Can computers be creative?

A review on artificial creativity arguments

Eric Kok – emkok@students.cs.uu.nl

Introduction
Often when thinking about artificial intelligence, we tend to directly think of the higher level notions
of intelligence that humans seem to have. Concepts like consciousness, emotions, free will and
reasoning frequently arise in the discussion on human-level intelligence. And thinking of this, I’d like
to think of one other concept as being the most important of them to create intelligence – creativity.

Creativity seems not only one of the most important aspects of human intelligence, it is also often
cited as perhaps the hardest problem to solve of them all – if even possible. It has many connections
to related problems (1), but even on its own creativity is a concept that is frequently. If we like to
build artificial creativity some day, it is important to see if this is possible and how.

In this essay I will review existing literature and explain the problems involved with creativity in
computers. Based on this, I will form a conclusion that will answer our question ‘Can computers be
creative?’.

In this study into creativity, I will first look at the problem of defining what creativity is and what kind
of creativity we are willing to create in computers. This will result in several questions concerning
whether it can be done in principle. These are divided in technical and non-technical considerations.
From all this information, I will draw a conclusion and explain how I come to this.

Creativity relates to several other artificial intelligence topics. Questions like ‘Can computers think?’
or ‘Can computers have free will?’ share a lot of the arguments made in this essay. However, we will
focus on the creativity of computers, it being hard enough to cover fully already.

The definition of creativity

Before we can start our research into artificial creativity, we need know what it is that we want to
build into our computers. Because we are looking to build this creativity and test whether we
succeeded we need to have a definition of what this concept of creativity is. Ask two people what
creativity is and they are very likely to give a whole different answer. Let us go though several
concepts that we may come across when looking into artificial creativity.

The origin of the artificial intelligence question is usually credited to Turing (3) in his 1950-paper
introducing the Turing Test. Already here he talks about creativity and whether it can be done. From
his point of view, creativity has to do with ‘surprise’ and ‘originality’. If a computer surprises us with
something we didn’t expect it to do, we may say it is being creative. Since even random number
generators are than creative, he extents his idea to originality, stating it should produce original
work. He claims computers can come up with new facts.
Thinking about the words surprise and originality, it seems these are important for creativity indeed.
Creativity certainly has to do with coming up with something that wasn’t there – something that
wasn’t an existing fact. We could see a new research theory as such a creative outcome, being
something that wasn’t there before. I will later look into whether computers can do this. For now, we
first further analyse if these concepts ‘surprise’ and ‘originality’ are enough, and I don’t think so.
Surprise can also be achieved by a random number generator or a failing computer. An original
outcome in the sense that something has never been done before, is not what creativity is about. We
could take a chess piece move as an example. We see making such a move, when being made by a
chess grandmaster in particular, as a great creative process. However, the actual outcome (the action
taking a piece from 1 place to another) is not something that has never been done before.

If we take this to the general problem, we see that creativity can be specified in two ways: the
process or the outcome. In the chess move, the creativity was in the thought process of the chess
grandmaster. However, in an art painting for example, the outcome is what we think of as being
creative. You will have to come up with the idea of making this painting. The process and creative
outcome are often intermixed as we already see. This makes it important to each time view at both
ideas of creativity.

Creativity as an outcome is interesting because this is what we are actually being able to sense. It’s
the painting that we see, not the thought process. Does the painter really have an underlying idea on
why he made the painting this way? Does it have meaning and does it not when it was made without
thinking about it? It will be really difficult to test this. Testing the outcome on creativity however is
easier. The Turing Test (3) for intelligence can be extended here to test for human-like creativity. We
could state that if the creative outcome (like a music composition or a research thesis) can just as
well be from a human as a computer, it passes the Turing Test for creativity. So if a viewer cannot tell
whether it was a computer who made it or a human, the computer possesses human-level creativity.
Of course, it is debated whether passing the Turing Test implies being truly creative, since it doesn’t
test the actual thought process. However, for now this is no problem as long as we state that at least
the outcome is creative.

Apart from the concept surprise and originality, we may look at more complex definitions of
creativity. For example, the Merriam-Webster dictionary (4) states that creativity is ‘Having the
quality of something created rather than imitated’. This is an interesting explanation because this
implies it should not be just an imitation. You could say that by making artificial creativity, you
implicitly imitate human-like creativity and thus humans. However, this is only true when you look at
this from the implementation view, not from the behavioural view. Looking at behaviour, or the
outcome, it is needed for the computer to create something that is not the result of something he
did already know. Now, it is interesting to see if a computer can actually come up with such new
ideas. Since computers only reasons on its symbols which are put in by the programmer, can it suffice
to only derive new facts based on this knowledge?

Just before we see if artificial creativity can be done in principle, let’s take a look at the degrees of
creativity we can distinguish. Firstly, it seems that human-level creativity is the most elaborate form
of creativity we know. Therefore, it is the level which we want to compare our computer to. We will
establish if we have come so far, but keep in mind there are more levels of intelligence which are of
interest. The other extreme is the random number generator, which may take us by surprise.
However, nobody considers this as being creative. So currently we are somewhere along this line
between the random number generator and humans.

Can it be done in principle?

Talking about creativity, with both people in the field of artificial intelligence and outside, can
become pretty heated. Concepts like emotion or consciousness may arise and from there the
discussion seems endless. Also, existing programming concepts are considered and refuted. Both
these points of view deal with the suggestion that creativity should be possible. We would like to see
if we, in principle, can build artificial creativity. Because if we find any shortcoming, we might leave
the idea of creating creativity altogether.

First we will look at the programming paradigms considered for building artificial intelligence. The
most widely used approach is that of classical pre-programmed or deterministic systems. These
programs are build based on predefined algorithms that deterministically operate on knowledge that
the system has. From this knowledge the algorithm derives new facts which are previously non-
existing outcomes of the system. These new facts might be considered creative, if it suffices our
definition of creativity.

Do such systems have any shortcomings because determinism cannot create creativity in principle? If
we look at humans, it seems we use this kind of reasoning ourselves a lot in certain areas. For
example, in science we search for new unexplored facts in our research projects. Both the research
process and the outcomes are considered to be creative. Therefore, this kind of reasoning, the
process of combining existing knowledge to create new facts, may very well be sufficient for building
creativity. The same holds for chess moves: we reason on all the possibilities we know of and choose
one that seems best.

A research project that uses existing knowledge is Cope’s Experiments in Musical Intelligence (14). It
generates musical compositions based on pieces of music by Bach, Vivaldi and Cope himself. The
software analyses these pieces and uses them, as well as generated variations, to create new work.
These compositions, especially to the non-experienced listener, sound interesting and amazingly
human-like.

Often the argument is raised that deterministic systems can only create something that already
exists. The computer can never take us by surprise, because it just knows what we put into it (3).
Creativity involves new ideas which cannot emerge by simply following existing rules (5). However,
this totally in the eye of the beholder. Surely, we could make all calculations that the computer has
to make and predict the outcome. But then, if we would fully understand the human brain, it’s no
longer creative anymore too. In contrast, it even seems reasonable to create something based on
existing knowledge, since we can only think about something if we (or the computer) has a
representation of it. Computers take us by surprise all the time, either wanted or unwanted
(computer failure).

Based on this argumentation, I believe that creative outcomes are just combinations of existing
knowledge, without the need for randomness. Note that we might use randomness in deterministic
software. Although it not being a necessity for creativity, it might help to improve on creative
outcome. We could even claim that this randomness is also just a computer algorithm though and so
the same line of argumentation holds as for determinism.

What we do need is variation. Like in evolution, variation is needed to make enough new useful
combinations. If we the knowledge base is too small, we would get stuck because of this limitations.
If we have enough variety, the computer will be perfectly capable of being creative. It can create
something that is surprising, novel and before non-existing.

Next to classical deterministic reasoning systems, we might use learning systems or connectionist-
like models to build artificial creativity. Various techniques can be used including evolutionary
algorithms (like genetic algorithms), reinforcement learning, genetic algorithms and function
approximation (like neural networks). Such systems do not reason on their knowledge to logically
come to new facts, but rather come to the optimal behaviour by trying things out and learning from
this experience. Such systems are therefore black boxes (although the algorithms themselves can be
explained of course). If some output of the system is given, you can’t explain why this was the
optimal solution. There is no argumentation for the outcome, it is there because this turned out to
be most beneficial.

Learning can be used to build artificial creativity. It can for example be used to analyse knowledge of
musical compositions and combine this to create a new composition. The outcome is likely to be
something new – non-existing. If you use neural networks, you could even compare this with how
the human brain works. The neurons in the net are connected by links with certain weights. These
patterns can be compared to the synapses in the human brain. The neurons on itself are not creative
and do not have any knowledge, but the systems as a whole can display creative behaviour.

Neural networks and other learning and connectionist approaches therefore seem suited to program
artificial creativity. However, I personally believe they are merely a very handy tool and nothing more
than that. Like randomness, it is a very nice technique that can help us build better programs, but it is
not compulsory to be able to build artificially creative programs.

As we will see later, a property of the software might be that it can adjust itself. It changes its own
functions or constraints it operates on. Several projects used this approach, such as Lenat’s
Automatic Mathematician and EURISKO (12).

Apart from the available programming paradigms, there are often arguments raised that go deeper
than just the programming techniques. These include claims that artificial creativity cannot be build
because computers lack emotions, consciousness, intentions or even a soul. At first, these arguments
may seem valid because people associate creativity directly with such concepts. In effect, we need to
address these objections and try to refute them if we want to build artificial creativity. Especially the
process of making something creative is being contested.

The most commonly raised argument is that computers cannot be creative because they lack
emotions. The idea behind this is that without emotions, a certain creative outcome just has no
meaning. Obviously this implies that meaning is needed to get a truly creative outcome. If a
computers makes a musical composition by just analysing existing music it has no meaning. I do not
agree with this. If the composition made is just as original and interesting as a human composition,
why should the listener believe this is not a truly creative piece of work? It is the listener that decides
not only if the outcome is creative, but also the process of making it. This is because we can only
judge the outcome on what we can sense. We can hear the music (or read the notes), but we give
meaning to it ourselves. Maybe we think we know what the author meant, but this is still our
interpretation.

The same holds for other kinds of creativity. If we view a painting, we can only criticise the meaning
of it based on what we see. The painter may explain the meaning, but we, or even the painter,
cannot be sure this is what it truly means. It is always in the eye of the beholder to judge the genuine
meaning. I see no reason why computers cannot use this line of argumentation. Emotion is not
needed to build artificial creativity.

Cohen’s AARON project is the best-know research project generating full colour paintings with its
own style (15). Although Cohen himself does not claim the software to be creative, it is if we as a
viewer of its paintings judge him to be.

A different view is that consciousness is needed. Consciousness is the idea that the system should be
aware of itself. Humans are considered to be conscious and arguably some animals are as well. The
point is often raised that it is the consciousness that sets us apart from computers since computers
have no subjective experiences, they are not aware of their place in the world. A computer cannot
like red better than blue for example, or like anything at all. This difference between humans and
computers makes that computers cannot be creative (16).

Although this seems reasonable, it has a problem. It assumes consciousness is something a computer
cannot be. It is a certain property that humans have and that cannot be build. However, if a
computer simulates the conscious behaviour of a human, why should we judge the computer as not
being conscious? This reflects the Turing test for creativity. If the computer exposes the conscious
choices and actions resulting in a creative outcome such as a painting, the computer is itself
conscious and creative. In the colour example, why can’t the computer prefer red over blue? As long
as it’s consistent and honest about its feelings, it has the same consciousness about it as humans
have (6).

It is hard to see why this argument should not hold. Why is a human or chimpanzee conscious and
not an ant? It is because we, as humans, judge the ant’s behaviour as not intelligent enough to be
conscious. However, a super intelligent alien race may not even consider humans as conscious. It is
not a property you have or not have, but an objective interpretation of the beholder.

Apart from emotion or consciousness, intention is being addressed as the missing link to build
artificial creativity. What is meant by intention here is the goal the author has for which it needs
creativity. What does the creator intent to achieve? One of the main defenders of this theory is John
Searle and it resembles his Chinese Room argument. (7) He designed an experiment in which a man
sits in a room with books to translate English to Chinese. Through a hole in the closed room, he
receives an English text, translates it using the books and returns it through the hole. This, Searle
states, is what a computer does when you ask him to do a certain task. Now, he claims that the man
in the room, although he translated these texts, can’t speak Chinese because he doesn’t truly
understand it. This argument is now called the Chinese Room argument and can be extended to
intentionality for creativity. Searle claims the whole point of the experiment is to show that the man
in the room, or a computer, does not have the intentionality it needs because it only operates on
symbols and not on semantics.

To see if this is a problem for building artificial creativity indeed, the fact must hold that genuine
intentionality is needed in the process of creating. Now, who determines this? If a computer makes a
piece of art, you might say it has no real argumentation or intention based for it, because it does not
possess intentionality. That’s where I think the problem lies. For one thing, as with feelings, who says
this is the true intention the creator based his work on? Does it make a difference if the work had
been done by someone who didn’t care? Or by an elephant (8)? No, I believe that creativity, even the
creative process itself, is in the beholder, not the creator. It is the person that is viewing the painting
or listening to the music who determines the degree of creativity, if at all. Therefore, the fact that
computers have no biological intentionality is no setback in making artificial creativity.

Intentions can however be an interesting way to view intelligent or creative systems. As described by
Dennett (9), there are different ways of describing systems such as by the physical or functional
stance. He proposes the intentional stance in which the goals, or intentions, are used to explain the
systems workings. This view is already used as a basis for the BDI software agent architecture (10)
and can also be of use in building creativity. This approach might make it not only easier to oversee
the program’s inner workings but might also make artificial creativity easier to accept because it
doesn’t look like the classical GOFAI approach.

Conclusion
Having considered several technical and fundamental arguments on why artificial creativity is
impossible I will try to answer the question ‘Can computer be creative?’.

Yes, I believe computers can be creative, even as creative as humans. We have not come that far yet,
but there are no fundamental issues on why artificial human-level creativity should not be possible.
This is because creativity is a non-random combination of existing knowledge. Since computers can
reason on their beliefs and create new, previously non-existing facts, computers can be creative too.

There are three counterarguments against this statement. The first being that biological
consciousness or any other animal-specific property exists that is needed that computers can’t have.
This is for example advocated by Searl (7), and is called ‘brain stuff’. It is the biological substance that
can contain intelligence and thus creativity. This material, neuroprotein, makes animals, humans in
particular, so special. It allows for the consciousness and intentionality to exist upon. The problem is
that it is never been proven that such a material is needed to build intelligence on. In fact, any
material will do as long as it is possible to create the functional characteristics upon it. Therefore,
artificial creativity may very well be build on silicon-based computers.

Secondly, some refute that all possible (creative) outcomes already exist in the exploration space. A
creative process creates new facts based on its existing knowledge, thereby creating novel and
surprising new combinations. These outcomes already existed, but were just not made until then.
Sometimes it is argued that only humans can be creative because these possibilities just didn’t exist
before. The facts were not yet there to be explored (and selected). However, this is false. Take for
example a painter. All the options to make brush strokes in all the different colours are there,
available to the computer. Boden (11) calls all these possible combinations the conceptual space. It is
in this conceptual space that we can explore to come up with new combinations of the existing
known facts. All the options are already there.

Sometimes however, to come up with something genuinely creative, never been done by any human
(or computer), it is not enough to just explore this space. What it needs is to transform the
conceptual space itself. For computers to do this, they need to change the way it works itself, like
human introspection. This can be done to edit their own programs, or at least there constraints that
defined the conceptual space. Although very few of such programs exist today, it is very well possible
for the computer to do so.

Now if we accept that artificial human-level creativity is possible, how do we make it and when will it
be available? This, of course, is still impossible to answer. If we would know exactly how to build
creativity into computers, we would have already done it. However, we might not be as far off as we
might think. Several research projects have already shown very interesting results on a low and
domain-specific level. I believe the main ingredients are already there: conceptual space exploration,
randomness, learning and connectionist algorithms and self-adapting software. Near-future research
will show increasingly higher degrees of creativity. If we adopt ideas like Kurzweil’s law of
accelerating returns (13), it could be in just a few years that we see human-level creativity. He
believes the increase in available technology, as well as computation power, will increase
exponentially and we are in the ‘knee’ of the explosion. In other words, within years the increase in
knowledge and computer power will explode. He calls this the Singularity and we will have all the
available resources and knowledge to create intelligence. From that point, computers will be viewed
at as being just as creative as we are.

One final point to notice is that I don’t claim that computers, if they poses this human-level
creativity, are biologically conscious or have genuine emotions or feelings. The point is that this isn’t
needed for our computers to accept them as being like us. If we pass this creative Turing test,
artificial creativity will be just as creative as human creativity. From that moment, we can expect
computers to not only produce novel and interesting new music or paintings, but create new musical
genres, artistic movements and scientific theories. And humans will have all this to marvel at and use
for the future extension of human intelligence.

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