SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs.

CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents. The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows: 1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. 2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). 3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly. 4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads: The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable. 5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ." 6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram: TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS. 7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present: 1. Sali, Salic 2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 3. Dagalangit, Rakil 4. Dela Fuente, Antonio 5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus 7. Palomares, Diego 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo 9. Tomawis, Acmad 10. Tomawis, Jerry After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present: 1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer 2. Ali Salic 3. Ali Salindatu 4. Aratuc, Malik 5. Cajelo, Rene 6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 7. Dagalangit, Rakil 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio 9. Ortiz, Jesus 10 Palomares, Diego 11. Quijano, Jesus 12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad 14. Tomawis, Jerry An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads: HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session. HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions. PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1 Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course; (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter; (c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void; (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and (e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2 Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the nonpayment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8 The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.

to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts. We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic. On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein.

(12) General auditing. 21 In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22 Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27 Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28 But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) National defense and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and sea transport (7) Postal matters and telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine; (9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and naturalization; (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30 xxx xxx xxx See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31 An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus: SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas: (1) Organization of regional administrative system; (2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region; (4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region; (5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region; (6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree; (7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region; (8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities; (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region. The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs. The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34 Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it. In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs. SO ORDERED.

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, Respondents. Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under

prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it." chanrobles virtual law library Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis. Act No. 671 in full is as follows: AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. "SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority. SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938 It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a twothird vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:

It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . . Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides: The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one. As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged. What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned

in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the conventing of that body. It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly-call that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power - and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we take it that the

respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from the Constitution. Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620. The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.

After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department - unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively." These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines. Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be charged. Ozaeta, J., concurs.