Professor: Tokaji; Book: Eskridge 4th ed.

; Grade: "A-" Note: This is likely my most comprehensive but least condensed outline. In other words, I think that it is my worst outline. Legislation was definitely not my favorite subject. Anyone using this outline should probably approach it with a questioning attitude.

Legislation
Professor Tokaji Winter 2011

ExamOutline
I. Introduction
A. TheLegislativeProcess
i. HowaBillBecomesLaw a. LegislationIntroduced Anyhousemembercanintroducelegislation b. CommitteeReferral Billsarereferredtocommitteesbythespeakerofthehouseorthepresiding officerofthesenate.Canbereferredtomorethanonecommitteeorhavepartssplitbetweenmultiple committees.Failuretoactonabillwithinappropriatetimelimitskillsthebill c. CommitteeAction Committeehashearings Billcanbeassignedtosubcommittee Markupsessionsrevisethebill Committeeswritereport>anbigpartofthelegislativehistory>mostpersuasive Billgoestotherulescommitteeinthehousebutnotthesenate d. ScheduleLegislativeConsideration e. FloorConsideration f. Reconciliation:ConferenceCommittee Afterthebillhasgonethroughbothhouseandsenatethereis usuallydifferences.>bothsidesmustproducetheexactsamebill. g. Presentment Presidenthas10daystosignorveto>2/3(supermajority)voterequiredtooverride .

B. CaseStudy:TheCivilRightsActof1964
i. General a. StrategyQuestion Whyusethelegislativeprocess?WhynotusethecourtslikeinBrown? Congresswaseasiertopersuadethanjudges/courts>Legislatorsarevotedinandareaccountable toconstituents Constitutionandequalprotectionclauseprotectagainstgovernmentdiscrimination,notprivate businesses>thuscouldbetoughtodo b. Reforms: Publicaccommodations Schoolsegregation Fairemployment Discriminationbyfederallyfundedentities Billalsoincludedproposalforcommissiononequalemploymentopportunity ii. PassageintheHouse a. JudiciaryCommittee 1. McCormack(DMA) Speakerofthehouse.Referredthebilltothejudiciarycommittee. 2. Celler(DNY) Chairmanofthejudiciarycommittee. Initiallypursuedanaggressiveapproachandalmosttorpedoedthebill. AdministrationandtheRepublicansagreedtoacompromisebill>approved2014. 3. McCulloch(ROH) Rankingrepublicanonthejudiciarycommittee.Supportiveofcivilrightsin generalbutwantedaweakerbillbecausehewantedabillthatwouldpass. b. RulesCommittee 1. KeyEvent:JFKAssassination AfterJFKwasassassinatedLBJmaketheCRAabigissue.Itwastobe apartofJFK'slegacy. 2. GettingOutofCommittee Ofthethreemethodsforgettingoutofcommittee,2failed.After Brown(ROH)agreedtosupportrequestformeeting,ChairmanSmith(DVA)agreedtohold hearings.>rulescommitteeapprovedresolutiongoverningdebate114 c. FloorDebate&Vote 1. WeakeningAmendments WiththehelpofthedepartmentofjusticeCellerandMcCullochfended offweakeningamendments. 2. Sex Smith,inalastditchefforttokillthebill,successfullyadded"sex"totitleVII.This"poisonpill" amendmentwasafailure. 3. Passage Housevotedinfavor,290130. iii. PassageintheSenate a. SenateCalendar MajorityleaderMansfield(DMT)avoidedthejudiciarycommittee(certaindeathb/c chairedbyEastland(DMS))bymovingtohaveitplaceddirectlyontheSenatecalendar. b. RoleoftheExecutive(LBJ) LBJmaintaineddisciplineamongliberalsthebesthecouldbyinfluencinghis friends.

c. Filibuster Southerndemocratsfilibusteredbutitwaseventuallydefeatedbyavoteforcloture.Cloture wasaccomplishedbyexchangingvotesforweakeningamendments. d. WeakeningAmendments Senatevoteddownthemajorweakeningamendments.Thosethatsurvived weremostlycosmetic. e. Passage Billpassed,7327. iv. BillBecomesLaw a. ConferenceCommittee Usuallyusedtoreconciledifferencesbetweenthebillspassedinthehouseand senate. 1. AvoidingConferenceCommittee Conferencecommitteeriskedkillingthebill(committeechaired byEastland,anenemyofCRA)heresoCellerandMcCullochreleasedajointstatementsupporting thebillaspassedbytheSenate. b. BillApproved HouserulescommitteeconcurredinSenateamendments.Houseapprovedbill289126 on7/2/1964.SignedintolawbyLBJthatevening.

C. CaseStudy:HealthCareReform
i. PoliticalClimate UShasmillionsuninsured,andspendsmorethananyotherdevelopednation. HealthcareapillarofObama'scampaign+demscontrol60votesinsenate Bigdifferencesinpublicopinionconcerningpublicoption,mandates,andabortionfinancing Threeobstacles:1)badmemoriesfrom'93,2)lotsofplayers,3)partisanpolarization. ii. PassageintheHouse Threecommitteeshadjx Interpartyconflictbtwlibsandbluedogsespeciallyoverpublicoption Antiabortiondemspresentedabarriertoo iii. PassageintheSenate Twocommitteeshadjx Negotiationsw/bipartisangangof6failed Conflictbtwlibs,centristdems,andindependents Senatevotedforcloture6039tobringbilltofloor Billscaledbacktogetcentristdemsonboard Afterseveralcloturevotes,senatevoted6039forpassage iv. BillBecomesLaw SenatorBrown(R MA)electedreducingDemstojust59votesinsenate(notenoughforcloture) HouseapprovedSenatebill Housethenapprovedcorrectionsthroughbudgetreconciliationbill(controversialapproach) Senatepassedreconciliationbill>notsubjecttofilibuster(thusnocloturenecessary) v. FilibusterandCloture Generalobservation Theuseoffilibusterandcloturehasincreaseddramaticallyinrecentyears. vi. DifferencesintheProcessBTW'64andNow a. What'sChanged Filibusterrules Specialinterestgroups Moreintensepartisandivision Whoisintheleadershipandtheparties b. WhatHasntChanged Powerofcommittees&theirchairs Divisionwithinparties Majoritydoesn'tnecessarilyrule,atleastinthesenate POTUS'spowertoshapetheagenda(ifnotprocess)

D. InterpretingtheCRAof1964
Note:SeePPTslides26,49,50,51,52,56,57&58forRelevantTitleVIIprovisions! i. KeyProvisions a. ProhibitiononEmploymentDiscrimination 1. 703(a) Prohibitiononemploymentdiscriminationbyemployers 2. 703(b) Prohibitiononemploymentdiscriminationbyemploymentagencies 3. 703(c) Prohibitiononemploymentdiscriminationbylaborunions b. ExceptionsandQualifications 1. 703(e) Bonafideoccupationalqualifications 2. 703(h) Seniority,meritandtestexceptions 3. 703(j) "preferentialtreatment"notrequired c. EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission 1. 705 establishesEEOC 2. 706 administrativeproceduresandprivateactions

3. 713 EEOC'spowertoissueregulations ii. InterpretationChecklist a. PossibleSourcesofInterpretation Textofthestatute Legislature'soverarchingpurposeorintent Otherprovisionsofthestatutoryscheme LegislativeHistory Note:Usethis CommitteeReports toformulate InterpretiveMemos yourexam FloorStatements responsewhen PresidentialSigningStatements interpretingthe AgencyInterpretation CRA.Also Precedent/StareDecisis incorporateas Backgroundideologicalcommitments muchasyou b. ApproachesofIndividualJustices can from OverarchingPurpose(Brennan) statutory SpecificIntent(Rehnquist) interpretation Pragmatism(Blackmun) intothe TextoftheStatute(Scalia) analysis!! iii. TheoriesofRacialInequality a. Atomistic(Rehnquist) Racismasanexplicitandconsciousbeliefinracialsuperiority.Theproblemisbad applesandthegoaliscolorblindness. b. Systemic(Brennan) Racismasasetofinstitutionalarrangementsthatperpetuatesinequality.The problemisa"poisonoustree"andthesolutionisantisubordination. iv. UseofTests Griggsv.DukePower a. Synopsis Fourblackshiredafter1955challengedcompanywhichhadhighschooleducation requirementwithcertainprofessionallydevelopedtestingrequirements. b. RelevantLaw 1. 703(a) Unlawfultorefusetohireordischargeanyindividualorotherwisetodiscriminate against anyoneonthebasisofrace,color,religion,sex,ornationalorigin. i) KeyIssue Themeaningofdiscriminateisambiguous. 2. 703(h) Professionallydevelopedtestsokayifnotdesignedorintendedtodiscriminate. c. Holding Seesdisputeover intentv.effect.Testswithadisparateimpactmustbejustifiedbybusiness necessity.Though703(h)doesnotexplicitlysaythis,thecourtstillreachedthisresultbecausetheteststill hadtheeffectthat703(h)wastryingtoprohibit. v. AffirmativeAction a. General Employersbetweena rockandahardplace >therearecompetingobligationstoundopast discriminationwhileavoidingdiscriminationagainstwhitepeople. 1. ThreePossibleCongressionalIntents: i) RequireAffirmativeAction Clearthelegislaturedidn'tintendthis ii) Permitit,butnotRequireit JusticeBlackmunandtheWebber casetakethisapproach. iii) ForbidAffirmativeAction b. UnitedSteelworkersofAmericav.Weber 1. Facts USWAandKaiserAluminumagreetoaffirmativeactionplan>50%oftrainingopeningsgo toblacks.Keyprovisions >703(a),(d),and(j) 2. Majority Upholdsplan.Congress'primaryconcern(intitle7)wastheplightofblacks.Itwouldbe ironicifthelawprohibitedeffortstoabolishtraditionalpatternsofracialsegregationandhierarchy. 3. Concurrence Title7createsatightropewithoutanetforemployers 4. Dissent Roleofthecourtisto"giveeffectoftotheintentofcongress."Reliesonplainlanguage andsupporters'statementstocometoaconclusiononintent. c. Johnsonv.TransportationAgencySantaClaraCounty Reiteratesthattitle7'sobjectiveistobreak downracialhierarchy.DoesnotoverruleWeber,arguingthatcongressionalinactionsignalsacquiescence. 1. Rule Affirmativeactionispermissibleifthereisamanifestimbalanceandplandoesnt unnecessarilytrammelwhite/maleinterests. 2. Dissent(Scalia) TextofT7prohibits"discrimination">meaningraceshouldntbeabasisfor employmentdecisions.>colorblindapproach.Webber shouldbeoverruled. d. Ricciv.DeStefano Citythrewoutresultsoftestforpromotingfirefighters,duetoathreatofGriggs styledisparateimpactclaim.Relevantstatutoryprovision> 703(a) 1. Majority City'sracebasedactionisimpermissible,unlessthere'sastrongbasisinevidencethatit wouldbeliable.Nostrongbasisinevidencehere. 2. Dissent(Ginsburg) CiteshistoryofexclusionofAA'sandLatinos.Testscanonlybeupheldfor businessnecessity.Here,therewasgoodcausetobelievethisstandardwasn'tmet.

II. Representation
A. TheRighttoVote
i. TwoImportantThemes a. IncumbentEntrenchment Whatroleshouldcourtsplayincheckingincumbententrenchment? 1. Incumbentlegislatorshaveenhancedpower(andenhancedinterest)inholdingpoliticalpower. b. EnsuringMinorityRepresentation WhatroleshouldCongressandthecourtsplayinensuringminority representation? ii. KeyVotingRightCases a. Gomillionv.Lightfoot (1960) Racialgerrymanderingcase b. Harperv.Virginia(1966) Polltaxcase c. Westberryv.Sanders (1964) Oneperson,onevote>Congress(<1%differencebtwdistrict) d. Reynoldsv.Sims (1964) Oneperson,onevote>Statelegislatures(<10%differencebtwdistrict)

B. VoteDilution:Malapportionment
i. Reynoldsv.Sims (1964) NoReapportionmentforover60years 25%ofpopulationresidesindistrictswithmajorityinbothhouses Peopleinthemorepopulatedcountieshavedilutedvotingstrength Warren'sargumentbasedonequalprotectionclause >citizensshouldhaveanequallyeffectivevoicein electionofstatelegislators Rule:Bothhousesofbicameralstate legislaturemustbeapproximatelyequal(<10%) ii. ArgumentsForJudicialIntervention a. AntiEntrenchment Toprotectthepublicfromselfinterestedpublicofficials(Reynolds) b. MinorityProtection Toprotectaminorityagainstthetyrannyofthemajority(Gomillion,Harper)> Themajoritydoesntwanttoloosepower iii. Crawfordv.MarionCountyElec.Bd. a. SynopsisofFacts IndianalawrequiresvoterstoprovidegovernmentissuedIDtohavetheirvotes counted.Lookssortoflikeapolltaxbutyetitcanbedistinguished. b. ImportantJustices 1. Stevens(LeadOpinion) Unlikepolltax,IDisrelevanttoqualification Stateinterestsinmodernization,fraudandconfidence Littleevidenceofexcessiveburdensonvoters 2. Scalia(Concurrence) IDrequirementisnonsevere&nondiscriminatory.Individualimpactsaren't relevant.Weshouldavoid"detailedjudicialsupervision" 3. Souter(Dissent) Burdensarenontrivialandstatehasn'tshownthatbenefitsoutweighburdens iv. TheVotingRightsAct(VRA) a. 3KeyProvisions 1. 2,Practices Prohibitspracticesthatdenyorabridgethevoteonaccountofraceorcolor.Applies toalljurisdictions(contrastto5thatonlyappliestospecificones) 2. 4,Tests Suspendsliteracytestsandotherdevicesinstateswithlowratesofparticipation 3. 5,PreClearance Requiredcoveredjurisdictionsto"preclear"anychangesinelectionprocedure withtheDOJorDCfederalcourt i) LegalStandard:Retrogression Changecantmakeracialgroupworseoff thanitwasbefore. b. VRAEnforcement 1. FirstGeneration(60sand70s) Breakingdownbarriers i) Problem:VoteDenial Peopleareimpededfromvotingorhavingvotescounted(eg: violence,literacytests,polltaxes,maybeIDrequirements?) 2. SecondGeneration(80sand90s) Increasingminorityrepresentation i) Problem:VoteDilution Everyoneisallowedtovote,butonegroup'svotingstrengthis weakened(eg:Atlargeelections,redistrictingpractices,racialgerrymandering)

C. RacialGerrymandering
i. Mobilev.Bolden a. SynopsisofFacts Blackswere~1/3ofcitypopulation,butnonehadeverbeenelectedtocity commissiondotoatlargeelectionscheme b. KeyPoints 1. Stewart(Plurality) Equalprotectionand15thamendmentareonlyviolatedbyintentional discrimination Reynolds onlyestablishesarighttoavote"weightedequally"toothers Focusedonindividualrighttovote>Mobilecourtwasunwillingtoextendthis principaltoagroup ThestandardinReynoldswasmorejudiciallymanageable

2. Stevens(Concurrence) Wouldlooktothe"objectiveeffects,"insteadoftheintent 3. Marshall(Dissent) Proofofdisparateimpactshouldsufficefor15thamendmentclaim 4. ProportionalRepresentation Allofthejusticeswereopposedtothis. i) Rational Thispresupposesthatallpeopleinaracialgroupareuniform.Italsoisinconsistent withthegoalofacolorblindsociety. ii. '82AmendmentstoVRA,LegislativeResponsetoBolden a. Changesto2 Splits2intotwosubsections Requiresaresults/effectstest>Thetestisnolongerintentbased(toodifficulttoprove) Explicitlysaysthatproportionalrepresentationisnotrequired Whatisrequired:Equalparticipationandequalopportunitytoelectrepresentativesoftheirchoice. b. TheProblemwith2 Itsanotherrockandahardplacescenario:Ononehandtherecannotbeaction thathastheresult/effectofdiscrimination(votedilution,votedenial)(seemingtoimplyproportional representation).Ontheotherhand,proportionalrepresentationisexplicitlynotrequired.So c. SeePPTSlides(106to110)forSpecificChanges d. "TypicalFactors"fromSenateReport 1. Thehistory ofofficialvotingrelateddiscriminationinthestateorpoliticalsubdivision; 2. Theextenttowhichvotingintheelectionsofthestateorpoliticalsubdivisionisraciallypolarized; 3. Theextenttowhichthestateofpoliticalsubdivisionhasusedvotingpracticesorprocedures that tendtoenhancetheopportunityfordiscriminationagainsttheminoritygroup; 4. Theexclusionofmembersoftheminoritygroupfromcandidateslatingprocesses; 5. Theextenttowhichminoritygroupmembersbeartheeffectsofdiscrimination inareassuchas education,employment,andhealth,whichhindertheirabilitytoparticipateeffectivelyinthe politicalprocess; 6. Theuseofovertorsubtleracialappeals inpoliticalcampaigns;and 7. Theextenttowhichmembersoftheminoritygrouphavebeenelectedtopublicoffice inthejx. iii. TheJudicialResponseto'82Amendments:Thornburghv.Gingles a. Havinga2Claim Threerequirementsmustbeestablished: 1. Minoritygroupissufficientlylargeandgeographicallycompact 2. Minoritygroupispoliticallycohesive 3. Whitemajorityvotesasabloc todefeatminoritypreferredcandidate Note:Theoccasionalelectionofaminoritycandidatedoesnotonitsowndefeata2claim b. CongressionalGuidance Congressprovidedalistof"typicalfactors"inthesenatereport.Thisgives generalguidancetothejudiciarybutleavesittothemtofigureouthowtoapplyit. c. WheredotheThreeRequirementsComefrom? Congresswasvague,sothisisthejudiciariesattempt to"walktheline"betweenintent andproportionalrepresentation. d. CriticismoftheThornburgh Test Ifminoritydispersedincommunitythena2claimwouldbedifficult. iv. Redistricting a. Basics Everydecade,statesmustredrawtheUShouseandstatelegislativedistricts,inaccordancewith theUScensusfigures>donebystatelegislatureoragency Legislatorshaveanincentivetodrawdistrictlinestobenefitthemselvesandtheirparty b. TheVRA2v.5 1. Section2 Appliestoallvotinglawsandpracticesoldornew Appliestoalljxnationwide Burdenonplaintiffstoobtainreliefagainstviolators Legalstandard:resultsin votedenialorvotedilution 2. Section5 Appliestochanges invotinglawsorpractices Appliesonlytocovered jx Burdenoncoveredjxtoobtainpreclearance LegalStandard:Retrogressive effectordiscriminatorypurpose c. Shawv.Reno 1. ImportantFacts NorthCarolinawantedtoredrawitsdistricts.Theirplanincludedonlyoneminoritydistrict. WhenNCsubmittedtoDepartmentofJusticeunder5,theirplanwasrejectedbecauseDOJ wantedtoseemoreminorityrepresentation. NCaddsasecondminoritydistrictinresponse.Bothdistrictsareverystrangelydrawn. TheNCdistrictsdidnothavetobesoweird.Thedemocratsdrawingthedistrictshad twoobjectivesthatcausedtheweirdness:1)Minorityrepresentation(perDOJ)and2) Incumbentprotection

2. ImportantPoints Theargumentisintentionalracediscrimination(discriminatoryintentviolatestheequal protectionclause Mobile)againstwhitepeople. Importsrationalefromaffirmativeactioncasestodeclarea(qualified)righttoa"colorblind" electoralprocess Segregatingvotersbasedonraceresembles"politicalapartheid,"sendsa"pernicious" message,andthreatensto"balkanize"voters Factofracialblocvotingdoesn'tmakesegregationofvoters"benign"orjustifylowerlevelof scrutinythanisappliedtootherracialclassifications. d. CasesFollowingShawv.Reno 1. The"PredominantFactor"Test Ifracewasthe"predominantfactor"motivatingplacementof votersindistrict,thenstrictscrutinymustbesatisfied.Tosatisfystrictscrutiny,theplanmustbe narrowlytailored toserveacompellinginterest.

D. PartisanGerrymandering
i. ArgumentsforJudicialIntervention a. AntiEntrenchment Toprotectthepublicfromselfinterestedpublicofficials(Reynolds) b. MinorityProtection Toprotectaminorityagainstthetyrannyofthemajority(Gomillion,Harper) ii. Davisv.Bandemer a. Facts Partisangerrymanderalleged. b. Majority Rejectsclaim.Systemmustbearrangedinamannerthatwillconsistentlydegradeavoter'sor agroupofvoters'influence. c. OtherSide Statefailedtojustifydiscrim.impactbyshowingarationalbasisinneutralcriteria. iii. Viethv.Jubelirer a. Scalia(Plurality) Noteslonghistoryofpoliticalgerrymandersandavailabilityofaremedyunderart14 Nojudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandards Claimofpartisangermanderisanonjusticiablepoliticalquestion b. Dissents Stevens:Wouldaskwhetherpartisanconsiderationswereapredominatemotive Souter:Wouldapply5parttestlookingforexistenceofcohesivepoliticalgroupsanddeviations fromtraditionalnorms. Breyer:Wouldlookatentireplanforunjustuseofpoliticalfactorstoentrenchaminoritypower. iv. LULACv.Perry a. Standard Stillnostandardwiththreejusticesnothefence.

III. MoneyandPolitics
A. CorruptionNote:SeePPTslidesforrelevantstatute(18USC201 Slide154)
i. TheoriesofRepresentation 1. Pluralism Legislatorsasagentsofthosewhoelectthem i) HorseTrading Tradingsupportforsomelegislationforotherlegislation.Pluralistswouldbe okaywiththisinmostcases. 2. Republicanism Legislatorsastrustees forthepublicinterest ii. Bribery a. PurposesofAntiBriberyStatutes Protecttheintegrityofthepublicservant'sdecisionmakingprocess Avoidtheappearanceofunfairnessandabuseofoffice Assureequalaccessofallcitizenstotheservicesofpublicservants b. BriberyStatute 1. GenerallyBriberyis Whenapublicofficial1)obtainsanythingofvalue,2)inreturnforanofficial actanddefendantpublicofficialorprivateperson,3)actedwithcorruptintention. 2. FederalBriberyStatute Limitedtofederal publicofficials. i) Corruption Notspecificallydefinedbythestatute.Ahugeamountofcaselaw.Sometimesit canbecomequitecomplicated. ii) Extortion Alsocancoverextortion>oftenactivitycanbeeitherextortionorbribery. c. TheoriesinBribery:Agentv.Trustee 1. TrusteeforthePublicGood Maybeinclinedtocriminalizecampaigncontributionsthatcarrya commitmentbythelegislatortovoteinaspecifiedwayonfutureissues. 2. AgentforPopularDesire Maywanttolimitbriberyprosecutionsonlytothosecaseswherethe representativebenefitspersonally.Youmightnotwanttoprosecuteinthosecaseswherethe representativeismerelymakingpoliticaltradeoffs resultinginlegislationthat,onbalanceservesthe interestofherconstituents.

d. Case:Peopleexrel.Dickinsonv.VanDeCarr An exampleoftherepublicanideaofvalue. 1. SynopsisofFacts AldermanofNYCchargedw/bribery.Commissionerofstreetcleaningwrote himtosayifhewouldgivehimmoremoneyforprojects,thecaseofCovinowouldbereconsidered. AldermanwrotebackandsaidifhewouldreinstateCovino,hewouldvoteandotherwisehelpto obtaintheneededmoneyfortheprojects. 2. Result SincethebenefitdefendantwastoreceivewasthereinstatementofCovino,thiswouldbe embracedwithinthemeaningofthestatute,sinceitwouldconstituteabribe. 3. Rational Itisdemoralizingtopublicserviceandagainstthespiritofthestatuteforalegislatoror otherpublicofficialtobargaintosellhisvoteorofficialactionforapoliticalorotherfavoror rewardasitisformoney. iii. Extortion a. Definition Commonlaw:apublicofficial'suseofofficialpositiontoextract moneyorotherbenefits fromprivatepersons. b. HobbsAct(Seep310forFullText),Summary Canapplytoeither stateorfederalofficials Extortionmeanstheobtainingofproperty (notemorelimitedthanbriberystatute)fromanother withhisconsent,inducedbythewrongfuluseofactualorthreatenedforce,violence,orfear,or underthecolorofofficialright. Mightapplytoofficialmisconductateitherthefederalorstatelevel Needstobeanexplicitexchangeofmoneyforanofficialact iv. ConflictsofInterest a. General Bothstateandfederallegislatureshaveenactedstatutestogetatproblemsofconflictsof interest,oranyfinancialincentivethelegislatormighthavethatwouldaffectherdeliberation. b. ResponsestoLoopholes Fulldisclosureoffinancialinterests Adoptionofprophylacticrules (rulesthatgobeyond quidproquo)topreventevenpotentialfor certaintypesoffinancialincentivestoslantpublicdeliberation c. RulesGoverningCongress 1. GiftsareSeverelyLimited Anythingofvaluefromthosewhoseinterestsmaybesubstantially affectedbymembers'officialduties.eg.,toothpickrule 2. OutsideEarnedIncomeisLimited 3. PostEmploymentLobbyingisRestricted Generally,completelyprohibitedforaperiodofyears (1yrforhouse,2yrsforsenate)andthenaccesstocertainfacilitiesiscurtailedthereafter.Restrict therevolvingdoor thatcoulddistorttheinterestsofsittinglegislators. 4. ProhibitionofActivityInconsistentwithRepresentationalDuties 5. HonorariaBanned Can'tgivespeechesorwriteformoney. d. Case:USv.NationalTreasuryEmployeesUnion 1. Facts Abunchoflowlevelfederalemployeesgotintroublefordoingthingslikegivingspeeches ontheQuakerreligion,lecturingonblackhistory,orwritingarticlesondancecontests.They claimedthatthisviolatedtheirfirstamendmentrights. 2. Majority Lawunconstitutionalasappliedtolowerlevelfederalemployees.Sincetheemployees hadsolittleinfluenceonthepoliticalprocess,thecourtconcludedthatfirstamendmentrights trumpedtheneedtopreventcorruption. 3. O'Connor(Concur') Thoughtthatanexus(btwemployeesworkandherspeech,articleor appearance)wasrequiredforbothaseriesofspeechesandsingleappearances. v. BlagojevichMaterials a. Summary BlagotriedtoselltheIllinoissenateseattothehighestbidder.

B. CampaignFinance
i. General a. TwoGeneralPhilosophies 1. PluralistThinkers Mightobjecttoregulationbecause1)counterproductivetopublicinvolvement and2)inconsistentwiththeconstitution(eg.,freespeech). 2. RepublicanThinkers Considerthepoliticaladvantagesofwealthinanunregulatedpoliticalsystem tobecorruptingasbribery.Theyconsiderunregulatedcampaigncontributionstobeinconsistent withtheprincipleofequality. b. MeansofRegulation 1. ExpenditureLimits Restricttheamountanindividualorgroupmayspendinsupportofor oppositiontoacandidate.Moststringentformofregulationandthussubjecttothehighestlevelof scrutiny(narrowlytailoredtoserveacompellingstateinterest Buckley).AfterCitizensUnited itis difficulttoimagineanyexpenditurelimitthatwouldsurviveconstitutionalscrutiny.

2. ContributionLimits Restricttheamountthatmaybegiventoacandidate.Contributionlimitsmay beupheldifcloselydrawn toanimportant governmentinterest(IntermediateScrutiny Shrink Mo). Thestandardislessbecausetherestrictiononspeechislesssevere. Riskofcorruption(quidproquo)isalsogreatersothereisanenhancedcountervailing interest. 3. PublicFinancing givespublicmoneytoqualifyingcandidates. 4. Disclosure requirescampaigns,parties,andothergroupstotrackandreport contributions/expenditures.TheCourtismorefavorabletotheseformsofregulation. c. Contributionv.Expenditure a) Contribution Givingtocandidates,whouse moneyfortheircampaigns. b) Expenditure Spendingmoneydirectly fororagainstcandidates.Lessconcernforcorruptionorthe appearanceofcorruption. d. PurposesofCampaignFinanceRegulation(Benefits) Tokaji Strongestrationalforcampaignfinancereformistopreventincumbententrenchment. Equalityinterest>thosewithmoremoneywillhaveagreaterinfluenceontheoutputof legislation.Twoprongedproblem Disproportionateinfluenceonwhogetsintooffice Disproportionateinfluenceonthepoliciesadoptedbythelegislature Reducecorruptionandtheappearancethereof Morerobustexchangeofviews Campaignswillbecharacterizedmorebyissuediscussion Legislatorsmightmakebetterchoicesifmoneyistakenoutoftheequation. Economicpowerequateswithpoliticalpowerbecauserichpeoplewillbeabletodemandmore quidproquos e. ArgumentsAgainstCampaignFinanceRegulation(Costs) $=Speech:Campaignfinanceregulationinfringesuponliberty (constitutionalargument) Reducescompetitiveness ifthelimitsaretoolawentrenchmentisfacilitated Placesburdenonoutsiders(eg.,3rdpartycandidates) Fundraisingtimeconcerns Thiscouldcuteitherway Ononehandifyoucangetmoneyfromeveryoneitmightbeeasiertogetfullyfinanced Ontheother,somethinglikepublicfundingcouldputlesspriorityonhavingtoraise funds fulltimefundraisers,parttimelegislators Forcescampaignspeechunderground Moneyislikewater,itwillalwaysfindanoutlet(eg., peoplearealwaysgoingtofindloopholes) f. WhyShouldtherebeJudicialIntervention Wehaveatwopartysystemandeachpartyisinclinedto enhancetheirpower.Sotheideaisthattheyaregoingtorigthegame.Thisisaantientrenchment rationale. g. PoliticalTheoriesofCampaignFinance 1. QuidProQuoCorruption Systemdominatedbylargecontributionsfromwealthyindividualsand interestgroupsclearlyseekinginfluence,access,andfavorablelegislationappearstobecorruptto ordinaryvoters.Empiricalstudies,however,suggestthatmoneyseldombuysvotesorparticular outcomes. 2. IncreasingVoterCompetence Politicalsystemiscorruptifitsystematicallyunderminesvoters' abilitiestovotecompetently. 3. ProtectingLegislatorTime Anysystemthatrequireslegislatorstospendmuchoftheirtimeraising moneyisacorruptone 4. ElectoralCompetitiveness Fairandvigorouscompetitionamongcandidatesandpartiesiscritical forthelegitimacyofelectionsandofthegovernmentthoseelectionsproduce. ii. TheBuckley Framework a. Buckleyv.Valeo 1)Strikesdownfedexpenditurelimits onlibertygrounds,2)upholdsfederal contributionlimits. 1. Facts TheconstitutionalityoftheFederalElectionCampaignAct(FECA)waschallengedunder1st amendmentspeechclausebySenatorBuckleyofNY. 2. FundamentalRational Thepolicyofcurbingcorruptionandtheappearancethereofcanbe sufficienttoovercomethe1sta.rightoffreespeechintherightcircumstances. i) ImportantQuote "Theconceptthatthegovernmentmayrestrictthespeechofsometo enhancethevoiceofothersiswhollyforeigntothe1stamendment." Note:ThisquoteeliminatestheequalityargumentfromtheBuckley framework

3. Holding i) StandardApplied Strictscrutiny ii) Upheld $1kContributionLimits Theneedtopreventcorruptionandtheappearance thereoftrumped1st amendmentconcern( opportunityforquidproquo neededtobereduced) ReportingandDisclosureRequirements Detercorruptionandappearancethereof Peoplecanseewherecandidatemoneycamefrom Recordkeepinghelpsdetectviolations iii) StruckDown ExpenditureLimits Greaterimpositiononfreespeech indirectlinkbtw$andcandidate=lessriskofquidproquo Reducingqtyofissuesdiscussed,depthofexploration,audiencereached,etc 4. WhyDistinguishbtwContributionandExpenditure Thelimitonexpendituresisamore direct/profoundrestraintonthespeechofthosepeoplewhoseviewsarerestricted.Theriskof corruption(quidproquo)isalsogreaterwithcontributions. 5. ProblemCreatedbyBuckley Nostandardtoevaluatecontributionsv.expenditures b. Corps:Austinv.MichiganChamberofCommerce Upholdsstatebanoncorporatecontributionsand expendituresonequality grounds.ExpenditurecomponentoverruledafterCitizensUnited. 1. Facts MIstatutebannedcorporations frommakingcontributionsofexpendituresinstateraces. 2. Holding Theregulationwasupheld.Regulationsurvivedstrictscrutiny(lawnarrowlytailoredto serveacompellinginterest).Policy:limitingthedistortingeffectofwealth 3. Observations Equalityvaluemaysupportcampaignfinancereform>TherationaleinBuckley appearedtoeliminateequalityasarationale 4. ImportantQuote "Michigan'sregulationaimsatthecorrosiveanddistortingeffectsofimmense aggregationofwealththatareaccumulatedwithhelpofcorporateforum" c. PostBuckley Issues 1. SoftMoney SoftmoneyismoneyleftunregulatedbytheFECA.Itismoneyspenttobenefitthe candidate.Therewasanexplosionofsoftmoneybecauselimitsoncontributionsbutnot expendituresleadstodramaticincreasesinexpenditures. 2. IssueAds Unregulated(beforeBCRA)adsthatdon'tuse"magicwords"like"voteforX" 3. RoleofCourts ThecourtbecomestheprimaryregulatorofthefieldbecauseBuckley leftitunclear whattheprecisedistinctionwasbetweencontributionsandexpenditures. 4. Campaigning Campaigning>moreinterestgroupcentered,morePACcentered,moreparty centered,thancandidatecenteredbecausenowonlyspendsomuchdirectlyonthecandidate. d. Nixonv.ShrinkMo Upheldstatecontributionlimitsas"closelydrawn"toimportantinterests. iii. TheBipartisanCampaignReformAct(BCRA)AKAMcCain/Feingold(2002) a. BCRAKeyProvisions 1. SoftMoney(323) i) NationalPartyCommittees Thenationalcommitteesofpoliticalpartiescanneitherreceive norspendsoftmoney. ii) PACs ProhibitsleadershipPACsandotherfederalcandidatecontrolledPACsfromraisingor spendingsoftmoney. iii) StateandLocalPartyCommittees Canusesoftmoneytofundgenericvoterregistrationand getoutthevotedrivesthatrelatetofederalelection.Theuseofthesoftmoney,however,is subjecttoalimitofnomorethan$10kpersource. iv) Candidates Candidatesarebannedfromsolicitingsoftmoney. 2. HardMoney i) CorpsandUnions CorpsandUnionshavetocreateaPAC(vs.givingdirectly). ii) IndividualContributions Individualcontributionstocandidatesandnationalpartiesare indexedtoinflation(eg.,aggregatelimits25kto37.5k). 3. IssueAds/ElectioneeringCommunications(201) i) Elements Adsthatrefertoaclearlyidentifiedcandidate Runwithin30daysofa primary or60daysofageneral election Targeted incongressionaldistrictorstatewhereelectionwillbeheld ii) Restrictions Only hardmoney maybespentonthese Corpsandunionscannotfund directly 24hrdisclosureforover10kthreshold

b. ConcernRaisedbyBCRA Softmoneywillflowtooutsidegroups Billeliminatessoftmoney,butincreaseshardmoneylimitstoparties Federalcandidatesarebarredfromsolicitingnonfederalmoneynotonlyforpartiesbutalsofor outsidegroups Nationalpartieswhichhavecontributedsignificantamountofmoneyinthepastwillnotbeina positiontodothatintheabsenceofsoftmoney c. McConnellv.FEC Upholdsfederallimitsonsoftmoneyandissueads 1. CompetingValues LibertyversusAnticorruption i) Equality Equalityisavaluestillinthebackgroundbuteffectivelycantbearguedsinceitwas takenoffthetableinBuckley 2. SupremeCourtHolding VirtuallyallofBCRAupheld Upheldsoftmoneylimits Corruptionandappearanceofcorruptionrationale(expansive viewv.narrow viewinBuckley) Specialaccessrational(candidatesweregivingbigdonorsspecialaccess>quid proquoconcern) Courtsstandard:Strictscrutiny>"Closelydrawntosufficientinterest" RestrictiononPACsincreasesdisseminationofinformationbyforcingparties, candidates,andofficeholderstosolicitfromawiderarrayofpotentialdonors Uphelddefinition/regulationissueads >raisesnoneofthevaguenessissuesasthe "magicwords"approachinBuckley Definitionofelectioneeringcommunicationsasbroadcastadsidentifying candidatewithin30/60daysofelection Regulatesby: disclosurerequirementsforthosewhospend>10kperyearon electioneering Prohibition ondirectcorporateanduniondisbursements(reversedin CitizensUnited).CanstilldoitthroughPAC'sthatdrawfundsfromsources otherthancompanytreasuries Theinterest(rationale)>riskofcircumventingcontributionlimits,reducingthe distorting effectofmoney(apseudoequalityargument) Uphelddisclosurerequestsbecausetheydonot prevent anyonefromspeaking Limitsonpartyspendingheldunconstitutional duringthepostnomination,preelection period. Partieshaveconstitutionalrighttomakeindependentexpenditures. Hardmoney>nonjusticiableissue(plaintifflackedstanding) d. Randallv.Sorrell Strikesdownstateexpenditureandcontributionlimits,citinganticompetitiveimpact. 1. VermontAct64:KeyProvisions i) ExpenditureLimits $300kforGubernatorial $2kto4kforstatelegislators Incumbentslimitedto8590% ii) ContributionLimits $400forGubernatorialcandidates $200$300forstatelegislators Politicalpartiessubjectedtothesamelimits 2. KeyOpinions i) Breyer(Plurality) UpholdsBuckley Struckdownexpenditurelimits InvalidatescontributionlimitsunderShrink,notcloselydrawn Impedeschallengersfromrunningeffectivecampaigns(morecompetitiveand thusrequiremoremoney) Incumbententrenchment ii) ThomasandScalia(concur'injudgment) Buckley isn'tprotectiveenoughofspeech associatedwithcontributions e. FECv.WisconsinRighttoLife,Inc. StrikesDownapplicationofBCRAtoissueadsunless"noreasonable interpretation"otherthananappealtovoteacertainway.< Thiscaseisalmostcompletelysuperfluous inlightofCitizensUnited

1. Facts Wisconsinrighttolifewasanonprofitadvocacygrouprunningadsurgingvoterstocontact theirsenatorsandurgethemtoavoidfilibustersofjudicialnominees.Thegroupwantedtorun theiradsduringthe2004generalelectionbuttheBCRAprohibitedit.WRTLarguedthattheirads wereissueadsandthattheydidntadvocateaparticularcandidate.TheFECarguedthattheads were"shamissueads"stillhavingthegoalofalteringtheelection. 2. Result Thecourtcarvedoutanexception totheMcConnellrulingwhereunlessanadcouldnot reasonablybeinterpretedasanythingotherthananadurgingthesupportordefeatofacandidate, itwaseligibleforan"asapplied"exceptiontotheBCRAlimitsonissueads. f. Davis (2008) Struckdown BCRA's"millionaire'samendment"whichraisedcontributionlimitsforthose facingwealthy,selffundedcandidates...Indicatesincreasedskepticismofcampaignfinancebythe supremecourt >newjusticesandO'Connor'sexit g. ValuesinCampaignFinanceDebate Note:Weavevaluesintoexamargument 1. Buckley i) Pro Anticorruption>Wedontwantlegislatorstobebought ii) Con Liberty>Toreducecorruptionhereinevitablyresultsinsomeinfringementupon1st amendmentrights. 2. Equality i) Buckley ThecourtinBuckleyappearedtorejectthisrational ii) Austin TheAustin courtacceptedalimitedversionofthisrationale 3. Competition InRandall thecourtusedtherationalofcompetition. iv. CitizensUnitedv.FEC Note:SeePPTslide182forrelevantstatute(2USC441b) a. Summary ChallengesapplicationofBCRA's"electioneeringcommunication"provisiontovideoon demand.StruckdownBCRA'sprohibitiononcorporateexpenditures forelectioneering,overrulingAustin andpartofMcConnell. b. Holding 1. IndependentExpendituresbyCorporations i) AustinOverruled Thecourtstruckdown441b'sbanoncorporate independent expenditures. ii) McConnellOverruledinPart ThecourtstuckdowntheBCRA'sextensionof441b's restrictionsonindependentcorporateexpenditures. iii) Rationale The"governmentmaynotsuppresspoliticalspeechonthebasisofthespeaker's corporateidentity.Nosufficientgovernmentalinterestjustifieslimitsonthepoliticalspeech ofnonprofitorforprofitcorporations."< limitsonspeechcoulddriveidesfromthe marketplace. 2. AsAppliedChallenge TheCourtheldthatthecasecouldnotberesolvedonanasappliedbasis withoutchillingpoliticalspeech. 3. FacialChallengeto441b Strictscrutinyapplied:Thegovernmentrequiredtodemonstratethat thestatutewasnarrowlytailored toacompellinginterest. i) CompellingInterest The CitizensUnited Courtreasonedthatdifferentialtreatmentof mediacorporationsandothercorporationscannotbesquaredwiththeFirstAmendmentand thereisnosupportfortheviewthattheAmendment'soriginalmeaningwouldpermit suppressingmediacorporations'freespeech.Austin,itfound,interfereswiththeopen marketplaceofideasprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.Asaresultofthisreasoning,the Courtwasnotpersuadedbythegovernment'sargumentson(1)anticorruptionand(2) shareholderprotection. 4. Anticorruption TheCourtaddressedthegovernment'santicorruptionargumentandruledthat independentexpendituresdonotgiverisetocorruptionortheappearanceofcorruption. i) Rationale Influenceoverandaccesstoelectedofficialsdoesnotmeanthatthoseofficials arecorruptandtheappearanceofinfluenceoraccess"willnotcausetheelectoratetolose faithinourdemocracy." 5. ShareholderProtection Finally,theCourtrejected thegovernment'sargumentthatshareholders shouldbeprotectedfrombeingcompelledtofundcorporatespeech. i) Rationale Underashareholderprotectioninterest,ifshareholdersofamediacorporation disagreedwithitspoliticalviews,thegovernmentwouldhavetheauthoritytorestrictthe mediacorporation'spoliticalspeech. 6. DisclaimerandDisclosureRequirements TheCourtruledthatBCRA'sdisclaimeranddisclosure requirementsareconstitutionalasappliedtobothHillary andadvertisementsforit.CitingBuckley andMcConnell,theCourtfoundthatdisclaimersanddisclosurerequirementsmayburdenthe abilitytospeak,buttheyimposenoceilingoncampaignrelatedactivitiesorpreventanyonefrom speaking.

v. StateReforms&PublicFinancing a. TheBasicModel Createsafloorratherthanaceiling.Providespublicmoneytocandidateswhoagree nottoacceptprivatemoneyortoabidebyexpenditurelimits(sometimesboth). b. StatesAdopting Somestatesdoitdifferentlythanothers... 1. Maine Candidatesqualifybyraisingseedmoneyfromsmallcontributors 2. Massachusetts Passes"CleanElectionsLaw">legislaturefailedtofundit,soitdied. 3. Arizona Passedthe"CleanElectionsLaw"thattookeffectin2002. 4. PresidentialElections Thereisalsoapublicfinancingsystematthenationallevelbutitisonlyfor presidentialcampaigns.Amountprovidedissosmalltheschemeisnotviable. c. ArizonaCitizensCleanElectionsAct 1. GeneralScheme Candidatesthatwantpublicfinancingqualifybyraisingacertainnumberofsmall ($5)campaigncontributions.Oncetheyqualifytheygetinitialgrantsfromthestate. 2. Problem:whatiftheinitialgrantisnotenough(eg.,theiropponentgetsahugedonationfromMr. BigBucks) i) Solution:Arizonawillmatchtheprivatelyfundedcandidatescontributionsthatareovera certainamount. 3. ConstitutionalProblems i) AppropriateLevelofScrutiny Argumentscanbemade seeMcComish ii) InfringementUponFreeSpeech Thelawwillhavea chilling effectonspeechbecausepeople mightbeunwillingtospendmoneyontheircandidateiftheyknowthattheircontributions willbematchedbypublicfundstotheopposition. d. McComishv.Bennett 1. Background Arizonacreatedacleanvotingactwherecandidatesthatparticipatedintheprogram couldbeeligibletoreceivestatefundsmatchingtheamountofprivatefundsoftheircompetitor. Tobeeligibleparticipatingcandidatesneededtoraiseacertainnumberof$5donations. 2. Issue WhethertheFirstAmendmentprohibitsastatefromgivingadditionalmoneytoacandidate whoacceptsstatefundingforhercampaignwhenever:(a)anindependentgroupspendsmorethan acertainamountcampaigningagainstthecandidate;or(b)thecandidate'sopponentrefusespublic fundingandspendsmorethanacertainamountonthecampaign. 3. ConstitutionalArgument Discourages/Chillsspeechbyandinsupportofnonparticipating candidates. i) LevelofScrutiny Thecertpetitionarguesforstrictscrutiny(empiricalargument,couldalso argueincumbententrenchment)butagoodargumentcanprobablybemadeforintermediate scrutinyorevenrationalbasis(acombinationofweakempiricalevidenceandincreases speechbygivingavoicetootherviewsargument). 4. StateInterestsinSupportingtheLaw Anticorruptionortheappearancethereof Thisisthebiggestonebecauseitistheonlyonethatthecurrentsupremecourt appearstosupport(see Davis) EqualityArgument RiskymakingthisargumentdirectlybecauseCitizensUnited andDavis appeartotake thisargumentoffthetable.Thoughcouldcouchitintermsofcorruption/appearanceof corruption.

C. Lobbying
i. General a. GeneralPoints Theflipsideofourcorruptiondiscussion(vs.campaignfinance) Theprocessthroughwhichindividualsattempttotranslateaccesstoinfluence Lobbyingisprotectedbythe1stA.likewithcampaignfinancewehavecompetingvalues: Corruptionortheappearancethereof(Washingisforsaletothehighestbidder). InterestofhavingavoiceinWashington. b. ConstitutionalBasisforLobbying(1stAmendment) 1. SpeechClause Recognizesthegeneralpreceptthatspeech,especiallyaboutpoliticalmatters, presumptivelycannotbelimitedbythegovernment. 2. PetitionClause Recognizesthegeneralpreceptthatlegislativerepresentativesinademocracy shouldbeopentotheviewpointsoftheirconstituents,andthelatterinturnshouldbeencouraged topresenttheirproposalsandideastotheirrepresentatives.

c. TypesofLobbying 1. DirectLobbying i) DirectPresentationofViews Throughtestimonyatlegislativehearings,callinguplegislators orwritingthemdirectly. ii) MembertoMember Usesaninsiderallytoinfluencelegislators.Oftenthemosteffective formoflobbying. iii) SocialLobbying Layingthegroundworkforfutureaccesstoinfluencepolicy. 2. IndirectLobbying i) OutsideForces Stirringupforcesoutsideofthebeltwaytogettheattentionofthepeople insidethebeltway. ii) GrassrootsEfforts Grassrootseffortsareatleastasprevalentasdirectlobbying.Abig reasonforthisistheincreasedregulationinboththeareaoflobbyingandintheareaof corruption.Grassrootslobbyingalsotendstoworkwell. iii) "Netroots"/Astroturf (a) Netroots Onlinesupportforvariousissues(eg.,presentdayissue5protests) (b) Astroturf Thesearebasicallyfakegrassrootsefforts. ii. FederalLobbyingRules a. FederalRegulationofLobbyingActof1946 1. 305StatementsofAccountsFiled Quarterlystatements(filedwiththeClerkofHouse)forthose whoreceivedcontributionsormadeexpendituresforthepurposeofinfluencinglegislation 2. 307PersonstoWhomApplicable Definitionofpersonboundbyregistrationanddisclosure requirements i) 307Issues Coverspeoplewhocollectmoneyforthepurposeofadvancingordefeatinglegislation. <sortofambiguousandopentointerpretation Directorindirectinfluence< couldincludegrassrootseffortsbutthesupremecourt doesntinterpretthisway. 3. 308RegistrationofLobbyists Quarterlyregistrationrequirementsforthoseengagedinlobbying forpay. b. USv.Harriss Note:SeePPTslide204,207&209forrelevantstatute(LobbyingAct,307,305) 1. Facts Guys(directorsofnationalfarmcommittee)werehavingpartiesandbasicallytryingto influencelegislationandtheyfailedtoreporttheiractivities.Latertheywereprosecutedunderthe FRLA. 2. Issue Is307ofFRLAgiveapersonofordinaryintelligencenoticeofwhathasbeenforbidden? 3. Majority i) NarrowlyConstrued Thecourtnarrowlyconstruedthestatutetoavoidconstitutionalissues. Alinewasdrawnbetweendirectcommunicationandotherformsofinfluence. ii) NewStandardArticulated Thecourtcreatedanewstandardandindoingsobasically rewrotethestatute. (a) Personsolicited,collected,orreceivedcontributions (b) Mainpurposeofcontributionwastoinfluencepassage/defeatoflegislation (c) Mostimportantly:Intendedmethodwas"directcommunication withmemberof congress."< difficulttoseethisrequirementinthelanguageofthestatutebecauseit says"directlyorindirectly". 4. ProsandConsofJudicialReWriting i) Pros Rewritten>stuckdownentirely(atleastfromCRorpluralistview) Theburdenofbuildinginertiaincongress>rewritinghelpsthemout ii) Cons Thelawaswrittenisunconstitutional>notrighttochangeitundertheguiseof interpretation Aswrittenitinfringesonwaytoomuch(eg.,couldpotentiallybeillegaltowriteto congress). Strikeandletcongressfix,maybetheymeantforittobeunconstitutional. 5. DefectsinFLRAof1946 i) Loopholes Waytoomany,effectivelyadeadletterby1979 ii) Vagueness Thereportingrequirementswerevaguetoanextentthattheyledtoincomplete information. iii) NotApplicabletoExecutive Thestatuteonlyappliedtothelegislativebranch. iv) OnlyCriminalSanctions Nocivilsanctions...kindofreducestheutility. v) Staff Didntapplytocontactswithstaffmembers

c. LobbyingDisclosureActof1995(asAmendedin2007) 1. GeneralObservations i) Breadth Thenewlegislationisbothbroaderandnarrower. Broader IncludesExecutiveofficials. Notjustlimitedtomembersbutalsotheirstaff Narrower Morespecificthreshold ii) ManyIssuesResolved Alleviatesfirstamendmentconcerns.Adoptingacivilenforcement approachishelpful.Thenewlawstillleavesothergaps,however. 2. ImportantSections i) Section2 Findsexistinglawineffectivetounclearlanguageandweakenforcement ii) Section3 Defineslobbyingactivities,lobbyingcontacts(andexceptions),lobbyist iii) Section4 Lobbyist(oremployer)mustregister,iflobbyingincome>$2500or expenses>$10k(indexedforinflation)/qtr iv) Section5 Quarterlyreportingrequirements,estimates>$5kroundedtonearest$10k, electronicfilingrequired v) Sections6&7 Enforcement,civilfines,criminalpenalties 3. ImportantProvisions Semiannualreportingrequirements Communicationmustonlyrelatetolegislation(notintendedtoinfluenceit) Defineslobbyingactivities,lobbyingcontacts,lobbyist 4. KeyDefinitions i) LobbyingActivities lobbyingcontactsandeffortsinsupportofsuchcontacts,including preparationandplanningactivities,researchandotherbackgroundworkthatisintended,at thetimeperformed,foruseincontacts,andcoordinationw/thelobbyingactivitiesofothers. (a) Bottomline Lobbyingcontactsandactivitiesinsupportofsuchcontacts. ii) LobbyingContacts any oralorwrittencommunication (includinganelectronic communication)toacoveredexecutivebranch officialOR acoveredlegislativebranch official(includesstaff)thatismadeonbehalfofaclient withregardto: Federallegislation Federalrules&Regulations Administrationorexecutionofprograms Nominationorconfirmation(e.g.,federaljudges) iii) Lobbyist Anyindividualwhois: employedorretained byaclientfor financialorothercompensation for servicesthatincludemorethanone lobbyingcontact, [Exception]otherthananindividualwhoselobbyingactivitiesconstitutelessthan20 percentofthetimeengagedintheservicesprovidedbysuchindividualtothatclient overa3monthperiod. 5. CriticalExceptionstoLobbyingContact Ministerialordeminimisactivities(e.g.,requestforameeting) Informationdisclosedunderotherlawsorpartofpublicrecord Contactsrequiredbylaworcourtorder(e.g.,asubpoena) Hardshipcases(e.g.,whistleblowers,churches) 6. Key3Concepts Usefulforgettingthroughhypotheticals i) LobbyingContacts Communicationswithcoveredexecutiveorlegislativeofficials ii) LobbyingActivities Contactsandeffortsinsupportofcontacts iii) Lobbyist Engagedforcompensation, >1lobbyingcontact, threshold:20%in3mos Percentoftimeisbasedonthetimeworkingforaparticularclient iv) Client Employsorretainssomeonetoconductlobbyingactivities v) Employee Officer,employee,partner,directororproprietor,butnotindependent contractor. vi) CoveredOfficials Executiveandlegislativebranchofficials,including congressionalstaff 7. StepsoftheAnalysis: i) Whoisalobbyist? (a) Dependentonlobbyingcontactsandactivities. ii) Whoisaclient? iii) Whoisanemployee?

8. RemainingGaps Doesntcovergrassrootslobbying Incrementsof$20klimitsprecision Nodisclosureunder$10k Reportsdontincludemuchdetailabouttheactualcontacts Noreportingof"strategiccounseling"fees(eg.,advicetoclientsabouthowcongresswill act). iii. ModernProblems a. ObamaReforms Ethicspledgeprohibitingappointeesfromparticipatinginmattersonwhichtheylobbiedinprior twoyears(butwaivershavebeengranted) Limitsonlobbyingforstimulusfunds Prohibitiononregisteredlobbyists b. OhioLobbyingRequirements Basicallymirrorsfederallobbyingstatutes Majordifference:prohibitscertainpeoplefromlobbying(e.g.,revolvingdoorstatutes) c. Brinkmanv.Budish 1. Facts COAST,anadvocacygroupforlessgovernment,suedJLECagovernmentorganization responsibleforenforcingaStateofOhiolobbyingrule(revolvingdoorstatute).COASTallegedthat thestatuteviolatedtheirfirstamendmentrightsbothfaciallyandasapplied. 2. StandardApplied StrictScrutiny:"WhenaStateplacesasevereorsignificantburdenonacore politicalrighttheprovisionmustbe narrowlytailored andadvanceacompelling stateinterest." 3. StateInterestsAlleged 1)Preventcorruptionandtheappearancethereof2)preventingunequal access 4. Result Therevolvingdoorstatutewasfoundtobeunconstitutional.Preventingcorruptionisa compellinginterestbutpreventingunequalaccessisn't(CitizensUnited).Butstillthelawwasn't sufficientlynarrowlytailoredenoughtotheanticorruptioninterest. 5. Rationale Thegovernmentdidnotproveanadequatestateinteresttojustifytheirrestrictionon uncompensated lobbyingefforts.Thestatutewasbothoverbroad(nopersonalinvolvement required,appliedtouncompensatedlobbyists)andunderbroad(didntdealwithsituations involvinggifts).

IV. MakingLaws
A. DueProcessofLawmaking

i. General a. MajorTension Towhatextentshouldcourtsbeinvolvedinensuringdueprocessofthelegislative process. b. Linde(GrandfatherofthisGarbage)View Thelegislativeprocessshouldbedesignedtoproduce rationallawmaking:Lawmakerswouldbeobligedtoinformthemselvesinsomefashionabouttheexisting conditionsonwhichtheproposedlawwouldoperateandthelikelihoodthatproposalwouldinfact furthertheintendedpurpose. ii. StructuralDueProcess a. ConstitutionalRequirementsfortheProceduresFollowedinLawmaking 1. Bicameralism Comesfromart.I,7oftheconstitution(presentmenttoo).Billsmustbeapproved inthesameformbybothchambers. 2. Presentment Billmustbesignedbythepresident/governor 3. Origination Billsraisingrevenue(tax)mustoriginateintheHouse.>closertopeople b. EnrolledBillRuleAn"EnrolledBill"isthefinaltextofthebillorresolutionasapprovedbyboththe SenateandHouse,asitissenttothePresidentinthecaseofabill.Undertherule,onceabillmoves throughtheCongressandissignedintolaw,thecourtsassumethatallrulesofprocedureinthe enactmentprocesswereproperlyfollowed. 1. MarshallField&Co. Anentiresectionwasallegedlymissingfromanenrolledbill.TheJudiciary refusedtogetinvolved.Courtsshouldnotinterferewiththewillofthepeopleexpressedthrough thelegislaturetoinvalidateenactedlegislation. 2. UnitedStatesv.MunozFlores Challengedrevenuebillonthegroundthatitwasarevenue measurethathadnotoriginatedintheHouse,contrarytotheOriginationclause. i) Majority ThestatutedidnotviolatetheConstitution.Housecanalwaysprotectitsown prerogativesbynotpassingoneofthesebills. ii) Concurrence Improperlyoriginatedbillsbecomelawaslongastheyfollowbicameralismand presentment,andCourtshouldnotlookpasttheenrolledbillformoreinformation(e.g.,bill hadan"H"whichwasgoodenoughevidencethatitoriginatedintheHouse).

NOTE:Astatutoryinterpretationproblemwilllikelybe embedded in anotherproblem(e.g.,affirmativeaction,disparateimpact).Whenyou getsomethinglikethistrytopackinasmanymajorstatutory interpretationpointsaspossible!!

c. InstitutionalCompetenceoftheDecisionmaker Formofjudicialreviewthatthecourtmighttakewith regardstolegislativedueprocess.Courtmorelikelytoengageinthisformofreviewcomparedtothe enrolledbillrulebutisstill rare comparedtootherformsofjudicialreview. 1. Hamptonv.MowSunWong i) Facts Residentaliendeniedcivilservicejobb/cCivilServiceCommission(CSC)barrednon citizens.Rulejustifiedonforeignpolicygrounds>gavepresidentabargainingchip,noother countriesletalienstakecivilservicejobs,andstatesecuritygroundsb/csomejobswere sensitive.AlienallegeddenialofDueProcess. ii) Majority Courtavoidedconstitutionalissueandlookedatinstitutional competency instead. CSCcouldonlyhavesucharuleifitrelatedtoitsownneedssuchaspromotingefficiency withincivilservice.Otherwisetherulehadtobemadebythelegislatureorexecutive b/c theyhadthecompetence (e.g.,CSCdidn'thavesufficientcompetence)todecideissuesof foreignpolicyandstatesecurity. iii) Takeaway Certainimportantdecisionsaffectingsubstantiverightsmustbemadebythe entitiesthathavethecapacitytodeliberate ontheissueandbehelddemocratically responsible. iv) Aftermath PresidentFordorderedtheban,Congressnevermodifiedandsupremecourt didntgrantcert. d. CongruenceandProportionality Courtwillreviewthecongruenceandproportionalityoflawsenacted underthe 14tha.(5). 1. Congruentandproportional:congressdoesnthavethepowertocreatenewrights.Itmustcreate lawsunder5thatarecongruentandproportional toactualrightsrecognizedbythesupreme court.(SeetheBoerne lineofcases) e. TheCompetencyofPoliticalActors Arepoliticalactorscompetenttojudgetheconstitutionalityof legislation? 1. Yes Theconscientiouslegislatorcanandshouldmakeanindependentjudgmentonthe constitutionalityofproposedlegislation. 2. No Congressisn'tdesigned tomakehardconstitutionaljudgments,butrathertopassthemoffto thecourts 3. Example:DefenseofMarriageAct Section3wasdesignedtopreventthefederalgovernmentfrom recognizingsamesexmarriage.Signedintolawin1996byslickWille.ThisyearBOdirectedthe attorneygeneralnottodefend3becauseBObelievesitisunconstitutional. i) ISBOwithinhispowerasthepresidentinnotenforcingalawitseesasunconstitutional?This questionissomewhatopen. f. StateConstitutions 1. ProceduralRequirements Oftenincludemoreforenactmentoflaws. 2. RoleofEnrolledBillRule Enrolledbillruleoftenseverelyrestrictsjudicialreviewoflegislative proceduralerrors.Courtsconclusivelypresumethatabillwasvalidlyenactedaccordingto prescribedproceduresandrefusetoentertaincontraryevidence.Somestateshaveanextrinsic evidencerule. i) Exception:JournalsofLegislativeProceedings Courtsmaymakeexceptionsforthejournals oflegislativeproceedingsthatlegislaturesarerequiredtokeep. (a) PureJournalEntryRule Conclusivepresumptionthattheenrolledbillisvalidonlyifit isinaccordancewithproceduresrecordedinthejournalandConstitution. (b) AffirmativeContradictionRule Determinationthattheenrolledbillisvalidunlessthe journalaffirmativelyshowastatementthattherehasnotbeencompliancewith constitutionalrequirements. g. TheRelationshipBetweenLegislatorandtheConstitution 1. ObligationofConstitutionalLegislation Legislatorsareobligatedtodeterminethe constitutionalityofproposedlegislation. i) Rationale: SomeprovisionsoftheConstitutionareaddressedtolegislators. ManyframersexpressedthebeliefthattheCongressshouldassesstheconstitutionality ofpendinglegislation. OathofofficegivingsupporttotheConstitutionisrequiredbyConstitution. Courtsoftenpresumethatlawsareconstitutionalbecausetheyassumethelegislators careaboutthissortofthing. 2. ObligationtoConsiderSupremeCourtHoldings Legislatorsshouldconsiderthemselvesboundby thesupremecourtssubstantiveconstitutionalholdings.

iii. LegislativeDrafting a. Question Cancourtsinducebetterlegislativedrafting? 1. Yes Scalia:Wehaveanobligationtoconductourexegesisinafashionwhichfostersthat democraticprocess 2. No Research:Congressionalstaffersdon'treallypaymuchattentiontohowcourtsinterpret statutes. b. GeneralApproachtoDraftingaStatute Athreesteplinearprocess: 1. DeterminewhattheProposedLegislationisDesignedtodo 2. DeterminetheStructure 3. DrafttheBill Mustbenomorecomplicatedthannecessary

B. DirectDemocracy
i. GeneralOverview a. Methods 1. Initiative Alternative,citizenpropelledlawmaking.Peoplevotedirectlyonaproposedstatutoryor constitutionalamendment. 2. Referendum Peoplevotetoapproveordisapprovealawalreadyproposedorenactedbythe legislature(peoplegettostopaproposedlawthatwasstartedinthelegislature). 3. Recall Peoplepetitiontohavecontinuedserviceofelectedofficialsputtoavote. b. AdvantagesofDirectDemocracy Returnspowertothepeople Highlightsissuesthatwon'tgentonlegislativeagenda Maymakelegislatorsmoreaccountableandresponsivetovoters(hybriddemocracy) Canincreasevoterturnout c. ProblemswithDirectDemocracy 1. DraftershavenoControl Nodeliberationandcompromiseprocesslikethereiswithlegislation(eg nodueprocessinlawmaking).Noinformed&inflectivedecisionmaking.Interestgroupslikethis. 2. TheExpenseofDirectDemocracy Directdemocracyisexpensive(btw$1$4asignature).This leadstoproblemsrelatedtoequality,corruption,andeverythingelseassociatewithrichpeople beingabletoinfluencelegislation. i) SpecialInterests Specialinterestswhodonothavepublicgoodinmindandaremerely makinganendrunaroundthelegislature. 3. VoterConfusion Ordinarycitizensdonthavethetimeorcapacitytoevaluateanumberof complexballotmeasures. 4. ProposalsSeveredfromFundingIssues Legislatureoftengetsstuckfundingprogramsthatresult frominitiatives.Initiativesupportersoftendontconsiderfundingissues. 5. TyrannyoftheMajority Directdemocracydoesnotprotectminorities.Theproceduralruleslike veto,filibuster,etc,thatmakeitdifficulttopasslegislationarenotpresent(e.g.,thereareno safeguardsindirectdemocracy). 6. DistortionoftheLegislativeAgenda AKABallotboxbudgeting.Votersdontconsiderallofthe budgetingprioritiesthatexist.Theydonthavetoweighthetrueplusesandminusesofthelaws thattheyaretryingtopass(e.g.,Californiaandlawsliketheirthreestrikeslaw). d. PossibleChecksonDirectDemocracy Makeitmoredifficulttogetissuesontotheballot Imposesupermajority requirementforpassage,especiallyofstateconstitutionalamendments Requirelegislativereview witha"coolingoff"period>providesatleastsomedeliberation Judicialreview>ourfocus Statelawrestraints Singlesubject,Initiativev.referendum Federallaw Equalprotection/Dueprocess ii. StateLawRestraints a. KindsofRestraints 1. SingleSubject Areferendum/initiativemustinvolveonlyonequestiontoavoidvoterconfusion. SomecourtsaremorestrictwiththisrulethanthecourtintheSt.Paul case. 2. Initiativev.Referendum Distinguishingbetweeninitiativesandreferendumsbyproviding differentmethodsforusingeachprocess.Thelinebtwinitiativeandreferendumisnotalwaysclear. b. St.PaulCitizensforHumanRightsv.CityCounciloftheCityofSt.Paul a) Facts:Initiativepassedtorepealexistingordinancegivinggayscertainprotectionsandinfluencing howreligiousschoolsadmitstudents.Plaintiffarguesthatthereferendumprocessshouldhave beenusedtorepealtheexistingordinance.Referendumstakeaway,initiativesadd.Thepractical resultofP'sargumentisthattherearedifferenttimingrequirementsforinitiatives/referendums. i) SecondaryIssue(SingleSubjectRule) sexualorientationandreligiousdiscriminationparts aretwodiscreteissues.Courtdismissesthisargumentstraightaway.Butthepolicydriving thisargumentisvoterconfusion.

b) Result:Initiativeupheld c) Rationale Thepowertogiveincludesthepowertotakeaway.Note:nolimitingprinciple c. CaliforniaProp.8 a) SubsequentChallenge1 Basicargument(similarto St.Paul):prop.8wasnotanamendmentbut wasarevisionthatissubjecttodifferentrequirements. b) SubsequentChallenge2 ViolatesUSConstitution:Stillpending... iii. FederalConstitutionalRestraints a. EqualProtection 1. Arthurv.CityofToledo i) Facts Acityordinancesupplyingutilitiestoapublichousingdevelopmentoutsidetheinner citywasrejectedbydirectdemocracy. ii) Issue Toestablisharacebasedclassificationthechallengermustestablishbothracially discriminatoryimpactandpurpose.Theproblemisthatitisverydifficulttoestablishpurpose withdirectdemocracybecausethereisasecretballotandthesheernumberofpeoplevoting forthelaw. iii) Holding Absentareferendumthatfaciallydiscriminatesracially,oronewherealthough faciallyneutral,theonlypossiblerationaleisraciallymotivated,acourtcannotinquireinto theelectorate'smotivationsinanequalprotectioncontext. iv) Rationale Thepolicyofthesecretballot 2. Romerv.Evans i) Facts Popularreferendumamendsthestateconstitutionwhichprovidesnostateorlocal branchofgovernmentcanenactanylawprotectinghomosexuals. ii) Issue Thedisputehereisreallyoverwhethergaysareaclassthatneedprotectionfromthe governmentornot.Kennedysaysyes,Scaliasaysno. iii) Holding Theamendmentwasstruckdownb/cnotrationallyrelatedtoalegitstateinterest. iv) Rationale Protectionofferedbyantidiscriminationlawsisnota"specialright"becausethey protectfundamentalrightsalreadyenjoyedbyothercitizens.Thoughantidiscriminationlaws "enumerate"certaingroupsthattheyprotect,thismerelyservestoputothersonnotice. Amendment2preventsgaysfromusingthetypicalpoliticalprocesstogainprotectionfrom thegovernment.Thelawistoobroad. (a) Infersanimus (b) Dislikesthatamendmentcutsoffgaysaccesstothepoliticalprocess>Thecontextof cuttingoffaccesstothepoliticalprocess causesthecourttobemoresearching. b. DueProcess Limitationsdontexistforthemostpart. 1. CityofEastlakev.ForestCityEnterprises,Inc. i) Facts Popularreferendummadealawthatrequiredchangesinzoningtobeapprovedbya 55%majorityofthecity'sresidents.Plaintiffsuedafterhiszoningapplicationwasdenied, contendingthatitwasaviolationofdueprocessbecausethedecisionwasonethatshouldnt bemadebytheelectorate(thereisnostandardordeliberation).Arguedtheschemewasa delegationoflegislativepower(requiresstandardstoguidediscretion). ii) Holding Therequirementdidnotviolatedueprocess. iii) Rationale ThereferendumisapowerreservedbythepeopleintheOhioStateConstitution (notadelegationoflegislativepower),andassuchisonlyrequiredtobewithinthescopeof thelegislativepowertobevalid>Thepeoplearesovereign. 2. Philly'sv.Byrne i) Facts Votersbannedthesaleofliquorintheplaintiffsprecinctbyreferendum.Plaintiff(bar owners)suedunderdueprocess.Thequestioniswhetherthisislegislationoradjudication. ii) Holding Noviolationofdueprocess.Thelocaloptionreferendumprocedurewasa constitutionallypermissiblemethodofregulatingthelocalsaleofliquor,assumingitwas conductedfairlyandhonestlybecauseitwaslegislative ratherthanadjudicative.>didnt decidewhetherthebarcouldsellliquorbutwhetherthewholeprecinctwouldadoptthe policyofnoliquorsales. c. ChallengingtheProcedure:FreeSpeech a) Doev.Reed i) Facts WashingtonPublicRecordsAct(PRA)requiresdisclosureofallpublicrecords, includingreferendumpetitions.Anantigaygrouphadpetitiontooverturnsomegaylaw. Thensomegaystriedtogetthepetitionstopostthenamesandaddressesoftheantigayson theweb.Antigaysclaimedthedisclosureviolatedtheconstitutionbychillingpoliticalspeech. ii) Holding Disclosureoftheidentityofpersonswhosignpetitionsforballotreferendadoes notnormallyviolate1stA.Courtleavesopen,however,thequestionwhether1stA.might prohibitdisclosureifitcanbeshownthatdisclosurecouldexposesignerstoseriousharm.

V. StatutoryInterpretation
A. General
i. ThreeApproachestoStatutoryInterpretation a. Intentionalism Interpreteridentifiesandfollowstheoriginalintentofthestatute'sdrafters.American courtsinthe18thcenturygenerallyproclaimedtheirfidelitytolegislativeintent,butwouldconsideras evidenceassuchintentthestatute'stext,canonsofconstruction,commonlaw,circumstancesof enactment,principlesofequity...etc. b. Purposivism Interpreterchoosestheinterpretationthatbestcarriesoutthestatute'spurpose.This looksforintentatahigherlevelofgenerality. c. Textualism Interpreterfollowstheplainmeaningofthestatute'stext.

B. StatutoryTextandLegislativeIntent
i. GeneralTheoreticalApproaches a. TheMischiefRule Fourthingsmustbediscernedtointerpretstatutes: Commonlawbeforethestatute Mischiefanddefectforwhichthecommonlawdidnotprovide Remedysuggestedtocurethemischief Truereasonoftheremedy,thenmakeconstructiontosuppressthemischiefandadvancethe remedy b. TheGoldenRule Judgesarenotsupposedtolegislate,butaresupposedtodeclaretheexpressed intentionofthelegislators.Mustdothreethings: Takethewholestatutetogether Givewordstheirordinarymeaning Iftheordinarymeaningleadstoanabsurd,inconsistent,orinconvenientinterpretation,thecourtis justifiedingivingthemanothermeaning. c. TheLiteralRule Ifthestatutorylanguageisplain,legislaturemustbetakentohavemeantandintended whatisplainlyexpressed.Wherethereareclearterms,theymustbeenforcedevenifitleadstoabsurdor mischievousresults. ii. RecognizingLegislativeIntent a. HolyTrinityChurchv.US 1. Facts Pastorwasforeign,churchwascontractedtobringhimtoachurchinNewYork.Astatute onthebooksmadeitunlawfulforanyperson,company,partnership,orcorporationtoprepaythe transportationofanyalienintotheUSundercontract,madebeforetheimportation,toperform labororservice. 2. Issue thechurchesactappearstobeunlawfulunderthestatutebutitseemsabsurdtoconclude thatcongresswouldhavedenouncedthistypeoftransaction. 3. Holding TheChurchesconductmustnothavebeenwithinthestatutebecausecongresscouldnot havepossiblyintendedthatresult. 4. Rationale Thecourtusedseveralinterpretivetechniquesforreachingitsconclusion: Statutemusthavemeantonlymanuallaborers Evilwhichwasintendedtoberemediedwastheinfluxofcheapunskilledlabor(Mischiefrule) Lookedtothelegislativehistorytocomeupwiththisrationale TheUSisaChristiannationanddoesnotwanttobarpriestsfromcomingin(goldenrule). 5. Importance ThefirstcasewheretheCourtrewrotethestatutebasedonevidencefromthe legislativerecord.Inasenseelevatingintentovertheactualtextofthestatute. Thecourthowever missedthefactthatnoamendmentwaseverproposedtolimitthestatutetomanuallaborers. iii. PlainMeaningRule a. GeneralRule Ifthestatutorytexthasaplainmeaningthenthatistheendoftheinterpretiveenterprise. Donotneedtogoontoconsultlegishistory,statutorypurpose,orotherpotentialsourcesofmeaning. iv. Pond'sSpuriousInterpretation a. ThreePurposesofGenuineInterpretation Discovertherulewhichthelawmakerintendedtoestablish Discovertheintentionwhichthelawmakermadetherule Enableotherstoderivefromthelanguageusedthesameideawhichtheauthorintendedtoconvey b. TwoWaystoInterpretStatutes 1. GenuineInterpretation Trytofindoutdirectlywhatthelawmakermeant. Assumepositionofthelawmakerinthesurroundingsinwhichheacted Endeavortogatherfromthemischiefhehadtomeetandtheremedybywhichhesoughtto meetit,hisintentionwithrespecttotheparticularpoint Ifinterpreterhasclearevidenceofintent,shouldfollowit Ifnoclearevidenceofintentisavailabletheinterpretermustengageinimaginative reconstruction

2. SpuriousInterpretation Meettheintentofthelawmakerdirectlyandassumethathethoughtas wedoongeneralquestionsofmoralsandpolicyandfairdealing. Theinterpretationwhichmostappealstoourcurrentsenseofrightandjusticeistheone mostlikelytogivemeaningofthelawmaker Casesmustbedecidedforthelongrun c. DisadvantagesofSpuriousInterpretation Tendstobringthelawintodispute Subjectsthecourtstopoliticalpressure Reintroducesthepersonalelementintojudicialadministration>judgesinjectingtheirpersonal viewsintothelaw. v. ImaginativeReconstruction a. Fishgoldv.SullivanDrydockandRepairCorp. 1. Facts Plaintiffreturnedfromarmyserviceandwaslaidofffromhisjobwithinayear.Astatute providedthatanypersonwhoisrestoredtoapositioninaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthe aboveshallbeconsideredashavingbeenonfurloughorleaveofabsenceduringhisperiodof trainingandserviceinthelandornavalforces,shallbesorestoredwithoutlossofseniorityand shallnotbedischargedfromsuchpositionwithoutcausewithinoneyearaftersuchrestoration. 2. Holding Thelayoffwaslegalunderthestatute. 3. Rationale Courtlookedtothedictionarydefinitionof"discharge"andfoundthatitmeant permanenttermination,nottemporaryterminationdenotedbyalayoff.

C. NewTextualism
i. Definition AstyleofTextualismdevelopedasamoreconstrainedversionoftheplainmeaningrule. a. GeneralPrinciples Courtshavenoauthoritytoevenapplyastatutetoaproblemunlessthelanguageclearlytargets thatproblem Courtsinterpretingstatuteshavenobusinessfiguringoutlegislativeintent Shouldeliminatetheuseoflegislativehistoryaltogether Atextualistshouldrewritethestatuteinawaythatdoesleastviolencetothetext Inthecaseofambiguity:Textshouldbeconstruedreasonably Reasonable:whatastatutefairlymeans WhatanordinaryspeakeroftheEnglishlanguagewoulddrawfromthestatutorytextisthealpha andomegaofstatutoryinterpretation. ii. JustificationsofNewTextualism a. ConsistencywithFacts Thelegislativeprocessischaoticandundependablesoitisalmostimpossibleto figureoutwhatcongressintended.Allweknowforsureiswhatthelegislaturecreated. 1. Counter Wecanfigureoutsomeintent.Intheprocessoflegislatinglegislatorscometoa functionalistagreementaboutwhatthelawisthatshouldbepassed. b. DemocraticLegitimacy Congresshastheresponsibilityofcraftingstatutes.Thoselawsthenneedtobe followedtotheT.Onlythoseproductsaretheendresultofbicameralismandpresentmentareworthyof democraticrespect.Moreover,legislatorshave(underthebeliefthatjudgeswoulduselegislativehistory) startedtoputstuffinthelegislativehistoryforthepurposeofinfluencingjudges.Theresultofthisisthe creationoflegislationwithoutbicameralismorpresentment. c. RuleofLaw Stabilityandpredictability.Wethinkit'sgoodwhenpeopleknowwhatthelawis,whenitis certain,etcTherearealsonoticeanddueprocessconcernswhenjudgesgomakinglawsthrough imaginativeinterpretation. iii. Greenv.BlockLaundry a. Facts Plaintiff,Green,suedafterbeinginjuredinalaundryaccident.BlockusedGreenspriorconvictions toimpeachhiscredibility.Thestatue(federalrulesofevidence)seemedtoonlylimittherulefor defendant.Thisresultwasclearlyabsurd(andevenunconstitutional)ifstrictlyapplied.Thus,thecourt hadtodecideif"defendant"hadsomeothermeaning. b. Majority Thestatutecouldnotpossiblymeanwhatitsaid.Themajoritywentontodiscussthe legislativehistoryuponwhichitconcludedthat"defendant"meanscriminaldefendantonly. c. Scalia(Concur') Scaliaalsorewrotethestatute.Hedisregardedtheplainmeaningbecausethestatute containedanunintendedabsurditythatjustifiedadeparturefromplainmeaning.Themajority's interpretationdoestheleastviolencetothetext.Scaliadisfavoredtherelianceonlegislativehistorybut acquiesced thatlegislativehistorycouldbeusedinaverynarrowway toverifythatthelegislaturedid notintendtheabsurdresult. d. Dissent Shouldinterprettheruletoprotectanyparty.Majority'sinterpretationwasnotconsistentwith thelogicofcongressasrevealedbytheconferencecommitteereport. e. Criticism Thisopinionsuggeststhatthereareelementsoftextualismthatarejustasarbitraryasother kindsofinterpretation.

iv. Chisomv.Roemer a. Facts AvotedilutionissuelikeinMobile v.Bolden.Orleansparish(withlotsofblackpeople)hadtwo seatswhileotherparisheshadone.PlaintiffwastryingtogetthestatuteinBoldentoapplyhere(a judicialelection). b. Issue Doesthevotedilutiontestinsection2(b)oftheVRAapplytojudicialelections? c. Dissent(Scalia) Suggeststhatusingtheterm"representative"toapplytojudgessimplybecausesomeof themareelectedisabadwaytogoaboutitbecausejudgesareordinarilynotmeanttoserveinthat capacity.

D. StaticandDynamicInterpretation
i. Staticv.DynamicInterpretation Thebasicquestionbetweenthetwoiswhetherajudgemustinterpretina wayconsistentwithhistoryorwiththewaythelawismodernly. a. RealistView Judgesshouldnotbeparticularlyconstrainedbypastrulingsbutshouldinsteadinterpretin awayconsistentwithmodernlaw. b. FormalistView(Brandeis) Thepaststatutorydecisionsofacourtareentitledtoextradeference becausecongressandnotthecourtismoreinstitutionallycompetenttochangestatutorymeaning. ii. Floodv.Kuhn Anextremeexampleofstaticinterpretation. a. Facts Atissuewasbaseballsexemptiontoantitruststatuteswithregardstoreserveclauses(aclause thatlimitedfreeagencyofplayers)inplayerscontracts. b. Majority Takingaformalisticapproach,thecourtrefusedtooverturnprecedentbecauseofchanged conditions.Allofthejusticesagreedthatachangewasappropriatebutthemajorityinsistedthatthat changewasbestlefttothelegislature. c. Dissents Exemptionisaderelictinthestreamofthelawthatwe,itscreator,shouldremove.The Majoritymayhavereadtoomuchintocongressionalinaction.Thecourtshouldadmiterrorandcorrectit, giventhesubstantialfederalrightsatstake. iii. EskridgeonDynamicStatutoryInterpretation a. RoleofJudges Judgesareagents ofthelegislatureapplyingtheprincipalsdirectivetounforeseen circumstances.Therefore,judgesshouldnotreadstatutesmechanically,butwithaneyetowards achievingunderlyingpurpose. iv. IntheMatterofJacob Anextremeexampleofdynamicinterpretation. a. Facts Unmarriedcohabitatingcouplewantstoadoptachild.Thefemalepartneristhechild'smother. Thereisalsoalesbiancoupleinthesamesituation. b. RelevantLaw 110saysthataboyfriendandgirlfriendorgaycouplecantadoptbecauseneitheroneis atwoparentmarriedfamily oroneparentalone.117saysthatanadoptionextinguishesparental rights ofthenaturalparentsbecausetheywanttoprotectadoptedchildrenagainstbiologicalparents changingtheirminds. c. Majority Thecourtallowedtheadoption.Policy:Thestatuteisdesignedforthebenefitofthechild.The statuteisold.Societyhaschanged.Thecourtshouldchangethestatutesothatitisconsistentwith changingsocialconditions. d. Problem Themajorityisn'texactlyconsistentwiththelegislativepurposeinNewYork.Itlooksalotlike judicialpolicymaking. e. Importance thisrepresentsdynamicinterpretationbecausethecourtdepartsfromtheplainmeaningin ordertohavethelawreflectchangedcircumstances(e.g.,morepeopleincohabituatingunmarried relationships). v. Liv.YellowCabofCalifornia TheCaliforniacourtisdealingwithanoldstatute.Becauseitissooldthecourt asksifthestatutemeanssomethingdifferentnowthanwhenitwaswritten. a. Issue ShouldtheCaliforniaSupremeCourtinvalidatecontributorynegligenceandreplaceitwith comparativenegligence?TheproblemisthatcontributorynegligenceisactuallyapartoftheCalifornia statutes.Doesthelegislaturehavetobetheonetoabolishcontributorynegligence? b. Majority Takesadynamicinterpretationapproachandreliedon"emergingconcepts"intortlawfrom otherjurisdictions.Theyconcludethatthelegislatureinthepastdidn'twanttokeepthejudicialsystem fromevolving. vi. PragmaticTheoriesofInterpretation vii. FunnelofAbstraction Anattempttodescribewhatmostjudgesactuallydoinpractice. Abstract \/ CurrentPolicy \/ \/ \/ Concrete \/ EvolutionofLaw LegislativePurpose LegislativeHistory Text Note: Usethisoneverystatutory interpretationproblemtotryand reconcileeachinterpretive approach!!!!

E. TextualCannons
i. Definition Textualcanonssetforthinferencesthatareusuallydrawnfromthedrafter'schoiceofwords, grammaticalplacementinsentences,andtheirrelationshipwithotherpartsofthewholestatute. ii. MaximofWordMeaning a. OrdinaryMeaning Judgesmayconsultdictionariesandwilloftenrelyontheirownlinguisticexperience orintuitiontodecidethemostreasonablemeaning. 1. PrototypicalMeaning Somejudgeswilllooktowhatcoreideaisassociatedwithawordorphrase (e.g.,Brennaninaffirmativeactioncasesawdiscriminationasrequiringinvidiousintent). 2. TechnicalorSpecializedMeaning Whenthestatutedealswithatechnicalorspecializedsubject thecourtsadoptthespecializedmeaningofthewordsunlessitleadstoanabsurdresult. 3. SettledMeaningUnderEquityorCommonLaw WhereCongressusestermsthathavean accumulatedmeaningundereitherequityorthecommonlaw,acourtmustinfer,unlessthestatute otherwisedictates,thatCongressmeanstoincorporatetheestablishedmeaningoftheseterms. iii. MaximsofWordAssociationandClassification a. nosciturasociis Lightmaybeshedonthemeaningofanambiguouswordbyreferencetowords associatedwithit(e.g.,statuteusesthetermsexplorationandprospectingtodescribediscover>meant onlythediscoveryofmineralresources). b. Ejusdemgeneris Wheregeneralwordsfollowspecificwordsinastatutoryenumeration,thegeneral wordsareconstruedtoembraceonlyobjectssimilarinnaturetothoseobjectsenumeratedbythe precedingspecificwords.Thiscanoncanalsoworkinreverse. c. Expressiounius Wordsomittedmaybejustassignificantaswordssetforth.Inclusionofonething indicatesexclusionofanother.Whenthiscanonleadstoanimproperresult,courtsmayignorethis.In decidingwhethertoemploythiscanonitishelpfultoconsidercontext(e.g.,statutecovering"anyhorse, mule,cattle,hog,sheep,orgoat"didnotcoverturkeys. iv. GrammarCanons Thelegislatureispresumedtoknowandfollowbasicconventionsofgrammarandsyntax. a. PunctuationRule (Majority)Lookingonpunctuationasalessthandesirable,lastditchalternative. Note: Thepunctuationcanonhasnotplayedamajorroleinthelegisprudenceofthesupremecourt. Though,moderncourtsusethiscanonmorethantraditionalcourts. b. ReferentialandQualifyingWords Referentialandqualifyingwordsorphrasesreferonlytothelast antecedent (previousorpreexisting),unlesscontrarytotheapparentlegislativeintentderivedfromthe senseoftheentireenactment.Canbetrumpedbythepunctuationrule. c. ConjunctiveversusDisjunctiveConnectors Wordsconnectedbythedisjunctive"or"areoftenreadto haveseparatemeaningsandsignificance.Thoughinordinaryusage,peopleoftenusethetwo conjunctions(and/or)interchangeably. d. MandatoryversusDiscretionaryLanguage Whenastatuteusesmandatorylanguage(e.g.,shall),courts ofteninterpretthestatutetoexcludediscretiontotakeaccountofequitableorpolicyfactors.Though ordinaryusesometimesusesthewordsmayandshallinterchangeably. e. Singular/PluralNumbersandMaleorFemalePronouns Generallyallofthesewordsarenotgivenmuch weight.Thisislargelyaresultofthehistoricaluseofthemalepronounonly. f. GoldenRule Interpretersshouldadheretotheordinarymeaningofthewordsused,andtothe grammaticalconstructionunlessthatleadstoanymanifestabsurdity orrepugnance,inwhichcasethe languagemaybevariedormodified,soastoavoidsuchinconvenience. g. NietzscheRule Behumbleratherthanhypertechnical,andshowsomecommonsense. v. WholeActRule Thelegislaturepassesjudgmentontheactasanentity,notgivinganyoneportiongreater authoritythananother.Thus,anyattempttosegregateanyportionorexcludeanotherisalmostcertainto distortthelegislativeintent. a. PresumptionofCoherence Thiscanonpresumesthatthelegislaturedraftedthestatuteasadocument thatisinternallyconsistentinitsuseoflanguageandthewaytheprovisionsworktogether.This presumptiondoesn'tnecessarilyreflecttherealityofthelegislativeprocess. b. Titles Thetitlecannotcontroltheplainwordsofthestatute.Incaseofambiguitythecourtmay considerthetitletoresolveuncertainty. c. PreamblesandPurposeClauses maybeusedtointerpretonlywherethereareambiguousterms(e.g., todeterminethelegislativepurpose). d. Provisos Restricttheeffectofstatutoryprovisionsorcreateexceptionstogeneralrules.Inthecaseof ambiguityaprovisoisstrictly construed. e. RuletoAvoidRedundancy Everywordispresumedtoaddsomethingtothestatutorylanguage.>a presumptionagainstredundantlanguage. f. PresumptionofConsistentUsage Identicalwordsusedindifferentpartsofthesameactareintendedto havethesamemeaning. g. RuleAgainstInterpretingaProvisioninDerogationofOtherProvisions Oneprovisionofastatuteshould notbeinterpretedinsuchawayastocreateconflictortensionfromotherprovisionsofthestatute.

vi. CriticismsofCannons a. KarlLlewellyn Arguedthateverycannonhadacountercanonthatwouldleadtotheopposite interpretationofthestatute.Therefore,theydontreallyrestrainjudgesatall. b. LegislativeProcess Thecanonsdonotreflectthewaythatstatutesareactuallydrafted.Theydonot forcelegislatorstodraftwithcare.Andtheydonotaddressthefactthatambiguitiesoftenexistbecause legislatorsfailedtoreachaconsensus.

F. SubstantiveCannons
i. Introduction a. Definition(SubstantiveCanons) Presumptionsaboutstatutorymeaningbasedonsubstantiveprinciples orpoliciesdrawnfromthecommonlaw,otherstatutes,ortheConstitution. ii. TheRuleofLenity a. Definition(RuleofLenity) Lawswhosepurposeistopunishmustbeconstruedstrictly. b. JustificationsforLenity 1. FairNotice Onejustificationfortheruleoflenityisfairnotice.Thestatemaynotimposepenalties uponpeoplewithoutclearlywarningthemaboutunlawfulconductanditsconsequences.Under thisrationalelenityismostappropriatelyappliedtooffensesthataremalumprohibitum. 2. MensRea Anotherjustificationistherequirementofmensreasinthecriminallaw. 3. SeparationofPowers Congresscannotdelegatetojudgesandprosecutorspowertomake commonlawcrimes,becausethemoralcondemnationinherentincrimesoughtonlytobe deliveredbythepopularlyelectedlegislature.(Tokajinotbigonthisargument) c. ModernRuleofLenity Asof200628stateshaveabolishedorreversedtheruleoflenity. d. Muscarellov.US 1. Issue Lawsaysthatifyouuseorcarryafirearmwhilecommittingcertaincrimes,yougetanextra 5years.Muscarellocarriesaguninhistruck.Isthiscarryingwithinthemeaningofthestatute? 2. Majority Usedlotsofevidence(e.g.,legislativehistory&such)besidestheruleoflenity.Existence ofsomeambiguityisnotenoughtotriggerruleoflenity.Musthavegrievousambiguity. 3. Dissent Lookstothecommonmeaningof"carriesafirearm."Putsmoreemphasisonapplyingthe ruleoflenity.Usedlenityasmoreofapresumptionthanatiebreaker.Mainreasonforruleoflenity isseparationofpowers:Legislatures,notcourtsshoulddefinecriminalactivity. e. McNallyv.US 1. Issue Therewassomesortofgovernmentinsurancecorruptionscheme.Thepeopleinvolved wereindictedundermailfraud.Atissueisthemeaningof"moneyandotherthingsofvalue" 2. Majority Appliedruleoflenitytorequire"tangibleloss"topublic.Doesn'tincludekickback scheme,unlessthestatelostmoney. 3. Dissent Wantstotakeamoreexpansiveview. f. Skillingv.US Exampleofacasewherethecourtwasmoresympathetictotheruleoflenity 1. Facts wehaveafraudstatutethatisveryvague.Particularly:"intangiblerighttohonestservices." 2. Majority Noviolation.Relying(inpart)ontheruleoflenity.Thecourtlimited"intangiblerightto honestservices"tobribesandkickbacks.>wouldstillapplystatuteinthefuture i) Note Thereissomeconstitutionalavoidanceheretoo. 3. Scalia Wouldhaveheldstatuteunconstitutionallyvague,accusesmajorityofsubstituting "invention"forinterpretation.>throwsoutrightentirely iii. ConstitutionalAvoidance a. USv.Witkovich 1. Facts Illegalimmigrantwasarrestedunderastatutethatappearedinitstexttogivetheattorney generaltheauthoritytoarrestillegalimmigrantswhorefusedtotestifyaboutthemselvesandtheir associates.Theimmigrantwasarrestedforrefusingtotestify. 2. Issue Isthestatuteunconstitutional? 3. Majority Interpretedaroundtheplaintextofthestatuteinordertoavoidconstitutionaldoubts. Tointerpretthemajorityusedlegislativehistory,thestatutoryscheme,andtheclauseimmediately followingtheclauseinquestion. b. NLRBv.CatholicBishopofChicago 1. Issue DoesNLRB'sjurisdictionextendtoreligiousschools? 2. Majority No.Firstevaluatediftherewereanyfirstamendmentconcerns.Foundthattherecould besothecourtinterpretedthestatutetoseeiftherewasanywaytoavoidtheconstitutional concerns.Therewasnoclearexpression ofcongress'intent toexercisejurisdiction(overreligious schools)whentheexerciseraisesconstitutionalquestions.Therefore,thecourtfoundno jurisdiction.>thisisa"clearstatementrule" 3. Dissent Aclearexpressionshouldnotberequiredwheneverthereisaconstitutionalquestion. Moreover,thestatutehas8exceptions>ifcongresswantedtoexcludetheycouldhaveadded.> dissentarguesthatsilencedoesntnecessarilymeanaclearstatementislacking(the8exceptionsis anexhaustivelist).

c. MethodsofApplyingConstitutionalAvoidance Whenoneinterpretationwouldbeunconstitutional,chooseanotheronethatwouldpass constitutionalmuster. Whenoneinterpretationwouldraiseseriousconstitutionalproblems,choosetheonethatwould not(ModernApproach). Whenoneinterpretationpresentsconstitutionaldifficulties,donotimposeitunlesstherehasbeen anaffirmativeindicationfromCongressthatitisrequired.Thisisthemoreaggressiveapproach. d. ValuesUnderlyingConstitutionalAvoidance Avoidanceinterpretersassumethatthelegislaturewouldnothavewantedtopressconstitutional limits. Protectingbasicconstitutionalvaluesornormsthatareunderenforced.Unwillingtocloseoff congressionaloptionsthroughconstitutionalreview,judgeswillgiveeffecttodueprocessandfree speechnormsthroughnarrowingconstructions. Judicialrestraint.Conservationofinstitutionalcapitalbyconstitutionalavoidance. e. CriticismsofAvoidance 1. JudgeFriendly Theavoidancecannonmaybeanoccasionforstealthjudicialactivism,whichis bothantidemocraticandunhealthyforthejudiciary.Thismayalsoleadtounpredictable application. iv. NewFederalism a. Definition Thecreationorclarificationofclearstatementsofrulesthatreflectconstitutionalnormsof federalism. b. Gregoryv.Ashcroft ThemostdramaticexampleoftheCourtprotectingstatesovereigntythroughthe useofcanons. 1. Facts Missouriconstitutionprovidedforamandatoryretirementageof70forjudges.Thiswasa violationoftheADEA.Anemployer cannotspecifyamandatoryagerequirementforemployees over40. 2. Issues Congressionalinterferencewiththisdecisionwouldupsettheconstitutionalbalanceof federalandstatepowers,whereasapplicationoftheplainstatementrulewouldavoida potentialconstitutionalproblem. Cannotconcludethattheactclearlycoversappointed(ADEAdoesntapplytoelected officials)statejudges,soitisatleastambiguouswhetherCongressintendedforappointed judgestobeincluded>"appointeesonthepolicymakinglevel"areexcludedfromtheADEA 3. Majority(Tokajiisnotintothis) WillnotattributetoCongressanintenttointrudeonstate governmentalfunctions(clearstatementrule).Themajorityinterpretedinawaytoavoid interferencewithstatepower. Judgesaren'texplicitlyincluded(expresiounio),butcouldqualifyasappointeesonthe policymakinglevel(plainlanguage). ClearStatementRule:Aconservativejudge'stiebreakercanon(likehowaliberaljudgewould uselegislativehistory).Thistrumpswhatissuggestedbytheordinarymeaning. Note Clearstatementrulenotreallynecessary...thereisanambiguousstatutehere.Could havejustreliedonthetext. Rejectsapplicationofnosciturasociis (wordknownbyitsassociates)canonaslimiting exceptiontothoseworkingwithelectedofficials. 4. CriticismofMajority Therationaleforfederalismisthatdecentralizedgovernmentprotectsthe rightsofthepeople.ADEAseemstoprotecttherightsofthepeople. i) Counter Peoplehavetherighttocompetentjudges. 5. JustificationsforClearStatementRule Adequatelydetectscongressionalpreferences,settledexpectationsandpublicvalues CountervailingJustification Couldbeviewedasjudicialactivism. c. Gregoryand Chisom (Above) Compared BothcasesseemtohavefederalismissuesbutthecourtdoesntusefederalisminChisom Thecaseswerealsodecidedbythesamecourt,onthesameday. Howcanthesecasesbereconciled? ADEAisjustifiedbycommerceclause,VRAjustifiedunder14thamendment Maybeasapracticalmatterthecourtachievesthesameresultinbothcasessoitdidntneed federalism.

G. LegislativeHistory
i. Introduction a. LeoSheep.Co.v.US 1. Facts Thisisapropertycase.Peoplewerehavingdifficultyaccessingaresavaurbecausethe surroundinglandwasprivatelyheld.Thelandoriginallybecameprivateduringtheconstructionof thetranscontinentalrailroad.Thegovernmentgrantedlandtotherailroadusingacheckerboard schemewhereeveryotherparcelwasgiventotherailroadwhiletherestremainedpublic.Because ofthisthegovernmentclaimedithadanimpliedeasementbynecessity. 2. Majority Focusedoncongressionalintent.Statute(UnionPacificActof1862)didnotmention easementsbutotherreservationsweremade.Rejectedacanonofresolvingdoubtsinvolvingland infavorofthegovernment.CourtconcludedthatsincetheCongressintendedorganicdevelopment throughthepurchaseofland,therewasnoimpliedeasement. i) KeyPoint Congresswastryingtoencouragedevelopment>theydidntwanttoencumber thelandmorethanwasnecessary.Thereforethegovernmentisnotjustifiedinassertingan easement.Thisiswhythehistorymatters. ii) ADifferentKindofHistory Thislegislativehistoryismorelikefindingtheactualcontextof thelaw.Itsnotasdubiousaslookingforsometinypieceofinformationburiedinacommittee report. ii. CommitteeReports a. Generally Mostjudgesagreethatcommitteereportsshouldbeconsideredasauthoritativelegislative historyandshouldbegivengreatweight. b. Limitations Therearelimitationsoftheusefulnessofcommitteereportsingivingmeaningto ambiguousstatutes. Sometimesthereisnocommitteereportforaparticularbillorimportantprovision. Committeereportisoftenasambiguousasthestatute.Itcouldevenbemisleadingbyleavingout importantqualifications. Traditionallycommitteereportsdidntincludemarkupsessions,wherecriticalcompromiseswere made. Undersomecircumstancesstatementsmaybesuspiciousbecausetherecouldbeotherreasonsfor thestatementsbeinginthereport(e.g.,politicalmaneuvering). c. StateLegislatures Statecourtsoftenusecommitteereportsandsimilardocumentstointerpret ambiguousstatutes.Theycantakeafewforms: Regularreports(akintocongressionalcommitteereports) Staffanalysisofabill Reportsofspecialcommitteescreatedtoinvestigateandresolveimportantproblems d. Blanchardv.Bergeron 1. Facts Acivilrightscase.Thestatuteprovidesthatplaintiffmayrecover"reasonable"attorneys fees.Thecourthadtofigureoutwhatwasreasonable. 2. Majority Lookedtothelegislativehistorywhichreferencedthreecasesthatcorrectlyappliedthe reasonablenessstandard.Thecourtthenlookedateachcaseandtriedtoapplyittothefactshere. 3. Concurrence(Scalia) Scaliaobjectedtothecourtsanalysisbecausethecasesthatthelegislature lookedtowerefromlowercourts.Thisrolereversalwasnotproper.Moreover,itisnottheroleof thelegislaturetopointtocases.Theyaretoenactstatutes.Finally,mostmembersofcongress probablydidntevenreadthecommitteereportsandthereforedidnotvotetoenactthem. e. InreSinclair f. Carrv.US TheuseoflegislativehistoryissomethingthattheSupremeCourtisokaywithusing(except Scalia). 1. Facts Sexoffenderregistrationandnotificationact(SORNA)wasenactedwhileCarrwastraveling interstate. 2. Issue SORNAmakesitacrimewhenapersontravelsinterstateandknowinglyfailstoregister(if thepersonisrequiredtoregister).Carrarguesthatthestatutecannotbeappliedtohimbecause thetravelmusthavetakenplaceafterthestatuteseffectivedate. 3. Majority Makesatextualargument(useofpresenttense)becauseapersonwhotravelsmust registerunderSORNA.Thereisnowayforapersonwhotravelstoregisterunderanonexistent statute. i) DictionaryAct 4. Dissent Reliesonlegislativehistory.Reliesonadraftingmanual,whichsayspresenttenseshould generallybeused. i) CounterArgument draftingmanualisnotastatutelikethedictionaryactis.

H. AgencyInterpretation
i. TheBasicFramework a. Skidmore Anagencyadministratorspracticesandrecommendationtothecourtisnotbindingbutis entitledtorespect becauseitconstitutesabodyofexperience andinformedjudgment.Theweightof suchajudgmentwilldependuponthethoroughnessevidentinitsconsideration,thevalidityofits reasoning,itsconsistencywithearlierandlaterpronouncements,andallthosefactorswhichgiveitpower topersuade,iflackingpowertocontrol. b. Chevron Establishedatwosteptestfordecidingwhenacourtshoulddefertoanagency'sconstruction: 1. CongressHasSpoken Ifcongresshasspokendirectlytotheissue,thecourtgivesnodeference. 2. CongressHasNotSpoken Ifcongresshasnotspokendirectlyandthestatuteissilentor ambiguouswithrespecttotheparticularissue,thenthecourtmustaskwhethertheagency's answerisbasedonapermissibleconstructionofthestatute. i) OverridingtheConstruction Iftheconstructionisarbitrary,capricious,ormanifestly contrarytothestatute,thenthecourtcanoverridetheconstruction. ii) ReasonsforAmbiguity Thecourtrecognizesthreereasonswhyastatutemightbe ambiguous:1)congressmayintendtohavetheagencystrikethebalance;2)Congressmay haveignoredtheissueentirely;3)Congressmayhavefailedtostrikeabalanceandthus agreedtoleaveitblank.

I. SingingStatements
i. UseofSigningStatements Presidentshaveusedto: Sayhowtheyinterpretandwillapplylaw Raiseconstitutionalobjections Bush43(W)challengedorsoughttoalter>800provisions>theuseofsigningstatementshasincreased ObamaMemo Singingstatementswillissue"onlywhenitisappropriatetodosoasameansofdischargingmy constitutionalresponsibilities"and ExecutivebranchisdirectedtoseekAG'sadvicebeforerelyingonpriorsigningstatementsto disregardorrefusetocomplyw/statutes.