alliance-free states continue to exist. Even though neutrality has lost its realistic survival function, it continues to serve as provider of national identity for neutral states. This identity is rooted in neutralitys idealistic function, according to which neutral states used to engage for humanitarian issues and the reduction of violence in international relations. The argument developed suggests an extension of this traditional role concept of neutral states: they should engage as promoters of ideas in international peacebuilding which are contested because they are perceived as a threat to national sovereignty, such as the responsibility to protect (R2P). While neutralitys realistic functions make neutral states credible advocates of sovereignty and autonomy, its idealistic functions provide them with a track record in positive reforms in international relations. Acting as norm entrepreneurs, neutral states could reduce the contradiction between prevention and intervention. Therefore, the key argument of this article focuses on the basis of neutralitys conceptual roots, the conditions for success of political ideas and examples from recent peacebuilding practice.

Keywords
foreign policy, ideas, neutrality, peacebuilding, small states

Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, the future of neutrality became an open question: the concept of neutrality had been developed in Europe as a survival strategy by smaller states. Once the period of major wars on the European continent seemed to have expired by the end of the 1980s, there were good arguments to raise about the remaining raison dtre of neutrality. Interestingly enough, more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, neutrality has yet to disappear. Switzerland still labels itself as neutral, as do Austria and Ireland, yet their policy statements are more ambiguous.1 Finland and Sweden use the term alliance-free, a policy they have clung to also inside the European Union (EU) (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006; Gehler, 2001; Ojanen, 2003; Ritterband, 2007). None of the
Corresponding author: Laurent Goetschel, Europe Institute, University of Basel, Gellertstr. 27, CH - 4020 Basel, Switzerland Email: laurent.goetschel@unibas.ch

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Western European states that claimed the status of neutrality during the Cold War have joined NATO. Discussions about abolishing neutrality, which were frequent in the 1990s, have virtually disappeared. This raises the question about the utility of neutrality in the current context. Historically, explanations of neutrality are typically built on a functionalist approach: neutrality fulfilled specific functions for the neutral states and for their neighbours which were usually related to security and stabilization (Riklin, 1992: 199204). Besides these realistic functions, however, neutral states also supported normative change in international relations by promoting humanitarian and human rights instruments, and by committing themselves to restricting and regulating the use of force in international relations (Joenniemi, 1993; cf. Agius, [in this special issue]). These idealistic functions of neutrality provided the foundation of the important contribution neutrality made to the national political identity of neutral countries (Goetschel, 1999). These idealistic functions also provide the basis for this articles argumentation. It is argued that the continued existence of neutrality provides neutral states with a comparative advantage in brokering new ideas in international relations. With their far-reaching historic track record in being both idealistic and realistic, neutral states are well positioned to further advance international norms in highly contested areas of international relations. This point is illustrated with reference to the example of peacebuilding, where it is explained why neutral states are particularly well suited to contributing to norm development in highly sovereignty-sensitive areas. Thus, the objective of this article is to present a plausible extended role concept (Gaupp, 1983; Holsti, 1970) for neutral states in international relations today. The argument is based on historical and theoretical reflections and utilizes some examples that serve as empirical illustrations. Reflections are developed by first going back to the historical and conceptual roots of neutrality. In a second step, neutrality can be categorized as a political idea in general and related to peacebuilding in particular. Third, existing research on the role of ideas in international relations is summarized, with particular attention being given to the conditions under which new ideas enter international politics. The three dimensions of content, actors and institutions can also be separated, reflecting the particularities neutral states might and should contribute in each of them. In this article, these arguments are illustrated through the inclusion of selected empirical examples of recent peacebuilding ideas. To conclude, the article summarizes the implications of the argumentation for the policy orientation of neutral and alliance-free states.2

Neutral states as norm entrepreneurs

This article now elaborates on the neutrality functions, on their realistic and idealistic sides, and on the historic track record of neutral states in acting as norm entrepreneurs. In short, being neutral means not taking sides in military conflict between third-party states. Yet, to understand the deeper meaning of this foreign and security policy stance, it is necessary to understand neutralitys roots. Neutrality as a recognized foreign and security policy concept originated at the same time as the concept of state sovereignty, which dates from the end of the Middle Ages when the universal authority of the Church began to fade. As a correlative, neutrality represented the right of states to abstain from war

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whenever it fitted their interests. Thus neutrality is an expression of sovereignty and can only be understood within this context: its original purpose was to help states defend their interests in an international environment characterized by conflicts and the preponderance of states as international actors (Frei, 1968; cf. Agius and Devine, [this issue]). Stemming from its raison dtre, neutrality traditionally fulfilled several political functions, which can be called realist (Goetschel, 1999: 120). Its most important function was to guarantee a countrys political independence. Neutrality was a strategy of survival in an international environment characterized by a states legitimate right to wage war in order to achieve international objectives in accordance with its national interests. In a realistic perspective, this legitimate right of a neutral state not to wage war aimed at increasing its chances of maintaining its independence and territorial integrity. Typically, neutral states were small states and were thus seen as weaker compared to their neighbouring states. Not having to take part directly in power-related interactions diminished their relative vulnerability. In order to be respected and effective, neutrality also had to offer third-party states something: well known in this respect was neutralitys international equilibrium function: Switzerland acted as the guardian of the Alpine passes in monarchical Europe, serving together with Austria as the neutral separator (neutraler Riegel) in Cold War Europe. Sweden was the centrepiece of the Nordic balance in the same period. These are the classic manifestations of neutrality (Gehler, 2001; Riklin, 1992; Thomas, 1996). Besides these realistic functions, however, neutrality always had an idealistic side too, which originated from neutral states renunciation to project their own military power and from their commitment to restrict and regulate the use of force in international relations (Joenniemi, 1993). Neutral states were also subject to internal and external pressure to justify their policy: avoidance of military battles often based on conflicting world-views had to be compensated for by some other fundamentals or ideas of grandness. The more a war had the character of a conflict of world-views, the more neutrals felt the need to highlight their own role in the international system. For that reason, they conceived their policy as something higher, like an ideal of justice (Frei, 1968). As part of this, neutral states have always tried to underline their policys usefulness for the international system. Many neutral states have participated in implementing specific norms aimed at fostering peace. A good example is the active involvement of European neutrals (like Austria, Sweden and Ireland) in developing UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War (Schmidl, 2000). However, their services consisted of far more than mere military protection and equilibrium functions. Neutral states also acted as arbitrators and mediators and provided their so-called good offices (Probst, 1989). Within international organizations, neutrals individually or as a group played the role of initiators or bridge-builders. A well-known example was the group of Neutral and Non-Aligned States (N+N) in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later to become the OSCE. Their contribution to confidence-building and conflict prevention was widely acknowledged by observers and scholars alike (Fischer, 2009; Holst, 1985; Renk, 1996). Cultivating their special role on the international scene, and the image associated with it, helped neutrals justify their policy towards third-party states. They also fostered internal acceptance of neutrality and its role as an identity provider for the population: neutral states distinguished themselves from other states in the way they handled their foreign

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affairs. They acquired their own foreign and security policy identity, according to which neutral states, while avoiding traditional interstate military conflicts, make their specific contribution to promoting international peace. As a result, neutral states have always had their specific way of approaching changes in international relations: while they usually favour reforms aimed at restricting uncontrolled use of force and imposition of interests by sheer power, their support is usually qualified. Aware that neutrality could be compromised if they became involved in conflicts or allowed external powers to manipulate them, neutral states were cautious about engagement in specific international organizations (cf. Devine, [this issue]). For example, during the Cold War, the neutral states would not join the European Community (EC). Ireland, which became a member of the EC in 1973, could, for historic and geopolitical reasons, not be compared to the other neutrals (Binter, 1989). Switzerland even refrained from joining the UN. But they all contributed to the CSCE, which they perceived as fundamentally democratic and consensus oriented. Neutral states did not just favour any new idea aimed at the control of international peace and security. They only supported the developments which they saw as sufficiently democratic (in terms of democracy of states) and which were not prone to manipulation by major powers. This sovereignty-sensitive approach to international cooperation may be labelled realistic.3 Yet neutrality always also had an idealistic component based on its core commitment to averting war and promoting non-violent means of conflict resolution. At the end of the day, neutrality was and remains far more than a tradition of standing apart and refusing to take sides in violent conflicts between third parties. Beyond this, neutrality also contained ideas and norms of behaviour that neutral states tried to export. This is what the late Swiss political scientist Daniel Frei called Sendungsgedanken [missionary thoughts] of neutrality (Frei, 1966). Georg Cohn (1939) had introduced the concept of neo-neutrality in the period between the world wars. Contrary to the tradition of individual abstention inherent in the conventional concept of neutrality, neo-neutrality meant the active, collective, disqualification of war by neutral states, including condemning war and adopting sanctions, which differed from merely abstaining from conflict. Though at the time these ideas emerged they had little chance of being accepted by the community of states, they still remained an interesting and somewhat avant-garde way of viewing international relations. Even though conceived as a foreign policy concept for individual nation-states, the essence of neutrality could be scaled upwards and seen as a possible foreign policy orientation for a group of states or even for all states. The idea of a defensive link between all neutrals is similar to the objective of reconciling war parties or bringing their hostilities to an end by means of collective action (Frei, 1969).4 Taken together, these short reflections about the substance and facets of neutrality recall a number of crucial points: Neutrality is ideational and ideas are central to developing, interpreting and implementing neutral foreign policy. Neutral states are particularly sensitive to their sovereignty. Their security policy builds on the core assumption of unconditional sovereignty.5

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Neutral states have a track record of promoting soft power in international relations and of favouring non-violent means of conflict resolution. The ideas they promote are aimed at either preventing war or limiting its negative effects. Neutral states should have a comparative advantage in introducing new ideas, as they are themselves keen not to be part of any hidden agenda in promoting powerrelated goals. Neutral states show both realistic and idealistic characteristics in their foreign policy: while neutralitys realistic functions make them credible advocates of sovereignty and autonomy, its idealistic function provides them with a track record in positive reforms in international relations aimed at the reduction of violence and the prevention of war. This portfolio qualifies neutral states as norm entrepreneurs (Ingebritsen, 2002), who play a crucial role in promoting the emergence of new norms because they construct frames of meaning by calling attention to issues (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). Neutrals have built on the experience they acquired as norm entrepreneurs in the twentieth century and particularly during the Cold War (Hurd, 1999; Ingebritsen, 2002). They show an outstanding combination of credible experiences regarding both the content orientation of their policy and the institutional framework in which this policy was developed: they have been active for decades in confidence-building and violence reduction following a bottom-up approach and opposing top-down mechanisms which could infringe on their sovereignty. This behaviour is part of their national role concept: it belongs both to deeply rooted values of the political elite and the population and to the expectations of third parties (Holsti, 1970: 2369). It is now appropriate to examine how this ideational portfolio can be conceptualized in relation to ideas of peacebuilding.

Neutrality and peacebuilding as ideas

Ideas can be defined as mental constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy (Hirschman, 1961: 3). Building on this understanding, Tannenwald (2005: 15) developed her definition according to which ideas are collective, shared or intersubjective beliefs. Ideas are not simply reducible to matters of individual psychology (Goldstein and Keohoane, 1993: 67); they are seen as generators of behavioural regularities and of identities. This definition allows for a further differentiation between cognitive and normative ideas: cognitive ideas provide guidance on how to achieve preferred objectives and may specify causeeffect relationships. Normative ideas develop or justify values and attitudes (Campbell, 1998; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 11). The different ideas have different sources and different effects: one may differentiate between the instrumental rationality of ideas and the value rationality of ideas (Tannenwald, 2005: 1720) the former referring to the logic of consequence, the latter to the logic of appropriateness. In the first case, ideas tend to rationalize actions in view of material interests. In the second case, ideas themselves play a more substantive or even autonomous role in promoting action and outcomes.

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Where does neutrality as an idea fit in? It can be said, for instance, that neutrality contains two sides, one realistic the other idealistic. Its realistic core, i.e. the right to abstain from war, can be categorized as a cognitive idea following a logic of consequence. It follows the logic of state survival: small states staying outside major military conflicts will enhance their chances of survival. This dimension of neutrality is based on cognition and intended effects. The idealistic dimension of neutrality, however, can be categorized as a normative idea following a logic of appropriateness: neutral states favour non-violent means of conflict resolution and want to limit the negative effects of war. These are clearly normative objectives following a logic of how things ought to be (March and Olsen, 1998). Thus, neutrality contains both kinds of ideas and both logics.6 With these distinctive ideas and the characteristics of neutrality in mind, it is now appropriate to turn to considering the concept of peacebuilding. The latter refers to collective efforts undertaken after a violent conflict and which follow the objectives of building peace, thereby also preventing the re-occurrence of violence. The concept of peacebuilding entered the sphere of international diplomacy with the UN Agenda for Peace, which entailed its political support by the international community (Chetail, 2009b: 2). However, its precise content remains subject to various interpretations (Barnett et al., 2007). The core issues surrounding the controversies of international peacebuilding relate to the essence of peace and how to achieve it (Chetail, 2009b: 79). Also after the adoption of the Agenda for Peace, states had a tendency to give priority to their own interests in a conflict over prevention policy (Ramcharan, 2008: 4350). This controversy has been going on for a very long time. Its origins belong to international law, where concepts such as sovereignty, collective security or human rights have been developed. These principles reflect the common interests, rules and values of todays international society or society of states (Bull, 1977: 13; Nadelmann, 1990). This society does not exclusively consist of legal norms, but also includes other fundamental normative anchorages, such as world-views and their ethical foundations, which are characteristic of the English School of International Relations (Buzan, 2004; Epp, 1998). Since the end of the Cold War, many new such policy principles or ideas found their way into international relations in general and into the practice of peacebuilding in particular: strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs), democratic accountability of states, gender equality, security sector governance or human security are but a few (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2001; Chetail, 2009a). They did so in a much quicker way than traditional international (legal) norms had done, but the change they fostered had less legitimacy. Though these ideas were also aimed at improving the international order and even promoting peace, their implementation has not been uncontested. Criticism has emerged describing these ideas as neo-imperialism disguised as good intentions. Similarly, scholars have criticized the lack of critical engagement with the new peace activities, which are being implemented by bureaucratic practices and which tend to blindly project liberal ideology on post-conflict societies (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009; Paris, 2002; Richmond, 2007). The field of peacebuilding ideas may be split into two kinds: on one side, there are ideas concentrated on problem-solving aspects of peacebuilding. These are cognitive ideas obeying a logic of consequence. On the other, there are ideas that imply rethinking fundamental concepts of international politics, such as sovereignty or the relative

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importance of individuals versus states in legal and political terms. These are normative ideas that follow a logic of appropriateness. Most peacebuilding ideas cannot clearly be attributed to one or the other category: they usually contain both a technocratic or problem-saving dimension which would fit into the cognitive category of ideas, and a political and value dimension which would fit into the normative category of ideas. For example, there are well-known instruments and procedures on how to improve the position of CSOs in political processes. However, whether one really wants to strengthen CSOs or not is a completely different issue. The same counts for democratic accountability, gender equality or security sector governance. Still, in the political practice of peacebuilding, some more or less politically contested ideas can be distinguished. For example, promoting security sector reforms (SSR) can be seen as relatively uncontested, whereas the promotion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) is clearly more disputed (see Chandler, 2010). Both examples will be considered further in the next section. The assumption followed in this article is that most of the international political disputes surrounding peacebuilding are due to a neglect of the respective ideas normative dimensions. The actors involved in peacebuilding do not pay enough attention to this issue and lack sensitivity to it. It can be further argued that this tension between technocracy and normativity is strongest when national sovereignty is at stake on the side of the recipient state. This is where the argument relating to neutrality comes in: neutral states have conceived their own foreign policy around a concept that combines cognitive and normative ideas. Their foreign policy obeys both a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness. Additionally, they are particularly sensitive to any encroachment on their sovereignty. And due to their historical track record, the importance of having them act as forerunner or role model comes in (Jacobsen, 2009). All in all, this should make them adequate brokers of peacebuilding ideas, particularly when national sovereignty is at stake. While this argument might seem rather idealistic at first glance, its logic builds on the roles which were described and which neutral states have played in the past. It also takes into account the ongoing development of neutrality towards a more influence- and action-oriented concept, having neutral states actively shaping their international environment with the objective of making it less prone to violence and conducive to their interests.7 In order to better grasp the mechanisms at stake, this article now turns towards international relations theories and the impact of ideas in international politics. Some concrete cases of ideas are used as heuristic examples to further develop this article's key argumentation on the role of neutral states as brokers of political ideas.

The context of the transmission of ideas: Content, actors and institutions

Within the realm of international relations theory, almost all approaches have dealt with the role of ideas in international politics (Sorensen, 2008). However, social constructivist scholars have most clearly underlined the relevance that ideas may have in contributing to changes in international relations. It is driven by the quest for insights into the conditions which might promote less violent and more peaceful relations among states as compared to the structure of the international system which had culminated in the two

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world wars of the 20th century (Kratochwil, 1998; Smith et al., 1996). This does not equate to overcoming anarchy by means of a world government, since it is assumed that ideas and norms deploy their effects at the level of individual actors and not through institutionalized top-down enforcement structures. Following a constructivist approach, the way people interpret the world and define their interests is based on ideas (Tannenwald, 2005: 18). Ideas provide the conceptual apparatus that enables actors to understand their environment and to formulate their interests (Sikkink, 1991: 5). Interests are conceived within a historically specific ideational and normative context (Jackson, 1993: 130). This includes not only norms prone to codification in international law, but also ideas that represent world-views or role concepts. Besides studies on the power of norms (Tocci, 2008), different types of ideas and beliefs were categorized (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), and possible ways of monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of norms were outlined (Kelley, 2008). Extensive debates were waged on a theoretical and ontological level about the roles of ideas in international politics. Among the manifold research branches, two are particularly relevant in terms of policy implications. The first research orientation concerns the impact of ideas on policy (Legro, 2000; Yee, 1996), the second the factors that influence the impact that ideas have on policy. The first orientation is output-oriented, the second is process-oriented. The factors of this second branch are typically differentiated into the dimensions of content of ideas themselves, actors (norm entrepreneurs) and institutions (Drezner, 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; cf. Beyer and Hofmann, [this issue]). Each of these dimensions are now considered in greater detail utilizing some examples pertaining to the field of peacebuilding and by looking at their implications for the postulated role concept of neutral states.

The content and shape of ideas

In terms of content, the question is: To what extent do the content and shape of peacebuilding ideas impact on their chances of success? What are the main challenges for the introduction of new peacebuilding ideas, and is there a role for neutral states to play? Norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest efforts to promote a new norm take place within the standards of appropriateness defined by prior norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). Thus, pre-existing norms are critical as conditions for the success or failure of new norms. They place limits on the possibility of their adoption (Tannenwald, 2005: 32). This is a rather crucial point which leads to the question of how foreign policy is crafted when competing ideas coexist (Drezner, 2000: 734). New ideas have to be seen as legitimate by the actors they apply to, whereby legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule ought to be obeyed (Hurd, 1999: 381) or an idea accepted. Legitimacy is a subjective quality, relational between actor and idea. The actors perception may come from the substance, from the procedure or from the source by which it was constituted (Hurd, 1999: 381). While these arguments touch upon the content of ideas, they also qualify the relevance of the content per se: it is not the problem-solving quality of a new ideas content which mainly affects its chances of success, but its relationship with other pre-existing ideas and the way in which it was introduced.

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In regard to this last point, the institutional context, which will be looked at afterwards, is of high importance too. Turning to peacebuilding, the neglected value dimension of these ideas by implementing agents has already been highlighted, and a clustering of peacebuilding ideas within two groups has been attempted; one with ideas more oriented towards processes and problem-solving, the other with ideas touching more upon fundamental normative issues. The processes are now described which accompanied one idea from each group, the idea of security sector reform (SSR), which belongs to the first, less contested, group, and the idea of responsibility to protect (R2P), which belongs to the second, more contested, group. SSR emerged as an idea after the end of the Cold War. While initially it was mainly aimed at accompanying the political and institutional transition process of former communist states, its scope was quickly expanded to reconceptualizing security concepts in other parts of the non-OECD world. Its overall objective is to create a secure environment which is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy (OECD, 2005: 16). SSR was integrated by many states and international organizations in their development and peacebuilding programmes. They also played an important role in helping further develop the concept and in suggesting ways for its implementation (Ball and Hendrickson, 2006: 1023). Conceptually, it became part of the security governance approach including questions of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, of action on mines and of control of small and light weapons (SALW) (Bryden and Hnggi, 2005). Though SSR has figured in a less prominent way on the political agendas of non-OECD countries, it was accepted as an important item on the international political agenda, including its implementation dimension.8 In 2008, SSR was explicitly recognized as one of the necessary elements for laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development by the UN Security Council under the Slovak Presidency.9 On the other hand, R2P has been one of the most contested ideas to have emerged in international politics since the end of the Cold War. Its origin dates back to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published in 2001 (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], 2001), which had been established in the aftermath of the discussion about the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo. At the time, there was little doubt that the concept of R2P was mainly about the right of international humanitarian intervention (Thakur, 2008; Chandler, 2010: 128). The report became a widely disseminated and well-known document advocating states obligation to intervene in conflicts in which mass atrocities were about to occur or had occurred. The connotation of interventionism has remained attached to the idea since its inception. It has been argued that the failure of the international community to implement the concept in Darfur was not only due to inflated expectations of military physical protection by international troops and to a confused advocacy surrounding it, but also mostly due to the host states fear about robust peacekeeping (De Waal, 2007). Even though R2P was endorsed by the UN General Assembly 2005 World Summit, it remained an essentially contested idea: its endorsement by the UN was achieved at the price of a conceptual shift from intervention to prevention, stressing the need for the international community to contribute to

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the capacity-building of states in order to give them the possibility to protect their own populations (Chandler, 2010). The special rapporteur of the UN Secretary General, Edward Luck, stated that there was a deep, inherent and irreconcilable tension between the notion of R2P and the full exercise of sovereignty at the national level and that for UN standards, R2P remained in its conceptual and programmatic infancy (Bellamy, 2006; Luck, 2008: 913; cf. Evans, 2008). What is the conclusion? Both ideas, SSR and R2P, touch upon core issues of national political competence: the governance of the security sector in the first case and the protection of a countrys population in the second. However, in line with my point about the shape and content of ideas, while SSR is perceived as widely technocratic and problemsolving by the recipient states, R2P has been perceived as a door-opener for international humanitarian interventions. Thus, other than SSR, R2P was perceived as a threat to national sovereignty. If it is assumed that neutral states have a comparative advantage in advocating peacebuilding ideas perceived as sovereignty-sensitive, there would definitely be a role to play for them in regard to R2P, for example, in genocide prevention or political early warning.

Which norm entrepreneurs?

In terms of actors, the question is: what kind of actor is implicated in the promotion of new peacebuilding ideas? How are they framing these ideas? Are neutral states already playing a special role? If not, is there some role to be expected from them? Norm entrepreneurs face the challenge of shaping ideas in a way that makes them seem as acceptable as possible. They should concentrate on diminishing the inappropriateness of new ideas in regard to pre-existing ideas, or put in different words: they should try to frame new ideas by building on pre-existing ones. Generally speaking, NGOs have been playing an increasing role in international peacebuilding for the past 20 to 30 years (Fischer, 2006; Fitzduff and Church, 2004). They have contributed substantially to selected fields, such as mediation (Bartoli, 2009). But their direct access to the political sphere remains subject to important constraints. While they may act publicly and in international forums, for example by acquiring consultative status to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), they will never be states themselves. They are not members of the club. The purpose of the consultative arrangement of ECOSOC, for example, has always been to secure expert information and to enable organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views (Gtz, 2008: 243). As a further example, the same could be said in a completely different context for the consultations that have been taking place with NGOs for some years already in the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).10 Ultimately, states must accept new ideas and agree on the conduct they promote. In regard to SSR, well-established think tanks such as the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) or the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) played an important role. Yet states too were already strongly supporting the concept in its initial phase. They eventually had to formally endorse it nationally and in international organizations such as the EU and the UN. In regard to R2P, the

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ICISS was composed of individuals who had high connections with governments, such as Australia or Canada, and to NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG). However, in the end, the concept had to be considerably modified and adapted in order to be tolerated by the states in the UN. While countless think tanks are still working on the topic, the issue of how the prevention of mass atrocities could be operationalized in a substantially meaningful and politically acceptable way remains to be resolved (Chandler, 2010: 1301). In addition to these two examples of R2P and SSR, which concerned core issues of states power, states and NGOs roles around two further well-known initiatives are sketched out, both touching upon the relative importance of individuals versus states in international relations: the concept of human security and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Making human beings instead of states the main subject of security, the idea of human security contains considerable transformative potential (Ulbert and Werthes, 2008). It can be seen as the foundation of other ideas, such as R2P, SSR or even the ICC, which all focus on the security and physical well-being of humans. Human security was originally strongly promoted by UNDP and Canada (Krause, 2009). The latter developed a network called the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, which also addressed think tanks and NGOs.11 In parallel, about a dozen states, among them Austria and Switzerland, formed the human security network, which was based on an initial agreement between Canada and Norway. Its objective was to repeat the success of the landmines campaign in other areas of human security.12 The Japanese government set up a foundation to support activities under this heading and also supported the Commission on Human Security, which produced a report in 2003.13 However, content wise, the balance-sheet of these various initiatives remains elusive. While the network still exists, the concept itself, contrary to some of the more concrete ideas linked to it, was never politically operationalized in a way that would have led to concrete obligations for states. Another interesting case is the process which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, where NGOs played a critical part. This role was well documented by the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, established in 1995. Scientifically, a content analysis of all summary minutes and press releases of the negotiations on the ICC from 1994 to 1998 showed that the outcome could not just be explained in terms of power and states initial interests (Deitelhoff, 2009: 34). States interests changed during the process and NGOs, together with small and middle powers, contributed significantly to these changes (Deitelhoff, 2009: 45). To conclude, it is evident that in the end states have a crucial role to play and help determine the failure or success of peacebuilding ideas. This is especially true if ideas are perceived as sovereignty-sensitive. As shown with the ICC, special conditions conducive to a stronger discursive influence of NGOs may prevail in the case of law-making; there, NGOs may decisively impact the framework and the substance of the negotiation process together with specific groups of states. The good offices of the neutral states extend to hosting NGOs such as DCAF, which is located in Switzerland (one of the founding partners of DCAF and a key contributor to its budget). In addition, the ICG counts several neutral and alliance-free states among its financing partners (Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland). However, as a general impression based on the few but important

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examples looked at, neutral states do not seem to have assumed tremendously active roles. This is particularly valid compared to states like Canada, Norway or Japan. The idea is of course not to promote neutral and alliance-free states as spearheads of an interventionist approach to either human security or R2P. On the contrary, it is about reflecting a different approach which might have been (and still might be) adopted towards R2P in order to make it more compatible with pre-existing UN norms, less interventionist and, finally, more acceptable to all states. This would contribute to the development and strengthening of international law, one of the traditional objectives of neutral states. Thinking further about the contribution neutral states can make, the manner in which ideas are framed is important to consider: while sensitive issues are more offensively and openly brought to the table by NGOs such as ICG, this approach can also hamper the development and particularly the implementation of ideas. If states had played a more active role in promoting the initial R2P concept, they might have given it a less interventionist twist, which again might have caused less opposition from non-OECD countries. Neutral states might have been well positioned to find a balance between the safeguard of sovereignty and the protection of individuals from mass atrocities. They could not have replaced an organization like ICG, but they might have worked as a strong complement to it. Neutral states could also have taken a more pronounced stance on fundamental normative issues of human security compared to the rather technocratic policy adopted by the Human Security Network, thereby developing a stronger profile among the supporting state group.

What institutional framework?

In terms of institutions, the question is: How should an institutional setting conducive to the promotion of new peacebuilding ideas be structured? Without being able to enter into the depth of this huge field of discussion and research, the discussion in this article is limited to merely stressing the importance of consensus among the actors involved. Particular reference is made to the writings of Oran Young on the formation of international regimes, where he differentiates spontaneous, negotiated and imposed order (Young, 1982). Whereas actors with a regime-shaping capacity might be best suited to transferring and expanding power-related ideologies, other attributes of actors and structures have to be sought after if ideas are to be brokered (Young, 1989: 355). As it is not necessary to conceive of peace as an ideology, it is obviously the latter model which corresponds to the transfer of ideas discussed in this article, and where intellectual leadership and bargaining power (as opposed to structural power) are seen as major determinants of success (Young, 1991: 298302). Thus, there is a focus on consensus-fostering international institutions and the existing or potential roles that neutral states might play in them as brokers of peacebuilding ideas. Among the existing international organizations, the UN obviously plays the central role for peacebuilding norms and ideas. Even though its decision-making process in the Security Council is all but ideal in terms of democracy and world-wide consensus, it is the only organization where new ideas can be discussed and accepted on a global scale. Most of the examples described earlier in this article had some origins in the UN. Still, a look at the regional level seems important because the discussions about the foreign and

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security polices of European neutral and alliance-free states to a large extent take place with reference to the European framework. Though its high time most probably lies in the past, a brief reference is due to the role played by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during the Cold War. This cooperation framework encompassed all states concerned and decisionmaking was based on consensus. It provided the structure for the introduction of several new and quasi-futuristic ideas in the field of European security, the most important being in the fields of arms control and human rights (Ghbali, 1989; Schlotter et al., 1994). The legally non-binding nature of its decisions was often criticized, but their political nature provided greater room for manoeuvre for new ideas and fresh thinking. As already mentioned, neutral and then non-aligned states played a substantial role in the creation and development of the organization (Fischer, 2009; Renk, 1996). While it continues to exist as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it lost most of its political momentum after the end of the Cold War. Western European states and the USA preferred to develop NATO and the EU. Russia wanted to be solely in charge of what it saw as its own sphere of influence over large parts of the territory of the former Soviet Union. Structurally, however, the OSCE would remain a valuable institutional setting for the development of peacebuilding ideas in a European setting, providing European neutral and alliance-free states with specific roles. While the EUs membership is geographically far more limited than that of the OSCE, it is much more structured and institutionalized. Its peacebuilding activities are conducted as a combination of individual member states foreign relations, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as its defence and security component. As a peacebuilding actor, the EU has developed an impressive number of instruments and activities in the civilian dimension of peace and security policy over the years (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2001; Weinlich, 2003). These have included consultation mechanisms and cooperation instruments with NGOs, such as the Instrument for Stability and its Peacebuilding Partnership.14 However, if the programmes that the EU has undertaken in the field of peacebuilding are considered, then most activities have taken place at the technocratic and problem-solving levels. The EU has, for example, been very active in the fields of SSR and gender. It has developed impressive structures in financing, implementing and managing peacebuilding. Yet it was far less active in the realm of highly politicized and value-oriented issues such as R2P or conflict prevention (Duke and Coutier, 2009; Rummel, 2003).15 Turning to the role played by neutral and alliance-free member states, several studies have shown how these states have contributed in shaping and influencing the development of European security as part of the CFSP/CSDP (Arter, 2000; Ferreira-Pereira, 2006; Jacobsen, 2009). Upon closer inspection, it appears that most of these contributions were concerned with questions of implementation and with preventing the military dimension of CSDP outweighing the civilian dimension of CFSP. While neutral and small states were able to impact significantly on CFSP development compared to their relative size and importance (Tonra, 2001), concrete neutral products in terms of the idealistic functions of neutrality are more difficult to find. Contributions of neutral and alliance-free member states to major institutional and policy developments of CFSP and CSDP in particular do not necessarily translate into actual substantial influence on policy outcomes.

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The contrary was also the case the EU impacted on the foreign and security policy orientation of the alliance-free Nordic states (Brommesson, 2010; Mller and Bjereld, 2010; Rieker, 2004; see also Agius, [this issue], on the limits of soft power). Generally, more recent orientations of the EUs foreign relations have challenged rather than facilitated small states foreign and security policies (Caramani, 2010; Miles 2010; Wivel, 2005). Increased attention to differentiated integration, where European states and sub-states move at different speeds and/or towards different objectives with regard to common policies (Dyson and Sepos, 2010: 45) can be seen in the introduction of variable geometry or two-speed approaches to security and defence (enhanced cooperation, for example). Governments of neutral and alliance-free member states might even be tempted to take the mechanisms and obligations of the EU as an excuse to delegate more competences towards supranational levels of decision-making (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). This could jeopardize the foreign and security policy tradition of neutral and alliance-free states, because the EU has no tradition of being an idealistic foreign policy actor. While it has repeatedly been coined as a civilian power, this was also faute de mieux, as there were no military alternatives available (Bull, 1982; Hill, 1990; Kirste and Maull, 1996). How relevant this concept will be in the future remains to be seen. For a number of reasons, the EU is still looking for its role in world affairs (Mayer, 2008). Observing a normative impact of the EU on its member states foreign and security policy, which may be called normative Europeanization, is not to be mistaken for a specific norm-oriented foreign and security policy of the EU itself (Brommesson, 2010). Summing up, while the UN plays a crucial role, small and medium-sized neutral and alliance-free states are also bound to look for regional organizations to develop and implement their foreign policy. Though regional organizations cannot export ideas per se, they can contribute to the promotion of new ideas within the UN global framework. Besides the potentially interesting framework of the OSCE already mentioned, neutral and alliance-free European states could strengthen their engagement as brokers of peacebuilding ideas both inside and outside the EU: inside the EU, they could opt for a clearer stance and more engagement of the Union on value-oriented and politically sensitive peacebuilding issues. However, the possibilities of the EU to seize the initiative in this field will be limited, as it will continue to count some larger states with extensive colonial traditions among its members, which will affect both the capacity of the EU to act on these issues and its perception by third-party states. Outside the EU, however, neutral and alliance-free states could define common initiatives to be implemented in the framework of the UN. The EU might still agree among its members to support these positions at a later stage.

Conclusions
The article suggests a modified role concept for neutral states. They should become brokers of specific ideas in the field of peacebuilding. Such a role would clearly trespass on their traditional national interests in terms of maintaining military neutrality. While neutrality as such may not be of great material relevance to their national security in todays international relations, a potentially reinforced brokering role based on their tradition and principles might still provide neutrals with a specific task based on comparative advantages in reforming and promoting the development of international society.

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The article shows how the ideational character of neutrality and its historic anchorage provide neutral states with a strong position from which to promote sovereignty-sensitive ideas in international relations. This is due to both the realistic and the idealistic functions of neutrality: while the credibility of neutrality presumes sovereignty and autonomy, neutral states have developed an impressive track record of promoting soft power in international relations and of favouring non-violent means of conflict resolution. These two types of neutrality functions can be attributed to two kinds of ideas: its realistic functions are based on cognition and intended effects, while its idealistic functions are more of a normative type of idea, following a logic of appropriateness. Todays peacebuilding ideas are more normative than assumed by implementing agencies. This means that the conditions deemed as necessary to achieving peace are more disputed than is usually recognized. Neutral states that have deployed both instrumental and value-type ideas in their foreign policy orientation make very suitable carriers of peacebuilding ideas, especially if those ideas prove to be sovereignty-sensitive. Having analysed the example of R2P, it can be assumed that neutral states would have an important role to play also with other ideas clustered around the overarching concept of conflict prevention (Lund, 2009). Neutral states might play a role not only in promoting such ideas, but also in monitoring and implementing them. They could promote new perspectives on how to further develop conflict prevention in order to assuage the suspicions of sovereignty-conscious states in the global south. Though prevention has been at the heart of the UN since it came into existence, states have always been reluctant to implement it in a substantive way. Neutrals could reduce the contradiction between prevention and intervention. They would help bridge the gap between the world of sovereignty (world of states) and the world of intervention (world of international society). Compared to NGOs, which, due to their nature, have less weight and legitimacy to argue on sovereignty issues, neutral state-advocacy could manage to affect positively the relation of new ideas towards pre-existing ones in order to make them appear as appropriate. Compared to non-neutral states, for example, Norway, where the projection as a peace nation is a relatively new phenomenon dating from the early 1990s (Skanland, 2010), European neutrals have historically well-established traditions in policy fields which would today be labelled as conflict prevention (Bjrkdahl, 2007; Goetschel et al., 2005: 1416). Particularly in regard to sovereignty-sensitive issues, this makes them better forerunners or role models than non-neutral states. Neutrals should develop this extended role concept, while being aware of manipulation by large powers, working on a consensus basis. In view of the historical, conceptual and theoretical arguments articulated in this article, it is possible to speak of untapped potential; neutrals have a comparative advantage in the promotion of sovereignty-sensitive peacebuilding ideas. Tapping into this potential would benefit both them and international peacebuilding. Funding
The Swiss National Science Foundation provided financial support through a direct grant and through its contribution to the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change.

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Thanks is given to the Center for International Conflict Resolution of the School for International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University, where the author spent one month as a Visiting Scholar, for its hospitality. The author remains indebted to David Lanz, Daniel Michel, both editors and the anonymous reviewers for their extremely useful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes
1. In Austria, the Lower House of Parliament adopted a new security and defence doctrine in 2001 in which it declared the country alliance-free. However, only the two then governing parties voted in favour of the new doctrine. The Social Democrats and the Green party opposed it (Neuhold, 2003: 16). Furthermore, the neutrality is still enshrined constitutionally. In Switzerland, 93% of the population is still convinced that neutrality allows the country to mediate in international conflicts and to offer its good offices (Tresch et al., 2010: 110). For the conceptual significance of peacebuilding in Irish neutrality, cf. Devine, 2008. The prudent behaviour of neutral states during the Cold War was also a result of the disappointing experiences they had had with the League of Nations in the inter-war period (Rappard, 1954). The idea of neo-neutrality was embedded in the context of the inter-war period in which other initiatives, such us the Kellogg-Briand Pact from 1928, prohibited international wars. The pact, initiated by the foreign ministers of France and the USA, was signed by a large majority of states but became politically buried in the deteriorating international political climate of its time. Other states also value their sovereignty, but may seek to protect it within a military alliance. The credibility of their foreign and security policy does not depend to the same extent on their self-determination. Others read this realistic and idealistic divide differently, it should be noted. For instance, Swedish neutrality was seen as Janus-faced because the state had also prepared for some assistance from NATO in the event of a Soviet attack during the Cold War (Tunander, 1999). I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this point. The development towards a more active stance corresponds to the discussions about small states foreign policy orientations in general (Goetschel, 1998). The particularity of neutral states lies in the substance of this more active orientation. In the case of Switzerland, the concept of active neutrality had already been coined during the Cold War. It was revived in 2005 by Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey. See Ball and Hendrickson (2006: 6) for an overview of African-led training and research initiatives. The United Nations Security Council statement (S/PRST/2008/14) can be found here: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%20S%20PRST%202008%2014.pdf CIVCOM is a committee within the diplomatic structure of the Council of Ministers on which member states are represented by diplomats from within their permanent representations to the EU. NGO consultations have been coordinated since 2007 by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). Further details on CCHS can be found here: http://www.humansecurity.info/. The networks members include Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand. South Africa is an observer. The report can be accessed via its website: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/ index.html

2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

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14. Introduced in 2007, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) allows the European Commission to finance projects in response to crises worldwide. The Peacebuilding Partnership provides a framework of cooperation between the European Commission and NGOs. Further information can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifs/index_en.htm 15. One of the reasons for this was the pillar-structure of the EU and the separation of political matters dealt with in the Council of Ministers from the technical matters dealt with in the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty brought more institutional coherence in this respect. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the reforms will be reflected in concrete policy changes.

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Goetschel Author Biography

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Laurent Goetschel is Professor of Political Science at the Europe Institute of the University of Basel and Director of the Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) in Bern. His research interests include foreign policy analyses, regional integration, as well as peace and conflict research.

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