Jan 21 - 48-Page Brief

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Date: 05/25/11 Time: 9:00 AM IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE CITY OF SEATTLE Plaintiff, vs. LEONARD BLATT, Accused. NO. 565314
DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPRESS (CrRLJ 3.6)
I.
MOTION
COMES NOW the accused, Leonard Blatt, in propria persona, and moves this Court to suppress all evidence taken subsequent to his and Harmon Weitzmans unlawful seizure by SPD officers at 21:35 HRS on January 21-22rd, 2011. This includes all evidence taken when police trespassed upon Harmons rented, private, secured, underground parking garage. This motion is based on the record and file in this cause, Article I, Section 7, of the Washington State Constitution, Criminal Rule (CrRLJ) 3.6, discovery supplied by the prosecution, testimony to be presented at the time of hearing, and the Memorandum of Authorities in support of this motion.
The Enlightening Bolt Project
DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPRESS (CrRLJ 3.6) 1
for Defense against Lawless State Action
leonsblatt@yahoo.com
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For purposes of this motion, Blatt will rely on undisputed facts. Mr. Blatt further moves this court to allow live testimony and presentation of this evidence in support of this motion. Mr. Blatt anticipates that the evidence presented at a hearing on his motion may not be consistent with the facts originally reported by police. If so, it may be necessary to submit supplemental briefing.
II.
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FACTS
The defense expects to elicit the following facts at the motion hearing: Wife threatens husband and child On the evening of January 21, 2011, Leonard Blatt was visiting his friends, Harmon Weitzman (Harmon) and his two year old daughter, Zoe, in their Seattle apartment. During this visit, Harmons estranged wife, Jennifer Weitzman, and Harmon had several phone conversations. Harmon switched his cell phone to speaker, enabling Mr. Blatt to hear the conversations. Mr. Blatt heard Jennifer threaten
violence against Harmon and Zoe. Harmon and Blatt brought Zoe to a babysitter, with an arrangement for Blatt to pick Zoe up at 10:00 pm.

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Husband calls the police Harmon and Blatt discussed whether to call 911. Blatt warned Harmon, Its risky. Theyre capable of anything because the courts grant them immunity from accountability as long as they claim their damage was accidental. Everything the police do is done by violence, or the threat of violence. Its not their child, its yours. So theyre free to behave recklessly, knowing YOU will be left to bear the consequences -- and you will bear them for years to come. It was agreed that Blatt would video record the encounter. Harmon called 911. Police visited Jennifer; however, they declined to arrest her. Nor did they interview Harmon, or write a report. Harmon doggedly contacted various law enforcement agencies asking them to take his report. SPD officers Michelle A. Heitman, #7434, and Marcus D. Inouye, #6414 (the officers) finally arrived at Harmons apartment. Officers demand Zoe From the outset, the officers made it clear they would not arrest the mother. They demanded that Harmon deliver Zoe to them. Harmon declined to produce Zoe, assuring the
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officers that Zoe was safe and in a licensed daycare facility. The officers refused to accept this and continually demanded Zoe. The officers failed to articulate any reasonable suspicion(s) or to identify a lawful authority on
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which they might rely; nor did they identify any harm that would come to Zoe in her father's care. At this time, Jennifer Weitzman arrived outside Harmons apartment, the police having allowed her to remain at large. At 21:35 HRS, officer Heitman ordered Harmon to sit on the hood of a patrol car equipped with visual and aural monitoring [In-car video]. Officer Inouye told Blatt to keep quiet, and officer Heitman ordered Mr. Blatt to stand by the building door. Blatt complied. Police seize and interrogate husband As Harmon sat on the hood, Heitman, an illiterate who probably does not even have children of her own, issued what she called orders to him to give up his child. Harmon steadfastly refused, saying that the police refusal to arrest Jennifer made him feel uncomfortable and gave him pause. Heitman told Harmon: Wed like to speak with the child [W]e need to know that shes in this state [W]e are not going to let the child go with her [Jennifer] [W]e promise we are not going to take the child, and we are not going to give her to either party. Like I said, thats not our job to enforce custodial stuff. However, Harmon remained unassuaged. He politely expressed incredulity and elected to exercise his right to remain silent. Harmon also explained to the officers that he was
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recovering from meningitis and should not be kept out in the cold. The officers kept Harmon on the hood, and ultimately kept him awake through the night. Police occupy residence At approximately 21:50 HRS, Blatt left the wall to pick up Zoe. A group of SPD officers then broke into Harmons apartment, searched it, seized Harmons keys, threatened Harmon with unspecified charges, disregarded Jennifers threats, and refused to leave Harmons apartment until he would produce his daughter. Blatt phoned Harmon, and upon learning that Harmon was being held hostage, Mr. Blatt, under Harmons direction, made preparations to contact an attorney with Zoe in the morning. Police intercept phone calls The officers ordered Harmon to send Blatt voice- and email messages purporting to be from Harmon, but in words dictated by the officers demanding Zoes return. Blatt did not respond to these messages. The officers also forced Harmon to facilitate their monitoring and interception of Blatts private phone conversations with him. Later that night, Mr. Blatt called a second time, and asked Harmon whether the police were still menacing him. Harmon told Blatt they were denying him sleep, threatening
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violence, and were breaking him down -- officer Heitman grabbed the phone from Harmon and screamed hysterically into the receiver; then handed the phone back to Harmon as quickly as she had grabbed it -- Blatt, asked Harmon to give the phone back to officer Heitman so he could address her concerns, and let her speak with Zoe. Officer Heitman refused to take the phone. In speech sounding uncharacteristically stilted and scripted, Harmon asked Blatt to return Zoe. After trying to persuade Harmon to continue resisting, Blatt asked Harmon a few questions to determine whether this was a true expression of his will, or the fruit of four hours of interrogation, sleep deprivation, promises, and threats, Mr. Blatt agreed to return with Zoe. Police infiltrate parking garage, kidnap Blatt and Zoe Officer Heitman sequestered Harmon in his apartment, while other officers descended to his private, secured, underground parking garage to intercept Blatt and keep him from bringing Zoe to her father. At approximately 01:24 am a gang of officers charged at Mr. Blatt with guns drawn, screaming, DOWN ON YOUR KNEES! NOW! PUT YOUR HANDS ON TOP OF YOUR HEAD! They bound Blatt in chains while officer Inouye jutted in Blatts face, rattling off a litany of charges he

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could bring against him. Mr. Blatt responded, Do whatever you think you can get away with. Police place Zoe in harms way The officers kidnapped Zoe and transferred custody to Jennifer Weitzman, forbidding Zoe and her father to say goodbye to each other. Father suffers shock, requires hospitalization Blatts warnings to Harmon about police modus operandi failed to prepare him for the shock. Harmon had to be admitted to the hospital emergency room for stress. Blatt was abducted and transported in a van -- going 60 mph and not allowed to wear a seatbelt to jail where he was locked in a cage like an animal for three days.
I certify under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing summarizes the evidence I anticipate to be introduced at a hearing on this suppression motion. 2011. _______________________________ Leonard Blatt Signed in Seattle, Washington this 18th day of May,

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LIES IN THE POLICE REPORT: These are examples of lies and embellishments which belie bias in officer Heitmans incident report. This is not to raise issues, but for edification. The public pays their police to tell the truth, not lies. When a public servant receives revenue allocated for one purpose and uses it for a purpose it was not intended, that public servant is guilty of embezzlement of public funds, a felony: Heitman lies that Blatt told her he may have a warrant because he received tickets and didnt pay them. The video shows Blatt telling her: I got a traffic ticket a couple of months ago and they said theyd mail me a court notice and I never got it. But I moved a few times. So if they did mail it to me and I didnt respond to it, there could be a warrant right? Heitman lies that the warrant [is] why he didnt want to provide his information. The video shows that Blatts reluctance was solely for fear of Jennifer Weitzman. Blatt explained, I dont want her to come after me. Heitman discounts Blatts testimony by lying that Blatt admits hearing most that is, not all -- of Jennifer threats, and only knew what Harmon had told him. Heitman further opines: I wasnt convinced entirely that he was present during the incident. The video shows the colloquy as it was: H: And what did you exactly hear? B: I heard her, uh, threaten to kill herself, threaten to, say she said something to the effect that if she kills her daughter and herself, theyll both go to heaven. And that she would vandalize the car. She was just going everywhere threatening violence And at first, she sounded really calm like extra calm. And then just snapped. The switch was just like seamless, from calm to crazy. Heitman lies that Harmon stated he could not trust anyone and that people would hurt in some way Zoe if she was located.
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Heitmans report is intersticed with her own accusatory rhetorical questions, omitting the answers that Blatt and Harmon gave her. Heitman lies that Blatt refused to sign the daycare center log. Blatt was neither asked to sign a log, nor made aware of it. Heitman lies that when Blatt called, [t]he first thing Blatt asked was if the police were going to take him to jail on his warrants. No, this is simply made up by Heitman. Heitman half-lies that she attempted to speak to Blatt on the phone. This implies a dialog. This was not the case. In reality, Heitmans attempt sounded to Blatt more like the ranting of a crazed woman. Because she was yelling into the receiver so loudly, Blatt could not discern what she was trying to say, except to make out cursing. During this conversation, Heitman never asked Blatt where Zoe was or how Zoe was. Heitman just hollered into the phone and handed it back to Harmon. Harmon relayed to Heitman that Blatt requested to talk with her so he could figure out what she wanted and give her an opportunity to speak with Zoe, but she refused to talk to Blatt. III. QUESTIONS What authority did the police have to seize Harmon and demand his child?
Can the police just barge into peoples lives and bully them into turning over family members? Can the state punish you for having the temerity to tell them you find them not trustable? Can you commit Obstruction by exercising your god given right to free speech? Can you obstruct by stating the truth: that the police will arbitrarily take your child? Does the state need an excuse, or can it simply take away children from people it deems unstable or liars or whose attitude is otherwise not to their liking?

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IV.
ARGUMENT
Police had no justification to demand Zoe from Blatt. They were able to seize Blatt only by 1) first seizing Harmon and forcing him to submit to illegal monitoring of Blatts calls, in which Blatt possessed 4th and 5th Amendment property interests, and 2) by breaking and entering into a parking garage in which Harmon granted license to Blatt, in whom therefore inhered 4th Amendment and Article I, section 7 property rights. All evidence police acquired subsequent to those acts are inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. A. Critera for Welfare Check is Clearly Established Law The criteria for child welfare checks have been established by a long line of cases. In Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, Child Protective Services received a report that the Rogers children: were locked in their rooms had multiple bruises on their legs looked very pale had unkempt hair with bald patches had mouth infections were not given dental care had no health insurance were not sent to preschool were not being toilet trained
and lived in a home that had:

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unsecured guns rat droppings maggot-infestation feces smeared on walls vomit on the furniture overflowing garbage piles of dirty dishes dirty clothing scattered everywhere dirty bedding; mattresses without frames
A police officer and CPS worker Royal removed the children and brought them to a hospital. The parents sued. The Court held: Assuming Royals version of the facts, the Rogers children were in a sorry state and suffering from neglect of a type that could, if their parents conduct was not modified within a reasonable period of time, lead to long-term harm. Still, the conditions here did not present an imminent risk of serious bodily harm. It would have taken Royal only a few hours to obtain a warrant. In removing the Rogers children from their home without obtaining judicial authorization, Royal violated the Rogers clearly established Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [T]he conditions in the home, even if as unsanitary as Royal asserts, fail to indicate any imminent danger of serious bodily harm. [T]here is no indication in the record of any particular risk that the Rogers children would become seriously ill during the few hours that it would take Royal to obtain a warrant. Royal also relies on the familys lack of medial insurance and daycare. [This] would border on the unconstitutional.
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Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be separated from their children without due process of law except in emergencies. Officials violate this right if they remove a child from the home absent information at the time of the seizure that establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. The law was clearly established at the time of the events in this case that a child could not be removed from the home without prior judicial authorization absent evidence of imminent danger of serious bodily injury and [unless] the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury. [All emphases added] State v. Sanchez, 74 Wn. App. 763 (1994), citing Mabe v. San Bernardino Co., Dept. of Pub. Soc. Svcs, 237 F.3d 1101, 1106, 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136, 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 827 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2003); Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1999); Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1996); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 202 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); B. Investigative Detention Critera is Clearly Established Alternatively, if the police claim not to have been performing a community caretaking function requiring the imminent danger of serious bodily harm standard, but rather an investigative detention (Terry stop) requiring the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard, the prosecution is still out of luck.

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The point at which Harmon was ordered to sit on the hood of the patrol car and Blatt was ordered to stand by the door, they were seized as a matter of law. In State v. Ellwood, the court found that an officers request for the defendant to wait right here constituted a seizure. 52 Wn.App. 70, 73 (1988). It does not matter that Blatt left the door to pick up Zoe. A citizen need not submit to the officers show of authority in order for the court to find that a seizure occurred. State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498 (1998) (declining to adopt the federal definition of seizure set forth in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)).
There is no doubt that police seized Blatt and Harmon not to check their welfare, but to detain them for an investigation a Terry stop. Under Terry, police officers need not have a warrant to stop a suspect if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 385 (2000) quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675 (2000). No reason for suspicion of criminal activity has thus far been articulated. With regard to the seizure of Zoe, if the police want to escape the requisite imminent danger of serious bodily injury, and instead claim they were performing an investigative child safety check, State v. Kinzy is
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analogous. There, police found a minor on the streets late on a school night in a high narcotics trafficking area in the company of an older male known to police to be involved in narcotics. The police approached to ask if she was OK. She started to walk away. The officer stopped her by putting his hand on her shoulder. The court said: Once the initial contact is made, the individual is entitled to walk away and terminate the encounter and may not be restrained by the officer absent some other justification such as a reasonable articulable suspicion of that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. In this case, the findings of fact do not support justification for a Terry stop because the first two sequential events of March 3, 1998, provide no indication of criminal activity by Petitioner. Indeed, Officer Jennings testified his reason for initiating contact with Petitioner was simply concern for her safety and not suspicion of criminal activity. Because Respondent State of Washington cannot establish a valid Terry stop, it relies instead upon the community caretaking function exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 375, 385 (2000) Now Heitman and her gang are saddled with daunting task of articulating how anyone was engaged in criminal activity. Like Kinzy, once the initial contact was made, and it was
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discovered that Zoe was just fine, Zoe, Harmon, and Blatt were free to terminate the encounter. However, Zoe was taken away, Harmon was imprisoned in his own apartment, and Blatt was hauled off to jail. In Lundstrom, a case uncannily analogous to the instant
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matter, a retired police officer called 911 to report a female neighbor abusing her toddler. Officers arrived to do a child welfare check. When [Mr.] Lundstrom opened the front door, he was openly suspicious [**21] and hostile toward officer Debra Romero. She told him she needed to enter Lundstroms house to verify no child was in need of assistance. [**4] Mr. Lunsdstrom cursed at Romero and
slammed the door. Then he called 911 to complain. A female resident who had exited the house, tried to talk with the officers about their concerns but was ignored. Backup units arrived and were told a disorderly subject had barricaded himself inside the house. They penetrated his curtilage and peered into his windows. Police eventually prevailed upon Lundstrom to exit, and handcuffed both residents while they
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searched the house, finding no child in danger. The residents sued. The appellate court held: Lundstom contends the officers unreasonably seized him when they surrounded his house, ordered him to exit, and he complied with their instructions. The district court ruled this encounter did not amount to an unlawful seizure because the officers were conducting a child welfare check pursuant to their community caretaking function, exigent circumstances existed, and Lundstrom did not yield to the officers show of authority. We do not agree with the district courts conclusions Nor at the time did the officers have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Lundstrom of legal wrongdoing, [citation omitted] or knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead a
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prudent man to believe he had committed an offense. [citation omitted] While Lundstrom was not as cooperative as we hope citizens would be in response to a law enforcement investigation, nothing indicated he had done anything wrong and he did not pose a threat to the officers. To the contrary, the record demonstrates: the neighbor reported hearing a woman not a man disciplining a child. [emphasis on woman in original]. [in the instant case, the record demonstrates: a woman, Jennifer Weitzman not a man threatening a child] [Despite] Lundstrom moving about the residence frantically, reviewing the record from the viewpoint of a prudent, cautious, and trained officer, we do not find that the officers were confronted with reasonable grounds to believe there was an immediate need to seize Lundstrom Because the officers seized Lundstrom [**31] without adequate justification, they violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure We have no difficulty in finding a reasonable officer would have understood the alleged conduct violated the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court held that [the] detention [of the woman who exited the house] was reasonable for protective purposes and because the officers had a basis for believing she may have been involved in mistreating the child about whom the neighbor called 911. We disagree. [**23] The officers argue, similarly, that their search was not illegal because they reasonably believed a child was in need of immediate aid. They also [*1128] contend, in the alternative, it was not clearly established that their search of the house was unreasonable under the circumstances. We disagree. Lundstrom and Hibner v. Alberquerque Police Officers, et al., 616 F.3d 1108 (2010)
C. The Officers Claimed Authorities are Invalid

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Officer Heitmans declaration in support of probable cause (hereinafter, report) attempts to identify the source of police authority to conduct a child welfare check on Zoe, and how Blatt obstructed that check: I became concerned of [sic] Zoes welfare because of the behavior exhibited by Harmon and that [sic] behavior also exhibited by that of [sic] Blatt. [Heitmans report, page 2, par. 2] Blatt obstructed a public officer by knowingly and intentionally hindered [sic] and delayed [sic] my investigation 1) by failing to return Zoe upon my order and the order of Harmon on several occasions. Blatt also further [sic] hinder [sic] my investigation by attempting to convince Harmon to not produce the child for the welfare check because the police lie to people and will take the child away. [Heitmans report, last page, par. 1] Blatts Behavior -- immaterial First, Heitman alludes to behavior exhibited by Harmon and Blatt to excuse the police intrusion, yet fails to specify that behavior. The only behavioral observations in the record about Blatt range from innocuous to exculpatory. They follow chronologically: Blatt video recorded the officers; Blatt allegedly didnt pay tickets; Blatt mentioned a possible traffic infraction warrant; Blatt hesitated, then told about Jennifers threats;
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Blatt appeared to be coached by Harmon; Blatt complied with Heitmans request to step away; Blatt refused to give police his phone number; Blatt did not have a drivers license; Blatt had a non-specified criminal history; Blatt left and picked up Zoe; Blatt hurriedly took Zoe without signing or car seat; Blatt told Harmon police lie, and to hang tough; Blatt refused to deliver Zoe to police; Blatt attempted to return Zoe to Harmon; Blatt was taken into custody without incident Blatt required no mental exam and uses no drugs Blatts Child Endangerment charge deemed Unfounded There are no other observations about Blatt. It is self
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evident that none of these show Zoe to be in imminent danger. Harmons Behavior -- immaterial Harmons behavior is also cited. However, one is hardpressed to find anything approaching probable cause, save unflattering ad hominem portrayals and vague unsympathetic impressions: Harmon seemed to be very nervous, unsteady, and perspiring significant [sic] amount. [Heitmans report, page 1]

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To cleanse her warrantless seizure, Heitman relies on police officer and amateur psychologist, Officer Sweeney who offers his assessment of Harmon from afar: I spoke with Officer Sweeney of the King County Sheriffs [sic] Office. Officer Sweeney stated that Jennifer [did not] make any statements or actions that were consistent of [sic] her being in a suicidal state of mind Sweeney informed me that Jennifer had called Harmon and Harmon started telling her not to be suicidal and wasnt making much sense Based on his [Sweeneys] information it appeared that Harmons behavior and demeanor was were [sic] very agitated and overly emotional [Emphasis added] [Heitmans report, page 2] Doctor Sweeney analyzes Jennifier without having psychological credentials, and finds Harmon wasnt making much sense without having met him. The doctor fails to disclose the level of agitation and emotion appropriate for a father facing the specter of his wifes murder-suicide. By any rational account, Harmons despair was consistent with that of a domestic violence victim.
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[Interestingly, Heitman describes Jennifer as very calm a demeanor consistent with suicidal depression; or alternatively, with someone not too worried about their child being in their fathers care -- yet Heitman claims to have given Jennifer custody because of this eerie demeanor] Notwithstanding Heitmans request that this court rely on thrice removed hearsay about Sweeney allegedly telling
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Heitman about what Jennifer allegedly told Sweeney about what Harmon allegedly told Jennifer, its use is precluded as a matter of law. An officers good faith reliance on information supplied by a fellow officer does not determine the validity of the arrest. State v. Trenidad, 23 Wn. App. 418 (1979). Where multiple levels of hearsay are involved, each declarant must satisfy the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for knowledge and veracity. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1973). Here, Sweeneys knowledge and veracity are not averred. Even if Sweeneys opinion were somehow deemed material, it does not meet any of the hearsay exceptions under ER 803 or ER 804 and lacks any indicia of reliability. It would be inadmissible at trial and could not be used to support a finding that police had authority to force a welfare check. In a case similarly involving a female thought to need a welfare check, a 911 caller reported that a car was parked on a road for several hours and a woman in it may be in trouble. Police arrived to do a community caretaking welfare check and observed two males in the car without the female. One male looked dazed and confused. Police asked for identification. The court ruled: Although the request for identification was a minimal intrusion, it was not warranted as no
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crime had been reported. The only rationale given for pursuing the investigation [beyond intitial contact] was the dazed, confused look on Mr. Markgrafs face. Reversed and dismissed. State v. Markgraf, 59 Wn.App. 509 (1990) In a case where a man whose plenary neuroses were alleged to run the gamut was behind the wheel of a car, the court said, So What!: Deputy Small noticed Mr. Henry had glassy eyes, moved slowly, and acted kind of like he was in some type of daze or something of that nature [at 552] and looked real nervous [at 546] Mr. Henry then began to perspire heavily, appeared to be upset, turned pale and complained of being sick and nauseous. [at 540] Police patted him down and found a crack pipe. [M]ost persons stopped by law enforcement officers display some signs of nervousness. [citation omitted] Although Deputy Small testified based on his experience that Mr. Henry appeared more nervous than normal, the officer on close examination was not able to articulate a basis for his conclusion. Therefore he had no [probable cause] to search. [at 552] State v. Henry, 80 Wn.App. 544 (1995). See also State v. Coyne, 99 Wn.App.566 (2000) (Nervousness during interaction when police return property does not support a seizure)
EXCLUSIVE! Man Charged with Telling the Truth.

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READ ALL ABOUT IT! The second prong of Heitmans charge cites Blatts attempting to convince Harmon to not produce the child for the welfare check because the police lie to people and will take the child away as the alternate means by which he Obstructed. Nonetheless, it remains axiomatic that the right to free speech is sacrosanct. A person cannot be convicted of Obstruction for exercising a constitutionally guaranteed right -- especially when the offending speech is truthful. Heitman complains that Blatt told Harmon the police lie, then wasted no time in proving Blatts words prophetic: Heitman kidnapped Zoe and forced her to go with Jennifer -- after assuring Harmon: [W]e are not going to let the child go with her [Jennifer] [W]e promise we are not going to take the child. How can you ask for our help and say you dont trust us. [We dont trust fire either, but its useful when under control.] SPD in-car video, 01/21/11. In a brazen act of hypocrisy and cynicism, the officers then (unsuccessfully) asked the prosecutor to file kidnapping charges against Blatt. When the jury hears of this, they will be pissed off. No jury will convict a man for telling the truth, no mater how unsettling, disturbing, or embarrassing. But they will condemn liars. Reaspondeat Superior inapplicable

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Notwithstanding Heitmans inane attribution of respondeat superior, Blatt is not legally accountable for Harmon. RCW 9A.08.020. Harmon is not Blatts ward or charge, and such is
not alleged. Blatt cannot make Harmon do anything, let alone commit the imaginary crime of failing to surrender his offspring to the state. Obstruction Mere Words are immaterial Third, the Obstruction charge encompasses deeds, not words. Obstruction of a law enforcement officer, RCW 9A.76.020, applies only to affirmative conduct, not mere speech. State v. Spartucus Williamson, 84 Wn.App 37 (Div. 2 1996) That is, the person must actively obstruct. In this case, Blatt simply did not act. Other cases have followed this reasoning. In State v. Contreras, 92 Wn.App. 307, 966, P.2d 915 (1988), the court recognized that mere refusal to talk with the police is not obstructing. However, the defendant in that case did more: he gave officers a false name and failed to keep his hands on top of the vehicle. Id. at 316. Child Restraint - Irrelevant The police allege they had authority to perpetrate a child welfare check because Blatt failed to use a child restraint seat. The police are attempting to distract the court with a red herring, in violation of RCW 46.61.687 which states:
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Failure to Use Child Restraint Not Negligence -Failure to comply with the requirements of this section shall not constitute negligence by a parent or legal guardian. Failure to use a child restraint system shall not be admissible as evidence of negligence in any civil action. RCW 46.61.687 A child welfare check is not a criminal investigation; it is civil in nature. The law explicitly prohibits the police from characterizing this as negligence. RCW 26.44.100(1) states the legislative intent: The legislature find parents and children often are not aware of their due process rights when agencies are investigating allegations of child abuse and neglect. The legislature affirms that all citizens, including parents, shall be afforded due process, that protection of children remains the priority of the legislature, and that this protection includes protecting the family unit from unnecessary disruption. RCW 26.44.100(1)
Furthermore, police need reasonable suspicion of a crime in order to conduct an investigative detention. Failure to use a child restraint is an infraction, not a crime. Even arguendo, a misdemeanor must be committed in the officer's presence to give him authority to arrest (let alone penetrate a secured underground parking garage to effect the arrest); an officer may arrest only for felonies committed out of his presence. In any case, Blatt HAD Zoe in a child restraint seat. Even the SPD detectives found the Endangerment charge unfounded. [Report snapshot, Public Disclosure, page 101]
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Daycare Log Irrelevant The police pretend Blatts putative refusal to sign the daycare log made it impossible to know it was really Blatt who picked her up, as if knowing so would have neutralized them. The controlling WAC operates only on the daycare center operator, not the parent or guardian; the operator is required to ask guardians for their signature. However, no law compels a parent or guardian to sign. It cannot, per the federal constitutional prohibition on impairing or, conversely, compelling the obligation of contracts. Furthermore, a signature on a sign-out sheet proves nothing; anyone can forge a signature. No one was alleging Zoe was kidnapped from daycare. That this is a sham issue is evidenced by the fact that the police declined to simply show the daycare operator a picture of Blatt and ask if it was Blatt. The police could also have spoken to Blatt and Zoe when he called, but they refused. Child Must be in State Absurd On the night in question, the police feebly grasped for straws when required by Harmon to identify how they might derive lawful authority to conduct a welfare check. The clearest reasoning they offered amounted to idle curiosity: Wed like to speak with the child. [in-car video] They also concocted an imaginary new law: [W]e need to know that shes in this state. [in-car video] However,
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neither Harmon nor Blatt were aware of any law requiring a child be to in this -- or any -- particular state. And if Harmon were in violation of law by having Zoe in the wrong state, his right to talk to an attorney was not being honored. If this sounds bizarre, thats because it is. The police could not articulate -- and neither Blatt nor Harmon could discern -- their claimed authority. The record is devoid of any suggestion of exigent circumstances. The record is devoid even of speculation, thus obviating a welfare check. Furthermore, the daycare center confirmed to police that Zoe was in this state, obviating a raid on the parking garage. Blatts Criminal History Immaterial Heitmans report alludes to Blatts criminal history," suggesting it provides grounds for probable cause. It is impossible to tell because it is not stated as a fact, but as one of the answerless rhetorical questions and commentaries Heitman inserts into her report, ostensibly to assist us: I asked [Harmon] why did Blatt pick her up when he did not have a drivers license. I also asked Harmon why he would entrust Blatt with the care of Zoe if he had prior knowledge of Blatt's criminal history and concern with current warrants. [Harmons answers, if any, are omitted] [Heitmans report, page 3] The Police compile and maintain a system of records. They therefore have control over the records content. Police
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officers have the power [albeit unlawful] to initiate charges on bogus reports, and they do so with a frequency that has attracted the attention of the FBI, which is investigating the SPD. Once an officer has written a fraudulent report, it becomes part of the subjects permanent criminal record. Of all the criminal charges brought against Blatt, 75 have been stricken, dismissed, or resulted in acquittal -THAT suggests malfeasance in the Police Department and prosecutors office it indicates they are reckless at best and corrupt at worst. The Seattle Police Department has generated no less than fifteen (15) bogus domestic violence reports against Mr. Blatt in nearly as many years yet none of them has resulted in a plea, conviction, or even a trial. THAT says something is seriously wrong. The Seattle Police Department has a pattern and practice of making every man who talks back to his wife a domestic violence defendant. And he neednt hit her, or threaten her. She simply needs to claim she is afraid something impossible to disprove in any court. This is state crime, and Mr. Blatt is not a criminal but a crime fighter. Among the crimes he fights is police corruption. Mr. Blatt devoted his life to fighting crime after witnessing corruption as an employee of the Seattle Police Union. The union was committing fraud and asking Mr. Blatt to aid and abet. Blatt quit. Later, Blatts friend, Wallace G. Lawry - a 20-year veteran of SPD, only weeks away
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from retirement -- was fired and de-pensioned for stating in an affidavit that his colleagues behaved unethically. Mr. Blatts first crime-fighting mission was to notice SPD of a lawsuit, resulting in the restoration of Lawrys job and pension. Mr. Blatt has kept the Stafford Frey Cooper law firm and Seattles municipal bonding company very busy, and cost the SPD many thousands of dollars in lawsuits for their fraudulent police reports. Even if Blatt loses, he wins because his objective is not to get rich, but to make crime costly. On the evening of January 21, 2011, Harmon left this message on Blatts voice mail: [One of these] officers knew you from the past and hes really amped up . This officer is officer G. Hughes #6237 mentioned in Heitmans report. Blatt sued Hughes under U.S. District Court case docket #021696 for generating a fraudulent incident report alleging Blatt beat a woman in north Seattle at a time when Hughes knew or should have known Blatt was confined in jail due to a previous bogus DV report. Even assuming Mr. Blatt is a baddass criminal, a criminal history is not sufficient to support a belief that the person is engaging in criminal activity, and does not allow the police a warrantless search and seizure, and the fact that Zoe was in the company of someone suspected of
25

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crime does not establish the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion: If a prior conviction, not to mention a prior arrest, should afford grounds for believing an individual is engaging in criminal activity at any given time thereafter, that person would never be free of harassment, no matter how completely he had reformed. To the Best of our knowledge, the law does not countenance such an assumption. State v. Tocki, at 464 [footnote omitted]; State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446-47 (1980); State v. Lennon, 94 Wn.App.573, 580, review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1014 (1999). Blatts Lack of Drivers License Immaterial The police cannot claim that Zoe was unsafe riding in Blatts car; the DOL record shows he received a speeding ticket (less than 10 mph over the limit) in 1989. This is the extent of Blatts moving violations. This, despite the record showing that he has been a daily driver for over 35 years, the last 20 of which he has elected to exercise his right to drive without the states license.
D. Blatt had a Duty to Obstruct the Officers Had the police applied for a warrant and been issued one, their acts could be characterized as a search, seizure, and arrest. But because they acted in the absence of all lawful authority, it was not a search, seizure, and arrest, but breaking and entering, assault and battery, wire tapping, and kidnapping. The victims of these crimes had a right to resist
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their commission. All three victims had a right to be left alone. If rights are not exercised, they disappear. Therefore it is a mans duty to exercise his rights. In this case, Zoes life was threatened by the officers extra-judicial custody transfer. Washington law recognizes the right to forcibly resist even by lethal force -- an officers kidnapping: An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery. State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260. It is the law that a person illegally arrested by an officer may resist that arrest, even to the extent of the taking of life if his own life or any great bodily harm is threatened. State v. Rousseau, 40 Wa.2d, 92, 241 P.2d 447, 449 (1952); In a case where a father denied Police warrantless entry into his house to apprehend a minor they saw holding a beer bottle, the court ruled: [T]he question is not whether Mr. Blesselle obstructed Officer Buckso -- of course he did. The question is whether he legally obstructed Officer Buckso in reliance on his constitutional (state and federal) right to insist on a judicial warrant as a condition of entry on his home. In other words, were there exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the requirement of a warrant? [Emphasis added] State v. Bessette, 105 Wn.App. 793, 797, 21 P.3d 318 (2001)

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A citizen has a right to resist an unlawful arrest ... Jones, 63 Wn.App., at 706 Citizens may resist unlawful
arrest to the point of taking an arresting officers life if necessary. Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bad Elk, and in other courts: Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a crime is within the jurisdiction, the one who is being arrested may resist and break away. If the arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary manslaughter. Housh v. People, 75 111.491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v. Rousseau, 241 P.2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621. When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justified. These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully used such force and violence.
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Jones v. State, 26 Tex.App, 1; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex.App. 175; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903. Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be revisited by the use of force, as in selfdefense. State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 A sheriff who acts without [due] process, or under a process void on its face, in doing such act, he is not to be considered an officer but a personal trespasser. Roberts, v. Dean, 187 So. 571, 575 (Fla. 1939) A person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest by an unlawful authority, i.e. an officer without a valid warrant. Franklin, 118 Ga. 860, 45 S.E. 698 (1903) What kind of resistance to the arrest? The authorities are in agreement that since the right of personal property [the right to a warrant and the right to privacy are recognized as personal property rights] is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and any unlawful interference with it may be resisted and every person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest. *** and, in preventing such illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use such force as may be necessary. City of Columbus v. Holmes, 152 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Ohio App. 1058 or 1958) It is the law of self defense and self preservation that is applicable. One has an unalienable right to protect his life, liberty, or property from unlawful attack or harm. *** It is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody without resistance.
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Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 163, 48 S.E. 910 (1904) A citizen illegally arrested cannot initiate the use of force and neither do words alone justify an assault. However, when the officer initiates the assault by physical contact, which is usually the case, and there is an unlawful arrest, the citizen has the right to protect his liberty to the extent of killing the officer. Green v. Kennedy, 48 N.Y. Rep. 653, 654 (1871) and/or Hicks v. Mathews, 266 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1954) What rights then has a citizen in resisting an unlawful arrest? An arrest without a warrant is a trespass, un unlawful assault upon the person, and how far one thus unlawfully assaulted may go in resistance is to be determined as in other cases of assault. Life and liberty are regarded as standing substantially on one foundation: life being useless without liberty, and the authorities are uniformed that where one is about to be unlawfully deprived of his liberty he may resist the aggressions of the officer, to the extent of taking the life of the assailant, if that be necessity to preserve his own life, or prevent infliction upon him of some great bodily harm. State. v. Gum, 68 W.Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463, 464 (1910). E. Harmon Was Seized Harmon indeed called the police but to report his wifes threats. This did not oblige him to continue talking with police once he determined they were biased, as evidenced by their initial reluctance to take a report from him, their instant refusal to consider arresting Jennifer Weitzman; and their confiscation of his keys. Harmon had a right to terminate contact with the officers. Such attempt to
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terminate did not give the police probable cause to seize him and gain free access to his home including its garage. A persons rights to privacy in his home does not diminish when he opens the door to the police. State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429 (1985). Similarly, a lawful police entry into one part of the home does not automatically authorize their entry into other parts of the home. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1984). In Coyne, Two men who contacted police to report a lost coat were seized because they were acting nervous. Police told them to sit on the hood of the patrol car and asked them to consent to a search. The court held: [The men] would not have believed they were free to leave once they were ordered to sit on the hood of the patrol car and remain there while an officer investigated. The officer retained Mr. Coyne's coat and license during the investigation. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly concluded both Mr. Coyne and Mr. Burt were seized without legal authority. The trial court correctly concluded the later given consent [to search] was vitiated by the prior illegal detention. ... The state incorrectly argues no seizure took place because Deputy Seig was justified under the community caretaking function ... Although the deputy thought their story was 'suspicious', this suspicion, similar to a 'dazed expression' in not enough to justify further intrusion. In other words, it did not amount to a reasonably articulated suspicion. State v. Coyne, at 572-74 [Citation omitted]; Kilcup v. McManus, 64 Wn.2d 771, 777, 394 P.2d 375 (1964); Swetnam v. W.F. Woolworth Co., 318 P.2d 364, 366 ("Any restraint, however slight, upon another's liberty to come and go as one
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pleases, constitutes an arrest."); State v. Allen, 138 Wn.App. 463, headnote 3. Officer Heitman commanded Harmon to sit on the car hood for a recorded interrogation. During this interrogation she told Harmon, Im giving you a lawful order to tell me where the child is. [in-car video] A reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter after this directive. Heitman thus seized Harmon in the constitutional sense. A person is seized in the constitutional sense when his or her freedom of movement is restrained. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 509, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). "Any restraint, however slight, upon another's liberty to come and go as one pleases,
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constitutes an arrest." Swetnam v. W.F. Woolworth Co., 318 P.2d 364, 366. A person is seized by the officer for purposes of the Washington State Constitution, article 1, section 7, if the officer requests information for investigatory purposes without having a reasonable basis for doing so, such as an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Allen, 138 Wn.App. 463, headnote 3. Restraint amounting to a seizure may arise either from the use of physical force or through a show of authority. See State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn.App. 9, 14 (2000). The relevant inquiry for the court is
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whether, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officers requests and terminate the encounter. See State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347, 352-53 (1996). Police need not take physical custody of a person or belongings to have made a seizure in the constitutional sense. See State v. Ellwood, 52 Wn.App. 70, 73 (1988)
(officers request to wait right here constituted a seizure). Police may seize an individual through commands or requests even if the words used do not explicitly implicate the freedom to walk away. See State v. Richardson, 64 Wn. App. 693, 696 (1992)(emptying pockets and placing hands on patrol car was seizure); State v. Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598 (1992)(implicit direction from officer to defendant to
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remove her hand or to show him what was in it was a Terry stop requiring legal justification). Whether an individual was seized turns not on the officers perceptions of what occurred but on the citizens reasonable evaluation of the situation. The officers subjective beliefs or intentions are immaterial unless communicated to the citizen. State v. Barnes, 96 Wn.App. 217, 223-24 (1999). The officers thereafter entered Harmons apartment, and came and went as they pleased through the night without permission. They searched the rooms, confiscated Harmons
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keys and sequestered him to prevent him from going to the parking garage. Washington courts have found that taking control of a persons personal property during the course of an investigation constitutes a seizure not just of the property but of the individual. State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 12 (1997), and that permissive encounters ripen into seizures when an officer commands the defendant to wait, retains valuable property, or blocks the defendant from leaving. State v. Coyne, 99 Wn.App. at 573. Harmons home was commandeered and his property held. He was given orders and threatened with arrest. He had nowhere to retreat he was in his last refuge. It is obvious he did not feel free to leave, and was thus seized. F. Blatt has Standing to Challenge Harmons Seizure
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Blatt had a license in Harmons home, including its curtilage, with all attendant reasonable expectations of privacy. Therefore, Blatt has standing to challenge the police home invasion, strong-armed robbery, phone surveillance, and other crimes against Harmon. State v. Allen, 138 Wn.App. 463, Division 2 (2007). Automatic standing accrues to those who lose a possessory interest due to a third-partys illegal seizure. It is a maxim of law that privacy and due process rights are

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property. Mr. Blatt was robbed of his property due to the illegal seizure of Harmon. Where consent to search is obtained from one who shares authority over the premises with another, the consent is valid as to the consenting party. Walker, 136 Wn2d at 686, and any absent, nonconsenting co-occupant. Id. At 682. The consent is not valid, however, against a co-inhabitant who is present and does not affirmatively consent to the search. Walker, at 683-84; Leach at 744. When two occupants are present, police must get consent to search a home from both of them. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1 (2005). The Investigation Detention Exceeded any Lawful Scope Notwithstanding the prosecutions challenge of this right, the police investigation went well beyond the scope of
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taking Harmons report about his wifes threats, it was a fishing expedition. One that caused trauma and grief, but yielded no fish. An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verity or dispel the officers suspicion in a short period of time. State v. Sweet, 44 Wn.App. 226, 232 (1986). If a detention is impermissibly long, even the defendants consent to a further search does not purge the
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taint of the illegal detention. State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn.App. 626, 630 (1991). Police Perpetrate Home Invasion / Armed Robbery The police were armed. They took over Harmons apartment and used it as a staging area. They refused Harmons demands to get out, and even had the audacity to insult him. They grabbed his keys and phone out of his hands. This was felony armed robbery. But worst of all, they had their sights on his child -they had Harmon by the balls - and with this power, they coerced Harmon into letting them intercept Blatts private
phone communications. This is an additional crime: Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any: (b) private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise, designed to record or transmit [i.e. speaker phone] such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation. [Emphases added] RCW 9.73.030 With information thus illicitly gleaned, the officers discovered that Blatt would be 1) driving, and 2) entering the P3 garage to bring Zoe to her father. This court should not allow the prosecution to benefit from the officers crimes. G. Warrantless Searches and Seizures are Presumptively Unlawful
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Warrantless searches and seizures are "per se" unreasonable under both the state and federal constitutions. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 678, 682 (1998); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 818 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (l97l). Washingtons Constitution Affords Greater Protection Under RCW 10.79.040 warrantless searches are crimes punishable by up to a year in jail: It shall be unlawful for any policeman or other peace officer to enter and search any private dwelling, house, or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant issued upon a complaint as by law provided. RCW 10.79.040 The federal constitution only establishes a minimum level of protection for individual rights. State v.
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Christman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 817 (1984). It is now axiomatic that article I, section 7 provides greater protection to an individuals right to privacy than that guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Parker, 139 W.2d 486, 493 (1999). The Washington Constitution has consistently provided greater protection of individual rights than its federal counterpart. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999); State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 111 (1998). Even someones trash cannot be searched without a warrant. State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 578.
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A warrantless search is presumed unlawful unless the State proves that it falls within one of the narrowly drawn and jealously guarded exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 736 (1984). strict one. This rule is a The
State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 496 (1999).
government bears the "heavy burden" of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Parker, 139 Wn.2d at 496; U.S. v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951); U.S. v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1987). In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the general rule requiring probable cause before a seizure is permitted. (1968). 392 U.S. 1
Under Terry, a police officer may briefly detain and
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question an individual if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, but the officer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; See
also State v. Tocki, 32 Wn. App. 457, 460 (1982) ("investigative stops are carefully circumscribed--the officer's suspicion must be based on specific, objective facts."). The State bears the burden of establishing a lawful

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basis for any Terry stop. 365 (1995).
State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362,
Under Washington law, the police may not detain a citizen unless there is a substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 223 (1999)(quoting State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 6 (1986)); See also State v. Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 626 (1992). "[C]ircumstances must be more consistent with criminal than innocent conduct." (1986). Moreover, the test is an objective one. no "good faith" the exception subjective to the Because there is rule in are State v. Mercer, 45 Wn. App. 769, 774
exclusionary of the
Washington, irrelevant.
beliefs
officer
State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92 (1982); State v.
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Sanchez, 74 Wn. App. 763 (1994), review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1022 (1995); State v. Trenidad, 23 Wn. App. 418 (1979). The Home Has Heightened Protection Especially evident is the fact that '[I]n no area is a citizen more entitled to his privacy than in his or her home. For this reason, the closer officers come to intrusion into a dwelling, the greater the constitutional protection." [Citation omitted] State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn2d 103, 112. Physical entry of the home is the chief evil which the wording which the Fourth Amendment is directed. The Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent
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circumstances, that threshold may reasonably crossed without a warrant.
not
be
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 590 (1980). The heightened protection afforded state citizens against unlawful intrusion into private dwellings places an onerous burden upon the government to show a compelling need to act outside out warrant requirement. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 822 (1984). "...and the more significant the intrusion, the more cause they must have to justify their suspicion." [Citations omitted] State v. Tocki, at 460. Police Choose to Proceed Without a Warrant The police were on the scene for five (5) hours, giving them ample opportunity to obtain a warrant. During that time, they harassed and menaced Harmon Weitzman, but made no attempt to secure a warrant (assuming any judge would be willing to issue one to them). The Washington Supreme Court has warned that [w]here the police have ample time to obtain a warrant, we do not look kindly on their failure to do so. State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744 (1989) (quoting United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). The police, by and through their incident report are nunc pro tunc, in effect, asking this court to issue a search warrant for Zoe Weitzman retroactively. Heitman's narrative report is the affidavit in support. Would a reasonable, sober judicial officer sign off on a warrant based on Heitman's facts? Well, maybe.
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After all, for 24 years the efforts of outraged parents to have a grand jury investigate juvenile court judge Gary Littles sexual molestation of their children were successfully blocked by Littles fellow judges until his suicide in the courthouse. And after all, most of the 400 children who died in the mass murder/suicide at the Jonestown compound in Guyana were placed in the custody of Jim Jones by granted custody to Susan Smith over the prescient warnings of the father. And when Susan apologized on national television for drowning her babies and sending the community on a wild goose chase, the court lacked the same decency by refusing to apologize to Mr. Smith. So yes, maybe the police could have acquired a warrant especially from Washingtons notoriously corrupt courts, famous for ineptitude, tyranny, and making up the law as it goes along. However, the police did not even try. It may be their philosophy that its better to apologize than ask to permission. They are betting this court will grant them a warrant ex post facto something long outlawed by the supreme law of this land. During the five hours police spent on Harmons property, they had time and several options for obtaining a warrant: RCW 13.32A.050 provides for the seizure of a child who has run away from home. However, this source of authority is unavailable to the officers in the instant case as its legislation is intended for parents and children who are in
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conflict, adolescents, runaways and children who endanger themselves. RCW 13.34.050 allows the court to enter an order directing a law enforcement officer, probation counselor, or child protective services official to take a child into custody if they file an affidavit setting forth specific factual information evidencing reasonable grounds that the
childs health, safety, and welfare will be seriously endangered if not taken into custody[,] and at least one of the grounds set forth demonstrates a risk of imminent harm to the child. However, this source of a warrant is unavailable to the officers as they cannot demonstrate imminent serious danger. RCW 26.44.050 allows an officer to seize a child without a warrant if the danger to the child rises to the level required by RCW 13.34.050 AND the child would be injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to first obtain a court order. However, this option is unavailable to the officers, as they cannot and do not allege these obstacles. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement The courts recognize routine child welfare checks as part of the police community caretaking function, a narrowly defined and jealously guarded exception to the requirement
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for a warrant, akin to a Terry stop. Because of the risk of abuse, the courts must be cautious in applying the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 750 (2003). In order to avoid abuse of the exception, community caretaking searches or seizures must be strictly divorced from criminal investigations. Even a routine stop for a safety check, if it involves a seizure by detaining, must be necessary and strictly relevant to performance of the noncriminal investigation. Acrey, at 750.
See also State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 802 (2004). (Community caretaking function of police must be divorced from a criminal investigation); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (U.S. 1973) (Community caretaking exception is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statue.). The community caretaking function exception may not be used as a pretext for a criminal investigation. State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn2d 373, 394 (2000). A community caretaking seizure is limited to the time it takes officers to address the original reason for the stop. The noncriminal investigation must end when reasons for initiating an encounter have been fully dispelled. Kinzy, at 395. See also State v. DeArman, 54 Wn.App 621 (1989). The officers in the instant case did not have authority to
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investigate traffic offences while investigating a childs welfare. They claimed to have been concerned about whether Zoe was safe; when they determined she was safe, they were obligated to end their seizure rather than pursue traffic charges. We must 'cautiously apply the community caretaking function exception because of a real risk of abuse in allowing even well-intentioned stops to assist ... The noncriminal [community caretaking] investigation must end when reasons for initiating an encounter are fully dispelled. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 750 (2003). Failure to Transfer Title Last, Blatt is charged with failing to transfer title and DWLS3. However, SMC 11.22.025 makes the purchaser or transferee responsible for this task. The State v. Sanchez, 74 Wn. App. 763 (1994) City fails to allege Mr. Blatt is the purchaser or transferee. Second, the right to drive without a license is protected by law which the jury will soon learn whether the court likes it or not. Blatts Day in Court This will be Mr. Blatts Day in Court; an American courtroom is the one place Mr. Blatts First Amendment rights WILL be protected, either by the judge or by Blatt himself. It is rumored the judge will try to squelch Blatt when he presents the foregoing information to the jury, and will sustain the prosecutors objections to Blatts presenting to the jury the law as it is actually written. This gives Mr. Blatt a chuckle. How would the court figure it can stop him?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
V. CONCLUSION The police are now effectively asking this court to issue a search warrant for Zoe Weitzman retroactively. They seized Zoe Weitzman, along with Harmon Weitzman and Leonard Blatt on January 21-22rd, 2011, based on a selfarrogated need to know that Zoe was safe and in this state. The police could not identify their authority or how Zoe may have been unsafe or in the wrong state. They seized the three without probable cause, as they lacked knowledge of specific and articulable facts combined with rational inferences to believe that a crime was committed, which is necessary for a Terry stop, or that Zoe was in imminent danger of serious injury, which is necessary for a child welfare check. All evidence acquired subsequent to these seizures must therefore be suppressed. Respectfully submitted this 27th day of May, 2011.
_______________________________ Leonard Blatt

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
RCW 10.79.040 RCW 13.32A.050 RCW 13.34.050 RCW 26.44.050 RCW 46.61.687 RCW 26.44.100(1) RCW 9.73.030 RCW 9A.08.020 Adams v. State, Aguilar v. Texas, Ballard v. State, Beaverts v. State, Anderson v. Creighton, Cady v. Dombrowski, Calabretta v. Floyd, California v. Hodari D., Carnell v. Grimm, Columbus v. Holmes, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, Doe v. Lebbos, Franklin, Green v. Kennedy, Hicks v. Mathews, Housh v. People, Illinois v. Wardlow, John Bad Elk v. U.S., Jones v. State, Kilcup v. McManus, Lundstrom v. Alberquerque,
121 Ga. 163, 48 S.E. 910 (1904) 378 U.S. 108 (1964) 43 Ohio 349 4 Tex.App. 175 483 U.S. 635 (1987) 413 U.S. 433 (1973) 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999) 499 U.S. 621 (1991) 74 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1996) 152 N.W.2d 301 (Ohio App.) 403 U.S. 443 (l97l) 348 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) 118 Ga. 860, 45 S.E. 698 (1903) 48 N.Y. Rep. 653 (1871) 266 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1954) 75 111. 491 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000) 177 U.S. 529 26 Tex.App, 1 64 Wn.2d 771 (1964) 616 F.3d 1108 (2010)
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Mabe v. San Bernardino, Michigan v. Clifford, Mincey v. Arizona, Parker, Payton v. New York, Plummer v. State, Ram v. Rubin, Roberts, v. Dean, Saucier v. Katz, Skidmore v. State, Spinelli v. U.S., State v. Acrey, State v. Alcantara, State v. Allen, State v. Armenta, State v. Avila-Avina, State v. Barnes, State v. Bessette, State v. Boland, State v. Christman, State v. Contreras, State v. Coyne, State v. DeArman, State v. Ellwood, State v. Ferrier, State v. Gleason, State v. Henry, State v. Hobart, State v. Holeman, State v. Kennedy, State v. Kinzy, State v. Ladson, State v. Leach, State v. Leach, State v. Lennon, State v. Markgraf, State v. Mendez, State v. Mercer, State v. Mobley, State v. Morse, State v. Parker, State v. Pressley, State v. Richardson, State v. Robinson, State v. Rousseau, State v. Rousseau, State v. Sanchez, State v. Spartucus Williamson, State v. Spaulding, State v. Sweet,
237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001) 464 U.S. 287 (1984) 437 U.S. 385 (1978) 139 Wn.2d 496 445 U.S. 573 (1980) 136 Ind. 306 118 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1997) 187 So. 571 (Fla. 1939) 533 U.S. 202 (2001) 43 Tex. 93 393 U.S. 410 (1969) 148 Wn.2d 738 (2003) 79 Wn.App. 362 (1995) 138 Wn.App. 463 (2007) 134 Wn.2d 1 (1997) 99 Wn.App. 9 (2000) 96 Wn.App. 217 (1999) 105 Wn.App. 793 (2001) 115 Wn.2d 571 100 Wn.2d 814 (1984) 92 Wn.App. 307 (1988) 99 Wn.App. 566 (2000) 54 Wn.App 621 (1989) 52 Wn.App. 70 (1988) 136 Wn.2d 103 (1998) 32 Kan. 245 80 Wn.App. 544 (1995) 94 Wn.2d 437 (1980) 103 Wn.2d 426 (1985) 107 Wn.2d 1 (1986) 141 Wn.2d 373 (2000) 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999) 113 Wn.2d 735 (1989) 7 Conn. 452 94 Wn.App. 573, 138 Wn.2d 1014 59 Wn.App. 509 (1990) 137 Wn.2d 208, 223 (1999) 45 Wn.App. 769 (1986) 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 156 Wn.2d 1 (2005) 139 W.2d 486 (1999) 64 Wn.App. 591 (1992) 64 Wn. App. 693 (1992) 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260 241 P.2d 447 40 Wa.2d, 92 (1952) 74 Wn.App. 763 (1994) 84 Wn.App 37 (1996) 34 Minn. 3621 44 Wn.App. 226 (1986)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
State v. Thorn, State v. Tijerina, State v. Tocki, State v. Trenidad, State v. Walker, State v. Walker, State v. White, State v. Williams, State v. Young, State. v. Gum, Swetnam v. W.F. Woolworth Co., Terry v. Ohio, U.S. v. Carmichael, U.S. v. Impink, U.S. v. Jeffers, U.S. v. Mendenhall, U.S. v. Vasey, State v. Thompson, Wallis v. Spencer,
129 Wn.2d 347 (1996) 61 Wn.App. 626 (1991) 32 Wn.App. 457 (1982) 23 Wn.App. 418 (1979) 136 Wn.2d 678 (1998) 66 Wn.App. 622 (1992) 97 Wn.2d 92 (1982) 102 Wn.2d 733 (1984) 135 Wn.2d 498 (1998) 68 W.Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463 (1910) 318 P.2d 364 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) 728 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) 342 U.S. 48 (1951) 446 U.S. 544 (1980) 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987) 151 Wn.2d 793 (2004) 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)


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DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPRESS (CrRLJ 3.6)

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and lived in a home that had:

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C. The Officers Claimed Authorities are Invalid

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EXCLUSIVE! Man Charged with Telling the Truth.

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State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 496 (1999).

Under Terry, a police officer may briefly detain and

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basis for any Terry stop. 365 (1995).

State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362,

State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92 (1982); State v.

circumstances, that threshold may reasonably crossed without a warrant.

_______________________________ Leonard Blatt

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