POLITICAL&

No. 3 (10), March 2008

SECURITY Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS “Viitorul”

STATEWATCH
Focus
After the PCRM
Congress,
the country has
a new-old
government

The Communist
“Ship” Charts a
Course for 2009:
Should Foreign
Policy Change?

The truth is out

there: drugging
on the way to
rule of law

www.viitorul.org
The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDS) Viitorul is a research, education
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 POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
Domestic
Policy Sector
March 2008
After the PCRM Congress,
the country has a new-old
government
2
Summary
No. 3 (10)
Elections in the Gagauz Yeri region often cre-
ate tensions between the central authorities and the
executive of the autonomous region because they
revel to Moldovan officials the region’s problems. The
election results do not favor the Communists Party
of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM). The PCRM
Congress took place without any surprises and there
was an attempt to promote youth. The surprise of the
month was the replacement of the Tarlev Govern-
ment with the Greceanîi Government. The changes
are not significant, but the representation of the
women in ministerial offices increased in the new
government from two to six. The Republic of Mol-
dova obtained a credit of 19 million USD from the
IMF, but opposition parties and some researchers
show that the Government is not financing the local
authorities according to economic criteria, but on the
basis of political criteria.
The elections in Gagauzia: party failure
or victory of independents
Elections for the Popular Assembly from
Găgăuzia show that in the region there are centrifu-
gal tendencies. Initially, the governor of the region,
Mihail Formuzal, demanded the allocation of 1.2
million lei ($108,000) to organize the elections for
the Popular Assembly of Gagauzia. The governor
qualified the Government’s refusal to allocate this
money as a „great error and a proof of Government’s
disrespect towards the deputies and the people of the
autonomy.” The Popular Assembly of Gagauzia previ-
ously voted to transfer the sum of 600,000 lei from
the regional Reserve Fund to the Central Electoral
Commission. Still, Governor Formuzal did not agree
on spending the money from the Reserve Fund for
by Ion Marandici
ionmarandici@gmail.com
elections. It should be mentioned that Formuzal was
never close to the Communist Party, but was sup-
ported by the opposition party Popular Republican
Party led by Nicolae Andronic.
The misunderstanding between the central
authorities and the Gagauz executive became more
pronounced when the Russian Federation decided to
send to Gagauzia, one of the regions most affected by
the drought, humanitarian aid following a request by
Formuzal. Still, the Moldovan Government consid-
ered the distribution of the humanitarian aid during
the electoral campaign as inappropriate, fearing the
increasing popularity of the pro-Formuzal candidates.
So, the decision was to block the humanitarian aid.
Later on, when the aid arrived in Moldova, Gagauz’s
executive demanded that the whole aid be directed
towards the region. However, regional representatives
were not allowed to participate at the transporta-
tion and the unloading of the humanitarian aid.
Moreover, the Minister for Agriculture, Anatolie
Gorodenco, declared that no aid would be sent to the
region. The declaration provoked the dissatisfaction
of the regional authorities who demanded that Prime
Minister Tarlev clarify those statements and that the
Republican Commission for Aid Distribution make
public the list of aid allocated for the Gagauz region.
The electoral campaign took place in the con-
text of tensions between Comrat and Chisinau. The
elections drew numerous Moldovan officials to the
region and revealed certain problems not covered by
the republican press.
Even though Russian is the working language at
Comrat University and the majority of ethnic Ga-
gauzians speak Russian, there is a need for Romanian
language studies. According to many ethnic Gagauz-
ians, especially youth, there are no Romanian lan-
guage professors in schools. For this reason, during
an electoral meeting, speaker Marian Lupu promised
Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS VIITORUL
to create a commission that will develop new state
language teaching methods for non-speakers and will
monitor the way this program is implemented. Previ-
ously, Gagauz’s executive demanded the allocation of
special funds for special Romanian language courses
for minorities, but their appeal went unanswered.
Another problem widely commented on by PCRM
representatives was the interruption of an interview
broadcast by a local cable television station. Local
authorities declared that the interruption was due
to technical problems, but the PCRM doubted this
explanation.
The political landscape of the region is defined by
three political groups and the independent candi-
dates. A distinguishing political characteristic of the
region is the failure of Moldovan political parties to
gain ground. Instead, many of the candidates register
as independent getting support from certain par-
ties. Broadly speaking, the first of the three groups
is the informal block „For a flourishing Gagauzia in
a Renewed Moldova”. The block attracts members
who are close to former Governor Gheorghi Tabun-
scic and communist candidates. The second group is
comprised of supporters of Nicolai Dudoglo, Mayor
of Comrat. According to certain sources, the candi-
dates from the Democratic Party are also part of this
group. The third group is „United Gagauzia” Move-
ment supported by Ravnopravie (Valery Klimenco),
Nicolae Andronic (Popular Republican Party),
Serafim Urechean (AMN) and Dumitru Braghis
(PSDM). There are also independent candidates who
are not supported by any of these groups.
Still, the most important regional structure is the
Social Movement „United Gagauzia” because it is
supported by politicians who would like the region
to gain even more autonomy. At the last congress
of the Movement in March, the first president of
the Gagauzian republic, Stepan Topal, compared
the activity of the Movement with the late-1980s
national-patriotic movements “Gagauz Halki” and
“Vatan”. Topal declared that the Gagauzians are con-
fronted with the same dangers as twenty years ago:
they are threatened with assimilation; they do not
have representatives among the central authorities;
they cannot influence the politics of the country; and
their rights are infringed upon. At the congress, the
Movement unanimously called upon the leadership
of the Republic of Moldova to change the attitude of
POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
the central authorities towards the inhabitants of the
region.
March 2008
“United Gagauzia” expressed its support for the
“sovereignty and integrity of their homeland” under-
lining that Governor Mihail Formuzal wished the
people of the region to live in peace and understand-
ing with the central government, but “the last events
show the hand that regional authorities gave to the
national government was ignored.” The delegates
3
claimed that the region does not get any money for
the development of the language, of the national
culture, for publishing books by Gagauzian writers
No. 3 (10)
and poets.” According to certain press information,
“Edinnaya Gagauzia” would seek to obtain the same
status as the Transnistrian region and proportional
representation in Moldova’s Parliament. The Gagauz
declare they do not have representatives in the state’s
higher offices and thus lack the capacity to influence
state policies. However, it should be mentioned that
the governor (bashkan) is a permanent Government
member and is consulted on all laws and govern-
mental decisions. Moreover, one representative of the
autonomous region is included in many of the high
ranking committees.
In the context of a poor electoral campaign, the
participation at the first round of elections was rela-
tively high, approximately 70%, and almost 60% in
the second round. The results of the elections showed
the Moldovan parties failure to consolidate in the
region. The final results show that 21 members of the
Popular Assembly will be independent candidates,
10 will represent the PCRM, two the Democrats
and two will represent Ravnopravie and the Socialist
Party.
Obviously, after loosing the competition for the
governorship and after loosing ground at the 2007
local elections, the PCRM also registered lower re-
sults at these elections. If in November 2003, Com-
munists gained 16 seats, this time they only gained
10. However, at that time the PCRM managed to
form a coalition with seven deputies. It remains to be
seen whether the PCRM will manage to form a post-
electoral coalition in the Popular Assembly this time.
Since the behavior of the independent candidates is
very hard to predict, it is not clear whether the coali-
tion will be formed by Communists or by supporters
of Governor Mihail Formuzal.
Regarding the fairness of the elections, the
 POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
Delegation of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe and the League
March 2008
for Defense of Human Rights concluded that these
elections generally met international standards. The
major deficiencies were the secrecy of the vote, the
family vote, the low-quality paper of the ballots, and
the high number of persons on the additional lists.
The Delegation recommended the elaboration of an
electronic registry by the Central Electoral Commis-
4
sion and the urgent harmonization of the Electoral
Code of Gagauzia with the national one.
No. 3 (10)
Premier Tarlev resigned after
the PCRM Congress
The Sixth PCRM Congress approved the new
party program and elected members to the party’s
leadership structures: the Central Committee (125
members) and the Executive Bureau (9 members).
Representing approximately 20,000 members, 412
delegates from all PCRM organizations participated
at the congress. Deputies from the Communist
parliamentary group and almost all Government
members were present at the congress. It was a con-
gress without any surprises, no splits and no criti-
cisms of the new party program. Hence, no wonder
that Vladimir Voronin was reelected to the office of
Party Chairman by the delegates’ unanimous vote.
Also, the structure of the Central Committee of the
party was extended to comprise 125 members and
the most important structure, the Executive Bureau,
now has nine members. Members of the Executive
Bureau remained Vladimir Voronin, Mark Tcaciuc,
Grigore Petrenco, Vladimir Vitiuc and Svetlana Popa
elected also at the last congress. The new members
of the Executive Bureau are Victor Mindru, Ana-
toly Zagarodnii, Alexandr Isaev and Doina Rotari.
All these changes took place in order to promote
younger people. Marian Lupu was also promoted,
probably in order to defeat rumors that he is likely
to leave the party. The same cannot be said about
Vasile Tarlev, at that time still prime minister. No
criticisms regarding his government were heard
during the Congress. Even if Tarlev’s dismissal was
planned a few months before the congress, the
delegates found out only a few days later that the
Government and Vasile Tarlev, after seven years of
leadership, resigned.
The majority of political analysts and journalists
were surprised by Tarlev’s resignation only a few days
after the party’s congress. For seven years there was
no change at the top of the Government and that
situation led to the stagnation of the Government’s
structures. Thus, Tarlev’s leave was considered as a
positive step for the activity of the Government. It is
important to keep in mind that Vasile Tarlev re-
nounced his office not because of certain criticisms,
but only “to change the boring faces,” an explanation
delivered by the president. The second explanation
offered by Voronin was that the simplest method to
change certain persons in the Government was to
change the whole Government. During his activity,
Tarlev was a disciplined official who made a lot of
visits in the country and less abroad. Despite those
activities, the Tarlev Government’s success remains
to be seen. There are no doubts that the resignation
was planned to take place after the PCRM Congress.
Although surprising, the logical conclusion is that
Prime Minister Tarlev did not leave his office for rea-
sons of incompetence, but because voters, and later
on party leadership, became bored and desired gov-
ernment changes “without much noise.” Still, Tarlev
continues to enjoy a high degree of popularity.
A day after Tarlev’s resignation, Voronin an-
nounced Zinaida Greceanîi as the new Prime Min-
ister. Probably Greceanii will stay prime minister
until 2009. Former finance minister and prime vice
premier, Greceanii has run for the mayor’s office in
Chisinau on behalf of PCRM, but without major
success. Even if she is considered a professional in
the field of finances, she too played a role in the de-
cision of the European Court of Human Rights that
the Republic of Moldova will have to pay 2,500,000
euros. It is not clear yet how successful were the
negotiations led by Greceanii with Russian giant
Gazprom regarding the price for the natural gas. On
the other hand, she was the one which managed to
re-start the negotiations with the IMF and World
Bank just after the PCRM came to power in 2001.
Still, Greceanii becomes the first female prime
minister in the whole history of the Moldovan state.
Previously, Eugenia Ostapciuc was the first female
speaker. Many anticipated that Greceanii would
come in front of the Parliament with a brand new
government, but she did not change much. In fact
five ministers were replaced: Victor Tvircun (Educa-
tion and Youth), Mihai Pop (Finances), Vladimir
Ababii (Public Health), Gheorghe Papuc (Domestic
Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS VIITORUL
Affairs) and Vladimir Molojen (Development of
Information Society). They were replaced by vice
ministers or other high ranking public servants
except in the Ministry of Finances, in which case the
former Moldovan Ambassador to the UK was ap-
pointed, but she was also a vice minister for several
years. The Ministry for Industry and Infrastructure
was dissolved, while a new ministry was created, the
Ministry for Constructions, on the basis of a former
agency. There are six new ministers, but they are not
government outsiders. At the top, Igor Dodon was
promoted becoming prime vice premier. At the same
time, Andrei Stratan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
European Integration, and Victor Stepaniuc main-
tained their offices of vice premiers.
Basically, there are no spectacular changes with
persons brought from outside the Government,
but rather the replacement of ministers with vice
ministers. Indeed, what is new with the Greceanii
Government is the higher number of women in
ministerial functions from two to six. Of course, in
a pre-electoral year the new Government will not
risk to undertake courageous reforms. Most of the
needed reforms are of a liberal type and are very
unpopular, thus it is highly improbable that the Gre-
ceanii Government will have the necessary political
will to start radical reforms.
The political aspect in financing
local authorities
In March, the International Monetary Fund
decided to allocate a new grant of approximately
19 million USD for the Republic of Moldova. The
IMF Board of Executive Directors published also
the prognosis and certain recommendations for
2008. On one hand, the IMF appreciated the fiscal
discipline of the authorities, but still views the risk
of an inflation rate higher than 10% as high. Ac-
cording to the IMF prognosis, the annual inflation
rate should not surpass 11.4% in 2008 and should
sink to 7.9% in 2009. The GNP should grow in
2008 from 4.2 in 2007 to 5.3 billion USD and
economic growth should reach 7%. The internal and
external debt should decrease according to the IMF
prognosis. Of course, taking a new credit in advanta-
geous conditions is a success, but in the last period
there were increasing signals that public finances are
re-distributed in the districts of the country based
POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
on political criteria. Chairman of the Our Moldova
Alliance party, Serafim Urecheanu, accused the
Government in a press conference of offering more
March 2008
funds for the Basarabeasca district, especially to the
Bascalia village, former Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev’s
hometown, while localities with non-Communist
mayors were deprived of public funds. Urecheanu
stated that the district of Basarabeasca, with a popu-
lation of 26,000 persons, was receiving 26 million
lei. At the same time, for the districts Ungheni,
5
Orhei, Hancesti, Edinet, with a population between
100,000 and 150,000, were allocated on average in-
vestments of 850,000 lei. Moreover, the capital city
No. 3 (10)
will not receive any investment funds this year.
The statements were confirmed by a study
published by IDIS “Viitorul” concerning the politi-
cal aspect of local administration financing. The
research demonstrated that the central authorities
favor Communist mayors. According to the study,
70% of the elected mayors on PCRM lists would
have received resources for capital investments in
2007, while only 32% of the non-Communist
mayors received such funds. Also, the study shows
that the Government Reserve Fund was misused in
order to support independent mayors, with the hope
of attracting them to the PCRM. In the first months
of 2008, the Government succeeded in directing
almost 80% of the capital investment funds towards
the PCRM and independent mayors.
Prognosis
Confrontations between non-communist parties
become more intense, particularly between Chris-
tian Democrats (PPCD) and Liberal Democrats
(PLDM). In April, the Liberal Democrats will start
gathering signatures for the initiation of a referen-
dum that aims to change the way the president is
elected and to introduce a uninominal vote. After
the president’s recent declarations, it seems in the
near future that the Parliament will raise the elec-
toral threshold from 4% to 6%. The protests of the
license holders will continue also in April. Negotia-
tions to form a post-electoral alliance will begin after
the second tour of elections in the Gagauz region.
It is also highly probable that in the period before
elections government financing of local authorities
will follow political criteria rather than development
priorities.
 POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
Foreign
March 2008
Policy Sector
The Communist “Ship”
Charts a Course for 2009:
Should Foreign Policy Change?
6
No. 3 (10)
Overview
An unexpected milestone in Moldovan political
life is undoubtedly the resignation of the Tarlev
government. No decisions adopted at Communist
Party congress of March 15th could predict such a
course of events. Mr. Tarlev willingly submitted his
resignation and President Voronin did not hesitate
to accept it. Without referencing conspiracy theories,
one would attribute the resignation to a strategic
change in policy promoted by the party in power. In
light of the 2009 elections, the Communist “ship”
appears to be making arrangements to continue
safely navigating the waters of Moldovan politics.
The issue is now what this move entails and what the
course of the foreign policy will be.
The Russian Duma’s hearings about the three
unrecognized republics in the post-Soviet space
fed and strengthened rumors about Chisinau and
Moscow agreeing on a plan to solve the Transnistrian
conflict. Regarding South Osetia and Abkhazia,
the Duma’s lower chamber recommended that
the Russian Federation consider recognizing
their independence; no such resolution was made
regarding Transnistria. The Duma considers that the
bilateral dialogue between Voronin and Putin does
not require such initiative and the process should
follow the agreements reached between the two
presidents.
In contrast, the EU Troika and Moldovan
authorities recently acknowledged at a meeting the
positive results of EUBAM mission and reinforced
their commitment to reforms and cooperation. All
in all, nothing unusual as the EU expects to see that
commitment fulfilled with results, not just empty
declarations.
by Sergiu Panainte
sergiu.panainte@gmail.com
Greceanii as Prime Minister, Tarlev as _____?
Tarlev firmly held the prime ministerial chair
during seven years of communist rule and enjoyed
the trust of party leadership. His sudden decision
to resign is not logical since the government that
he led has been constantly praised for its successes
and achievements. In any democratic country such
a paradox would never happen. Moreover, Tarlev’s
mentor, President Voronin, accepted his resignation
within seconds. It suggests nothing less than a very
well orchestrated Communist Party plan before the
parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, this equation
lacks some variables obscuring the meaning of this
undertaking.
The only known variable is the president’s
announcement of the nominee, Deputy Prime
Minister Zinaida Greceanii, for the post of prime
minister. Facing a severe lack of qualified people
within the party, Greceanii is an acceptable choice for
the situation the party finds itself in. The question
is whether Greceanii will be any more able than
Tarlev to cope with all the problems inherited from
the previous government. However, considering
party discipline and its rigid hierarchy, predictably
Greceanii will follow party decisions with regard to
all aspects of internal and foreign policy. She will
not have much room for maneuvering and will not
get the chance to promote her own initiatives. She
made a relatively good finance minister, but here the
pressure will be ten times greater. Nonetheless, with
her party’s blessing she will be an obedient prime
minister just as Tarlev was.
The second variable is relatively unknown. What
future is Tarlev expected to embrace? There is an
inexplicable silence on this topic. Tarlev himself did
not make any comments over his resignation, nor
Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS VIITORUL
did anybody else within the party. However, just
after accepting Tarlev’s resignation, President Voronin
decorated him with the highest state distinction,
the Order of the Republic. The Order is awarded
for extraordinary achievements in government
service. This leads to the idea that while thanked for
his service as a prime minister, Tarlev must receive
another “job” either within the party or within state
structures. Although there are speculations that
Tarlev is being groomed for the presidential chair,
it would be premature to accept this hypothesis.
However, it should not be disregarded either. What
other options are there for him? None fit the logic of
his resignation. An ambassadorial mandate, foreign
minister portfolio, and most everything else would
be a step down for Tarlev after holding the second
most powerful position in the executive branch.
Therefore, Tarlev is either to become president or to
be dismissed entirely.
Whatever scenario the Communists have
prepared it is relevant to question what foreign policy
will look like? Presuming that Greceanii will not
be a better prime minister than Tarlev and will be
a docile “tool” in the hands of the Voronin clan, it
appears that there will be no change in foreign policy.
Relations with Russia will be further developed
in tandem with EU relations assuming that EU
integration does not conflict with membership in
the CIS. As the saying goes, there is nothing new
under the sun. Once again, the 2009 elections will
decide who is to be trusted with the power to rule
the country.
How Close to Reunification?
This month, the Russian Duma examined the
possibility of recognizing the separatist entities
of South Osetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. This
comes in response to Kosovo’s independence and
enormous Western support for the realization of this
independence. Stating that these “republics with
established democracies deserve to be independent
more than Kosovo,” the Duma, however, pledged
its commitment to international norms and the
territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova.
Nevertheless, the roughly 17-year existence of these
state-like entities urges the Russian Federation to
account for their “rights” and the rights of Russian
POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
citizens residing in these territories. Although Russian
intentions are no secret, Moldovan authorities must
March 2008
rely on the Russian Federation’s good will, which
actually President Voronin does all too well.
The hearings revealed the Duma’s strong
conviction that South Osetia and Abkhazia should
gain independence and two documents have been
drafted and submitted to the incumbent President
7
Administration and Government. They will have to
examine the proposed acts and to decide the fate of
these regions in due time or to let this responsibility
No. 3 (10)
to the new administration.
With regard to Transnistria the Duma was less
intractable. The Duma acknowledged that relations
between Moldova and Russia provide for a constant
dialogue on the Transnistrian issue and reconfirmed
its attachment to Moldova’s territorial integrity.
However, until a political solution is reached, the
Russian army contingent will not leave Transnistria
in order not to destabilize the region. Moreover, the
Duma suggested increasing this contingent just in
case.
The good part of these hearings is that for the
time being the Russian Federation is not willing to
recognize Transnistrian independence. The drawback
is that the Russian authorities do not seriously
consider the withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers”.
On the contrary, they are considering augmenting
this military presence. This is outrageous since
Moldova is a neutral state and it is neutral not only
from NATO, but from Russia as well. This thing
however, counts less for Moscow which tries to
coerce Moldova into drafting a document providing
for the international recognition of country’s
neutrality to be signed during NATO Summit in
Bucharest by the major powers like the US, EU
and so on. Meanwhile, Russia brutally violates this
neutrality by still keeping its troops in Transnistria.
It seems that the price for the non-recognition of
Transnistria is Moldovan neutrality. This represents a
countermove undertaken by Russia in the light of the
NATO Summit in Bucharest where three new states
will join the Alliance. These are the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania and
Croatia. Ukraine and Georgia are to be proposed for
NATO membership. Thus loosing important ground
to NATO, Russia is striving to fortify its position in
Transnistria.
 POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
In conclusion, reunification between Moldova
and Transnistria is still a dream for the future. Where
March 2008
Russia is ubiquitously present in all the conflict
resolution mechanisms, Chisinau is dragged more
and more into asymmetric concessions. Discouraging
enough is that this situation is entirely approved
by the EU Special Representative for Moldova,
Kalman Miszei, who emphasized that the “5+2”
negotiating format is the optimal one for reaching
8
a long-lasting solution. Once again, as so many
times in the past the issue remains to be solved by
Moscow and Chisinau where Chisinau has nothing
No. 3 (10)
to counterbalance the “Russian bear”.
How Much Progress Will Be
in the “Progress Report”?
By the middle of the month the meeting of the
EU Troika and the Moldovan delegation in Brussels
rendered no new results for bilateral relations.
The EU vocabulary hardly favored encouraging
declarations with regard to Moldova. The only
praiseworthy activity was the EUBAM mission
which is successfully carrying out its mandate at the
Moldovan-Ukrainian border.
Later on, at a conference dedicated to the
resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, the head of
the European Commission Delegation to Moldova
announced that the unit he is heading will produce
a “country report” to asses the progress achieved by
Moldova in the implementation of the Action Plan.
This report will serve as the main reference point
for the EU as a whole in deciding what the future
agreement with Moldova should look like. It seems
that the EU has a tough job to do since there is
little progress to measure. In the last six months the
recurrent phrase of EU officials visiting Moldova was
“reforms should continue.” With the reformation
process on its knees, Moldova has no right to hope
for receiving the Association Agreement it wants.
Nevertheless, the report must reference the
results achieved by the same EUBAM or the process
of harmonizing national and European legislation.
Based on these small accomplishments the EU
should formulate its further approach to “reforms-
reluctant” Moldova. While there is little to praise, the
EU will again draw attention to the things Moldova
did not manage to accomplish. These targets remain
unchanged: the rule of law, respect for basic freedoms
and liberties, and a functional market economy. The
economic premises have been set by entering into
force from the 14th March of the Autonomous Trade
Preferences. Politically, the meetings of the EU-
Moldova Cooperative Committee, as well as of other
committees, constantly raised the issue of democratic
reforms and transparency of the democratic process.
The following months will shed light on the way
the relationship between Moldova and the EU is to
continue and how long the sides can “bear with each
other.”
Prognosis
This spring began distinctly with the resignation
of Tarlev cabinet raising the issue of succession to
the incumbent president. As such, Tarlev appears
as the most likely candidate to replace Voronin
and to secure the Communist Party grip on power.
The foreign policy of the new government will not
undergo changes since the governing party altered
the shape, but not the content. Therefore, one
will witness the same close relations with Russia,
antagonism in relations with Romania, and feigned
compliance with European norms and values when
negotiating with the EU.
On the reunification issue, the Russian
Federation has assured the international community
that it will not presently recognize Transnistria on
condition that Moldova would remain neutral and
put that neutrality in a document signed by the
major powers represented in the format of “5+2”
format of negotiations. This will stop the expansion
of NATO at least in a region where Russia still has a
military presence. If Georgia and Ukraine start the
procedure for joining the Alliance, Russia will be
surrounded on the whole of its western front. That
is why Moscow needs an ally, even one as small as
Moldova is.
While the EU made it clear that no new
contractual agreement will be available for
Moldova unless the parliamentary elections are
held in accordance with democratic norms, the EU
Commission’s draft progress report will be definitive
until 2009. It will clarify whether Moldova
receives any further assistance and support for its
enterprises.
Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS VIITORUL
Security
Policy Sector
The truth is out there:
drugging on the way
to rule of law
Overview
Regarding developments in the security sector
of the Republic of Moldova, this month witnessed
a series of events which prove some well-known
patterns or widespread beliefs concerning the
behavior of the police service, as well as the
state of affairs on the Transnistrian side of the
Moldovan-Ukrainian border.
Referring to the police image in the Republic
of Moldova, one could easily state that it has not
improved since the Soviet period. Instead of being
a useful tool in maintaining public order and the
rule of law, security services have increasingly
focused on the first task, while forgetting the
meaning of the second. On the one hand, state
officials have praised the liquidation of organized
crime in the Republic of Moldova, referring to
the detention of major criminal leaders, while
ignoring the widely held opinion that it is the
police that, being involved in different illegal
activities, actually adopted a sort of criminal
behavior.
In respect to the situation on the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border, this month witnessed two big
drug trafficking operations, each of them pointing
to activities of international trafficking networks,
which are using Moldova, including Transnistria,
as a transit country for smuggling drugs to and
from the EU and to Eastern Europe.
POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
March 2008
by Alex Leşanu
leshanu@gmail.com
9
No. 3 (10)
From informational
to alimentary security
On March 7th, The Supreme Security
Council drafted a decision which recommended
the Government adopt a series of measures,
including the possibility of dismissing Stanislav
Gordea, the Director General of the Agency
for the Monitoring of Telecommunications and
Informatics. Referring to the reasons which lead
to this action, the Moldovan president’s official
web-site states that it is a matter of the “lack of
responsibility and initiative, which, in its turn,
endangers the informational security of Republic
of Moldova.”
Besides this statement, no other details
concerning the dismissal of Stanislav Gordea
have been unveiled. One of the possible reasons
is related to a letter, which was received by the
Voronin Administration. It seems that this letter
contained information on a possible placement
by a certain mobile operator of its server on
the territory of Romania. In this respect, it was
assumed that Romanian secret services were
granted access to this server, which gathers
information on the phone calls and electronic
messaging of customers. Thus, it was perceived as
a threat to national security.
On the other hand, not so long after the
demise of Stanislav Gordea, new information was
unveiled stating that this server is on the territory
of Moldova. Nevertheless, there is another server
on the territory of a neighboring country, but it
 POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
deals with GPRS access, which demands expensive
maintenance. As a consequence of this incident,
March 2008
the GSM operator has taken the responsibility
to relocate the GPRS server on the Moldovan
territory in April or May.
In addition, the Council has decided to form
a working group consisting of different control
institutions. This group will conduct an assessment
of fiscal activity of mobile operators and will check
10
the fulfillment of obligations assumed by these
operators according to their licenses. Moreover,
on March 28th, Parliament drafted a law on
No. 3 (10)
additional university specializations, one of which
happens to be “Informational Security”.
At the same meeting of the Supreme Security
Council, situations in the field of veterinary
standards and of alimentary security were
discussed. According to the information posted on
the Moldovan president’s official website, during
the meeting participants had the opportunity
to consult the results of a study, which points
to some problems such as: frequent frauds in
regard to public procurement of vaccines against
infectious animal diseases; misunderstanding of
requirements for prevention, diagnosis, treatment
and prevention of infectious animal diseases;
superficial inspection of quality of products of
animal origin; incomplete and unprofessional
veterinary medical examination.
In this sense, Vladimir Voronin demanded the
punishment of heads of sanitary and veterinary
supervision agencies who allowed abuse and
indiscipline. Furthermore, a series of actions
must be taken regarding the re-organization of
these agencies. Some ideas concerning the re-
organization process were presumed to have been
sent to the Government and Supreme Security
Council during a ten-day period. Nevertheless,
ten days after this meeting of the Supreme
Security Council, Prime-Minister Vasile Tarlev
resigned. Thus, the task of veterinary services
re-organization has to be fulfilled by another
government, which in its turn has to undergo the
same re-organization procedure. This resignation
of the whole Moldovan Government comes after
a series of sound resignation of particular heads of
some ministries or agencies.
Is Transnistria
„a black hole”?
Since its Declaration of Independence on
August 27th, 1991, Moldova has not had any
means of efficient monitoring of its border with
Ukraine, especially on the Transnistrian side of
the border. In the ‘90s it was widely beleived
that the breakaway province of Transnistria
was „Europe’s black hole”. In other words,
Transnistria was perceived as a promised land for
traffickers of all sorts - from drugs, weapons, and
human trafficking to food products. Since the
establishment of EUBAM, this perception was
somehow dilluted as soon as its representatives
held numerous press-confferences where they
revealed smuggling of only food products and
limited amounts of drugs. Nevertheless, recent
developments are reminiscent of the ‘90s
experience.
In March, a series of events related to
drug smuggling have pointed to the increased
importance of Moldova as a transit country on
the map of illegal trafficking. First, Ukrainian
mass-media reported the capture of more then
40 kilograms of cocaine by Ukrainian customs
authorities at the Odessa port. The drugs were
found in 36 cans of coconut juice in transit with
the destitation of Costa Rica-Moldova.
Immediately after this information was
revealed, the press office of the Moldovan
Prosecutor General anounced the destruction of an
extensive drug trafficking network that operated
according to the following scheme: Columbia-
Guatemala-Costa Rica-Odessa-Moldova-EU. This
network operated in Moldova since 2007.
The source refers to the main culprits of this
affair: Anatolie Vidish, group leader, Boris Vidish,
who was employed by Balti Forestry, and his
brother, Mircea Vidish, who is administrative head
in Tsypleshty village, Syngerey district. Along with
these suspects, there are two Costa Rican citizens
who are now in pretrial detention. They have
been engaged in activities of extracting cocaine
from different mixed liquids, which have been
transported to Moldova since the beginning of
Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova issued by IDIS VIITORUL
2008. For their activities they were each promised
a reward of 10,000 USD.
One week later, the Deputy Minister of
Interior Affairs, Valentin Zubic, unveiled a
new scheme of drug trafficking during a press
conference. This time it was a matter of 200
kilogramms of heroin, the largest amount of
drugs captued on Moldovan territory since its
independence. Taking into consideration that one
gram of heroin costs 50 euro on the black market,
then 200 kilogramms can be valued at 10 million
euro. In this case, the network operated according
to the following route: Afganistan-Turkey-
Moldova-EU.
According to Valentin Zubic this
transportation was detected as a result of an
extensive transnational operation conducted
in colaboration with some institutions from
neighboring countries. Drugs were carried in a
mini-bus and kept in sacks along with beans. Ala
Meleca, Spokesperson of The Ministry of Interior
Affairs, stated that operation was organized in two
months and, as a result, three suspects, all of them
foreign citizens, were detained.
Ministry of Interior Affairs
vs. Office of the Prosecutor
General: who is the winner?
Police corruption remains a problem according
to the 2007 Moldova Country Report on Human
Rights Practices, released by the The U.S. State
Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor on March 11th, 2008. The
Office of the Prosecutor General is responsible
for investigating police activities. However, the
prosecutor’s office staff stated that the Ministry
of Interior often ignored, or only superficially
examined, their reports of violations by police.
From this excerpt it is easy to acknowledge
that any sort of competition between the Ministry
of Interior Affairs and Office of The Prosecutor
General should not be excluded. Following
Vladimir Voronin’s recent initiatives to re-organize
the structure of control institutions, and the recent
POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
draft law that grants the Prosecutor General the
exclusive right to initiate penal charges against
March 2008
the Judiciary without the approval of Superior
Council of Magistracy, the balance of forces has
changed in favor of the Prosecutor General Office.
Moreover, due to the unclear circumstances
following the retirement of the Government, a
series of corruption deals involving high-ranking
police representatives could be unveiled. This
11
revelation is increasingly possible since the Office
of The Prosecutor General is gaining more
influence, while the Ministry of Interior Affairs,
No. 3 (10)
along with some other control authorities such
as the Center for Combating Corruption and
Economic Frauds, is loosing ground.
Already, on March 28th, PRO-TV Chisinau, a
private channel, provided some details concerning
the record capture of 200 kilograms of heroin.
According to this source, it is highly likely
that the Office of the Prosecutor General has
brought criminal charges against some top police
representatives who were involved in illegally
transporting drugs on Moldovan territory. It
is a matter of three police officers who were to
supervize the secure transportation of these ilegal
goods on Moldovan territory up to the Romanian
border.
In addition, the same TV channel stated
that the mini-bus used for the transportation of
drugs was stopped for an ordinary check by two
police agents. In this sense, it is highly likely that
the so-called „multinational operation”, which
was organized in two months, is no more than
a matter of chance or pure coincidence. This is
especially evident since these two police agents,
instead of being praised, were fired.
On the other hand, the prosecutor general’s
increasing legal authority does not necessarily
presume the extrapolation of this authority on the
moral level. On the contrary, lack of political will
to reform the Office of the Prosecutor General,
along with certain incidents implicating this
institution in the harassment of opposition parties
and media institutions, is increasingly pointing to
the fact that the Office of the Prosecutor General
resembles a kind of „scarecrow” against all those
whose viewpoints differ with the official party line.
 POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH
Prognosis
March 2008
To illustrate the behavior of security services
in the Republic of Moldova, the same report
released by The U.S. State Department refers to
the fact that „[in 2007] it was widely believed
that authorities, including the Ministry of the
Interior, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the
Security and Information Service, continued to
12
No. 3 (10)
The Bulletin is a bilingual monthly publication aiming to
provide analysis on various elements of domestic and foreign
policy, as well as on some issues of special interest for Moldova.
Political and Security Statewatch authors: Ion Marandici,
Sergiu Panainte, Alex Leşanu.
In order to subscribe to the distribution list of Political and
Security Statewatch bulletin, please contact us by e-mail:
ghenadie.mocanu@viitorul.org.
Coordination and distribution of the bulletin: Ghenadie
Mocanu.
Contacts:
Chisinau, 10/1, Iacob Hincu Str., 2009 MD, Republic of
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Tel/fax: (+ 373/22) 21 09 32; 21.36.32; 22.71.30
E-mail: idis_viitorul@mdl.net
Web: www.viitorul.org
conduct illegal searches and wiretaps.” Taking
into consideration the developments of the first
three months of 2008, it is increasingly possible
that these authorities did not learn their lesson in
2007 and this undemocratic instinct will prevail
in 2008. In addition, the fact that there is less
than one year left until the 2009 parliamentary
elections will demonstrate some new elements of
this „zero-sum game”.
www.viitorul.org
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