The Temporary Migration-Development Nexus in Canadian Perspective:

An examination of Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program

Jordan A. Reiniger

September 7, 2010 Word Count: 14,982

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ABSTRACT
Temporary labour migration from developing to developed countries is on the rise. The paper discusses the temporary migration-development nexus by looking at Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and whether it is positive for source-country development. The literature surveyed found that temporary migration can have positive impacts on source country development, but the conditions under which such migration occurs is important. The paper then examines Canadas TFWP through points of leverage that can make temporary labour migration schemes development friendly. The paper finds that Canadas TFWP in Alberta creates barriers to making its development impact on source countries positive. Finally a number of recommendations are made to make Canadas TFWP more development friendly.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Relevance Research Objective Methodology and Limitations Structure 4 4 5 6 7 8 8 8 10 12 15 17 18 22 24 26 27 27 29 29 31 31 32 37 42 44 46 48 48 48 49 50 53 60 61

Chapter Two: Literature Review 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Introduction Early Migration-Development Optimism: Post-WWII to the 1970s Development-Migration Pessimism: 1970s 1990s The Development-Migration Rethink: 1990s Present Circular Migration The Temporary Migration-Development Nexus: A Capabilities Approach 2.6.1 Temporary Migration and Financial Capital 2.6.2 Temporary Migration and Human Capital 2.6.3 Temporary Migration and Social Capital 2.7 Conclusion Chapter Three: Points of Leverage 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Canadas TFWP 3.2.1 The Structure of Canadas TFWP 3.2.2 The Evolution of Canadas TFWP 3.3 Points of Leverage 3.3.1 Recruitment and informed decision-making 3.3.2 Rights in the workplace 3.3.3 Remittances 3.3.4 Return 3.4 Conclusion Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusions 4.1.1 The development impacts of migration are conditional 4.1.2 Canadas TFWP is not development friendly 4.2 Recommendations Annex A: References Annex B: Abbreviations Annex C: Survey Results

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Relevance Temporary migration from developing countries to developed countries is on the rise. In fact, temporary migration to OECD countries has increased by around five per cent annually since 2000 (Thomas 2010, pp. 36). Those entering the U.S., Australia and Canada on temporary permits now outnumber those entering on a permanent basis (ibid). The impact this trend has on the development of temporary migrants source countries has long been the subject of debate. In 2007, the Global Forum on Migration and Development was established as a multi-country forum to discuss the impacts that migratory trends have on development, and has found a broadly positive correlation. However, such optimism has been tempered by the realization that migration does not always contribute positively to development, and, indeed, may have negative implications. In both source and destination countries, the conditions under which temporary migration occurs impacts the outcomes. Within Canada, there is a debate over increased temporary migration from developing countries and whether this is positive or negative (AFL, 2009). This debate, as many others throughout the western world, seems to centre on one of two positions: that its bad for us or its bad for them. The bad-for-us argument focuses on the impact on the host countrys labour markets, including the notion that TFWs1 are either taking jobs from host country citizens or driving down wages, and that the long-term economic needs of the host country are not being met be temporary labour flows. The bad-for-them argument focuses on the notion that the host country is exploiting temporary migrants in a system that is fundamentally racist (ibid).

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However, yet to be discussed in this debate is whether Canadas TFWP 2 has a positive or negative impact on the source countries of our TFWs. There are three reasons why this is a relevant consideration for Canada. First, Canada is increasingly dependent on trade for its livelihood, and therefore must be concerned by actors in the global economy. When temporary migrants increasingly come from developing countries which are also new and growing markets such and the Philippines, Mexico, India and China, and that migration has an impact on the source country, Canadas is impacted economically by its immigration policies. Second, Canada will be completely dependent on in-migration for all population growth by 2030 (Thomas, 2010). Much of this is expected to come from developing countries, where population growth is too high. Having a temporary migration scheme that considers the impact it has on developing countries will help build Canadas reputation abroad, and help it compete for desirable, skilled economic migrants with other industrialized host countries. The third reason is a moral argument: that Canada should not be engaged in activities that have an adverse affect on others, notably developing countries. For these reasons, this paper will explore the temporary migrationdevelopment nexus to determine whether Canadas TFW program has a positive impact on source-country development. It is hoped that this paper will positively contribute to the discussion on Canadas TFWP already underway. 1.2 Research Objectives The aim of this paper is to examine Canadas TFWP with a particular focus on what impact it is having on source-country development. The paper will first explore the literature on the temporary migration-development nexus in order to find the circumstances under which temporary migration can contribute positively to development, and thus provide a sensible benchmark against which to judge Canadas TFWP. An assessment of Canadas TFWP with the understanding of these

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conditions can help to answer the ultimate question this paper is asking: is Canadas TFWP contributing positively to source-country development? 1.3 Methodology and Limitations As the most common type of temporary labour to Canada from developing countries is unskilled (AFL, 2009), this paper will pay particular attention to the way in which Canadas TFWP deals with unskilled TFWs. In order to further focus the discussion, and because each province within Canada has some jurisdictional authority over the TFWP, this paper will look specifically at the Province of Alberta in assessing Canadas program overall. Alberta, on a per capita basis, has more TFWs than any other province, with 1.6 per cent of its total population there on a temporary work permit (CIC, 2008). This paper will also focus on two source countries: the Philippines and Mexico. The Philippines is the country from which Canada draws the most TFWs, both skilled and unskilled. Mexico is the second largest source of TFWs from a developing country (ALF, 2009). This paper also relies heavily on published literature as it is, primarily, a desk-based study. Two separate sets of original research have been conducted, including a survey of practitioners who assist TFWs and one-on-one interviews with a number of TFWs currently residing Alberta, Canada (Cf. Appendix C). While this research provides valuable insights, the sample size of each survey is not significant statistically. Therefore, the original research that has been conducted can be seen as a way to colour in vast empirical data available from various government and non-government sources. Moreover, the author draws heavily on personal experience in Canadas immigration system, most notably in section 3.2.1. Exposure to Canadas TFWP comes from two sources: as a case worker for a Member of Parliament in Canada and work with a non-profit centre providing legal

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assistance to TFWs. The combination of these two experiences has given the author considerable professional experience in the area of TFWs and the TFWP in Canada. Despite the publication of numerous studies on the general connection between temporary migration and development, there exists a dearth of research on the connection between temporary migration schemes in industrial countries and development, specifically as they pertain to the Canadian context. Therefore, this paper must draw heavily on a few studies in order to come to its findings and recommendations. Research on this topic could usefully include extended research in source countries. Not having the capacity to facilitate this research, and the limited nature of such studies, also hinders the findings of the paper. 1.4 Structure The next chapter (Chapter Two) examines the literature on the temporary migration-development nexus. It will find that, while there is much debate on the subject, out-migration can have positive impacts on source-country development; however, the conditions under which such out-migration occurs has a profound impact on whether the correlation is positive or negative. Chapter Three explores Canadas TFWP through a framework adopted by Barber, Black and Tenaglia (2005) to examine the U.K.s guest worker program. Through the exploration of the TFWP, a number of policies are uncovered which call into question the development impacts of Canadas program. Chapter Four summarizes previous findings and suggests a number of recommendations to make the program more development friendly.

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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction Views on the migration-development nexus have differed substantially throughout the years (De Haas, 2010). On one side, optimists from various perspectives have seen a significant positive connection between migration and development for countries of origin. On the other, pessimists have seen migration, particularly south-north, as having a detrimental impact on the development of countries of origin. Historically, these migration-development-nexus mood swings are correlated with the predominant paradigm shifts in social and development theory (ibid). In recent years, with the advances in social and development paradigms, the impact on development by migration has been viewed with a renewed sense of optimism. This literature review examines this evolution in the understanding of the migration-development nexus. It then looks at temporary migration through the lens of the capabilities approach to determine which conditions render the greatest development impacts of migration for countries of origin. The literature shows that temporary migration can be either positive or negative for source-country development, depending on the circumstances under which that migration takes place, and suggests the conditions which produce positive development results. 2.2 Early Migration-Development Optimism: Post-WWII to the 1970s From the post WWII-era to the 1970s, migration was believed to contribute to the rapid growth and development of both the migrant-recipient countries and the migrants countries of origin, and was thus a win-win (Kindleberger, 1965: pp. 253). During this period, migration was seen to contribute to positive development by promoting greater equality, sustained economic growth,

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increases in knowledge and capital transfers to developing countries, and an improved quality of life beyond what even development aid could deliver (Keely and Tran, 1989). The Neo-Classical Migration Theory viewed migration as a source of equalization between migrant source and recipient countries. According to this theory, the free flow of labour, from labourrich to labour-scarce countries, would result in increased scarcity of labour in labour-rich countries, coinciding with a higher marginal productivity of labour and increasing wage levels in migrant sending countries (De Hass, 2010: 231). Capital flows would go in the opposite direction as labour flows, from capital-rich to capital scarce-countries. This flow of capital and labour would ultimately improve development in both countries, and continue until factor price equalization is achieved. That is, once wage levels in origin and destination countries reach equalization, migration will cease (Massey et al, 1994). Other dominant views of migration and development in the post-WWII-era saw migrants as sources of capital and knowledge flows to source countries, thus contributing to development. Through large scale capital transfers, such as remittances, aid and loans, decolonized developing countries would be able to experience rapid economic growth and industrialization (De Haas, 2010). Moreover, remittances as a source of capital transfer had the potential to improve both income distribution and quality of life in source countries beyond other transfers, such as aid, loans and FDI (Keeley and Tran, 1989: 500). Return migrants were seen as important agents of change and innovation (De Haas, 2010: 231). Migrants were expected to bring back new ideas, knowledge and entrepreneurial attitudes. In this way, migration was seen as playing an important role in modernizing developing countries, and further removing the knowledge gap between industrialized countries and the developing (ibid). It was also anticipated that migrants, whose return to their country of origin was widely expected, were

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going to make substantial investments in their home countries, and thus represented the hope for development in their native land (Beijer, 1970: 102; quoted in De Haas, 2010: pp. 232). As a result of the optimism connected with development in this era, developing-country governments began to encourage migration to industrialized countries, which was often one their main development policies (Penninx, 1982). However, during the 1960s, and increasingly in the 1970s, this optimism was called into question, and the pessimists gained a stronger voice. 2.3 Development-Migration Pessimism: 1970s 1990s Criticism of early optimism emerged for two fundamental reasons: there was a paradigm shift in social and development theory and emerging empirical evidence and policy experiences did not support early optimist theories (De Haas, 2010: 232-233). In fact, pessimism took the opposite view of the link between migration and development: that migration was increasing inequality in development levels; the industrialized countries, through migration, were getting wealthier, with developing countries becoming relatively poorer (ibid). According to De Haas (2010), the pessimistic theories of this era, including Structuralism and Neo-Marxism, fit particularly well within the Cumulative Causation Theory elaborated on by Myrdal (1957). According to this theory, capitalist development is marked by deepening welfare inequality. As soon as one country has a head start on development, economies of scale perpetuate and deepen the pattern of accelerated growth in the core and the cycle of poverty in the periphery. Moreover, the economic activities of those with the initial advantage (the core) drain investment and encourage outmigration of the most talented populations in the disadvantaged areas (the periphery). This theory does not discount that there may be some positive effects from out-migration for the periphery; however, the theory stipulates that the negative effects far outweigh the positive.

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According to the Cumulative Causation Theory, the negative effects of migration relate to both human and capital flight and inequality, all of which leads to the increased dependence on core countries. Often seen as one of the primary benefits of migration, according to early migration optimism, remittances were now seen to lead to capital flight and inequality (Lipton, 1980). Those who are able to migrate tend to be the better off members of the periphery, as migration often has financial barriers. Therefore, remittances tend to favour the better off, thus making non-migrant communities relatively worse off (De Haas, 2010). Migrants, and those to whom they send remittances, are also seen to spend remittance funds on non-productive consumption. As migrants spend more time abroad, they develop different tastes, and increasingly demand goods that are foreign to their home country. They also seek to consume more luxury items, such as refrigerators, televisions, etc. This increases consumption of imported goods, causing a decrease in local production and employment (Lipton, 1980; De Haas, 2010). These two factors contribute to both the increase in poverty and inequality among non-migrants (Zacharia, Mathew and Rajan, 2001) and the increased underdevelopment and dependence on the core, perpetuating the cycle of increased migration (De Haas, 2010). Migration also leads to the depletion of human resources. Labour flight to developed countries was seen to contribute to both brain and brawn drain (Penninx, 1982). Migration is a flight from misery, and is characterized by the depletion of the most healthy, educated and productive members of a developing countrys society, which are already in short supply (Papademetriou, 1985). Those who are able to migrate are usually the most entrepreneurial and well educated in society (the brain), a group of people that the society has invested significant capital in, or the young, productive members (the brawn). Because the exit of the most skilled and productive members of society leads to increased under-development, which results in greater migration (as flight from misery), migration ultimately leads to greater dependence on the core.
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New studies, leading to growing volumes of empirical evidence, also began to counter optimistic outlooks of the post-WWII to 1970s era, contributing to the growing consensus that migration contributes to underdevelopment, rather than the opposite (Keely and Tran, 1989). The evidence, along with the prevalence of those paradigms aligned with the Cumulative Causation Theory, led to the notion of the migrant syndrome (Reichert, 1981), which infers that migration contributed to more underdevelopment, which led to more migration and so on. 2.4 The DevelopmentMigration Rethink: 1990s Present Despite the seemingly logical case of the pessimistic approach to the migration-development nexus, there are inconsistencies. In discussing the pessimistic position, De Haas (2010) notes that: [O]n the one hand, migration is assumed to breed inequality because migrants come from better off groups within society. On the other hand, further impoverishment of the region of origin is expected to lead to more migration (De Haas, 2010: 239). Empirical evidence points to the fact that economic and social development both enable and inspire people to migrate (De Haas, 2007a), and the relationship between migration and development has been found to be more synonymous with an inverted U-curve, rather than the linear and inversely proportional curve suggested by the pessimists (De Haas, 2010). This evidence seems to suggest that the more developed a society becomes, the more, not less, mobile they are, up to a certain level. Pessimists can be said to rightly assume that migrants tend to come from those who are better off, but are, by that very notion, incorrect in asserting that further impoverishment leads to greater migration. Additionally, the pessimist approach must be called into question because of yet more studies that have found that, under certain conditions, the development impacts on migration have been positive for countries of origin (De Haas, 2010: 240). Moreover, migrants have been found to play a

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positive role in their countries of origin through remittances, investments, entrepreneurship and contributions to social change (De Haas, 2007b). Not only is the pessimistic position logically inconsistent, the evidence suggests that migration can contribute to positive development. This, however, should not be taken to mean that, de facto, the optimistic position was correct all along. In fact, both the optimist and pessimist positions relied on a form of theoretical determinism, claiming to know all of the variables and attempting to predict the development outcomes of migration on that basis. In reality, both development and migration are too complex and multi-faceted to be examined through the toonarrow paradigms previously employed by both sides (De Haas, 2010: 240). Evidence has indeed shown situations in which migration has had a positive impact on development, and those where the impact has been neutral or negative (De Haas, 2009). Therefore, the migration-development nexus is complex. Given this complexity, a number of new approaches came to light. In response to NeoClassical Migration Theory, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) approach emerged (Massey et al, 1994: 711). NELM argues that international migration arises out of the failures in markets that threaten the material well-being of households, and recognized that markets, particularly in the developing world, are imperfect (ibid). For instance, developing countries often lack the capacity, financial and otherwise, to provide insurance against risks to income, production and property. In order to self-insure, families often send members to foreign labour markets, which offer relatively higher wages and prove effective in minimizing household risks and overcoming capital constraints (Stark, 1991). Similarly, in response to the rather rigid neo-Marxist perspectives, the Household Livelihoods approach was postulated. A livelihood is composed of the assets (material and social),

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capabilities and activities required for a means of living (Ellis, 1998). A livelihoods strategy, therefore, consists of the deliberate combination of choices made by households and their individual members to secure, maintain and improve their livelihoods (De Haas, 2010: 244). Migration can then be seen as a strategy for improving the livelihood of a family. In line with the departure of the deterministic and pessimistic approaches, which viewed departing migrants as lost to their countries of origin and gained by the receiving countries, a transnational framework emerged (Agunias, 2006: 5). According to this transnationalism, migrants continually forge and sustain multiple attachments across nation-states (ibid). Migrants are increasingly able to foster links with their societies of origin through phone, satellite television and the internet, and to be able to better remit money through an increasingly globalized banking system (De Haas, 2005). While migrants in the 19th and 20th century kept intensive transnational ties, the technological advances since then have allowed migrants and their families to pursue transnational livelihoods on a more constant, day-to-day basis (ibid). This new transnational approach has significant implications for both the study of migration and development, but also the policy implications thereof. First, views of migration being a zero-sum game are becoming out-dated, and migration as a win-win is emerging (Agunias, 2006). Integration in receiving societies and commitment to countries of origin can be viewed as complimentary to one another, rather than as substitutes, as integration into one society no longer implies loosening of ties with the other (De Haas, 2010: 247). The emergence of these new approaches are particularly relevant to the discussion on the temporary-migration. First, by understanding that migration is a livelihoods strategy, as in NELM and the livelihoods approach, one can better understand the impact of migration on development on a household level. That is, if the objective of migration is improved livelihoods, the question becomes:

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does migration improve the livelihoods of those in the source country? Second, the concept of transnationalism opens up many doors with respect to possible policy options for migration. The next section discusses this in more detail by examining the concept of circular migration. 2.5 Circular Migration Circular migration is a term that has been around for decades, and has emerged at the forefront of the migration policy agenda (Agunias and Newland, 2007), due to increasing optimism about its development potential (Agunias, 2006: 5). Circular migration refers to a continuing, longterm, and fluid relationship among countries that occupy what is increasingly recognized as a single economic space (Agunia and Newland, 2007: 2). Migration is thus seen as a continual back-andforth from source country to recipient country, as one can have an affiliation with both (as in the transnational approach). This can create what many call a triple win: the migrant and the migrants source and recipient country benefiting from migration. A number of attributes of circular migration are particularly salient to this discussion. First, circular migration is a natural occurrence. That is, without governments establishing boundaries and restrictions to migration, labour would be much more mobile, and circulate from origin to foreign countries and back again. This is exemplified by looking at internal migration and migration that existed previous to border regulations. Internal migration is roundly seen in developing and developed countries alike. For instance, in some rural communities, young men often seek wage employment in urban areas during down season or periods of drought (Newland, Agunias and Terrazas, 2008:4). Transnationally, nomads, traders and seasonal labourers follow livelihood strategies that take advantage of different conditions in different locations (ibid). The Mexican border provides a striking example of this. Previous to the 1990s, before the U.S. began more serious border enforcement, the migratory trends of Mexican populations were more or less circular Mexican

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labourers would go to the U.S. for temporary work as a part of a livelihood strategy, and then return home. According to the Migration Policy Institute, further restrictions on the borders only served to trap migrants inside the U.S., and thus end circularity on that end, rather than stop the flow of migrants coming to the U.S. Therefore, were it not for regulations imposed by governments at their borders, labour would be much more mobile and circular. Second, the impact of circular migration on development is complex, and can have either positive or negative effects on development (Agunias and Newland, 2007). For instance, in the case of seasonal migration of Mexican workers to Canada, studies have found that return migrants invest in agricultural land and small businesses at home. They also engage in so-called non-productive consumption (such as purchasing a house, sending children to school, purchasing household items, etc.), which serves to stimulate the local economy (Basok, 2003: 20). Another study, assessing the impact on development of temporary migrant workers returning home to Kerala, India from work in the Middle East, was more negative. Nair (1999) found that most migrants that returned were usually middle-aged and some 50 per cent were unemployed. This suggests that there are certain conditions which are conducive to positive circularity, and those that are not. Of these conditions, return is one. Evidence suggests that the benefits of development in source country are elevated when migrants plan to return (Agunias, 2006). However, along with a broader understanding of circular migration, thinking on return has evolved. While the return of permanent migrants is often seen in a more positive light (ibid), it is no longer seen as necessary for positive development results; temporary migrants returning can produce development results as well. For temporary migrants, return can be temporary (where they plan to return to the host country as a temporary migrant again), permanent (where they stay in their source country for good) or absent (where they remain in the host country illegally or legitimately permanently). Either one of these

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options can produce development results in the source country with the exception of illegally staying in the host country as long as certain conditions exist for return. Of these, having the return planned and voluntary is one of the most important factors for positive circular migration (Agunias and Newland, 2007:8). That is, migrants, as managers of their livelihood, will return when it is of maximum benefit to them. Another factor of particular importance is the socio-economic conditions in their source country (ibid). If conditions are good, improving or expected to improve, migrants are more likely to return, and that return is likely to be positive. Third, and most important, is the capital financial, human and social that migrants can gain while abroad. If they can gain enough capital, the development benefits of migration will be positive. The next section examines this in detail, by looking at temporary migration through the capabilities approach. 2.6 The Temporary MigrationDevelopment Nexus: A Capabilities Approach When attempting to examine the conditions under which temporary migration is conducive to development, the first challenge is to find a theoretical framework that is refined enough to deal with the heterogeneity and complexity of migration-development interactions, but that does not restrict itself to empiricism and all is local and singular relativism (De Haas, 2010: 240). Both NELM and the Livelihoods approach exemplify that migration is a means to acquire a wider range of assets which insure against future shocks and stresses. In light of that view of migration, and to assess the impact that migration has on development, it is important to examine the impact of migration, and the various policies that surround it, through a multi-faceted approach capable of considering its effects on the livelihoods of families. The capabilities approach, postulated by Sen (1999) provides one such approach. Sen views development as a process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy. By increasing the capabilities of the individual, you enhance

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their well-being by giving them a greater degree of freedom to choose the livelihood that provides the greatest fulfillment. In viewing development as such, this paper will turn to examining the impact that migration has on enhancing the capabilities of individuals, families, communities and countries of origin by looking at the impact of temporary migration on financial, human and social capital. 2.6.1 Temporary Migration and Financial Capital The financial capital of the temporary migration-development nexus generally involves a discussion on remittances and the savings temporary workers are able to amass while abroad. The growth in remittance transfers has been staggering over the past four decades, growing from $2 billion in 1970, to $78.6 billion in 2000 (World Bank, 2005), to $206 billion in 2006 (GFDM, 2007b). The actual amounts are thought to be much higher as informal transfer arrangements are still widely used (ibid). This dramatic increase is caused by a number of factors, including: the better measure of cross-border financial flows since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; reduction in remittance costs and expanding networks in the industry; depreciation of the American dollar; and the growth in the global migrant stock and incomes (Ratha, 2007). On average, remittances account for roughly 3.5 per cent of GDP in low-income countries and 1.5 per cent in middle-income countries, and are two-thirds of global FDI and twice the amount spent on ODA (ibid). Many scholars believed that the micro-impact of remittances on development is minimal or negative, due to spending on non-productive consumption (King, 1986). Spending on such things as housing, clothing, sanitation, health, food and education were all seen as non-productive, as they were seen as merely consumption rather than contributing to any sort of growth in wealth (Ammassari and Black, 2001). Moreover, certain business investments, such as in small-scale enterprise and agricultural land acquisition, were seen as unproductive due to what scholars perceived as an already crowded market (King, 1986). Remittances have also been blamed for

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increasing inequality (Ammassari and Black, 2001). As migrants tend to come from the better off portions of society, remittances are not sent to the most vulnerable in society, further increasing the relative poverty of those on the bottom of the economic ladder (ibid). Over time, however, the understanding of development has evolved. For Canada, the goal in helping other countries develop is singular: poverty reduction (House of Commons Canada, 2008). Poverty is now seen as dynamic; something that one can move in and out of. Moser (1998) described poverty in terms of vulnerabilities, and that the poor themselves are managers of a complex set of assets: the more they are able to accumulate by way of assets, the less vulnerable they are to shocks and trends. The consumption of what were called non-productive assets actually helps to build up that asset base, and can be considered poverty reducing on that basis. For example, studies have shown that remittance-receiving households generally have a higher quality of education and healthier babies than non-remittance-receiving households (GFMD, 2007c). Therefore, consumption in education and health, and other asset-building expenses such as sanitation, can be seen as reducing household vulnerability to shocks and trends and therefore as a positive contributor to development, at least at a micro-level. Remittances have also been shown to have multiplier effects, where the benefits of the remittance money has a positive impact on non-migrant families (GFMD, 2007c). For instance, remittance money invested in small-scale enterprises have, in some circumstances, created economic activity that benefits the entire community (Taylor, 1999). One study found that each dollar remitted to a family actually yields the equivalent of three dollars to the community (GFMD, 2007b). Remittances may have contributed to moving 11 per cent of the population out of poverty in Uganda, six per cent in Bangladesh and five per cent in Ghana (GFMD, 2007c). Moreover, a cross-country analysis showed a direct connection between remittances and a drop in the poverty rate: a 10 per cent

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increase in overall remittances may cause a 3.5 per cent drop in the overall poverty rate (Adams and Page, 2005). Like micro, the macro-impact of remittances has long been questioned, with upward pressure on both inflation and currency within countries-of-origin being the primary concern (Ratha, 2007). In some countries, remittance transfers account for a significant portion of their GDP. For instance, remittances are responsible for 30 per cent of GDP in Moldova (GFMD, 2007c). This inflow of capital, which is not the result of increased productivity from within, can increase inflation and trigger a phenomenon known as Dutch disease. Dutch disease refers to a situation in which demand for a countrys currency is increased, resulting in appreciation of its value. This makes the countrys products more expensive to export, and imports less expensive, both of which reduces demand for in-country production (Ratha, 2007). Most often, Dutch disease occurs in economies where there is a resource boom, and high demand for a product (such as oil or diamonds) begins the cycle and hurts all other internal industries. In the case of remittances, it is outside-production that causes the problem and serves to make countries of origin dependant on remittance monies as their local production dwindles. The issue of inflation and Dutch disease is a very real concern. However, it is important to discuss the possible benefits of remittances on the macro level as well. Remittance can provide a source of financial stability, as their flows tend to be counter-cyclical (GFMD, 2007c). That is, when other sources of funds, such as FDI, dry up in times of financial crisis, economic uncertainty or national disasters, remittance flows tend to increase (ibid). For instance, evidence suggests that remittances have become vital to Bangladesh and its resilience to the economic devastation caused by monsoons (GFMD, 2007c: 5). Remittances are also a crucial source of foreign currency, helping developing countries maintain a balance of payments (De Haas, 2005).

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Remittances can also help developing countries get access to better credit ratings and, thus, better terms on loans. According to Ratha (2007), by including remittances in debt-export ratios, a key indicator on the rate at which a country can borrow in the international market, credit ratings can be improved substantially. In the cases of Haiti and Lebonon, including remittances in such calculations would improve each countrys credit rating by two notches, which results in sovereign spread reductions3 of 130 to 330 basis points. Moreover, as Keely and Tran (1989: 515) note, it is hard to imagine a more efficient system for transferring capital to so many countries (often poor) to the benefit of so many citizens. FDI requires a certain amount of trickle down, development assistance goes through inefficient and, often, corrupt government systems; however, remittances are given directly to the people. For others, remittances form the best type of bottom-up development (De Haas, 2005; Jones, 1998). What is clear, however, is that remittances best contribute to development in an environment characterised by good or improving development (Agunias and Newland, 2007). A good policy approach to remittances can help amplify the good and mitigate the potential risks. The savings a migrant is able to amass while abroad and bring home can also have a significant impact on development. Empirical evidence suggests that migrants are often able to save significant amounts of money (Ammasari and Black, 2001: 26-27). The amount that they are able to save depends largely on how much it costs to live while they are earning money abroad, how long they are working abroad and the extent to which they sacrifice while abroad (King, 1986: 24). As in the case of remittances, there are those who believe that savings do not contribute to development and that migrants do not spend their savings on productive investments, and the

Sovereign spreads are the difference in a countries sovereign bond rate and comparable US Treasury Bonds.

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consumption increases the inequality between non-migrant-sending families and migrant-sending families (Ammassari and Black, 2001). However, one study pointed to the investments seasonal migrants made in their home country, and the positive impacts those investments made both on the migrant families and the communities in which they lived (Bosak, 2003). With regard to financial capital, temporary migration can have a positive impact on development, under certain conditions. First, regardless of the environment in a migrants country of origin, remittances can assist in improving the livelihoods of migrants, at least in the short-term, and act as insurance against states that are often incapable of assisting in the livelihoods of their people. In the macro context, financial flows in the form of both savings and remittances can have positive impacts if the governments are capable of using the inflow wisely. For countries who receive temporary migrants, a number of lessons can be learned. Remittances to assist in the reduction of poverty and strategies to help temporary migrants send more money more efficiently can contribute positively to development. Furthermore, assisting temporary migrants to save more money for their return can also have significant impacts on development. 2.6.2 Temporary Migration and Human Capital There are usually two issues with regard to temporary migration and human capital. The first relates to whether or not countries are losing enough of their human capital to have a negative impact on development. The second relates to the extent to which return migrants can have a positive impact on development. Many people argue that out-migration has a detrimental impact on developing countries, often referred to as the brain (high skilled workers) and brawn (low skilled workers) drain. De Haas (2005) notes that the brain drain is one of the largest migration-development myths around. In fact, one study has discovered that less than 10 per cent of highly-skilled workers are migrating, leaving
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more than 90 per cent in the country of origin. Moreover, in most developing countries, there are high unemployment rates among highly skilled workers. Some countries even encourage high unemployment among skilled workers to encourage migration and reap the benefits thereof. For instance, the Philippines purposely trains more nurses than are needed in the country. Therefore, migration can be seen to help keep highly skilled individuals productively employed, thereby reducing the unemployment rate and reaping the benefits migration. The extent to which migrants contribute to development upon return is often contested. On the one side, many have argued that migrants acquire new skills, ideas and attitudes while abroad, which are expected to contribute positively to development (Ammassari and Black, 2001). While there is a large body of empirical evidence to support this proposition, there is large body of evidence which contradicts this notion as well (ibid). Some studies on migrants returning to Africa from Europe noted that some migrants actually de-skilled (Al-Rashid, 1992). That is, they did such lowskilled jobs in Europe that not only did they not learn new skills, but they had lost many of the skills required to be productive in their home countries. Moreover, of those who did learn new skills, many found them irrelevant in their home country. Studies have also shown, however, that with regard to employment and wage rates, relative to non-migrants, return migrants had lower unemployment rates and higher mean incomes (Muschkin, 1993). Other studies have pointed out that, as a result of their work experience abroad, return migrants enjoyed greater occupational mobility, being able to move out of production-service occupations into business and agriculture occupations (Arif and Irfan, 1997). Therefore, on an individual level, return migrants themselves are often better off for having lived abroad. But, what does that do for countries as a whole?

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There is little doubt that return migrants learn new ideas and return with changed attitudes and behaviours (Ammassari and Black, 2001; Gmelch, 1980). For instance, Bernard (1978) noted that return migrants came home with substantially different views on social issues, such as divorce, dowries, gender relations and child rearing. Return migrants can, under certain circumstances, use the new ideas and attitudes acquired abroad to promote change (Ammassari and Black, 2001). Skilled workers are generally seen to be more important agents of change, as they tend to return to positions of greater influence, either in government or the private sector (ibid). Even unskilled workers, however, can have an impact. The conclusion made by Thomas-Hope (1999) was that returnees often create positive change because, by virtue of their experience abroad, they become leaders in their local community. The out-migration does not only help to alleviate high unemployment rates, particularly among high skilled individuals, but, on return, migrants can have improved employment and wage options and share their new ideas and attitudes with those in their home country. For countries receiving temporary migrants, encouraging the learning of new skills and exposure to new ideas can help temporary migrants contribute more positively to development when they return home. 2.6.3 Temporary Migration and Social Capital Financial and human capital are the most commonly examined when looking at temporary migration and development, while social capital has largely been ignored (Ammassari and Black, 2001). Social capital can be defined as the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 11; quoted in Ammassari and Black, 2001). Social capital influences both whether an individual decides to

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migrate (Massey et al, 1994) and the extent to which that migration has a positive impact on development (Ammassari and Black, 2001). As Massey et al (1994: 728) note, [t]he existence of [social capital] is hypothesised to increase the likelihood of emigration by lowering the costs, raising the benefits, and mitigating the risks of international movement. One key determinant of where migrants emigrate to, for instance, is the size of the stock of migrants from the prospective migrants country of origin in potential locations (Massey et al, 2004: 729). One source of a migrants social capital is family abroad. One study found that family connections in the U.S. raised a migrants wages, hours of work and total monthly income (Donato, Durand and Massey, 1992). This can have positive implications for source country development, given the discussions above with regard to financial and human capital. Migrants, however, do not need family connections to benefit from social capital. In fact, a key aspect of a migrants skill set is thought to be her ability to network (Assamari and Black, 2001: 30). The more migrants have developed their networking capability, and the more they have

developed their network both at home and abroad, the more freedom they have to return, stay away or shuttle back and forth (ibid). Moreover, developed networks can help migrants be more successful in achieving their goals while working abroad and their goals for their return (ibid). Most importantly, social capital plays a critical role because it can be used to transfer (and re-transfer back) human and social capital (Faist, 1997). That is, social capital makes the impact of financial and human capital greater. For recipient countries concerned with the impact of temporary migration on source country development, and the ability of temporary migrants to maximize their contribution to the recipient country, efforts should be made to foster improved social capital, such as, for example, linking new migrants to existing cultural associations from their country of origin.

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2.7 Conclusion The way in which the temporary migrationdevelopment nexus is viewed has evolved over the years, largely in line with advances in conceptualizations of development. What is clear is that temporary migration can have a positive impact on development when the conditions under which that migration occurs are conducive to development. From the literature, it is evident that one of the conditions includes planned and voluntary return. The literature also shows that migration in which migrants gain financial, human and social capital will produce positive development results. When all of the above exist together, the temporary migration-development nexus is positive. Having a source country in which the socio-economic situation is good or improving also amplifies whatever development results might otherwise be available. The challenge for countries of destination for temporary migrants is to examine their temporary labour migration schemes, and determine whether they are creating these conditions. The next chapter examines Canadas TFWP for this purpose.

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CHAPTER THREE: POINTS OF LEVERAGE IN CANADAS TFWP

3.1 Introduction The previous chapter outlined the various sides of the literature on the subject of the temporary migration-development nexus, and showed that temporary migration can have either a positive or negative impact on the development of source countries, depending on the circumstances under which such migration occurs. This section will explore the Canadian context, and circumstances surrounding temporary labour migration to Canada from developing countries. On the Canadian side, the province of Alberta will be highlighted, as it has more TFWs in its labour force than any other province, on a per capita basis. This paper will also focus on the Philippines and Mexico as source countries for TFWs in Canada. These two countries represent the two largest sources of unskilled temporary labour in Canada. One of the most important policy objectives for Canadian immigration is to create a strong Canadian economy by pursuing the maximum economic benefit of in-migration (CIC, 2008). The Canadian Government, however, has indicated that permanent migration may not be enough to meet the labour shortages that Canada will see in the next decade. Indeed, it is estimated that by 2020, Canada will experience a one-million-person labour shortage (Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2008). The Government sees temporary migration as part of the solution (Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010), and has characterised it as the principal tool to help employers meet immediate skill requirements when qualified Canadian workers cannot be found (Finance Canada, 2007: pp. 217). A significant reason why Canada, and industrialized countries in general, are relying more heavily on temporary labour is their desire to form knowledge-based economies (Alboim, 2009: 11). To do so, you need an educated population and skilled workers to settle more permanently. While unskilled labour is in short supply, as fewer Canadians seem willing to fill these positions, temporary migration
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increases. In order to fill these positions, which employers demand (Finance Canada, 2006: pp. 50), the Canadian government has actively engaged in a TFWP that specifically allows for low-skilled TFWs. As temporary migration is employer driven (Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010), and employers continue to demand low-skilled workers to fill labour shortages, Canada is likely to continue the inmigration of low-skilled, temporary migrants. The trend among industrialized countries, including Canada, has been an increased reliance on temporary migration to fill unskilled labour shortages (Thomas, 2010). Developing countries have also encouraged the temporary out-migration of their low-skilled populations. Mexico, for instance, has signed an agreement with Canada to allow for seasonal agriculture workers to come to Canada during peak farming season and return home in the off season. Such arrangements are seen as beneficial to Mexico because they boost their balance of payments through remittance-sending migrants and are beneficiaries of increased capital investments that return migrants tend to make (Basok, 2003). Moreover, most developing countries have sizable unemployment rates. Out-migration can help to alleviate this burden for those remaining at home, while at the same time provide benefit to the country as migrants remit funds (Ammasari and Black, 2001). Developing countries, therefore, seem poised to continue to allow the out-migration of their unskilled population, either in a passive or active way. This paper assumes, as the literature has shown, that temporary migration can have a positive impact on source-country development. It will, therefore, assess whether Canadas TFWP creates the right conditions under which temporary migration can have a positive impact on source country development. Barber, Black and Tenaglia (2005) argue that the policies a recipient country establishes can impact source country development, and that each recipient country has four points of leverage with which to work. By evaluating Canadas TFWP through these points of leverage, this chapter will endeavour to determine whether Canada contributes positively to source country
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development. The points of leverage can also be utilized as a tool for determining reforms to Canadas TFWP in order for it to be a better contributor to source country development. This chapter will first look at the structure of Canadas TFWP. The remaining sections examine each of the four points of leverage in logical order of the immigration process: recruitment, rights in the workplace, remittances and return. Finally, the last section concludes by summarizing the chapters findings. 3.2 Canadas TFWP 3.2.1 The structure of Canadas TFWP During Canadian Confederation, the powers associated with immigration were split between federal and provincial governments. Under the Constitution Act, 1867, immigration became a matter of shared jurisdiction. The federal government is responsible for regulating who comes into the country and the duration of their stay. The provincial government is charged with protection of civil rights employment rights, health care, education and housing (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: pp. 8). The federal government is, therefore, responsible for admission and stay, and the provincial government is in charge of the protection of TFWs rights, with the exception of Employment Insurance a federally administered program (ibid). Federally, the responsibility of the TFWP falls under the jurisdiction of three different departments. The first Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) is responsible for providing employers with a Labour Market Opinion (LMO), which gives them permission to hire TFWs. In order to obtain an LMO, the employer must demonstrate that the position cannot be filled by a Canadian and agree to provide the prospective TFW with pay that is equal to what a Canadian would get in that position. The pay rate is set by HRSDC. For low skilled

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TFWs, the employer must also agree to pay for return airfare and arrange for reasonable accommodation. Secondly, the employee, the prospective TFW, then applies to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) for a work permit. Having an LMO does not guarantee a work permit. Rather, prospective TFWs must prove that they are conversant in one of Canadas two official languages, a requirement that is often relaxed depending on the position being applied for; able to perform the job being applied for; have the capacity to support themselves in Canada; and will return at the end of their authorized stay in Canada. If the immigration officer at CIC decides the prospective TFW meets these requirements, they will approve the work permit After the TFW receives a work permit, they must pass through Customs on Canadian soil. This is where the third department Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) comes in. It has the power to issue Temporary Resident Visas and Work Permits on the spot, and also to deny entry to someone who already has a Work Permit. Additionally, CBSA is the department tasked with deporting individuals who overstay their authorized period within Canada and policing violations of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, including violations by employers and third parties. Once the TFW and his employer have passed through each of these departments, the TFW is in Canada and ready to work. Aside from regulating when the TFW is to leave and administering Employment Insurance (EI), the provincial government is now responsible for protecting the TFWs civil rights while they reside in the provinces jurisdiction (Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010). In accordance with provincial legislation, TFWs enjoy all of the same rights as other Canadians. However, practically, this is not often the case (Cf. section 3.3.2).

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3.2.2 The evolution of Canadas TFWP The TFWP was founded in January of 1973, and initially targeted specific groups such as academics, engineers and other highly-skilled, in-demand foreign workers whose skills were not available elsewhere in Canada, or in limited supply (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: pp. 4). In 2002, the government of Canada introduced the Pilot Project for Hiring Foreign Workers in Occupations that Require Lower Levels of Formal Training (commonly referred to as the low-skill pilot project) (ibid; AFL, 2009). Canada has five categories for classifying skill levels called National Occupational Classifications (NOC). Skilled occupations are considered NOC 0, A and B (AFL, 2009: pp. 9). Unskilled occupations are classified as NOC C and D, and generally require little to no training or education (ibid). In the five years following the introduction of the low-skill pilot project, the percentage of unskilled (NOC C and D) TFWs out of total TFWs admitted increased from 26.4 per cent in 2003 to 40.8 per cent in 2007. Over the same period, the percentage of skilled (NOC 0, A and B) TFWs out of total TFWs admitted went from 49.7 per cent to 39.6 per cent (AFL, 2009; CIC, 2008). TFWs from developing countries also increased dramatically over this period of time. In 1998, for instance, 1,377 TFWs from the Philippines and 194 from Mexico were admitted to Alberta. By 2007, those numbers grew to 9,139 and 2,584, respectively (CIC, 2008). 3.3 Points of Leverage Whether a temporary worker scheme is development friendly or not depends on the process, including policies and procedures, of the program (Barber, Black and Tenaglia, 2005: 7). In that context, Barber, Black and Tenaglia (2005) describe four points of leverage in a temporary worker program for making them development friendly. These points of leverage, in logical order of the migration process, include recruitment and information; rights in the workplace; remittances; and
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return. By examining Canadas TFWP in Alberta through these points of leverage, a conclusion can be made as to whether or not Canadas scheme in Alberta is development friendly. A number of previously-discussed findings are relevant to this section. First, while migration can have a positive impact on a macro-level, it does so primarily by a bottom-up process. That is, money flows into the country through individual families, and the cumulative impact of all of those transfers, and the money being spent within the country has a positive impact. Therefore, if migration is good for the livelihood of migrants generally, it can be seen as positive on a more macro-level. The factors influencing whether migration is a positive livelihoods strategy relate to the impact it has on financial, human and social capital. Second, return plays a role in the development impact of migration. That return happens is inevitable; however, the way this return occurs both differs and influences the development of source countries. The factors that matter most are not whether return is temporary or permanent; but rather, whether it is voluntary and planned or the opposite. Therefore, this section will explore the impact that each point of leverage has on the various types of a migrants capital and the nature of his return. Some points of leverage will have a greater impact on different forms of capital and return than others. 3.3.1 Recruitment and informed decision-making Recruitment There is a spectrum for how temporary migration schemes recruit workers from abroad: on one end, there is the laissez-faire approach; on the other, the tightly regulated system. Canadas general TFWP is effectively unregulated. Regulation of such practices falls under the purview of each province. The province of Alberta has made it illegal to charge recruitment fees to TFWs

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(Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010); however, considering most recruitment happens abroad, where neither the government of Canada nor province of Alberta have jurisdiction, it makes the law practically impossible to enforce. The result of this jurisdictional problem is that most recruitment of TFWs to Canada is completely unregulated. Moreover, employment agencies are allowed to charge TFWs settlement fees, for such services as finding accommodation, helping them find bus routes, etc. (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: 14). However, many TFWs are confused by the difference, and are often charged a settlement fee for what is actually recruitment (ibid). Recruitment agencies, which are only supposed to charge employers, often charge prospective TFWs. According to a survey of TFW advocates in Canada, fees that recruiters charge range from a few hundred dollars to as high as CAD 20,000, as in one extreme case. One Filipino TFW who was interviewed for this paper said he was charged PHP 180,000 (CAD 4, 215) and had to pay for his own airfare, which the employer is supposed to cover. Therefore, while not all TFWs are charged recruitment fees, according to surveys conducted for this paper, it appears that many are. The impact that such unregulated recruitment practices have on livelihoods is significant. First, by having to pay large recruitment fees, which, according to interviews of TFWs, is often money borrowed from family and friends, TFWs spend much of their earnings paying off these debts. TFWs in unskilled occupations often earn low wages. One TFW interviewed, working at a gas station/fast food restaurant initially earned CAD 9.50 per hour and, after two years, was making CAD 11 per hour. With this wage rate, a TFW could expect to make, on the higher end, CAD 2,000 per month. After the cost of living, taxes and deductions, such as Workers Compensation Board (WCB), Employment Insurance (EI) and Canada Pension Plan (CPP), there is often little left at the end of the month. Instead of saving and remitting what little money a TFW can earn, after expenses, s/he has to pay off debt. If the TFW mentioned above, who paid a CAD 4,200 recruitment fee, did not have that debt to pay off, his income would have had an increased financial impact on his family
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in the Philippines and his ability to save. In short, illegal recruitment fees, and unregulated recruitment schemes in general, contribute to a reduction in financial capital that TFWs should be able to gain. In October 2008, the province of Alberta signed a memorandum of understanding with the Philippines (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). This documents primary purpose was easing labour flows and improving the entry of Filipino workers into the province, but also contains a policy prohibiting charging recruitment fees to TFWs who wish to come to Alberta (ibid). It has led to a collaborative effort between the two sides in going after recruitment agencies and warning prospective TFWs to avoid these groups (Alberta, 2008). According to Nekache and Kinoshita (2010: 15), these bilateral agreements clearly help protect TFWs against illegal recruitment fees. Neither the government of Canada nor the province of Alberta has entered into more of these bilateral agreements to help deal with jurisdictional issues (ibid). Mexico, therefore, does not have a similar agreement, putting TFWs coming from that region at increased risk of being defrauded by unscrupulous employment agencies. As they pertain to recruitment, the policies currently in place, and the lack of action on bilateral agreements to help strengthen the jurisdiction of these policies in source countries, do not adequately prevent abuse by recruitment agencies. Therefore, Canadas TFWP in Alberta is not a positive contributor to source country development on these terms. Information A migrants ability to make an informed decision about working abroad is key when viewing migration as a possible strategy to improve his livelihood. When surveyed about whether TFWs were adequately informed about Canadas TFWP, all TFW advocates either somewhat disagreed or

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strongly disagreed with the notion. Among the TFWs interviewed for this paper, a number of gaps in the information they had prior to coming to Canada were identified. First, while most TFWs interviewed knew what their wages would be, many were unclear on the costs associated with living in Canada. For instance, one TFW from Mexico, knew that her prearranged rent would be CAD 425 a month, but did not understand that she had to pay utilities electricity, power and water on top of that. This TFW noted that her utilities, in the winter, added as much as CAD 250 per month to her rent. Other cost-of-living expenses some TFWs were unaware of included transportation, housing, food, etc. While knowledge of these expenses may not stop TFWs from coming to Canada, it gives them the ability to better plan the amount they can save, and how much they will be able to send to their families back home. Second, survey respondents identified that many TFWs come to Canada with a desire to stay permanently, and often think that they are able to. However, unskilled TFWs in Alberta have no means of permanent migration to Canada (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010), except through some form of family sponsorship. It is unclear whether migrants, notably those who are leaving a spouse and children behind, would separate from them if they knew there was no path to permanent residency, and eventually the ability to bring their family with them. Survey respondents noted that some recruitment agencies make these problems with information worse, as they actively spread misinformation to make migration look more appealing so that prospective TFWs will pay fees to get to Canada. Therefore, not only is there a lack of information, in certain circumstances there may also be a purposeful misrepresentation of information in order to make migration look more appealing than it is. The above forms the two most common information gaps among migrants, identified through the survey and interviews conducted. The situation, as it stands, depends on which country they are
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coming from. One TFW from the Philippines noted that he was told to attend a one-hour seminar on what he could expect in Canada and found it particularly useful. Some of these seminars, however, are hosted by recruitment agencies, which tell TFWs that they are mandatory and charge them a fee. The government in the Philippines takes a more proactive role in trying to inform its citizens who are planning to work abroad about the conditions they may face (Agunias and Ruiz, 2007). For those coming from Mexico, the government appears to take a much more passive role. Despite some efforts to rectify the lack of accurate information, there exists a significant gap. Transnational ties can assist in filling this information gap. One TFW interviewed noted that he had a friend already working in Canada, and was able to ask questions about what Canada would be like. He was, therefore, prepared and knew precisely how much he would be able to save and send back. He decided to come on that basis. He and his friend, already in Canada, were unaware that they would not be able to migrate permanently to Canada. Efforts have also been made by the government of Canada and the province of Alberta to address the information gap. Documents have been prepared by the province of Alberta that relate to an employees rights when they come to Canada (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). The government of Canada has also prepared a number of information packets in other languages. While these are good initiatives, they are often inaccessible and do not deal with many of the factors that TFWs should consider in order to make an informed decision, such as cost of living and paths to permanent residency. As not all TFWs know about or can access these government-issued documents, and many do not have transnational ties on which to draw, the information gap can have an impact on the livelihoods strategy of TFWs. With regard to financial capital, many are not able to save or send as much money as they thought due to a lack of understanding of costs. One TFW interviewed, for

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instance, mentioned that the unknown costs were so high that she was unable to save any money, and expressed frustration that she left all of her family back home and was no further ahead financially after two years. Both recruitment and information can have an impact on, primarily, the financial capital that migrants can gain while abroad. While the province of Alberta has taken some proactive steps with the Philippines to address some of the issues around recruitment agencies one of the primary problems they have not reached similar agreements with other governments, such as Mexico. The rules and regulations around the TFWP regarding recruitment and information, while not actively doing so, passively inhibit the amount of financial capital TFWs are able to acquire while abroad. Therefore, on this point of leverage, Canadas TFWP in Alberta is not development friendly as it is inhibiting the amount of financial capital a TFW might be able to acquire. 3.3.2 Rights in the Workplace In theory, all TFWs in Canada have the same rights as permanent residents and Canadian citizens (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010; AFL, 2009; Alboim, 2009). In practice, this is often not the case (ibid). The survey of TFW advocates and various studies on the TFWP have identified the two primary reasons for this: lack of knowledge among TFWs about their rights and, most important, work permits being tied to a single employer (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010; AFL, 2009; Alboim, 2009). The axiom knowledge is power is only partially relevant to TFWs in Canada. On the one hand, the province of Alberta has attempted to make TFWs aware of their rights by producing a handbook about employee rights in the province (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). While this is a worthwhile step, and it is important for TFWs to know their rights, the information contained within that handbook may not be applicable to them at all times. This stems from the fact that a work permit
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is tied to a single employer, and the process for switching employers is very difficult. A TFW needing to switch jobs for one reason or another would have to find an employer who either has an LMO or is willing to obtain one. Finding an employer who has an LMO is difficult, as there are not any databases a TFW can access to find this information. The process for obtaining an LMO can take months, during which time the TFW cannot work. As of February 2010, it took approximately four months to get a new LMO and Work Permit (ibid: 18). Moreover, there is no guarantee that CIC will approve a new Work Permit. The fact that a TFW may have to go four months without employment, with no guarantee of actually getting a new Work Permit, inhibits a TFW from quitting his job and compels him not to report abuses for fear of being fired (ibid). A number of issues can be identified when work permits are restricted to a single employer. First, the enforcement of employment rights is more complicated for TFWs (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). TFWs, like everyone working in Alberta, are governed by the Employment Standards Code, which sets the minimum employment standards. They are also governed by the employment contract, which is approved by HRSDC, that they must sign with an employer prior to obtaining their work permit (ibid). However, according to the Ministry of Alberta Employment and Immigration, a TFW has a disincentive to file a complaint (Harding and Walton, 2007). For instance, prior to filing a complaint, the complainant must provide his or her employer with a self-help kit, which is intended to resolve the problem before it has to go through the complaint process. This deters many from filing out of fear of losing their job. If a TFW does want to file a complaint, it can be a long, bureaucratic process, with all instructions offered only in English (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: 24). Even if the employer is found in the wrong, it has the right to appeal. The best recourse a TFW can hope for is to be compensated for what is rightfully owed to him or her, or to be reinstated in the same job (ibid). Under the Employment Standards Code, there is no compensation for people who have worked less
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than three months, and those who have worked for less than two years are only entitled to one week of pay. Between the length of the process, administrative burden, risk associated with it, and possible benefits if successful, many TFWs do not file complaints. For example, only 18 of 4,000 Employment Standards complaints in 2007 came from TFWs (Harding and Walton, 2007). TFWs are also supposed to be insured in the event of a work place injury. In Alberta, they fall under the Workers Compensation Act (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). While the Workers Compensation Board (WCB) has made some important accommodations, such as allowing TFWs to file and receive benefits from abroad, the legal status of TFWs hinders them in one significant way. The WCBs goal is to help injured workers get back to their original job at the same rate of pay (ibid). When they cannot do so, the WCB encourages workers to work at any job they can, and the WCB tops up their pay to their pre-injury rate. TFWs, however, are prevented for working anywhere else, and the WCB ignores this legal restriction and pays them the difference between what they theoretically could make and what they were earning pre-injury (ibid). This is a serious disadvantage to the TFW who is prevented from working due to a workplace injury, as they are punished by the province of Alberta for a legal restriction placed on them by the government of Canada. As Employment Insurance (EI) premiums are deducted off each TFWs paycheque, as it is for all employees in Canada, they are eligible to receive EI benefits (HRSDC, 2009). However, and again due to the legal restrictions of their work permit, they are often prevented from receiving EI benefits when they are unemployed, even if they meet all of the criteria a Canadian citizen must meet to access benefits. The problem stems from the fact that an EI recipient must be available for work in order to receive the benefits. While TFWs are both available and willing to work, they are legally prohibited from doing so until they receive a new LMO and Work Permit. A TFW worker is unable to receive benefits until he has found and is able to begin working at another job, at which point he no longer requires them. A number of cases have been appealed in court on this issue, and in all
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cases, the judge has been forced to deny benefits on the basis of the restrictions on the TFWs work permit (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). In Alberta however, the experience among TFW advocates is different. EI has begun approving all EI applications, and those that are refused can be overturned by sending a letter to HRSDC, the department that administers the program. In law, therefore, TFWs are prohibited from receiving EI benefits because of the restrictions placed on their work permits by the government of Canada. In practice, however, HRSDC has begun accepting EI applications. While, in practice, the problem seems to have been rectified, it is still ambiguous legally. This leaves the possibility of unfair treatment of TFWs, particularly when all appeals to federal court, the last stage of appeal for EI benefits, have denied TFWs benefits (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010). Therefore, due to the restrictions of TFWs work permits, they are, in many cases, blocked from receiving the same benefits as Canadians and Permanent Residents. The last component of their protection as workers is their employment contract. The provisions within the contract, which have to be approved by HRSDC, are meant to ensure that TFWs are treated fairly and given the guarantees that the regulations grant them, such as return airfare and accommodation. However, in practice, it is very difficult for employees to use the contract to guarantee their rights. If an employer breaches the contract the government has no authority to intervene in the employer/employee relationship or to enforce the terms and conditions of employment. It is the responsibility of each party to the contract to know the laws that apply to them and to look after their own interest (HRSDC: quoted in Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: 23). Therefore, if an employer is violating the terms of the contract, it is up to the TFW to know his or her rights and seek remedy. There, again, is a disincentive for the TFW to do this. First, the TFW must bring an application in provincial court to have the employer meet its contractual obligations a process which can take between six and nine months (ibid). Moreover, there is a fear that if the employee is suing the employer, the employee will be fired. At which point, the employee will be out of work, for at a minimum four months while obtaining an LMO and work
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permit, and having to pay the cost of court fees. One TFW that was interviewed mentioned that his employer did not pay for his airfare, but that it made more sense to keep working for the company. The TFWs rights in the workplace influence the financial capital they are able to acquire while working abroad. According to survey respondents, many TFWs are taken advantage of: they work long hours for which they are not paid, and often do not receive the pay they were guaranteed. Also, some TFWs may be placed in unsafe work environments, because unscrupulous employers know they have a disincentive to report abuse. This could have an impact on financial capital as a TFW who is injured will either work injured, compromising future earning potential, or quit working. If that TFW quits, he may not be eligible for the same benefits and will lose significant financial capital. The conditions in the workplace can also have an impact on human capital. One of the benefits of migration is that, upon return, migrants often bring new ideas about processes and social norms in their host countries, which can impact source country development (Bernard, 1978). However, if TFWs are told that they have all of the same rights as Canadians, but then are subject to significant abuses with little recourse, what benefit does that provide the source country? What can that return migrant impart about the rights they had in Canada, when many were not provided to them? By saying that they have the same rights, and then allowing them to be subject to abuse and mistreatment, Canadas TFWP provides a flawed example of labour policies on which TFWs can draw from in their source country. The restrictive nature of unskilled TFWs work permits provides a practical barrier to TFWs receiving the same rights as Canadian citizens and Permanent Residents. It impedes on both the human and financial capital that TFWs are able to acquire while in Canada, and is, therefore, not development friendly.

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3.3.3 Remittances As mentioned in Chapter Two, remittances form one of the primary development benefits of migration. Canadas TFWP can either provide an environment that facilitates these transfers or one that does not. A number of factors need to be considered. First, the two points of leverage above have both pointed to the fact that Canadas TFWP has a negative impact on financial capital, meaning that migrants, because of the program, have less money to send abroad or save. By having a system that is conducive to recruitment agencies spreading mis-information and charging illegal recruitment fees, the amount of remittance money that can go to families in the source country is not only less than it could be, but often less than the migrant had planned due to higher costs in the recipient country (Cf. section 3.3.1). Almost all TFW advocates surveyed mentioned that the higher-than-expected cost of living was a significant barrier to TFWs remitting money back home. Additionally, a system which puts the burden on TFWs to stand up for their own rights, while at the same time creating disincentive for them to do so, is not conducive to maximizing the remittances that migrants can send (Cf. section 3.3.2). Therefore, the recruitment and information process and the rights that TFWs have in the workplace are not facilitating the transfer of remittances; they serve to limit the amount of financial capital a migrant can acquire. Second, the way in which remittances are sent affect the development impact of migration (Barber, Black and Tenaglia, 2005: 13). A number of TFW advocates noted that the high cost of sending money back home was a barrier to TFWs remitting money to their families. Five years ago, the average cost of remitting money overseas was roughly 12 per cent of the amount being remitted (ibid). However, since the amount of money being sent has increased so dramatically in recent years (Cf. section 2.2), the costs have come down. At one mainstream bank in Edmonton, the capital city

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of Alberta, the bank sending money abroad charges CAD 15 and the bank receiving the money charges CAD 15. One TFW interviewed says is costs him about CAD 12 to send roughly CAD 300 to the Philippines. Neither the government of Canada nor the province of Alberta have a direct impact on what fees private financial institutions charge, aside from setting the regulatory environment in which they operate. The private sector has been slowly reducing prices as the stock of temporary migrants grows, and competition for wire transfers increases. Another aspect involved in remittances, and one that could ultimately help increase competition among financial institutions, is giving TFWs easier access to bank accounts. Studies have shown that more money is saved when a formal financial institution is used (Meyers, 1998). Additionally, migrants in developing countries can be introduced to the formal financial sector while abroad, and help to establish it in their countries of origin. For instance, one study found that the much of the banking sector in Latin America was a result of demand from return migrants used to using the banking system while abroad (ibid). The government of Canada could be pro-active in introducing TFWs to the formal banking sector, which would reduce the amount they spend to send money back home, as mainstream banks tend to be cheaper than other financial institutions such as Western Union. This could also help to introduce formalized banking, which, upon return, helps to facilitate greater savings and access to credit. While Canadas TFWP in Alberta is not specifically responsible for inhibiting the amount of remittances being sent home, as many of the factors involved in this are relegated to the private sector, it does prevent the amount of remittance being sent to source countries by the policies outlined in the first two points of leverage.

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3.3.4 Return The final point of leverage deals with return. There are two important factors in the discussion on return. They relate to how long a migrant can be in Canada before he returns, and how he returns. The most important determinant of whether return is development friendly relates to whether it is planned and voluntary. The amount of time that a migrant is able to spend abroad has an impact on the development impacts of temporary migration. Generally, the time abroad needs to be long enough for migrants to build up their financial, human and social capital previous to return. In 2007, the government of Canada announced that work permits would be valid for two years, up from the one year period previously prescribed (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: 5). The increase of one year was significant and could be seen as a development friendly move. Indeed, the first year of migration is not as productive as the second, due to the initial costs of settlement. Despite this positive move, the duration of work permits issued for Alberta was reduced back to one year in June 2009 (Nekache and Kinoshita, 2010: 18). Additionally, according to one TFW advocate, HRSDC has made renewal of LMOs almost impossible, effectively meaning that TFWs can only work in Canada for one year and then will have to find another employer or return home. Whether or not a TFW can find alternate employers and receive extensions to his work permits, CIC has now mandated that a TFW can work for a maximum of four years in Canada, and then must return to his source country for four more years before he can work in Canada again (CIC, 2010). Secondly, how the TFW returns home has also been the subject of debate. Many question whether the temporary migration schemes are truly temporary (Barber, Black and Tenaglia, 2010: 16). The most commonly cited example is the Gastarbeiter scheme in Germany. Many argue that overstaying is the inevitable outcome of such programs (Acma, 2002). Others, however, note that
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even in the Gastarbeiter program, return rates were high and those migrants that chose to stay largely did so due to family reunification (ibid). While there is question as to whether migrants actually do return, there is little question that many hope to stay in Canada permanently. The survey of TFW advocates found that, in their experience, TFWs always wish to stay permanently. If TFWs generally want to stay, then whether they do or do not has a lot to do with Canadas policy toward return. In Canada, skilled TFWs can apply to be a Permanent Resident through one of three streams: the Federal Skilled Worker Program; the Canadian Experience Class; or the Provincial Nominee Program (Alboim, 2009). As a permanent resident, one can come and go as one pleases, so long as that person spends at least two of five years in Canada. This effectively means that migrants can plan their return, and go back on a voluntary basis, making it effective for development. However, since low-skilled TFWs are unable to acquire permanent residency, they are subject to the rules installed under Canadas TFWP. In contrast to the ability to come and go as they please, as is the case with permanent residency, TFWs work permits are single entry, meaning that the work permit is no longer valid once the TFW leaves Canada. He or she must apply for a new work permit previous to coming back to Canada for work. This creates a disincentive for TFWs to return home when it would be of maximum benefit, as they are not guaranteed access to get back to Canada. Low-skilled TFWs are effectively barred from circular migration. Return within Canadas TFWP for low-skilled TFWs is not development friendly. Reducing the amount of time for which a work permit is valid from two years to one has a significant impact on both the financial and human capital migrants are able to acquire. With regard to financial capital, the costs of settlement can often be quite high. Giving migrants one more year of work, without the settlement costs associated with the first year, can greatly increase the funds they are able to save and remit. Moreover, the extra time in Canada can lead to increased human capital by giving them more

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job experience which may assist them on return, help them to better learn the language and gain a better understanding of the country. The restrictions on return, including not allowing low-skilled TFWs access to permanent residency and providing them with single-entry work permits inhibits their ability to make their return planned and voluntary. 3.4 Conclusion Canadas TFWP is governed by multiple parties, with each having specific jurisdictional responsibilities. The system can be characterised as complex. The entry of TFWs, the duration of their stay and the type of job they are able to do fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The rights that TFWs enjoy, which are supposed to be the same as those any Canadian or permanent resident enjoys, are governed by each province. The TFWP has evolved considerably since its inception in 1973. In 2002, the federal government opened the door to low-skilled TFWs. This caused the number of temporary migrants from developing countries to increase at a substantial rate. Given that the TFWP now has a growing number of TFWs from developing countries, this chapter endeavoured to examine the development impact that it has on source countries. It has done so through Barber, Black and Tenaglias (2005) four points of leverage. By examining Canadas TFWP through these points of leverage, this chapter has found that the Canadas low-skilled temporary migration scheme in Alberta is not development friendly. That is, it provides barriers to a positive contribution to source country development. This paper has not examined whether the impact is neutral or negative. While it is not currently contributing to development, the four points of leverage point to a number of reforms that can help make Canadas TFWP move in that direction. The next chapter

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summarizes the findings of the paper and makes a number of recommendations for making the TFWP a more positive contributor to source-country development.

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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions This paper has discussed the temporary migration-development nexus in the Canadian context. It first looked at what literature has said about the impact that temporary migration has on source country development. The paper then examined Canadas TFWP to determine whether it has a positive impact on countries-of-origin. A number of conclusions were reached on each of these points. 4.1.1 The development impacts of migration are conditional The discourse of the temporary migration-development nexus has historically shifted from finding the link between migration and development positive or negative. By viewing migration as a livelihoods strategy, one can view the impact that migration has on development by looking through the lens of the capability approach. The paper found that the extent to which migration contributes to development depends on the circumstances under which such migration occurs. Temporary migration schemes that encourage the accumulation of financial, human and social capital are positive contributors to source-country development. Moreover, the concept of circular migration has allowed a broadened view of a migrants return to emerge. No longer is permanent return to the source country seen as necessary for positive development. In fact, the type of return matters little relative to whether that return is planned and voluntary. The literature provides a benchmark against which Canadas TFWP can be examined. By determining the impact that Canadas TFWP has on the financial, human and social capital of

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migrants, and the nature of their return, an assessment can be made with regard to whether the program has a positive impact on source country development. 4.1.2 Canadas TFWP is not development friendly An examination of Canadas TFWP was conducted using Barber, Black and Tenaglias (2005) four points of leverage that recipient countries have to make their policies more development friendly. The first point of leverage is recruitment and information. The paper found that many TFWs were being charged illegal recruitment fees and were subject to inaccurate information about what to expect in Canada, notably with regard to the cost of living and their ability to obtain permanent residency. It concluded that this had a significant impact on the financial and human capital a TFW was able to acquire while in Canada. It also found that pre-existing social capital was helpful in dealing most notably with mis-information about what to expect in Canada. The paper also found that while the province of Alberta has taken pro-active steps to deal with this problem by signing a memorandum of understanding with the Philippine government, it has not agreed to new arrangements with other governments such as Mexico. Finally, the unregulated approach to recruitment and information was not found to be positive for source country development. The second point of leverage deals with a TFWs rights in the workplace. While TFWs are supposed to enjoy the same rights as Canadians, the restrictive nature of their work permits prohibits them from applying these rights. The paper found that the process by which workers file Employment Standards complaints, seek WCB benefits, are granted EI and have the employers contractual obligation upheld are unfair to the TFW, who usually has a disincentive to assert the rights he or she is supposed to have. In practice, TFWs do not have the same rights as their Canadian counterparts. Moreover, the lack of these rights is detrimental to their ability to acquire financial and
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human capital. The paper therefore concluded that this second point of leverage showed that Canadas TFWP in Alberta is not development friendly. The third point of leverage is remittances. The paper found that the combination of the first two points of leverage created a situation in which fewer remittances are sent abroad, therefore, limiting capacity for development. The reduced cost of sending money back home has been positive, and having TFWs more engaged in the formal financial sector presents certain development opportunities. The fourth and final point of leverage is return. The paper found that Canadas reduction in the amount of time a work permit is valid for from two years to one has a detrimental impact on the financial and human capital the TFW is able to acquire while abroad, and is thus not development friendly. Moreover, not giving unskilled TFWs a path to permanent residency reduces their ability to have a voluntary and planned return. Work Permits for TFWs are too restrictive, and on this point of the leverage, the paper finds that Canadas TFWP is not positive for source country development. Therefore, in assessing Canadas TFWP in Alberta overall, it can be classified as having barriers to making it positive for source-country development. The paper did not examine whether the net impact is neutral or negative, but found that there is clearly room for improvement. The next section proposes a number of reforms that would turn Canadas TFWP into a more developmentfriendly program. 4.2 Recommendations On the first point of leverage, the most prevalent problem was unscrupulous agencies who charge large recruitment fees to prospective TFWs and spread misinformation to amplify the positive aspects of temporary migration to Canada. Therefore, three recommendations related the first point of leverage are made:
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Canada should more actively enforce the laws that are already in place with regard to unscrupulous employers and recruitment agencies. Some recruitment agencies and employers are found to violate the laws around migration and development for which the governments of Canada and Alberta have jurisdiction. In these circumstances, they should proactively go after these offenders using the enforcement mechanism at their disposal and not rely solely on complaints from TFWs.

The province of Alberta should strengthen its memorandum of understanding with the Philippines and sign similar agreements with other migrant-sending countries.

Canadian embassies abroad should make information with regard to the cost of living, how much TFWs can expect to earn, TFWs rights in Canada and their chances of permanent residency more available to prospective TFWs in their language.

On the second point of leverage, the restrictive nature of the work permit was the primary problem. Therefore, two recommendations are made, the first of which is considered the most salient of all recommendations: Work Permits should be sector-specific rather than employer-specific. HRSDC could designate a certain sector, such as the hospitality sector in Alberta, short on labour. A TFW could have work permit for that specific sector, which would enable him to exercise the rights which he is supposed to have access to. Certain hurdles to this, such as which employer would pay for airfare could be dealt with in a number of ways. A private fund could be established in which the fund pays for the airfare, and the employer pays the cost back, with interest, on a monthly basis. If the TFW changes employment, the new employer takes over the payments. A similar scenario could be implemented, with the government controlling the fund. The situation as it stands now, with the last person employing the TFW paying the cost of airfare, may also work.
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Provide a database that lists all employers who currently have LMOS, and make it accessible to all TFWs, government offices and non-profit organizations who deal with TFWs. This should reduce the time between employers for TFWs who need to quit their jobs or get fired.

The third point of leverage deals with remittances. The recommendations above will assist in making this point of leverage more development friendly; however, one further recommendation is made: Encourage TFWs to engage in the formal banking sector by providing training and working with the banks. Banks may be eager to assist as this is an increasing source of business for them, and could help to establish international name recognition. The fourth point of leverage is return. In order to make Canadas TFWP more development friendly, two recommendations are made: Make Work Permits valid for a minimum of two years and multiple entry. The longer a TFW is able to stay, the greater the financial, human and social capital he is able to acquire. By making them multiple entry or double entry TFWs have the option of at least one return to the source country on a planned and voluntary basis without having to be worried about re-entry to Canada. Open the Canadian Experience Class or AINP up to low-skilled TFWs. By giving TFWs the option to permanently migrate, one allows for long-term solutions to Canadas impending labour shortage, while reducing the costs of settlement for newcomers. Moreover, the possibility of permanent residency provides incentive for TFWs to follow the rules, rather than stay in Canada illegally.

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ANNEX B: ABBREVIATIONS
AINP CBSA CIC FDI GFMD HRSDC NELM NOC ODA PNP TFW TFWP Alberta Immigrant Nominee Program (formerly PNP) Canadian Boarder Services Agency Citizenship and Immigration Canada Foreign Direct Investment Global Forum on Migration and Development Human Resources and Skills Development Canada New Economics of Labour Migration National Occupational Classifications Official Development Assistance Provincial Nominee Program Temporary Foreign Worker Temporary Foreign Worker Program

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ANNEX C: SURVEYS
One-on-one interviews were conducted with five TFWs currently working in Canada. Three were from the Philippines one male and two female and two came from Mexico one male and one female. Due to their situation in Canada, each was given anonymity. A one-on-one interview was also done with Yessy Byl, a lawyer and TFW advocate in Alberta. A survey was sent to most individuals in Alberta who assist TFWs. As TFWs in Canada receive little by way of settlement assistance, there are few people in this category. Of the surveys sent out, seven individuals responded, each of whom was given anonymity. Below are the questions and responses for that survey, conducted between 10 July and 25 August 2010. Survey on Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program Question 1: In your experience, what the most prevalent obstacles temporary foreign workers face when trying to come to Canada, prior to entering the country? 1. uncertainty 2. Lack of correct information, getting a valid LMO, saving enough money to pay the fees and plane tickets 3. Not sure. 4. The misinformation by commercial brokers in countries who charge a lot of money and give the idea that the TFW will have the right to stay permanently when he/she gets to Canada 5. having sufficient money to pay a recruiter in order to arrange for employment 6. Find employers willing to go through the LMO process. Refusal of visas at Canadian Embassies 7. The obstacles that TFW face when coming to Canada is getting appropiate employers and as well as passing their medical exams. The language is a big barrier before and after tfws enter Canada. Question 2: In your experience, what costs do temporary foreign workers incur in the process of obtaining permission to work in Canada? 1. The fee for the work permit. 2. The most significant costs are recruitment fees, most of which are illegal.
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3. Not sure. 4. The cost of paying brokers, sometimes they also pay for their transportation costs. 5. very high recruitment agency fees ranging from $3,000 to $20,000. In some countries, tfws are required to take training courses in order to get jobs...and the tfws must pay for those courses 6. Ussualy, Recruitment agencies and/or immigration fees. 7. The costs that TFW incur are costs of the application and medicals. As well they have to show that they can support themselves while waiting for a work permit if it is inside Canada. Question 3: Temporary foreign workers are adequately informed about Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program prior to making the decision to come to Canada. Strongly agree - 0 Somewhat agree - 0 Somewhat disagree 2 (29%) Strongly disagree 5 (71%) Question 4: In your opinion, is the process temporary foreign workers go through to obtain a work permit and enter Canada fair? Yes 2 (29%) No 2 (29%) Unsure 3 (43%) Question 5: In your experience, what are the most common challenges that temporary foreign workers encounter while working in Canada? 1. abuse, ineligibility to different programs, low income 2. Exploitation by employers including incorrect payment, overwork and actual jobs not fitting the job description; isolation due to language and cultural barriers; inappropriate housing situations, often tied to thier employers; misunderstandings about thier rights and lack of access to trustworthy, accurate information about rights, immigration programs and rules 3. Lack of Knowledge about where to go; Lack of connections; alientation and isolation. Abuse when they lost their jobs overnight and there was no LMO registry to search for an alternative LMO Employer. 4. dealing with exploitative/abusive employers and maintaining legal status in Canad 5. 1. Employement stadards issues, rights, responsibilities, etc. 2. Language & culture 3. Health and/or benefits 6. The most common challenges is the exploitation and the vulnerability of tfws because they are not treated fair. Especially if they get fired they have little recourse. Another chalenge is that TFWs are under the impression that if they come they can eventually become permanent residents but that is untrue and is very dificult for tfws ro get.

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Question 6: What, if any, barriers exist for temporary foreign workers in attempting to send money to their family and friends back home? 1. not making enough money to send home 2. Many TFWs have higher costs here than they expected, and large debt loads to recruiters and immigration consultants. 3. The expenditure they have to cover- housing, food costs are substantially higher than country of origin- many have had to live in conditions that are deplorable. 2 to 3 sharing a room 4. they are paid so little in the service sector jobs (and often not paid) that they have no money left to send home. 5. Probably the high fees of the compnies who transfer the money. Tax claims and benefits are not always elegible and often very limiting and limited. 6. Language barrier cost of standard of living Question 7: In your experience, what factors would contribute to temporary foreign workers being unsatisfied with their life and work in Canada? 1. lack of hope to stay permanently 2. mistreatment by employers and landlords, misrepresentaion of their ability to gain permanent residency, lack of access to programs (such as language classes) that are open to permanent residents, feelings of being trapped because their status is tied to one employer, feelings of being marginalized because of their insecure immigration status, excessive and confusing regulations and paperwork 3. They are faceless, we buy hamburgers from them but we do not know that they exist and the conditions and abuse they are undergoing. 4. abusive employers, a totally disrespectful and unresponsive government. and no way to remedy problems. 5. Disrespect for contract conditions: lower wages, longer hours than agreed, mistreatment, harassment work place, abuse and/or exploitation by employers. 6. treatment by employers are a big factor in being unsatisfied. Another is that they are professionals back home i.e. lawyers and they come to canada as i.e painters or construction workers. Question 8: In general, temporary foreign workers expectations about what working in Canada would be like, including how much money they can earn and save, are met. Strongly agree - 0 Somewhat agree 2 (33%) Somewhat disagree 3 (50%) Strongly disagree 1 (17%) Question 9: In general, temporary foreign workers have a good understanding of their rights as workers.
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Strongly agree - 0 Somewhat agree - 0 Somewhat disagree - 4 (67%) Strongly disagree 2 (33%) Question 10: In general, temporary foreign workers feel trapped in their jobs. Strongly agree 6 (100%) Somewhat agree - 0 Somewhat disagree - 0 Strongly disagree - 0 Question 11: In general, temporary foreign workers plan to return to their country of origin after their authorized stay in Canada. Strongly agree - 0 Somewhat agree 1 (20%) Somewhat disagree 0 Strongly disagree 4 (80%)

Question 12: In your experience, what factors influence whether a foreign worker decides to return home or attempts to stay in Canada permanently? 1. If they are here with the family or not 2. Many TFWs who come here intend to stay. They have often planned thier lives around a permanent move to Canada. Most of these workers are not willing to return home. TFWs who experienced poverty, political insecurity, or opression in thier home countries generally try to stay in Canada. Those who return home are usually skilled workers who were never planning on staying in Canada permanently, and have some security in their countries of origin. 3. The loss of their LMO employer and the inability to get a new one. The fact that they are spending more than they are earning. Isolation and lonliness. 4. Whether or not they have been able to maintain legal status. Sometimes they return home because of the problems and difficulties encountered here. 5. Most of Temporary Foreign Workes come to Canada with the hope of staying permanently because they have better opportunities and seek quility of life for them and their families. It sometimes happend they find love and stay in Canada. If they decide to go home is ussually because of personal or familiar factors. (Separation, helt issues. etc.)
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6. one factor is whether there is a possiblity of them being able to stay most will try to stay because back home may not be as safe or very low standard of living. Question 13: In general, temporary foreign workers who return home after working in Canada have been able to save enough money to significantly improve their life in their country of origin. Strongly agree 0 Somewhat agree 0 Somewhat disagree - 3 (50%) Strongly disagree (50%) Question 14: When a temporary foreign worker returns home, what would s/he say are the most positive aspects of Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program? 1. The opportunity to live and work in Canada. 2. I don't think that there is anything positive that the visible minority TFW's have to say about Canada 3. most return home without any money....they exhausted their savings trying to find a new job before their opportunity for renewing status ran out. The only people who are happy with earnings, savings, etc. are those who have been able to become certified tradespeople. 4. Wages fairness (same a s Cnadians) 5. n/a Question 15: When a temporary foreign worker returns home, what would s/he say are the most negative aspects of Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program? 1. lack of access to resources, inability to change jobs without an LMO 2. The vulnerability of TFWs to exploitation, difficulty of getting an LMO, feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability, difficulty in becoming permanent residents. 3. 1. Racism 2. Exploitation 3. Cold 4. Cost 5. They pay into the CPP and EI Program and taxes which leaves them with very little to survive on once they have sent money home. 6. The shame of having to get food from the food bank; beg for clothing. 4. that the renewal process is impossible and that an employee can work for years and be fired because maybe a Canadian now wants the job. and that Canada doesn't do anything about the exploitation. 5. 1. Working conditions. Eventhough is said are the same as Canadians in reality is not always like that. Often thay are taken advantage by employers, immigration agents, etc. 2. Limitations on social system when emergencies or unexpected situations come up. The system is not cxompletly prepared to assis TFWs.
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6. n/a Question 16: Overall, Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program is beneficial to Canada. Strongly agree 1 (17%) Somewhat agree 1 (17%) Somewhat disagree - 1 (17 %) Strongly disagree 3 (50%) Question 17: Overall, Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program is beneficial to the temporary foreign workers. Strongly agree 1 (17%) Somewhat agree 0 Somewhat disagree 3 (50%) Strongly disagree 2 (33%) Question 18: Overall, Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program is beneficial to the temporary foreign workers home country. Strongly agree 1 (17%) Somewhat agree 1 (17%) Somewhat disagree 2 (33%) Strongly disagree 2 (33%) Question 19: In your opinion, would it be better to: Leave Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program as it is - 0 Reform Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program 50% Get rid of Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program 50% Question 20: If you could change one thing about Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program, what would it be and why? 1. I would focus on fixing Canada's mainstream immigration system and return the TFW program to its original (pre 2006) form. That is, a program designed for skilled workers doing temporary positions such as university professors, sports teams, tradespeople working on plant shutdowns, etc.
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2. I would abolish it! 3. while I chose "get rid of the TFW program" I mean: get rid of the low skill pilot and to revert back to the program as it existed prior to 2002. At that time it was a TEMPORARY foreign worker program. It is now being used to circumvent the immigration process and to fill a long term need for low skilled workers without letting them immigrate. 4. I would really enforce the punishment for employers. recreuitment agencies and even fake immigarion agents who don't abide under all the immigration and employments standards condition and or take advantage of the vulnerability of TFWs. It seems like no mater what happens there are very little consequences for employers and and the worst part goes for the TFWs. 5. the treatment of TFWs and not bringing tfws into canada where there are Canadians willing to work because these TFWs will end being exploited.

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