T prav...

Zbornk prspevkov z konferencie o pravicovom extrmizme Open Society Camp

The righT ones...

Open Society Camp REX conference proceedings

NADCIA OTVORENEJ SPOLONOSTI OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION

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extrmizmus v kadodennom ivote Viktria Mlynrikov, Zuzana Gborov ............................................................................................ 6 politick kontext innosti radiklnych nacionalistov a pravicovch extrmistov na slovensku Grigorij Mesenikov ............................................................................................................................. 9 Jed demokracie poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme v strednej a vchodnej eurpe Pter Krek.......................................................................................................................................... 17 extrm ako mainstream Lucia Faltinov .................................................................................................................................... 29 pohad na sebareflexiu slovenskej spolonosti Jaroslav Franek .................................................................................................................................. 35
T prav ... / The right ones .... editorky: Viktria Mlynrikov Zuzana Gborov autori (v abecednom porad): Irena Bihriov Sergej Danilov Ronald Eissens Gregory Fabian Lucia Faltinov Jaroslav Franek Robert Gould Lucia Grekov Alojz Hlina tefan Ivanco Alena Kotvanov Pter Krek Miroslav Kus Roland Kyka Grigorij Mesenikov Daniel Milo Michael Roberts Rastislav enkirik Vydala: nadcia otvorenej spolonosti open society Foundation, 2011 Jazykov prava: Andrej Blaas, Claire L. Sturm Foto: Igor Miku Vydanie: prv Grafick prava a tla: Zing print, s.r.o. Publikciu mono njs aj na strnke www.osf.sk. ISBN: 978-80-970143-8-4

nboenstvo v extrme Lucia Grekov.................................................................................................................................... 45 svetl zajtrajky pravicovho extrmizmu na slovensku? Alojz Hlina............................................................................................................................................ 53 sloboda slova Miroslav Kus ...................................................................................................................................... 59 vvoj slovenskej medilnej scny z hadiska prezentovania tm svisiacich s intoleranciou, rasizmom a xenofbiou, antisemitizmom Alena Kotvanov ................................................................................................................................ 65 Dilemy novinra pri informovan o aktivitch extrmistov Roland Kyka ..................................................................................................................................... 73 Je obmedzenie slobody prejavu efektvne? Sergej Danilov .................................................................................................................................... 81 CYberhaTe 2 pravicov extrmizmus a mainstreamov rasizmus na internete ako kadodenn realita Ronald Eissens ................................................................................................................................... 91 Trestn iny motivovan nenvisou Daniel Milo .......................................................................................................................................... 95 slov a obrazy mu spsobi boles. ako sa stava voi obrazom a jazyku zameranm proti meninm Robert Gould ...................................................................................................................................... 101 nie som rasista, ale... Irena Bihriov ................................................................................................................................... 115 boj proti haTe CriMe prostrednctvom advokanch stratgi Gregory Fabian ................................................................................................................................... 125 praktick rieenia prpadov rasovej diskrimincie s vyuitm prvnych prostriedkov ochrany na slovensku tefan Ivanco ..................................................................................................................................... 133 o osude jednej vzvy Rastislav enkirik .............................................................................................................................. 139

NADCIA OTVORENEJ SPOLONOSTI OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION

extremism in daily life Viktria Mlynrikov, Zuzana Gborov ............................................................................................ 146 political Contexts of radical nationalists and Far-right extremists activities in slovakia Grigorij Mesenikov ............................................................................................................................. 149 poison for Democracy Demand for right-Wing extremism in Central-eastern europe Pter Krek.......................................................................................................................................... 157 extreme as a Mainstream Lucia Faltinov .................................................................................................................................. 169 a look at the self-reflection of the slovak society Jaroslav Franek ................................................................................................................................ 175 religionin in extreme Lucia Grekov.................................................................................................................................. 185 The bright Future of right-Wing extremism in slovakia? Alojz Hlina.......................................................................................................................................... 193 Freedom of expression Miroslav Kus .................................................................................................................................... 199 The Developments in the slovak Media in presenting Themes related to intolerance, racism Xenophobia and anti-semitism Alena Kotvanov .............................................................................................................................. 205 Journalists Dilemas in informing on extremist activities Roland Kyka ................................................................................................................................... 213 is limitation to freedom of expression effective? Sergej Danilov .................................................................................................................................. 221 Cyberhate 2.0 - right Wing extremism and Mainstream racism on the internet as an everyday reality Ronald Eissens ................................................................................................................................. 231 hate-Motivated Crimes Daniel Milo ........................................................................................................................................ 237 Words and pictures Can hurt: Dealing with anti-Minority images and Language Robert Gould .................................................................................................................................... 243 i am not a racist, but... Irena Bihriov ................................................................................................................................. 257 Combating hate Crime Through Comprehensive advocacy strategies Gregory Fabian ................................................................................................................................. 267 practical solutions of Cases of race Discrimination with the Use of Tools of Legal protection in slovakia tefan Ivanco ................................................................................................................................... 277 a story of one petition Rastislav enkirik ............................................................................................................................. 283

T prav...
Zbornk prspevkov z konferencie o pravicovom extrmizme Open Society Camp

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eXTrMiZMUs v KaDoDennoM ivoTe

Diskusia o vplyve extrmizmu a extrmistickch hnut na vvoj spolonosti, stav demokracie a spolunavanie rznych skupn obyvatestva v poslednom ase nadobudla vo viacerch eurpskych krajinch, vrtane Slovenska, viu intenzitu. Po pde komunizmu sa v krajinch strednej a vchodnej Eurpy, v podmienkach zloitho transformanho procesu, ktor prina nejednoznan vsledky v socilnej aj ekonomickej oblasti a v oblasti inter-etnickch vzahov, aktivizovali radiklne sily, ktor premenili nacionalizmus na nstroj masovej politickej mobilizcie. V krajinch zpadnej Eurpy zasa narastajci prlev migrantov z krajn s odlinm kultrnonboenskm resp. civilizanm zzemm a problmy, ktor sprevdzaj ich integrciu do tzv. vinovej spolonosti, vyvolvaj siln protiprisahovaleck nlady. Tie s ivnou pdou pre xenofbne a izolacionistick politick strany. Na pozad celkovej aktivizcie nacionalistickch sl vynikaj snahy extrmistickch zoskupen, t.j. tch skupn, ktorch konenm cieom je prienik do politickho mainstreamu a znienie demokratickho systmu. Oslovuj vek poet ud, nespokojnch so svojimi ivotnmi podmienkami, frustrovanch vlastnmi zlyhaniami a nespechmi, a usiluj sa vyvola a nsledne ri a ivi rasov predsudky a nenvis voi meninm, inovercom, migrantom, inak zmajcim uom. Sasn extrmizmus v jeho rozmanitch podobch (nacionlnej, rasovej, nboenskej) predstavuje jednoznan spoloensk zlo. Je ahistorick, pretoe je obrten do minulosti a sna sa vvoj udskej spolonosti zabrzdi, obrti sp do ias, ke bolo lepie. Je asocilny, pretoe neprina nijak zmyslupln, pozitvne nvrhy na rieenie relnych problmov. Navrhuje iba tak rieenia, ktor - ako potvrdili dejiny - ved ku konfliktom, vojnm, pogromom a masovmu vradeniu. Je protidemokratick, pretoe povauje demokraciu za chor vplod a nastroj cudzch sl, domha sa nastolenia diktatry dominantnho nroda, rasy alebo konfesie. Je protisystmov, pretoe pod pltikom vyuitia mechanizmov liberlnodemokratickho zriadenia sa usiluje o jeho pln likvidciu. Svojimi zhubnmi aktivitami (naprklad nenvistnou rasistickou propagandou) extrmisti nielen otravuj atmosfru v spolonosti a zhoruj kvalitu ivota, ale vytvraj aj relnu hrozbu pre poetn skupiny ud. Spolonos, samozrejme, neme necha tieto aktivity bez povimnutia. Tak ako sa nacizmus v 20.-30. rokoch dvadsiateho storoia ril v Eurpe, aj ambciou dnench odno extrmizmu je zamori svojimi predstavami o najviac verejnho priestoru. Spolonos sa mus vedie voi tejto hrozbe postavi. M pritom nielen vytvra efektvne prekky pre extrmizmus (politick, prvne) a odstraova priny aktivizcie extrmistov, ale predovetkm kona preventvne, sledova, vzdelva. Predpokladom tchto innost je o najirie poznanie tejto problematiky, nielen v prostred vybranej skupiny tch, ktor s s tmto fenomnom profesionlne spojen alebo sa s nm snaia bojova, ale

aj uvedomenie si hrozby v celej spolonosti. Ve vinu podporovateov tchto mylienok netvor skupina mladch ud s vyholenmi hlavami, ktorch pri istch prleitostiach vidme v uliciach. Typickm rasistom je, ako povedala Hannah Arendtov, otec rodiny pln dobrch myslov, o si el prevychova alebo izolova netandardn skupiny na okraji spolonosti, ktor s kared, pinav a zl1. Vina z ns v sebe nos pocit ohrozenia z neznmeho. Od poznvania a pochopenia zvis, do oho sa tento strach pretav. Prve podpori poznvanie a pochopenie je zmerom publikcie T prav, ktor predkladme itateom. Tvoria ju prspevky, ktor odzneli na medzinrodnej otvorenej konferencii Open Society Camp, venovanej problematike boja s pravicovm extrmizmom, ktor zorganizovala Nadcia otvorenej spolonosti Open Society Foundation (Bratislava, 1. 2. december 2010). Cieom konferencie bolo otvori celospoloensk diskusiu o sasnch prejavoch pravicovho extrmizmu a ich princh, vytvori priestor pre prezentovanie aktivt, projektov a analz zameranch na boj proti tomuto fenomnu. Podujatie zrove poskytlo monos vytvori kontaktn sie expertov a organizci, venujcich sa problematike extrmizu a zloinov z nenvisti. truktra konferencie vychdzala z presvedenia, e prierezov spoluprca a komunikcia je absoltne nevyhnutn nielen v rmci ttnych intitcii, ale aj medzi nimi a domcimi aj zahraninmi mimovldnymi organizciami. Mimovldne organizcie na Slovensku sa snaia pristupova k rieeniu tejto problematiky systematicky. Zvolili si formu spolonej neformalizovanej komunikcie, ktor vytvra priestor na vmenu sksenost, poznatkov, ale aj efektvnejiu prcu a presadzovanie svojich zujmov voi vldnym intitcim. Tto komunikcia vak neostva len v priestore mimovldneho sektora, ale sna sado diskusie zapoji aj oficilne intitcie. Treba kontatova, e v istej miere je snaha o vzjomn komunikciu aj na strane ttu. Nezastupiten lohu maj mimovldne organizcie prve v preventvnej a vzdelvacej oblasti. Zohrvaj kov lohu pri rznych modernch formch vzdelvania mldee, organizovan kampan a podobne. V tomto duchu vznikla aj idea spomnanej otvorenej konferencie a na u nadvzujcej publikcie. Publikcia T prav sa sklad z troch tematickch ast. V prvej asti Spoloensk svislosti extrmizmu sa Lucia Faltinov, Pter Krek, Grigorij Mesenikov, Jaroslav Franek, Alojz Hlina a Lucia Grekov zameriavaj na vybran historick, politick, ideologick a nboensk faktory aktivizcie nacionalistickch sl v sasnej Eurpe a na Slovensku. V druhej asti Sloboda slova, mdi a extrmizmus sa Miroslav Kus, Sergej Danilov, Alena Kotvanov, Roland Kyka a Ronald Eissens venuj problematike extrmizmu v kontexte princpov slobody slova a tlae a z hadiska spracovania tejto problematiky v mdich a na internete.
1 V lnku: Tabucchi, A.: kared, pinav a zl. Mosty, pecilne slo esko Slovensko bez hranc.

V tretej asti Boj proti rasovej nenvisti a diskrimincii Daniel Milo, Gregory Fabian, tefan Ivanco, Irena Bihriov a Rastislav enkirik poukazuj na nevyhnutnos efektvneho odporu voi reniu nenvistnch nlad a diskriminanch praktk, informuj o nstrojoch efektvnej rezistencie voi rasovej nenvisti a diskrimincii. Verme, e rovnako ako publikcia Nemaj trmu z extrmu. Informciami proti extrmizmu, ktor Nadcia otvorenej spolonosti Open Society Foundation vydala v dvoch vydaniach v rokoch 2007 a 2009, aj publikcia T prav, prispeje k lepiemu pochopeniu fenomnu pravicovho extrmizmu, povedie k odhaleniu menej viditench svislost extrmistickho podhubia v eurpskych krajinch, vrtane Slovenska, a pome vypracova efektvnejie postupy boja proti extrmistickmu nebezpeenstvu. Viktria Mlynrikov, Zuzana Gborov editorky

poLiTiCK KonTeXT innosTi raDiKLnYCh naCionaLisTov a praviCovCh eXTrMisTov na sLovensKU

grigorij Mesenikov
Intitt pre verejn otzky

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Existuje sbor faktorov (historickch, politickch, ideologickch, socio-kultrnych, etnodemografickch), ktor vytvraj na Slovensku pomerne priazniv spoloensk prostredie pre aktivity radiklnych nacionalistov a pravicovch extrmistov. Tieto faktory zahaj multietnick zloenie obyvatestva, kritick situciu rmskej meniny, ktor nikdy nebola adekvtne integrovan do tzv. vinovej spolonosti, ideologick a politick dedistvo domceho faizmu z prvej polovici 20. storoia (vrtane tzv. slovenskho ttu z rokov 19391945), prehlbujce sa revizionistick prvky v oficilnej historickej vede (vinou pod zmienkou objektvnejieho hodnotenia kovch historickch udalost a osobnost slovenskch nrodnch dejn), negatvny dopad dlhodobej izolcie krajiny poas komunistickho reimu na hodnotov orientcie obyvatestva, celkov posilnenie pozci nacionalistickch sl v oficilnej (mainstreamovej) politike v rokoch 20062010, ke Slovensk nrodn strana (SNS) bola sasou vldnej koalcie. Nedostaton efektvnos orgnov ttnej moci v oblasti represie, prevencie a osvety v boji so renm rasovej nenvisti, ako aj postupn erzia konsenzu mainstreamovch politikov ohadom prevencie asti extrmistov v oficilnom politickom ivote tie zohrvaj svoju negatvnu lohu.

nov politick taktika extrmistov

V poslednch rokoch mono pozorova zven aktivitu skupn pravicovch extrmistov a rasistov. Na vlne posilnenho nacionalistickho diskurzu vo verejnom a politickom ivote krajiny, zmerne rozvinutho mainstreamovmi nrodno-populistickmi politickmi silami (stranami vldnej koalcie Smer-SD SNS S-HZDS, ktor psobila na Slovensku od jla 2006 do jla 20101), parazitujc na sasnch socilnych problmoch v niektorch reginoch Slovenska (vysok miera nezamestnanosti, nzka ivotn rove, slab infratruktra, kriminalita, socilna deprivcia a vylenie rmskej populcie), lenovia extrmistickch a ultranacionalistickch zoskupen vypracovali nov taktiku. Modifikovali organizan princpy svojich aktivt, zaali imitova koncepciu autonmneho nacionalizmu znmeho v zpadnej Eurpe a podnikli kroky na infiltrciu do existujceho stranckeho systmu.
1 Viac o pozad slovenskho nrodnho populizmu a politickch aktivitch nrodnch populistickch strn na Slovensku: Mesenikov, G: Nrodn populizmus na Slovensku: aktri, tmy, stratgie. In: Mesenikov, G., Gyrfov, O.: Nrodn populizmus na Slovensku. Intitt pre verejn otzky, Bratislava, 2008, s. 7 38.

Grigorij Mesenikov

politick kontext innosti radiklnych nacionalistov a pravicovch extrmistov na slovensku

V niektorch reginoch v reakcii na vrazn nespokojnos vekej asti miestneho obyvatestva so socilnymi podmienkami vlastnej existencie a s neschopnosou orgnov verejnej moci riei znepokojujce problmy vo vzahoch medzi rmskym a nermskym obyvatestvom extrmisti zaali priamo komunikova so svojimi potencilnymi prvrencami v jednotlivch lokalitch, organizova verejn podujatia (demontrcie, manifestcie, predvolebn zhromadenia). Zrky medzi polciou a extrmistami poas tchto podujat im poskytli prleitos prezentova sa ako martri bojujci za nrodn spravodlivos. Vroia vybranch udalost nrodnch dejn a in symbolick komunikan udalosti vytvorili alie prleitosti pre extrmistick skupiny ri ich posolstv k potencilnym priaznivcom, ako aj k irej verejnosti. V roku 2009 extrmistick a radiklno-nacionalistick sily sformulovali svoje programov zmery v dokumente Memorandum prvej ponovembrovej genercie slovenskej mldee. Dokument bol prijat spolonou rezolciou astnkov verejnej manifestcie nazvanej Za budcnos naich det, ktor zorganizovala Novch Zmkoch v auguste 2009 skupinka radiklno-nacionalistickch organizci. K charakteristickm rtm spomnanho dokumentu patrili odmietnutie liberlno-demokratickho reimu, spochybovanie zkladnch princpov trhovej ekonomiky, identifikcia s historickm revizionizmom, anti-atlanticizmus a antiamerikanizmus, protimeninov nlady, antisemitizmus, demontratvne stotonenie sa s panslavizmom, zdrazovanie kresanskch koreov2. D sa hovori o vysokej relevancii silia extrmistickch skupn premeni sa na etablovan politick formcie s cieom zska na svoju stranu aiskov as radiklno-nacionalistickho elektortu. Cieom extrmistov je sta sa legitmnym a oficilne uznvanm sperom etablovanch nacionalistickch politickch sl. Napriek tomu, e slovenskm extrmistom sa nepodarilo obnovi svoju politick stranu pod pvodnm nzvom Slovensk pospolitos, ktor zruil Najvy sd SR v roku 2005, a ani vytvori plne nov politick stranu, dokzali prekona potencilne prekky pre angaovanie sa v politickom ivote tak, e prevzali vedenie v u existujcej marginlnej politickej strane. Vaka tejto taktike sa im podarilo vyjs z politickej ilegality a vstpi do mainstreamovej politiky. Postupnos ich krokov bola nasledovan: v roku 2009 lenovia zakzanej extrmistickej strany Slovensk pospolitos vstpili do Strany priateov vna a nsledne dvakrt zmenili jej nzov najprv na udov stranu socilnej solidarity a potom na udov stranu Nae Slovensko (SNS).

vsledky nacionalistickch politickch strn v parlamentnch vobch na slovensku v rokoch 19902010 (v %)

nacionalisti a extrmisti v parlamentnch vobch

SNS zskala v parlamentnch vobch (v roku 2010) 1,33 % hlasov (33 742 voliov). Nepodarilo sa jej sce prekona 5-percentn hranicu potrebn na vstup do parlamentu, ani 3-percentn hranicu na zskanie finannch prostriedkov od ttu na hradu vdavkov na as vo vobch. Vsledky volieb vak priniesli doposia najlep vsledok, ak dosiahli ultranacionalistick a extrmistick sily vo volebnch dejinch sasnej slovenskej demokracie.
2 Memorandum prvej ponovembrovej genercie slovenskej mldee , 25. august 2009.

V jnovch parlamentnch vobch 2010 mainstreamovej nacionalistickej SNS sa podarilo vstpi do parlamentu napriek vraznej strate hlasov v porovnan s vobami 2006 (11.73 % v roku 2006, 5.07% v roku 2010). Hoci hlavn zisk v dsledku straty hlasov SNS zaznamenala avicov nrodno-populistick strana Smer-SD (ktor sa deklaruje ako socilno-demokratick strana), v prpade alieho oslabenia SNS (i u v dsledku vntrostranckych turbulenci alebo odhaovania korupnch kandlov, ktor sa odohrali v rii tejto strany v obdob bvalej vldy), sila, ktor tie me zska na kor SNS je pravicovo-extrmistick, rasistick politick formcia, ktor sa evidentne poka aplikova pro-aktvnu taktiku v sil zska hlasy najradiklnejej asti elektortu SNS. Pre pravicovch extrmistov z SNS sasn umiernen pozcia SNS vytvorila vhodn pozadie pre vlastn prezentciu ako autentickho predstavitea silnho, skutonho, naozajstnho nacionalistickho prdu v slovenskej politike. Napriek tomu, e SNS sa zatia nachdza v tdiu proto-stranckej organizcie a nedisponuje vetkmi parametrami na vyvjanie aktivt relevantnej politickej formcie (celottne strancke truktry, profesionlny strancky apart, kvalitn intelektulne pozadie, masov lenstvo, dostaton volisk podpora, koalin potencil apod.), strana zana smerova k opusteniu tzv. przdneho priestoru stranckeho systmu.

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Grigorij Mesenikov

politick kontext innosti radiklnych nacionalistov a pravicovch extrmistov na slovensku

akceptcia extrmizmu verejnosou

silie pravicovch extrmistov etablova sa ako relevantn politick sila treba vnma v irom kontexte akceptcie extrmizmu a extrmistickch skupn verejnosou. Tu treba ma na zreteli deklarovan postoje verejnosti voi aktivitm extrmistov, obsiahnut vo vsledkoch prieskumov verejnej mienky, oddanos obanov rznym typom politickej kultry, postoje voi meninm, vzah k liberlno-demokratickm hodnotm, miera tolerancie k spoloenskej diverzite. Dleit lohu zohrvaj aj postoje relevantnch politickm aktrov, ich vzah k extrmistom a radiklnym nacionalistom, primnos ich zvzku bojova proti extrmizmu a chrni prva tch socilnych skupn, na ktor sa osobitne zameriavaj extrmisti. Poda prieskumu verejnej mienky, uskutonenho Intittom pre verejn otzky (IVO)3, vina obyvateov Slovenska pociuje najv odstup od skinheadov a neonacistov. 82% obyvateov SR by nechcelo ma skinheadov a neonacistov za susedov. Tento odstup je vsledkom prevajceho imidu skinheadov a neonacistov ako osb, ktor pouvaj nsilie voi kadmu, kto s nimi neshlas, ktor podporuj likvidciu celch skupn obyvatestva, demontruj lojlnos voi nacistickej ideolgii, schvauj nacistick vojnov zloiny, pouvaj nacistick slogany a pozdravy a s hrdosou nosia nacistick symboly. Fyzick zjav extrmistickch astnkov protirmskych zhromaden na vchodnom Slovensku v rokoch 20092010 (vrtane lenov Slovenskej pospolitosti a inch podobne orientovanch extrmistickch zoskupen), sa vak odlioval od spomnanho imidu: vyzerali civilnejie a otvorene nepropagovali hodnoty, ktorch sa ben obania ttia. Vyhbali sa otvorenm referencim na historick faizmus a nacizmus a zdrazovali tmy blzke kadodennmu ivotu miestneho obyvatestva (naprklad tmu tzv. rmskej kriminality). Faktorom, ktor zvyuje verejn akceptovatenos rasistov a extrmistov, je nepochybne vysok socilny ditanc vinovej populcie voi Rmom (69% respondentov v uvedenom prieskume IVO nechcelo ma Rmov za susedov), ako aj rasov predsudky voi Rmom. Neschopnos ttnych orgnov zlepi socilnu situciu Rmov a efektvne chrni miestne obyvatestvo pred nsledkami sprvania niektorch rmskych obyvateov poruujcich zkon, tie vedie k vyej akceptcii extrmistickch aktivt. Historick revizionizmus a pozitvny postoj voi vojnovmu slovenskmu ttu zo strany niektorch verejnch initeov (nacionalistickch politikov, lenov hierarchie katolckej cirkvi, nrodne orientovanch historikov apod.), poskytuje extrmistom monos sa identifikova s tmto trendom. V poslednch rokoch predstavitelia vlasteneckho nzorovho prdu (naprklad lenovia a sympatizanti Matice slovenskej) vydvali vyhlsenia, ktor obsahovali pozitvne hodnotenie aktivt niektorch lenov ultranacionalistickch a extrmistickch zoskupen, vrtane Slovenskej pospolitosti. Charakterizovali ich ako sprvne naladench mladch ud, ktorm zle na dobre nroda, historickch tradcich a nrodnom povedom.
3 Zvldanie vziev 21. storoia. Centrum excelentnosti pre vskum a rozvoj obianstva a participcie (COPART). IVO/KVBSK, Bratislava, mj 2008.

Zo socio-demografickho hadiska medzi lenmi a sympatizantmi extrmistickch formci dominuj mlad udia, najm mui, ktor predstavuj vinu aktvnych a prleitostnch astnkov verejnch podujat organizovanch extrmistickmi zoskupeniami. V poslednom ase vak dochdza k vyej asti miestneho obyvatestva najm na vchodnom Slovensku (napr. demontrcie proti rmskej kriminalite). Tieto akcie tu pritiahli ako prleitostnch astnkov nielen mladch muov, ale aj ud v strednom a vyom veku, dchodcov, eny, tudentov, iakov, dokonca mlad matky s demi.

oslabovanie politickho konsenzu v oblasti odporu voi extrmistom

V niektorch lokalitch udia znmi svojm spojenm s radiklnou a extrmistickou scnou s zamestnan vo verejnej sprve a naalej ovplyvuj verejn diskurz (ako to bolo naprklad s bsnickou zbierkou o prezidentovi Tisovi, ktorej spoluautormi boli dvaja poslanci Nrodnej rady SR, vrtane lena socilno-demokratickho Smeru-SD, a zamestnanci regionlnej verejnej sprvy). Vyskytli sa tie prpady asti prslunkov extrmistickho hnutia na mainstreamovch kultrnych a umeleckch aktivitch. Naprklad Rastislav Rogel, bval divadeln herec, jedna z najprominentnejch osobnost slovenskch neonacistickej scny, znmy svojou fyzickou brutalitou a nsilnm sprvanm voi antifaistom a idom, bol angaovan dvoma televznymi stanicami (TV Markza a TV Joj, pre hru epizodickch postv v populrnych televznych seriloch. Intalcia sochy Svtopluka, vldcu Vekej Moravy, iniciovan stranou Smer-SD niekoko dn pred parlamentnmi vobami v jni 2010 ako sas stranckej volebnej kampane, vytvorila pre extrmistov miesto a zmienku na organizovanie spektakulrnych verejnch podujat v centre hlavnho mesta SR. Svtoplukova socha bola vyzdoben insgniami napodobujcimi symboly vojnovho slovenskho ttu. Po intalcii spomnanej sochy lenovia Slovenskej pospolitosti zorganizovali k nej niekoko nrodnch pochodov demontrujc svoj obdiv Svtopluka a uvedench faistickch insgni. Po parlamentnch vobch 2010 politick a intelektulni predstavitelia nrodno-populistickej scny (vlastenci), povaujci Svtopluka za kra starch Slovkov (tto teria bola ostro kritizovan poprednmi akademickmi historikmi ako pseudovedeck a mytologick), zorganizovali kampa proti monmu odstrneniu sochy. Obvinili nov vldu SR z protislovenskch a protinrodnch postojov, priom extrmisti sa k tejto kampani pridali. Kauza Svtoplukovej sochy sa stala pre nich vtanou a dlho oakvanou prleitosou otvorene sa prezentova ako sas irieho hnutia za zachovanie slovenskho historickho a kultrneho dedistva. Symptomaticky, podmienky pre takto prezentciu im vytvorili mainstreamov nrodno-populistick politick aktri, v tomto prpade sebadeklarovan socilni demokrati zo Smeru-SD. Zd sa, e v poslednom obdob dochdza k uritej erzii veobecnho konsenzu, ktor existoval naprie celm politickch spektrom na Slovensku v otzke o neprpustnosti asti extrmistov v politickom ivote. Niektor politici prezentovali nzor, e extrmisti ako sas

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politick kontext innosti radiklnych nacionalistov a pravicovch extrmistov na slovensku

oficilnej stranckej scny a zrove ako stle marginlna politick sila, mu oslabi populistick a radiklnu (hoci nie protisystmov) nacionalistick SNS. Treba podotkn, e podobn vahy znamenaj de facto uznanie extrmistov ako legitmneho aktra na domcej politickej scne. Svedia o tom, e mainstreamov politici podceuj rolu extrmistov ako hrov, ovplyvujcich verejn diskurz zhubnmi prvkami, ohrozujcimi demokraciu a pokojn spolunavanie rznych etnickch, rasovch a nboenskch skupn.

pozitvny potencil sasnch politickch zmien

spech akejkovek politickej sily v politickej sai zvis od viacerch faktorov: socilnoekonomickej situcie v krajine, postoja verejnosti k uskutoovanej politike, systmu hodnotovch orientci obyvatestva, prevaujcich vzorov politickej kultry, stavu interetnickch a interkonfesionlnych vzahov v spolonosti s multkultrnym a polyetnickm zloenm, profesionalizmu stranckeho vedenia a pod. Prpad protisystmovch, antidemokratickch politickch sl (extrmisti, faisti, neonacisti) je vak pecifick. Kee ich programy, nvrhy a aktivity s v protiklade so zkladnmi princpmi a hodnotami liberlnej demokracie a s zameran na znienie jej zkladov a jej nahradenie nedemokratickm reimom, spolonos mus vypracova systm vlastnej ochrany a odporu proti zhubnm politickm prvkom a neutralizcie monch nsledkov ich aktivt. Tento systm by mal obsahova opatrenia v oblasti legislatvy, represie a osvety. Na makropolitickej rovni dolo k zsadnej zmene v dsledku parlamentnch volieb 2010 ke avicovo-orientovan nrodno-populistick koalciu Smer-SD SNS S-HZDS vystriedala stredoprav liberlno-konzervatvna koalcia SDK-DS SaS KDH Most-Hd. Malo to predovetkm pozitvny vplyv na atmosfru v spolonosti a na verejn diskurz, viedlo k oslabeniu etnickho nacionalizmu a k citenmu uvoneniu naptia v interetnickch vzahoch. Hoci slovensko-maarsk vzahy s v agende pravicovch extrmistov menej relevantn ne tzv. rmska otzka, elimincia silnho protimaarskho nacionalistickho diskurzu, ktor koalcia na ele s Robertom Ficom povila na rove vldnej politiky v predchdzajcom volebnom obdob, nepochybne vytvorila priaznivejie podmienky pre odpor voi radiklnym nacionalistom a extrmistom. Nov vldnu koalciu pod vedenm Ivety Radiovej nemono charakterizova ako koalciu slovenskch etnickch nacionalistov (ako tomu bolo v prpade predchdzajcej vldy vedenej Rbertom Ficom). Okrem toho, politick strana, ktor m podporu prevanej viny maarskej nrodnostnej meniny a ktor vedie charizmatick politik maarskho pvodu, je sasou vldnej koalcie. Tto skutonos by mala pozitvne ovplyvni ttnu meninov politiku. Program novej vldy obsahuje nvrhy opatren na zintenzvnenie boja proti extrmizmu. Tmto vlda uznala vznam spomnanej tmy. Formulcie jednotlivch opatren svedia o sil prepoji legislatvne, udsko-prvne a socilne aspekty v prstupoch k problematike, o zmere aplikova komplexn metodiku: Vlda SR vyhlasuje, e akkovek prejavy

extrmizmu v naej spolonosti nemaj miesto. Vyuije vetky zkonn prvomoci a nstroje v boji proti extrmizmu vrtane personlneho a odbornho posilnenia truktr boja s extrmizmom a alej ich skvalitn. Vlda SR dostupnmi prostriedkami zabrni tomu, aby extrmisti brali do svojich rk iniciatvu v rieen problmov rmskej komunity. Vlda SR bude presadzova nulov toleranciu k individulnemu, skupinovmu a intitucionlnemu nsiliu pchanmu v rozpore s princpmi udskch prv garantovanch stavou Slovenskej republiky a medzinrodnmi dohovormi. Po vykonan analzy sasnho stavu schvli nov koncepciu boja proti extrmizmu. Vlda Ivety Radiovej sa tie zaviazala presadzova triezve vlastenectvo a vedomie eurpskej spolupatrinosti, vyhlsila, e odmietne nacionalizmus a totalitn ideolgie a bude bojova proti prejavom extrmizmu, rasizmu, xenofbie a antisemitizmu.4 Vlda sa zaviazala prekonva socilnu exklziu Rmov, ktor zhoruje vzahy medzi rmskou meninou a vinovm obyvatestvom a zvyuje nebezpeenstvo renia extrmizmu. Po zhodnoten zmerov novej vldy a s prihliadnutm na u uskutonen kroky v oblasti boja proti pravicovmu extrmizmu sa d kontatova, e nov vldna garnitra preukazuje dostaton vu riei problematiku extrmizmu.

Zver
Podobne ako v inch krajinch, pravicov extrmizmus na Slovensku je vo svojej podstate protisystmov, neliberlny, neakceptujci opozciu voi sebe, je nsiln a predstavuje bezprostredn riziko pre niektor skupiny obyvatestva (etnick, rasov a nboensk meniny, nositelia alternatvnych subkultr, osoby s protirasistickmi a protifaistickmi nzormi). Extrmisti a neofaisti, predstavujci zatia marginlnu politick silu, sa pritom snaia infiltrova do mainstreamovej politiky prostrednctvom imitcie vlasteneckho prdu. Existuje cel kla faktorov, vytvrajcich pomerne priazniv podmienky pre aktivity pravicovo-extrmistickch zoskupen v SR. Na druhej strane existuj aj faktory, ktor mu aktivity extrmistov obmedzova resp. komplikova. Zahaj oficilnu protifaistick ttnu doktrnu, liberlno-demokratick politick systm, lenstvo krajiny v E a NATO, aktivity MVO a mdi, monitorujcich radiklno-nacionalistick a pravicovo-extrmistick scnu. Na zabrnenie extrmistom ri ich vplyv a etablova sa ako relevantn aktr politickho ivota je potrebn efektvne spolon silie ttnej sprvy a rozmanitch aktrov protifaistickej a protiextrmistickej scny (MVO, obianske iniciatvy, zstupcovia intelektulnej obce). Kvalifikovan analza extrmistickej scny je dleit najm pre zvenie schopnosti aktrov protiextrmistickej politiky, aby mohli existujce problmy riei na zklade skutonej znalosti problematiky.5 Sasou integrovanho preventvneho systmu boja proti extrmizmu by mali by vzdelvacie aktivity najm ttom financovanch intitci, uplatujcich skutone multikultrny
4 5 Obianska zodpovednos a spoluprca. Programov vyhlsenie vldy SR na obdobie rokov 2010-2014: www.vlada.sk. Mlynrikov, V. (ed.): Nemaj trmu z extrmu. Informciami proti extrmizmu. 2. vydanie. NOS OSF, Bratislava, 2010.

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prstup zohadujci diverzitu slovenskej spolonosti, komplexnos historickch podmienok a sasn situciu rznych skupn obyvatestva, vrtane nrodnostnch menn. Potencilne posilnenie umiernench nenacionalistickch mainstreamovch politickch strn me oslabi pozciu nrodno-populistickch formci a vytvori vhodnejie prostredie pre boj proti pravicovmu extrmizmu a radiklnemu nacionalizmu na rznych rovniach. Pozitvne zmeny v tejto oblasti, ktor naznauj deklarcie novej vldy o nevyhnutnosti zintenzvni boj proti extrmizmu, ako aj neprehliadnuten stup nacionalistickej rtoriky a diskurzu po parlamentnch vobch 2010, by mali nsledne sprevdza praktick kroky v oblasti legislatvy, represie a osvety. Na politickej rovni je potrebn obnovi a potvrdi medzistrancky konsenzus o neprijatenosti extrmistov ako legitmnych politickch aktrov.

JeD DeMoKraCie poiaDavKa o praviCovoM eXTrMiZMe v sTreDneJ a vChoDneJ eUrpe

pter Krek
Political Capital Institute, Maarsko
Multikultrny prstup zlyhal, celkom zlyhal.1 Angela Merkel, ktor bola spoiatku na tmu imigrcie umiernen, predniesla toto tvrd stanovisko v oktbri 2010 a dodala, e Nemci by mali by pred pracovnkmi zo zahraniia v zamestnvan uprednostnen. Vyjadrenie nemeckej kancelrky bolo v slade s niekokmi (ete tvrdmi) stanoviskami na tmu imigrcie zo strany inch politikov CDU a CSU. V lete roku 2010 franczsky prezident Nicolas Sarkozy spustil kampa za vysdlenie Rmov ijcich v neleglnych tboroch z Franczska (etnick motv tohto rozhodnutia, ktor vlda odmietla, potvrdil obenk Ministerstva vntra FR).2 Vye tisc Rmov bolo vysdlench a poslanch nasp do Bulharska a Rumunska. Poda nzoru mnohch tento krok patril medzi najvnejie poruenia udskch prv v E za posledn roky. V Bulharsku vlda Bozko Borisova, zvolen v roku 2009, neraz prekrauje demokratick medze v sil vyriei spory s oponentmi pod zmienkou boja proti korupcii. Vldna rtorika o vlde zkona a poriadku a niektor kroky spochybujce nezvislos sdnictva, psobia dojmom, e Bulharsko je skr policajn tt, ne demokracia. V Maarsku Fidesz-KDNP (vldnuca strana s dvojtretinovou vinou v parlamente) rob revolciu v domcej politike a iniciovala zsadn zmeny v niekokch oblastiach. Zaviedla symbolick gest posilujce nrodn identitu (spomienkov de na Trianon a dvojit obianstvo pre zahraninch Maarov). Zrove spustila transformciu intitucionlneho systmu a oslabila systm rovnovhy a kontroly. o maj spolon tieto udalosti? Ak s politick motvy tchto krokov? Odpove je jednoduch: poiadavka verejnosti. V Nemecku prili vyjadrenia Angely Merkel a inch politikov CDU po tom, o bankr centrlnej banky Thilo Sarrazin vydal bestseller, v ktorom tvrd, e moslimsk imigranti rozkladaj nemeck spolonos a obhajuje retriktvnu imigran politiku. Prieskumy verejnej mienky poukzali na nrast protiimigranch postojov, zatia o sa popularita Merkelovej vldy prepadala vaka nepopulrnym krokom, ako naprklad predloenie zchrannho balka pre Grcko.3 Vo Franczsku chcel Sarkozy zvi svoju upadajcu popula1 2 3 Pozri: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/uk-germany-merkel-immigration-idUKTRE69F19T20101016. Pozri: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/13/sarkozy-roma-expulsion-human-rights. Pozri: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/weak-merkel-stokes-xenophobia-as-she-fights-for-political-survival2109433.html.

poUiT LiTeraTra
Mesenikov, G.: Nrodn populizmus na Slovensku: aktri, tmy, stratgie. In: Mesenikov, G., Gyrfov, O.: Nrodn populizmus na Slovensku. Intitt pre verejn otzky, Bratislava, 2008. Memorandum prvej ponovembrovej genercie slovenskej mldee, 25. august 2009. Obianska zodpovednos a spoluprca. Programov vyhlsenie vldy SR na obdobie rokov 2010-2014. Pozri: www.vlada.sk. Mlynrikov, V. (ed.): Nemaj trmu z extrmu. Informciami proti extrmizmu. 2. vydanie. NOS OSF, Bratislava, 2010.

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Jed demokracie poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme v strednej a vchodnej eurpe

ritu protiimigranm zkonom a politikou poriadku po tom, o sa na verejnosti prevalil kandl financovania jeho strany spolonosou LOral. Z krtkodobho hadiska sa tto politika prejavila ako spen a Sarkozy zskal podporu.4 V Bulharsku po srii korupnch kandlov vznikla potreba posilni politiku zkona a poriadku. Vlda prijala nleit kroky a hoci niektor s z hadiska demokracie pochybn, zskali podporu verejnosti. V Maarsku dolo k podobnej situcii: po smich rokoch socialistickej vldy (druh obdobie bolo poznaen spornmi opatreniami a korupnmi kandlmi) umonilo vrazn sklamanie z demokratickch intitci a systmu novej vlde celkom modifikova systm intitci spsobom, ktor najlepie vyhovuje jej politickm cieom vyslila si za to podporu. Nacionalistick rtorika je posilnen volimi ultranacionalistickho Jobbiku, ktor zskal v parlamentnch vobch v roku 2010 a 17 percent hlasov. Tchto politikov a vldnuce strany samozrejme nemono povaova za pravicovch radiklov alebo extrmistov. Uveden prklady vak jednoznane ukazuj, e predpojat, nacionalistick a protisystmov verejnos me dotlai politikov do radiklnejch pozci. Verejn mienka m siln vplyv na vkon funkcie politikov, ich agendy a prijman rozhodnutia. V sasnch dopytom riadench demokratickch systmoch sa politici snaia maximlne uspokoji potreby voliov, kee je to jedin spsob, ako by (znovu) zvolen. Preto predstavuje poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme cel spektrum rizk, ktor maj dopad na politick rozhodnutia. Nzka dvera v demokratick systm obmedzuje jeho funknos. Antielitizmus a ekonomick protekcionizmus mu znii investin prostredie. Xenofbia a agresvny nacionalizmus mu ohrozi stabilitu doma i v regine. Political Capital Institute vypracoval nstroj na meranie tchto verejnch tendenci: index dopytu po pravicovom extrmizme.

Hodnota Derex je pre dan krajinu uren poda hodnotenia respondentov, ktor patria aspo do jednej zo tyroch kategri: napr. respondenti, ktor naraz vyjadria protiimigran sentimenty, protisystmov postoje a pravicov hodnoty. Pouitm tchto striktnch kritri DEREX analyzuje percento potencilnych extrmistov, ktorch extrmistick nzory mu destabilizova politick a hospodrsky systm v krajine pokia v ne bud prechovva dveru. Pribline v priebehu roka vypracovali analytici Political Capital Institute model, vybrali otzky, urili skupiny poda subjektu a stanovili kritri. Na vytvorenie indexu zvolili induktvny i deduktvny prstup. Zaali s teoretickm modelom, spoahnc sa na dotaznk ESS a korelcie medzi variabilnmi hodnotami na vytvorenie subindexov. Metodiku vytvorili tyrmi krokmi: 1. vypracovanie teoretickho modelu, 2. voba vhodnch otzok z prehadu ESS, 3. rozhodnutie, ako kvalifikova odpovede respondentov na otzky v prehade, 4. priradenie numerickch hodnt odpovediam, ktor nm umonili vypota skre pre DEREX a jeho subindexy. Na zver otestovali spoahlivos modelu a jeho pravdivos. Podrobnej opis modelu je na webstrnke Political Capital.5 Graf 1: truktra modelu DEREX

Metodika DereX v skratke

Political Capital Institute vytvoril index dopytu po pravicovom extrmizme (DEREX) s pouitm vlastnho teoretickho modelu a dt z Eurpskej socilnej sondy (European Social Survey, ESS), tdiou, ktor kad polrok zaznamenva zmeny v postojoch a hodnotch spolonosti v 33 krajinch (Eurpa +Turecko, Rusko, Izrael). DEREX prepotava spoloensk dopyt po extrmizme hodnotenm tyroch faktorov: l predsudky a ovinizmus socilneho zabezpeenia, ktor zaha sentiment voi imigrantom a homosexulom, l protisystmov postoje, ako nespokojnos s vldnymi intitciami a demokraciou, l pravicov hodnotov orientcia, ktor je definovan ako podpora tradinch hodnt, nboenstva a potreby poriadku a poslunosti, l strach, nedvera a pesimizmus, nzory na negatvne tendencie v skutkovom stave, existenn obavy a nedvera voi spoluobanom. truktra modelu je v 1. grafe.
4 Pozri: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-12/expulsions-of-illegal-roma-win-approval-from-public-in-sarkozy-s-france.html. 5 Pozri: http://www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/files/derex_study.pdf.

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Jed demokracie poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme v strednej a vchodnej eurpe

prehad vsledkov
Vo vchodnej Eurpe sa prejavuje najv dopyt po diskriminanch, protisystmovch a autoritrskych ideolgich na Ukrajine, v Bulharsku, Lotysku a Maarsku. V Maarsku sa poet potencilnych pravicovch extrmistov viac ne zdvojnsobil z 10 percent v roku 2003 na 21 percent v roku 2009. Veobecne mono kontatova, e nebezpeenstvo pravicovej radikalizcie je vraznejie vo vchodnej Eurpe. Potencilni prvrenci pravicovho extrmizmu s najpoetnej v krajinch, ktor nedvno prekonali zloit zmton obdobie, ako Ukrajina, Maarsko, Bulharsko a Lotysko. Postoje predstavuj vie nebezpeenstvo na Vchode, ne na Zpade (Graf 2 a 3). V zpadnej Eurpe nachdza extrmna pravica odozvu najm v svislosti s protiimigranou politikou. To je tma, ktor zriedka vedie ud k odmietaniu politickho systmu ako celku. Vo vchodnej Eurpe s predsudky a protirmske postoje zko spojen s opozciou voi celmu politickmu systmu, nedverou a veobecnou zlou nladou. Takto kombincia postojov predstavuje vne nebezpeenstvo pre stabilitu. Hoci sa me zda, e sa dopyt po extrmistickej pravicovej politike li na zpade a na vchode Eurpy, exituje tu tie severojun rozdelenie. Jun lenovia EU-15, ako Grcko, Taliansko a Portugalsko, vykazuj vysok percento dopytu po pravicovom extrmizme, v porovnan naprklad so kandinviou, kde len 1 i 2 percent populcie prejavuj sympatie s tmito mylienkovmi prdmi. Portugalsko je jedin krajina v zpadnej Eurpe, kde dopyt po pravicovom extrmizme vrazne vzrstol za poslednch es rokov. Vek Britnia vykzala najni stupe dopytu. Vo veobecnosti vidme, e dejiny zohrvaj v tomto kontexte vrazn lohu: vyie skre DEREX vykazuj krajiny, v ktorch autoritrske a totalitn reimy zohrvali kov lohu vo vytvran dejn poslednch 70 rokov (s vnimkou panielska a Nemecka). Hoci stupe predsudkov a xenofbie je u zpadnch Eurpanov vy, ako ich protisystmov postoje, vchodoeurpski susedia ich v oboch oblastiach prekonvaj. Paradoxne, opozcia voi imigrcii je najvyia v krajinch s najmenm potom imigrantov. Virtulni cudzinci s oividne schopn vytvori toko strachu a averzie, ako relni cudzinci. Treba vak doda, e nzky stupe predsudkov v zpadnej Eurpe me by zavdzajci. Geert Wilders, holandsk politik obvinen z prejavov nenvisti voi moslimom, mal asi pravdu, ke povedal: Hovorm to, i si mysl vina, ale nem odvahu poveda to nahlas. Zpadn Eurpania s pod silnm tlakom by politicky korektn. Niektor respondenti sa preto zdrhaj vyjadri predsudky voi minoritm pred ostatnmi vrtane zberateov dt pre Eurpsku socilnu sondu. Vchodoeurpania vak s vou pravdepodobnosou odpovedaj na otzky v prieskumoch otvorene a pravdivo. Je to znmka spoloenskho vvoja na Zpade: skryt predsudky zriedkavejie ved k otvorene diskriminanmu sprvaniu, aspo nie na vedomej rovni.

Graf 2: Skre indexu DEREX

Graph 3: Skre indexu DEREX na mape

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Jed demokracie poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme v strednej a vchodnej eurpe

o je spolon? Fenomn gardy

Predsudky vo vchodnej Eurpe sa vo veobecnosti spjaj so silnmi protisystmovmi postojmi, o je jedom pre demokraciu. To je jednoznane viditen vo fenomne gardy, kedy pravicov strany podporuj vznik skoro polovojenskch organizci, ktor otvorene spochybuj monopol ttu vo vzahu k nsiliu. Tieto skupiny niekedy volaj po alternatvnej organizcii ttu. Bulharsk Nrodn garda sa objavila ako prv v roku 2007, za ou nasledovala Maarsk garda (Magyar Grda) a neskr esk Nrodn garda. Slovensk pospolitos, ktor vznikla v roku 1996, je tie organizcia podobn garde. V zpadnej Eurpe sa skupiny tohto typu (okrem Talianska) neobjavili nikde. V tejto svislosti mono hovori o vraznom rozdiele medzi vchodnou a zpadnou Eurpou. Dejiny s dleitm faktorom pri urovan potencilu tchto organizci. Otzkou nie je len, ak lohu zohrvali gardy v minulosti, ale i bola spolonos schopn vyrovna sa s ou. Na Zpade sa strany extrmnej pravice zaali rozchdza so svojou faistickou minulosou v 60. rokoch 20. storoia. Ich ideolgia sa stala veobecne diskreditovanou po tom, o boli udia donten konfrontova dmonov svojej minulosti 30. a 40. rokov 20. storoia. V 80. a 90. rokoch sledovali radiklne pravicov strany ist formu neonacionalistickej neopopulistickej lnie zameranej na antiimigran a protielitn politiku. Strany ako franczsky Nrodn front, belgick Vlaams Belang (Flmsky zujem, pvodne Flmsky blok), rakska Strana slobody, talianska Nrodn aliancia a dnska udov strana viac-menej odstrnili akkovek spojenie s faizmom. Prvrencov zskavaj vaka schopnosti poskytn jednoduch odpovede na vne tmy. Nie nhodou m extrmna pravica men manvrovac priestor v Nemecku, ktor sa muselo vyrovna so svojou vinou po 2. svetovej vojne. Nemeck ultrapravica sa preto te najvej popularite vo vchodnej asti krajiny, kde udia neboli zatia dostatone konfrontovan so svojou minulosou. Situcia je podstatne in v krajinch bvalej komunistickej Eurpy, ktor ovplyvnili extrmne avicov mylienky od konca 2. svetovej vojny. Spomienky na extrmne pravicov diktatry sa asom zahmlili o to viac, e udia neboli nikdy nten ich konfrontova. Socilne triedy, ktor s voi extrmizmu vo vchodnej Eurpe otvoren, ahie prijmaj extrmnu pravicu, ne extrmnu avicu. Aj ponuka pravicovch mylienok je in. Strany a najm gardy, ktor s neraz nstrojom nboru pre strany, ikovne kombinuj prvky faistickch hnut spred roku 1945 s mylienkami neopopulistickch hnut v zpadnej Eurpe.

Graf 4: Protisystmov postoje, predsudky a ovinizmus v oblasti socilnej starostlivosti: top 15 krajn
protisystmov postoje predsudky a ovinizmus v oblasti socilnej starostlivosti

Graf 5: Skre indexu DEREX vo vchodnej Eurpe

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Pter Krek

Jed demokracie poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme v strednej a vchodnej eurpe

o je in? prehad situcie vo vchodnej eurpe

Zatia o vchodoeurpske krajiny maj niektor rty spolon, pri pozornom tdiu mono medzi nimi njs niektor vrazn rozdiely v hodnotch a trendoch (Graf 5). Naprklad porovnanie Poska a Maarska me vyznie negatvne pre Maarsko. Obe krajiny boli v roku 2003 na podobnej rovni: 10 percent Maarov a 9 percent Poliakov predstavovalo potencilnych prvrencov extrmnej pravice. Do roku 2009 kleslo skre indexu DEREX v Posku skoro o tretinu, zatia o v Maarsku sa zdvojnsobilo. Posko dosiahlo najvyiu hodnotu v roku 2005, kedy sa rozpadla jeho avicov vlda kvli korupnm kandlom a nahradila ju aliancia pravicovch fundamentalistickch strn bratov Kaczyskich. Rastci hnev proti vldnucej elite zvil hodnoty indexu v rokoch 2003 a 2006, hoci verejn mienka medzi konzervatvnymi a nboensky zaloenmi Poliakmi sa posunula o nieo doprava. Od roku 2005 vak percento Poliakov, ktor podporuj extrmne pravicov politiku vykazuje klesajci trend. Najvm rozdielom je verejn morlka: po roku 2005 sa zaal meni protielitn trend a udia nadobudli pozitvnej postoj voi ekonomike. Verejn mienka sa teda skonsolidovala. (Graf 6) Graf 6: Porovnanie hodnt DEREX v Posku a Maarsku

Posko je dobrm prkladom toho, ako sa me zmeni dopyt po pravicovom extrmizme spechom alebo prepadom strn politickho stredu a zmenami dvery obyvateov. Navye dve posk radiklne pravicov strany Sebaobrana a Posk liga rodn sa samy zdiskreditovali poas psobenia vo vldnej koalcii (20052007). To prispelo k vazstvu triezvosti nad politikou extrmnej pravice. V tom istom obdob, od roku 2003, maarsk predispozcia voi extrmne pravicovm mylienkam zaznamenala vzostup. Nrast predsudkov najm proticudzineckch sentimentov k tomu prispel najviac, m sa dramaticky zvil poet prvrencov z 37 percent v roku 2003 na 55 percent v roku 2007. Ba o viac, verejn morlka upadla, o je podnieten hnevom na politikov a rastcou nespokojnosou s vldou a samotnm demokratickm systmom. Nedvera sa rozrila proti vetkm intitcim vrtane tch, ktor zohrvaj vo verejnom ivote okrajov lohu. Naprklad poet ud, ktor nedveruj OSN sa v obdob medzi rokmi 2003 a 2009 skoro strojnsobil z 5 na 15 percent. Maarsk extrmna pravica vytvra populrnu ideolgiu vychdzajcu z tvrdenia, e vetko a vetci s zl. (Graf 7) Na slovensku predsudky a pravicov hodnoty zaznamenali nrast v rokoch 2005 2009, zatia o strach, nedvera, pesimizmus a protisystmov postoje sa vrazne zlepili. Slovensk premir Rbert Fico a jeho vlda oividne ovplyvnili verejn mienku zmesou nacionalizmu a militantnho protekcionizmu. Tomu napomohla skutonos, e vek as populcie bola spokojn s Ficovmi hospodrskymi vsledkami i symbolickmi vazstvami v podpore novej slovenskej identity. (Graf 8) Graf 7: Vvoj zloiek indexu DEREX, Maarsko

posko a Maarsko rovnak tartovac bod, rozdielny osud

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Pter Krek

Jed demokracie poiadavka o pravicovom extrmizme v strednej a vchodnej eurpe

Graf 8: Vvoj zloiek indexu DEREX, Slovensko

ale rovnako ju aj strca. Vo vchodnej Eurpe niet extrmne pravicovej strany, ktor by si dokzala udra vraznejiu podporu za poslednch 20 rokov. Ale samotn turbulencia predstavuje riziko. Extrmne pravicov strany sa doku objavi odnikia tak, ako sa to stalo v prpade Vekorumunskej strany na prelome tiscroia, Ligy poskch rodn v roku 2005 i maarskho Jobbiku. Index DEREX ukazuje, e spoloensk postoje sa mu zmeni rovnako rchlo a poskytn socilnu bzu schopnm politickm silm, ktor na nej doku budova. To predstavuje vnu vzvu pre mlad demokracie vchodnej Eurpy. A mylienka, e hospodrske ozdravenie automaticky vyliei tto spoloensk chorobu, je rou ilziou.

Zvery a dsledky
Vysok dopyt po pravicovom extrmizme je signlom a predstavuje obrovsk nebezpeenstvo pre cel Eurpu. Skonila ra, kedy mala zpadn Eurpa kontrolu nad vchodnou asou kontinentu. Dnes je Vchod v postaven, ke je schopn exportova radiklne ideolgie na Zpad. Radiklne pravicov strany na Zpade, zvidiac spech svojich vchodnch partnerov, mu potencilne prebra niektor z ich ideolgi a nstrojov, ako naprklad polovojensk hnutia. V tomto smere sa me sta, e zpadoeurpske strany prekonaj niektor ideologick bariry, ktor dosia obmedzovali ich aktivity. alm monm prostriedkom vplyvu je skutonos, e extrmna pravica vo vchodnej Eurpe bude povaova za jednoduchie spoji sa s podobne orientovanmi stranami na Zpade, ne s domcimi. Nacionalistick strany v susediacich krajinch (napr. Slovensko a Maarsko) sa asto povauj za vzjomnch protivnkov a nie potencilnych partnerov. V roku 2009 vytvoril maarsk extrmne pravicov Jobbik alianciu s talianskymi, vdskymi a belgickmi extrmne pravicovmi stranami, namiesto s partnermi v regine. V tomto zmysle sa extrmne pravicov organizcie nedj kategorizova mono ich len analyzova poda krajn. Napriek tomu maj niektor extrmne pravicov strany dleit veobecn charakteristiky: s nepredvdaten, maj schopnos zskava rchlu podporu,

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Lucia Faltinov
University of Cambridge a Woolfov intitt pre tdium vzahov medzi idmi, kresanmi a moslimami
Extrmizmus je odvrten strnka demokracie. Vychdza zo samej podstaty demokracie, najm zo slobody prejavu, ktor poskytuje. Ak niekto neprde s prevratnm vynlezom ako zachova demokraciu a odstrni extrmizmus, extrmizmus tu zostane, pokia bude existova demokracia. Majc na zreteli medzinboensk vzahy konkrtne vzahy medzi idmi, kresanmi a moslimami v irom spoloenskom kontexte, tto vaha najprv nartne niektor z aktulnych vvojovch trendov vo vzahu medzi extrmizmom a demokraciou. Potom predlo niekoko nmetov ako vytvori v obianskej spolonosti dynamick rovnovhu, ktor vrti extrm tam, kde v demokracii patr na okraj spolonosti. Zmerom tohto prspevku nie je poskytn vyerpvajcu analzu situcie, ale poukza na niektor aspekty spoloenskho spoluitia, ktor ved k extrmizmu a na niekoko spsobov ako tmto javom predchdza. Prklady s vybran so zreteom na ich presah do mimonboenskho sveta a na monos ich vyuitia v irom kontexte. Extrmizmus bol donedvna na vzdialenej hranici kadodennosti. Vina z ns mohla pred nm viac-menej zavrie oi, pokia sme nepatrili k pomerne zkej skupine profesionlov, ktor proti nemu bojuj alebo k niektorej z menn, ktor s cieovmi skupinami extrmistickch tokov. Doba sa zmenila a extrm sa stva mainstreamom. K tomu prispieva mnostvo zlozvykov slobody a demokracie. Prvm je rast individualizmu a s nm spojen spoloensk fragmentcia. S vvojom demokracie je n svet oraz fragmentovanej a vznikaj nov komplexn spoloensk vzahy. Paradoxom je, e napriek rastcemu individualizmu maj inak odait udalosti oraz ir spoloensk dopad. Navye individualizmus v prostred rozmachu internetovch socilnych siet prina hyperkomunikciu. Vaka nej sa neraz zniuje schopnos rozliova medzi relnym a virtulnym svetom. Mnohm, najm mladm uom, nahrdza virtulny svet tzn. relny. Nielen pri komunikcii, ale aj z hadiska vnmania priort a lojlnosti. Vyuitie internetu je dnes dobre znme, najm v svislosti s extrmistickmi skupinami. Komunikan revolcia priniesla okrem internetu, ktor sa d len ako kontrolova, aj boom elektronickch mdi. Niektor, ako napr. al-Jazeera, ani nemusia by v rukch extrmistov, aby im slili ako efektvny nstroj zastraovania a publicity. Nboensk skupiny oraz astejie samy vlastnia rozsiahlu medilnu infratruktru. Poda nedvnej tdie Cambridgeskej univerzity, od 80. rokov 20. storoia, kedy satelitn kanly na Blzkom vchode nejestvovali, dosiahol

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extrm ako mainstream

dnes ich poet 500. Tm sa vrazne zvil aj priestor pre nboensk vysielanie. Po prklady vak netreba chodi a na Blzky vchod. V Posku psob Radio Marija znme svojimi nzormi spjajcimi nacionalizmus s nboenskm fundamentalizmom, neraz presahuj do extrmizmu. Druh zlozvyk, ktor prispieva k rozmachu extrmizmu, je jeho formalizcia prostrednctvom politickch strn. K tomu prispelo niekoko vvojovch udalost. Pd komunizmu umonil pluralizciu spoloensko-politickho spektra. Eurpska integrcia viedla k nrastu nacionalizmu. V eurpskej politike situcia kulminovala vobami do Eurpskeho parlamentu v roku 2009, ktor vyniesli mandt extrmistickej Britskej nrodnej strane. Okrem toho dochdza k fragmentcii politickch strn. V sil o al demokratick vvoj Eurpskej nie sa vek politick strany stvaj v oiach verejnosti samonosnm kolosom, ktor nedoke zabezpei relne a efektvne spojenie s obanom. Na vchode Eurpy je fragmentcia strn do istej miery reakciou na bval monopol komunistickch strn, hoci na druhej strane tto spomienka nebrni obbenosti populistickch ldrov, o iastone vyplva zo sentimentu za komunizmom (niekde dokonca za stalinizmom), ako aj zo socilnej frustrcie a obianskej demokratickej nevyzretosti. Najaktulnej vplyv na skepsu voi vekej politike a vodou na mlyn extrmizmu mala by hospodrska krza, ktorej najbolestnejm dopadom na benho obana bola zven nezamestnanos a hadanie vinnka. Tret zlozvyk je apatia. Sn najvarovnejm prkladom z modernch dejn je apatia po nstupe Hitlera k moci. Jednm z prkladov v sasnosti je vplyv kresanskej pravice na politiku v USA. Skupiny vznikajce na zklade nzorovej jednoty siahajcej a k potieraniu argumentanho pluralizmu, naprklad sekty, sa neraz spoloensky izoluj a postupne podliehaj negatvnym, neraz extrmistickm postojom voi okoliu. Tme sa okrem inch venuje Nathaniel J. Klemp.1 Upozoruje na rozdiel medzi politickou angaovanosou tchto skupn a obianskych zdruen, ktor sa dria nzorovho pluralizmu do tej miery, e nepovauj za vhodn aktvne sa angaova vo verejnch zleitostiach vrtane volebnej asti. To napomha prieniku extrmizmu nielen do stranckeho a politickho spektra, ale aj k jeho ovplyvovaniu verejnej diskusie.

a. negatvna transcendencia
Jednm z javov zko spojench s extrmizmom, a to nielen nboenskm, ale aj inak mytologicky motivovanm, je negatvna transcendencia, ako ju definuje z pohadu mimetickej terie Franois Girard. Mimetick teria sa venuje tdiu vzjomnho napodobovania spoloenskch postojov jednotlivca i skupn. V tejto svislosti je znma teria zastraovania (deterrence) v medzinrodnch vzahoch poas studenej vojny. Jej koniec preniesol prax zastraovania priamo medzi ns. A medzinrodn renie terorizmu je len jedna, extrmna sas tohto javu. Niektor tvrdia, e dolo k deritualizcii vojny. Mierov rokovania zriedka vystia do dohd izraelsko-palestnsky konflikt, ktor je pre mnohch aktivistov v idovskokresansko-moslimskch vzahoch kameom razu, je jednm z kovch prkladov. Ak sa mierov dohody uzavr, stvaj sa neraz kusom papiera a skr prleitosou zlepi verejn imid, ne efektvnou barirou alieho renia konfliktov, ako naprklad otzka vchodnho Balknu. alm javom, ktor rob z extrmu mainstream, je guerilov boj, ktor sa najm vaka reniu terorizmu stva hlavnm prostriedkom vedenia vojny. Tento boj m svoje dejiny napr. rsko v 20. storo vo forme etnicko-nboenskho konfliktu vedenho vinou formou extrmistickch a teroristickch akci. alm prkladom s udalosti, ktor predchdzali vzniku ttu Izrael, kde sa situcia rokmi zhorila a osciluje medzi regionlnymi konfliktmi a cezhraninmi alebo vntrottnymi teroristickmi akciami. Proxy vojny, ktor boli sasou studenej vojny, dnes nahradil fenomn, ktor mono nazva teroristick proxy akcie. Na rozdiel od studenej vojny, poas ktorej sa podarilo udra proxy vojny na loklnej rovni, operabilita teroristickch skupn je globlna. ivnou pdou pre renie terorizmu je postupn etablovanie extrmizmu v spolonosti, bez ohadu na stavn systm i ekonomick vyspelos krajiny. renie strachu, zastraovanie, mono nazva poda Girarda liberalizciou satana. V rmci mimetickej terie, satan likviduje satana, resp. zl sa odha zlm. Girardov kolega Benoit Chantre upozoruje na to, e imitatio Dei neznamen bohorovnos. Namiesto imitcie navrhuje obdiv ako symetrick a ireverzibiln vzah. Tento obdiv m vies k obeti, ale obeti vo forme sluby a nie k obeti tak, ako ju ponmaj samovraedn tonci. Peter Sanders, britsk fotograf, ktor zaal svoju kariru v 60. rokoch ako fotograf rockovch hviezd, je dnes znmy skr fotografiami moslimskho sveta. Pred asom konvertoval na islam. V svislosti so slubou ostatnm hovor na margo migrantov ijcich v rznych diasporch, e len vtedy, ke zaneme sli hostiteskej spolonosti, prestaneme sa prli zaobera sammi sebou a zaneme myslie na ostatnch.

Mon rieenia
Nartnem niekoko tm, ktor sa dotkaj problematiky extrmizmu v medzinboenskch vzahoch, i tch medzi nboenskmi spoloenstvami a sekulrnym svetom. Extrmizmus sa dotka vetkch tchto oblast interakcie, priom nejde len o jednu z jeho najkrajnejch manifestci, o terorizmus.

b. getoizcia
V Eurpe poloil pd Berlnskeho mra zklady mnohm novodobm mrom. Vznikaj mry, ktormi vytvrame novodob get. Do nich bu vyleujeme problmov skupiny obyvatestva, naprklad Rmov, alebo sa do nich zatvrame fyzicky i symbolicky sami v obavch pred neduhmi tohto sveta. To sa naprklad tka morlnej nadradenosti a odmietania inakosti mnohch veriacich, o je astm prejavom ranho tdia nboenskej konverzie. Nov get, neraz dobrovon, s asto prirodzenm javom prvej genercie imigrantov,

Klemp, N.J.: Kresansk pravica: Angaovan obania i teokratick kriiaci? Politics and Religion, 2010.

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naprklad nske tvrte alebo londnsky East End, kde sa za stroia vystriedali franczski hugenoti, rski katolci, vchodoeurpski idia, bangladski moslimovia a v poslednch rokoch ich nahrdzaj sudnski moslimovia. Tento jav je vak prirodzen. Vrme sa vak k tomu, o nazvame getoizciou. Jednm z najvch problmov priepasti medzi nboenskm a sekulrnym svetom je getoizcia nboenskch a svetskch spoloenstiev. Maj tendenciu vytvra si viac-menej izolovan truktry a sluby, i u v oblasti socilnej a zdravotnckej starostlivosti, vzdelvania, kultry a dokonca obchodu. Napriek nespochybnitenmu prnosu, ktor poskytuj svojim lenom, mnoh takto organizcie vbec alebo len minimlne spo-lupracuj so svojmi protiplmi nie vak nevyhnutne protivnkmi. Tto priepas zasahuje aj do legislatvnych a stavnch procesov, ktor ponmaj nboenstvo ako jednu z marginalizovanch menn vyadujcich si etatistick ochranu. Tmto nespochybujem nevyhnutn mieru prvnej ochrany slobody vierovyznania, ale upozorujem na jeden z problmov, ktor vznikaj na zklade tohto marginalizujceho prstupu. Ide o implementciu a vymhatenos udskch prv: ich liberalistick koncepcia kladie v draz na prva, ne na zodpovednos. Nvrat nboenstva s historickm akcentom k zodpovednosti me prispie k vytvoreniu potrebnej rovnovhy medzi prvami a zodpovednosou vo verejnom ivote. V svislosti s stavnm vvojom, verejn diskusia, ktor sa rozprdila na margo nvrhu preambuly eurpskej stavy, pripomenula Eurpe, e jej nboenstvo je sasou jej komplexnej identity. Nboensky a svetsky orientovan verejnos sa dobrovone stretli v kontruktvnej diskusii, a tm aktvne prispeli k stavotvornmu procesu Eurpskej nie.

d. pam
Pam oa, ktor mono vyjadri vrokom U nikdy viac!, dnes nadobda aliu dimenziu posvtnosti ivota a udskej dstojnosti. Lekcie, ktor nm dalo 20. storoie, musme aplikova na t najexistencilnejiu vzvu sasnosti, ktorou je terorizmus vychdzajci z fundamentalistickho extrmizmu. Spomeniem len jednu paralelu (ide o symbolick a nie kvalitatvne i kvantitatvne porovnanie), ktorou je depersonalizcia obet nacistickch krematri a obet tokov na Svetov obchodn centrum 11. septembra. Dvojiky dnes stelesuj iriu skutonos, na ktor upozoruje Tom Halk: Zujmom tonkov je vekolep medilny efekt, spsoben o mono najvm potom tiel. tonkom ide toti najm o sla a nie identitu obet.2 Toto je samozrejme jeden z faktorov vberu prostriedkov a cieov teroristickch akci. Spolonm menovateom je tu vak neraz nieo in, ia dosia nedostatone zdrazovan: jednou z hlavnch prin terorizmu je nespokojnos extrmistickch fundamentalistov s plodmi sekularizcie.

e. vzdelvanie
20. a dokonca u aj 21. storoie priniesli tragick dsledky priepasti medzi nboenskm a sekulrnym svetom, i ilo o dve svetov vojny a oa, alebo toky na newyorsk Dvojiky. Poda Toma Masaryka je rozbukou nsilia i u na sebe alebo na druhch samovrada alebo vrada, ktor sa skrva v samej podstate loveka. Kombincia nedostatonho intelektulneho a duchovnho vzdelania, ktor s nevyvinut a navzjom neprepojen. Masaryk tomu hovor polovzdelanos, resp. vzdelanie, ktor prakticky nie je uplatovan a prevan, ktor ale vedie k existencilnej nave. Celistvos loveka, tvrd Masaryk, pozostva z intelektu a morlky, priom je dosiahnuten prostrednctvom vchovy. udsk spsa preto nespova v rukch ttu, ale vo vzdelvan a morlke. Na podklade Platna vnma Masaryk psychologick celistvos loveka pozostvajcu z pamti a rekolekcie. Tto vntorn kapacita dva loveku schopnos aktvnej interakcie s okolitm prostredm.3 Popri rozvoji vlastnej mysle je teda zodpovednosou loveka rozvja aj tto interakciu. ia, prve oblas vzdelvania je dnes asto jednm zo zdrojov takejto polovzdelanosti, a tm aj zkladnm kameom nboensko-sekulrnej priepasti. Masarykov nboensk humanizmus chpe vieru ako presvedenie, ktor lovek nadobudne prostrednctvom kritickej reflexie. Mnoh vzdelvacie ustanovizne vak povauj princpy kritickho myslenia za neelaten za ohrozenie autority. To sa tka mnohch nboenskch, ako aj svetskch kl a univerzt. Takto priepas vo vzdelvan a vzjomn ignorcia (alebo skoro ignorcia) medzi nboenskm a sekulrnym svetom, ako aj v medzinboenskom spektre, sa stva zkladnm kameom novodobch get. Ako jeden zo zkladnch demokratickch princpov princp subsidiarity otvra nov monosti pre priamu a aktvnu participciu obanov na sprve vec verejnch. Ale len jednotlivec posilnen neustlym vzdelvanm pome kontruktvne prispie k tomuto dielu.
2 3 Halk, T.: Stromu zbv nadje. 2009. Masaryk, T.: Samovrada zmysel civilizcie. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970.

c. Migrcia
Getoizcia sa po pde komunizmu paradoxne zvila aj odstraovanm hranc a inch barir. Pre mnohch migrantov predstavuje nboenstvo zdroj etnickej sebaidentifikcie a spojenia s krajinou pvodu. Obania Eurpskej nie, ktor dnes u bene nazvaj domovom aj dva, neraz tri lensk tty, tento jav dobre poznaj. Pre mnohch migrantov a imigrantov vak kozmopolitn sksenos nezaruuje otvranie mysle. Naopak, asto vedie k extrmizmu a indoktrincii, i vytvra nov etnick i nboensk bariry. Pritom mobilita prinajmenom Eurpanov me by ako p, ktor ns napln duchovnou a intelektulnou mdrosou. Nboensk obce a cirkvi by preto mali vyvja vie silie o vyvenejiu interpretciu obianskych prv a povinnost nielen vo vzahu k svetovmu spoloenstvu spoluveriacich, ale nemenej aj s drazom na krajinu, v ktorej psobia. Aby sa mry modlitebn nestali mrmi dobrovonch get a cirkv, nboensk obce by mali aktvnejie vies svojich lenov ku komunlnej solidarite, ktor sa tka prslunkov inch vierovyznan, aj sekulrneho spoloenstva.

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oDporan LiTeraTra
Girard, R.: Bojova a do konca: Rozhovory s Benoit Chantreom. (tdie nsilia, mimzy a kultry.) (Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoit Chantre (Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture)), Michigan State University Press, 2009. Lincoln, B.: Svt teror. vahy o nboenstve po 11. septembri (Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after September 11), 2. vyd. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003, 2006. Masaryk, T.G.: Samovrada a zmysel civilizcie (Suicide and the meaning of civilization). University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. Shrylock, A. (ed.): Islamofbia a islamoflia. Za hranicou politiky priatea a nepriatea (Islamophobia. Islamophilia. Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend). Indiana University Press, Bloomington a Indianapolis, 2010.

pohaD na sebareFLeXiU sLovensKeJ spoLonosTi

Jaroslav Franek
stredn zvz idovskch nboenskch obc v SR

vod
Pvodne mal by tmou tohto prspevku popis antisemitizmu v sasnosti na Slovensku. Preto povaujem za vhodn poznamena, e antisemitizmus, ktor nepochybne jestvuje na Slovensku aj dnes, nikdy nepredstavoval pre ma bytostn problm. Nikdy som nemal pocit bezprostrednho ohrozenia alebo ohokovek, o by bolo mon porovnva so zitkami, ktor poznali moji rodiia a star rodiia. Nazdvam sa, e toto tvrdenie mono aj zoveobecni a poveda, e sasn antisemitizmus nepredstavuje pre slovensk idovsk komunitu problm, s ktorm sa kadodenne potka. Napriek predolmu, antisemitizmus, jeho prejavy a jeho nositelia jestvuj aj u ns na Slo-vensku v takej podobe ako v ostatnch eurpskych krajinch a maj svoje slovensk pe-cifik. Rovnako ako inde jestvuje irok spektrum prejavov antisemitizmu: poetn prejavy rasovo motivovanho vandalizmu, toky na idovsk cintorny a pamtnky, hanobenie idovskch symbolov, verblne alebo medilne toky na idov. Jestvuj viacer antisemitsk a neonacistick webov domny (Prop, Beo, SP) a tie (naastie) pomerne zriedkav toky na verejne znme osoby idovskho pvodu (bratislavsk rabn, Grigorij Mesenikov, Fedor Gl, Petr Muk a in). Vyskytli sa aj in prpady jemnejieho alebo hrubieho zrna. Ale vetko predol by som chcel vynecha a venova sa fenomnom, ktor mono oznai za slovensk pecifik a s zjavne spojen a naviazan na modern histriu 20. storoia na Slovensku. Inmi slovami chcem sa venova pohadom na sebareflexiu slovenskej spolonosti a konfrontova ju s pohadom, ktor je typick pre podstatn vinu slovenskch alebo zo Slovenska pochdzajcich idov. Tmou prspevku s teda rozdiely vo vnman niektorch historickch skutonost idovskou minoritou na jednej strane a asou majoritnej slovenskej spolonosti na druhej strane.

slovensk tt
Najvraznej rozdiel medzi vnmanm histrie idovskou minoritou a majoritou slovenskej spolonosti sa tka obdobia rokov 1939 a 1945, teda Slovenskho ttu. Sasn Sloven-sko je nstupnckym ttom eskoslovenskej republiky a nenadvzuje na Slovensk tt. Napriek

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tomuto prvnemu faktu jestvuj nezanedbaten spoloensk sily usilujce sa o vyehlenie obrazu vojnovej Slovenskej republiky, o popieranie jej faistickej ideolgie a o relativizovanie poetnch zloinov, ktorch sa reim Slovenskho ttu dopustil. K intitcim, ktor sa najvraznejie podieaj na tejto innosti, patr predovetkm Slovensk pospolitos a jej prbuzn politick strany a obianske zoskupenia, ale aj ttom podporovan intitcie ako je Matica slovensk, Zvz protikomunistickho odboja, stav pamti nroda, rmskokatolcka (r. k.) cirkev. Z parlamentnch politickch strn sa pozitvne hlsila k odkazu slovenskho faizmu len Slovensk nrodn strana. V sasnom klube poslancov SNS u nie je poslanec Jozef Rydlo, ktor sa ako stavn inite (poslanec) vrazne angaoval v prospech pozitvneho obrazu obdobia 1939 a 1945. Z vldnych strn mono cti sympatie k Slovenskmu ttu u niektorch politikov z KDH, avak ich rtorika je pri rovnakom obsahu podstatne kultivovanejia, ako rtorika politikov SNS. Treba vak doda, e aj medzi poslancami, ktorch politick strany maj kritick pohad na obdobie Slovenskho ttu, s jeho sympatizanti. Mm na mysli predovetkm poslanca strany Smer Jna Podmanickho, ktor svoje sympatie k prezidentovi faistickho ttu Jozefovi Tisovi vyjadril verejne a spolone s u zmienenm exposlancom Jozefom Rydlom a almi radnkmi ilinskho VC, nominantmi strany Smer ide o riaditea radu ilinskho samosprvneho kraja Pavla Holetiaka a hovorcu ilinskho VC Petra Kubicu). Z prv spomenutch organizci m najvraznej dosah na verejn mienku katolcka cirkev. Pod pojmom rmskokatolcka cirkev rozumiem vedcich predstaviteov tejto cirkvi na Slovensku. Situcia v inch krajinch a predovetkm vo Vatikne je odlin. Vieme, e na ele Slovenskho ttu stl katolcky kaz, ktor bol po skonen vojny postaven pred sd a popraven. Napriek zloinom, ktor predstavitelia Slovenskho ttu pomhali vykona, nebolo zo strany predstaviteov r. k. cirkvi na Slovensku vysloven kritick slovo na adresu pchateov tchto zloinov. Ba prve naopak, opakovane sme konfrontovan so sprvami, poda ktorch sa predstavitelia r. k. cirkvi snaia Dr. Jozefa Tisa, prpadne inch predstaviteov Slovenskho ttu obhajova, vydva v ich prospech verejn svedectv a dobrozdania (najznmejmi autormi tchto vyjadren s arcibiskup Jn Sokol a spisk biskup Frantiek Tondra). Verejnos bola prostrednctvom tlae informovan aj o tom, e arcibiskup Jn Sokol osobne poehnal vodcu Slovenskej pospolitosti. Slovensk pospolitos u vola do povedomia verejnosti ako politick strana, respektve zdruenie s vrazne faistickou rtorikou, programom, symbolmi a prejavmi. Spomenut vyhlsenie arcibiskupa Sokola bolo podporen zverejnenm listu 30 signatrov (17. janura 2007). Na prvch miestach s podpisy bvalho poslanca Augustna Marina Hsku a bvalho riaditea STV Jozefa Darma. V liste oznauj prezidenta Tisa za zchrancu idov a kritiku Jna Sokola oznauj za tok na slovenskch katolkov. Na zem Slovenskej republiky dnes jestvuje viacero hmotnch pripomienok, ktor meme povaova za prklad verejnej glorifikcie Dr. Jozefa Tisa. S to: Busta Dr. J. Tisa na jeho rodnom dome v Byti, na Ulici 1. mja. Busta sa nachdza priamo

v centre mesta naproti sdlu mestskej polcie. Okrem busty je na dome vystaven al psomn materil a kvetinov vzdoba. Ulica Dr. Jozefa Tisa v obci Varn (v blzkosti iliny). Socha Dr. J. Tisa v obci akajovce (v blzkosti Nitry). Socha je sasou Pantenu slovenskch dejateov a je umiestnen pred budovou Obecnho radu v akajovciach. Pamtn tabua v meste Rajec umiestnen v centre mesta na budove fary v blzkosti kostola. Pamtn tabua v obci Oadnica umiestnen v centre na budove fary v blzkosti kostola. Fiktvny hrob J. Tisa na Martinskom cintorne v Bratislave.

Rodn dom Dr. Jozefa Tisa v Byti.

Ulica Dr. Jozefa Tisa vo Varne.

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Najnov prpad pripravovanej glorifikcie radiklneho faistickho politika svis s rozhodnutm Mestskho zastupitestva v meste Rajec (v blzkosti iliny). Zastupitestvo rozhodlo a zverejnilo (mesank Rajan, . 10/ 2010, prstupn na internete), e postav na svojom hlavnom nmest bustu Ferdinandovi uranskmu, ktor je svojm politickm ivotom stelesnenm radiklneho krdla slovenskho faizmu. uransk sa aktvne zastnil rozbjania eskoslovenskej republiky. V jeho predveer bol spolu s Jozefom Tisom u Adolfa Hitlera. Jeho aktivity udci odmenili viacermi vznamnmi postami v slovenskej vlde. Z postu ministra zahraniia bol na iados nacistov odvolan pokal sa o nezvisl zahranin politiku. idov povaoval za nepriateov slovenskho nroda. Zaslil sa o protiidovsk zkonodarstvo a z jeho st odznelo vea protiidovskho tvania. Ani po strate postu ministra zahraniia (20. jna 1940) sa nepoudtil a ostal nenvistnm radiklom. Patril medzi skupinu mladoudkov, ktor koncom roku 1944 a zaiatkom roku 1945 kritizovali slovensk vldu, ktor nezabrnila puu (rozumej SNP) a dovtedajie rieenie idovskej otzky sa im zdalo mlo razantn. Po vojne uiel do Junej Ameriky a bol in absenteriam odsden na trest smrti. Umrel v exile, v Mnchove v roku 1974. Mestsk zastupitestvo povauje JUDr. uranskho za svojho najvznamnejieho rodka. asopis Rajan priniesol rozhovor s primtorom mesta Ing. Jnom Rybrikom, poda ktorho je uransk vaka svojmu prstupu k faistickmu Nemecku znepriatelenou osobou a bol na neho vydan zatyka a vbec nie je pravda, e mal prsty v deportcich idov. Jeho osoba a iny ani po revolcii neboli uznan, a to aj napriek medzinrodnej konferencii, ktor sa uskutonila pri prleitosti jeho nedoitch 90. narodenn. Starostom spomenut konferenciu organizovala Matica slovensk v roku 1996 v Rajci. Jedin, kto m prvnu relevanciu pozastavi spomenut glorifikcie Jozefa Tisa, Ferdinanda uranskho a inch faistickch pohlavrov, je Nrodn rada SR. Jestvuje dokonca precedens, ke NR SR zakroila proti osadeniu pomnka vtka Turula, ktor je maarskm nrodnm symbolom. Vo veci glorifikcie Jozefa Tisa vak nikdy nezakroila, ani nevydala stanovisko. Z pohadu idovskej komunity absentuje v postojoch r. k. cirkvi jasne negatvny postoj k faizmu a jeho prejavom. Nielen k faizmu, ktor sa prejavoval v Nemecku a Taliansku, ale aj k tomu, ktor tu vldol v rokoch 19391945. idovsk komunita negatvne vnma aj skutonos, e r. k. cirkev vyslovila svoju podporu kontroverznej uebnici prof. Milana uricu Dejiny Slovenska a Slovkov. Tto uebnica hrubm spsobom falzifikuje a prekrca fakty, je xenofbna a antisemitsk. Do rovnakej kategrie patr aj nvrh predstaviteov r. k. cirkvi na blahoreenie spiskho biskupa Jna Vojtaka. Poda nzoru idovskej komunity, aj znanej asti historikov, sa biskup Jn Vojtak diskreditoval svojou asou v ttnej rade Slovenskej republiky a svojm laxnm, miestami a podpornm stanoviskom k deportcii idov zo Slovenska, a tie tm, e bol ariztorom a udavaom. Kritick dokumenty o jeho postojoch pochdzaj aj z vatiknskych zdrojov. Z tohto dvodu zastvame nzor, e osoba Jna Vojtaka by nemala by vyzdvihovan ako vzor pre spolonos.

21. a 22. oktbra 2010 usporiadala r. k. cirkev (Konferencia biskupov Slovenska a Spisk Kapitula) vedeck konferenciu o biskupovi Vojtakovi. stredn zvz idovskch nboenskch obc (Z NO) listom oslovil organiztorov (biskupov R. Bezka a F. Tondru) a poiadal ich, aby bolo zstupcovi Dokumentanho strediska holokaustu pri Z NO umonen prednies prspevok. Organiztori nvrh odmietli a zdvodnili to nedostatkom asu a fixnm programom. Konferencie sa napokon zastnili len obhajcovia Slovenskho ttu ako M. urica, F. Vnuk, R. Letz, P. Mulk, Emlia Hrabovec, I. Chalupeck, J. Duda, V. Judk, I. Petransk, pracovnci Matice slovenskej a PN. Napriek deklarovanej vedeckosti nevyiel z tejto konferencie iaden vstup zbornk, zznam alebo nieo podobn. Pri posudzovan Vojtaka s racionlne argumenty zo strany jeho obhajcov potlan a pod kepienkom vedeckosti sa buduje ideologick propaganda. Zatia o postoj opakovane zdiskreditovanej Matice slovenskej k Slovenskmu ttu je u chronicky znmy, menej znmy je podobn postoj inej PN.

stav pamti nroda

Zkonnou lohou stavu pamti nroda je reflexia slovenskch dejn v obdob dvoch totalitnch reimov na Slovensku faizmu a komunizmu. V zmysle zkona m stav sprstupova, skma, zverejova a dokumentova zloiny faizmu a komunizmu v rokoch 1939 a 1989. Priamo v preambule zkona . 553/2002 Z.z. stoj, e lohou stavu je dokumentova zloiny, ktorch sa tt dopustil na svojich obanoch, majc na pamti povinnos nho ttu uini zados vetkm, ktor boli pokoden ttom, o poruoval udsk prva a vlastn zkony, povinnos nho ttu sprstupni utajen innos represvnych orgnov v dobe neslobody 1939-1989 a uri zodpovednos za porobenie vlasti, vradenie, zotroovanie, lpenie a poniovanie, morlny a hospodrsky padok sprevdzan justinmi zloinmi a terorom proti nositeom odlinch nzorov, detrukciu tradinch princpov vlastnckeho prva, zneuvanie vchovy, vzdelvania, vedy a kultry na politick a ideologick ely ako vraz nho presvedenia, e ten, kto nepozn svoju minulos, je odsden ju opakova a e iadne protiprvne konanie ttu proti obanom neme by chrnen tajomstvom ani neme by zabudnut, uzniesla sa na tomto zkone. (1) lohy zveren stavu ttom s najm: l vykonva pln a nestrann hodnotenie doby neslobody, hlavne analyzova priny a spsob straty slobody, prejavy faistickho a komunistickho reimu a ich ideolgi, as domcich a zahraninch osb na nich, l sprstupova prenasledovanm osobm dokumenty o ich prenasledovan, l zverejova daje o vykonvateoch tohto prenasledovania a ich innosti, l dva podnety na trestn sthanie zloinov a trestnch inov poda 1; spolupracuje pritom s Generlnou prokuratrou Slovenskej republiky,

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l poskytova potrebn informcie orgnom verejnej moci, l systematicky zhromaova a odborne dokumentane spracovva vetky druhy informci, dokladov a dokumentov vzahujcich sa na dobu neslobody, l spolupracova s obdobnmi intitciami v Slovenskej republike aj mimo nej, hlavne s archvmi, mzeami, kninicami, pamtnkmi odboja, pamtnkmi koncentranch a pracovnch tborov, poskytova im informcie, bdatesk monosti a metodick pomoc a propagova ich innos, l poskytova verejnosti vsledky svojej innosti, hlavne zverejova a sprstupova informcie a in doklady o dobe neslobody 1939-1989 a o inoch a osudoch jednotlivcov, vydva a ri publikcie, poriada vstavy, seminre, odborn konferencie, diskusn fra, l propagova mylienky slobody a obrany demokracie pred reimami podobnmi nacizmu a komunizmu. stav pamti nroda sa po tragickej smrti jej zakladatea Jna Langoa dostal pod politick kuratelu SNS. Pvodne navrhla SNS na miesto predsedu Sprvnej rady PN predsedu Zvzu protikomunistickho odboja, Arpda Tarnczyho. Tarnczy sa zviditenil ete v roku 1997 odhalenm pamtnej tabule vtedy ijcemu pohlavrovi slovenskho faizmu Jozefovi Kirschbaumovi. Ke tla pripomenula Tarnczymu jeho kandalzne sprvanie, vyjadril sa, e Kirschbaumovi sd ni nedokzal a e komunizmus je ovea hor, ako faizmus. Naznail tie, e idia sa do kauzy voby predsedu Sprvnej rady PN nemaj plies, e ich nzor nie je dleit, lebo ich je mlo a demokracia je (poda Tarnczyho) presadenie nzoru viny. Ale reakcia mdi ho rozlila a kandidatry sa vzdal. Dostal sa vak do Sprvnej rady PN, kde spolu s A. Malackm, A. M. Langom a I. Petranskm (vetko nominanti SNS) formuj innos PN.

Vojtaka treba vidie vo svetle katolckej socilnej nuky, ktor poaduje, aby katolci svoj majetok zveaovali. Nemalo by sa teda hovori, e biskup Jn Vojtak arizoval, pretoe jeho zmerom bolo Baldovsk kpele zveadi), Rbert Letz, Emlia Hrabovec a in. Ivan Petransk je lovek, ktor verejne vyjadroval svoje pozitvne postoje k prezidentovi Jozefovi Tisovi. Rovnak tvrdenie mono vyslovi o bvalom arcibiskupovi Jnovi Sokolovi, ktor je znmy vrokmi v prospech Tisa. Nsledne neprekvapuj nadtandardn vzahy medzi I. Petranskm a J. Sokolom alebo bvalm poslancom J. Rydlom. Jozef Rydlo je jeden z poslancov, ktor sa po boku neonacistov zastoval pamtnch akci pripomnajcich popravenho prezidenta Jozefa Tisa. Na jar roku 2010 sa vedenie PN spolone s Nadciou Matice slovenskej podiealo na vydan Dennkov Karola Sidora. Dennky zamliavali skuton psobenie udckeho extrmistu a fanatickho antisemitu Sidora, boli opatren vodom Frantika Vnuka bez akejkovek zmienky o jeho politickom extrmizme a ich vydanie nedokem hodnoti inak, ako zjavn pokus o falovanie slovenskej histrie a glorifikciu slovenskho faizmu. V lete toho istho roku organizoval PN diskusiu o Otomarovi Kubalovi, veliteovi Pohotovostnch oddielov Hlinkovej gardy (POHG), ktor bol po vojne odsden na trest smrti a popraven. Na spomenutej diskusii sa Frantiek Vnuk kriticky vyslovil jednak k odsdeniu Kubalu, ale aj k psobeniu povojnovho retribunho sdnictva. Diskusie sa zastnil aj za Alexandra Macha, pn Karol Kubk, ktor vyzdvihol osobnos Otomara Kubalu. V spomenutom duchu sa nesie aj ostatn psobenie PN, ktor by malo poda litery zkona vies k dokumentovaniu zloinov, ktorch sa udcky reim dopustil na vlastnch obanoch. Miesto tejto innosti sa organizuj akcie, ako napr. Konferencia Slovensk republika 19391945 oami mladch historikov (16. aprla 2010), kde sa popisoval kadodenn ivot v Slovenskom tte a to, o m stav skutone robi, sa stva v najlepom prpade marginlnou zleitosou. V piatich blokoch konferencie sa takmer tyridsa autorov snailo poda plastick obraz o spoloensko-politickch aspektoch, ivote v armde i Hlinkovej garde, slovenskom kolstve a kultre, cirkevnej a hospodrskej politike. Autori vo svojich prspevkoch analyzovali mnoh, asto kontroverzne vnman tmy poukzali na kadodenn ivot slovenskch vojakov na fronte i v zzem, represie voi obyvateom obc obsadench partiznmi, proces slovakizcie a jeho reflexiu v slovenskej spolonosti, ivot Slovkov na Maarmi zabratom zem, analyzovali ivotn rove obyvatestva i slobodu nboenskch pomerov. Kontroverzn je aj publikan innos: miesto dokumentovania zloinov sa vydvaj u spomenut a romantizovan dennky pchateov zloinov alebo knihy ako nedvno ohlsen dielo Slovensko-talianske vzahy v rokoch 19391945. Je to publikcia autora Petra Kubka a zaober sa politickmi, obchodnmi, vojenskmi, kultrnymi a portovmi oblasami spoluprce medzi Slovenskom a Talianskom v obdob vldy faizmu. Ako prklad silne pokrivenej optiky PN uvediem ryvok z listu, ktor predseda I. Petransk po opakovanch urgencich poslal Z NO. V liste sme iadali vyjadrenie PN k psobeniu

Zvz protikomunistickho odboja (ZpKo).

Tto organizcia chpe pojem protikomunistick odboj troku svojrzne. lenov Hlinkovej gardy, Pohotovostnch oddielov HG a sympatizantov faizmu chpe ako bojovnkov proti komunizmu. Zvz protikomunistickho odboja sa zastoval mnohch otvorene faistickch stretnut, demontroval v prospech odhalenia pamtnej tabule prezidenta Jozefa Tisa. SNS po niekokch nespench pokusoch presadi do ela Sprvnej rady PN sympatizantov udctva zo ZPKO zmenila taktiku a presadila v parlamente na tento post Ivana Petranskho. Za predsednctva Ivana Petranskho sa z PN stala organizcia, ktorej innos je karikatrou toho, o by mala by. U samotn vber spolupracovnkov stavu je veavravn. asto ide o obhajcov Slovenskho ttu z rokov 1939 a 1945, ako Frantiek Vnuk (Slovci, ako jedin mali prinu deportova idovsk obyvatestvo), Peter Mulk (Prpad biskupa

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Jna Vojtaka poas rokov 1939 a 45. Predovetkm nm ilo o to, aby sa PN vyjadril k tomu, o udcki historici stle odmietaj alebo spochybuj, a to, e Spisk Kapitula pod Vojtakovm vedenm arizovala Baldovsk kpele. Na list sme akali a urgovali ho viac ako rok. Napokon priiel a je krsnym prkladom priam komunistickho newspeaku, teda propagandistickho jazyka, ktor jasn vec zastiera a zahmlieva. Krtka citcia z listu: Je znmou snaha spiskho biskupstva zska Baldovsk kpele, ktorch arel sa nachdzal v tesnej blzkosti biskupskch majetkov. V tomto smere sa biskupstvo angaovalo u od zaiatku roka 1941, kedy vyjadrilo zmer nehnutenos odkpi. silie napokon viedlo k arizcii tohto podniku. Nemono zamla fakt, e podnik bvalho idovskho majitea Ladislava Frieda bol dlhodobo v padku, v znehodnotenom stave a vemi zaden. Arizcia sa uskutonila poda vtedy platnch zkonov. Nelo vak o arizciu v zmysle, akom ju dnes vnma irok slovensk verejnos, t. j. s cieom obohati sa na prosperujcom idovskom podniku i majetku. Sved o tom napokon ekonomick tatistika biskupstva. Ozvali sa aj mlad historici PN (M. Lacko a P. Sokolovi), ktorch komentre s napriek maskovanej snahe o objektivitu zjavne v prospech Slovenskho ttu a otvorene relativizuj reim a jeho predstaviteov. Je vhodn uvies mal ukku spomenutho prstupu z komentra P. Sokolovia: Mnoh Tisovi kritici mu dnes vytaj spoluprcu s Hitlerom. Pravdou vak je, e vycestoval do Berlna na stretnutie s Hitlerom a po tom, ako mu funkcionri HSS odshlasili jeho cestu aj to len s podmienkou, aby sa Nemcom nezaviazal iadnymi zrukami o budcnosti Slovenska. Tiso sa ich slov dral a aj zoi-voi obvanmu Fhrerovi odmietol sm ultimatvne napriek nemeckm naliehaniam o prtomnosti maarskej armdy na slovenskch hraniciach vyhlsi Slovensk tt. Na dokreslenie toho, ako mlo sa rozliuje medzi odporcami a sympatizantmi slovenskho faizmu, dovolm si citova mladho historika Petra Sokolovia: Formovaniu obrazu Slovenskej republiky z rokov 19391945 dnes neprospieva ani fakt, e pri prleitosti 14. marca s najviac viditen extrmisti na oboch stranch i u na avej alebo pravej. Je to vak dkaz, e pri jej hodnoten dodnes nad racionlnymi argumentmi prevldaj ideologick aspekty.

v parlamente. Je zaujmav, e extrmne radiklna SP nebroj proti Maarom a dokonca za protimaarsk rtoriku kritizuje SNS. Svoju volebn zkladu zskava SP v oblastiach, kde ije poetn rmske obyvatestvo, predstavujce pre svoje okolie obrovsk socilny problm. SP si uvedomuje zvanos a dlhodob nerieenie spomenutch problmov a na rozdiel od ttnych intitci dokzala presvedi as obyvatestva, e uveden problmy doke riei. Ideologickou zkladou SP stle ostva antisemitizmus poda nacistickho vzoru. Vzhadom na nezvldnutie vlastnch dejn majoritnou slovenskou spolonosou, jestvuje nemal spektrum ttnych a ttom podporovanch organizci, ktor tvoria most medzi radiklnymi prejavmi antisemitizmu a rasizmu na jednej strane a ttom, resp. ttnymi orgnmi na strane druhej. Antisemitizmus a jemu podobn prejavy u ns nikdy neboli marginalizovan, naopak, neustle sa snaia o rozrenie svojho vplyvu a v poslednom desaro trvalo testuj spoloenskopolitick situciu v zmysle, o si ete mu dovoli (napr. aktivity PN) a o u je za hranicou akceptovanho (aktivity SP). To je, ia, zrukou alieho prevania tchto aktivt.

Zver
Antisemitizmus preva viac v latentnej ako v aktvnej podobe. Jeho nositemi s (nielen) aj neofaistick a im podobn zoskupenia, ako napr. Slovensk pospolitos alebo politick strany, do ktorej sa SP pretavila. Vsledky parlamentnch volieb 2010 ukazuj, e vzia Slovenskej pospolitosti ako parlamentnej strany nie je nemon. Na druhej strane zostva faktom, e predstava SNS ako parlamentnej strany bola pred 20 rokmi podobne hroziv, ako je dnes predstava SP

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nezvisl politologika
Globlna vojna proti teroru a extrmizmu pritiahla pozornos k lohe nboenstva vo svete. Objavil sa mimoriadny zujem (sn najzretenej s ohadom na islam a nov nboensk hnutia) zisti, i s nboensk tradcie zluiten s intitciami a hodnotami liberlnej demokracie. Napriek vraznm dkazom o opaku sa mnoh socilni vedci obvaj, e ijeme v sekulrnej dobe. N vek vak zail obrovsk vbuchy nboenskch vn. Modern doba je rovnako nboensk ako predchdzajce historick obdobia, dokonca v niektorch oblastiach ete nboenskejia. Boh je mtvy. Alebo aspo tak to povedal Nietzsche. Takmer storoie a pol bolo jednm z najpevnejch presveden spoloenskch vied to, e sa nboenstvo a nboensk organizcie nevyhnutne vytratia zo spoloenskho (a mono aj skromnho) ivota. Taktie sa predpokladalo, e modernizcia vo forme vedeckho pokroku a byrokratickej pecializcie zbav spolonos povier a potreby dvery v socilnu starostlivos cirkv. Poda mnohch empirickch ukazovateov s viera a jej vyznvanie rovnako dleit ako v minulosti, ak nie viac. Nov nboensk skupiny sa objavuj ovea rchlejie ne sekularisti predpokladali a uznvan viery ako katolicizmus alebo islam naalej preukazuj schopnos zska novch lenov. Dokonca ani v komunistickch a bvalch komunistickch krajinch duchovn skupiny nezanikaj, ale vracaj sa op na scnu aj po tom, o boli desiatky rokov prenasledovan vldou.1 Touto prcou sa snam poukza na miesto nboenstva pri tdiu politiky a najm na fenomn novej formy religiozity nboenskho extrmizmu, ktor je dleitm faktorom politickho ivota a tdia politiky ako takej. Nboenstvo pochopitene vytvra reakcie a zo tdia problematiky vyplva, e tradin a etablovan nboensk spolonosti (majce na Slovensku prevane podobu cirkvi) nevytvraj, vstupujc do interakcie so ttom a spolonosou, tak naptie a konflikt, ako je to v prpade novch netradinch nboenskch hnut. Vznik, vvoj, transformcia i znik novch nboenskch hnut je odvek a prirodzen spoloensk proces. Slovo nov v pojme nov nboensk hnutia hovor viac o postaven konkrtnej nboenskej skupiny v spolonosti, ne o dke jej psobenia. Synonymom slova nov s tak vrazy, ako nezaraden, nerepektovan, neetablovan i neregistrovan. V zklade NNH je predstava, ktor reaguje na doteraj nboensk ivot a povauje doterajie nboensk predstavy za nedostaton a neuspokojiv. Nov nboensk hnutia tak vstupuj s touto protestnou silou do konfliktu s vinovou spolonosou. Vrazom odmietnutia novho nboenskho hnutia zo strany vinovej spolonosti, je hanliv vraz sekta. Konflikt medzi novmi nboenskmi
1 Greeley, A.: A religious revival in Russia? Journal for the Stientific Study of Religion, 1994.

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hnutiami a vinovou spolonosou sa odohrva v niekokch rovinch v rodine, na verejnosti, v prvnom systme. Medzi zkladn princpy liberlnej demokracie patr ochrana udskch prv vrtane nboenskch prv. V prstupoch k rieeniu tejto problematiky sa stretvame s dvomi zkladnmi modelmi pre jeden je najdleitejm princpom ochrana prv menn (vrtane nboenskch), zatia o druh tieto prva obmedzuje v prospech bezpenosti spolonosti. Prve pri tchto dvoch prstupoch sa stretvame so zloitosou celej problematiky psobenia netradinch nboenstiev a so zkladnou otzkou, ako zarui kadmu zkladn udsk prva, resp. zabrni ich poruovaniu, a to tak zo strany ttu, ako aj zo strany nboenskch skupn. Mylienka nboenskej slobody vychdza z plurality nboenskho ivota a smeruje proti dominantnmu postaveniu jednej alebo vybranej skupiny nboenskch spolonost so ttnou mocou. Pod pojmom pluralizmus rozumiem mierov koexistenciu rznych nboenskch tradci v rmci jednej spolonosti. Na vyjadrenie kvality pluralizmu pouvam rku a hbku: rkou pluralizmu vyjadrujem, ak vek poet nboenskch intitci sa ho zastuje, hbkou pluralizmu zase, do akej miery s tieto intitcie rovnoprvne. Tento model je vak ovplyvnen tradciou a konkrtnymi politickmi, socilnymi, historickmi a kultrnymi svislosami. Je to vemi zreten pri sledovan zkonov, ktor vytvraj legislatvny rmec usporiadania vzahov ttu a cirkv (nboenskch spolonost) na Slovensku. Po pde komunistickho reimu v roku 1989 bola v eskoslovensku nastolen nboensk sloboda. Sloboda znamenala odstrnenie kontroly nboenskch spolonost ttom a umonila vykonva nboensk innos bez akhokovek obmedzenia. V roku 1991 bola nboensk sloboda potvrden novm zkonom o slobode nboenskej viery a postaven cirkv a nboenskch spolonost. Tento zkon aj naalej potal s intittom registrcie nboenskej spolonosti, ale po prvkrt tto registrciu podmieoval potom obanov, ktor sa k danej nboenskej spolonosti hlsia. Registrovanm nboenskm spolonostiam zkon zachoval doterajie prva a rozril ich. Federlny zkon z roku 1991 zostal v platnosti v obidvoch nstupnckych ttoch bvalho federatvneho eskoslovenska po jeho rozpade v roku 1993. V eskej republike bol nahraden zkonom z roku 2002, na Slovensku plat dodnes. Vaka nboenskej slobode zaali po roku 1989 vo vtedajom eskoslovensku psobi desiatky nboenskch skupn a nboensk pluralizmus tak dosiahol do tej doby neobvykl rku. Veda kresanskch, idovskch a islamskch spolonost existuj aj hinduistick, budhistick, sikhistick, taoistick a in nboensk skupiny. Ich spektrum sa zd by rovnako irok ako v krajinch zpadnej Eurpy. Zrove ale zkon z roku 1991 zachoval a dokonca potvrdil nerovnoprvnos ich postavenia. Prstup k vhodm registrovanch nboenskch spolonost bol znane skomplikovan podmienkou potu obanov, ktor sa hlsia k danej nboenskej spolonosti. Tento poet stanovil al zkon (z roku 1992), platn pre slovensk as federatvneho eskoslovenska, na 20 tisc. Vzhadom na poet obyvateov Slovenska bolo vemi ak tto podmienku splni.

Vysok poet prslunkov nevyhnutn na registrciu novej nboenskej spolonosti spsobil, e v priebehu rokov 1991-2010 pribudli k registrovanm nboenskm spolonostiam len tyri: komunistickmi radmi nepovolen Nboensk spolonos Svedkovia Jehovovi, Novoapotolsk cirkev, Cirkev Jeia Krista Svtch neskorch dn a Bahjske spoloenstvo. Z poadovanho potu a z vnimky, ktor mala preferova kresansk cirkvi, je jasn, e slobodn eskoslovensko sa obvalo rchlej cesty k nboenskmu pluralizmu. Zatia o rku pluralizmu obmedzi nechcelo, ponechalo znan rozdiely v prvnom postaven nboenskch spolonost. Ilo teda v strety zavedench nboenskch spolonost. Treba si uvedomi, e registrcia uritej nboenskej skupiny nepredstavuje zruku jej kvality. A naopak, niektor nboensk skupiny, ktor nie s ttom uznan, nemusia by nebezpen alebo spoloensky neprospen. Postavenie netradinch, neregistrovanch nboenskch hnut a nboenskch menn je na Slovensku ovplyvnen pomerne vekou netolerantnosou voi odlinostiam. alou oblasou, kde sa naptie medzi novmi nboenstvami a spolonosou jav najviac, s mdi. Jednm z prpadov, ke mdi zohrali vznamn lohu pri spusten lav-ny, bola nvteva bvalho prezidenta Michala Kova na podujat organizovanom IIFWP (Medzinboenskou medzinrodnou federciou pre mier vo svete) zaloenou reverendom Munom v jli 2006. lnky a reporte, ktor nasledovali, boli namieren proti meninovej nboenskej organizcii. Informcie boli nepravdiv, skreslen a snaili sa vytvori z Cirkvi zjednotenia obraz zhadnej, tajne pracujcej a nebezpenej skupiny fungujcej v podzem. Spravodajstvo obsahovalo zva len shrn nepodloench faktov, eufemizmov, skreslench informci a urok rev. Muna a ud, ktor usporiadali veern program v budove SND (Slovensk nrodn divadlo). iadne spravodajstvo neposkytlo informciu o tom, ak akcia vlastne v SND prebiehala, kto sa jej zastnil, ak bol program. Neoveren a nepravdiv fakty poskytnut v spravodajstve vytvraj netransparentnos, ktorou mono ahko ovplyvni verejn mienku proti meninovm nboenskm skupinm. Posledn vrazn morlna panika bola spusten pri novele zkona 201/2007 Z.z., kedy vlda shlasila s poslaneckm nvrhom, ktor sprsnil registrciu novch cirkv. Po novom mali mal cirkvi so zujmom o oficilne prihlsenie predloi aj 20 000 podpisov jej lenov s estnmi vyhlseniami, e k cirkvi patria. V minulosti staili na registrciu nboenskho spoloenstva aj podpisy sympatizantov. Tto klauzulu by dnes spalo iba es cirkv (rmskokatolcka, grckokatolcka, evanjelick a.v., kalvni, Svedkovia Jehovovi a pravoslvni). Tto podmienka bola prijat zo strachu pred registrciou moslimov, ktor koncom roku 2006 zaali vyvja aktivity v tomto smere. Niektor predstavitelia SNS si pri tejto prleitosti nedvali servtku pred sta. V marci 2007 sa poslanec NR SR za SNS, jednej z troch strn sasnej vldnej koalcie, vyjadril v tom zmysle, e elom prsnejch pravidiel registrcie cirkv a nboenskch skupn je zabrni tomu, by sa nae deti chodili modli do meity a vyhlasovali o sebe, e 'my sme al-Kida '... .2
2 Pozri: http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/2007-international-religious-freedom-report-slovensk-republika.html.

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Napriek tomu, e od roku 1989 boli zaregistrovan iba tyri nboensk spolonosti, udmila Mukov (S-HZDS3), jedna z predkladateov novely (alm bol Jn Podmanick z politickej strany Smer-SD4), argumentuje: Chceli sme, aby hocijak sekta, mono aj nebezpen, nemohla erpa financie zo ttneho rozpotu. Mala som informcie, e tudenti na elezninej stanici podpisovali, ani nevedeli o, hlavne, e na nich hovorili po anglicky.5 Zatia jedinou recesistickou spolonosou, ktor sa uchdzala o registrciu na Ministerstve kultry SR a zozbierala aj 20-tisc podpisov sympatizantov, bola Ateistick cirkev neveriacich, ktor MK SR definitvne odmietlo registrova v decembri 2006 z dvodu, e organizcia nie je zdruenie osb rovnakej nboenskej viery a tie nie je zdruenie nboenskej viery a zrove nartnut chpanie nboenskej viery je plne bez prepojenia s konkrtnou nboenskou predstavou ivota sveta. Prve tento problm, odohrvajci sa v sfre mdi a majoritn nboenstvo verzus minoritn (a asto nie kresansk) nboensk skupiny, u dlho trpi svedomie demokracie zaloenej na slobode vierovyznania na Slovensku. Na tento problm u dlh as upozoruj aj okolit tty a orgny sledujce jeho vvoj. Komisia pre udsk prva OSN v roku 2005 upozornila na niekoko kritickch bodov, ktor poruuje aj n diskriminan zkon. Minister kultry M. Maari povedal novinrom, e tto prava nijakm spsobom neobmedzuje slobodu vierovyznania, nboenstva, a ani samotn zakladanie cirkv". Generlna prokuratra SR podala nedvno podnet na stavn sd, aby rozhodol o stavnosti zkona o slobode nboenskej viery a postaven cirkv a nboenskch spolonost (zkon . 308/1991 Zb.). Vo februri 2010 stavn sd zamietol podanie Generlnej prokuratry a rozhodol, e prsnejie podmienky na registrciu cirkv a nboenskch spolonost nie s protistavn. Panika sa samozrejme preniesla aj zhora nadol a vyhlsenia cirkevnch predstaviteov na seba nenechali dlho aka. Poda vtedajieho arcibiskupa Jna Sokola by na Slovensku mali ma slobodu vierovyznania vetci, ale prvo registrova sa iba tyri hlavn cirkvi, a to: katolcka, evanjelick, kalvnska a idovsk. A malo by sa poda neho zvi tzv. kvrum veriacich zo sasnch 20 000, aby mohla by cirkev registrovan. Generlny biskup evanjelickej cirkvi Jlius Filo naopak vyhlsil, e 20-tiscov kvrum meni netreba, ale z-rove by vak nemali by diskriminovan veriaci inch nboenstiev. Vemi opatrne sa k tejto otzke vyjadril Ivan Gaparovi, prezident SR: Ja si myslm, e je to hodn irieho verejnho prieskumu a na zklade toho rozhodn. Snahm upravi nejako prvny stav tak, aby mohli by zaregistrovan aj svetovo uznvan nboenstv, ku ktorm sa hlsi pr stoviek veriacich, s naklonen skr mal cirkvi. Dostvaj sa tak prakticky mimo zkon nemu prvne nijako fungova, s asto nten existova mimo zdravho spoloenskho ivota a je na ne automaticky vytvran tlak zo vetkch strn. Vsledkom je verejn odsudzovanie, oho-vranie, diskrimincia, na ktor s zneuvan aj verejn medilne prostriedky a intitcie. Existuje ete niekoko kuz, ktor vytvorili mdi: i u novinrmi obben satanizmus, alternatvna pedagogika, charizmatick hnutia, jedno nov nboensk hnutie je vak jasn
3 4 5 udov strana Hnutie za demokratick Slovensko. Smer socilna demokracia. Prokuratra otvra dvere cirkvm, Hospodrske noviny, 1. 2. 2008.

vaz, o sa tka priestoru venovanmu v mdich, a to je Scientologick cirkev. iaden nov nboensk smer nevzbudil po roku 1989 toko otzok, ako prve Scientologick cirkev. Okolo nej sa sstredilo najviac kontroverzi, sdnych sporov, medilneho zujmu, parlamentnch diskusi a sprv spravodajskch sluieb. Hoci na Slovensku nie je Scientologick cirkev zaregistrovan ako cirkev (nboensk spolonos), ani ako obianske zdruenie, i tak patr k najrchlejie sa rozvjajcim novm nboenskm skupinm. Uveden prklady s jasnm prejavom morlnej paniky v zmysle Stana Cohena a Jacka Zounga, ke bol masovokomunikanmi prostriedkami vyvolan stav verejnho znepokojenia nad istmi nboenskmi skupinami. Toto znepokojenie bolo ovea vie, ako bol skuton stav nebezpeia. Morlna panika sa asto transformovala do oficilnych krokov namierench proti verejnmu zlu alebo pchateom za domnel problm vznikli nov zkony a nariadenia, bol uplatovan prsnej dohad a tvrdie postihy. Tie sa stali nmetom alej vlny report a ete viac prehbili morlnu paniku. Treba si vak uvedomi, e v istom zmysle meme tvrdi, e strednou tmou nboenstva je nsilie, rovnako ako je nm nensilie.6 S nboenskm nsilm teda treba pota a nevyostrova naptie medzi nboenskmi hnutiami a spolonosou. Prklady zo sveta ns uia, e prve vyostrenie tohto naptia prispelo k nsilnmu koncu, ktor si nik z ns neelal. Preto je vemi dleit prevencia predchdzania konfliktom s nboenskmi skupinami. Globalizcia rznych tematickch oblast vytvorila plne nov podmienky medzinrodnch a vntrottnych konfliktov. Zana sa presadzova teoretick prstup rieenia konfliktov, oznaovan ako conflict resolution.7 asto pouvanm nstrojom v tomto prstupe je rozsiahla preventvna diplomacia, udriavanie mieru (peacekeeping), vyntenie mieru (peaceforcement) a komplexn povojnov rekontrukcia oblast a spolonost. Z dvojrovovej diplomacie sa prelo na mnohorovov (multi-track) diplomaciu. Aktrmi mnohorovovej diplomacie sa tak stvaj aj medzinrodn a loklne nevldne intitcie, vedci, univerzity, predstavitelia cirkv a nboenskch spolonost... Rieenie konfliktov, terorizmu a extrmizmu v udskej spolonosti je jednm z najdleitejch a najzloitejch loh medzinrodnho spoloenstva. Konflikty maj vlastn vvojov dynamiku a prechdzaj rznymi tdiami. Kad z konfliktov je jedinenou udalosou, ktor si vyaduje individulny prstup. V snahe obmedzi udsk a materilne straty sa mnoh tty a medzinrodn organizcie musia sstredi najm na prevenciu vypuknutia nsilia a na kultivciu rieenia konfliktov. Pri nboenskom extrmizme by prevenciou mohol by medzinboensk dialg, nemarginalizcia nboenstva, jeho poznanie a porozumenie, ako aj nediskriminan prstup k nboenskm meninm, nepreceovanie monosti represie a falovanie procesu denominalizcie, ktor v sebe nes vek potencil predchdzania nboenskm konfliktom a zneuvania nboenstva.
pozri Candland, CH. (ed.): The Spirit of Violence: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography of Religion and Violence. Occasional Papers Number 6. 1992. Wallensteen, P.: Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System. Sage Publications. 2002.

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poUiT LiTeraTra
Berger, P. L.: The desecularization of the world: A global overview. In: Berger, P.L. (ed), The desecularization of the world. Resurgent religion and world politics. Washington, DC, Eerdmans, 1999. Borowik, I.: Religion and Civil Society in Poland in the Process of Democratic Transformation. In: Jerolimov, D.M., Zrinak, S., Borowik, I. (eds.), Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation, Zagreb, 2004. Borowik, I., Babiski, G. (eds): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Nomos, Krakow 1997. Candland, Ch. (ed.): The Spirit of Violence: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography of Religion and Violence. Occasional Papers Number 6, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, New York, 1992. Cohen, S.: Folk Devils and Moral Panics. London, 1972. MacGibbon, K., Greelley, A.: A religious revival in Russia? Journal for the Stientific Study of Religion, 33(4):253-72, 1994. Grekov, L.: Nboenstvo a sloboda. In: Dingir , ro. 13, . 2, 2010. Hall, D., Smoczyski, R. (eds.): New Religious movements and conflict, Warsaw: IFiS Publisher.Hall, S., et al. 1978. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order., Macmillan Press, London, 2010. Henkel, R., Knippenberg, H.: Secularisation and the rise of pluralism. Main features of the changing religious landscape of Europe. In: Knippenberg (ed), The changing religious landscape of Europe. Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 2005. Huntington, S.: The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996. Jenks, Ch.: Subculture: the Fragmentation of Social. Sage Publications, London, 2005. Knippenberg, H.: Secularization in the Netherlands in its historical and geographical dimensions. In: GeoJournal, 1998, . 45. Knippenberg, H. (ed): The changing religious landscape of Europe. Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 2005. Kong, L.: Geography and Religion: trends and prospects. In: Progress in Human Geography, vol. 14, 1990, No. 3. Laclau, E.: New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. Verso, London, 2005. Laclau, E.: On Populist Reason. Verso, London, 2005. Laclau, E., Mouffe, Ch.: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics.: Verso, London, 1985. Marada, R.: Kultura protestu a politizace kadodennosti. CDK, Brno, 2003. Marada, R.: Social Construction of Youth and Formation of Generational Awareness after Socialism. In: Society, Reproduction and Contemporary Challenges, Barrister & Principal, Brno, 2004.

Thompson, K. In: Critcher, C.: Critical readings: Moral Panics in the Media. Berkshire. Open University Press, 2006. Tomka, M.: Religious Change in East-Central Europe. In: Borowik, I., Tomka, M. (eds): Religion and Social Change in Post-communist Europe. Nomos, Krakow, 2001. Wallensteen, P.: Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System. Sage Publications, 2002.

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sveTL ZaJTraJKY praviCovho eXTrMiZMU na sLovensKU?

alojz hlina
aktivista
Mono kontatova, e pravicov extrmizmus na Slovensku bude na vzostupe, pokia nenjdeme odpovede na niektor otzky a vzvy, pred ktormi stojme. Postavi sa zmysluplne proti nrastu extrmizmu sa d, poda mjho nzoru, tmito zkladnmi spsobmi: l rieenie rmskej otzky, ktor pre pravicov extrmizmus na Slovensku predstavuje zdroj zkladnej energie; l aktivizcia obianskej spolonosti, najm schopnosou vystupova jednotne v dleitch otzkach; l poukazova na innos pravicovch skupn takm spsobom, e ich innos a schopnos relne nieo vyriei bude deglorifikovan, dokonca a zosmieujca.

rieenie rmskej otzky

Na tto tmu sa konalo mnostvo konferenci a seminrov. Zjedlo sa vea chlebkov a vstupom je kontatovanie, e tento problm je nron, a genilny a jednoduch recept na jeho rieenie neexistuje. To vak urite neznamen, e na hadanie rieenia treba rezignova. Prve naopak, ak rezignujeme, jednoduch rieenia zane verejnosti ponka pravicov extrmizmus. Jednm z projektov, ktor by mohol prispie k iastonmu rieeniu, je projekt mobilnch klok a kl. Projektu som sa venoval v texte publikovanom na blogu pod nzvom Nenechajte tie deti jes psov, fetova a skoni v base! Koko mdrosti je v starch knihch? V nich sa naprklad pe: Jeruzalem padol vtedy, ke deti prestali chodi do koly. Ak tragdia sa rod v naich rmskych osadch? Ako tam trpia tie deti? Deti v rmskych osadch prestvaj chodi do koly, a tak sa rod alia tragdia pre nae loveenstvo. Tragdia, ktor bude asovanou bombou pre spolonos a bude ticho tika, aby v prav as vybuchla. Situcia sa zhoruje. Nervozita sa stupuje. A nielen kvli rmu poviem, e niekto u na tom i parazituje.

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Alojz Hlina

svetl zajtrajky pravicovho extrmizmu na slovensku?

Pokia bud deti v osadch jes psov, va sa v pine, bojova o potravu s potkanmi a najm prestan chodi do koly, bude to zl nielen pre ne, ale aj pre ns majoritn spolonos. A preto znova hadajme rieenie v mdrych knihch. V knihch sa pe: Ke neprde Mohamed k hore, mus prs hora k Mohamedovi. V naom prpade to znamen, e namiesto obloench chlebkov niekde v Bratislave, si treba pichn tetanovku, zopr vakcn proti chorobm, zvi ivotn poistku a s skutone pomha, nie tra. Pomha tak, aby sme zachrnili aspo tie deti. Pomha tak, e v osadch postavme mobiln koly, klky, denn tbory. V nich budeme deom ta, budeme ich ui, bud sa tam mc umy, najes. Bud tam v istom, civilizovanom prostred, veer sce pjdu domov, ale s tm, e rno mu znova prs. Projekt mobilnch kl, klok a jasl v osadch nie je finanne nron. Vyaduje vak odhodlanie a presvedenie ud. tt by mal ud motivova, aby tam li pracova, naprklad daovm zvhodnenm, tudenti, ktor by tam odrobili prax, by mali ma prednostne internt a podobne. tt kadm zachrnenm dieaom z osady, ktor sa vyman z toho prostredia a zane i normlny ivot, len a len zska. My vetci tm zskame.

Nmestie SNP bude tento rok patri obanom. Je rezervovan pre nich. Pubertiaci v kanadch bud marova niekde inde. Hrdinovia v papuiach bud pri telke alebo pri compe. T, o neprdu preto, lebo ..... , a ete preto .... a najm preto, lebo .... a lebo, lebo, lebo, lebo, lebo tam jednoducho nebud. Mme radi tto krajinu.

Deglorifikcia innosti pravicovch skupn

innos pravicovch skupn a ich vodcovia predstavuj astokrt pre mlde, ale i dospel populciu (zva so zkladnm vzdelanm) zdroj inpircie. Ich innos sa mystifikuje, heroizuje a pripisuj sa im in atribty, ktor s pre urit skupiny atraktvne. Poukzanie na to, e tieto falon predstavy s ist mtus, predstavuje dobr spsob na dosiahnutie toho, aby sa podpora extrmistov a takchto skupn vrazne znila. Akcia, ktorou som sa snail jazykom pochopitenm pre irok vrstvy vysla signl, e hrdinstvo niekoho je len mtus, sa konala v de, kedy extrmisti prvkrt pochodovali k soche Svtopluka. as textu z mjho blogu: V de, kedy Kotleba priiel o vlajku: Kee ete prebieha vyetrovanie, budem psa iba o okolnostiach, ktor nemaj na tto skutonos vplyv. U som spomnal, e denne prechdzam peo okolo parlamentu a hradu, lebo ksok odtia bvam. Aj v sobotu som iiel okolo. Vedel som, e maj by pospolit, ale nevedel som, kedy presne. Nhoda chcela, aby som iel akurt vtedy, ke prili k Hradu. Vdy sa zaujmam o to, o sa deje v susedstve, preto som sa pozrel, o o ide. Mal som t es zau as prejavu M. Kotlebu. Vynten technick pauzu, ktor mali, ke sa im pokazil megafn, som vyuil na to, aby som vyjadril svoj nzor, e s tmi reami o sionistickch, slobodomurrskych a inch bandch neshlasm. Minimum pochopenia mali pre tento mj aktvny vstup do diania v mojom (vaom) susedstve policajti a odviedli ma pre (miestami to celkom bolelo). Vcelku zaujmav pohad, ke som si to pozeral na videu: pospolit akuj policajtom a skanduj: Odvete ho, hajzla!" Druh dejstvo prebiehalo bliie pri Hrade. Je predmetom vyetrovania, preto ho zatia neopem. Faktom vak je, e na konci tohto dejstva som mal v rukch vlajku Pospolitosti. Pred viac ako rokom som sa zmocnil (ukoristil) vlajky SNS a trochu aj tmto aktom sa pomohla spusti plata s labuou piesou pre SNS. Nechbalo vea a slotovci by boli na smetisku. Minul vkend prili o svoju vlajku aj Kotlebovci. Zrejme inpirovan hrdinskosou slotovcov, rovnako ako oni, aj Pospolitos poiadala polciu, aby im vlajku vrtili. Ak-tak bojovnci, nieto ete hrdinovia, by sa najskr od hanby pod zem prepadli, e prili o vlajku. T nai domci utekaj na polciu. Ak by som tam nebol, niektor z pospolitho udu na Slovensku by si cel medilny vstup zjednoduili asi takto: Zopr fekov a buzerantov s dhovmi vlajkami tancovalo okolo

aktivizcia obianskej spolonosti, a to najm schopnosou vystupova jednotne v dleitch otzkach

Druhou oblasou je schopnos spolupracova, vedie sa dohodn a zjednoti. Krsnym prkladom schopnosti vysla jasn signl jednotnho odporu voi prejavom extrmizmu bol 14. marec 2010, kedy sa konalo viacero sbench akci, ktor prehluili akciu pomerne malej skupiny extrmistov. V prpade, e by bolo mesto v tento de przdne, resp. pln iba chlapcov v kanadch, bolo by dsledkom pripsanie bodov na stranu extrmistov. 14. marca 2010 bol pochod extrmistov sekundrnou zleitosou. A tento de som v mojom blogu nazval D-Day. De s vekm D. 14. marec, ako dtum vzniku Slovenskho ttu, a tm aj dtum, kedy pubertiaci v kanadch maj snahu poveda nieo obanom naej krajiny. Tak preto D-Day de, kedy bude v uliciach husto. Uvidme, koko odvnych bude chrni nae ulice. Koko odvnych bude radej sedie za compom. Alebo za stolom a pred nm pivo. Uvidme, koko obanov sa vylod na Nmest SNP. Aj tento rok bud 14. marca marova po uliciach pubertiaci v kanadch, vo frajerskom obleen s cudzmi nzvami, ktorm ani nerozumej. Vlci lesoochranrske zdruenie, ochranri, Tatranec, ktor vie aj in, nielen predva lstky na zchod (lebo poda poslanca SNS vedia Tatranci iba to robi), bud 14. marca dra lniu na Nmest SNP. Kde budete vy? Mme radi tto krajinu, preto ju uchrnime. Teda aspo dfam. O nieo menej, ale stle dfam.

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Alojz Hlina

svetl zajtrajky pravicovho extrmizmu na slovensku?

Svtopluka a nho hrdinu Kotlebu zbili do krvi za to, e sa na u chcel s pozrie. Kotleba by tak svoj status martra oivil, lebo u to bude rok, o sa stal martrom (pre niekoho) po zsahu v ariskch Michaanoch. Cel toto Kotlebovo divadeln predstavenie pokazil Hlina. Teraz to u nie je tak idylick a podaktor bud musie prepsa jednoduch verziu asi takto: Hore pri soche Svtopluka sce boli feci a buzeranti, pred hradom nai (Kotlebovci). Ale bol tam aj ten Hlina. Do kelu, t vlajku si chalani nemali necha vzia! Ako ns chc chrni, ke nevedia uchrni vlajku? Boj s pravicovm extrmizmom bude dlhodobm problmom, ale treba sa mu venova, km predstavuje len mal ohnky. Ak by naberal na sile a prerstol do vekho poiaru, boj s nm bude mimoriadne nron. Pri poslednej akcii extrmistov som na tto skutonos upozornil plagtom: Vdy lepie, ke bud st v hnoji, ako v krvi! Plagt som dral poas celho ich protestu. Slovn spojenie v hnoji som pouil preto, lebo niekto na miesto, na ktorom sa konalo zhromadenie extrmistov, vysypal v noci tonu hnoja. Pred tmto protestom som publikoval blog, v ktorom upozorujem, e je dleit by citliv k prejavom extrmizmu: Pred parlamentom by kanady dupa nemali. Ako keby tej mizrie nebolo dos, udia v kanadch sa rozhodli prs 18. 9. (Nrodn p k soche .2) pred parlament a chc si ucti sochu Svtopluka. Nebudem psa o soche. Budem psa o tom, o o tmto uom uom v kanadch ide. Tmto uom vbec nejde o sochu. Koniec koncov, ako by aj mohlo, ke sa inpiruj ideolgiou a lovekom, ktor povaoval Slovanov za niiu rasu. Teda na kra tchto ud by ich vzor, vodca re Hitler, z druhej strany Dunaja urite povedal: Pony muss weg! Pospolitosti, extrmistom, neofaistom ide o to, e sa im zapilo dupa v kanadch pred parlamentom. Mm obrovsk problm s tm, e takto dup pred nam parlamentom. Dos, e u ako spm, ke si predstavm, ako zastupuje vu obanov Jn Slota. A teraz si ete pribral druha v zbrani Vincenta Luka. Preo sa ete musm pozera ako tvrd jadro Pospolitosti a zopr pubertiakov s akn dupoce pred nam parlamentom? Pred parlamentom by kanady dupa nemali. Na tom by sme sa mali zhodn vetci. Pekn symbolika by bola, keby dvaja kohti Matovi a Kalik na chvu zabudli, o si povedali a ili pred parlament poveda extrmistom, e pred parlamentom sa dupa s kanadami nebude. Potom nech si to znovu dovysvetuj a objednaj trebrs aj nejak zubn implantty. Teraz vak ide o vnu vec. Bolo by pekn, keby aj in poslanci z nepriateskch tborov na chvu zabudli, i bude DPH 19 % alebo 20 % a prili v sobotu pred parlament. Aj pre-to, aby neskr nhodou nemuseli riei, i vsledky prce takchto extrmistov budeme prepravova z hygienickch dvodov po eleznici alebo po D1. V sobotu 18. 9. budem pred parlamentom a pozvam takto pnov poslancov Igora Matovia a Rberta Kalika a samozrejme aj vetkch ostatnch ktorm zle na tom, aby udia

v kanadch (ale o je horie, udia s pomlenmi nzormi) nedupotali pred nam parlamentom. P.S.: Vetkm tm gniom, ktor v tejto protiakcii identifikuj len mj zujem zviditeni sa, odkazujem, e sa kedykovek vzdm tejto pocty necha sa okukva a foti do pamtnkov lenov Pospolitosti. Sta mi, ak nieo urob niekto in, lebo ak nie, tak Pospolitos v tento de zape (18. 9. 2010) vek body na medilno-mentlnej mape Slovenska. Na zver chcem poveda, e s pravicovm extrmizmom sa nevyjednva. Ak raz zanete, u to neskon.

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sLoboDa sLova
Miroslav Kus
politolg
Dnes u niet nikoho, kto by popieral slobodu slova i prejavu. Aj t najtvrd dikttori sa ou zaprisahvaj, podmieuj ju vak svojm povestnm ale... Za komunizmu sa u ns kad mohol tei plnej slobode slova, pokia ju nezneuval proti zujmom socializmu, proti zujmom pracujcich, na spochybovanie vedcej lohy komunistickej strany a Sovietskeho zvzu v boji proti svetovej reakcii. o vak zostalo z takto poatej slobody slova? Na druhej strane ani jej oprvnen limity nemono prehliada. o mi je platn sloboda slova vo vzenskej kobke? Nao by bola Robinsonovi na pustom ostrove? Ale darmo budem reni aj na runom nmest, ke nikto nie je ochotn ma vypou. A ak sa o to poksim poas ome v kostole, vyhodia ma rozhoren veriaci von. Navye sloboda slova sa nevzahuje na akkovek verejn prejav loveka. Kad chpe, e by bolo nepatrin o nej hovori v prpade opileckho babotania i ruenia nonho pokoja, manelskch hdok i prekraiek adolescentov. Tka sa iba istho zvltneho druhu slovnho prejavu loveka pouvanho vo verejnom diskurze obianskej spolonosti. Zkladnm predpokladom jej existencie je sloboda a rovnos vetkch obanov v dstojnosti a prvach. Tm s dan aj limity slobody slova. Predovetkm sloboda slova patr medzi zkladn udsk prva a slobody a tie nie s samoeln. Zmyslom, cieom ich uplatovania je zachovanie, posilovanie dstojnosti loveka. A naopak, poruovanie udskch prv a slobd vdy predstavuje tok na udsk dstojnos. Ide pritom o dstojnos kadho loveka, teda nielen toho, kto si nejak svoje prvo uplatuje, ale aj toho, voi komu si ho uplatuje, koho sa uplatovanm svojho prva dotka, i komu tm priamo ubliuje. Ak teda niekto uplatuje svoju slobodu slova tak, e pomocou nej poniuje dstojnos inho loveka, napr. tm, e ho vyhlasuje za menejhodnotn bytos, e mu upiera prvo na rovnak zaobchdzanie a takto aj cel rad alch prv, ide o zneuitie slobody prejavu na diskriminan ciele, teda o popretie samotnho zmyslu tohto prva. Plat tie, e sloboda slova patr medzi tzv. politick slobody. O nej sa teda v rmci veobecnch filozofickch vah o istej slobode ako takej vea nedozvieme. Lebo politick sloboda nie je vntornou slobodou, je to intrumentlna a vzahov sloboda, ktorej hlavnm elom je vytvori situciu slobody, podmienky pre slobodu.1
1 Sartori, G.: Teria demokracie. 1993.

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Miroslav Kus

sloboda slova

Politick slobody sa uplatuj vlune v rmci konkrtneho politickho spoloenstva, t.j. dnes v rmci uritho ttu. Presnejie prvneho demokratickho ttu, v ktorom demokracia zabezpeuje rovnos obanov a prvo (ako sbor zvznch a sankcionovanch noriem) na ich obianske a politick slobody. V prvnom tte stoj nad politickou mocou zkon, ktor politick slobody obanov nielen garantuje, ale aj limituje. Toto kontatoval u J.J. Rousseau, ke limitoval politick slobodu poslunosou voi zkonom, ktor si sami predpeme v slade so veobecnou vou udu. V sasnom prvnom tte tto jeho volont gnrale zverujeme do rk zvolenmu zkonodarnmu zboru, ktor rozhoduje o zvznch pravidlch, na zklade ktorch obania svoje politick slobody v rmci danho ttu uplatuj. Iba tak sa me sta, e s tieto pravidl v rznych demokratickch prvnych ttoch prpad od prpadu in (napr. prvo na interrupciu, na eutanziu a pod.) esk filozof Jan Sokol rozliuje v danom kontexte tri formy slobody: slobodu ako absenciu prekok, slobodu ako monos voby a slobodu ako hru poda stanovench pravidiel. Kto chpe slobodu v tej prvej podobe, bude odstraova put a prekky, v tej druhej rozirova monosti vberu. Ale len v tej tretej pochop podstatn rozdiel medzi prekkami a pravidlami: bez pravidiel sa ned hra. m lepie pravidl a m lep sudca, tm lepia bude aj hra. Bez pravidiel by hra okamite degenerovala: predstavte si naprklad futbal bez pravidla ofsajdu. V tomto zmysle je skuton udsk sloboda vdy obmedzen, pretoe nutne potrebuje pravidl.2 Vemi vea ud chpe slobodu slova len v tom prvom zmysle, teda len ako pubertlnu slobodu, o ktorej Sokol pe, e prekvapujco mnoho ud s ou vysta a do dchodku a hevnato sa udriava aj medzi vzdelancami a filozofmi. Slobodu ako absenciu printenia, odstrnenia vonkajch prekok mjho rozhodovania a konania...3 Od zaloenia OSN (1945) a prijatia VDP (1948) si udstvo (v zmysle Sokolovej tretej formy slobody) na zklade medzinrodnch listn prv zaalo urova pravidl uplatovania politickch slobd vbec a slobody prejavu zvl. Poda Medzinrodnho paktu o obianskych a politickch prvach, realizcia slobody prejavu nesie so sebou osobitn povinnosti a zodpovednosti. Me preto podlieha uritm obmedzeniam; tieto obmedzenia vak mu by len tak, ak ustanovuje zkon a ktor s nevyhnutn: a) na repektovanie prv alebo povesti inch, b) na ochranu nrodnej bezpenosti, verejnho poriadku, verejnho zdravia alebo morlky. Niet pochb o tom, e uveden obmedzenia s v bode (a) zameran predovetkm voi nenvistnm prejavom (hate speech) hlsajcim rasov, etnick (a pod.) nenvis a s ou spt skupinov nadradenos. Prve o tom hovor aj l. 4 Medzinrodnho dohovoru o vylen vetkch foriem rasovej diskrimincie, prijatho vetkmi lenskmi ttmi E. Preto sa zaviazali poda zkona prehlsi za trestn iny akkovek rozirovanie ide zaloench na rasovej nadradenosti alebo nenvisti, akkovek podnecovanie k rasovej diskrimincii, ako
2 3 Jak liberalismus, jak svoboda? In: Listy, 1/2002. Jak liberalismus, jak svoboda? In: Listy, 1/2002.

aj kad nsiln in i podnecovanie k takmu inu proti ktorejkovek rase, i ktorejkovek skupine osb inej farby pleti alebo etnickho pvodu... Na Slovensku sme tieto univerzlne pravidl uplatovania slobody slova zakotvili v stave SR (l. 26 ods. 4), tlaovom zkone, Trestnom zkone i Obianskom zkonnku. Medzi ich ustanovenia sa tak do nho Trestnho zkona dostala aj klauzula o hanoben rasy, etnika a nroda, ktor na Slovensku vyvolala spor v mdich i medzi samotnmi prvnikmi. Nestilo to do prvnickho sporu o slovka, ale do sporu o samotnho ducha stavy a Veobecnej deklarcie udskch prv, ktor je v nej zakotven. Jej preambula vychdza z eurpskej sksenosti s faizmom slova a skutku, ke neuznanie udskch prv a pohdanie nimi viedlo k barbarskm inom urajcim svedomie udstva. Prve pre tto otrasn sksenos Eurpanov sa pasus o hanoben rasy, etnika a nroda dostal v prevanej vine eurpskych ttov medzi mantinely obmedzujce slobodu prejavu. Znmy slovensk prvnik Jn Hrubala v tomto kontexte napsal: V Slovenskej republike je neprpustn a trestn hlsa nrodnostn, nboensk, rasov, triednu alebo in nenvis, podporova a propagova hnutia, ktor preukzatene smeruj k potlaeniu prv a slobd obanov a nerepektuj demokraciu. Ide najm o faizmus a niektor prejavy komunizmu, a to preto, e faistick i komunistick ideolgia ako prejav a nsledok slobody myslenia nerepektuje rovnak slobodu myslenia inch, nerepektuje mnoh zkladn udsk prva a ani demokraciu ako tak. Demokracia mus ma mechanizmy na to, aby mohla potlai prejavy zmania, ktor jasne preukazuj snahu demokraciu znii. Niet sporu o tom, e takto obmedzenie slobody prejavu a myslenia je v demokratickej spolonosti nevyhnutn.4 Japonsk profesorka Kinhide Mushakoji (expertka UNESCO, prednajca o.i. aj na Univerzite OSN) povauje prejavy vyvolvajce rasistick i etnick nenvis za aksi zrkadlov obraz xenofbie. Xenofbia nie je prost strach z odlinho, z toho, o je pre dan osobu i skupinu cudzie, ale prejavuje sa predovetkm ako podozrievav, a nepriatesk postoj voi tm, ktor s in voi cudzincom. To, m sa cudzinci od ns lia, povaujeme za menejhodnotn, ba a nectyhodn. Preto sa rasizmus a xenofbia fenomenologicky vzahuj na ten ist akt: opovrhovanie sa z hadiska jeho objektu prejavuje ako rasizmus, zatia o z hadiska jeho subjektu ide o xenofbiu. lovek, povaujci in osobu i skupinu za menejcenn a hlsajci svoju nadradenos voi nej, je obvykle xenofb, v oiach toho druhho vak predstavuje rasistu. Xenofbia je poda nej vysoko nkazliv socilna patolgia a navye vedie k vnym politickm dsledkom. Sloboda prejavu predpoklad, e obianska spolonos sa sklad z jednotlivcov, ktor sa usiluj o vzjomne rovnocenn dialg. Xenofbia, zvl vo svojich sofistikovanejch formch, vytvra situciu, pri ktorej takto dialg nie je mon. V tomto zmysle xenofbia predstavuje vrus rozvracajci otvoren komunikciu medzi obanmi.

Kresk, P. (ed.): Oban a demokracia. 1997.

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sloboda slova

Pretoe sa vymyk z ich rmca, neme neobmedzen sloboda prejavu, bez zbran a obianskej zodpovednosti za jeho obsah, patri medzi politick prva. Zostva nanajv na rovni spomenutho opileckho babotania. Na celoeurpskej tryzne k 60. vroiu oslobodenia Osvienimu odznela pozoruhodn vzva, ktor treba pripomen kadmu, kto pri hlsan pubertlnej slobody prejavu bez pravidiel hry ahkovne oddeuje slov od inov. Antisemitizmus asto zana slovami: musme urobi vetko pre to, aby nekonil inak. Hkov kre na ramench nacistov (aj to je sloboda prejavu!) u raz viedli priamo k ltm hviezdam na prsiach zatratench a npisy idia do plynu! k plynovm komorm. Sloboda slova a prejavu m dnes aj deliktnejie podoby, ne je priame hlsanie tzv. osvienimskej li, i nenvistn prejavy, alebo provokovanie faistickmi uniformami a symbolmi. Nikto vm nezakazuje osoova svoju manelku na verejnosti, e je ampa, pata a mdlho rozumu, ale ke s tm zanete, kadmu je jasn, e je vae manelstvo v troskch alebo ho chcete do trosiek dosta. Nikto vm nebrni nadva na svojho suseda, ale u samo osebe je to svedectvo o zlch susedskch vzahoch. To ist plat aj o susedskch vzahoch medzi nrodmi a krajinami. Vedie vyuva prvo na slobodu prejavu tak, aby sme sa navzjom neurali, aby sme nevyvolvali i neeskalovali naptie medzi nami, je vek umenie mdrych a tolerantnch politikov, urnalistov a ostatnch verejnch initeov, svediace priamo o rovni ich politickej kultry. Na Slovensku s tm mme svoje zl sksenosti. Nai nacionalisti ibrinkovali eskou kartou a do plnho rozpadu spolonho ttu a dnes rovnako nezodpovedne vyahuj maarsk kartu proti maarskej menine doma i proti dobrmu spoluitiu so susednm Maarskom. Globalizcia a revolcia vak v rmci renia informci spsobili, e nami susedmi sa stali vetky krajiny sveta vrtane moslimskch. To, o bolo ete donedvna vntornou zleitosou tej i onej krajiny, sa dnes ahko me sta medzinrodnou afrou, na ktorej (tak i onak) participuje cel svet. Presne to ist sa svojho asu stalo aj s dnskymi karikatrami proroka Mohameda. Hoci Dnsko od islamskho sveta delia stovky kilometrov na kad svetov stranu, odvadia sa ozvali radiklne moslimsk protesty a hrozby. Znamen to, e dnes u musme ovea citlivejie zvaova, o je pre naich aj tch vzdialenejch susedov neprijaten, urliv, ba a znesvcujce, ak sa ich nechceme dotkn i vyvola s nimi roztrku. To, o za tak povauj, je ich vec, aj ke si o tom meme myslie svoje. Je to vec ich hodnotovej kly, viery, spsobu ivota, o musme repektova rovnako, ako od nich iadame, aby to repektovali aj oni u ns. Meme ma pritom dojem, e miera tolerancie nie je na oboch stranch rovnak, ale to na veci ni nemen. Najastejie zvykneme nepriaznivo hodnoti to, o nm najviac a najexpresvnejie prezentuj mdi, teda to, o sa deje na uliciach. Sfanatizovan dav tam moil na dnske a in zstavy a plil ich, reval nenvistn hesl, toil na vevyslanectv, teda ventiloval svoje agresvne pudy. Bolo to primitvne a nechutn, ale prevan vina astnkov takchto

hysterickch zhromaden ani dobre nevedela, o om je re, iba sa pridali. Ako nrod sa nemme preo nad nich prli vyvyova, lebo to dobre poznme aj z naej nedvnej minulosti (napr. protiidovsk pogromy) a v rznych varicich sa to u ns deje ete aj dnes. Sta si spomen na nechutn vtrnosti naich futbalovch i hokejovch fanikov, na znme babky demokratky i na organizovan orwellovsk minty nenvisti v bratislavskej portovej hale na Pasienkoch za Meiara. Takto sfanatizovan davy s na oboch stranch rovnako netolerantn, neosloviten racionlnou argumentciou tmi, proti ktorm sria zlobou. Tieto davy vak mus niekto podnecova, uvdza do varu. Vieme, kto to rob u ns. Poda Bernarda Lewisa, znmeho americkho experta na dejiny islamu, v moslimskch spoloenstvch s to fundamentalistick mullovia (moslimsk duchovn), ktor hovoria jazykom, zrozumitenm pre prostch moslimov.5 Lewis vak dvod, e teokratick reim irnskych mullov je u dnes rovnako skorumpovan a neobben, ako reim minul. asto sa na Zpade argumentuje aj tm, e moslimsk svet neme pochopi (a tob prija) zpadn demokraciu s jej poatm politickch slobd vbec a slobody slova zvl, pretoe je navyknut na despotizmus a chba mu naa sksenos z budovania a presadzovania sa sekulrnej obianskej spolonosti. Preto tu vlastne ide o stret dvoch rznych civilizci. Ani tto argumentcia vak poda Lewisa celkom neobstoj: Kto hovor o diktatre ako o metde riadenia spolonosti, ktor je tam zakorenen od nepamti, nem pravdu. Opakovanie tejto tzy sved o ignorovan arabskej minulosti, pohda arabskou sasnosou a pochybuje o arabskej budcnosti. Typ reimu, ktor nastolil Saddam Husajn a ktor doteraz jestvuje v mnohch arabskch krajinch, m modern, sasn pvod a je plne cudz podstate islamskej civilizcie. Jestvuj starie zriadenia a tradcie, na ktorch nrody Blzkeho Vchodu mu budova svoju budcnos.6 S tu teda dva spory, ktor sa nm v sasnosti prelnaj. Prv zaal ako spor o karikatry a ten sa nevedie v rovine sloboda prejavu verzus nboensk bigotnos, ale v rovine sloboda prejavu verzus pravidl jej demokratickej regulcie, prekroenm ktorch poruujeme vsostn prva inch ud. Druh je dlhodob spor diktatra verzus demokracia, ktorho sasn podoba zaala tokom na newyorsk Dvojiky. Nie je to spor dvoch rznych civilizci, ale pokraovanie politickho konfliktu o charakter sasnej globalizujcej sa spolonosti, ktor viedol modern slobodn svet u s faizmom a komunizmom. Aj v om m humanistick interpretcia slobody slova a prejavu svoje vemi dleit miesto. Od tch komunistickch (ako aj faistickch) pravidiel regulcie slobody slova sa tie nae humanistick pravidl zsadne lia. Zatia o v prvom prpade ich diktuje politick svojva uzurptorov moci, v druhom je to axima dstojnosti loveka, na ktorej bola postaven modern koncepcia univerzlnych udskch prv a slobd.

5 6

In: Foreign Affairs, 5-6/2005. Tame.

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poUiT LiTeraTra
Sartori, G.: Teria demokracie. Bratislava. Archa, 1993, s. 303. Kresk, P. (ed.): Oban a demokracia. MRG, Bratislava, 1997.

vvoJ sLovensKeJ MeDiLneJ sCnY Z haDisKa preZenTovania TM svisiaCiCh s inToLeranCioU, rasiZMoM, XenoFbioU a anTiseMiTiZMoM
alena Kotvanov
rad vldy SR, Sekcia udskch prv a rovnakho zaobchdzania
Mdi a medilna komunikcia sa vznamnou mierou podieaj na vytvran priestoru verejnho diskurzu aj o citlivch tmach svisiacich s intoleranciou, rasizmom, xenofbiou a antisemitizmom. Mdi poskytuj informcie o spoloenskom dian, sprostredkvaj a sprstupuj obsah politickch diskusi a s tak jednm z kovch zdrojov informci o spomnanch spoloenskch javoch. Stvaj sa materilom pre monitorovanie tchto javov samotnch a zrove pre analzu ich medilnej reflexie, ako aj spsobu, akm sa informcie tohto typu v mdich prezentuj, do akej miery s vyven a korektn. Zdrojom informci o medilnej reflexii istho spoloenskho fenomnu s v danom obdob monitoringy mdi. Na Slovensku sa doposia realizovali viacer iastkov monitoringy, zaoberajce sa naprklad obrazom menn v mdich1, i spsobom tlmoenia informci o (anti)diskrimincii.2 Pri hodnoten situcie nami sledovanej oblasti na Slovensku mono predovetkm vychdza z vsledkov priebenho monitoringu, zameranho na prejavy rasizmu, xenofbie a antisemitizmu, uskutonenho v uplynulch dvoch rokoch.3 Nejde o typick medilnu analzu, kee metodika sa musela prispsobi danm monostiam, teda spsobu zberu a vyhodnocovania materilu, ktor bol k dispozcii, vrtane jeho rozsahu. Na druhej strane jeho prednosou je rozsiahly asov sek, ktor bol sledovan, o umonilo komparciu jednotlivch asovch obdob a monos identifikova vvojov trendy v tejto oblasti. Kvantitatvna analza dt, zskanch prostrednctvom monitoringu, ukzala postupn vrazn nrast vskytu sprv svisiacich s extrmizmom, rasizmom a antisemitizmom v slovenskom medilnom prostred. Monitoring sledoval vskyt sprv a prepisov relci, ktor sa tkali negatvnych prejavov vrtane rasovo motivovanch tokov, stretnut extrmistickch
1 2 3 Obraz menn vo vysielan vybranch elektronickch mdi: Dostupn na: http://www.memo98.sk/data/_media/sprava_memo_ mensiny_2008.pdf. Ako mdi informuj o (anti)diskrimincii /online/. Pozri: http://www.diskriminacia.sk/?q=node/1145. Kotvanov, A., Mncnerov, L.: Sprva z monitoringu mdi so pecilnym zameranm na prejavy rasizmu, xenofbie a antisemitizmu. 2008.

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vvoj slovenskej medilnej scny z hadiska prezentovania tm svisiacich s intoleranciou, rasizmom...

skupn, podpory skupn smerujcich k potlaniu zkladnch prv a slobd, prejavov divckeho nsilia a extrmizmu na portovch podujatiach, ale aj pozitvnych i neutrlnych skutonost, konkrtne opatren na eliminciu uvedench javov, analz a tatistk tkajcich sa uvedench javov i fenomnu antisemitizmu.4 Km v prvom polroku 2008 monitoring zaznamenal spolu 166 sprv s takto vymedzenou tematikou, v druhom polroku 2008 to bolo 341, v prvom polroku 2009 len 267 a v druhom polroku 2009 to bolo a 637 sprv. Ako ukazuje porovnvacia tabuka (pozri niie), vysoko frekventovanmi tmami sa postupne stali rasovo motivovan toky, prejavy divckeho nsilia a krajnho nacionalizmu na portovch podujatiach, postupy polcie (napr. pri vyetrovan rmskych chlapcov v Koiciach) a v poslednom obdob vrazn nrast informci o zhromadeniach lenov a sympatizantov krajne pravicovch (neonacistickch) hnut s nebezpenm, extrmne nacionlnym a antirmskym obsahom v jednotlivch mestch a obciach Slovenska (v svislosti s oslavami vro historickch udalost), ako aj v tch reginoch, kde tieto skupiny parazituj na problmoch vznikajcich v sit majority s rmskou meninou (v snahe upta pozornos verejnosti a zska jej podporu). V minulom roku patrili k medilne najsilnejm kauzm stretnutia neonacistov, konkrtne v ariskch Michaanoch 8. 8. 2009 (133 sprv), v Krompachoch 3. 9. 2009 (60 sprv), stretnutia pri prleitosti vroia vzniku Slovenskho ttu 14. 3. 2009 a protesty proti nim (25 sprv). V oblasti rasovo motivovanch tokov patril k medializovanm kauzm predovetkm prpad zlho zaobchdzania s rmskymi chlapcami na policajnej stanici v Koiciach (8 sprv). Medializovanou kauzou bolo aj rozhodnutie Najvyieho sdu SR o zruen rozhodnutia Ministerstva vntra SR z novembra 2008 o rozpusten Slovenskej pospolitosti (18 sprv). Vznamnou tmou minulho roka bola aj vstavba mru oddeujca rmsku osadu od obce v Bystranoch (38 sprv). Pokia ide o preventvne opatrenia, najv priestor dostalo vytvorenie obianskych hliadok v rmskych osadch na Spii (36 sprv). Monitoring zaznamenal aj viacero sprv (15) tkajcich sa nebezpeenstva renia extrmizmu na internete, ktor indikuj vzostupn tendenciu zneuva otvoren priestor internetu a socilnych siet na renie rasizmu, predovetkm protirmskych nlad, ale aj na zhromaovanie a zdieanie osobnch dajov, fotiek a inch podrobnch informci o odporcoch krajne pravicovch hnut.5 Absoltne poty sprv v uvedenom lenen zachytva tabuka:

Okrem evidentnho nrastu potu sprv je pre medilnu reflexiu intolerancie, rasizmu, xenofbie a antisemitizmu v sledovanom obdob charakteristickou rtou reaktivita. Vrazn poetn rozdiely v jednotlivch sledovanch kategrich, s spsoben prevane (niekedy a prehnanou) reakciou mdi na urit udalos6, ktor strieda vemi vlan medilny zujem. To znamen, e menovan tmy nie s pravidelnou sasou medilneho diskurzu (vzhadom na neustlu potrebu informova slovensk verejnos o ich nebezpenosti), ale s uznan za hodn medializcie, len ke sa vyskytne nejak (zva negatvny) exces. Dkazom toho je, e viac ako jedna tretina celkovho potu monitorovanch sprv, s sprvy tkajce sa stretnut, zhromaden i pochodov neonacistov z leta 2009, takmer ptina sa tkala rasovo motivovanch tokov, kde silno medializovanou bola spomnan kauza poniovania rmskych chlapcov na koickej policajnej stanici a len necel estina sprv sa zameriavala na informovanie o prevencii a opatreniach proti extrmizmu a ostatnm sledovanm javom. lenenie tabuky poskytuje ete jeden dleit pohad na truktru slovenskho medilneho priestoru v danom kontexte. Informcie o negatvnych javoch maj v mdich trojnsobne v priestor ako informcie o pozitvnych javoch, svisiacich s prevenciou, opatreniami, hodnotenm i tatistikami (977 : 318). Zd sa, e mdi v tejto oblasti prvoplnovo napaj znmy medilny princp negativity (v potencil zauja maj negatvne sprvy), napriek tomu, e tm dochdza k nevyvenmu a tm nekorektnmu informovaniu o sledovanch fenomnoch. Mdi si zjavne nedostatone uvedomuj dopady takhoto postupu a svoj diel spoloenskej zodpovednosti za. Hlb pohad na spsob, ako narbali mdi v minulom roku s tmou rasizmu, neonacizmu a nimi motivovanch prejavov nenvisti, umouje kvalitatvna analza vybranch dt zskanch monitoringom. Spomedzi tm, ktormi sa mdi v minulom roku v danej oblasti zaoberali, najsilnejou a aj najvraznejou bola reflexia pochodov i demontrci neonacistov
6 Naprklad najfrekventovanejie tmy zachyten monitoringom udalosti svisiace s medzinrodnm futbalovm zpasom medzi DAC Dunajsk Streda a K Slovan Bratislava z 1. 11. 2008 a sria zhromaden a pochodov neonacistov v roku 2009 v slovenskch mestch a obciach.

4 5

Podrobnejie k metodike monitoringu a kategorizcii sprv pozri citovan sprvy. Sprva o dodriavan udskch prv vrtane zsady rovnakho zaobchdzania v Slovenskej republike za rok 2009. Pozri: http://www.snslp.sk/images/stories/file/spravy/sprava-dodrziavanie-lp-2009.pdf.

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vvoj slovenskej medilnej scny z hadiska prezentovania tm svisiacich s intoleranciou, rasizmom...

v mestch a obciach strednho a vchodnho Slovenska, priom najviac sprv (133) sa tkalo pochodu v ariskch Michaanoch (M). Podrobnejia analza tejto tmy ukzala zsadn limity slovenskch mdi pri zobrazovan tm spojench s intoleranciou, rasizmom, xenofbiou i antisemitizmom veobecne. Kauza pochodu v ariskch Michaanoch sa v minulom roku stala v danej oblasti najdominantnejou nie len kvantitatvne (hoci monitoring neumouje posdi podiel tchto sprv na ich celkovom objeme, d sa usudzova, e v danom obdob od 5. augusta do oktbra 2010 vznamne ivila medilnu scnu na Slovensku). Kee akcia mala aj cezhranin dosah (avizovan i uskutonen podpora a prtomnos prslunkov a prslunok neonacistickch skupn z iech a Maarska) a v tom istom ase dolo i k vyhroteniu protirmskeho nsilia v Maarsku, tma sa stala strednou tak v dennej tlai, elektronickch a internetovch mdich, ako aj v tdennkoch a alch periodikch. O vysokej pozornosti mdi svedil aj priestor (poet znakov prpadne dka trvania spravodajstva a publicistickch relci), ktor bol tejto tme venovan, a napokon aj to, e absoltna vina sledovanch sprv spracovala tmu ako hlavn. Uveden skutonosti svisia s jednou zo zkladnch otzok kvalitatvnej analzy: ak bolo medilne pokrytie danej tmy. Nemenej dleitou otzkou je, ako mdi s danou tmou pracovali. Predovetkm je zrejm, e uveden kauza sa vyvjala v ase, to znamen, e postupne sa akcent a draz mdi menil a prenal na in svislosti a subjekty. Km na zaiatku kauzy mdi kldli draz na zverejnenie odmietnutia avizovanho pochodu zo strany stavnch predstaviteov a prvoplnov deskripciu dajnch dvodov pochodu (priom v pozad zostvali skuton priny a svislosti), bezprostredne pred udalosou sa akcent preniesol na postupne zosilovan medializovanie tmy strachu v loklnej rmskej komunite. Bezprostredne po udalosti sa centrlnou tmou stal zsah polcie proti neonacistom a ich miestnym sympatizantom. Tm sa do zadia dostal zmysel pochodu. Kee znan priestor prenechali mdi reprodukovaniu stanovsk aktrov situcie, treba sa zaobera otzkou kto a akm spsobom sa k tme vyjadroval. Spomnan odsdenie prejavov intolerancie, extrmizmu a rasovej neznanlivosti prezidentom I. Gaparoviom, premirom R. Ficom a vicepremirom D. aploviom zostalo viac-menej v deklaratvnej polohe ostrho odsdenia a nulovej tolerancie voi extrmizmu. Do istej miery boli tieto prejavy reakciou na zverejnen iados o pomoc zo strany predstaviteov Rmov. Po pochode a zsahu polcie sa ku kauze vyjadrovali predovetkm predstavitelia Ministerstva vntra SR a polcie, s obhajobou adekvtnosti, primeranosti a zkonnosti zsahu. Jeho kritici (medzi nimi aj predseda i podpredseda Vboru NR SR pre obranu a bezpenos) povaovali zsah za absoltne neadekvtny a neopodstatnen, poda poslanca V. Palka je dleitejie a efektvnejie, ne policajn zsahy, zverejovanie dt o rmskej kriminalite. V svislosti s udalosou dokonca zaznelo, e akcia bola pripravovan a importovan zo zahraniia (teda zrejme z Maarska). Politici sa ku kauze vyjadrovali mlo, a tak mdia opakovali dokola tie ist vyjadrenia. Zrove, kee tieto stanovisk neboli (ako je zrejm) postaven na vecnom analytickom prstupe, realistickom posden situcie a ponknut

monch rieen, neposkytli mdim tak vchodiskov bzu, na ktorej by mohli kvalitnejie a korektnejie spracova dan kauzu. Okrem politikov dostali v mdich priestor aj in aktri, i ke neprimeran. Z predstaviteov Rmov dostal priestor len predseda Rmskej iniciatvy Slovenska (RIS) A. Patkol a niekoko miestnych Rmov odpovedalo na situan otzky novinrov. Minimlny priestor dostali aj odbornci na extrmizmus z mimovldneho sektora (PR, Via Juris, NM). Zato pomerne vek priestor dostal M. Kotleba zo Slovenskej pospolitosti (SP), ktorho vyjadrenia spolu s citciami a odkazmi na webov strnku SP(!) mdi v porovnan s predchdzajcimi aktrmi, zrejme v honbe za senzciou, evidentne naduvali. Na ilustrciu v lnku Pospolitos chce zopakova pogrom z Janova (SITA, Webnoviny.sk 5. 8. 2009) bol priestor venovan citcim a opisu situcie z pohadu SP viac ako trojnsobne v (286 slov), ne priestor pre pohad polcie (85 slov) a tyri- a polkrt v, ako pohad Rmov (63 slov). Na redakn nzor nezostal iaden priestor. Zrove treba zdrazni, e mdi nekriticky preberali rtoriku7 Pospolitosti, jej formulan, ba aj argumentan vbavu. Naprklad bezmylienkovite opakovali argumenta-n schmu, e dvodom pochodu pripravovanho na 8. 8.(!) je tok dvoch mladistvch na dchodcu, ktor sa odohral zhruba tde pred pochodom, a to v rznych varicich: mnoiace sa toky Rmov na bielych, toky osadnkov z Ostrovian, hrozivo rastca zloinnos neprispsobivch Rmov a pod. Slovensk mdi v svislosti s hodnotenm priebehu pochodu a policajnho zsahu veakrt reprodukovali nekomentovan stanovisko miestnych, e ve t udia na ihrisku ni nerobili, nikoho fyzicky nenapadli, nenarali verejn poriadok..., naznaujc, e nedolo k iadnym incidentom, a teda, e problm nie je v usporadvan takchto pochodov. Naprklad v lnku pod nzvom Extrmistov umlali policajn obuky (Hospodrske noviny 10. 8. 2009) sa trikrt za sebou vyskytla emotvna citcia vkrikov rozhorenho davu: Bijete slunch ud! Snahu odhali tieto manipulatvne interpretcie a sledova skuton zmysel, zujmy a cie organiztorov pochodu sa poksilo pomerne mlo medilnych vstupov, v ktorch sa komenttori a redaktori relci sami alebo poskytnc priestor odbornkom zhostili danej tmy profesionlne.8 Z nich viacer poukazovali na skutonos, e SP vyuila vgnos stanovsk a vyjadren politikov i nekoncepnos prstupu polcie a napokon aj nepripravenos mdi vo svoj prospech, priom sa jej dostalo zbytonej reklamy a sympati nielen u miestnych obyvateov, ale celkovo sa jej darilo nakloni si v znanej miere verejn mienku.
7 8 Mobilizcia Pospolitosti vyvolala strach, protest proti cignskemu teroru, otzka cignskej kriminality, hordy cignskych kriminlnikov. Naprklad: Schutz, P.: Cesta do pekla. In: SME, 6. 8. 2009; Pataj, R.: Cesta do geta. In: SME, 10. 8. 2009; Schutz, P.: Extrm je tu. In: .tde, 10. 8. 2009; Nicholson, T.: Hodn holohlavch. In: SME, 10. 8. 2009; Kostelansk, .: Policajti odili, problm zostva. In: Pravda, 11. 8. 2009; Schutz, P.: astnci zhromadenia. In: Korzr, 11. 8. 2009; Gloviko, J.: Vlda o Rmoch najm ren. In: SME, 11. 8. 2009; Kubk, P.: Kolektvna vina. In: TREND, 13. 8. 2009; Slikov, N.: Editoril, 14. 8. 2009; Extrmisti kriminalitu nevyrieia. In: urnl, 14. 8. 2009; Bn, A., Majchrk, J.: Kvapky hnevu. In: .tde, 17. 8. 2009 a alie.

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vvoj slovenskej medilnej scny z hadiska prezentovania tm svisiacich s intoleranciou, rasizmom...

O spsobe, akm sa mdi zhostili danej tmy, vypoved aj vber jazykovch prostriedkov. Vyie spomnan preberanie rtoriky Pospolitosti podmienilo hojn vskyt znane expresvnych vyjadren, obzvl v titulkoch lnkov9, ktor usilujc sa vyhovie poiadavke strunosti, vstinosti a ptavosti, asto skzli do polohy bulvru10, dokonca aj v tch zdrojoch, ktor bvaj tradine vnman ako serizne mdi. Niektor titulky tak niekedy v snahe zauja za kad cenu ani nekorepondovali s obsahom lnkov (naprklad lnok: Poriadky s Rmami, TV JOJ 5. 8. 2009). D sa predpoklada, e pouvanm takhoto jazyka a navodzovanm s nm spojench typickch asocici11 sa v tejto kauze mdim nepriamo podarilo vyhovie skr masovmu vkusu a prispsobi sa benm interpretcim (a tm upevni existujce stereotypy), ne ostraito upozorni na relne hrozby oivovania neonacizmu. Potvrdzuje to aj al pozoruhodn aspekt kontruovania medilneho obrazu pochodu neonacistov v ariskch Michaanoch na pozad problmovch vzahov majority a rmskych komunt. Ide o (mono neuvedomen a nezmern kontruovanie trichotomickho obrazu problematickch Rmov (oni), nevtanch stpencov Pospolitosti, ktorch rozhorenie je ale pochopiten (in oni) a ns (my), ktorch dan situcia vyruuje, ale sa priamo nedotka. V tomto zmysle sa problm asto verbalizoval ako problm Pospolitos verzus Rmovia.12 Samotn novinri tto kontrukciu posilovali, okrem zjavnho ditancovania sa13 vo vzahu k Rmom aj tm, e pochod neonacistov nedostatone oznaovali ako hrozbu pre demokratick spolonos na Slovensku, ako tok na udsk dstojnos, ako riziko opakovania historicky potvrdenho tragickho omylu. V tomto obraze bol strach prisudzovan len Rmom, ako skupine inch, od ktorch je majorita vrtane novinrov zretene oddelen, a preto sa jej netka.
9 Ticho pred brkou v Michaanoch. 5. 8. 2009; Utekaj k prbuznm. TV JOJ, 7. 8. 2009; Rmovia postavili domobranu. In: SME, 7. 8. 2009; Strach v osade. 7. 8. 2009; Pospolitos akaj kukli. 8. 8. 2009; arisk Michaany, de po. 9. 8. 2009; spech extrmistov. 9. 8. 2009; iadaj starostovu hlavu. 9. 8. 2009; Vodca Pospolitosti hrdinom da. In: Hospodrske noviny, 10. 8. 2009; Chc ukza na zloiny Rmov. In: SME, 10. 8. 2009; Kotleba na hrad. In: Pravda, 10. 8. 2009; Kradn viac ako gadovia? In: Hospodrske noviny, 10. 8. 2009; Nezvldnut manvre. In: Plus jeden de, 10. 8. 2009; Policajn roboti op zoali nevu. 10. 8. 2009; Rmov uchrnili vodnm delom. 10. 8. 2009; Rmovia ako horci zemiak. 10. 8. 2009; Rmovia sa nm vysmievaj. In: Plus jeden de, 10. 8. 2009; Zverejnite tatistiku o rmskej kriminalite. 10. 8. 2009; Rmovia boli pripraven bojova! 11. 8. 2009; Michaany sa alej boja Rmov. A polcie. In: Pravda, 12. 8. 2009; Vtedy na vchode. V Michaanoch. In: Hospodrske noviny, 14. 8. 2009; Zneuit strach. In: ivot, 15. 8. 2009 a alie. V tejto svislosti mono spomen fenomn tzv. titulkovej xenofbie, ktor popsal lingvista Marek Nekula u pred viac ako desiatimi rokmi ako jav, ke sa v titulkoch uvdza nrodnostn alebo etnick prslunos aj v tch prpadoch, ke to nie je podstatn informcia (v tej dobe typick pre kriminlne spravodajstvo). Pozri: Kaderka, P., Karhanov, K.: Obraz cizinc v mdich. Sprva o projektu za rok 2002. Praha: stav pro jazyk esk AV R. http://www.cizinci.cz/files/clanky/122/Obraz_cizincu_v_mediich_Zprava_o_projektu_za_rok_2002.pdf.

Na zklade uvedenho mono poveda, e medilna reflexia tejto kauzy bola poznaen typickmi nedostatkami oklieten spravodajsk prstup, predstieran nestrannos a nedostatone uplatnen hodnotov prstup, dsledkom oho bol vytvoren sploten obraz reality, ktor podmienil nzku mieru empatie, a naopak navodil atmosfru nevmavosti, ahostajnosti, ba a oakvania prpadnho nsilia. Zd sa, e mentlne bariry inkluzvnych postojov, prejavujce sa stereotypnm vnmanm, viedli k nivelizovaniu a trivializovaniu danho problmu. Uveden zistenia predstavuj naliehav vzvu zvi mieru gramotnosti medilnej komunikcie, tak na strane producentov, ako i recipientov medilnych vstupov, uplatova zodpovednej prstup pouvanm citlivho jazyka, odsudzovanm stereotypov, prermcovanm verejnej diskusie a odmietnutm nebezpench vzorcov a kli. Spolonos mus vytvra tlak na mdi, aby zodpovedne plnili funkciu strcu demokracie v sinnosti s asertvnym a proaktvnym prstupom zstancov dslednho uplatovania udskch prv a nediskrimincie, ktorm treba v mdich vytvori adekvtny priestor.

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11 V tejto svislosti je pojem banlny nacionalizmus relevantn, pretoe poda jeho autora Michaela Billinga pracuje s pasvnymi vymyslenmi formami, rutinne pouvanmi aj mdiami, v tomto prpade prostrednctvom aprirne negatvneho obrazu Rmov ako tch druhch, inch. Tento pojem by sa dal v tomto kontexte vznamovo posun do polohy banlny rasizmus, smerujci v konenom dsledku k ospravedlneniu a legitimizovaniu exklzie Rmov ako etnika, bez ohadu na to, i s subjektmi socilno-patologickch javov alebo nie. 12 Extrmisti sa zatia neohlsili. Pospolitos vs Rmovia. In: Hospodrske noviny, 7. 8. 2009. 13 Novinr ako hovoriaci si me zvoli pozciu zahrnutia samho seba alebo ditancovania sa, ke referuje o konkrtnej skupine alebo konkrtnej identite.

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DiLeMY novinra pri inForMovan o aKTiviTCh eXTrMisTov (ako men n pohad nstup novch mdi)
roland Kyka
publicista
Diskurz okolo protestnch akci Slovenskej pospolitosti a alch organizci v lete 2009 medzi novinrmi, mimovldnymi organizciami a odbornkmi na pravicov extrmizmus ukzal aj nov aspekt tejto problematiky primrnou otzkou u nie je, i dva v mainstreamovch mdich priestor extrmistom, ale i doku tradin mdi identifikova nov vzvy, vyrovna sa so svojou novo definovanou lohou v spolonosti a napomc vzdelva svojich divkov, posluchov, itateov. Medilne prostredie na Slovensku prechdza prudkmi premenami. Po celospoloenskom prelome, ekonomickej i politickej emancipcii mdi, ich adaptcii na trhov podmienky, komercionalizcii, ale aj politizcii v ostatnch dvoch desaroiach1, priniesli zsadn zmeny v ostatnom ase najm celosvetov hospodrska krza a prchod socilnych mdi.2 Synergia tchto dvoch faktorov spsobila, e mdi neraz psobia bezradne a s novm technologickm zzemm sa v dsledku strt spsobench hospodrskou krzou vyrovnvaj pomalie. Socilne mdi vak nie s vzvou len pre urnalistick obec. Dleit je vnma ich nstup aj v politicko-spoloenskch rozmeroch, nakoko menia spsob distribcie informci. Absencia autority na internete je na jednej strane pozitvom pre demokraciu, najm v podobe ahieho prstupu k informcim v krajinch s vysokou mierou cenzry, i ako platformy na organizovanie opozcie a jej aktivt. No na druhej strane je ahko vyuiten aj na renie nenvistnch prejavov a organizovanie sa nedemokratickch sl.

Je ignorovanie extrmistov sprvnou etickou vobou?

Pred podujatm, ktor na 8. augusta 2009 zvolala Slovensk pospolitos, sa medzi novinrmi i udskoprvnymi aktivistami rozvrila diskusia o tom, ako medilne pokrva tto udalos. Ist nemal as nzorov tvrdila, e by bolo vhodn tieto aktivity ignorova a neinformova o nich vbec. Dvodov bolo niekoko:
1 2 Breka, S., Ondrik, B., Keklak, R.: Mdi a novinri na Slovensku. 2010. Socilnymi (alebo novmi) mdiami chpeme webov aplikcie, ktor umouj vytvra, ahko prena, zdiea obsah vo forme textu, obrzkov, videa alebo zvukovch nahrvok. Pre viac informci pozri napr.: Sofko, L., Brake, D.K.: The Social Media Bible. Tactics, Tools & Strategies for Business Success. 2009.

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Dilemy novinra pri informovan o aktivitch extrmistov

l v susednch krajinch v Maarskej aj eskej republike dolo v tom ase k viacerm tokom na Rmov a ich obydlia (V Maarsku vo februri 2009 zastrelili Rma aj so synom pred ich domom v Tatrszentgyrgyi3, v mji dorezali rmsky manelsk pr v Abdszalku, v tom istom mesiaci zaznamenali strebu na dom rmskej rodiny v obci Lengyeltti, v auguste brutlne zabili Rmku v obci Kislta.4 Najznmejm prpadom v esku bol v tom ase tok zpalnmi faami na dom rmskej rodiny vo Vtkove, pri ktorom ich dvojron dcra Natlka utrpela popleniny na 80 % tela.); l vo svojich vyjadreniach organiztori asto spomnali akciu extrmistov na sdlisku Janov vo Vtkove. Slovensko vo svojej modernej histrii doposia nemalo sksenos s tm, ako sa brni organizovanm pogromom voi istej skupine ud a vzhadom na vyhlsenia organiztorov zo Slovenskej pospolitosti mohol ich protest v Michaanoch ako pogrom skoni; l pravicov radikli sa zanali organizova s cieom vytvorenia legitmnej politickej sily, ktor by vstpila do politickej sae v bliacich sa upnch a v irom asovom odstupe aj parlamentnch vobch. Aj ke relna politick sila pravicovch extrmistov bola v tom ase nzka a ako ukzali nadchdzajce parlamentn voby, jestvoval strach, e by sa nejakm spsobom mohli tto udia pretransformova na relevantn silu. V susednch krajinch op existovala podobn sksenos jednak s maarskm Jobbikom vrtane jeho militantnej odnoe Maarskej gardy, ako i eskou Dlnickou stranou; l v neposlednom rade existovala monos, e konanie Slovenskej pospolitosti m schopnos zska si sympatie istej asti verejnosti, ktor by pravdepodobne za inch okolnost s extrmistami nikdy nesympatizovala. V krtkom ase v obci arisk Michaany dolo k dvom nsilnm trestnm inom predavaku zavradili priamo v miestnej veierke a takmer na smr dobili sprvcu miestneho tadina, ktor pchateov pristihol pri krdei televzora. Obaja obania mali repekt a ctu miestnej komunity. Spolonm znakom oboch trestnch inov bolo, e pchatelia pochdzali z rmskej osady v susednej obci Ostrovany.5 Dilema, ako pristupova k medilnemu pokrvaniu podujat pravicovch extrmistov, nie je nov. Nvum bolo len v koncentrcii spomnanch faktorov. Bola to sksenos, ktor dovtedy slovensk mdi nemali. To iba zosilnilo diskusie o postupoch, dosahu a etike urnalistickej prce. Tto dilema spova nielen v klasickom problme urenia, kde kon sloboda prejavu. Km Eurpsky sd pre udsk prva tvrd, e sloboda prejavu chrni i slov a mylienky, ktor s urliv, okujce i znepokojujce, Medzinrodn pakt o obianskych a politickch prvach uruje, e akkovek nrodn, rasov alebo nboensk nenvis, ktor predsta3 4 5 Bn, A.: Lovci a obete. In: .tde, 9.3.2009. Drbek, I.: Vrada Rmky bola tokom na Maarsko, tvrd premir. In: Pravda, 6.8.2009. Kyka, R.: Manvre. In: Plus 7 dn, 12.8.2009.

vuje podnecovanie k diskrimincii, nepriatestvu alebo nsiliu, mus by zakzan zkonom. Z toho sa d abstrahova, e prejav obsahujci nrodn, rasov alebo nboensk nenvis, ktor nebude sasne nadobda intenzitu podnecovania k diskrimincii, nepriatestvu i nsiliu, nespad pod vymedzenie Paktu.6 Toto vymedzenie je blzke americkmu chpaniu slobody prejavu. Existuje niekoko modelov etickho rozhodovania v urnalistike, ktor maj pomc vyhodnoti dsledky konania novinra.7 Zkladn vymedzenie obsahuje aj Etick kdex Slovenskho syndiktu novinrov: Novinr nepodnecuje nenvis, ani diskriminciu zaloen na rase, svetonzore, nboenskom vyznan, etnickom pvode, veku, socilnom postaven, pohlav i sexulnej orientcii.8 Objavuje sa a stle silnejie sa prejavuje aj nzor, e existuje rozdiel medzi slobodou prejavu jednotlivca a slobodou prejavu novinra. Napr. poda Remiovej bolo slobodou prejavu dnskeho umelca nakresli Mohamedove karikatry. Sloboda prejavu a sloboda tlae tch novn, ktor ich prv opublikovali, vak mala by limitovan prijatm zodpovednosti a neuverejni ich.9 Ak by mdi pristpili na tto interpretciu novinrskej etiky, pravdepodobne by o udalosti v ariskch Michaanoch neinformovali. Ak by sa tak stalo pred nstupom webu 2.010, pravdepodobne by bolo mon toto rozhodnutie vyhodnoti ako sprvne. Socilne mdi by vak mali meni nielen medilne prostredie, ale zmeni aj pohad na etick rozhodovacie procesy v redakcich, a tm nepriamo aj chpanie slobody prejavu. Nulov aktivita tradinch mdi v informovan o innosti pravicovch extrmistov toti vytvra predpoklad prevahy informanch zdrojov v novch mdich, kde maj extrmisti neobmedzen priestor. Takto spsoben kody mu previ potencilnu hrozbu renia nenvistnch mylienok. Naopak, etick a rozumn prstup tradinch mdi me prispie k vej pluralite nzorov. Internet je pln najrozlinejch webovch strnok, socilne siete s pln skupn a profilov s nenvistnm obsahom. Niektor sa dar likvidova, in nie aj vzhadom na ich registrciu v cudzch krajinch. V podstate je vak expanzia extrmistov vo virtulnom priestore nezastaviten. Dokzal to aj monitoring cyberhate-u na socilnej sieti Facebook, ktor pred asom s podporou Nadcie otvorenej spolonosti urobila organizcia udia proti rasizmu.11 Km sa podarilo zrui jednu strnku i skupinu, pribudli rdovo desiatky inch, s prejavmi mkkho i tvrdho rasizmu. Preto je lohou tradinch, klasickch mdi, aby boli istm garantom a nositeom pozitvnych mylienok a zrove inicitorom kultivovanej diskusie. Je nepredstaviten, aby boli nov mdi v rukch extrmistov nejakm spsobom uspsoben na diskusiu a pluralitu nzorov.
6 7 8 9 10 11 Barto, M.: Svoboda projevu: princpy, garance, meze. 2010. Burns, L.S.: urnalistika. 2004. Etick kdex Slovenskho syndiktu novinrov. Pozri: http://www.ssn.sk/?id=50&num=10&lang=sk Remiov, A.: Etika mdi. 2010. Koncepcia internetu ako platformy postavenej na interakcii uvateov, ktor s sami tvorcami obsahu, a ten sa vaka sieovmu efektu zlepuje s rastcim potom uvateov. Viac informci pozri napr.: Shuen, A. Web 2.0: A Strategy Guid, 2008. Bihriov, I. (ed.): Facebook 1939. 2010.

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Dilemy novinra pri informovan o aktivitch extrmistov

Z ich podstaty vyplva, e sa in nzor nepripa, neakceptuje, a naopak, automaticky odsudzuje, trest. Vina blogov pravicovch extrmistov nepovouje diskusiu (aj ke prve t je jednm zo zkladnch prvkov filozofie blogovania), v skupinch s nenvistnm obsahom na socilnych sieach sa diskutuje zriedka, naopak, iba sa kumuluj nzory rovnakho razenia.12 V prpade, e by tradin mdi ignorovali svoju spravodajsk povinnos, bol by jedinm zdrojom informci o dian na arii internet, i presnejie webov strnky a servery extrmistov. T u chodia na demontrcie dobre pripraven, maj vlastnch spravodajcov vyzbrojench najmodernejou zznamovou technikou. asto ich ani nerozoznte, pretoe nemaj primrne znaky, ktor by oznaovali ich prslunos k neonacistickej komunite. Krtko po demontrcii a zsahu policajnch zloiek sa na webe objavila ich verzia udalosti, avak patrine upraven a dokreslen. Hlad po informcich v regine (a neskr pravdepodobne aj za jeho hranicami) by spsobil, e by sa tieto jednostrann informcie zaali ri najprv distribciou linkov, zdieanm v socilnych sieach, ale aj klasicky, takmer samizdatovo. Akkovek vysvetovanie by u nemalo zmysel, pretoe by bolo povaovan za propagandu. Je preto dleit, aby tradin mdi ostali ak nie primrnym, tak minimlne vemi dleitm a akceptovanm zdrojom informci.

V priebehu da udalos monitorovali tlaov agentry a aktulne informcie zverejovali aj spravodajsk servery. Citovali pritom aj miestnych, ktor problm kriminality negeneralizovali len na rmsku komunitu. Bol to mimoriadne dleit moment, pretoe neskr sa mnoh snaili navodi dojem, e v obci medzi obyvatestvom zavldli rasistick nlady. Dennk SME obhajoval postup polcie, priom okrem vedenia rezortu citoval aj viacerch exministrov vntra. Udalosti sa venoval aj na nzorovej strane. Dal priestor socilnemu antropolgovi Tomovi Hrustiovi, ktor napsal, e cel Eurpa dostala v sobotu v ariskch Michaanoch varovanie a e si u nememe nama, e rasovo motivovan vrady Rmov v Maarsku, kriminalizovanie prisahovalcov v Taliansku, slov britskho poslanca Europarlamentu o potpan lod s uteencami z Afriky i toky na rmske rodiny v eskej republike sa ns netkaj tak, ako si kedysi udia namali, e sa ich netkali deportcie idov. Tie dodal: Ako sa postavi proti rastcemu extrmizmu a otvorenm prejavom rasistickho nsilia? Politici musia jednoznane odsdi pochody extrmistov a obhajova prvo a spravodlivos. No histria ukazuje, e to nesta. Vetky genocdy v histrii udstva ukzali, e je nebezpen zatvra oi pred prejavmi nenvisti. Slun udia musia rozliova dobr od zlho, musia demontrova svoj obiansky postoj proti tomu, aby ktokovek bral spravodlivos do vlastnch rk.14 Viacer mdi spochybnili radiklny postup polcie, rdio Expres pritom zvraznilo, e Slovensk pospolitos vyuila fakt, e iadna z ponovembrovch vld neriei problmy socilne vylench Rmov. Bez ohadu na to, ako dopadlo zhromadenie, ktor ohlsila pospolitos v ariskch Michaanoch, podujatie evokuje dojem, e ani Slovensko u nie je imnne voi eskalcii etnickho nsilia, upozornil magazn Tde. Tdennk, tak ako aj ostatn mdi, upozornil, e nzory majority vznikli kvli skutone zlej situcii v regine. Nemono vak ignorova, e prve tragick pomery v najzaostalejch astiach rmskeho spoloenstva, ast asocilne sprvanie i neochota prija civilizovanejie tandardy rozdchavaj averzie vo vinovej spolonosti a zvyuj riziko nsilnost.15 Na internetovch serveroch, ktor ovldaj pravicov extrmisti, sa rili nielen informcie pred plnovanm pochodom, ale aj poas neho a bezprostredne po policajnom zsahu. Na jednej z najznmejch webovch strnok slovenskch pravicovch extrmistov Proti prdu vysvetovali opodstatnenos protestu aj argumentciou o skreslenom informovan v mdich: Napriek zjavnmu a nespochybnitenmu faktu kto bol tonk a kto obe, slovensk mdi tento fakt otoili a z Cignov urobili obete. Nie prvkrt. Lpen prepady, vradenia a strach obyvateov vchodnho Slovenska z dedn, kde cigni tvoria viac ako 10% obyvatestva nikoho nezaujmaj.16
14 15 16 Hrusti, T.: Mement zo aria. In: SME, 12.8.2009. Schutz, P.: Extrm je tu. In: .tde, 10.8.2009. Zsah v ariskch Michaanoch. Pozri: http://www.protiprudu.info/zasah.html.

Medilne posolstv z pochodu v ariskch Michaanoch

Lepie pochopenie rozdielneho prstupu tradinch a socilnych mdi prina porovnanie toho, ako o udalosti informovali. Tri dni pred samotnm pochodom napr. tlaov agentra SITA priniesla informciu, e politick piky odmietaj akciu Slovenskej pospolitosti, priom oslovila vtedajieho predsedu vldy SR Roberta Fica, prezidenta SR Ivana Gaparovia a podpredsedu vldy SR Duana aplovia, ktor mal na starosti agendu menn.13 Spravodajsky pokrvali udalos vetky relevantn dennky u pred jej zaiatkom. Informovali nielen o samotnej akcii, ale aj o protiopatreniach zo strany polcie, o situcii v inkriminovanej rmskej osade v Ostrovanoch, teda o strachu jej obyvateov a organizovan obianskych hliadok z ich strany. Slovensk mdi v de pochodu a nsledne aj v alch doch relatvne objektvne informovali o udalosti. Upozorovali najm na neinnos vldy pri rieen socilnych problmov a otzky bezpenosti obyvateov obc so zvenm vskytom drobnej kriminality zo strany socilne odkzanch obyvateov. TV JOJ vo veernom spravodajstve upozornila, e policajn zsah urobil z Kotlebovcov v oiach miestnych obyvateov martrov, a to najm kvli dlhodobmu nerieeniu spomnanch problmov. Televzia zrove upozornila na nenvistn nsiln iny v susednom Maarsku.
12 13 Kyka, R.: Vetci sme nah na Facebooku. 2010. Odsudzuje akkovek akcie, ktor pripravuje Slovensk pospolitos: Vydan 5. 8. 2009. Pozri: http://hnonline.sk/c1-37987640odsudzuje-akekolvek-akcie-ktore-pripravuje-slovenska-pospolitost.

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Pravicov extrmisti sa nauili vyuva internet, ich online marketing je skutone vemi presvediv a vedia, o me spsobi dobre mieren hoax.17 Poplan a podvodn sprvy doku zapsobi nielen vo vntri komunity, ale aj na vonkajie prostredie. Aj preto sa po toku v ariskch Michaanoch objavili informcie o ako zranench, zmrzaench i takmer zabitch demontrantoch. Na serveri beo.sk sa objavila report z demontrcie s podobnm popisom: Jednmu demontrantovi dokonca zatlail policajn akoodenec nohou hlavu do zeme, m ho takmer zabil udusenm. Bezvldne telo ahali po ceste ako vrece zemiakov. Miestni obyvatelia kriali na policajtov, aby nieo robili, pretoe dotynmu zaala tiec z st pena. Policajt, ktor ho predtm dobil do bezvedomia, mu do st vloil prsty a skontroloval, i nem zapadnut jazyk. Nsledne plne spokojne skontatoval, e mu ni nie je, e je iba opit (dotynho poznm osobne je abstinent!).18 Prostrednctvom webovej strnky Slovenskej pospolitosti, jej vodca Ivan Skora, okamite vydal svoje stanovisko: Demontrcia proti cignskemu teroru mala by rozpren tak i onak. Nezlealo, i sa jej zastnia aktvni nacionalisti alebo len matky s demi. Nie je predsa prstupn, aby sa v modernej multikultrnej spolonosti ctila majoritn as obyvatestva vo svojej krajine ako doma, ie bezpene a spokojne. Tu mus by cignska menina zkonom chrnen a Slovk mus pocti, e je len hosom vo vlastnej krajine. A pri kadej monej prleitosti mu to bude obukami a kopancami pripomnan, aby nhodou nezabudol, e nem nrok dovolva sa svojich prv. A v sobotu sme mali monos vidie a zai excelentn prklad. Nadran policajti, nahuckan svojimi nadriadenmi a motivovan vidinou peknch prmi na vplatnej pske, oduevnenm mltenm obukov do hlv praktizovali osveden spsob prevchovy nespokojnch obanov. Nensiln a netoiaci dav ud sa len tak ahko nedal zlomi.19 Extrmisti sa nsledne pokali presvieda, e verejnos sa s nimi identifikuje: Brutlny zsah Kalikovho Mossadu voi Slovenskej pospolitosti a ich partnerom odsudzuj hlavne na slovenskom vidieku vetci obyvatelia. Vedia toti, e tmto neadekvtnym zsahom narstol Cignom hrebienok. U na druh de po zsahu objavili v Jasove dobodan starenku20

vzva: Zvyova digitlnu gramotnos

V prpade, ak by tradin mdi ignorovali udalos v ariskch Michaanoch, jedinm informanm zdrojom by sa stali prve tieto citovan informcie, ktor by nemal kto vyvi. Rastca penetrcia internetu v slovenskch domcnostiach a jeho obbenos zvyuje aj jeho preferenciu ako informanho zdroja. Poda sprvy Eurpskej komisie o digitlnej konkurencieschopnosti 2010 a 66 % slovenskej populcie pravidelne (minimlne raz do tda) vyuva internet a 35 % uvateov (o je nad priemerom E, ktor je 31 %) had na internete sprvy.21 To ale, ia, nekoreponduje s rovou digitlnej gramotnosti slovenskej populcie. Poda prieskumov je nedostaton zvuje sa tzv. digitlne rozdelenie spolonosti.22 Ani medilna vchova nie je na Slovensku poriadne ukotven v tudijnch plnoch. Navye uebn texty, ktor odpora ttny pedagogick stav, s z roku 2005 a problematika webu 2.0 v nich nie je adekvtne (resp. takmer vbec) zachyten. iakom sa opisuje fungovanie tradinch mdi televzie, rozhlasu, tlaench mdi, no nevysvetuje sa fungovanie blogov, internetovch vydan novn, socilnych siet a podobne. Pritom poda ostatnch prieskumov a 60 percent socilnych interakci ud mladch ako 20 rokov prebieha prve na internete. Rastcej aktivite pravicovch extrmistov mu by vo virtulnom priestore protivhou tradin mdi. No rovnobene s tm, ako bude rs loha internetu v spolonosti, je dleit zamera sa na vzdelvanie nielen det a mldee, ale aj dospelej populcie. Vo vyspelch krajinch, naprklad Vekej Britnii, existuj programy, ako pritiahnu k internetu nielen tch, ktor ho doposia nikdy nevyuili, ale predovetkm ako ich naui, aby sa pri jeho pouvan sprvali zodpovedne. Zvyovanie digitlnej gramotnosti, predovetkm vysvetlenie rozdielu medzi tradinmi a novmi mdiami, me zni dosah informci zo socilnych mdi extrmistov. Web 2.0 im dal do ruky priame nstroje na ovplyvovanie verejnej mienky. Dleit je, aby na ne dokzala adekvtne reagova aj obianska spolonos 2.0.

17 Pod pojmom hoax rozumieme mystifikciu, poplan sprvu ren cez internet. 18 Orlick, J.: Protest v ariskch Michaanoch potupa polcie a morlne vazstvo nrodovcov. Pozri: http://beo.sk/reportaze/985-protest-v-sariskych-michalanoch-potupa-policie-a-moralne-vitazstvo-narodovcov. 19 Skora, I.: Slovo Vodcu Policajti nemaj zujem riei cignsky problm a miestnych dedinanov poastovali obukami. Pozri: http://pospolitost.wordpress.com/2009/08/10/slovo-vodcu-policajti-nemaju-zaujem-riesit-cigansky-problem-a-miestnychdedincanov-pocastovali-obuskami/. 20 Clementis, S.: Adekvtny zsah?. Pozri: http://www.protiprudu.info/adekvatny.html. 21 Europes Digital Competitiveness Report 2010. Pozri: http://www.epractice.eu/files/Europe%27s%20Digital%20 Competitiveness% 20Report%202010%20-%20Commission%20Staff%20Working%20Document.pdf.

22 Pozri napr.: Digitlna gramotnos na Slovensku 2009. Pozri: http://www.ivo.sk/5854/sk/aktuality/digitalna-gramotnost-na-slovensku-2009.

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poUiT LiTeraTra
Barto, M.: Svoboda projevu: princpy, garance, meze. Leges, Praha, 2010. Bn, A. Lovci a obete. In .tde, 9.3.2009. Bihriov, I. (ed.) Facebook 1939. udia proti rasizmu, Bratislava, 2010. Breka, S., Ondrik, B., Keklak, R.: Mdi a novinri na Slovensku 2010.: Paneurpska vysok kola, Bratislava. Burns, L.S.: urnalistika. Portl, Praha, 2004. Drbek, I.: Vrada Rmky bola tokom na Maarsko, tvrd premir. In: Pravda, 6. 8. 2009. Etick kdex Slovenskho syndiktu novinrov. Pozri: http://www.ssn.sk/?id=50&num=10&lang=sk. Europes Digital Competitiveness Report 2010. Pozri: http://www.epractice.eu/files/Europe%27s%20 Digital%20Competitiveness%20Report%202010%20%20Commission%20Staff%20Working%20 Document.pdf. Hrusti, T.: Mement zo aria. In: SME, 12. 8. 2009. Kyka, R.: Manvre. In: Plus 7 dn, 12. 8. 2009. Kyka, R.: Vetci sme nah na Facebooku. Forza Music, Bratislava, 2010. Remiov, A.: Etika mdi. Kalligram, Bratislava, 2010. Shuen, A:. Web 2.0: A Strategy Guide. OReilly Media, Sebastopol, 2008. Schutz, P.: Extrm je tu. In: .tde, 10. 8. 2009.

Je obMeDZenie sLoboDY preJavU eFeKTvne? (Je na slovensku sloboda prejavu extrmistov postihovan?)
sergej Danilov
novinr

vod
Je skutone trestanie prejavov hate speech verblnych nenvistnch prejavov efektvne? Na Slovensku s poda trestnho zkona postihovan tzv. trestn iny extrmizmu. Zkony, okrem inho zakazuj verejne prejavova sympatie skupinm a hnutiam, ktor nsilm, hrozbou nsilia alebo hrozbou inej akej ujmy smeruj k potlaniu zkladnch prv a slobd osb, naprklad pouvanm zstav, odznakov, hesiel i rovnoatami. Pchateovi za to hroz odatie slobody na 6 mesiacov a na 3 roky. Za hanobenie rasy a nroda je sadzba 1 a 3 roky. Naproti tomu, druh odsek 26. lnku stavy hovor, e: Kad m prvo vyjadrova svoje nzory slovom, psmom, tlaou, obrazom alebo inm spsobom, ako aj slobodne vyhadva, prijma a rozirova idey a informcie, bez ohadu na hranice ttu. Prklady z praxe ukazuj, e orgny inn v trestnom konan sa zrejme riadia len tmto ryvkom z stavy. Pritom jej 26. lnok m aj tvrt odsek, ktor hovor, e: Slobodu prejavu a prvo vyhadva a ri informcie mono obmedzi zkonom, ak ide o opatrenia v demokratickej spolonosti nevyhnutn na ochranu prv a slobd inch, bezpenos ttu, verejnho poriadku, ochranu verejnho zdravia a mravnosti. Kolkov a Krlik (2003) ako prklad uvdzaj, e naa stava (v lnku 26) spolone s Eurpskym dohovorom na ochranu udskch prv (v lnku 10) vymedzuj tri zkladn podmienky, kedy mono obmedzi slobodu prejavu.1 Podmienky musia by splnen sasne. Hne prv hovor, e obmedzenie slobody prejavu je vymedzen v zkone. Naprklad trestn zkon poda Kolkovej a Krlika, okrem inho, obmedzuje slobodu prejavu trestanm za rasistick vroky, i renie symbolov faizmu.

Kolkov, M., Krlik, A.: Oban a demokracia prvo na kad de Tma 1 (metodick prruka) Tma 1: Sloboda prejavu. 2003.

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Je obmedzenie slobody prejavu efektvne?

Trestn iny extrmizmu 140a

Medzi trestn iny extrmizmu patria: trestn in podpory a propagcie skupn smerujcich k potlaeniu zkladnch prv a slobd poda 421 a 422, trestn in vroby extrmistickch materilov poda 422a, trestn in rozirovania extrmistickch materilov poda 422b, trestn in prechovvania extrmistickch materilov poda 422c, trestn in hanobenia nroda, rasy a presvedenia poda 423, trestn in podnecovania k nrodnostnej, rasovej a etnickej nenvisti poda 424, trestn in podnecovania, hanobenia a vyhrania sa osobm pre ich prslunos k niektorej rase, nrodu, nrodnosti, farbe pleti, etnickej skupine alebo pvodu rodu poda 424a a trestn in spchan z osobitnho motvu poda 140 psm. d) a f).2

prklady z praxe
Na prkladoch z praxe mono ilustrova, e orgny inn v trestnom konan pristupuj k postihovaniu verblnych nenvistnch prejavov selektvne a mnohokrt zostvaj pchatelia nepotrestan. Sloboda prejavu, po ktorej volaj extrmisti, je tak paradoxne obmedzovan len vemi mlo alebo vbec.

prklad 1
Trestn oznmenie poslankyne NR SR Natlie Blahovej na internetov portl Prop.sk za prejavy nenvisti, napr. antisemitsk, karikatry proti rmskej a maarskej menine. Napr. idn ostrov, Cignskym teroristom vstup zakzan, Arbeit and Freedom macht Frei. stav: Polcia vec vyetruje u niekoko mesiacov. Medializovan bolo jej vyetrovanie v oktbri dennkom SME. Avak napriek tomu, e autor karikatr je znmy (kresl tie pre mesank Extra Plus), nebol doteraz obvinen.

prklad 3
Prejavy futbalovch chulignov (nielen) na futbalovch tadinoch, i extrmistickch strn na ich mtingoch a pochodoch. Naprklad v Bratislave, poas vlaajieho derby Slovan-Trnava, kriali ultra fanikovia host na verejnos a zstupcov mdi za prtomnosti polcie na o kukte, vy kurvy idovsk. Kee cieom nebola u len rivalsk skupina ultra fanikov, nelo o latentn prejav antisemitizmu. Extrmisti zase na mtingoch permanentne uraj meniny, najm Rmov a homosexulov. stav: Po kritike mdi a nariaden ministra vntra Lipica preveri postup bratislavskch policajtov v septembri 2010 zaala krajsk polcia s vyetrovanm antisemitizmu trnavskch fanikov. Hoci k dispozcii mala detailn zbery tvr z kamier televzie Markza, prpad zaiatkom roka 2011 uloila s tm, e sa jej nepodarilo stotoni vinnkov. Krajsk policajn riaditestvo v Bratislave (KR PZ v BA) na otzku, preo teda slubukonajci policajti nezasiahli priamo na mieste odpovedalo, e polcia nem povinnos zasiahnu, ak si nie je ist spechom zkroku. KR PZ v BA tie vyhlsilo, e f bezpenostnch opatren nevyhodnotil konanie fanikov ako trestn in. Poda prvniky a predsednky OZ udia proti rasizmu Ireny Bihriovej, naopak prilo k preinu hanobenia nroda, rasy a presvedenia poda 423 trestnho zkona. Poda nej toti nie je podstatn, i hanobenie smerovalo voi konkrtnemu adrestovi, sta, e sa udialo verejne a je povinnosou ttu chrni es, dstojnos a dobr meno menn.4
4 Pozri: http://futbal.rasizmus.sk/2011/02/19/monitoring-vysetrovanie-protizidovskych-nadavok-nikam-neviedlo/.

prklad 2
Protirmsky bilbord SNS z predvolebnej kampane so sloganom Aby sme nekmili tch, o nechc pracova. Bilbordy v mji 2010 vyvolali kritiku pre podnecovanie k rasizmu a zdrazovanie stereotypov o Rmoch.
3

stav: Na bilbordy SNS boli podan viacer trestn oznmenia. Vetky boli zamietnut. Polcia vo svojom uznesen kontatovala, e SNS ilo o upriamenie pozornosti verejnosti na obanov, ktor hrubo zneuvaj socilny systm, nemaj zujem o prcu a o vyvolanie irokej diskusie na tmu tvoriacu sas jej volebnho programu, priom osoba na bilborde je ilustran, bez akhokovek odkazu na meninu z pohadu etnickho i nrodnho.

2 3

Zkon .305/2005 Z.z. trestn zkon. Pozri: http://ww.vyvlastnenie.sk/predpisy/trestny-zakon/. Prpadu sa podrobnejie venuje prspevok Rastislava enkirika v tejto publikcii.

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Je obmedzenie slobody prejavu efektvne?

idovsk obec pravidelne kritizuje polciu pre jej nedslednos a nerieenie podobnch prpadov. Policajn f Spiiak na margo prejavov trnavskch fanikov ete v septembri 2010 vyhlsil, e polcia mala na mieste in prcu,ako riei vulgarizmy.5

prklad 6
Aj tento prklad sa tka predsedu udovej strany Nae Slovensko Marina Kotlebu, a to konkrtne kauzy, ktor sa ako jedna z mla mohla dosta pred sd, v tomto prpade pred Okresn sd v Banskej Bystrici. Kotleba bol trestne sthan za lepenie propaganch materilov v rmci kampane na predsedu Banskobystrickho samosprvneho kraja v roku 2009. Na letkoch stl aj slogan odstrni nespravodliv zvhodovanie nielen cignskych parazitov. Na Kotlebu podal 14. 12. 2010 na Okresnom sde v Banskej Bystrici okresn prokurtor obalobu za prein hanobenia nroda, rasy a presvedenia poda 423 ods. 1 psm. a trestnho zkona8, ktor mal obvinen spcha tm, e v obdob mesiacov september a oktber 2009 bol ako nezvisl kandidt na upana autorom letkov s vyie uvedenm textom hanobiacim Rmov. stav: Okresn sd v Banskej Bystrici uznesenm samosudcu Petra Philadelphyho z 15. 12. 2010 zastavil trestn sthanie obvinenho Kotlebu, kee poda samosudcu sa z dkazov nedalo usdi, i za letkmi skutone stl Kotleba. Samosudca, ako aj predloen dkazn materil, obstaran v prpravnom konan, skontatoval, e vsledky prpravnho konania neodvoduj postavenie obvinenho pred sd, pretoe z vykonanho dokazovania nepochybne nevyplva, e skutok spchal obvinen. Philadelphy svoje rozhodnutie oprel o vyjadrenia svedkov, ktor neoznaili konkrtnu osobu, ktor stla za vlepom letkov: iadnym dkaznm prostriedkom nebolo preukzan, e by sa obvinen podieal na distribcii alebo rozirovan spomenutch propaganch materilov, resp. e by bol ich autorom. Z predloenho letka vyplva len to, e sa tkal predvolebnej kampane obvinenho Mgr. M... K.... na predsedu Banskobystrickho samosprvneho kraja, ale kto je jeho autorom, kto ho vyrobil, kto ho roziroval a distribuoval preukzan nebolo.9 O sanosti okresnho prokurtora 18. 1. 2011 rozhodoval v sente zloenom z predsedu sentu JUDr. Jna Deka a sudcov JUDr. Petra Chovanka a JUDr. Juraja Babjaka Krajsk sd v Banskej Bystrici.10 Krajsk sd zruil napadnut uznesenie Okresnho sdu: Proti tomuto uzneseniu podal v zkonnej lehote sanos okresn prokurtor. V psomnom odvodnen sanosti uviedol, e sa nestotouje so zvermi prvostupovho sdu. Poukzal na to, e obvinen bol vypout v postaven svedka, kde potvrdil, e autorom inkriminovanho textu je on, o napokon potvrdil aj v sanosti podanej proti uzneseniu o vznesen obvinenia.
8 9 Odsek 1) Kto verejne hanob a) niektor nrod, jeho jazyk, niektor rasu alebo etnick skupinu potresce sa odatm slobody na jeden a tri roky. Uznesenie samosudcu JUDr. Petra Philadelphyho z Okresnho sdu v Banskej Bystrici da 15. 12. 2010 spisov znaka 1T 126/2010.

prklad 4:
Letk miestneho odboru Matice slovenskej v Pchove, ktor v tom ase viedol kandidt na poslanca NR SR za udov stranu Nae Slovensko Marin Miun, pozval na mting v Martine sloganom obsahujcim slovn spojenie asocilni cignski paraziti. stav: Polcia trestn oznmenie Matice slovenskej, ktor sa okrem inho brnila zneuvaniu svojho mena, zamietla s tm, e nebolo jasn, koho tm autor letka myslel. i klamrskych parazitov alebo prslunkov rmskeho etnika. Vyetrovate z Martina poda vyjadren polcie v ilinskom kraji k takmuto zveru dospel na zklade rozboru slova cig poda slovnka slovenskho jazyka.6 Nezohadnil pritom znmy kontext vroku ani jeho autorstvo. Vrok asocilni cignski paraziti sa pritom od roku 2009 pravidelne vyskytoval na mtingoch extrmne pravicovch a radiklne nacionalistickch skupn a viackrt ho pouil aj f miestneho odboru Matice slovenskej Marin Miun. Miuna vak doteraz nikto ani len nevypoul. Zdvodnenm polcie bolo, e to nie je povinnos vyetrovatea a e proti takmuto postupu nenamietal ani prokurtor.

prklad 5:
V roku 2009 Marin Kotleba, lder udovej strany Nae Slovensko, pozdravil na demontrcii k vzniku Slovenskho ttu zhromadench pozdravom Na Str!, ktor pouvali Hlinkove gardy v ase, kedy bola Slovensk vojnov republika satelitom faistickho Nemecka. stav: Prokurtorka jeho obvinenie pre trestn in podpory a propagcie skupn smerujcich k potlaeniu zkladnch prv a slobd napriek znaleckmu posudku ktor opsal pozdrav ako pozdrav polovojenskch oddielov totalitnho reimu, zruila. Prokurtorka kontatovala, e Kotleba nepouil pozdrav kompletn, to znamen, e nezdvihol dva prsty svojej ruky do rovne o.7

5 6 7

Pozri: http://www.sme.sk/c/5546779/antisemitske-pokriky-fanusikov-vysetria.html. Pozri: http://www.expres.sk/spravodajstvo/sprava/11805/undefined?78. Pozri: http://pospolitost.wordpress.com/2009/06/28/pouzivanie-pozdravu-na-straz-nie-je-trestnym-cinom-uznala-to-aj-prokuratura/.

10 Uznesenie Krajskho sdu v Banskej Bystrici da 18.1.2011 spisov znaka 5 To 12/2011, IS: 6110011469.

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Je obmedzenie slobody prejavu efektvne?

Ke bol Mgr. M. K. nsledne vypout v postaven obvinenho, vypovedal v tom zmysle, e si nie je vedom protiprvnosti svojho konania. Prokurtor vyslovil potom nzor, e nie s pochybnosti o autorstve obvinenho k predmetnmu textu. Navrhol, aby Krajsk sd zruil napadnut uznesenie a Okresnmu sdu prikzal vo veci znova kona a rozhodn. Krajsk sd na podklade podanej sanosti preskmal sprvnos vrokov napadnutho uznesenia, proti ktorm saovate podal sanos a tie konanie predchdzajce tmto vrokom a dospel k zveru, e sanos mono akceptova, avak len o sa tka dvodu zastavenia trestnho sthania, pretoe Krajsk sd dvod zastavenia trestnho sthania vid v inch skutonostiach. Uznesenie Krajskho sdu v tomto bode teda ukzalo, e samosudca Okresnho sdu zastavil trestn sthanie Kotlebu napriek tomu, e letky slili jeho kampani, Kotleba sa od nich neditancoval, dokonca poas vypoutia v postaven svedka potvrdil, e je autorom inkriminovanho textu: Krajsk sd sa potom nemohol nestotoni s dvodmi uvedenmi v napadnutom uznesen, e sa nepodarilo preukza, kto dan text napsal a distribuoval. Vyplva to napokon i z logickho hodnotenia veci, z ktorho je zrejm, e obvinen musel vedie, o je obsa hom letku, prostrednctvom ktorho kandidoval na post predsedu Banskobystrickho samosprvneho kraja v Banskej Bystrici a s tmto textom v letku bol aj uzrozumen. Krajsk sd vak zastavil trestn sthanie Kotlebu pre prein hanobenia rasy, nroda a presvedenia poda 423 ods.1 psm. a) trestnho zkona: Na druhej strane, aj sanostn sd mal k dispozcii letk, kde poda obaloby bol aj text, ktor mal by namieren proti rmskemu etniku a spovajci presne v tom, e obvinen Mgr. M. K.., ako nezvisl kandidt na predsedu Banskobystrickho samosprvneho kraja, uvdza s tvojou dverou urite dokem (okrem inho) odstrni nespravodliv zvhodovanie nielen cignskych parazitov. Z vkladu tohto textu pritom jednoznane vyplva, e obvinenmu nejde o Rmov ako etnikum v celku, ale len o tch, ktor sa priivuj na vhodch, ktor im poskytuje spolonos, a napokon nejde len o parazitujcich z tohto etnika, ale aj o parazitujcich z vinovho obyvatestva, o je zdraznen spojkou nielen. Z tohto vkladu je zrejm, e takto text zo strany obvinenho neme naplni znaky preinu hanobenia nroda, rasy a presvedenia poda 423 ods.1 psm. a) trestnho zkona, kee obvinenmu nie je preukzaten mysel hanobi verejne etnick skupinu, konkrtne Rmov. Splnomocnenec vldy pre rmske komunity Miroslav Pollk nazval postup sdov v tejto kauze kreatvnym alibizmom.11 Podpredseda vldy pre meniny Rudolf Chmel vydal vo februri 2011 vyhlsenie12, z ktorho vyplva, e Kotlebove vroky na rozdiel od sdu povauje za tok na Rmov, a to na cel etnick skupinu (meniny s zrove poda Chmela zranitenejie)
11 Pozri: http://www.expres.sk/spravodajstvo/sprava/15102/kotleba-romov-nehanobil-podla-pollaka-ide-o-kreativny-alibizmus-sudu.html. 12 Pozri: http://vicepremier.sk/index.php?ID=24419.

a vyzval sdy i vetky ttne orgny, aby u proti o i len rasistickm nznakom pouili vetky dostupn prostriedky a sthali ich, kee tieto podnecuj medzietnick naptie a posiluj stereotypy o Rmoch.13

hodnotenie
Nemusme meni zkony, lebo aj tak nefunguj, resp. astokrt za sympatizovanie s totalitnmi ideolgiami i verblne prejavy nenvisti nikto nie je postihnut. Deje sa tak po: l neinnosti alebo zveroch polcie, l uzneseniach prokuratry, ktor vsledky policajnch vyetrovateov zruia, l ako dsledok rozhodnut sdov, napriek posudkom znalcov i vpovediam svedkov. Meme tak zrui obmedzenia v trestnom zkone a necha extrmistov hovori o chc, kee tak robia bez akchkovek nsledkov. Existuje vea u uzatvorench alebo pokraujcich prpadov, ale vinnci ostvaj nepotrestan. Dvodom, preo napriek tomuto relnemu stavu na Slovensku zrejme neprde ani k formlnemu rueniu obmedzen slobody prejavu s, poda niektorch nzorov, medzinrodn prvne zvzky. Ide najm o Dohovor OSN o elimincii vetkch foriem rasovej diskrimincie, k dodriavaniu ktorho je zaviazan aj Slovensko.14 o tt me a mus zmeni, je prstup polcie, prokuratry a sdov v oblasti rasizmu a extrmizmu. Ak aj ide len o okrajov kriminalitu v pomere ku krdeiam, ozbrojenm lpeiam, znsilneniam, ubleniam na zdrav i vradm, skupiny stojace za extrmistickou kriminalitou s antisystmov a ich snahou je zvrhn demokraciu. Inak takmer vetko zostva len v deklaratvnej rovine a ani neonacistick i extrmistick skupiny nemusia ma z perzekci obavy.

sloboda prejavu pre neonacistov?

Poradca eskho prezidenta Vclava Klausa Petr Hjek vyzval bvalch disidentov Vclava Havla a Jana Rumla, aby demontrovali za slobodu slova v prpade poprednch eskch neonacistov.15 Reagoval tak na sdny proces s poprednmi neonacistami lepili nlepky, organizovali spomienkov akciu za padlch vojakov nacistickej armdy. Hjek vyhlsil: Je vemi zl, ke pravicov extrmisti nemu hovori, o si myslia. Demokracia tm upad a stva sa z nej boh karikatra. Sloboda slova, nzoru a politickho presvedenia plat len pre tch, ktor maj ten sprvny politick nzor, to sprvne politick presvedenie. Hjek dokonca povedal, e chce sm vyrba nlepky, ak bude proces pokraova. Kritizoval bvalch hrdinskch disidentov, e nedemontruj za slobodu slova preto, lebo ide o politick proces s nositemi nzorov a mylienok, ktor s tmto uom cudzie. V diskusii na
13 Pozri: http://www.expres.sk/spravodajstvo/sprava/15117/na-rozsudky-sudov-ohladom-kotlebu-reagoval-aj-vicepremier-chmel.html. 14 Pozri: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Elimination_of_All_Forms_of_Racial_Discriminatio. 15 Pozri: http://www.sme.sk/c/5634209/klausov-poradca-sa-zastal-neonacistov-kritizoval-havla.html.

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Je obmedzenie slobody prejavu efektvne?

portli SME.sk sa pod medializovanou sprvou objavili dva protichodn prspevky, ktor asi najvernejie vyjadruj rozdielny pohad verejnosti na slobodu prejavu pre neonacistov: a) Diskutr sano b: Hjek sa jednm slovom nezastal neonacistov Hjek sa zastal slobody prejavu a upozornil na dve dleit veci: 1. demokracia a verejn diskurz upad, ak je sloboda prejavu a priori selektvna; 2. neonacizmus nezmizne ani nevyhynie, ak ho politicky korektn aviiari zamet pod koberec. b) Diskutr blanc1: a oho sa tka sloboda slova v prpade neonacistov? ak bud vykrikova, e treba posla niekoho do plynu, prpadne, e plynov komory neexistovali? Tak tmto zkazom demokracia nebude a tak vemi ochudobnen... Na Slovensku sa zatia iadny politik, podobne ako Hjek, neprejavil. Minister vntra Slovenskej republiky, vo vlde premirky Radiovej, Daniel Lipic, je znmy akurt tm, e je schopn akceptova aj slobodu prejavu extrmistov. Je vecou ns politikov, vs novinrov a nzorovch elt vykza nositeov extrmistickch nzorov na okraj spoloenskho diania. To s neslun, zakomplexovan udia. Ale poui trestn prvo? Poda mjho nzoru tt by nemal ma prvo, povedal Lipic v jli 2010.16 O vzve Hjeka disidentom mono poveda, e je rozporupln. Km Havlovi a Rumlovi ilo o porku a odstrnenie totalitnho komunistickho reimu, cieom eskch neonacistov je odstrnenie demokracie. Je vak pravda, e v USA toleruj neonacistick skupiny, ktor mu slobodne aj hajlova.

pohad 1
NEMECKO vplyv neonacistov je v, s relnou hrozbou. Poet tokov a verejnch akci stpa. USA mu sce hajlova, ale ich vplyv na spolonos je minimlny. S okrajovou subkultrou.

pohad 2
NEMECKO napriek rastcej sile neonacistov s strany typu NPD a ich sympatizanti na okraji spolonosti. Elity s voi nim v opozcii. USA udia napojen na extrmistick a rasistick zdruenia sa objavuj po boku republiknov a prezentuj sa v mdich. Ich terie tkajce sa prisahovalcov preberaj konzervatvne mdi. Poda tohto pohadu je ich vplyv v ne v Nemecku.

Zver
Kad krajina si mus njs vlastn odpove na extrmizmus, kee v kadej sa zrodil z inch koreov. loha mdi, ktor sa asto obmedzuj na informovanie o pochodoch extrmistickch skupn bez odhaovania ich pozadia, je v tomto smere nezastupiten, pretoe sprostredkvaj masm obraz, ktor mu zafarbi rznym spsobom. O veciach spojench s extrmizmom by mali mdi informova kriticky a v kontexte, aby verejnos vedela rozli kto k nej hovor.18 Od ttu, orgnov innch v trestnom konan a sdov sa zase oakva, e javy, ktor ohrozuj udsk prva a demokratick spolonos ako tak, bud eliminova tak, ako ke zkon. Ak aj nesthaj vinu prejavov extrmistov eliminova, v zujme obianskej spolonosti je, aby ich aspo nelegitimizovali. V opanom prpade s len karikatrou samch seba a sloboda prejavu je de facto na Slovensku neobmedzen alebo obmedzovan len ad hoc. V takom prpade je otzne, i Slovensko nie je viazan medzinrodnmi dohovormi len formlne a nemalo by od nich odstpi a zrui legislatvu, ktor m nenvistn, aj ke nensiln (vroky, gest a symbolika) prejavy extrmistov postihova.

prklady obmedzovania slobody prejavu: nemecko a Usa

Ako reagova na hate speech, resp. verblne prejavy nenvisti extrmistickch i chulignskych skupn, najm voi meninm? Porovnajme si dve krajiny s vrazne odlinm prstupom. Nemecko s prsnymi zkonmi voi prejavom neonacizmu a USA17, kde maj vonos v sebarealizcii. Otzka znie, o je viac efektvne i postihova verblne hanobiace a nenvistn prejavy, alebo nie.

premisa
NEMECKO prsne postihuje verblne prejavy extrmistov. USA vonos pre extrmistov. Napriek tomu neexistuje jednoznan odpove, kde maj extrmisti v vplyv, resp., kde hroz z ich strany vie nebezpeenstvo.

16 17

Pozri: http://aktualne.centrum.sk/domov/doprava-a-bezpecnost/clanek.phtml?id=1212784. Pozri: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution.

18

Pozri: http://danilov.blog.sme.sk/c/241422/Reporting-on-extremist-politicians.html.

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CYberhaTe 2 praviCov eXTrMiZMUs a MainsTreaMov rasiZMUs na inTerneTe aKo KaDoDenn reaLiTa

ronald eissens
International Network Against Cyber Hate, Holandsko
Preo bojova proti prejavom nenvisti na internete? Nao vbec bojova proti hate speech (verblnym prejavom nenvisti)? Nenvis a jej prostriedok renia hate speech rozdeuje ud, spsobuje utrpenie, nsilie, neraz vrady, zneuvanie, etnick naptie, vojnu a teror. Skresuje myslenie. Je nepriateom logiky. Obracia ns jeden proti druhmu. Nejde o banlne i nekodn zlo. Jeho zmerom je v konenom dsledku odstrni demokraciu a zavradi tch, ktorch nem rada. Za kadm pogromom, genocdou, etnickou istkou i vojnou, boli na zaiatku slov. Slov nenvisti. Medzi ritemi nenvisti na internete sa prejavuje snaha oznaova zneucovanie a rasizmus za urnalistiku, na zklade oho si pisatelia vyaduj slobodu. V mene slobody prejavu je tendencia publikova i ukza okovek, bez ohadu na to, i je to znevaujce, podnecujce k nenvisti alebo jednoznane rasistick. Dominantnm prstupom nie je lska k slobode prejavu, ale hedonizmus poda hesla vetko je mon. o je teda sloboda prejavu? Nemala by by pln a neobmedzen? Nie je sloboda a demokracia prve o tom? Po prv: pln sloboda prejavu neexistuje. Dokonca aj stava USA uznva ist obmedzenia slobody prejavu. Po druh: ak by sme v mene slobody prejavu a demokracie nemali prejav nijako obmedzova a ponecha nenvis a extrmizmus bez konfrontcie, znamenalo by to koniec demokracie. Jej miesto by prevzala diktatra, ktorej prvm krokom by bolo obmedzenie slobody prejavu. To chc prve t, ktor ria nenvis. Chc najvyiu moc na to, aby sa zbavili vetkho, o nemaj radi, vrtane slobody prejavu.

Krtke dejiny nenvisti na internete

Od roku 1992 vyuvaj neonacisti internet na renie svojej rtoriky. U pred existenciou World Wide Web (www) si nemeck neonacisti uvedomovali potencil informanch technolgi a vyuvali Bulletin Board Systems. Akonhle to bolo mon, presunuli sa na internet. V istom zmysle nemuseli zjs aleko od domu. Ako ukzal novinr a spisovate Edwin Black, informan vek sa nezrodil v Silicon Valley, ale v Berlne v roku 1933. IBM pomohla administrcii holokaustu kartami na stanie udu a technolgiou tikacch kariet.

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CYberhaTe 2 pravicov extrmizmus a mainstreamov rasizmus na internete ako kadodenn realita

Pritom poboky IBM boli spravovan zo vajiarska. Nacisti mali problm a IBM poskytla prostriedok na urchlenie ich konenho rieenia. Preto je pre ns ponauenm ma sa na pozore pred tmi, ktor tvrdia, e len predvaj technolgie a nezle im, na o sa vyuvaj. Vaka internetu je dnes vo svete viac antisemitizmu a odmietania holokaustu, ne v minulosti. Ale vaka internetu mme k dispozcii aj viac informci o holokauste a antisemitizme, ne tomu bolo doposia. Tieto dve polohy sa len ako vzjomne vyvia, aj keby ste si mysleli, e negatvne a nsiln prejavy mono vyvi reou pozitvnou. U to nie s oumel knhkupectv predvajce pod pultom vtlaky Protokolov sionskch mudrcov. Ani po domoch roznan cyklostylov kpie neonacistickch pamfletov. Dnes ide o tisce webstrnok a sttisce prejavov rasizmu, diskrimincie, antisemitizmu, nenvisti voi moslimom, homosexulom i Rmom. S to miliny kliknut a sttisce nvtev webstrnok. Dnes sa vina hate speech preniesla na internet. Pvodn komunikan mdi na renie diskrimincie a nenvisti sa stali zastaranmi. Mein Kampf, Protokoly sionskch mudrcov, i Hardwoodsove prejavy naozaj zomrelo es milinov ud aj dnes njdete v tom typickom oumelom knhkupectve alebo si ich objednte cez internet. Koko mladch ud pod 30 rokov vak ete ta knihy? Vemi mlo. Pre mnohch sa stal internet hlavnou kninicou, encyklopdiou, komunikanm prostriedkom a centrom zbavy. Za sedemns rokov, odkedy sa rozbehol internet, prenikli rasizmus a diskrimincia do vetkch jeho zkut. Najprv len do pravicovo extrmistickch webstrnok a ich uvateskch skupn. Dnes ich vak njdete na webovch blogoch, frach, Youtube, internetovch hrch, chatoch, na Facebooku, Myspace, at.. Poet webstrnok prezentujcich antisemitizmus alebo odmietanie holokaustu dosiahol desiatky tisc. Prpady nenvisti voi moslimom s nespotaten. Nehovorme len o pecializovanch neonacistickch i inch extrmistickch webstrnkach. Ben populrne frum m denne viac ne 1 000 vstupov, z ktorch je priemerne 50 rasistickej i diskriminanej povahy. Takchto fr s na webe tisce. Ke k tomu pridte tisce extrmistickch internetovch fr, ktor denne prdu so stovkami nenvistnch vrokov, k tomu vetky odkazy na strnkach socilnych mdi ako Youtube, Twitter a Facebook, celkov objem je zvratn. Vieme len, e je obrovsk. Ale registrova a vetko to monitorova, je ako rta vnne muky. Je ich vea, rchlo umieraj, ale kee sa rchlo mnoia, stle sa rodia nov.

Nenvis sa na internete stala kadodennou realitou a vznamnm mienkotvornm faktorom. udia si bu vedome, alebo podvedome vytvraj nzor poda toho, o je na Facebooku alebo na Twittri. Alebo aj tak, e si na Google vyhadaj informcie pre kolsk lohu a neraz sa im ponkne myln alebo priam rasistick informcia. Alebo ke si pretaj obben blog, i vaka interakcii na webfre. Dokonca vaka hre ako je Etnick istka. Internet je nefiltrovan a zatia sa nikto neu, ako vyhodnoti pravdivos jeho informci. Ani rodiia i uitelia nemaj znalosti a as pomc. Tm sa dostvam k smutnej realite: poda tatistiky je hate speech publikovan na internete inmi ako neonacistami alebo pravicovmi extrmistami vplyvnejia, a preto nebezpenejia. Nenvis na webe sa stala mainstreamom. Tak ako vzostup populistickch strn v Eurpe, mainstreamov nenvistnci asto definuj svoju nenvis ako politick rtoriku. Chc zachrni krajinu alebo Eurpu pred invziou moslimov. Chc upozorni na moc idov. Neraz ikovne zakrvaj svoje skuton zmery a tvrdia, e maj staros o imigrciu a preitie krajiny. Populistick strany tvrdo pracuj na tom, aby previedli nenvis na cel spolonos. A mainstreamov rasisti a bigoti na internete robia to ist. Vsledkom je prehlbovanie rozdelenia spolonosti, vyia podpora rasistickch mylienok, viac zloinov z nenvisti. Uvediem niekoko prkladov. Vrada publicistu a filmra Thea van Gogha moslimskm extrmistom v Holandsku v roku 2004 bola podnieten internetom. Samotn vrada viedla k aliemu rozsiahlemu podnecovaniu na internete. Webfra a blogy zaplavili tisce protimoslimskch vyjadren a vziev k bombovm tokom na meity a zabjaniu moslimov. Vsledkom bola vlna podpaaskch tokov, ako aj tokov na moslimov a domnelch moslimov v Holandsku. Zhorela meita a islamsk zkladn kola, vyskytol sa tie pokus vyhodi do vzduchu in meitu. Celkovo dolo k 174 nsilnm tokom, z oho bolo 36 prpadov podpaastva, 1 prpad vrady, 12 prpadov toku a 23 prpadov majetkovho pokodenia. Uvedomujem si, e nie kad shlas s argumentom, e podnecovanie k nenvisti na internete vedie k nsiliu v relnom svete a to ma zara. Je to vak fakt. Zvltne, e niektor udia si myslia, e ukazova v televzii alebo na internete nah eny alebo prsia, i dvoch muov alebo eny bozkva sa, k nieomu vedie. K omu konkrtne? K pohlavnmu styku? Alebo k tomu, e sa z niekoho zrazu stane homosexul? Nie je zvltne, e podnecovanie k sexu alebo homosexualite je realita, zatia o podnecovanie k nenvisti ou nie je? Je tu stran posolstvo: zloin z nenvisti je v poriadku, sex je v poriadku len ho neukazujte, ale homosexualita vbec nie je v poriadku! Nae deti chrnime pred tm, aby videli nahotu i prejavy homosexulnej lsky, ale nemme problm s tm, e sa pozeraj na najhorie prejavy nsilia a rasizmu, alebo ich nechvame hra nsiln potaov hry.

sasn realita web 2.0

Modern interaktvny internet so svojimi blogmi, frami, foto a videoarchvmi ako Youtube, prostriedky socilneho networkingu ako Facebook i Twitter, robia z kohokovek okamitho publicistu. Internet je najvou mydelnikou na svete a t, ktor by sa neodvili vyjadri svoje nzory offline, nachdzaj komunikan kanly na ich vyjadrenie na internete, majc pritom pocit, e s celkom anonymn. Ke je raz nieo na internete, je takmer nemon nadobro sa toho zbavi. ijeme vo svete kopruj a vlo.

rieenia
Na problematiku renia nenvisti cez internet je niekoko rieen. Prvm je odstrnenie materilu ako jednho z hlavnch nstrojov Medzinrodnej siete proti nenvisti na internete (International Network Against Cyber Hate INACH). INACH vznikla v roku 2002 ako prostriedok na zniovanie prejavov nenvisti na internete. Je to medzinrodn sie s lenmi v 18 krajinch (16 v Eurpe a 2 v Severnej Amerike). Kad lensk organizcia m vlastn

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spsob prce. Niektor pracuj spsobom iastone dobrovonho odstraovania materilu, skoro vetky sa venuj vchove a vzdelvaniu, niektor z ns odstrauj nenvis tm, e otvorene pomenvaj a zahanbuj vinnkov, alebo spolupracuj s internetovm priemyslom, niektor sa venuj vhradne prijatm sanostiam, in sleduj internet. Vetci monitorujeme, robme vskum a publikujeme. Sme praktick a flexibiln sie zameran skr na monosti, ne na diskusiu o zdanlivo otvorench prvnickch otzkach. Od roku 2002 sa nm podarilo odstrni viac ne 15 000 prejavov nenvisti, iniciova niekoko sdnych konan a dosiahnu obvinenie viac ne 60 internetovch rasistov a antisemitov. Vyuvajc rznu nrodn a medzinrodn legislatvu zameran na boj proti nenvisti, sname sa obmedzova renie verblnych prejavov nenvisti, a tm robi aj nbor tch, ktor nenvisti ete nepodahli, ako aj predchdza zloinom z nenvisti v relnom svete. Druhm dleitm nstrojom, ktor INACH vyuva, je vchova. Mlde je mimoriadne citlivou skupinou, ktor mono ahko ovplyvova, indoktrinova a robi medzi ou nbor. Vina z ns sa tie venuje vchovnm a vzdelvacm projektom. Kee koly oraz viac vyuvaj internet, iaci si na om musia vyhadva informcie, priom s konfrontovan s rasistickmi a antisemitskmi webstrnkami alebo strnkami s inm diskriminanm obsahom. Rodiia a uitelia potrebuj pomoc a radu, ako o najlepie filtrova a vyhodnocova informcie, aby chrnili a nleite viedli deti a iakov. Uitelia a vychovvatelia sami potrebuj prruky. Naa holandsk a nemeck organizcia pripravili vzdelvacie CD-ROMy s praktickmi informciami o tom, ako rozozna a bojova proti rasizmu, odmietaniu holokaustu, antisemitizmu a diskrimincii na internete. CD obsahuj vukov moduly, vysvetlivky rznych druhov nenvisti na internete, prruky o pravicovo extrmistickch a rasistickch symboloch a rtorike, ktor rasisti bene pouvaj pri nbore mldee, o predsudkoch, prklady toho, o sa na internete publikuje a rady, ako vyhodnocova webstrnky a o robi pri konfrontcii s nenvisou na internete. CD vyuvaj viacvrstvov prstup, aby boli dostupn uiteom, rodiom a stredokolkom. Naa lensk organizcia v USA Antidefamation League, m navye mnostvo online prruiek, vzdelvacch programov a modulov. Existuje tie monos filtrova nevhodn obsah webstrnok. Tto alternatvu vak podporujeme len na kolch a u iakov. Vychdzame toti z toho, e filtrovanie problm nevyriei. Filtrova znamen zavrie okn, ke je na ulici nsilie: ke ni nevidm, ni sa tam nedeje. Napokon je tu aj monos konfrontova hate speech s opanm prejavom. Toto je najzloitejie z monch rieen. Na to, aby sa realizovalo ako projekt, treba disciplnu, mnostvo vedomost a pracovnkov. Samozrejme, e sa mu me venova kad z ns po veeroch, doma, alebo formou kolskho projektu, zjs na blog alebo webfrum a konfrontova diskriminciu a in prejavy verblnej nenvisti, informova, zverejova linky na vhodn materil, i konfrontova li. Internet u dvno nie je novinkou. Dnes existuje cel genercia ud nepozn dobu, kedy internet neexistoval. Stal sa integrlnou, dokonca kovou sasou nho ivota. Je to nstroj, ktor denne pouvame na dobr i zl ely. Musme vynaloi viac energie na to, aby sme na internet dodali hodnotnej materil a zbavili ho zlho.

TresTn inY MoTivovan nenvisoU (Charakteristika, dopad a loha medzinrodnch organizci pri ich potieran.)
Daniel Milo
poradca pre boj proti rasizmu a xenofbiu OBSE ODIHR
o s to trestn iny motivovan nenvisou? Ako sa odliuj od ostatnej kriminality? m s pecifick a ak monosti maj orgny ttu a medzinrodn organizcie pri ich potlan? Toto s otzky, na ktorch pln zodpovedanie by nestail omnoho v priestor, ne ponka tento zbornk. Napriek tomu vak dfam, e sa mi v tomto texte na ne podar aspo iastone nartn odpovede.

Definovanie trestnch inov z nenvisti

Pojem hate crimes, najastejie prekladan do sloveniny ako trestn iny motivovan nenvisou (alebo trestn iny z nenvisti), je v mnohch krajinch sveta stle pomerne nov a preto tento koncept vyaduje irie objasnenie. Existuje viacero definci trestnch inov z nenvisti1, vetky vak maj spolon tieto rty: l trestn in z nenvisti mus v prvom rade spa znaky trestnho inu poda prvneho poriadku danho ttu; l v druhom rade sa mus jedna o tak trestn in, pri ktorom si pchate vybral objekt trestnho inu (ktorm me by jednotlivec, skupina osb alebo majetok) na zklade skutonej alebo domnelej prslunosti, i vzahu k niektorej z takzvanch chrnench charakteristk. Za chrnen charakteristiky sa pritom povauj zkladn, kov charakteristiky, ktor s bu vroden alebo je ich zmena zsadnm zsahom do identity loveka. Najastejie uvdzanmi chrnenmi charakteristikami v svislosti s trestnmi inmi z nenvisti s: pohlavie, rasa, etnick prslunos, nrodnos, jazyk, vierovyznanie, sexulna orientcia a telesn i mentlne postihnutie.

Za medzinrodne akceptovan sa povauje defincia hate crimes vypracovan OSCE-ODIHR. Pozri: http://www.osce.org/odihr/68668 alebo defincia v Hate crime act zo Spojench ttov americkch, poda ktorej je zloinom z nenvisti "a crime in which the defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that is the object of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person."

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Trestn iny motivovan nenvisou

Cieom takto pomerne iroko koncipovanej defincie trestnch inov z nenvisti je zachyti o najir okruh prpadov, kedy si pchate myselne vyber obe toku prve na zklade prslunosti i vzahu k niektorej z tchto chrnench charakteristk. Pchate zloinu z nenvisti si teda vyber obe trestnho inu nie ako indivduum, ale ako zstupcu uritch hodnt i charakteristk, ktor s reprezentovan danou skupinou. tok teda nesmeruje voi konkrtnej osobe, ale voi celej skupine osb urenej ich prslunosou k rase, etniku, vierovyznaniu, sexulnej orientcii at. a osoba (prpadne budova), voi ktorej je tok namieren, len reprezentuje dan skupinu. Takto konanie vychdza z predsudkov voi tejto skupine, ktor sa manifestuj v nsilnom konan. Tento princp sa nazva princpom vberu (selection principle). zko sa spja s alou charakteristickou rtou zloinov z nenvisti, ktorou je absencia inej materilnej pohntky konania (napr. majetkov prospech). Samozrejme existuj aj prpady zmieanej motivcie, kde prslunos obete k uritej skupine zohrva lohu pri jej vbere, aj ke motvom inu je majetkov obohatenie. Prkladom takhoto konania me by naprklad lpen prepadnutie obeti idovskho pvodu. Primrnou motivciou je majetkov prospech, ale pri vbere obeti vychdzal pchate z predsudku, e vetci idia s bohat, preto si vybral prve takto obe. Termn hate crimes sa po prvkrt objavil v legislatve USA v roku 19692, ke bol prijat federlny zkon o trestnch inoch z nenvisti. Neskorie prijat zkony3 o trestnch inoch motivovanch nenvisou rozrili okruh chrnench charakteristk, ako i innost, na ktor sa vzahuje ochrana na federlnej rovni. Americk legislatva sa v tejto oblasti stala postupom asu modelom pre mnoho inch krajn. Existuj dva zkladn modely pravy tejto trestnej innosti v trestnch kdexoch jednotlivch ttov. Prvm modelom je definovanie trestnch inov motivovanch nenvisou ako pecifickch skutkovch podstt s vlastnmi ustanoveniami v trestnch kdexoch. V rmci tohto modelu existuj rzne prstupy definovania okruhu objektov toku (len osoby, alebo osoby aj majetok), chrnench skupn/charakteristk, ako i formy spchania trestnho inu (hrozba nsilm, pouitie nsilia at.). Tento model prvnej pravy pouvaj naprklad USA a Vek Britnia. Druhm modelom je pouitie kvalifikovanch skutkovch podstt definujcich motv inu (rasov, etnick, nrodnostn, nboensk i in obdobn nenvis) ako pecifick znak trestnho inu, ktor podmieuje pouitie vyej trestnej sadzby. V rmci tohto modelu tie existuj rozdiely ohadne uplatovania nenvisti, ako faktora podmieujceho pouitie vyej trestnej sadzby pri akomkovek trestnom ine (napr. Chorvtsko, Bosna a Hercegovina) alebo len pri niektorch skutkovch podstatch (napr. ublenie na zdrav, vrada at.).
2 3 Federal Hate Crime Law United States Code, lnok 18, 245(b)(2). Pozri: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/245.html. Hate Crime Statistics Act (1990), Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (2009).

Prvna prava zloinov z nenvisti v slovenskom prvnom poriadku vychdza najm z druhho modelu a vyuva osobitn motv konania4 podmieujci pouitie kvalifikovanch skutkovch podstt a vyej trestnej sadzby (trestn iny kladnej vrady, vrady, zabitia, ublenia na zdrav, nsilia proti skupine obyvateov at.). V svislosti s prvnou pravou trestnch inov z nenvisti vak treba zdrazni, e termn zloiny z nenvisti oznauje skr typ alebo kategriu trestnch inov, ktor sa od ostatnch odliuj svojm charakterom a dopadom, ne pecifick ustanovenia v trestnch zkonoch jednotlivch ttov.5 Pod pojem trestn iny z nenvisti toti meme subsumova urit typ konan sankcionovanch trestnm zkonom aj v prpade, e v danej krajine neexistuj pecifick ustanovenia trestnho zkona vymedzujce tento pojem. D sa teda poveda, e termn zloiny z nenvisti je skr prvnym konceptom, ne prvnou definciou v legislatvnom zmysle.

nie je nenvis ako nenvis

astm omylom pri hodnoten zloinov z nenvisti je definovanie nenvisti v nzve tohto druhu trestnej innosti. Aj ke sa v samotnom nzve spomna nenvis, nie je nevyhnutn na to, aby bol dan skutok charakterizovan ako trestn in z nenvisti. Pchate nemus cti nenvis voi konkrtnej obeti takhoto trestnho inu. Posta, ak plat, e vber obete bol motivovan jej prslunosou k danej skupine definovanej spolonou charakteristikou. A naopak, nie kad trestn in, v ktorom pchate subjektvne pociuje nenvis voi obeti, spad do kategrie trestnho inu z nenvisti. Naprklad ak manel fyzicky napadne milenca svojej manelky (a jeho tok je motivovan osobnou nenvisou), nebude takto tok posudzovan ako hate crime. A naopak, ak pchate, ktor hod zpaln fau do domu, v ktorom bvaj Rmovia, nemus pociova osobn nenvis voi obetiam na to, aby mohol by takto in kvalifikovan ako trestn in z nenvisti.

Dopad hate crimes

alm znakom, ktorm sa trestn iny z nenvisti odliuj od ostatnej kriminality, je ich dopad tak na individulnej, ako aj na skupinovej a celospoloenskej rovni. Takto toky, i u s smerovan voi osobm alebo majetku, maj kvli svojmu charakteru ovea ir dopad, ako ben trestn iny. Na individulnej rovni je ich dopad zrejm vo forme posttraumatickho oku, pretrvvajcich pocitov ohrozenia, i a zmien sprvania obet. Prstup polcie a prokuratry doke znane ovplyvni mieru nsledkov skutku na obe.
4 140 psm. d) Trestnho zkona: Osobitnm motvom sa rozumie spchanie trestnho inu... v mysle verejne podnecova k nsiliu alebo nenvisti voi skupine osb alebo jednotlivcovi pre ich prslunos k niektorej rase, nrodu, nrodnosti, farbe pleti, etnickej skupine, pvodu rodu alebo pre ich nboensk vyznanie, ak je zmienkou pre vyhranie sa z predchdzajcich dvodov. Aj ke, ako je uveden vyie, existuje cel rad ttov, ktorch trestn kdexy obsahuj definciu trestnch inov z nenvisti.

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Trestn iny motivovan nenvisou

Dopad takchto inov na skupinovej rovni vychdza z princpu vberu tok nesmeruje voi konkrtnej obeti, t je len nhodnm reprezentantom danej skupiny. Ostatn lenovia skupiny preto oprvnene pociuj ohrozenie a strach, e sa v budcnosti mu sta obeami toku. Trestn iny z nenvisti sa preto asto oznauj aj ako tzv. message crimes, ie iny, ktor vysielaj celej skupine odkaz nie ste tu vtan, nenvidme vs, a preto zkonite vyvolvaj pocit ohrozenia pri celej skupine, nielen pri konkrtnej obeti toku. Na celospoloenskej rovni s dopady hate crimes takisto vemi vznamn. V situcii, ke sa jedna alebo viac skupn v spolonosti ctia ohrozen a nedostatone chrnen pred nsilnmi tokmi, je prirodzenou reakciou nrast naptia a naruenie princpov spolunavania s inmi skupinami v spolonosti. Ak orgny ttu najm polcia i prokuratra nepracuj dostatone efektvne, bagatelizuj i zahuj motv takchto tokov a dochdza k opakovanm tokom voi danej skupine, me to vies k tomu, e dan skupina zoberie spravodlivos do svojich rk. Jej lenovia zan nezriedka organizova vlastn ochrann skupiny alebo toky voi skutonm i domnelm pchateom hate crimes. Takto toky samozrejme vyvolaj protireakciu. Ak v tomto tdiu nedjde op k rchlemu a efektvnemu zsahu ttu, situcia me eskalova z obmedzenho loklneho konfliktu do rozsiahlych rasovch, etnickch i nboensky motivovanch nepokojov.

l zbiera a analyzuje dta o zloinoch z nenvisti v celom regine OBSE a publikuje ich vo forme vronej sprvy jedinej svojho druhu na medzinrodnej rovni; l podporuje snahy obianskej spolonosti v oblasti monitoringu, reportovania a poskytovania asistencie obetiam trestnch inov z nenvisti. V zujme zabezpei, aby lensk tty OBSE dokzali sprvne rozoznva, definova a bojova s trestnmi inmi z nenvisti, ODIHR vyvinul sriu seminrov, kolen a trningov pre polciu, prokuratru, sdnictvo, mimovldne organizcie a medzinrodn organizcie. Na podporu tchto aktivt ODIHR vydal viacero materilov, manulov a nstrojov7: l Hate crimes in the OSCE region8 incidents and responses (Trestn iny z nenvisti vron sprva o vskyte hate crimes a prkladoch dobrej praxe, ktor lensk tty a MVO aplikovali na ich predchdzanie a rieenie; l Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide (Legislatva trestnch inov z nenvisti: praktick prruka) vytyuje jasne, prstupnm jazykom dvody a argumenty pre adopciu legislatvy upravujcej tto oblas a ponka prklady a komentr k viacerm monostiam, ktor v prstupe k rieeniu existuj; l Preventing and Responding to Hate Crimes A Resource Guide for NGOs in the OSCE l Region9 (Predchdzanie a odpove na trestn iny z nenvisti prruka pre MVO) ponka definciu HC, praktick rady, ako najlepie predchdza a reagova na tento fenomn a obsahuje taktie uiton zoznam alch zdrojov; l Understanding Hate Crimes (Porozumenie trestnm inom z nenvisti) je sriou bror pre rzne krajiny s cieom pomoc polcii, miestnym autoritm, prokuratre a MVO lepie pochopi problematiku HC. l TANDIS The Tolerance and Non-Discrimination l Information System (http: //tandis.odihr.pl) je verejnou webstrnkou poskytujcou informcie tkajce sa problematiky tolerancie a nediskrimincie, ako napr. medzinrodn tandardy a intrumenty, nrodn reporty, vron sprvy z lenskch ttov a medzinrodnch organizci, ako aj o pripravovanch aktivitch tkajcich sa tejto oblasti. Pri vetkch tchto aktivitch sa ODIHR opiera o spoluprcu a partnerstvo s mimovldnymi organizciami, ktor s astokrt najbliie k obetiam trestnch inov z nenvisti a ich loha pri monitoringu, ale i pomoci obetiam i vzdelvan rznych profesijnch skupn, je nezastupiten.
7 8 9 Vetky tieto materily s dostupn na strnke: http://tandis.odihr.pl/?p=ki-hc. Pozri: http://www.osce.org/odihr/73636. Pozri: http://www.osce.org/odihr/39821.

aktivity obse a oDihr

Organizcia pre spoluprcu a bezpenos v Eurpe (OBSE), ako najvia regionlna bezpenostn organizcia zdruujca 56 lenskch krajn, sa ako prv medzinrodn organizcia zaala zaobera problematikou zloinov z nenvisti v roku 2003. Vychdzajc zo svojho komplexnho prstupu k bezpenosti, ktor zaha tri dimenzie (politicko-vojensk, ekonomicko-environmentlnu a udsk) a uvedomujc si potencilny dopad zloinov z nenvisti na celospoloenskej rovni, prijala v roku 2003 rozhodnutie6, ktorm poverila Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) zberom dt, vyhodnocovanm prkladov dobrej praxe a rozvojom aktivt v oblasti predchdzania a rieenia zloinov z nenvisti. ODIHR sa problematike zloinov z nenvisti venuje na viacerch rovniach: l pomha lenskm ttom pri tvorbe legislatvy tkajcej sa zloinov z nenvisti; l buduje a posiluje kapacity zloiek innch v trestnom konan efektvne aplikova existujcu legislatvu pomocou pecifickch trningovch programov; l zvyuje povedomie o vzname a dopadoch zloinov z nenvisti v radoch predstaviteov vldnych autort, medzinrodnch organizci a mimovldnych organizci;
6 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03, Tolerance and Non-discrimination, Maastricht, 2, December 2003. Pozri: http://www.osce.org/mc/19382.

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Zver
Trestn iny z nenvisti s komplexnm fenomnom, ktor si vyaduje sstreden pozornos a spoluprcu vetkch aktrov na nrodnej aj na medzinrodnej rovni. Negatvne dopady tchto inov a ich potencil ohrozi stabilitu a bezpenos spolonosti si preto vyaduj koordinovan silie podporen znalosami, odbornou kapacitou, ako aj finannmi zdrojmi. Verm, e tento lnok, tak ako aj prehad nstrojov a materilov vytvorench ODIHR-om, pome zujemcom o dan problematiku ahie sa zorientova a njs vhodn nstroje, ktor im pomu v aktivitch zameranch na boj proti tomuto pecifickmu druhu trestnej innosti.

sLov a obraZY MU spsobi boLes aKo sa sTava voi obraZoM a JaZYKU ZaMeranM proTi MeninM
robert gould
Centrum eurpskych tdi, Carleton University, Ottawa

vod
Na lepie vysvetlenie vplyvu prejavov a obrazov, zameranch proti meninm a cudzincom, budem postupova nasledovne: 1. nartnem zkladn stratgie tchto vyjadren a obrazov, 2. pouvan taktiku, 3. na to, aby som objasnil tieto stratgie, taktiku a protinvrhy poskytnem niekoko obrazovch prkladov a ukem, ako funguj, 4. zanalyzujem protimeninov vyjadrenia a navrhnem spsoby ich rieenia, 5. napokon navrhnem postupy, ako sa stava voi takmuto jazyku a obrazom. Zameriam sa len na verejn verblne i obrazov prejavy politickch strn a politikov v mdich, ale nie na politick dokumenty, kde vak mono njs rasistick vyjadrenia a stereotypy.1 Mono kontatova, e protimeninov prejavy a obrazy maj spolon model v tom, e oddeuj vinu od meniny, o znamen posilovanie vzoru opozcie. Protimeninov pravica v podstate buduje vzahy medzi vinou a meninou okolo nevraivosti2 a socilneho antagonizmu, ktor vychdza z toho, o je prezentovan ako neprekonaten a nezmeniten kultrne rozdiely. Toto je premisa, na ktorej stavia mnostvo protimeninovch verblnych a obrazovch prejavov. asto sa vyuva metafora vojny: minority s implicitne a neraz i explicitne prezentovan ako nepriatelia. Na rozdiel od oponentov, s ktormi mono diskutova, nepriatelia s udia, ktorch treba odstrni.

Zkladn stratgie
renie STRACHU je zkladnou stratgiou pri vytvran nevraivosti voi meninm a imigrantom zo strany pravice. To mono pozorova v nespoetnch prpadoch v celej Eurpe, od rska po ierne more. O niektorch prkladoch sa o chvu zmienim. Ako zklad vak uvediem dva prklady, ke politik a publicista blzky politickej strane o tejto stratgii
1 2 Ako naprklad ukzal Drl, 2006. Parafrzovan poda Leudar, Hayes, Nekvapil a Turner Baker, 2008.

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slov a obrazy mu spsobi boles ako sa stava voi obrazom a jazyku zameranm proti meninm

otvorene hovorili. Prv prklad vychdza z rozhovoru 15. 1. 2004 medzi Oliverom Gedenom, vskumnm pracovnkom Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik v Berlne, a Eduardom Mainonim z Bndnis Zukunft sterreich, vtedy mestskm tajomnkom Viedne. Mainoni povedal: To je aktulna situcia. Ale pozrime sa na kov otzky, najm o sa tka cudzincov. Ak to m pozadie? Je to strach ud, v tomto prpade Rakanov, zo straty identity. Vetky politick strany, dokonca aj as podikateov, pracuj so strachom, obchoduj so strachom.3 Druh vyjadrenie pochdza sn od najspenejieho grafika a publicistu protimeninovej pravice, Alexandra Segerta. Ten asto pracuje pre Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) vo vajiarsku, v svislosti s proticudzineckmi a anitiimigrantskmi kampaami. Poskytol tie materil pre raksku FP. V tlaovom interview bol citovan takto: Hra so strachom je sasou politiky, povedal Alexander Segert, lovek na PR pri SVP. Je celkom legitmne apelova na tto emciu. Bez nej by nebolo mon komunikova posolstvo ani smerom doprava, ani doava..4 Druh zkladn stratgia protirasovej/protimeninovej pravice je pojem nevyhnutnej menejcennosti a nevraivosti cudzinca alebo minority. To sa spja s nebezpeenstvom, ktor o chvu rozoberiem. To, e udia predstavuj hrozbu, me psobi nelogicky, o vak nebrni pravidelnmu vyuvaniu tohto dojmu.

alou taktikou je prevzia pozitvne nastaven kov slov, zmeni ich zmysel a obrti ich vo vlastn prospech. Prkladom s tu vrazy ako patriot alebo multikultrny. V Nemecku pojem multikultrny prevzali skupiny s nevraivm postojom voi prtomnosti vekho potu cudzincov ako rezidentov, v dsledku oho sa kancelrka Merkelov od tohto pojmu verejne ditancovala 16.10.2010.5 Pravica podobne asto vyuva nznaky a kdovan slov, ktor (len tak-tak) neprekrauj hranice zkona. Vetky tieto stratgie a taktiky sa asto pouvaj v celej Eurpe (a inde), a to na kadej politickej rovni, od parlamentu a po mestsk zastupitestv, obce i dediny,6 a samozrejme v baroch a na ulici. V otvorenej spolonosti dochdza vdy k verejnej sai o zdroje, preto s niektor socilne konflikty nevyhnutn. To sa tka aj teoretickej krajiny s dokonale uniformnou populciou. Pravica asto vyuva socilne konflikty, aby ich prezentovala ako kultrne, i ako dsledok odlinej skupinovej mentality alebo nboenskch rozdielov. Tto skupinov mentalita i kultra je vdy prezentovan ako nemenn. Takto argumenty treba vyvrti. Prv, ne sa budeme venova konkrtnym prkladom a spsobom, ako proti nim bojova, treba zdrazni zkladn princp, e toi treba vdy na podstatu, na premisu, na ktorej stoj argument protivnka. Takto premisa me zosta nevyjadren, najm pri stratgii menejcennosti. Ale to, e zostva nevyjadren, ju neoslabuje. Je ovea silnejia, lebo je schopn sa implicitne i explicitne odvolva na odvek predsudky. Premisa vak me by vyjadren aj naprklad: toia na ns (British National Party vo Vekej Britnii); Kolonizuj ns (British National Party vo Vekej Britnii a Jobbik v Maarsku); Prevezm nau krajinu (ben vraz v Lotysku).

Taktika
Ak taktika sa pouva v uvedenej celkovej stratgii, o chce pravica, aby ste sa bli, o je poda nej ohrozen? V podstate je to: 1. krajina, ako nrodn tt, v zmysle politickho stelesnenia etnickej skupiny, 2. kultra krajiny/udu, 3. jazyk krajiny a jej ttotvornho nroda, 4. nboenstvo krajiny a jej ttotvornho nroda, 5. nrod samotn, 6. ekonomick blaho ttu a obanov, 7. fyzick bezpenos jednotlivcov. alie tmy sa vytvraj tak, aby sa hodili do konkrtnych podmienok. Druhou taktikou je poveda alebo naznai, e jednotlivci v rmci danej meninovej skupiny, ktor je, ako u bolo vyie povedan, stigmatizovan, ako menejcenn, s: 1. vetci rovnak, 2. neschopn zmeny a po 3. ich celkov kultra je neschopn zmeny. To prispieva k vytvraniu opozcie my a oni, pri ktorej je odstrnen akkovek sympatia voi minorite alebo jej jednotlivcom.
3 Das ist die derzeitige Situation. Aber gehen wir vielleicht einmal zu ihren Schwerpunkten, speziell in der Auslnderpolitik. Was ist der Hintergrund? Es ist die Angst der Menschen, der sterreicher in dem Fall, vor Verlust der eigenen Identitt. Alle politischen Parteien, sogar ein Teil der Wirtschaft, funktionieren ber die Angst, ber das Geschft mit der Angst. Interview Eduard Mainoni korrigierte und autorisierte Fassung 15.1.2004, 17:45 Uhr, Salzburg, transkribiert am 27.1.2004 korrigiert und autorisiert zurck am 29.1./9.2.2004; http://www.florianklenk.com/2006/09/22/mainoni-das-ungekurzte-interview-aus-dem-bauch-der-fpo/ nhad: 13.1. 2011. Genau wie das Spiel mit der Angst. Das gehre zur Politik dazu, hat der SVP-Werber Segert ... gesagt. Es ist absolut legitim, dieses Gefhl anzusprechen, sonst geht die politische Botschaft, links wie rechts, an den Leuten vorbei. Die Welt 16.10.2009, Streit um Minarettenverbot erreicht Deutschland; http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article4867285/Streit-um-Minarettenverbot-erreicht-Deutschland.html nhad: 13.1.2011.

obrazov prklady
Teraz sa pozrieme na to, ako psob tto rtorika. Plagty s efektvnym prostriedkom komunikcie s verejnosou. Zkladn stratgia a taktika je v podstate t ist, ako pri verblnej komunikcii. Tento dnes u slvny plagt navrhol Alexander Segert pre kampa SVP vo vajiarskom referende proti minaretom, konanom 29. 11. 2011. ttna zstava symbol nroda a ttu, je prezentovan ako dominovan minaretmi a enou v burke. K tomu je pridan slogan, ktor vyzva obana, aby nejakm spsobom konal.

5 6

Pozri Gould, december 2010. Prklady uvdza Gould, in Golubeva and Gould..

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Na prklade, ktor publikovala British National Party, je al variant tohto plagtu. Zrove mono ukza, e mnoh jazykov a vizulne techniky, ktor vyuva protimeninov pravica, s ahko prenosn cez jazykov a ttne hranice.

Plagt vyuva strach ako zkladn stratgiu strach zo straty nrodnej identity, zo straty kontroly. Strach sa zvyuje tm, e minarety s zobrazen tak, aby pripomnali rakety, ktor s vo svojej podstate agresvne. Podobne, ako psob vina protimeninovch jazykovch vyjadren, aj plagt vychdza z podstaty u existujceho predsudku. Moslimovia s prezentovan ako celok a nezmenitene odlin, a islam v totlnom protiklade so vajiarskou identitou. Obraz naznauje, e kontakt medzi tmito dvoma kultrami nem zmysel a e vajiarska identita nepovouje takto nboensk rozdiel. Umoni rozdielnos je kovm bodom, ku ktormu sa vrtim v poslednej asti, kde sa budem venova spsobom, ako bojova proti jazyku zameranmu proti meninm. Obraz psob nznakom. Niet v om otvorenho vyjadrenia, ktor by toilo na islam i akkovek rasov skupinu. Jeho posolstvo vak neme by jasnejie. Je vytvoren tak, e postava eny je bez tvre: to znamen, e nie je jednotlivcom, ale len lenkou istej nediferencovanej skupiny a naznauje, e vetci prslunci tejto skupiny s rovnak. To tie znamen, e divk s ou neme sympatizova alebo empatizova. Ide tu o proces delegitimizcie, postavenia meniny mimo spolonos a mimo hranc adekvtnej vahy.

Vyjadrenia faktu v anglitine, v spodnej asti obrazu, s anglickm prekladom vyjadren (s modifikciou nzvov strn), ktor pouila Freiheitliche Partei sterreichs v kampani do Eurpskeho parlamentu v roku 2009.7 Kee s prezentovan ako fakty, maj viu vhu. Dleitou dimenziou druhho vyjadrenia je implikcia, e len British National Party me zachrni krajinu, ktor je v ohrozen. Zkladnou stratgiou tohto plagtu a vyjadren je renie strachu. Verzia, ktor pouil franczsky Front National, predstavuje intenzifikciu u nartnutej techniky. Bola vytvoren pre regionlne voby v juhovchodnom Franczsku v marci 2010.

Pozri: www.fpoe.at..

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hoci nie jednoduch, hada spsoby, ako zniova ich emocionlny dopad. V zvere sa k tomuto ete vrtime.

verblne prklady
Uveden prklady tie slia ako spsob kategorizcie. To, o konkrtne niekto nazva jednotlivcom alebo skupinou, m zsadn vznam.8 Je to preto, e tradine v mysli mnohch je etnick i nboensk kategorizcia vemi neprun, exkluzvna, evaluatvna a neraz sa pouva na zdrazovanie rozdielu, menejcennosti i absencie spolonej bzy. Preto je nevyhnutn neakceptova nikdy terminolgiu i kategorizciu pouvan s tmto zmerom. Pri zmieanom obyvatestve, v podstate kadej eurpskej krajiny, m tento postoj zsadn vznam. Ilustruje to prklad z predvolebnej kampane vo Viedni 10. 10. 2001.

Zkladnou stratgiou je op strach. Taktika vyuva nasledujce postupy: evokova pojem islamizmus, t.j. politiku zmeny socilnych a politickch truktr v krajine tak, aby sa ara stal jednm zdrojom prva. To jasne vyjadruje stratgiu renia strachu z plnho prevzatia a zmeny franczskej politiky odluky cirkvi od ttu. Nznak straty kontroly a identity je posilnen superimpozciou alrskej vlajky na mapu Franczska. Dlh tie minaretov nad celm Franczskom, ktor presahuje do ostatnch krajn Eurpy, naznauje nebezpeenstvo pre cel Eurpu. Stratgia sa tak sna vytvori dojem nezluitenej polarizovanej opozcie medzi Franczskom a Alrskom, Franczmi a Alranmi, Franczskom a islamom, Eurpou a islamom. To, samozrejme, psob proti mnohm franczskym obanom alrskeho pvodu. Tieto prklady mu vies k otzke, ako mono predchdza takmto a podobnm plagtom. V prvom rade treba akceptova trval prtomnos vekho potu moslimov vo Franczsku a v Eurpe. Odmietanie otvorenej diskusie o socilnych zmench a posunoch v nboenskch praktikch nepredstavuje kontruktvnu alternatvu. Treba ukza, e nboensk a etnick rozdiely s legitmne a ben v akejkovek spolonosti a nepredstavuj pre tt hrozbu. A tie treba poukza na to, e tieto rozdiely z nioho neuberaj dlhodobo etablovanej populcii. Akkovek vyjadrenie i nznak toho, e je tomu tak, treba vyvrti. Logicky, implicitn tvrdenia na plagte, e prvo ara kad chvu nahrad Obiansky a Trestn zkonnk a alrska prax bude vldnu franczskemu ttu, s smiene. Ale plagt, rovnako ako mnoh verblne protimeninov vyjadrenia, nepsobia na princpe logiky. Ako u bolo povedan, psobia na princpe emcie najm strachu. Preto je nevyhnutn,

Dve verblne kategrie, ktor tento plagt pouva, s domov a islam. Naznauj priamy a nezluiten protiklad medzi domovom/Rakskom/Viedou a islamom. Je to zdraznen prostrednctvom rakskej vlajky a regionlnou rakskou/viedenskou formou daham, namiesto tandardnho nemeckho vrazu daheim.
8 Ako poukazuje napr. Blackledge, 2005.

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Op je otzkou, ako vyvrti posolstvo oddelenia ns a ich a zdrazni inklziu a spolon rty. Tu sa ponkaj tieto monosti: a) poukazova na inklziu vyuitm toho istho miestneho dialektu, ale v spojen s cudzm menom: In Wien ist Mehmet auch daham (Mohamed je doma aj vo Viedni.); b) poukazova na prbuznos, prijatenos a svislos: Nil ist meine Nachbarin (Nil je moja susedka); c) poukazova na spolon hodnoty alebo zujmy naprie nboenskmi rozdielmi: Mein Nachbar ist Muslim; wir whlen beide SP (Mj sused je moslim; obaja volme socilnych demokratov) alebo wir spielen beide Fuball ( obaja hrme futbal), alebo wir spielen zusammen Fuball ( hrme spolu futbal). Na praktickej rovni je jasn jedno: hesl alebo vrazy na vyvracanie protimeninovho jazyka musia by opatrne nastaven na miestnu situciu a dynamiku. alie prklady pochdzaj z isto verblneho textu (program Bndnis Zukunft sterreich) z rakskych volieb v roku 2006. Ilustruj explicitn vyuitie istej, asto pouvanej taktiky v rmci stratgie renia strachu: Ak sa nm nepodar zachova homogenitu spolonosti v priebehu najblich rokov a zni imigrciu na akceptovaten a nevyhnutn rove, migranti prines obrovsk zmeny hodnt. Nsledn konflikty mu predstavova skuton nebezpeenstvo pre cel spolonos.9 Text hovor o migrantoch (Zuwanderer). T vak predstavuj v rakskej spolonosti rezidenn a trval meninu. Tu je zaiatok procesu delegitimizcie meniny, proces, ktor napreduje a zobrazuje meninu ako zdroj vekej kody pre jednotlivcov, v spolonosti ako celku. Vyjadrenie zana formova explicitn premisu, e spolonos je homognna, ako aj implicitn premisu, e je nemenn. Ale spolonos nie je ani jedno, ani druh. Vyjadrenie tie obsahuje aliu implicitn premisu, e individulna identita je absoltne fixn v rmci skupinovej identity a nikoho preto nemono zmeni. To je v protiklade s praxou, ke naprklad udia menia strancke preferencie, opaj vierovyznanie, alebo dokonca (ako v prpade autora) prejchdzaj z jednho jazyka dennej komunikcie do druhho. Vyjadrenie tie tvrd, e migranti spsobia obrovsk posun spoloenskch hodnt. To vychdza z nevyslovenej premisy, e migranti nie s vbec schopn adaptova sa a e menina me spolonos destabilizova. Tvrd tie, e migranti nevyhnutne spsobuj konflikty. To posiluje stratgiu renia strachu prostrednctvom obviovania. Tto stratgia prezentuje ohrozenie ako nieo, o vyplva z rozdielov medzi dajne homognnou spolonosou, ktor je kultrne odlin od migrantov neschopnch zmeny. Problm poda toho tkvie v imigrcii a prtomnos meninovch imigrantov je absoltne nerieiten.
9 Prevzat z asti sterreich zuerst sterreich ist und bleibt kein Einwanderungsland: Wenn es in den kommenden Jahren nicht gelingt, die Homogenitt der Gesellschaft zu sichern und die Zuwanderung auf das vertretbare und notwendige Ausma zu beschrnken, verursachen die Zuwanderer einen massiven gesellschaftlichen Wertewandel. Die damit einhergehenden Konflikte knnen zu einer effektiven Gefahr fr die Gesamtgesellschaft werden.

Tieto premisy a spsob argumentcie s neakceptovaten. V tomto konkrtnom prpade treba vyvrti tieto tri premisy: a) homogenita, b) neschopnos zmeny zo strany jednotlivcov a c) neschopnos zmeny ako zo strany viny, tak i meniny.

rmovia
Tvrdilo sa, e predsudkov vyjadrenia o Rmoch v strednej a vchodnej Eurpe s extrmnejie, ako tie proti cudzincom a imigrantom v zpadnej Eurpe10 a e takto jazyk kladie Rmov za hranice rozdielu, morlneho poriadku, inm slovom do pozcie plnch outsiderov a v podstate menejcennch. Nedvne vyjadrenie ministra jednej z lenskch krajn E to presne potvrdilo.11 Me to by iastone aj vzhadom na situciu opsan takto: v krajinch SVE sa nikdy nepodarilo spene dosiahnu odlenie medzi nrodnou a obianskou identitou12 a Rmovia s v mnohch krajinch historicky i dnes rodenmi a venmi cudzincami. Netreba opakova rozsah protirmskeho jazyka, ktor sa v regine pouva. Mnoh tdie to dostatone dokumentuj.13 Sta len poveda, e takto jazyk sa sna prezentova cel etnick skupinu ako podradn a patologicky odlin. Tto verblna taktika totlnej diskreditcie identifikovatenej meniny a nsledn odmietanie akejkovek monosti dialgu, solidarity a empatie s ou, tie nikdy neprezentuje jednotlivcov v pozitvnom svetle. Pre protimeninov pravicu tu niet integrovanch prslunkov meniny. Prslunci meniny s vdy skupinou alebo dokonca masou medzi nami. asto, ako v prpadoch uvdzanch Nicolaem, je tu tie proces dehumanizcie a presunu do patologickej situcie. Len o je skupina dehumanizovan a patologizovan, je nsilie voi nej opodstatnen alebo dokonca iadan, ako tomu bolo v prpade protirmskej kampane v anglickom dennku The Sun v roku 2005.14 Takto vyjadrenia (bez ohadu na to, odkia pochdzaj) brnia akejkovek monosti mierovho spoluitia. V svislosti s dennkom The Sun som preiel od politickej rtoriky a reklamy k mdim. Tu je situcia mimoriadne aktna. Vny komentr o spravodajskch mdich tvrdil: Marginlne skupiny a medzi nimi etnick meniny nebud nikdy povaovan za spravodajsky zaujmav, pokia nepovedia alebo neurobia nieo, o potvrd stereotyp.15 V svislosti s meninami v podstate niet pozitvnych stereotypov. Hlavnm dvodom je, e vytvranie rozdielov je vdy evaluatvne: vina je vdy hodnoten smerom nahor alebo
10 Pozri Tileaga, 2005. 11 Sofia News Agency http://novinite.com/view_news.php?id=120548 (27.9.2010); nhad: 15.1.2011. 12 Kapralski 2009. 13 Pozri publikcie MVO udia proti rasizmu na www.rasizmus.sk, Tileaga a Kapralski (vyie); Krau in gesis; Nicolae 2006; Albert, 2007 a Gailov, 2007 . 14 Viac v Nicolae, 2006. 15 Harley, 1982 citovan v Erjavec, 2001.

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zobrazovan ako nadraden a menina ako podriaden. Prspevky Ireny Bihariovej16 a Aleny Kotvanovej17 sa odvolvaj na niektor veobecn vyjadrenia a odhauj niektor nov stereotypy, ktor mono prida do katalgu dlhodobch predsudkov. Dleitou sasou tohto vyhodnocovacieho procesu je, e hranice kultr s vdy opatrne stren, aby sa predilo ich prechodu. Navye pre protimeninov pravicu a pre mnohch ud je akkovek zisk zo strany meniny vnman ako oslabenie pozcie alebo postavenia viny. Je to premisa (celkom falon), na ktorej s tieto tvrdenia postaven. Proti tejto premise preto treba bojova.

3. V rmci uvedenho posunu treba vies verejn diskurz k vnmaniu skupinovej identity, ktor umouje rozdiely.19 Prve toto v konenom dsledku vyvrti posolstv zdrazujce inakos prslunka meniny alebo skupiny.20 4. Centrum pre verejn politiku PROVIDUS v Rige realizovalo 3-ron projekt monitorovania parlamentnej a medilnej diskusie o meninch v Lotysku. Vsledky komunikovalo prostrednctvom tlaovch sprv a konferenci, priebench sprv a stretnut s politikmi.21 Prezentcie Aleny Kotvanovej a Ireny Bihariovej na Open Society Camp ukzali, e nieo podobn sa realizuje aj na miestnej rovni na Slovensku. Takto projekty by mali by koordinovan a rozren aj na parlamentn a medilnu diskusiu na Slovensku a inde, aj poas dlhieho asovho obdobia. Ako navrhol Gregory Fabian vo svojej prezentcii o Bosne,22 vzahy so sympatizujcimi novinrmi treba kultivova. 5. Zmerom akhokovek rasistickho jazyka a obrazov je rozdeli spolonos, vytvra a zdrazova rozdiely. Na to, aby sme bojovali s takmto jazykom a obrazmi, treba sa zamera na spolon potreby, zujmy a pod. Spolon rty by mali st v popred. 6. Akkovek boj s predsudkovm jazykom a obrazmi by mal by dobre pripraven a mal by ma na zreteli dlhodob stratgiu. Kad miestne zastupitestvo, MVO, obianske zdruenie, zujmov skupina a pod., ktor maj zujem riei protimeninov vyjadrenia a obrazy, by mali uri osobu, ktor by mala na starosti prpravu protiopatren. Na prevenciu toho, aby sa rasistick vyjadrenia zakorenili vo verejnom myslen a na protitok, pokia s sprvy erstv, bud protiopatrenia efektvnejie, ak sa prijm m skr po uverejnen vyjadren, proti ktorm s zameran. To predpoklad ist stupe prpravy zo strany osoby, ktor bola na tto lohu delegovan. 7. Pri nrte procesov, ktormi takto jazyk a obrazy psobia, sme venovali pozornos tomu, e emcia je vemi dleitm, vlastne najdleitejm faktorom. Pri prprave protiopatren preto treba hada spsob, ako v nich vyui emcie. Zhrnutie: Vyvrte premisy, na ktorch stoj protimeninov pozcia; nikdy neakceptujte kategrie oponenta, terminolgiu i argumenty najm nie tie, ktor zneuvaj strach; vyuite jazyk, ktor m pozitvny emocionlny obsah, a ukte, e tolerancia a akceptovanie rozdielov mu by prnosn. Poas diskusie na Open Society Camp sme zdraznili, e navrhovan opatrenia maj sce vychdza z miestnej dynamiky a pomerov, ale musia prezentova princpy pokojnho spoluitia v otvorenej spolonosti, ktor je adekvtne pre modern ekonomiku zvisl od zrunost a vedomost vetkch obanov. Ete jedno je ist aby som pouil modern terminolgiu reklamy meniny sa stvaj brandom ako negatvne a dokonca
19 Pozri napr. KOOPMAN, 2005, s. 202, (hovoriac o britskom obianstve). 20 Jeden z praktickch a vemi viditench krokov smerom k inkorporcii rozdielov prijali v Spojenom krovstve: atka, ako pokrvka hlavy, je autorizovanou sasou uniformy prslunok Hraninej polcie Spojenho krovstva. Moslimky, ktor chc nosi v slube atku, tak mu urobi.

o s tm?
Treba uzna, e protimeninov jazyk a obrazy s vyjadreniami o identite viny ale bez toho, aby vymenovali pecifick charakteristiky viny. Psobia na princpe my a oni alebo oni versus my, ktor vnma vo svojej podstate identitu poda nevraivosti.18 Preto treba urobi, o je mon, aby sa tieto nzory o identite a nevraivosti vyvrtili. 1. Dleit psychologick faktor, ktor m zsadn vznam pre vinu tchto nevraivch slov a obrazov, je to, e prezentuj alebo hrozia stratou nieoho. Monos, hrozba alebo nebezpeenstvo straty nieoho dleitho, o niekto u m (napr. strata kontroly, identity, peaz, jazyka), je vemi siln. V mnohch uvedench prkladoch a inde vidno v popred hrozbu straty identity, kultry alebo peaz. Strach sa vytvra tie z monosti straty. Je to vemi siln faktor. Protimeninov vyjadrenia tvrdia, e k strate djde kvli neprispsobivej kultre alebo rasovm rozdielom. Kee strata je vemi siln, treba aj nieo ponknu. To, o konkrtne treba ponknu, mus vychdza z miestnych pomerov a dynamiky. 2. Jazyk vo forme asto pouvanch konceptov a argumentov vytvra fakty, preto treba pracova s meniacim sa verejnm diskurzom. Tu sa vraciame k aliemu prstupu k vyie uvedenmu vyjadreniu o nevyhnutnosti napadn premisu, na ktorej argument stoj. Treba opakova, e problmy s socilnej, ekonomickej i vzdelvacej povahy. Nevyplvaj z nemennch kultrnych i rasovch rozdielov, alebo osobnej (i skupinovej) menejcennosti. Dvod, preo to treba jednoznane zdrazova, je, e rozdiely, ktor s zobrazen a prezentovan ako vychdzajce z tzv. nemennch kultrnych alebo rasovch rozdielov, nemono nikdy odstrni politickmi rozhodnutiami alebo opatreniami (protimeninov pravica to dobre vie). Na druhej strane socilne, ekonomick i vzdelvacie problmy mono do istej miery riei politicky hoci len pomaly. To sa tie spja s tvrdenm, e nikdy neslobodno akceptova klasifikciu alebo kategorizciu ponkan protimeninovou pravicou.

16 Mty a predsudky. 17 18 Slovensk medilna scna: Vvoj v oblasti prezentcie tm intolerancie, xenofbie a antisemitizmu . Erb a Kohlstruck, 2009, s. 430-431.

21 Vsledky a analza s v Golubeva a Gould, 2010. 22 Stratgie boja proti nsiliu a nenvisti.

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slov a obrazy mu spsobi boles ako sa stava voi obrazom a jazyku zameranm proti meninm

detruktvne. To je vsledkom dvnych predsudkov a posilnen modernou politickou potrebou. Aby sme to prekonali, zmenili brand, potrebujeme sstavn, cielen, dlhodob a mnohostrann stratgiu,23 v ktorej je draz na jazyk len jednm z aspektov. A NAPOKON: koliaci program vemi spenej vajiarskej protimeninovej strany Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) v roku 20062007 mal nzov spen politick komunikciu sa mono naui.24 Program obsahoval tmy ako: Rtorika, Argumentan trning, Prstupy a reakcie, ako aj Prca s elektronickmi mdiami. Organizcie, ktor chc pripravi efektvnu kampa proti rasistickmu a protimeninovmu jazyku, by sa mohli z prkladu SVP poui.

Geden, O.: Interview Eduard Mainoni korrigierte und autorisierte Fassung, 15.1.2004, 17:45 Uhr, Salzburg, transkribiert am 27.1.2004, korrigiert und autorisiert zurck am 29.1./9.2.2004. Pozri: http://www.florianklenk.com/2006/09/22/mainoni-das-ungekurzte-interview-aus-dem-bauch-der-fpo/. Golubeva, M. a Gould, R. (eds.) Zmenujce sa obianstvo: Duskurzvna prax limitujca demokratick participciu v litovskej politike (Shrinking Citizenship: Discursive Practices that Limit Democratic Participation in Latvian Politics), Amsterdam a New York City, Rodopi, 2010. Gould, R.: Some Recent Discourses of Exclusion in the EU. In: Golubeva and Gould. Gould, R.: The Death of German Multiculturalism: What Angela Merkels shock talk is hiding, Ide fdrale1(2), december 2010. Pozri: http://ideefederale.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Dec_2010.pdf. Harley, J. Rozumie sprvam (Understanding News), Methuen, Methuen Studies in Communication, Londn a New York City, 1982. Husen, A.: Antiislamischer Rechtspopulismus in der extremen Rechten die PRO-Bewegung als neue Kraft?, In: S. Braun, A. Geisler, M. Gerster (eds.): Strategien der extremen Rechten. Hintergrnde Analysen Antworten, VS Wiesbaden, Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, s. 130-147; pozri s. 141. Kapralski, S. Democratization in the Post-Communist Europe: a Romani Perspective. In: N. Schleinstein, D. Sucker, A. Wenninger, A. Wilde (eds.): gesis, tematick sria Social Sciences Eastern Europe. Leibniz Institut fr Sozialwissenschaften, Berlin, 2009(2), s. 5 - 11 (8). Kotvanov, A.: Slovensk medilna scna: Vvoj v oblasti prezentcie tm intolerancie, xenofbie a antisemitizmu, tto publikcia. Koopmans, R. (spolu s Statham, P., Giugni, M. a Passy, F.): Sa o obianstvo. Imigrcia a kultrna diverzita v Eurpe. Contested [Citizenship. Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe]. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2005, s. 202. KRAU, J.: The Roma People in Romania, Gesis, s. 20-22. Leudar, I., Hayes, J., Nekvapil, J. a Turner Baker, J.: Hostility Themes in Media, Community and Refugee Narratives, Discourse & Society 19(2) 2008, s. 187-221. Nicolae, V.: Words that Kill. In: Index obianstva (Index on Censorship), 35:1 (2006), s. 137-141. Sofia News Agency: http://novinite.com/view_news.php?id=120548 (27.9.2010), dostupn: 15.1. 2011. Tileaga, C.: Romanies: Accounting for extreme prejudice and legitimating blame in talk about the Romanies, Discourse & Society; 16(5) 2005, s. 603-624.

poUiT LiTeraTra
Albert, G.: How Central European Populism Exploits Anti-Roma Sentiment. In: Nekvapil, V. Staszkiewicz, M. (eds): Populism in Central Europe. Association for International Affairs (AMO), Praha, 2007, Pozri: http://www.amo.cz./publications/populism-in-central-europe.html?lang=en. Bihariov, I.: Mty a predsudky, tto publikcia. Blackledge, A.: Diskurz a moc v multilingvlnom svete (Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World), Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture 15. Amsterdam a Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2005. Der Zrcher Bote, . 14, 7.4.2006. Pozri: http://www.svp-neerach.ch/Aktuell/2006/schulungsprogramm. pdf. Die Welt, 16.10. 2009, Streit um Minarettenverbot erreicht Deutschland. Pozri: http://www.welt.de/politik/ ausland/article4867285/Streit-um-Minarettenverbot-erreicht-Deutschland.html. Drl, P.: Etnizovan lenivos: Rm v slovenskom socilnom politickom diskurze (Ethnicized Laziness: Roma in the Slovak Social Policy Discourse), magistersk prca. Budape, Central European University, 2006. Erb, R. a Kohlstruck, M. (eds.): Die Funktion von Antisemitismus und Fremdenfeindschaft fr die rechtsextreme Bewegung. In: S. Braun, A. Geisler, M. Gerster (eds.): Strategien der Extremen Rechten: Hintergrnde, Analysen, Antworten. Wiesbaden, Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, 2009. Erjavec, K. Media Representation of the Discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovenia. In: Discourse & Society 12(6) 2001. Fabian, G. Stratgie boja proti nsiliu a nenvisti, tto publikcia. Gailov, M.: Populism in the Context of The Roma Question. In: Populizmus v strednej Eurpe (Populism in Central Europe). Eds: Vclav Nekvapil and Maria Staszkiewicz, Association for International Affairs (AMO), Praha, 2007. Pozri: http://www.amo.cz./publications/populism-in-central-europe.html?lang=en.
23 24 K informcim o multistrategickom prstupe. Pozri: Fabian, tto publikcia. Erfolgreiche politische Kommunikation ist lernbar. Der Zrcher Bote, 2011.

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nie soM rasisTa, aLe...

irena bihriov
OZ udia proti rasizmu
Pojem rasista sa dnes zvykne skloova vo vzname spoloensky neprijatenej nlepky a od jeho obsahu sa demontratvne ditancuje aj samotn krajn pravica. Km v minulosti nebolo v rtorike pravice iadnym tabu rozvja vahy o nerovnosti rs a priorizcii tej rijskej, dnes narba so svojm slovnkom podstatne sofistikovanejie. V jej prejavoch dostvaj priestor spoloensky diskutovan a naliehav tmy, ktor polarizuj verejn diskurz a utvrdzuj as verejnosti v tom, e m svojho nepriatea homosexulov, Rmov, Maarov, liberlov, migrantov. Nrodnostn, etnick, nboensk i sexulnu charakteristiku nepriateskej skupiny najastejie spjaj s pojmami kriminlnici, paraziti, kodcovia a pod.

Ufgiuwgzefiuw
Repertor hanlivch postojov voi meninm, tvoren na prv pohad nevinnmi stereotypmi, nie je vlune zbraou krajnej pravice. Jej prslunci ho vinou ponkaj ako svoju nosn agendu, m sa stvaj itatenej, no s podobne stereotypizujcimi formulciami sa mono stretn aj pri tandardnch politickch stranch. Nie je zriedkavosou, e to, o vyslov prslunk krajne pravicovho hnutia prvoplnovo a explicitne, povie politik benho politickho spektra elegantnejou pozltkou.

Zvhodovanie
irok verejnos, ktor je sama o sebe primrnym zdrojom negatvnych stereotypnch mtov o meninch, si mylne osvojila predstavu, e nositeom rasovch, etnickch a nrodnostne neznanlivch postojov a predsudkov me by len mladk s vyholenou hlavou, skrvajci vytetovan kr pod trikom a dopajci sa fyzickho nsilia voi prslunkom menn. Pokia niekto o tom, e Rmovia s kriminlnici, na ktorch treba krtky dvor a dlh bi len hovor, v zsade ho verejnos za rasistu nielene neozna, ale asto sa s takmto postojom aj stoton. Tento prstup symbolicky ilustruje asto pouvan frza: nie som rasista, ale... (...nemm rd tch, ktor k nm chodia kradn prcu..., vad mi rmsky parazitizmus) Spolonos teda na jednej strane izoluje fenomn nrodnostnej i etnickej nenvisti vlune na zleitos pravicovo extrmistickch skupn, no na strane druhej je prstupn argumentcii, ktorou sa takto nenvis ospravedluje i podnecuje. Takto prstup vak vo finle najviac oso prve pravicovo extrmistickm skupinm, kee tie si dnes buduj svoj politick kapitl prve pod pltikom akceptovanej stereotypizcie menn.

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nie som rasista, ale...

najastejie mty o meninch rmovia

V diskusich o meninch predstavuj Rmovia najastej ter nenvistnch prejavov. Dnes sa v nich len vnimone objavuje nzor, ktor by nezapadal do negatvne ladenho kontextu debaty. V tchto postojoch sa nezriedka abstrahuje od toho, e etnick Rmovia s rovnako ako prslunci inch etnict kultrne, vzdelanostne i majetkovo rznorodo stratifikovanou skupinou, tak ako akkovek in menina na Slovensku. Napriek tomu sa oznaenie Rm zuuje takmer vlune na osoby rmskeho pvodu ijce v segregovanom prostred v extrmne chudobnch pomeroch, eventulne ako synonymum pre asocilny spsob ivota.

V skutonosti je samozrejme nesporn, e vdavky uren na socilnu politiku nie s ani jedinou, ani nosnou kapitolou ttneho rozpotu. Ani samotn rezort prce, socilnych vec a rodiny nefinancuje vlune nklady spojen s dvkami ttnej socilnej podpory. Je teda technicky nerelne, aby Rmovia mohli oderpa podstatn as daovho prjmu ttu. Pokia ide o prslunkov rmskej meniny ijcich v osadch a ich zvratn profit zo socilneho systmu, treba vzia na zrete ich socilnu realitu vo vzahu k podmienkam, ktor zkon vyaduje na priznanie nroku na urit dvku i prspevok. Vina dvok sa naprklad viae k podmienke trvalho pobytu, ktorej splnenie komplikuje majetkov nevysporiadanos prbytkov v rmskych osadch. Niektor dvky, o ktorch sa bene predpoklad, e s najviac spotrebvan prve rmskymi osadnkmi, vyaduj splnenie alch pecilnych podmienok: napr. prplatok k prspevku pri naroden prvho a tretieho dieaa me zska len rodika, ktor nie je malolet a ktor sa poas tehotenstva pravidelne zastovala gynekologickch prehliadok.2 Podobne komplikovan prstup predstavuje napr. prspevok na bvanie.3 Ten mono poskytn len osobe v hmotnej ndzi, ktor sa preuke vlastnckym alebo njomnm vzahom k obvanej nehnutenosti. Obyvateom osd ostva pravdepodobne najahie prstupn tzv. dvka v hmotnej ndzi.4 Pri nej je vak potrebn upozorni na dve zaujmavosti, ktor istm spsobom demtizuj predstavu o vekorysom ivote rmskych osadnkov zo socilnych dvok. Tou prvou je vka dvky, ktor k dnenmu du predstavuje sumu 157,60 eur pre dvojicu s 1 a 4 demi a 212,30 eur pre dvojicu s viac ako 4 demi.5 To spochybuje teriu o tom, e v rmskych rodinch je vysok prodnos spojen s myslom parazitova na socilnych dvkach. Ako vidno, vka tejto dvky sa dvojici po 4. dieati prestva zvyova a zrove je len nepatrn finann rozdiel medzi dvojicou s jednm dieaom alebo napr. s smimi. Druh zaujmavos sprostredkvaj daje zo tatistiky radu prce, socilnych vec a rodiny o percentulnom zastpen osb v celkovom koli poberateov dvky v hmotnej ndzi (obdobie: marec 2010).6 Graf vysuje, e najpoetnejie zastpenie v rmci poberateov tejto dvky predstavuj jednotlivci bez det (62 %), zatia o dvojica so 4 a viac demi len 3 %-n podiel, alebo v prpade jednotlivca s viac ako 4 demi je to 0 %-n podiel.

vina a svetl vnimky

Protirmsku rtoriku najastejie sprevdza myln kategorizcia Rmov na vinu parazitov a kriminlnikov a na pr svetlch vnimiek. V skutonosti, poda dostupnch dajov, ije na Slovensku 60% obanov rmskeho pvodu integrovane a 40 % v osadch a mestskch getch.1

Zvhodovanie rmov
V diskusii o Rmoch dostva irok priestor teria, poda ktorej s Rmovia privilegovanou skupinou s bohatou klou socilnych prv, rzne zvhodovanou na kor majority. Vyvrtenie tejto terie umouje nielen l. 12 stavy SR, ktor vyluuje zvhodovanie v zkladnch prvach a slobodch na zklade etnicity, ale aj cel kla prvnych predpisov upravujcich podmienky poskytovania ttnej socilnej podpory. Zstancovia tejto terie zvyajne nepracuj s faktom, e priznanie socilnych benefitov sa viae na socilno-ekonomick podmienky iadatea (napr. prjem, poet lenov v domcnosti a pod.), a teda v prpade, e ich oban SR spa, s mu priznan bez ohadu na jeho etnicitu a pvod.

socilny parazitizmus
al frekventovan stereotypn pohad na Rmov vychdza z predstavy, e s to prve oni, ktor najviac spotrebvaj dane obanov. Eventulne, e prve Rmovia z osd sa vedia dosta k obrovskmu balku prostriedkov ttnej socilnej pomoci.
2 3 4 5 1 Pozri: http://www.romovia.vlada.gov.sk/3554/listfaktov.php. 6 Zkon . 235/1998 Z. z. o prspevku pri naroden dieaa, o prspevku rodiom, ktorm sa sasne narodili tri deti, alebo ktorm sa v priebehu dvoch rokov opakovane narodili dvojat v znen neskorch predpisov. Zkon . 599/2003 Z.z. o hmotnej ndzi v znen neskorch predpisov. Tame. Tame. Pozri: http://www.upsvar.sk/statistiky/socialne-davky-statistiky.html?page_id=10826.

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Kultrne cudz prvok a zlodej pracovnch miest

Obrzok 1 Cudzinec na Slovensku bva spjan s predstavou nositea cudzej kultry, nekompatibilnej s kultrou a hodnotami viny. Objavuje sa tie predsudok o tom, e cudzinci na Slovensku mu jednho da zaa obsadzova pracovn trh a vytla z neho domce obyvatestvo. Relne psobia v SR cudzinci z E 15, USA i Junej Krey ... ako vysoko kvalifikovan experti, konzultanti, manari a podnikatelia.8

Moslimovia
Moslimovia s svojm potom nepatrnou minoritnou nboenskou skupinou na Slovensku. Napriek tomu je mienka asti slovenskej spolonosti vo vzahu k nim znane pokriven.

Teroristi a militantn islam

Tradin mty, ktormi s vyznvai islamu opraden, sa viau s predstavou teroristickej hrozby, omu iste nepomohol globlno-politick a svetovmi mdiami iven hon na teroristov, pri ktorom sa profilovan obraz teroristu automaticky prekrval s obrazom moslima. Okrem spomenutch, prevane ekonomicko-socilnych kli o Rmoch, rezonuj stereotypy o rmskej kriminalite, o u spomenutom zmernom roden vekho potu det s myslom ich zneuitia na zskavanie socilnych benefitov, i v neposlednom rade sce menej hanliv, ale rovnako len stereotypizujce a generalizujce kli o rmskej predurenosti k hudobnmu uplatneniu. V istom zmysle mono hovori o akejsi dmonizcii islamu. V spoloenskej diskusii sa toti jeho kdex neraz zuuje na spory o vklad intittu svtej vojny. Ignoruje sa v nej fakt, e v takmer kadej svtej knihe niektorho zo svetovch nboenstiev by sme nali pas, ktorej by vedela da zka skupinka fanatickch vyznavaov svoj vlastn vznam, hoci zvyok nboenskej obce by s nm nebol nijak stotonen.

Migranti
Hoci obania Slovenska vo vine reginov neprichdzaj s cudzincami do styku asto, s cudzinci vnman domcou vinou v posunutch percepcich. Tento fakt dokazuje, e stereotypizciu a mty o meninch nepodporuje len negatvna sksenos s jednotlivcami, z ktorej sa zvykne modelova obraz celej skupiny, ale naopak aj nedostatok sksenost.

Kultrna okupcia
Moslimom je asto vytan, e prinaj do Eurpy prvky, ktormi naraj jej kultrnu identitu. Tento pohad vak nereflektuje niekoko svislost, pod ktor sa podpsali najm integran procesy prslunej eurpskej krajiny. V sasnch genercich det migrantov z moslimskch krajn u toti dochdza ku kultrnemu zmieavaniu s ostatnmi skupinami obyvatestva. Prejavuje sa to naprklad aj v tom, e potomkovia moslimskch rodiov sa dnes len mlokedy identifikuj prve prostrednctvom nboenstva. alm ignorovanm faktom je, e vzjomn koexistencia kultrne rznorodch spoloenstiev v rmci jednej krajiny prebieha vdy v intencich prvneho ttu. To minimalizuje relnos rznych paranoidnch scenrov, v duchu ktorch by mali by v krajinch E zaveden tresty ukameovanm i intitt mnohoenstva. V neposlednom rade kultrna identita Eurpy nikdy nemala homognny a nemenn charakter. Za zmenami a posunmi v ideologickom a axiologickom systme Eurpy mono rovnako vidie vplyv liberalizmu, relativizmu i inch modernch etickch, filozofickch a ideologickch konceptov.
8 Tame.

Zaostalos a socilna odkzanos

Typick profil cudzinca, ijceho na Slovensku v optike slovenskej verejnosti, je osoba, ktor prichdza zva zo zaostalch krajn, nie je vybaven patrinm vzdelanm, ekonomickou sebestanosou, neovlda jazyk a prine k socilnemu systmu ttu. V skutonosti podiel cudzincov v produktvnom veku dosiahol v roku 2008 a 90 %, priom v roku 2008 bolo a 62 % cudzincov ijcich na Slovensku z krajn E. Typickm migrantom v Slovenskej republike od vstupu krajiny do E je mu (podiel a 81 %) vo veku 25 34 rokov s pomerne dobrm vzdelanm (32 % vysokokolsky vzdelanch v roku 2008).7
7 Vaeka, M.: Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraninej migrcii v Slovenskej republike, 2009.

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podpora stereotypizcie menn mement zo slovenska

Za kov faktory, ktor sa najvou mierou podpisuj pod posilovanie stereotypov, mono oznai : 1. nedostaton informovanos, needukovanos spolonosti, 2. politick diskurz (legitimizcia hanlivch postojov v prejavoch politickch reprezentantov, politick parazitizmus na socilnych tmach s nrodnostnm i etnickm prvkom a pod.), 3. mdi (horce prbehy, ktormi sa na prklade konkrtnych prslunkov meniny podsva profil celej skupiny, bulvarizcia meninovch tm a pod.), 4. dezinterpretcia zahraninch sksenost (problmy predmestskch segregovanch get ako reprezentatvna ukka nsledkov migrcie a pod.).

politick diskurz
Prklad pofidrneho onglovania s rmskou stereotypizanou kartou priniesla bilbordov kampa parlamentnej Slovenskej nrodnej strany, ktorou sa strana uchdzala o priaze voliov v parlamentnch vobch v mji 2010. Na bilbord umiestnila fotografiu Rma, ktormu graficky dotvorila stereotypizan prvky (zlat retiazku a tetovanie) a k nej doplnila text Aby sme nekmili tch, o nechc pracova! Napriek tomu, e na stranu SNS bol viacermi mimovldnymi subjektmi podan podnet na zaatie trestnho sthania pre podozrenie zo spchania trestnho inu podnecovania k rasovej, nrodnostnej a etnickej nenvisti, kampa bola vyhodnoten ako prvne priechodn. Odvodnenie zamietnutia podnetu bratislavskm radom justinej a kriminlnej polcie Star mesto vychdzalo z presvedenia, e myslom strany SNS bolo len vyvola celospoloensk diskusiu o osobch hrubo zneuvajcich socilny systm. Takmto zdvodnenm sa orgn inn v trestnom konan v podstate stotonil so samotnm posolstvom bilbordu, o mono takisto vnma ako al zo spsobov legitimizcie hanlivo stereotypnch postojov.9

nedostaton informovanos
Uveden faktory zohrvaj svoju rolu aj v slovenskom prostred: naprklad nedostaton edukovanos znanej asti slovenskej verejnosti o socilnom zkonodarstve asto vedie k vnmaniu Rmov ako socilne zvhodovanch osb. Medzery sa ukazuj aj v znalosti prvneho intittu diskrimincie. Dkazom s ast nlady a postoje asti majority, v ktorch sa prezentuje ako obe diskriminanch praktk s menm rozsahom prv, ako maj meniny. O rozsahu informci, ktormi verejnos disponuje v problematike spojenej s rasizmom a postavenm menn, asto vypoved rove internetovch diskusi a aktivita uvateov virtulnych socilnych siet.

Viac o kampani v prspevku Rastislava enkirika v tomto zbornku.

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nie som rasista, ale...

Mdi
V roku 2010 otriasol slovenskou verejnosou prpad strelca z Devnskej Novej Vsi, ktor z dodnes bliie neobjasnench prin vystrieal samopalom niekoko svojich susedov a nhodnch okoloidcich. Spsob, akm slovensk mienkotvorn mdi postupne prinali informcie o prpade, vyvolal chaos, zmtok a najm antirmsku hystriu v postojoch verejnosti. Pr hodn po incidente toti zaala mdiami kolova sprva, e obeou streby bola rodina rmskych dlerov a ilo o loklne vybavovanie si tov v rmci drogovej mafie. V alej vlne odvysielala najsledovanejia televzia chaotick report, ktorou informovala, e zavradenmi osobami boli problmov rmski susedia strelca. Niektor alie mdi doplnili, e obyvatelia danej tvrte niekokokrt iadali samosprvu o pomoc pri rieen nespratnch rmskych susedov, no kee im kompetentn nevyli v strety, je mon, e strelec vzal spravodlivos do vlastnch rk. Aj ke sa nakoniec dospelo k zisteniu, e report sa tkala celkom inej rodiny (spomedzi obet streby bola len jedna osoba rmskeho pvodu, aj to bez akejkovek svislosti s reportou i profilom problmovho suseda), verejnos u ni neodradilo od ospravedlovania i miestami a glorifikcie strelca. Dkazom tchto masvne zastpench postojov boli akovn npisy a odkazy pre vraha na mieste inu.

Demtizan nstroje
Zbavi sa vetkch negatvnych predsudkov voi meninm by bolo utopickou ambciou. Dleit je nepodceni tie, ktor svojm obsahom vne zasahuj do cti a dstojnosti prslunkov menn a zrove zskavaj vhu spolonosou bezvhradne prijmanho faktu.

vzdelvanie
Kovou zbraou proti nrodnostne a etnicky nenvistnm stereotypom a mtom je renie faktov. Aby sa k nim dostal o najir okruh spolonosti, je nevyhnut, aby boli zakomponovan do edukanch procesov. Pokia ide o vzdelvanie mldee (tudenti na kolch), nie vdy mus ma formu tdia povinnej literatry. Osveduj sa rzne vzdelvacie praktiky, pri ktorch prebieha priama interakcia tudentov so samotnmi prslunkmi menn (napr. iv kninice, workshopy, besedy a pod.).

Medilna viditenos tmy, podpora pozitvnych prkladov

Aby sa informcie zameran na odbranie stereotypov dostvali nielen k tudentom, ale aj k strednej a starej genercii, je potrebn zakomponova tmu do prostredia pre nich viditenho i u medilnou podporou pozitvnych prkladov alebo aspo prleitostnm edukanm stpekom v mainstreamovch mdich.

ponuka kontruktvnych rieen

Ak reprezentanti krajnej pravice politicky profituj z nerieench socilnych problmov asti rmskej meniny, potom je dleit, aby relevantn odbornci a tandardn politick subjekty ponkli kontruktvne rieenia ako alternatvu voi rieeniam, ktor navrhuj extrmisti. V opanom prpade sa spolonos pod tlakom tchto problmov posva do polohy, v ktorej vnma extrmistov ako jedinch, ktorm skutone zle na problmoch obyajnch ud.

postoj verejnch autort, osobn angaovanos

V neposlednom rade, zmena hanlivho tnu spoloenskej debaty o meninch neme nasta bez toho, aby do nej vstpili hlasy, ktor ju zneutralizuj. Pomc me hlas spoloenskej autority, medilne znmej osobnosti, ale aj benej verejnosti, ktor nm prispeje i u v internetovej diskusii, svojmi blogmi alebo obyajnm renm svojej dobrej osobnej sksenosti.

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poUiT LiTeraTra
Marcinin, A., Marcininov, .: Straty z vylenia Rmov. Open Society Foundation Nadcia otvorenej spolonosti, Bratislava, 2009. Vaeka, M.: Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraninej migrcii v Slovenskej republike. IOM Medzinrodn organizcia pre migrciu, Bratislava, 2009. Zkon . 235/1998 Z. z. o prspevku pri naroden dieaa, o prspevku rodiom, ktorm sa sasne narodili tri deti, alebo ktorm sa v priebehu dvoch rokov opakovane narodili dvojat. Zkon . 599/2003 Z.z. o hmotnej ndzi v znen neskorch predpisov.

boJ proTi haTe CriMe prosTreDnCTvoM aDvoKanCh sTraTgi

gregory Fabian
expert pre medzinrodn udsk prva

vod
Z pohadu advokanch aktivt mono tmu hate crime povaova za vemi komplikovan. Nie je jednoduch presne odhadn sprvny vber vhodnch tm a cieov na advokciu. Tie je ako uri konkrtnu advokan taktiku, aby sa dosiahol poadovan vsledok. Mimovldne organizcie (MVO) sa vinou venuj jednej tme alebo cieu a v zvislosti na miestnych podmienkach volia konkrtnu taktiku alebo aktivity, priom nie s schopn zohadni cel klu monch taktk a aktivt. Preto treba vytvori komplexn advokan stratgie, ktor mu prinies efektvnejie vsledky. Tento prspevok sa venuje tomu, ako mu aktivisti vylepi svoje advokan stratgie tak, aby komplexnejie vyuvali cel klu taktk. Sasou je tie prpadov tdia, ktor ilustruje komplexn advokan stratgiu na zabezpeenie bvania pre rmsku komunitu v Sarajeve.

Kde zaa?
i sa advokan aktivity venuj boju proti hate crime alebo nenvisti voi meninm, treba si pamta, e pri aplikcii udskoprvneho prstupu (LPP) m vlda povinnos repektova, chrni, podporova a napa prva vetkch, a najm tie, ktor sa tkaj prv tch, o s v najcitlivejej situcii. Aplikcia LPP umon definova kov tmu v boji proti hate crime a tie monosti, ako s ou naklada.

povinnos repektova, chrni, podporova a napa

Pre aktivistov venujcich sa advokcii je nevyhnutn, aby si uvedomili, e poda medzinrodnch udskch prv je povinnosou vldy repektova, chrni, podporova a napa prva vetkch. Tu je shrn povinnost vldy: repekt je negatvna povinnos, ktor poaduje, aby sa tt vyhol odmietaniu alebo obmedzovaniu rovnho prstupu vetkch k vyuitiu ich prv. To tie znamen, e tt sa mus vzda vkonu, podpory alebo tolerovania akejkovek praxe, politiky alebo prvneho opatrenia, ktor pokodzuje integritu jednotlivca, alebo ktor akmkovek spsobom zasahuje alebo obmedzuje prvo jednotlivca vyuva svoje prva v rmci medzinrodnch udskoprvnych nstrojov, ktormi je tt viazan, napr. vyhn sa svojvonmu nsilnmu vysahovaniu.

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boj proti haTe CriMe prostrednctvom advokanch stratgi

Chrni uklad ttu pozitvnu povinnos, aby predchdzal naruovaniu prv jednotlivca, napr. skromnm zamestnvateom zasahujcim do prva na prcu alebo pracovnch prv tm, e nedodriavaj zkladn pracovnoprvne normy. podporova uklad ttu pozitvnu povinnos vytvra atmosfru, v ktorej mu udia uplatova svoje prva a slobody tak, e podporuje povedomie o ich prvach prostrednctvom osvety, napr. opatreniami podporujcimi toleranciu a prevenciu diskrimincie v prstupe k prvam. napa uklad ttu pozitvnu povinnos prijma opatrenia, ktor umouj kadmu jednotlivcovi prstup k nroku na prvo, ktor neme by vykonvan len na zklade vlastnho silia jednotlivca. ttne rady maj tie povinnos poskytova konkrtne prvo vtedy, ke jednotlivec alebo skupina nie s schopn, z dvodov mimo ich kontroly, uplatova prvo sami prostriedkami, ktor maj k dispozcii napr. udia, ktor sa ocitn vo vnej ndzi. tt je tie povinn prijma adekvtne legislatvne, administratvne, fiklne, sdne a in opatrenia na podporu plnho uplatovania prv.

nvrhy alternatvnych spsobov identifikcie tm alebo voby advokanej stratgie

Ako alternatvu vyuitia LPP pri identifikcii tm pre advokan aktivity mono vyui odporania udskoprvnych dohd, ktormi je viazan krajina, napr. Vbor OSN pre udsk prva alebo Vbor OSN pre odstrnenie rasovej diskrimincie a pod. Medzinrodn vldne organizcie, ako Eurpska komisia pre problematiku rasizmu a intolerancie, ako aj medzinrodn mimovldne organizcie asto vydvaj sprvy s konkrtnymi odporaniami pre kad krajinu a jej vldu. Tie s rovnako bohatm zdrojom nmetov a tm pre advokan aktivity.

10-bodov pln boja proti hate crime

Medzinrodn mimovldna organizcia Human Rights First vytvorila 10-bodov pln boja proti hate crime.1 Napriek tomu, e je zameran na vldy, me sli ako bohat zdroj npadov pre hadanie zmerov advokanch aktivt. pln: Vyzvame vetky vldy 56 astnckych ttov Organizcie pre bezpenos a spoluprcu v Eurpe (OBSE), aby uplatnili nasledujci 10-bodov pln na boj proti nsilnm hate crimes vo svojich krajinch, ako aj odporania na posilnenie kapacity OBSE v tejto oblasti: Rozpozna a odsdi nsiln hate crime vdy, ke sa vyskytn. Ldri krajn by mali vysiela okamit, siln a konzistentn posolstvo, e nsiln hate crimes, ktor sa javia ako motivovan predsudkami a intoleranciou, bud dsledne vyetren a odsden v plnom rozsahu prva. Vytvra zkony, ktor sa explicitne venuj hate crimes. Vldy by mali vytvra zkony, ktor definuj konkrtne iny a stanovuj zosilnen postihy za nsiln trestn iny motivovan sexulnou orientciou, rodom, rodovou identitou, mentlnym a fyzickm postihnutm alebo obdobnm statusom obete. Posilni vymhatenos prva a postih vinnkov. Vldy by mali zabezpei trestnoprvnu zodpovednos tch, ktor s zodpovedn za hate crimes a aby sa vymhatenos zkonov, tkajcich sa hate crime, stala prioritou v justcii a ich vymhanie sa dsledne registrovalo a zverejovalo. Poskytova adekvtne intrukcie a zdroje policajnm orgnom. Vldy by mali zabezpei, aby polcia a vyetrovatelia boli presne intruovan a mali k dispozcii nevyhnutn postupy, zdroje a trning na identifikciu, vyetrovanie a registrcie predsudkovch motvov na sdoch, aby boli prokurtori kolen v predkladan dkazovho materilu o predsudkovch motvoch a aplikovali prvne opatrenia potrebn na odsdenie hate crimes.
1 Pozri: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/fighting-discrimination/recommendations-for-governments/.

sedem krokov k vytvoreniu advokanej stratgie

1. Pri vbere tm, ktorm sa treba venova, alebo zmerov, ktor dosiahnu pri boji proti hate crime, treba vytvori komplexn advokan stratgiu s LPP. To mono dosiahnu odpoveou na tchto sedem otzok: 2. Kto vo vlde m zo zkona zodpovednos za dan tmu? Ak s jeho udskoprvne povinnosti? Chrni a napa ich? 3. Poda odpovede na bod 1., ak cie si zvolte pri rieen danej tmy? 4. Ak ciele sa snate dosiahnu ako al krok na dosiahnutie celkovho zmeru? Ak asov rmec ste si na to stanovili? Ak cie chcete dosiahnu danm vstupom? 5. Ak konkrtne aktivity vyviniete na dosiahnutie oakvanho vstupu? 6. ie prva vs konkrtne zaujmaj? Ktor zloky ttnej sprvy s cieom vaich aktivt? Exekutva (t, ktor vytvraj zkony), legislatva (t, ktor prijmaj zkony), alebo justcia (t, ktor dozeraj na dodriavanie zkonov), alebo kombincia tchto zloiek? Ak taktiku zvolte na dosiahnutie zmeru? 7. Okrem identifikcie konkrtnych nositeov prv a povinnost, ktor partneri vm mu pomc identifikova, o urobili a neurobili nositelia zodpovednosti v svislosti s vam zmerom? S km sa spoji na dosiahnutie zmeru? 8. Ak miery a indiktory udskch prv pouijete pri pravidelnom zhodnoten a reportovan rozsahu, v akom sa nositelia prv venuj zmeru, ktor sledujete, a pri identifikovan barir dosiahnutia vstupov?

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boj proti haTe CriMe prostrednctvom advokanch stratgi

Zaa parlamentn, medzisektorov a in pecializovan diskusie o problematike hate crime. Prostrednctvom nich povzbudi verejn diskusiu, hada cesty efektvnejch reakci na hate crimes, hada tvoriv spsob, ako reagova na korene intolerancie a diskrimincie prostrednctvom vzdelvania a pod. Monitorova a reportova hate crime. Vldy by mali vytvori systmy monitorovania a verejnho reportovania hate crimes, ktor poskytn presn daje pre informovan politick rozhodnutia na boj proti nsilnm hate crimes. Tieto systmy by mali tie obsahova anonymn a neviazan informcie o predsudkovch motvoch, resp. skupinch obet. Mali by monitorova incidenty a priestupky, ako aj aloby. Vldy by mali zvi vytvorenie postupov sanost, aby tak podporili aktvnejie reportovanie hate crimes. Treba pripravova aj periodick prehady viktimizcie hate crimes na monitorovanie nedostatonho oznamovania prpadov obeami a zrove nedostatonej evidencie prpadov polciou. Vytvra a posilova antidiskriminan orgny. Oficilne antidiskriminan a udskoprvne orgny maj prvomoc venova sa hate crimes prostrednctvom monitoringu, reportovania a pomoci obetiam. Spolupracova s komunitami. Vldy by sa mali venova osvete a vzdelvaniu v komunitch a obianskych skupinch, aby znili strach a pomohli obetiam vytvra vzahy medzi polciou a komunitou, podporova reportovanie hate crimes a zlepi kvalitu zberu dt. Vystupova proti oficilnej intolerancii a bigotrii. Sloboda prejavu umouje pomerne vek rozsah urlivho a nenvistnho prejavu, ale verejn initelia by sa mali dra vych tandardov. Poslanci parlamentu a loklni ldri by mali ma politick zodpovednos za bigotn vyjadrenia, ktor podporuj diskriminciu a nsilie, m prispievaj k vytvraniu atmosfry strachu u menn. Podporova medzinrodn spoluprcu v boji proti hate crime. Vldy by mali podporova a posilova mandt medzivldnych organizci venujcich sa problematike diskrimincie, ako OBSE, Eurpska komisia pre problematiku rasizmu a intolerancie, Agentra pre zkladn prva. Tieto organizcie by tie mali vies k zvyovaniu kapacity na kolenia polcie, prokurtorov a sudcov, ako aj alch oficilnych orgnov a mimovldnych organizci v boji proti hate crime. Vldy by tmto organizcim mali alej predklada podrobn odpoet vskytu a povahy hate crimes, v slade s relevantnmi zvzkami.

o jednotlivch politikch, budovanie koalci MVO, zsahy medzinrodnch vldnych a mimovldnych organizci a pod.. Samozrejme, nie kad advokan kampa si vyaduje vyuitie vetkch tchto prvkov. Rovnako ani kad advokan cie nepotrebuje angaova tak mnostvo aktrov a zdrojov. Naopak, vina advokanch stratgi si vyaduje len jednu alebo dve z tchto taktk. Ich vber je determinovan komplexnosou a zloitosou problmu, ako aj objemom finannch a udskch zdrojov na kampa. Niektor z taktk boli pouit postupne, in vo vzjomnej kombincii. Niektor sa pouili naraz a kumulatvne, o si vyiadalo dokonal naasovanie a spoluprcu medzi partnermi. Napokon to bol kumulatvny efekt pouitch taktk a spoluprca partnerov, o v tomto prpade obrtilo vvoj udalost v prospech Rmov, ako cieovej skupiny kampane. Odporame upriami pozornos na tie taktiky, ktor organizcia, z ktorej je itate, nevyuva vo svojej advokanej innosti. Prve diverzita a kumulatvny efekt ved v konenom dsledku k dosiahnutiu zmerov a vyrieeniu problmu.

prpadov tdia: relokcia rmskej komunity butmir v sarajeve

3. jna 2009 dolo k relokcii 270 lenov rmskej komunity (32 rodn), ktor ili v osade Butmir v Sarajeve, do 33 novch bytovch jednotiek v 8 novch jednoposchodovch domoch. Projekt financovala vdska agentra pre medzinrodn rozvoj (SIDA) a postavil ich vajiarsky Caritas na pozemkoch s infratruktrou darovanou rznymi samosprvnymi jednotkami v kantne Sarajevo. Toto rozdelenie a integrcia lenov komunity do rznych samosprv sa uskutonili so shlasom lenov komunity a zstupcov rmskej MVO. Osada Butmir, ktor obvali Rmovia vye 40 rokov, bola povaovan za jednu z najhorch osd v Bosne a Hercegovine. Rmovia nemali prstup k adekvtnemu bvaniu vrtane zariaden nevyhnutnch pre zabezpeenie zdravia, bezpenosti, komfortu a vivy, ako je vyhovujca pitn voda, energetick zdroje na varenie, krenie, svetlo, sanita, likvidcia odpadu, skladovanie a pohotovostn sluby. Ani jedno z det nenavtevovalo kolu, miera nezamestnanosti bola vemi vysok. Vsledok silia bol sce pozitvny, ale viedol k nemu proces, ktor bol komplikovan a pertraktovan, vyadujci si spolon a vytrval silie mnohch partnerov. Projekt sa napokon realizoval po niekokoronom opakovanom nespechu samosprv presdli osadu. Posledn pokus zaal v jli 2006, ke kantonlny minister pre urbanistick plnovanie a ochranu ivotnho prostredia zvolal stretnutie lenov obce, aby ich informoval, e v priebehu niekokch tdov bud presdlen do doasnej kontajnerovej osady Vlakovo, na okraji Sarajeva. Uviedol, e toto opatrenie je nevyhnutn, lebo neleglne okupovali ochrann vodn znu.

prpadov tdia komplexnej advokanej stratgie

Nasledujca prpadov tdia ilustruje, ako vytvori komplexn advokan stratgiu. Pri jej tdiu si mono vimn niekoko vec. Po prv: advokan stratgia obsahovala mnostvo rznych taktickch krokov. Tie sa venovali tmam, ktor sa vyskytli poas 3-ronej kampane, napr. vyuitie elektronickch a printovch mdi, zmluvn mechanizmus OSN, strategick litigcia, odborn strategick konzultanti, vyjednvania so samosprvnymi a ttnymi orgnmi

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boj proti haTe CriMe prostrednctvom advokanch stratgi

Nov nermska osada, vystavan cez cestu oproti rmskej osade po bosenskej vojne, vak presdlen by nemala, lebo rady uznali, e je v nej adekvtna infratruktra na prevenciu zneistenia vody. Tto nermska komunita navye vyvjala tlak na miestne rady, aby Rmov vysahovali. Spoiatku nebol iaden nznak, e rady dodria prvo rmskych osadnkov na proces vysahovania v zmysle medzinrodnch udskoprvnych zkonov a noriem. Nebola ani zohadnen alternatva, e by po 40 rokoch osdlenia pozemku mala komunita nrok na nejak kompenzciu. Naopak, osada mala by vysahovan nsilm. A napokon neexistovali iadne dkazy, e nhradn ubytovanie bude adekvtne. Odbornci na udsk prva na Misii OBSE v Bosne a Hercegovine sa tohto stretnutia zastnili a upozornili ministra na zvzky vyplvajce z udskoprvnych zmlv. Vyplvala z nich povinnos zabezpei rmskej osade Butmir adekvtne bvanie vrtane prvnej istoty njmu, ako aj povinnos chrni komunitu pred nezkonnm nsilnm vysahovanm. V rmci prieskumu prpadu zistil udskoprvny tm OBSE, e SIDA vylenila pribline 1 milin KM (511 292 ) na trval bvanie pre lenov tejto komunity a e Caritas mal poui prostriedky na vstavbu novch domov pre obyvateov Butmiru. Zistilo sa tie, e Caritas mal vypracovan komplexn pln na rieenie alch socilnych problmov komunity, ako kolsk dochdzka a in zleitosti nevyhnutn pre socilnu inklziu. Napriek tomu miestne rady prejavili o tieto nvrhy len minimlny zujem. Preto plnovali investova 720 000 KM (368 130 ) z prostriedkov daovch platcov na nsiln vysdlenie obyvateov Butmiru do doasnej kontajnerovej osady. Pritom mali k dispozcii ponuku SIDA vo vke 1 milin KM (511 292 ), pozemok v adekvtnej lokalite, a tm monos poui 720 000 KM (368 130 ) na nevyhnutn infratruktru, ktor by skvalitnila bvanie. Tmu OBSE sa podarilo njs zdarma prvne zastpenie pre lenov komunity tak, e ich spojili so sarajevskou pobokou MPDL panielskej MVO, venujcej sa prvnej pomoci. Mnoh lenovia komunity podpsali shlas s ich prvnym zastpenm pracovnkmi MPDL, ktor mohla zaa vyvja potrebn kroky na to, aby v ich prospech iniciovala sdne konanie. Tm sa vytvorila vyjednvacia pozcia lenov obce a motivovali rady kantonu, aby zvili pln SIDA a Caritas. Tieto dve organizcie navye trvali na tom, e nemu investova prostriedky ani silie na doasn bvanie, o ete posilnilo pozciu komunity. V rmci zmeny nzoru radov sarajevskho kantnu, jeho minister pre bvanie prevzal vedenie celej zleitosti, m sa zlepila situcia v prospech Rmov. V rmci kampane vytvoril tm OBSE medilnu stratgiu zameran na elektronick aj printov mdi. Bosna a Hercegovina mala v tom ase predloi sprvu pre Vbor OSN pre udsk prva (VLP) o dodriavan Medzinrodnej konvencie o obianskych a politickch prvach. Tm OBSE sa preto spojil s Eurpskym centrom pre prva Rmov a nrodnmi rmskymi MVO

vo veci nsilnho vysahovania Rmov. To viedlo VLP k vydaniu zsadnho znepokojenia a odporania . 23 z 22. novembra 2006, tkajceho sa Bosny a Hercegoviny: 23. Vbor so znepokojenm zaznamenva zmer ttu nsilne presdli obyvateov rmskej osady v Butmire, dajne z dvodu absencie nevyhnutnej infratruktry na prevenciu zneistenia vodnho zdroja, zatia o podobn pln nebol vytvoren pre nermske rodiny bvajce cez ulicu. Taktie so znepokojenm zaznamenva, e pln relokcie dajne neobsahuje iadne podrobnosti prvnej nhrady a kompenzcie pre dotknut rmske rodiny (lnky 2, 17, 26). tt by mal prehodnoti pln presdlenia rmskej osady Butmir, vzia do vahy rezidenn nroky obyvateov osady, ktor existuje 40 rokov, ako aj alternatvne rieenia prevencie zneistenia vodnho zdroja. Pripomname ttu, e akkovek presdlenie sa mus uskutoni nediskriminanm spsobom a mus spa medzinrodn udskoprvne normy vrtane prva jednotlivcov na efektvnu nhradu, kompenzciu a poskytnutie adekvtneho nhradnho bvania. V auguste 2007 prijali rady sarajevskho kantnu nvrh SIDA a Caritas a k nsilnmu presdleniu do doasnej kontajnerovej osady nedolo. A napokon v jni 2009, po akostiach s vberom lokality, mali lenovia butmirskej rmskej komunity adekvtne bvanie. Hlavnm ponauenm je, e zodpovedn osoby v nvrhu doasnho presdlenia rmskych osd nebrali do vahy udskoprvnu strnku. Ich nvrh znemonil rmskej obci vytvori si vyjednvaciu pozciu na zskanie adekvtneho bvania prostrednctvom prvneho konania, ktorm by sa predilo nsilnmu vysdleniu. Neslobodno zabda, e zodpovedn osoby maj neraz jedin zujem m skr odstrni Rmov z pozemkov, ktor osduj. Akcie na obranu ich prv, na prevenciu nezkonnho nsilnho vysdlenia a poiadavka adekvtneho bvania, s jedin skuton vyjednvacie karty, ktor m rmska komunita k dispozcii. Preto m dlhie bojuj rmske komunity za to, aby mohli zosta na pozemkoch, ktor osduj, tm silnejia je ich vyjednvacia pozcia. alm ponauenm je, e prostriedky pripraven na doasn bvanie mono poui na adekvtne trval bvanie, ktor zaha prvnu zbezpeku njmu a prstup k nevyhnutnm slubm. Doasn presdlenie mono vzia do vahy len vtedy, ak a) sa uzavrela prvne zvzn dohoda o trvalej relokcii na miesto, ktor spa medzinrodnoprvne normy na adekvtne bvanie; b) boli na to vylenen prostriedky; c) vstavba sa u zaala. Treba tie doda, e doasn bvanie mus tie spa medzinrodn udskoprvne normy na adekvtne bvanie. Ak aj s tieto podmienky splnen, stle plat, e prostriedky vynaloen na doasn bvanie s stratou, kee mohli by investovan do trvalho bvania.

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Hlavnm ponauenm vak je, e kampane na adekvtne bvanie pre lenov rmskych komunt si vyaduj vytrval a komplexn advokan stratgie, ktor angauj mnohch partnerov pracujcich vo vzjomnej koordincii. To sa tka aj mdi, medzinrodnch vldnych a mimovldnych organizci, driteov prv, MVO, donorov, nezvislch expertov, at.. Toto silie si nadovetko vyaduje vytrvalos, cieavedomos a jednotu zainteresovanch strn.

praKTiCK rieenia prpaDov rasoveJ DisKriMinCie s vYUiTM prvnYCh prosTrieDKov oChranY na sLovensKU
tefan ivanco
Porada pre obianske a udsk prva
Ochrana udskch prv sa vo svete opiera o mylienku, e vetci udia sa rodia vo svojej dstojnosti rovn a maj rovn prva. Bez ohadu na akkovek charakteristiky, ktormi sa udia navzjom odliuj kad lovek zdiea rovn dstojnos a prva. Prejavy diskrimincie tto rovnos medzi umi poruuj. Diskrimincia je konanm, ktor obmedzuje ud vo vyuvan ich garantovanch udskch prv a zniuje ich udsk dstojnos. Nielen histria, ale aj sasnos ukazuj, e jednm z najrozrenejch dvodov tzv. rasovej diskrimincie je prslunos k odlinej rase, nrodnostnmu i etnickmu pvodu. Prejavy rasovej diskrimincie zakazuj mnoh medzinrodn prvne predpisy na ochranu udskch prv a jej zkaz njdeme aj v slovenskej legislatve. Cieom tohto prspevku je pribli, ako v sasnosti na Slovensku funguje ochrana pred rasovou diskriminciou v praxi. Jeho autor vychdza z niekokoronch praktickch sksenost mimovldnej organizcie Porada pre obianske a udsk prva (alej len Porada), s rieenm konkrtnych prpadov rasovej diskrimincie na Slovensku s vyuitm existujcich prvnych prostriedkov ochrany. V sil o vymedzenie rasovej diskrimincie pre potreby tohto prspevku, meme narazi na ist nejasnosti, preto si tento termn zasli krtku pozornos. Medzinrodn dohovor o odstrnen vetkch foriem rasovej diskrimincie (ICERD) medzinrodn zmluva, ktor bola v tejto oblasti prijat v roku 1965 na pde OSN interpretuje vo veobecnosti rasov diskriminciu ako poruovanie rovnosti v uplatovan akchkovek garantovanch udskch prv a slobd, ktor sa deje z dvodu prslunosti k rase, nrodnosti a etnickej prslunosti. To je ponmanie, do ktorho mono zaradi akkovek znevhodovanie i obmedzovanie loveka na rasovom, nrodnostnom i etnickom zklade, v rznych oblastiach ivota vrtane akhokovek nsilia voi uom v spolonosti, ktor je zaloen na rasovom, nrodnostnom i etnickom zklade. Prslun Vbor OSN pre odstrnenie rasovej diskrimincie (CERD), ktor monitoruje implementciu dohovoru v jednotlivch signatrskych ttoch, venuje vo svojej prci pozornos naprklad prejavom nerovnakho zaobchdzania v rznych oblastiach verejnho ivota, rovnako tak prejavom extrmizmu, xenofbie i antisemitizmu, prejavom hate speech, vskytu rasovo motivovanch trestnch inov, rasovo motivovanho nsilia zo strany polcie a podobne.

oDporan LiTeraTra
Organizcia pre bezpenos a spoluprcu v Eurpe (OBSE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Prevencia a reagovanie na hate crimes, manul pre MVO v regine OBSE (Preventing and responding to hate crimes, a resource guide for NGOs in the OSCE Region). Varava, 2009. http://www.osce.org/odihr/39821. OBSE/ODIHR: Hate Crimes v regine OBSE Incidenty a reakcie, Vron sprva za rok 2009 (Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2009). Varava, 2010. http://www.osce.org/odihr/73636. OBSE/ODIHR: Zkony tkajce sa hate crimes praktick prruka (Hate Crime Laws A Practical Guide). Varava, 2009. http://www.osce.org/odihr/36426. European Network against Racism (ENAR): Boj proti rasistickm zloinom a nsiliu: Svedectv a stratgie advokcie (Combating Racist Crime and Violence: Testimonies and Advocacy Strategies). 2009. http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/AdvocacyBooklet_EN_lowres.pdf. Agentra EU pre zkladn prva (European Unon Agency for Fundamental Rights): Efektvnejia polcia chpanie a prevencia diskriminanho etnickho profilovania (Towards More Effective Policing Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic Profiling). Belgicko, 2010. http://www.fra.europa. eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Guide_ethnic_profiling.pdf. OBSE/ODIHR: Medzinrodn akcia proti rasizmu, xenofbii, intolerancii a antisemitizmu v regine OBSE. Porovnvacia tdia (International Action against Racism, Xenophobia, Intolerance and Anti-semitism in the OSCE Region A comparative study). Varava, 2004. http://www.osce.org/odihr/13995. The Southern Poverty Law Center: Desa spsobov boja proti nenvisti prruka komunitnch reakci (Ten Ways to Fight Hate A Community Response Guide). Montgomery, Alabama, 2010. http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/Ten_Ways_2010.pdf.

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Tento prspevok sa vak nevenuje celmu okruhu nezkonnch prejavov svisiacich s rasovou diskriminciou. Zameriava sa pecificky na prejavy priamej diskrimincie na rasovom zklade, v zmysle defincie, ktor njdeme v naom antidiskriminanom zkone1 na prpady, ke sa s lovekom zaobchdza menej priaznivo v rovnakej i porovnatenej situcii, v konkrtnych, zkonom vymedzench oblastiach verejnho ivota. Ide zrove o prpady, ktorm sa Porada venovala. V naich podmienkach ide v drvivej vine o znevhodnenia rmskej meniny v prstupe k slubm, zamestnaniu, zdravotnej starostlivosti i vzdelaniu. V porovnan so zloinmi hate crimes, zaloenmi na rasovom zklade, ide tie o prpady nezkonnho konania, ktor s v princpe zaloen na rasovej neznanlivosti i predsudkoch, avak spravidla nenapaj skutkov podstatu rasovo motivovanch trestnch inov, tak ako ich njdeme v slovenskom Trestnom zkone. Na ochranu pred nimi slia in prvne predpisy, a tm najdleitejm je antidiskriminan zkon. Porada sa vo svojej prci zaala venova rieeniu prpadov rasovej diskrimincie s vyuitm antidiskriminanho zkona po jeho prijat v roku 2004. Nam cieom bolo vyuva antidiskriminan zkon v konkrtnych prpadoch diskrimincie na sdoch tak, aby sa z neho postupne stval efektvnej prvny prostriedok ochrany pred diskriminciou. Pravdou vak je, e nebol jedinm prvnym nstrojom, ktor sme na rieenie prpadov rasovej diskrimincie vyuvali. Na prv pohad sme trochu paradoxne viacer prpady rieili poiatone podanm trestnho oznmenia a argumentovali, e diskriminciou dolo k spchaniu rasovo motivovanho trestnho inu.2 Ilo o prpady nerovnakho zaobchdzania, ktor sa z nho pohadu diali na verejnosti a to konkrtne prpady obmedzovania prstupu prslunkom a prslunkam rmskej meniny k verejnm slubm, ich nevpanie do retaurci, na diskotky a podobne. Orgny inn v trestnom konan posudzovali tieto prpady najm v zvislosti od argumentcie v trestnom oznmen ako podnecovanie k rasovej nenvisti, prpadne ako hanobenie. Pri posudzovan skutkovch okolnost v zsade skmali, i bola naplnen objektvna podmienka danho trestnho inu, a to, i sa skutok dial verejne a i pri diskrimincii dolo aj k verblnemu rasovmu hanobeniu. Asi nikoho neprekvap, e v tchto prpadoch nebol nikto uznan vinnm. Orgny inn v trestnom konan v niektorch prpadoch diskrimincie sce v prstupe k slubm zaali trestn sthanie, avak neskr ho zastavili a prpad posunuli na priestupkov, resp. sprvne konanie (obvodn rad, inpektorty Slovenskej obchodnej inpekcie). V inch prpadoch trestn sthanie vbec nezaali a prpad ihne postpili na administratvne konanie, prpadne pokodench odkzali priamo na sd. Pozoruhodnm v tejto svislosti, je prpad, ktor sa tkal nevpania Rmov a Rmok na rybnk a zrove letn kpalisko, ktor spravovala jedna z obc v Preovskom kraji. Jej obecn zastupitestvo ete v roku 2006 vydalo nariadenie, ktorm zakzalo prstup obyvateom a obyvatekm rmskej meniny na rybnk. Prijatie tohto nariadenia neulo svojho asu ani pozornosti mdi. Na zklade podnetu ho prslun prokuratra celkom pochopitene
1 2 Zkon . 365/2004 Z.z. o rovnakom zaobchdzan v niektorch oblastiach a o ochrane pred diskriminciou a o zmene a doplnen niektorch zkonov. Zkon . 365/2004 Z.z. o rovnakom zaobchdzan v niektorch oblastiach a o ochrane pred diskriminciou a o zmene a doplnen niektorch zkonov.

zruila ako protizkonn. V praxi vak diskriminan prax na rybnku pokraovala. V lete roku 2007 nebola na rybnk vpusten skupina mladch Rmov, a to tak, e od nich predavai lstkov pri vstupe ptali fiktvne lensk karty. Nermsky spolupracovnk a spolupracovnka Poradne si vak bez problmov zakpili lstok a boli vpusten do arelu. Predava im zrove vysvetlil, e lensk karty poaduj len od Rmov, aby im zabrnili vo vstupe. Orgny inn v trestnom konan zaali v prpade trestn sthanie z radnej povinnosti, ktor nsledne poveren prslunk PZ zastavil. Toto rozhodnutie bolo nsledne prokuratrou zruen ako nezkonn a nsledne bola na prslun sd dokonca podan aloba na starostu obce pre trestn in hanobenia nroda, rasy a presvedenia. Okresn sd starostu spod obaloby oslobodil, no krajsk sd jeho rozhodnutie zruil a prpad mu vrtil. Okresn sd svoje rozhodnutie optovne potvrdil, a to z dvodu, e nebolo mon dostatone dokza, e prkaz na diskriminciu Rmov dal prve starosta. Toto rozhodnutie u Krajsk sd v Preove ako odvolac sd potvrdil.3 Spsob, ako k tomuto prpadu pristpila prokuratra, bol ojedinel a z nho pohadu a prekvapujco progresvny, kee samotn diskrimincia mladch Rmov na rybnku nebola spojen so slovnm rasovm hanobenm. Jej prstup naznail, e ak diskrimincia na rasovom zklade spa podmienku, e sa deje verejne, je mon samotn skutok nerovnho zaobchdzania interpretova ako prejav hanobenia, ktor zniuje vnos pokodench a nemus s teda len o typick slovn i psomn hanobiaci prejav.4 Svoju lohu pri posudzovan tohto prpadu pravdepodobne zohralo aj spomnan nezkonn diskriminan nariadenie obecnho zastupitestva, ktor celej veci predchdzalo. Bez ohadu na to, ako orgny inn v trestnom konan ten-ktor prpad rasovej diskrimincie posdia, z naich sksenost vieme, e m vznam, ak sa na miesto incidentu zavol polcia a diskriminovan osoby podaj trestn oznmenie alebo oznmenie o priestupku. Polcia me ma, po prchode na miesto, tendenciu prpad zahova, ale v konenom dsledku by mala prpad zdokumentova a vypou svedkov, o me by uiton neskr, ak by sa pokoden rozhodli domha svojich prv na sde alobou, podanou poda antidiskriminanho zkona. V prpade rasovej diskrimincie v prstupe k verejnm slubm je pecificky uiton, ak diskriminovan osoby na mieste polciu poiadaj o vykonanie dychovej skky na alkohol, pretoe pomyseln opitos pokodench je zvyajne jednm z hlavnch argumentov, ktorm sa diskriminujci subjekt sna na sde zdvodni, preo pokodenm zabrnil vo vstupe do retaurcie, na diskotku a podobne. Trestn zkon vak nie je v sasnosti jedinm, a poda nho nzoru ani tm najdleitejm prvnym predpisom na ochranu pred nerovnm zaobchdzanm, z dvodu prslunosti k rase,
3 4 Rozsudok Okresnho sdu vo Vranove nad Topou, sp. zn. 2 T 66/08 zo da 24. 5. 2010 v spojen s uznesenm Krajskho sdu v Preove, sp. zn. 7 To 75/10 310. V tejto svislosti mono okrem inho citova z rozhodnutia Najvyieho sdu eskej republiky z roku 2002 k 198 Trestnho zkona . 140/1963 Zb. v znen neskorch predpisov (zkon platn do 31. decembra 2009) k skutkovej podstate trestnho inu hanobenia nroda, etnickej skupiny, rasy a presvedenia. Ide o jeho obdobn znenie, ak njdeme aj v Slovenskom Trestnom zkone. Sd pripomna, e hanobenie je kad myseln zniovanie vnosti a me sa dia v akejkovek forme: Hanobenie je subjektvny, hrubo urliv prejav...Me sa prejavova v akejkovek forme... Urlivos prejavu me vyplva bu u z jeho obsahu a spsobu jeho prednesu, alebo prevedenia, prpadne z inch okolnost, za ktorch bol vykonan. Sp. zn. 7 TDO 989/2002.

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nrodnosti i etnickej prslunosti. Faktom je, e ani samotn Dohovor ICERD nevyaduje, aby sa plne vetky prejavy rasovej diskrimincie v zmysle defincie dohovoru vslovne kriminalizovali. V kadom prpade vak vyaduje, aby vetku rasov diskriminciu zakzali, aktvne ju odstraovali a zabezpeili kadmu inn prvnu ochranu pred rasovou diskriminciou prostrednctvom sdov i inch ttnych orgnov vrtane prva poadova spravodliv a primeran nhradu za akkovek kodu, ktor v dsledku diskrimincie pokoden utrpel. Zabezpeuj dnes teda na Slovensku tto ochranu civiln sdy a antidiskriminan legislatva, akou je n antidiskriminan zkon? Krtka odpove znie: nie. Po vye iestich rokoch od prijatia antidiskriminanho zkona mono kontatova, e v sasnosti tento prvny predpis nezabezpeuje inn a efektvnu ochranu pred rasovou diskriminciou. Antidiskriminanm zkonom si Slovensko splnilo svoju povinnos, v svislosti so vstupom do Eurpskej nie, zavies prslun antidiskriminan smernice do domceho prvneho poriadku. Po svojom prijat tento zkon poslil ako uiton pomcka na zvyovanie povedomia o diskrimincii. Dodnes sa vak len mlo vyuva v sdnej praxi ako praktick prvny prostriedok ochrany pre diskriminovan osoby. Prvoplatnch sdnych rozhodnut je poda antidiskriminanho zkona len hstka. Mnoh z rozhodnut prvostupovch a odvolacch sdov mono navye z hadiska kvality v kontexte medzinrodnej antidiskriminanej legislatvy vnma ako kontroverzn.5 Praktick uplatovanie antidiskriminanho zkona v prpadoch diskrimincie a pecificky rasovej diskrimincie el z nho pohadu trom hlavnm prekkam: 1. Sdy rozhoduj pomaly. Konania na ochranu pred diskriminciou trvaj aj niekoko rokov, aj ke prieahy v sdnych konaniach nie s pecifikom len sdnych sporov na ochranu pred diskriminciou. 2. Rozhodnutia sdov s v prpadoch diskrimincie asto nekonzistentn a kontroverzn, sdy mnohokrt nedostatone reflektuj pecifik v antidiskriminanej legislatve, ako je intitt obrtenho dkaznho bremena. 3. Sdy nemaj tendenciu vnma rasov diskriminciu ako konanie, ktor znanm spsobom zniuje dstojnos loveka a zdrhaj sa priznva pokodenm osobm akkovek finann odkodnenie za rasov diskriminciu. Domha sa svojich prv za diskriminciu a pecificky rasov diskriminciu na sde, si dnes vyaduje vea trpezlivosti a znan dvku osobnho aktivizmu bojova za svoje prva. Zrove treba ma na pamti, e vsledok sporu je neist viac, ako sa spoiatku zo skutkovej podstaty prpadu me zda. Spomnan nedostatky dobre ilustruje sdny prpad, ktor bol prvoplatne rozhodnut na jese roku 2010. Ilo o jeden z prvch prpadov rasovej diskrimincie, ktor bol iniciovan poda antidiskriminanho zkona ete v roku 2005. Tkal sa diskrimincie troch miestnych
5 V novembri 2010 vydala Porada Zbornk sdnych rozhodnut vo veciach prva na rovn zaobchdzanie, kde je mon okrem rozhodnut z eskej republiky, Spojenho krovstva a Sdneho dvora ES, njs aj niekoko progresvnych rozhodnut sloven.skch sdov v prpadoch diskrimincie. Zbornk je k dispozcii v na www.poradna-prava.sk.

rmskych aktivistov, ktor namietali, e im bol pre ich rmsky pvod zabrnen vstup do jednej z kaviarn v Michalovciach. Okresn sd v Michalovciach rozhodol v prpade prvkrt v auguste roku 2006, ke kontatoval, e Rmovia sce boli diskriminovan, avak zrove odmietol tvrdenie, e dvodom diskrimincie bol ich etnick pvod. Sd vbec nevysvetlil, na akom zklade boli Rmovia diskriminovan. Krajsk sd v Koiciach, ako odvolac sd, rozsudok okresnho sdu v roku 2007 zruil ako zmton a prpad mu vrtil na alie konanie. Okresn sd v Michalovciach vec optovne prejednal a v januri 2008 rozhodol tak, e Rmovia boli v kaviarni skutone diskriminovan na zklade svojho etnickho pvodu. Sd uloil majiteovi kaviarne povinnos zasla pokodenm Rmom ospravedlujci list, no odmietol im prizna akkovek finann odkodnenie za diskriminciu a ou spsoben ujmu na dstojnosti pokodench.6 V septembri 2010 Krajsk sd v Koiciach potvrdil, e rozhodnutie je prvoplatn. Argumentcia, ktorou sd odmietol prizna pokodenm akkovek odkodnenie, je poda nho nzoru kontroverzn a nie je v slade s medzinrodnmi tandardmi na ochranu pred rasovou diskriminciou. V sasnosti prebieha v prpade konanie pred stavnm sdom SR. Klienti, v spoluprci s Poradou, ktor im v prpade sprostredkovala bezplatn prvne zastpenie, zvauj aj podniknutie alch prvnych krokov. Dleitou otzkou v svislosti s efektvnejm uplatovanm antidiskriminanho zkona s tie relne monosti, ako diskriminciu v obianskoprvnom konan na sde preukza. Diskrimincia sa asto deje nhle, neoakvane, bez prtomnosti svedkov (napr. v prstupe k zamestnaniu) a v mnohch prpadoch ju nie je jednoduch dosvedi. Napriek zavedenmu intittu tzv. obrtenho dkaznho bremena v antidiskriminanch sporoch (t.j. nie alobca, ale naopak alovan mus dokazova, e nediskriminoval, ak alobca predlo sdu skutonosti, z ktorch je mon dvodne usudzova, e k diskrimincii dolo) je dleit, aby pokoden osoba mohla v rmci sdneho konania oznai skutonosti, z ktorch bude sd dvodne usudzova, e dolo k diskrimincii. Preto v niekokch antidiskriminanch konaniach, v ktorch Porada sprostredkva prvne zastupovanie hr dleit lohu aj zvukov nahrvka z tzv. testovacieho experimentu, ktor zachytva dan diskriminan konanie, ku ktormu dochdza na verejnosti. Je pozitvne, e slovensk sdy dnes takto dkaz vo veobecnosti akceptuj. Na potrebu zlepova uplatovanie antidiskriminanej legislatvy na sdoch v prpadoch rasovej diskrimincie v praxi zretene upozoruje, v jednom zo svojich aktulnych odporan pre Slovensko (okrem inch), aj v vode spomnan Vbor pre odstrnenie rasovej dis-krimincie.7 Ako vbor pripomna, pri uplatovan antidiskriminanho zkona v praxi by malo by aktvnejie Slovensk nrodn stredisko pre udsk prva ttna intitcia, ktorej prvomoci zahaj aj praktick poskytovanie prvnej pomoci diskriminovanm osobm v konaniach pred sdmi. V tejto oblasti svojej prce nebolo doposia prli aktvne. Prvomoci preetrova a sankcionova niektor prejavy diskrimincie maj vo svojich sfrach psobnosti v rmci administratvneho konania aj ttne intitcie, ako inpektorty Slovenskej
6 7 Rozsudok Okresnho sdu v Michalovciach zo da 29.janura 2008, sp. zn. 12C/139/2005 158. CERD/C/SVK/CO/6-8. p. 10.

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obchodnej inpekcie, inpektorty prce i ttnej kolskej inpekcie, no ich innos v oblasti postihovania diskrimincie m dnes v praxi taktie svoje vlastn limity. K efektvnejiemu a prunejiemu prvnemu postihovaniu uritch prpadov diskrimincie, by v budcnosti mohlo prispie naprklad rozrenie prvomoc Slovenskho nrodnho strediska, a to tak, e by prejavy diskrimincie sankcionovalo priamo tak, ako je tomu v niektorch inch krajinch, ako napr. v Bulharsku i Maarsku. V sasnosti sa jeho prvomoci v tomto smere obmedzuj na monos vykona tzv. nezvisl etrenie. V kadom prpade vak netreba zabda predovetkm na implementciu antidiskriminanho zkona sdmi. Antidiskriminan zkon je vo svojej dnenej podobe v zsade dobrm prvnym predpisom, ktor me poskytn diskriminovanm osobm vysok mieru zadosuinenia, ako s rzne formy ospravedlnenia vrtane finannej nhrady nemajetkovej ujmy i inej nhrady. Z hadiska jeho uplatovania v praxi vak nememe oakva iadny rchly posun. Je dleit, aby slovensk sdy v budcnosti pracovali s prpadmi diskrimincie v praxi a aby sa postupne zlepovala interpretcia antidiskriminanej legislatvy, formovala domca judikatra v prpadoch diskrimincie a aby napokon pozitvne rozhodnutia sdov v prpadoch diskrimincie motivovali alie diskriminovan osoby domha sa svojich prv. Verme, e pozitvne verdikty sdov v prospech diskriminovanch osb mu zrove prispieva k prevencii prejavov diskrimincie v spolonosti. Nae sdy neak ahk loha. U v blzkej budcnosti sa bud musie v praxi vysporiada, okrem inho, aj s posudzovanm pecifickch prejavov rasovej diskrimincie, akm je rasov segregcia rmskych det vo vzdelvan. Verme, e tch, ktor sa v prpadoch diskrimincie spene domu svojich prv na sde, bude v budcnosti oraz viac a viac.

o osUDe JeDneJ vZvY (ergo, toleruje i netoleruje slovensko rasizmus?)

rastislav enkirik
socilny poradca a kulturolg
Cieom tohto prspevku je na konkrtnom prpade poukza na alarmujci rozpor medzi deklarovanm a relnym prstupom k problematike intolerancie, rasizmu a extrmizmu v Slovenskej republike. Pritom nejde o iadny ako deifrovaten i nhodn kaz, ale o oficilnu sas predvolebnej politickej kampane, ptajcej pozornos verejnosti. Navonok sa Slovensko prostrednctvom multilaterlnych zvzkov, internch prvnych noriem a programovch dokumentov prilenilo k tej asti medzinrodnho spoloenstva, ktor dsledne obhajuje udsk prva a slobody (udsk dstojnos nevynmajc) a sna sa vytvra inn hrdzu xenofbii, intolerancii, rasizmu a otvorenm, ale aj skrytm formm extrmizmu vo verejnom ivote. Z formlneho hadiska teda Slovenskej republike nie je o vyta. O to rozporuplnejia je relna podoba spoloenskej praxe na Slovensku. T balansuje na vemi subtlnej hranici, oddeujcej populizmus, nacionalizmus a radikalizmus od zjavnch prejavov rasizmu a extrmizmu. ia, nejde o nhodn excesy, ale dlhodob a eskalujci proces. Vypoved o tom alostne nzka vymoitenos prva v tejto oblasti, vulgrna a agresvna rtorika verejnch initeov (vrtane stavnch), spenos politickho populizmu zameranho na atavizmy udskej povahy, pretrvvajcu historick frustrciu slovenskej spolonosti a z nej prameniace sociokultrne stereotypy. Kampa pred parlamentnmi vobami v roku 2010 predstavuje vrchol tohto negatvneho trendu. A do tchto volieb patrili otvoren podnecovanie k etnickej neznanlivosti a rasizmus do agendy marginlnych extrmistickch politickch sl. Pred vobami v roku 2010 sa k takmto praktikm uchlila parlamentn strana, sce veobecne povaovan za nacionalistick, no nie extrmistick. Slovensk nrodn strana (SNS) pouila v kampani bilbordy s vyobrazenm polonahho Rma v chudobnej domcnosti s textom: Aby sme nekmili tch, o nechc pracova.

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o osude jednej vzvy

Napriek minimlnej medilnej podpore a krtkosti asu sa medzi signatrov vzvy do 7. 6. 2010 zalenila vina odbornkov a aktivistov z danej oblasti, ako aj relevantn obianske iniciatvy, mimovldne subjekty a intitcie: Agentra Pohoda (Michal Kak) Aspekt (Jana Cvikov, Jana Jurov) lovek v ohrozen (Gabriela uvadov) Iniciatva Bratislava otvorene (ubica Trubniov) Iniciatva Inakos(Jn Benec) Intitt pre verejn otzky (Grigorij Mesenikov) Konzervatvny intitt M .R. tefnika (Peter Zajac, Ondrej Dostl) Monos voby (Adriana Mesochoritisov) Nadcia Milana imeku (Laco Oravec) Oban, demokracia a zodpovednos (arlota Pufflerov) Obianska iniciatva Nechceme sa prizera (Miroslav Kocr) SOCIA nadcia na podporu socilnych zmien (Helena Wolekov) Za matku Zem (Pavol irok) Zdruenie mladch Rmov (Ivan Mako) Zdruenie za socilnu reformu (Pavel Hanut) Rastislav enkirik, Lucia Piussi, Ladislav Snopko, ubica Trubniov, arlota Pufflerov, Dorota Nvotov, uba Lesn, Eduard Chmelr, Juraj Mesk, Jozef Hato, Juraj Alner, Katarna Zavack, Filip Vaga, Hana Fbry, Lucia Stasselov, Duan Katuk, Katarna Fabini, Daniel Pastirk, Vladimr Ondru, Jana Cvikov, Mikul Huba, Klmn Petcz, Zuzana Kus, Frantiek Guldan, Patrcia Garajov-Jariabkov ............ (409 obanov). Mono zoveobecni, e prakticky cel slovensk odborn verejnos sa unisono zhodla na tom, e v prpade kontroverznho bilbordu SNS ilo o prejav rasizmu a o podnecovanie k etnickej nenvisti. Rovnak nzor pri neformlnej konzultcii zaujal aj osloven sdny znalec. O to prekvapivej bol verdikt orgnov innch v trestnom konan. Po presvan trestnho oznmenia z Generlnej prokuratry na alie miestne prslun prokuratry a policajn oddelenia, zamietol cel zleitos (nedolo k naplneniu skutkovej podstaty) radov policajt z policajnho riaditestva Bratislava Star Mesto ako neopodstatnen. Rovnak, prefoten zamietnutie dostali vetci, ktor nezvisle podali trestn oznmenie. Bez monosti vyjadri sa, bez monosti obhji svoje podanie, bez sdnoznaleckho dokazovania (slovensk prvny systm v prpade rasovo motivovanch trestnch inov vyaduje odborn, respektve znaleck dokazovanie takzvanho osobitnho motvu). Pozoruhodn bola aj rchlos tejto

Bilbordy vyvolali prudk pobrenie mnohch osobnost a intitci a zaujali pozornos mdi. V bezprostrednej reakcii podpredsednka SNS potvrdila, e bilbordom chcela strana poukza na problmy s Rmami a argumentovala tatistikami o rmskej kriminalite, nezamestnanosti a odkzanosti na ttne socilne dvky. Neskorie argumenty SNS, e na bilborde nie je vyobrazen Rm, mono povaova len za elov reakciu na verejn kritiku, resp. za alibizmus pod tlakom monch trestnoprvnych konzekvenci. Ako oban, a sasne odbornk v danej oblasti, som podal trestn oznmenie na Generlnu prokuratru SR pre podozrenie z podnecovania rasovej neznanlivosti a zrove som inicioval Vzvu za oistu verejnho ivota od prejavov rasizmu a alch foriem politickho extrmizmu. Podstatou vzvy bolo vyjadrenie znepokojenia nad otvorenmi prejavmi rasizmu a podnecovanm k rasovej neznanlivosti, drazn odmietnutie takchto prekroen etickch, kultrnych a prvnych noriem vrtane medzinrodnch zvzkov SR. Vzva poadovala jednoznan stanovisko od kompetentnch stavnch initeov, tak ako im to vyplva z mandtu zverenej verejnej funkcie. Vzva zrove iadala orgny inn v trestnom konan o razantn postup v slade so zkonom a v slade s etikou verejnej sluby. Da 7. 6. 2010 signatri vzvy zverejnili tlaov informciu a vzvu s otvorenm listom doruili kompetentnm stavnm initeom: Ivanovi Gaparoviovi, prezidentovi SR Pavlovi Pakovi, predsedovi Nrodnej rady SR Robertovi Ficovi, predsedovi vldy SR Duanovi aploviovi, podpredsedovi vldy SR, kompetentnmu pre problematiku udskch prv Robertovi Kalikovi, ministrovi vntra SR

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o osude jednej vzvy

administratvnej procedry. Km v podobnch prpadoch vyetrovanie trv roky, v tomto prpade to cel reazec orgnov innch v trestnom konan stihol za niekoko dn, skr ne dolo k povolebnej vmene fovskch garnitr. Osud samotnej vzvy bol rovnako tristn. Ani jeden z oslovench stavnch initeov nereagoval osobne, hoci vzva bola zaslan s osobnm sprievodnm otvorenm listom. V tatistickom vyjadren mono zhrn: 100%-n ignorancia povinnost vyplvajcich zo zverenej verejnej funkcie, 100%-n ahostajnos k flagrantnm prejavom rasizmu vo verejnom ivote. Rekapitulcia hovor za vetko: predseda parlamentu iadna reakcia predseda vldy iadna reakcia podpredseda vldy iadna reakcia prezident vgna reakcia odboru komunikcie s verejnosou (...pn prezident zastva stanovisk v slade s vzvou...) minister vntra irelevantn reakcia (po vobch vymenovan policajn prezident zaslal list o prci polcie...). Vldna garnitra sa sce po vobch vymenila, ale konkrtny problm tu zostva pol roka bez adekvtnej odozvy. Ale ve aj vkon najvych stavnch funkci predsa m ma svoju kontinuitu: existuje centrlny register poty a evidencia vybavench a nevybavench podan... (!) Nemono sa skrva ani za zvanejie a globlne problmy. Pretoe politick radikalizmus a extrmizmus patria nepochybne medzi globlne a najzvanejie problmy dneka. A nielen globlne, ale aj rdzo slovensk. Extrmistom sa podarilo dosta do regionlnej samosprvy (Banskobystrick samosprvny kraj). V parlamentnch vobch im chbalo len niekoko desatn percenta hlasov, aby im tt poda platnch volebnch zkonov musel zaplati volebn nklady (fakticky poskytn ttnu dotciu na aliu innos!!!). To s nanajv varovn signly, kedy ponecha bez povimnutia verejn rasistick prejavy parlamentnej strany znamen dobrovone vystavi verejn ivot infiltrcii politickm extrmizmom. Je nanajv nezodpovedn ignorova vbun potencil zmanipulovanej a polarizovanej slovenskej spolonosti (majorita minorita, Nermovia Rmovia, my a oni...) i zjednoduen nacionalisticko-rasistick ideologizciu namiesto objektvneho pomenovania zloitch socilnych a ekonomickch problmov. Slovensk verejnos je oraz skeptickejia k intittom presadzovania a vymhania prva, rastie apatia k verejnm problmom, respektve sa prejavuje sklon k zjednoduenm a populistickm rieeniam. Prah citlivosti verejnosti na rzne kauzy, zjavn nespravodlivos a nemorlnos, je nastaven alarmujco vysoko. Takto stav spolonosti vdy predchdzal dramatickm a tragickm zvratom. Tento prspevok je napsan netandardnm spsobom. Nie je to ani refert, ani sprva, ani informcia, ani analza, ani prednka, ani vaha... D sa vak tandardne a formlne

vyhranene reagova na reazenie netandardnch javov a udalost?! U zabudnut bilbordov kauzu SNS z poslednch volieb a nasledujce udalosti vrtane osudu jednej vzvy nedokem povaova za nhodn i situan kolaps iniciovan vobami. Domnievam sa, e ide o ovea zvanej a zloitej fenomn, deformujci verejn ivot slovenskej spolonosti v dlhej asovej perspektve. Obvam sa, e najbliie voby posun hranicu prejavov rasizmu vo verejnom ivote ete alej. A nemono vyli ani to, e takto praktiky prines extrmistom spech a participciu na politickej moci. Pokia tt za danho stavu vec ml, v skutonosti takmuto vvoju napomha. Je preto naase nahlas, pravdivo a predovetkm poctivo odpoveda na zkladn otzku: Toleruje i netoleruje Slovensko rasizmus?

vzva za oistu verejnho ivota od prejavov rasizmu a alch foriem politickho extrmizmu
S hlbokm znepokojenm sme zaznamenali otvoren prejavy rasizmu a podnecovania k rasovej neznanlivosti, ktorch sa vo volebnej kampani dopustila Slovensk nrodn strana na svojich bilbordoch zobrazujcich Rma a s textom aby sme nekmili tch, o nechc pracova. Zjavn skutonos, e na bilbordoch je zobrazen prslunk rmskeho etnika, ako aj to, e text sa vzahuje cielene k tomuto etniku, nepopreli v prvch reakcich ani samotn predstavitelia SNS. Na rasistickej podstate tejto skutonosti ni nemen sasn snaha vedenia SNS, spochybni nrodnos mua zobrazenho na bilbordoch. Otvoren rasizmus vo volebnej kampani je neprpustnm prekroenm etickch, kultrnych, ale aj prvnych noriem, je v priamom konflikte s prvnym poriadkom Slovenskej republiky, s medzinrodnmi dohovormi a almi zvznmi dokumentmi, ku ktorch dodriavaniu sa Slovensko zaviazalo. S ete vm znepokojenm sledujeme ahostajnos elnch predstaviteov Slovenskej republiky k tomuto otvorenmu rasistickmu ataku, vyvolvajcemu negatvne emcie a przemn vne v politickom speren. Svojou pasivitou zneuvaj predstavitelia moci zveren mandt na podporu politickho extrmizmu. Takto prstup vzbudzuje vne pochybnosti o zsadnom smerovan Slovenskej republiky a medzinrodne diskvalifikuje nau krajinu. Prejavy a renie rasizmu a alch foriem politickho extrmizmu vo verejnom ivote s neprpustn, nezkonn a s veobecne povaovan za najviu globlnu hrozbu. Preto: Drazne odmietame akkovek formy a prejavy rasizmu a extrmizmu v spoloenskom ivote a nabdame politick strany ku korektnosti v prebiehajcej volebnej kampani. Zrove iadame stavnch initeov, aby k uvedenm rasistickm prejavom zaujali jasn a jednoznan stanovisko, tak ako im to vyplva zo zodpovednosti spojenej s vkonom zverenej verejnej funkcie. Predovetkm poadujeme zaujatie a zverejnenie konzekventnho

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stanoviska od prezidenta SR, predsedu Nrodnej rady SR, predsedu vldy SR, podpredsedu vldy SR, zodpovednho za problematiku udskch prv a nrodnostnch menn a ministra vntra SR. Sasne iadame orgny inn v trestnom konan o urchlen a razantn konanie, tak ako im to uruje zkon a etika sluby verejnosti.

The righT ones...

Open Society Camp REX conference proceedings

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introduction

eXTreMisM in DaiLY LiFe

The discussion about the impact of extremism and extremist movements on social development, the state of democracy, and the coexistence of diverse groups has recently gained intensity in a number of European countries, including Slovakia. Following the fall of communism, during the complex transformation that often brings about ambiguous results in social and economic life, as well as within interethnic relations, radical forces have acquired greater momentum. They transformed nationalism into a tool of mass political mobilization. In Western Europe, the growing influx of immigrants with their different cultural, religious and/ or civilizational background and the problems related to their integration into the majority population trigger strong anti-immigration sentiments. They serve as fertile soil for xenophobic and isolationist political parties. Extremist groupings, i.e. the groups that ultimately aim to penetrate political mainstream and destroy the democratic system, prevail in the background of the mobilization of nationalist forces. They speak to a significant segment of population discontented with their living standards, frustrated with their own failures and lack of success. These groupings strive to trigger, disseminate and fuel racial prejudice and hatred against minorities, people with different faiths, against migrants and people who hold different views. Contemporary extremism in its diverse forms (national, racial, religious) represents a patent social evil. It is ahistoric since it looks into the past and aims to curtail social development and bring about return to the good old days. It is asocial, as it fails to offer any agenda that would solve actual problem: it merely proposes solutions that as history showed lead to conflicts, wars, pogroms and mass killings. It is antidemocratic, for it considers democracy to be an insane idea and a tool of alien forces. Extremism calls for dictatorship of a dominant nation, race or confession. It is antisystemic: under the pretext of the use of mechanisms of liberal democracy, it strives for its utter destruction. Extremists with their destructive activities (such as the racist hate propaganda) not only poison the atmosphere within society and limit quality of life. They present a real threat for a number of social groups. No society can ignore these activities. Just as the Nazism spread across Europe in 1920s and 1930s, the ambition of contemporary branches of extremism is to infest to a maximum the public space with their ideas. The society needs to know how to face this threat. This requires the development of effective barriers (political and legal) and the elimination of causes of extremist mobilization. Most importantly, the society has to act preventively, to monitor and to educate. Such activities require thorough awareness of the issue not merely within the context of a select group of professionals who try to fight extremism. It equally demands recognition of the threat to the entire society. Most supporters of extremist ideas do not come from groups of youths with shaved heads whom we see at times on the streets on special occasions. As Hannah Arendt put it, a typical racist is a father in a family who is full of

good intentions, who wishes to re-educate or isolate non-standard groups on the margins of society that are ugly, dirty and bad.1 Most of us carry within a sense of threat of the unknown. Knowledge and understanding determine the ultimate result of transformation of the inner sense of such threat. It is the very support to the awareness and understanding that The Right Ones [T prav] aims to achieve. it contains contributions presented at an international open conference, Open Society Camp that addressed the fight against right-wing extremism and was organized by the Open Society Foundation (Bratislava, December 12, 2010). The conference aimed to open a wider public discussion on current manifestations of right-wing extremism and to create a forum for presentation of activities, projects and analyses that focus on the fight against right-wing extremism. The event also presented an opportunity to extend the network of contacts among experts and organizations working on the issue of extremism and hate crimes. The structure of the conference arose from the conviction that interdisciplinary cooperation and communication are a must not only within state institutions, but also among local and international non-profit organizations. In Slovakia the latter aimed to expand a systemic solution of right-wing extremism. They opted for a joint informal communication that enables transfer of know-how, and effective cooperation and implementation of interests vis--vis state institutions. Such communication, however, does not remain limited to the non-profit sector. It aims to engage public institutions in the discussion. The state indeed shows some interest in communication. Non-profit organizations have a special place in prevention and education. They play a key role in different contemporary forms of youth education, in organizing campaigns, etc. It has been in this spirit that the idea of the open conference and the conference-related volume emerged. The Right Ones [T prav] has been arranged into three thematic parts. In the first part, Social Context of Extremism, Lucia Faltinov, Pter Krek, Grigorij Mesenikov, Jaroslav Franek, Alojz Hlina and Lucia Grekov address selected historical, political, ideological and religious factors of mobilization of nationalist forces in contemporary Europe, including Slovakia. In the second part, Freedom of Speech, Media and Extremism, Miroslav Kus, Sergej Danilov, Alena Kotvanov, Roland Kyka and Ronald Eissens approach the issue of nationalism within the context of freedom of speech and press and from the perspective of its presentation in the media and on the internet. In the third part, Combat Against Racial Hatred and Discrimination, Daniel Milo, Gregory Fabian, tefan Ivanco, Irena Bihriov and Rastislav enkirik point out the necessity of
1 Quoted from A. Tabucchi, Ugly, dirty and bad [kared, pinav a zl]. Mosty, Special issue CzechoSlovakia without Borders [esko Slovensko bez hranc].

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effective resistance against the spread of hate sentiments and discriminatory practices. They present some tools of effective resistance against racial hatred and discrimination. We trust that, similarly to the other publication, No Fear of Extreme. Use of Information Against Extremism [Nemaj trmu z extreme. Informciami proti extrmizmu] published by the Open Society Foundation in 2007 and 2009, the present volume The Right Ones [T prav] will further the understanding of the phenomenon of right-wing extremism, and will help uncover the less visible context of the extremist underground in Europe and Slovakia and thus help develop more effective procedures for the fight against the extremist danger. Viktria Mlynrikov, Zuzana Gborov Editors

poLiTiCaL ConTeXTs oF raDiCaL naTionaLisTs anD Far-righT eXTreMisTs aCTiviTies in sLovaKia

grigorij Mesenikov
Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia

introduction
There is a set of factors (historic, political, ideological, socio-cultural, ethno-demographic) which creates relatively favorable social environment for activities of radical-nationalist and far-right extremist groups in Slovakia. These factors include: multi-ethnic composition of the population, critical situation of the Roma minority that has never been adequately integrated into the majority society, ideological and political legacy of domestic fascism from the first half of the 20th century (including the so-called first Slovak statehood of 19391945), the deepened revisionist elements within the established historical science, mostly under the pretext of more objective evaluation of important historic events and personalities of Slovakias national history, the negative effects of the countrys long-term isolation during the communist regime on the populations value orientations, and the strengthened overall positions of nationalist forces in mainstream politics during 20062010, when the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) was a constituent part of the ruling coalition. Inefficiency of the state system of combating extremism in the areas of repression, prevention and education as well as a recent gradually eroding consensus of mainstream politicians about prevention of extremists from participation in official political life is also a part of the picture.

new political Tactics of extremists

Over the last few years the intensified activities of far-right extremist and racist groups could be observed in Slovakia. Surfing on the waves of the strengthened nationalist discourse in countrys public and political life, deliberately developed by the mainstream nationalpopulist political forces (parties of the ruling coalition Smer-SD SNS S-HZDS, which operated in Slovakia since July 2006 till July 20101), and parasitizing on the existent social problems in some countrys regions, namely in remote areas of the Eastern Slovakia (high rate of unemployment, low living standards, bad infrastructure, criminality, social deprivation/
1 More on ideological background of Slovak national populism and political activities of national populist parties in Slovakia see: Mesenikov, G.: National Populism in Slovakia: Actors, Issues, Strategies in: Mesenikov, G., Gyrfov, O.: National Populism in Slovakia, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, 2008, s. 7 34.

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exclusion of Roma population), members of extremist and ultra-nationalist groupings have come up with the new tactics. They modified the organizational principles of their activities, imitating the concept of autonomous nationalism known in Western Europe, conducting at the same time practical steps to infiltrate the official party system. Extremists started to communicate directly with their potential supporters in localities, organizing public events (rallies, manifestations, pre-electoral meetings) in reaction to the strong disappointment of a substantial portion of local population with the social conditions of life and with the inability of authorities to solve disturbing problems existing in relations between Roma and non-Roma population. Clashes between police and extremists during these events offered the latter opportunity to propagate their views, presenting themselves as martyrs who are fighting for national justice. Anniversaries of selected events of national history and other symbolic communication events also created opportunities for extremist groups to deliver their messages to potential constituency as well as to the general public. In 2009, extremist and radical-nationalist forces formulated their program objectives in a document entitled Memorandum prvej ponovembrovej genercie slovenskej mldee [Memorandum of the First Post-November Generation of the Slovak Youth]. The document was adopted as a joint resolution of participants of the public rally headlined Za budcnos naich det [For Our Childrens Future] that was organized by a handful of radical nationalist groups in August 2009 in Nov Zmky. Characteristic features of the document included refusing liberaldemocratic regime, questioning basic principles of the market economy, embracing historic revisionism, anti-Atlanticism, anti-Americanism, anti-minority sentiment, anti-Semitism and demonstratively subscribing to pan-Slavism and Christian roots2. A high relevance can be attributed to the efforts of extremist groups to transform themselves into the established political formation in order to attract the core of the radical nationalist electorate. The extremists goal here is to become the legitimate and officially recognized competitor to the established nationalist political forces. Although Slovak extremists formally failed to renew their party under the initial name Slovensk pospolitos (Slovak Community) dissolved by Supreme Court in 2005, or to establish the brand new party, they succeeded to overcome potential legal barriers for their engagement in political life through the takeover of leadership in an already registered marginal political party. Thanks to this tactic they, in fact, came up from political illegality to the official political scene. They renamed the given party and used it as a vehicle for incorporation into mainstream politics. The sequence of their steps was the following: in 2009 members of the prohibited extremist party Slovensk pospolitos entered the Party of Friends of Wine and changed its name twice (first, to udov strana socilnej solidarity / Peoples Party of Social Solidarity), and then to udov strana - Nae Slovensko / Peoples Party Our Slovakia SNS).

nationalists and extremists in parliamentary elections SNS ran in the parliamentary elections of June 2010 and gained 1.33 percent of votes (33 742 voters). The party failed to overcome both the 5-percent threshold to qualify into the parliament and the 3-percent threshold for getting money from the state budget to reimburse their election participation expenses, however it was the best result ultranationalist and extremist forces ever reached in the electoral history of modern democratic Slovakia. Table 1 results of nationalist political parties in parliamentary elections in slovakia in 1990 2010 (in %)

Memorandum of the First Post-November Generation of the Slovak Youth (Memorandum prvej ponovembrovej genercie slovenskej mldee), August 25, 2009.

In the June 2010 parliamentary elections the mainstream nationalist SNS succeeded in qualifying for the parliament, but with a substantial loss of votes compared to the 2006 elections (11.73 % in 2006, 5.07% in 2010). Although the main beneficiary from the SNS poor results was the left (self-declared social-democratic) national-populist party Smer-SD that attracted a substantial segment of traditional SNS voters, in case of further political weakening of SNS (as a possible result of internal party turbulences, public revelations of circumstances of SNS corruption scandals in previous electoral tenure, etc.), the other beneficiary at the expense of SNS could be the far-right, a racist and extremist political formation, which is evidently trying to apply pro-active tactics in the hope of getting the votes of the most radical core of the SNS electorate. For far-right extremists from SNS the recent moderation of SNS created favorable conditions for presenting themselves as authentic representatives of a strong, real, genuine nationalist stream in politics. Despite being still at the stage of a proto-party organization, not having all the parameters needed for activities of relevant political formation (cross-country party structures, professional party apparatus, quality intellectual background, developed programmatic platform, mass membership, sufficient electoral support, coalition potential, etc), SNS is starting to head into the direction of leaving the empty space of party system and becoming formation with certain political relevance.

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public acceptance of extremism

The efforts of far-right extremists to establish themselves as a relevant political force should be considered in the broader context of the general public acceptance of extremism and members of extremist groups. here we need to take into account the declared public attitude to extremists activities (findings from public opinion polls), but also the adherence of the population to different types of political cultures, attitude toward minorities, liberal democratic values, level of peoples tolerance to societys diversity. an important part of the issue is the relevant political actors stances, their attitude to extremists and radical nationalists, the sincerity of their commitment to fight extremism and to protect rights of social groups targeted by extremists. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO)3, most people in Slovakia feel the highest social distance toward skinheads and neo-Nazis. 82% of Slovakias citizens would not want skinheads, neo-Nazis for neighbors, however such strong social distance came about as a result of the lingering image of skinheads and neoNazis as persons who resort to violence with respect to anybody who disagrees with them, openly subscribe to extermination of entire population groups, demonstrate loyalty to the Nazi ideology, approve Nazi war crimes, use Nazi slogans and greetings and proudly wear Nazi symbols. But the physical appearance of extremist participants of anti-Roma demonstrations in Eastern Slovakia in 20092010 (including members of Slovensk pospolitos and other similarly oriented extremist groupings) differs from the described image: they look more civil and they do not openly advertise values ordinary citizens feel repelled by in the long term. They refrain from making open references to historic fascism or Nazism and highlight the issues most local inhabitants view as relevant for their everyday lives (i.e. the so called Roma criminality). One factor which increases the level of public acceptance of racists and extremists is undoubtedly the high level of social distance of the majority population toward Roma (69% of respondents in the quoted IVOs opinion poll did not want Roma for neighbors) as well as existent racial prejudices against Roma. The inability of authorities to improve the social situation of the Roma as well as to protect local people from the consequences of law-breaking activities of some Roma inhabitants can also play in favor of a higher acceptance of extremists activities. Historic revisionism and the positive attitude toward the war-time Slovak state, demonstrated by some public figures (nationalist politicians, hierarchs of the Catholic Church, nationally oriented historians etc.), creates opportunities for extremists to identify themselves with this trend. Moreover, in recent years representatives of the patriotic opinion stream (e.g. members and sympathizers of Matica slovensk, a historic cultural organization sponsored by the state) issued statements that featured positive references to some members of ultranationalist
3 Poll conducted for the project Centre of Excellence for Research on Citizenship and Civic Participation: Facing the Challenges of 21st Century (COPART), Bratislava, IVO/KVBSK, May 2008.

and extremist groupings including Slovensk pospolitos. They described them as goodtempered young people who care about the nations well-being, historical traditions and national consciousness. From the socio-demographic view, the category of extremist formations members and sympathizers is strongly dominated by young people, especially by men who make up most participants and attendants of public events organized by extremist groupings. Recently however, these events have been often attended by residents of towns and villages where they are held, particularly in Eastern Slovakia (e.g. rallies protesting against Roma criminality). These events attendants included not only young men but also middle-aged and elderly people, pensioners, women, students, pupils and even young mothers with children.

Weakening political Consensus on resistance to extremists

In some localities, people known for their ties to the radical and extremist scene are employed in public administration and they continue to influence public discourse (as it happened with the book of poetry about war-time Slovak state president Jozef Tiso, co-authored by two MPs, including MP for social-democratic party Smer-SD and by employees of regional public administration). There were also cases of engagement of persons belonging to an extremist movement into the main-stream public cultural and artistic activities. For example, Rastislav Rogel, former theater actor and one of the most prominent figures among Slovak neo-Nazis, known by his physical brutality and violent behavior against antifascists and Jews, was hired by two TV channels (TV Markza and TV Joj, the two countrys largest private TV stations) to feature in episodes of popular soap operas. The installment of the statue of Svtopluk, prince of medieval Great Moravia, in front of the Bratislava Castle, initiated by party Smer-SD a few days before the June 2010 parliamentary elections as a part of the partys election campaign, created the site and the pretext for spectacular public events organized by the extremists in the center of Slovakias capital city. Svtopluks statue was decorated with insignia replicating the symbols of the war-time Slovak fascist state. After the installment, members of Slovensk pospolitos organized several national marches to the statue, demonstrating their adherence to Svtopluk and to the mentioned fascist insignia. After the 2010 parliamentary elections political and intellectual representatives of the nationalpopulist scene (the so-called patriots), who consider Svtopluk the King of Old Slovaks (this theory was fiercely criticized by prominent academic historians as pseudoscientific and mythological), launched a loud campaign against the possible removal of the statue, blaming the new government in anti-Slovak and anti-national stances. Extremists joined this campaign. For them the case of Svtopluks statue became the welcomed and long expected opportunity to position themselves openly as a part of a broader movement for preserving national historic and cultural heritage. Symptomatically, the conditions for such a positioning have been constituted by the mainstream national-populist political actors, namely the selfdeclared social democrats of Smer-SD.

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It seems that the general consensus which existed in Slovakia in the previous years across the main-stream political spectrum to prevent infiltration of extremists to official politics has recently been partially eroded. Some politicians publicized their considerations that extremists, being a part of the official party arena but still remaining a marginal force, can weaken the main-stream radical (however not anti-systemic) populist nationalist party SNS. This kind of consideration implies a factual recognition of extremists as legitimate players of domestic political life. It also indicates that some mainstream politicians underestimate the role of extremists as actors influencing public discourse by malicious elements threatening democracy and peaceful coexistence of various ethnic, racial and religious communities.

positive potential of the recent political Changes

The success of any political force in political competition is contingent on a number of factors: the countrys overall socio-economic situation, the public perception of the implemented policies, the system of value orientations of the population, the prevailing patterns of political culture, the state of inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations in society with a multi-cultural and a poly-ethnic character, the professionalism of partys leadership, etc. The case of anti-systemic, antidemocratic political forces (extremists, fascists, and neo-Nazis) is, however, a specific one. As their programs, proposals and activities contradict the basic principles and values of liberal democracy, aiming to destroy its fundaments and to replace it with a non-democratic regime, society needs to work out a system of self-protection, resistance against malicious political elements, and how to neutralize the possible consequences of their activities. This system should include arrangements and measures in the areas of legislation, prosecution and education. On the macro-political level the major change took place in Slovakia as a result of the June 2010 parliamentary elections (replacement of the left-leaning national-populist coalition Smer-SD SNS S-HZDS by the center-right liberal-conservative coalition SDKU-DS SaS KDH Most-Hd). It had a positive impact on the atmosphere in society and public discourse, caused the downplaying ethnic nationalism and the tangible relief in inter-ethnic relations. Although the issue of Slovak-Hungarian inter-ethnic relations is less relevant for right-wing extremist agenda than the so-called Roma issue, the disappearance of the strong anti-Hungarian nationalist discourse, energized by Ficos coalition on the level of governmental policy in the previous electoral term, undoubtedly created better conditions for resistance against radical nationalists and extremists. The new government led by Iveta Radiov can not be characterized as a coalition of Slovak ethnic nationalists (as the previous coalition led by Robert Fico had been). Moreover, the political party supported by the prevailing part of Slovakias Hungarian minority and led by a charismatic politician of Hungarian origin is a constituent part of new ruling coalition that should favorably influence the state minority policy.

The program of the new coalition government included provisions on the necessity to intensify the fight against extremism. By doing so the government has recognized the importance of the issue. Formulations of provisions indicate the effort to interlink legal, human rights and social aspects of the issue in approaching the problem, to apply a more complex methodology: Slovakias government declares that extremism in any of its expressions should not have place in our society. The government will use all legal competences and tools to fight extremism, including the personal and professional strengthening of the capacities in combating extremism and it will increase their quality further. Using all available means the government will prevent extremists from taking the initiative into their hands to solve the problems related to Roma community. The government will enforce the principle of zero tolerance to individual, group and institutional violence committed in contradiction with the principles of human rights guaranteed by the countrys constitution and international treaties. After completing the analysis of the current state, the government will approve the new concept of fight against extremism. Radiovs government also promised to enforce the sober patriotism and consciousness of belonging to Europe, to reject nationalism and totalitarian ideologies and to fight against the signs of extremism, racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.4 The government expressed its commitment to overcome the social exclusion of Roma which worsens relations between the Roma minority and the majority population and increases the danger of spreading extremism. Assessing the new governments intents and taking into consideration some practical steps already conducted in fighting right-wing extremism, one can define the situation as a demonstration of will to tackle the issue.

Conclusions
Similarly as in many other countries, right-wing extremism in Slovakia is anti-systemic in its substance it is antidemocratic, illiberal, hostile to any opponents, violent and presents direct risks for certain groups of the population (ethnic, racial and confessional minorities, adherents of alternative subcultures, persons with anti-racist and anti-fascist views). Being still a marginal political force, extremists and neo-fascists are trying to infiltrate the main-stream politics by imitating a patriotic trend. There is a range of factors that create relatively favorable conditions for activities of far-right extremist groupings in Slovakia. On the other hand, factors also exist that should restrict or complicate extremists activities. They include the states official antifascist doctrine, the existent liberal-democratic system of the government, the countrys membership in the EU and NATO, the activities of NGOs and media outlets that monitor the radical nationalist and right-wing extremist scene. The effective common efforts of the state administration and various actors of the anti-fascist and anti-extremist scene (NGOs, civic initiatives, and public intellectuals) are needed to prevent extremists from spreading their influence and from establishing themselves as relevant actors
4 Civic Responsibility and Cooperation. Program Manifesto of the Government of Slovak Republic for 2010 2014 (Obianska zodpovednost a spoluprca. Programov vyhlsenie vldy SR na obdobie rokov 2010-2014 ). See: www.vlada.sk

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of political life. The qualified analysis of the extremist scene is important to increase the ability of actors of anti-extremist policies to tackle the issue on the base of real knowledge.5 The integral preventive system against extremism should include educational activities, especially those of the government-financed education institutions embracing true multicultural approach that take into account the diversity of the Slovak society, the complexity of historic circumstances and the current social situation of various population categories including ethnic minorities. The potential strengthening of moderate non-nationalist mainstream political parties may successfully undermine the position of national-populist formations and create a more favorable environment for combating extremism, radicalism and far-right nationalism at all levels of the society. Positive changes in approaching the issue, such as the new governments declaration on the necessity to intensify combating extremism, as well as another positive shift the significant downplaying of nationalist rhetoric and discourse after the 2010 parliamentary elections should be accompanied by practical steps in the areas of legislation, prosecution and education. On the political level the cross-party consensus on unacceptability of extremists as recognized political players should be re-established and re-confirmed.

poison For DeMoCraCY DeManD For righT-Wing eXTreMisM in CenTraL-easTern eUrope

pter Krek
Political Capital Institute, Hungary
The multicultural approach has failed, utterly failed.1 Angela Merkel, formerly soft on immigration issues, made this harsh statement in October 2010, adding that Germans should take priority in employment over recruiting workers from abroad. The German chancellors statement was in line with several, even stronger declarations in the issue of immigration from other politicians of CDU and CSU. In the summer of 2010, French president Nicolas Sarkozy launched a campaign for the expulsion of the Roma in France living in illegal camps (the ethnic motive behind this decision, denied by the government, was proved by a circular of the Interior Ministry2). More than one thousand Roma were expelled and sent back to Bulgaria and Romania. According to the opinion of many, this move was among the most serious human rights abuses in the EU in the last few years. In Bulgaria, Prime Minister Boyko Borisovs Government, elected in 2009, frequently steps outside democratic boundaries to try to settle scores with opponents under the pretext of fighting against corruption. The governments law-and-order rhetoric and some steps questioning the independence of the judiciary would make Bulgaria look more like a police state than a democracy. In Hungary Fidesz-KDNP (the governing party in Hungary with a two-thirds majority in Parliament) has offered a revolution in domestic politics, and initiated deep changes in several fields. Symbolic gestures strengthening national identity (Trianon commemoration day and dual citizenship for Hungarians outside the borders) were introduced. At the same time, the government started the transformation of the complete institutional system weakening checks and balances, and will pass a new constitution in the parliament in April 2010. What is common in these events? What are the similar political motives behind these moves? The answer is simple: the strong popular demand. In Germany, the statements of Merkel and other CDU politicians were made after central banker Thilo Sarrazin published his best-seller book saying Muslim immigrants deteriorating the German society and arguing for a restrictive

biographY
Mesenikov, G.: National Populism in Slovakia: Actors, Issues, Strategies. In: Mesenikov, G., Gyrfov, O.: National Populism in Slovakia, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, 2008. Memorandum of the First Post-November Generation of the Slovak Youth (Memorandum prvej ponovembrovej genercie slovenskej mldee). August 25, 2009. Civic Responsibility and Cooperation. Program Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic for 2010 2014 (Obianska zodpovednos a spoluprca. Programov vyhlsenie vldy SR na obdobie rokov 2010-2014). See : www.vlada.sk Mlynrkov, V. (ed.): No Fear of Extremism. By Information against Extremism. Second Edition (Nemaj trmu z extrmu. Informciami proti extrmizmu. 2. vydanie). Open Society Foundation, Bratislava, 2010.

Mlynrkov, V. (ed.): No Fear of Extremism By Information against Extremism (Nemaj trmu z extrmu. Informciami proti extrmizmu). 2nd edition. Open Society Foundation, Bratislava, 2010.

1 2

See: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/uk-germany-merkel-immigration-idUKTRE69F19T20101016 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/13/sarkozy-roma-expulsion-human-rights

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poison for Democracy Demand for right-Wing extremism in Central-eastern europe

immigration policy. Public opinion polls indicated strengthening anti-immigration attitudes, while the Merkel governments popularity crashed due to some unpopular moves such as the introduction of the bailout package to save Greece. 3 In France, Sarkozy also wanted to cure his dwindled popularity by anti-immigrant law and order policies, after he started to drown in the LOral party-financing scandal. In the short run, this policy proved successful in winning approval for Sarkozy in France. 4 In Bulgaria, after the governance of the socialists laden with corruption scandals, the need for law and order policies strengthened, and the steps of the government, even if some of them were questionable from a democratic perspective, was met with widespread public approval. In Hungary, a similar thing happened: after eight years of socialist government, (the second term full of austerity measures and corruption scandals), the strong disillusionment with the democratic institutions and the system itself enabled the government to completely modify the system of institutions in a way that fits best its own political goals followed by a strong applause. The nationalist rhetoric is strengthened to take away the voters of the ultranationalist Jobbik who gained 17 percent of the parliamentary elections in 2010. Of course, these politicians and governmental parties cannot be mentioned as right-wing radicals or extremes. Neither of them. But these examples clearly indicate that prejudicial, nationalist and anti-establishment public opinions can push political leaders toward a more radical position. The public opinion has a strong impact on how politicians do their job, what their agenda is, what decisions they make. In demand-driven democratic systems nowadays, politicians do their best satisfy the voters needs this is the only way of being (re)elected. Therefore, high demand for right-wing extremism poses a broad array of risks as they have an impact on political decisions. Low levels of trust can render the democratic system unable to function. Anti-elitism and economic protectionism can destroy the investment climate. Xenophobia and aggressive nationalism can endanger both domestic and regional peace. The Political Capital Institute elaborated a perfect tool for measuring these tendencies in public opinion, which we will introduce below focusing on Eastern Europe: the Demand for Right Wing Extremism Index.

l right-wing value orientation, which is defined as support for traditional values, religion and need for order and obedience; l fear, distrust and pessimism, view on the negative tendencies of state of affairs, existential anxiety and distrust in fellow citizens. The structure of the model can be seen on the 1st graph, A countrys DEREX score is determined by the rate of respondents who belong to at least three of the four categories: for example, respondents who express anti-immigrant sentiments, anti-establishment attitudes and right-wing values all at once. Using these strict criteria, the DEREX Index examines the percentage of the potential extremists, people whose extremist views could destabilize a countrys political and economic system if these views continue to gain credence. Political Capital designed the Demand for Right-Wing Extremism (DEREX) Index using its own theoretical model and data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a biannual study that tracks changes in societal attitudes and values in 33 countries in Europe and the Middle East. Analysts of the Political Capital Institute developed the model, chose the questions, determined subject groupings and set the criteria over the course of roughly one year. We took both inductive and deductive approaches to constructing the DEREX Index. We began with a theoretical model, relying on the ESS questionnaire and correlations between variables to create the sub-indices. We developed the methodology in four steps: 1. Building the theoretical model; 2. Choosing the appropriate questions to include from the ESS survey; 3. Deciding how to qualify the respondents answers to the survey questions; and 4. Assigning numerical values to the answers, which allowed us to calculate scores for DEREX and its sub-indices. At the end of the process we also tested the models reliability and validity. You can find a more detailed description of our model on the website of our institute5:

DereX Methodology in a nutshell

The DEREX Index calculates a societys demand for such extremism as a product of four determinants: l prejudice and welfare chauvinism, which includes sentiments toward immigrants and homosexuals; l anti-establishment attitudes, such as dissatisfaction with government institutions and democracy;
3 4 See: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/weak-merkel-stokes-xenophobia-as-she-fights-for-political-survival-2109433.html See: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-12/expulsions-of-illegal-roma-win-approval-from-public-in-sarkozy-s-france.html

See: http://www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/files/derex_study.pdf

See: http://www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/files/derex_study.pdf

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Graph 1: The structure of DEREX model

Although it may seem that demand for far-right wing politics divides itself along East-West lines, there is also a North-South divide. Southern members of the EU-15 such as Greece, Italy and Portugal have high rates of demand for right-wing extremism compared to, say, Scandinavia, where barely 1 or 2 percent of the population expresses sympathy for such ideas. Portugal is the only Western European country where demand for right-wing extremism has grown significantly in the past six years; Great Britain registered a smaller increase. In general, we can see that history plays a great role in this aspect: we can see higher DEREX rates in countries where authoritarian or totalitarian regimes played a key role in shaping the history in the last 70 years (the two exceptions are Germany and Spain). Although Western Europeans rates of prejudice and xenophobia are more significant than their anti-establishment attitudes, their Eastern European brethren run rings around them in both departments. Paradoxically, opposition to immigration is strongest in countries that have the fewest immigrants. Virtual foreigners are apparently capable of generating just as much fear and aversion as the tangible ones. But we should add: Western Europes low levels of prejudice may be somewhat misleading. Geert Wilders, the Dutch politician charged with hate speech against Muslims, was probably right when he said, I say what the majority thinks, but does not dare to say. Western Europeans feel a strong pressure to be politically correct; tolerance is frequently part of school curriculum. Some respondents are therefore probably reluctant to express prejudice toward minorities in front of others, including the European Social Surveys pollsters. Eastern Europeans, on the other hand, are more likely to treat pollsters to a blunt, unvarnished stream of truth-telling. This is a mark of societal development in the West: hidden prejudice more rarely leads to openly discriminatory behavior at least not on a conscious level.

an overview of the results

In Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Latvia and Hungary show the strongest demand for discriminatory, anti-establishment and authoritarian ideologies. In Hungary, the number of potential right-wing extremists more than doubled from 10 percent in 2003 to 21 percent in 2009. Generally, we can say that the danger of right-wing radicalisation is most prominent in Europes eastern half. Potential extreme right-wing supporters are most numerous in countries that have recently gone through tumultuous periods, such as Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria and Latvia. This attitude poses a smaller threat in the East than on the West (Graph 2, Graph 3). A reason is that, in Western Europe, the extreme-rights main appeal lies in its anti-immigration policies, a topic that rarely leads people to reject the political establishment as a whole. In Eastern Europe, prejudice and anti-Gypsy attitudes are closely linked to opposition to the entire political system, along with distrust and general malaise. This combination can pose a major threat to stability. Of course, rising anti-immigration sentiment in Western Europe poses a threat of escalating ethnic conflict for some countries as well.

Graph 2: DEREX Index scores

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Graph 3: DEREX Index scores on a map

By the 1980s and 90s, radical-right parties were pursuing a kind of neo-nationalist, neopopulist line centered on anti-immigrant and anti-elite policies. Parties such as Frances Front National, Belgiums Vlaams Belang (Flemish interest, formerly Vlaams Blok), the Austrian Freedom Party, Italys National Alliance and the Danish Peoples Party have more or less severed ties with fascism. They attract supporters based upon their ability to provide simple answers to serious questions that affect a lot of people. It is no coincidence that the extreme right has the least room for manoeuvre in Germany, which had the heaviest burden of guilt to process following World War II. The German ultra right thus enjoys the strongest support in the countrys eastern regions, where people have not yet fully confronted this chapter of their history. The situation is fundamentally different in Europes formerly communist countries. Here, it was primarily extreme left-wing ideas that were discredited in the decades after World War II. Memories of extreme right-wing dictatorships have grown foggy with time, even more so because people were never forced to come to terms with them. Social classes that are open to extremism in Eastern Europe are therefore more receptive to the extreme right than to the extreme left. The supply of right-wing ideas is also different: parties and especially the guards, often a recruiting tool for the parties, brazenly combine elements from pre-1945 fascist movements with ideas from modern neo-populist movements in Western Europe. Graph4: Anti-establishment attitudes and Prejudices and Welfare chauvinism: the top 15 countries

What is Common? The guard phenomenon

Prejudices in Eastern Europe are generally linked to strong anti-establishment attitudes- the poison cocktail for democracy. This is blatantly obvious in the regions guard phenomenon, where right-wing parties support the formation of almost-paramilitary organizations that openly question the states monopoly on violence. Sometimes, these groups practically call for an alternative state organization. Bulgarias National Guard organization came first in the summer of 2007, followed by the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Grda) and the Czech National Guard. The Slovak Brotherhood, formed in 1996, (Slovensk pospolitos) is also a Guard-like organisation. No such groups have ever cropped up in any Western European country (except Italy). In this context, there are pronounced differences between Western and Eastern Europe. History is an important factor in determining the appearance of these organisations. The question is not just what role the extreme right played in the past, but whether society has been able to come to terms with it. In the West, extreme-right parties began to break with their fascist roots in the 1960s; the ideology had become widely discredited after people were forced to face their demons from the 1930s and 40s.

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Graph5: DEREX-Index scores in Eastern Europe

Graph 6: comparison of DEREX figures in Poland and Hungary

What is Different? an eastern european overview

While Eastern European countries have some features in common, we can find some important differences between the figures and their trends if we examine them in details (Graph 5). A comparison of Poland and Hungary, for example, may make for depressing reading for Hungarians. The two countries started at about the same base in 2003: 10 percent of Hungarians and 9 percent of Poles were potential supporters of the extreme right. By 2009, Polands DEREX score had dropped by nearly a third and Hungarys had doubled. Polands DEREX ranking peaked in 2005, the year its left-wing government disintegrated amid corruption scandals and was replaced by an alliance of right-wing fundamentalist parties led by the Kaczinsky twins. Fulminating anger toward the governing elite drove the index upwards between 2003 and 2005, even as public opinion among the traditionally conservative and religious Poles moved only slightly rightwards. Yet since 2005, the percentage of Poles who support extreme right-wing policies has been on a downward trend. The biggest difference was the improvement in public morale: After 2005, the anti-elite trend began to turn around and people began to feel more positive about the economy. Public opinion was thus consolidated. (Graph 6)

Poland is a good example of how demand for right-wing extremism can be swayed by the success or failure of middle-of-the-road parties, along with changes in consumer confidence. In addition, Polands two radical-right parties, Self-Defence and the Polish League of Families, largely discredited themselves during their years in Polands governing coalition (2005-2007). This contributed to the victory of sobriety over extreme-right politics. Meanwhile, Hungarians predisposition to far-right ideas has been on an uninterrupted rise since 2003. Growth in prejudice especially anti-foreigner sentiment has been a major contributor, shooting up from 37 percent of respondents in 2003 to 55 percent in 2007. More importantly, public morale has deteriorated, driven by anger towards politicians and mounting dissatisfaction with the government and the democratic system itself. Distrust has extended to all institutions, including those that only play a minor role in Hungarian public life. For example, the number of people who said they distrust the U.N. nearly tripled from 5 percent to 15 percent between 2003 and 2009. Hungarys extreme right wing is creating a popular ideology out of everything and everyone is bad. (Graph 7) Slovakias prejudice and right-wing values, worsened between 2005 and 2009, while fear, distrust, pessimism and anti-establishment attitudes improved markedly. Slovak Prime Minister

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Robert Ficos government apparently buoyed public opinion with his mix of nationalism and militant protectionism. This was helped by the fact that a large swathe of the population is pleased with Ficos economic performance, as well as his symbolic victories in promoting a new Slovak identity. (Graph 8) Graph 7: Development of DEREX components, Hungary

Conclusions and Consequences

The high level of Demand for Right-Wing Extremism Index results is a wake-up-call and a huge danger for all of Europe. The era is over when Western Europe exercised ideological influence over the eastern part of the continent, but not vice versa. Now, the East is in a position to export radical ideologies westwards. Radical right-wing parties in the West, envying the success of their eastern counterparts, may adopt some of their ideologies and tools such as paramilitary guard movements. In this process, Western European parties may break through some of the ideological boundaries that have confined their activity so far. Another possible channel of influence is that right-wingers in Eastern Europe may find it easier to form alliances with like-minded political groups in the West than in their own backyard. Nationalist parties in neighboring countries (e.g. Slovakia and Hungary) frequently view each other as adversaries, not potential partners. Hungarys extreme-right Jobbik party formed an alliance with Italian, British, Swedish and Belgian far-right parties in 2009, not its counterparts in the region. It is impossible to categorize the various countries far right-wing organizations in these terms we can only analyze them on a country-by-country basis. Still, extreme right-wing parties do have some important general characteristics: they are unpredictable, and they have a knack for building up support quickly and losing it just as quickly. There is no far-right party in Eastern Europe that has been able to maintain significant approval ratings over the past 20 years. This turbulence in itself represents a risk: extreme right-wing parties can appear out of nowhere, as happened with the Greater Romania party at the turn of the millennium, the League of Polish Families in 2005 and Hungarys Jobbik party in the past few years. The DEREX Index shows that societal attitudes can change at an equally frenetic pace, providing a social base for savvy political forces to build upon. This presents a serious challenge for Eastern Europes young democracies. And the idea that economic recovery will automatically cure this social disease can be easily written off as a pipedream.

Graph 8: Development of DEREX components, Slovakia

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Lucia Faltinov
University of Cambridge, Woolf Institute Centre for the JewishChristian Relations Centre for the Study of MuslimJewish Relations, UK
Extreme is the dark side of democracy. It derives from its very nature, namely the freedom of expression. Until someone comes with a momentous discovery of how to retain democracy and eliminate extremism, the latter will be here as long as there is democracy. Against the background of relations between Jews, Christians and Muslims within a wider society, the following contribution shall first outline some of the current trends in the relationship between extremism and democracy. Second, it will present a few ideas of how to re-create a dynamic balance within civil society, which will return extreme where it belongs: to the extremity of the society. It is not possible for the scope of this paper to offer a comprehensive analysis of the situation. It will therefore highlight some aspects of social coexistence that contribute to extremism and a few ways to prevent its rise. The examples which will be offered have been selected as they extend to the secular world and have a transferable value for the wider context. Until recently extremism was on the faraway margins of daily life. Most of us could essentially close our eyes to avoid it, unless we belonged to the relatively narrow group of professional who fight extremism, or to one the targeted minorities of the extremist attacks. Times have changed and extreme has become mainstream. This is helped by a number of the vices of freedom and democracy. The first vice is the growth of individualism and subsequent social fragmentation. Along with the development of democracy, our world becomes increasingly fragmented as new and complex social structures emerge. It is a paradox that, in spite of the increasing individualism, otherwise unrelated events have an ever wider social effect. Moreover, individualism, in the environment of the virtual social networks, brings along hyper-communication that often reduces an ability to differentiate between real and virtual world. For many, especially young people, the virtual world replaces the real one not merely in communication, but also in the perception of priorities and loyalties. The use of the Internet is well-known today particularly in connection with extremist groups. In addition to the hard-to-control Internet, the communication revolution brought a boom of the electronic media. Some, such as al-Jazeera neednt even be in the hands of extremists to serve them as an effective tool of deterrence and publicity. Religious groups enjoy an increasing ownership of an extensive media infrastructure. Recent study at the University of Cambridge showed that, while there were no satellite channels in the

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Middle East in 1980s, there are some 500 of them today. This significantly expands the scope for religious broadcasting. Yet one doesnt need to reach to the Middle East for examples. The Polish Radio Marija is infamous for its views that air religio-nationalist fundamentalism that sometimes exceeds to the extreme. The second vice that contributes to the rise of extremism is its formalization through political parties. This trend was facilitated by a number of events. The fall of communism enabled pluralization of social and political life. The accelerated and extended European integration lead to the rise of nationalism. The situation so far culminated at the European level in the 2009 elections that resulted in a mandate for the extremists British National Party. Furthermore, there is also fragmentation of political parties. From the public point of view in striving for further development of democracy in the European Union, namely in light of the effort to bring Europe closer to the people, large political parties have become a self-serving colossuses that cannot provide real and effective connection with the citizen. In the east of Europe, the party fragmentation is also in part a reaction to the former monopoly of communist parties. Yet this memory doesnt prevent the popularity of populist leaders, somewhat as a result of sentiment over communism (in some places even of Stalinism), but also as a consequence of social frustration and civic democratic immaturity. The recent factor that further precipitated skepticism about high politics and fuelled extremism was the economic and financial crisis. Its most painful impact on common people was increased unemployment, but also that aids populist and extremist rhetoric. The third vice of democracy and freedom is apathy. The apathy after Hitlers rise to power is the most warning of examples in modern history. One of the contemporary examples is the rise of the Christian right in the United States. Groups emerging on the basis of an ideological unity that exceeds to the point of suppressing pluralism of argument, such as sects, are often socially isolated (or self-isolated) and gradually succumb to negative or often extremist attitudes to their surroundings. This has been discussed for instance by Nathaniel J. Klemp.1 He highlights the difference between the political engagement of some civic groups that adhere to ideological pluralism to a degree that they dont deem it appropriate to actively engage in public affairs, including voting. This aids the penetration of extremism not only into the partisan and political spectrum, but it also helps it influence public discourse.

a) negative Transcendence
Negative transcendence, as defined by the mimetic theory of Franois Girard is one of the phenomena that are closely connected to extremism not only religious, but also otherwise mythologically motivated. Mimetic theory addresses mutual copying of social attitudes of an individual or groups. The deterrence theory often applied in international relations during the Cold War is one of the examples here. However, the end of the Cold War brought the practice of deterrence closer to the citizen when the international spread of terrorism is but one, albeit extreme aspect of this phenomenon. Some speak of de-ritualization of war. Peace talks seldom result in peace accords: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is a stumbling bloc for many activists in JewishChristianMuslim relations is one of the most telling examples. Moreover, if peace accords are at all concluded, they often become a mere piece of paper and an opportunity to improve ones PR rather than an effective barrier to further escalation and spread of conflicts, as can be seen for instance in the Balkans. Another phenomenon that turns extreme into the mainstream is guerilla warfare which, because of the spread of terrorism, has become the main means of waging war. Guerilla war has its history suffice to mention Ireland since the early 20th century a conflict that lasted in the form of an ethno-religious conflict throughout the century, often waged in form of extremist and even terrorist actions. Other examples are events that preceded the foundation of the State of Israel. The situation there has also deteriorated over the years, and oscillates between hot regional conflicts on the one hand and cross-border and internal terrorist activities on the other hand. Proxy-wars that were part of the Cold War have now been replaced by a phenomenon of terrorist proxy-actions. Unlike the Cold War, that managed to retain proxywars at a localized level, the operability of terrorist groups makes them global. A gradual establishment of extremism in the society, regardless of constitutional system or economic maturity of a given country, is a fertile ground for the spread of terrorism. According to Girard, the spread of fear, deterrence, can be called the liberalization of Satan. According to the mimetic theory, Satan eliminates Satan. Girards colleague Benoit Chantre points out that imitatio Dei doesnt mean being equal to God. Instead of imitation he suggests adoration as a symmetric and irreversible relationship. Such adoration is to lead to sacrifice as a form of service and not as a form of victim as is understood by suicide terrorists. Peter Sanders, British photographer who started his career in 1960s with photos of rock stars, is better known today for his photos of the Muslim world. He eventually converted to Islam. In connection with the service to the others and addressing migrants living in various diasporas, Sanders says that only when we start serving the host society we cease dealing excessively with ourselves and we start thinking of the others.

possible solutions
The following passage outlines some topics that touch upon the issue of extremism in interreligious relations as well as those between religious communities and secular society. Extremism and not only its most extreme manifestation, terrorism concerns all of these areas of interaction.

Klemp, N.J.: Christian Right: Engaged citizens or theocratic crusaders?, Politics and Religion, 2010, 3:1-27.

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b) ghettoization
The fall of the Berlin Wall set a foundation for a number of new walls in Europe. We build them to create new ghettoes. We place on the other side problem social groups such as the Romas. Alternatively, we close ourselves in the symbolic or actual ghettos in fear of the evils of todays world. We do this out of our sense of moral superiority or because of rejecting otherness. This does not only concern the religious groups and those who have recently undergone religious conversion. New ghettoes, often voluntary, are often a natural phenomenon among the first generation of immigrants. One can think of Chinatowns or Londons East End that has seen centuries of migration waves, from the French Huguenots, through the Irish Catholics, East European Jews, Bangladeshi Muslims to the recent arrival of Sudanese Muslims. Yet this phenomenon is entirely natural. Lets however return to the ghettoization. One of the major problems related to the gap between the religious and secular worlds is ghettoization of religious and secular communities. They tend to create more-or-less isolated structures and services, be them in health and social care, education, culture and even trade. Despite the undeniable benefits they provide to the members of these communities, a lot of these organizations only cooperate to a degree or even not at all with their counterparts though not necessarily adversaries among other faiths and secular groups. This gap extends also to the legislative and constitutional processes that perceive religion as one of the marginalized minorities requiring etatist protection. This does not question the inevitable degree of protection of freedom of belief, but points out one of the problems that arise as a result of such a marginalizing approach: the implementation and enforcement of human rights. Their liberalistic conception places greater emphasis on rights than on responsibilities. The return to the public square of religion with its historical accent on responsibilities may help to restore the necessary balance between rights and responsibilities in public life in connection with the human rights issues and with practical understanding of democracy. As far as the constitutional developments are concerned, public discourse that opened the some time ago about the Preamble to the European Constitution reminded Europe that religion is part of its complex identity. Religious and secular public met willingly in a constructive discussion and thus actively contributes to the constitutional process in the European Union.

and churches should therefore generate greater effort towards a more balanced interpretation of civic rights and responsibilities with a particular emphasis on their host country. If the walls of prayer houses are not to become the walls of voluntary ghettoes, churches and other faiths organizations should more actively guide their members towards communal solidarity that applies equally to members of other faiths and the secular community.

Memory
The memory of the Shoah that can be expressed with Never again! acquires today an additional dimension of sanctity of life and human dignity. The lessons of the 20th century have to be applied to the most existential challenge of the day: terrorism that arises from fundamentalist extremism. There is a parallel (though merely in symbolic sense and by no means in qualitative or quantitative comparison) in the depersonalization of victims of the Nazi crematoria and the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11. The Twin Towers symbolize a broader reality pointed out by Tom Halk: the intention of the attackers was to achieve a grand media effect created by the maximum possible number of bodies. They were interested in figures and not in the identity of victims.2 This is certainly merely one of the many factors of the choice of means and targets of terrorist activities. In this context, however, the common denominator is something that is not sufficiently accentuated. One of the major causes of terrorism is fundamentalist discontent with the fruits of secularization.

education
The 20th and already even the 21st century have brought tragic consequences of the religiosecular gap, whether the consequences were the two World Wars and the Shoah, of the Twin Towers. According to Tom Masaryk, the trigger of violence, whether on one self or the others i.e. murder or suicide, lays in the very human nature. The problem lays in the combination of insufficient intellectual and spiritual education that are often underdeveloped and mutually unconnected. Masaryk calls this semi-education that is not practically applied and lived, what leads to existential fatigue. Human fullness, says Masaryk, consists of intellect and morality and can be attained through education. In a platonic manner, Masaryk views psychological fullness of man as a combination of memory and recollection. Such an internal capacity gives man and ability to actively interact with his environment.3 In addition to the development of ones mind, it is thus a matter of responsibility to also develop social interactions. Regrettably, it is precisely education that is today one of the sources of the semi-education and thus the foundation of the religio-secular gap. Masaryks religious humanism understands faith as a conviction acquired by man through critical reflection. Yet many schools and other educational institutions perceive critical thinking as a threat to authority. This applies to a number of religious as well as secular schools and universities. Such a gap and mutual
2 3 Halk, T.: There is Yet Hope for The Tree [Stromu zbv nadje]. Lidov noviny, Praha 2009. Masaryk, 1970.

c) Migration
Paradoxically, ghettoization increased with the removal of borders and other barriers after the fall of communism. To a number of migrants religion represents a source of ethnic selfidentification and also a link to their country of origin. The EU nationals, who often refer today to two or three countries as their home, are well aware of this. Yet, to many migrants and immigrants, a cosmopolitan experience does not guarantee a mind-opening experience. Quite on the contrary, it often leads to extremism and indoctrination, and creates new ethnic and religious barriers. Yet the mobility of the Europeans, at least, may be perceived through a metaphor of pilgrimage which wills us with spiritual and intellectual wisdom. Faith communities

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ignorance between the religious and secular world, as well as in the interfaith context, lay the foundations of contemporary ghettoes. The principle of subsidiary as one of the fundamental democratic postulates opens new opportunities for direct and active participation of citizens in res publica, i.e. in the administration of public affairs. Yet only an individual empowered by education can constructively contribute to this task.

a LooK aT The seLF-reFLeCTion oF The sLovaK soCieTY

Jaroslav Franek
The Central Union of Jewish Faith Communities, Slovakia

FUrTher reaDing
Girard, R.: Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoit Chantre. Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture. Michigan State University Press, 2009. Lincoln, B. Holy Terrors.Thinking about Religion after September 11. University of Chicago Press, 2003, 2006. Masaryk, T.G. Suicide and the meaning of civilization. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. Shrylock, A. (ed.) Islamophobia. Islamophilia. Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend). Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2010.

introduction
This section was to originally describe anti-Semitism in contemporary Slovakia. It would therefore be appropriate to point out that the anti-Semitism that no doubt exists in Slovakia today never presented an existential problem to me. I never had a sense of mindless threat or of anything that would be comparable with the experiences of my parents and grandparents. I believe that my suggestion can be generalized and that anti-Semitism does not present a day-to-day problem to the Jewish community. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism, its manifestations and proponents do exist in Slovakia and are comparable to those elsewhere in Europe, whilst retaining their own Slovak specifics. Just as elsewhere, there is a broad spectrum of manifestations of anti-Semitism, numerous incidents of racially motivated vandalism, attacks on Jewish cemeteries and memorials, defamation of Jewish symbols, verbal or media attacks against Jews in Slovakia. There are also numerous anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi web domains (Prop, Beo, SP) and (fortunately) relatively rare attacks on public figures of Jewish origins (the Rabbi of Bratislava, Grigorij Mesenkov, Fedor Gl, Peter Muk, etc.). Additional incidents were of lesser scale and strength. Yet I would like to skip all the above and focus on phenomena that can be identified as Slovak specifics. They are evidently connected with and related to Slovakias history of the 20th century. In other words, I should like to look at the self-reflection of the Slovak society and confront it with a perspective that is typical for most Slovak Jews or those who originally come from Slovakia. The following section will thus address the difference in perception of some historical facts by the Jewish minority on the one hand, and by a part of the majority society on the other hand.

The slovak state

The greatest difference in the perception of history by the Jewish minority and the majority of the Slovak society concerns the period of 19391945, i.e. the Slovak State. Contemporary Slovakia is a successor state of the Czechoslovak Republic and does not retain continuity with the Slovak State. Despite this legal fact, there are notable social forces which are trying to polish the image of the war-time Slovak Republic, to deny its fascist ideology and to relativize numerous crimes committed by the regime of the Slovak State. The institutions that most

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significantly contribute to these activities include those supported by the state, such as Matica Slovensk [Slovak cultural heritage organization], Zvz protikomunistickho odboja [the Union of Anticommunist Resistance], stav pamti nroda [Nations Memory Institute], Katolcka cirkev [the Catholic Church] and also perhaps especially organizations such as the Slovensk pospolitos [the Slovak Brotherhood] and related political parties and civic groups. Among the parliamentary political parties it is only the Slovak National Party [SNS] that used to identify with the legacy of Slovak fascism. The current parliamentary club of the SNS no longer has Jozef Rydlo, who, as a constitutional representative (as a Member of Parliament) was actively involved in the creation of a positive image of the period of 19391945. Among the governing parties, sympathies towards the Slovak State can be noted among some politicians of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). Whilst retaining the same content, their rhetoric is far more cultured than that of the politicians from the SNS. Even though most parties hold a critical view of the period of the Slovak State, some of their MPs are its sympathizer. In particular Jn Podmanick (SMER) stated his sympathies to the President of the fascist state Jozef Tiso. This statement was made jointly with the former MP Jozef Rydlo and other civil servants at the Higher Regional Unit in ilina who were nominated by SMER (director of the Office of the ilina Municipal Region Pavol Holetiak and the Spokesman of the Higher Regional Unit in ilina Peter Kubic). From the aforementioned organizations it is the Catholic Church that has the greatest influence on public opinion. By Catholic Church I mean the leaders of this Church in Slovakia. The situation is different in other countries and particularly in the Vatican. We know that the head of the Slovak State was a Catholic Priest who was tried and executed after the war. Despite the crimes which the leaders of the Slovak State helped to commit, no criticism ever came from the leaders of the Church in Slovakia against the perpetrators of these crimes. Quite on the contrary, we have been repeatedly confronted with news according to which the Church leaders try to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso and some other leaders of the Slovak State, to issue public testimonies and credentials in their support. (Archbishop Jn Sokol and the Bishop of Spi Frantiek Tondra are some of the best know figures.) The media informed the public that Archbishop Jn Sokol personally blessed the leader of the Slovak Brotherhood. This group enters the public mind as a political party or an association with strongly fascist rhetoric, agenda, symbols and manifestations. The aforementioned statement by Archbishop Sokol was supported by thirty signatories (January 17, 2007). Among the first ones were signatures by the former MP Augustn Marin Hska and the former Director of the Slovak Television Jozef Darmo. The letter identifies President Tiso as the savior of Jews and dismisses the criticism of Jn Sokol as an attack on the Slovak Catholics. There are a number of material artifacts in Slovakia that can be considered as examples of glorification of Dr. Jozef Tiso: The bust of Dr. Tiso on the facade of his native house in Byta, on May1st Street is located in the very town centre opposite the police headquarters; in addition to the bust, there is also a text and floral decorations;

Dr. Jozef Tiso Street in Varn (near ilina). A statue of Dr Tiso in the town of akajovce (near Nitra); the statue is part of the Pantheon of Slovak Leaders located in front of the Municipal Office in akajovce; A memorial plaque in Rajec located in the town centre on the vicarage near the church; A memorial plaque in the town of Oadnica on the vicarage near the church; A fictitious grave of Jozef Tiso in Saint Martins Cemetery in Bratislava.

The bust of Dr. Tiso on the fasade of his native house in Byta

Dr. Jozef Tiso street in Varn

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The most recent case of glorification of the radical fascist politician is connected to the decision by the municipal council in Rajec (near ilina). The council decided and publicized (in a monthly Rajan, 10/ 2010, available online) to place a bust of Ferdinand uransk on the main square. His political life was an embodiment of the radical wing of Slovak fascism. uransk took an active part in dismantling the Czechoslovak Republic. On the eve of the split of Czechoslovakia, he and Jozef Tiso met with Adolf Hitler. The members of the Hlinkas Slovak Peoples Party rewarded him for his activities with a number of major posts on the Slovak Government. He was removed from the post of the Foreign Minister upon Nazi request, for he attempted to carry out an independent foreign policy. He considered Jews to be enemies of the Slovak nation. He stood behind the anti-Jewish legislation and made numerous statements against Jews. Even after his dismissal from the Foreign Ministry (in June 20, 1940) he did not become more human and remained a hateful radical. He was member of young populists [transl. note: populists was a term referring to members of Hlinkas Slovak Peoples Party] who in late 1944 and early 1945 criticized the Slovak government that did not manage to prevent the coup (i.e. the Slovak National Uprising). They also considered the hitherto solution of the Jewish question not sufficiently radical. After the war he escaped to South America and was sentenced in absentia to capital punishment. He died in exile in Munich in 1974. The municipal council considers uransk to be the towns most notable citizen. The magazine Rajan published an interview with the towns mayor Jn Rybrik, according to whom uransk, thanks to his attitude to the Nazi Germany became an enemy. An arrest warrant was issued on him. It is not true at all that he was involved in the deportations of Jews. His personality and activities were not recognized even after the [Velvet] revolution despite an international conference held on the anniversary of his 90th birthday. The conference was organized in Rajec by Matica Slovensk in 1996. The Slovak parliament is the only body with the legal relevance to stop the glorifications of Jozef Tiso, Ferdinand uransk and other key figures of fascism. There is even a precedent: the Parliament acted against the placement of a statue of a bird Turul, which is the Hungarian national symbol. It has never acted in the matter of the glorification of Jozef Tiso, not has it ever issued any statement on this. From the point of view of the Jewish community, there is an absence of clearly negative position of fascism and its manifestations within the Roman Catholic Church. It does not only concern the fascism outside our country, in Germany and Italy, but the fascism that reigned in Slovakia between19391945. The Jewish community also negatively perceives the fact that the Church expressed support for the controversial textbook by Prof. Milan urica History of Slovakia and the Slovaks [Dejiny Slovenska a Slovkov]. The textbook severely falsifies and distorts facts, and is xenophobic and anti-Semitic. A proposal by the Church leaders for canonization of the Spi bishop Jn Vojtak falls into the same category. According to the Jewish community and a significant

number of historians, bishop Vojtak discredited himself by participating in the State Council of the Slovak Republic and with his ambivalent, often even supportive position on the deportations of the Jews from Slovakia, and also by being involved in arization [transl. note: a process of takeover of Jewish properties by their state and handing them over to non-Jewish population during the Slovak State] and having turned people in. Critical documents about his attitude (or actions) come from the Vatican sources. We therefore believe that the personality of Jn Vojtak should not be celebrated as a social model. On October 21 and 22, 2010, the Conference of the Bishops of Slovakia and Spisk Kapitula organized an academic conference on bishop Vojtak. The Central Union of Jewish Faith Communities (CU JFC) sent a letter to the organizers (bishops R. Bezk and F. Tondra) asking them to enable the representatives of the Holocaust Documentation Center of the CU JFC to give a paper at the conference. The conference was eventually attended only by the advocates of the Slovak State, including M. urica, F. Vnuk, R. Letz, P. Mulk, prof. Hrabovec, I. Chalupeck, J. Duda, V. Judk, I. Petransk, staff of Matica Slovensk and the Nations Memory Institute. Despite its declared academic nature, no conference-related volume was produced following the event , there were no conference proceedings or anything of this sort. Bishop Vojtaks advocates suppress any rational arguments and, under the pretext of academic approach, they build the harshest propaganda. Whilst the repeatedly discredited position of Matica Slovensk on the Slovak State is notoriously known, the attitude of another important institution, the Nations Memory Institute, is less known.

The nations Memory institute

The official role (as derived from the legislation) of the Nations Memory Institute is the reflection on Slovakias history during the two totalitarian regimes, fascism and communism. According to the law, the Institute is expected to study, document, publish and make accessible the crimes of fascism and communism between 1939 and 1989. The preamble to Act 553/2002 states that the role of the Institute is to document the crimes committed by the state on its people. Mindful of the obligation of our state to compensate all those who had been wronged by the state that was breaching human rights and its own laws, considers it a duty of our state to make available information about the secret activities of the repressive organs at the time of totality between 1939 and 1989, and to assign responsibility for the subjugation of our country, for murders, slavery, robbery and humiliation, moral and economic decline accompanied by judicial crimes and terror against the carriers of different views, for the destruction of traditional principles of proprietary law, the use of education, learning, science and culture for political purposes; as an expression of our conviction that who does now know ones own past, is deemed to repeat it, and that no unlawful activity by the state against the people shall be protected by secrecy, must not be forgotten, we have agreed on this Act:

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(1) Responsibilities delegated to the Institute by the state, namely l Carry out comprehensive and impartial review of the times of totality, especially analyze the causes and the means of loss of freedom, manifestations of the fascist and communist regime and their ideologies, participation by our and foreign national in these activities; l Enable access to the documents about persecution to those persecuted; l Publish data on the executioners of the persecution and their activities; l appeals for criminal proceedings of offences and crimes according to para. 1, File in conjunction with the General Prosecution of the Slovak Republic; l Provide relevant information to public authorities; l Systematically collect and professionally process all types of information and documents related to the period of totality; l Cooperate with specialist institutions in the Slovak Republic and abroad, particularly with archives, museums, libraries, participants in the resistance, concentration and labor camp survivors, and provide them information, research opportunities and methodological assistance, and publicize their work; l Provide public information about research output, especially publicize and make accessible information and other documents about the period of totality from 1930 to 1989 about the activities and destiny of individuals, publish and disseminate publications, organize exhibitions, seminars, specialist conferences, discussion fora; l Publicize the idea of freedom and defense of democracy against regime similar to Nazism and Communism. After the tragic death of its founder Jn Lango, the Nations Memory Institute (NMI) fell under the political control of the Slovak National Party (SNS). The party first nominated the President of the Union of Anticommunist Resistance Arpd Tarnczy for the Chair of the NMI. Tarnczy became publicly known as early as 1987 when he unveiled a memorial plaque to one of the major figures of the Slovak fascism Jozef Kirschbaum. When the media reminded A. Tarnczy his scandalous behavior, he stated that the court proved nothing on Kirchbaum and that communism was far worse than fascism. He also hinted that Jews should not interfere with the appointment of the NMI Chair, as their views are irrelevant given their numbers and democracy was (according to Tarnczy) a matter of implementing majority views. Yet the media response upset him and he withdrew his candidacy. He did however manage to join the NMI Board of Trustees. Together with A. Malack, A. M. Lang and I. Petransk (all nominees by the SNS), he currently runs the NMI.

The Union of anticommunist resistance (Uar)

This organization understands anticommunist resistance somewhat arbitrarily. It views members of the Hlinka Guards, the Emergency Units of the Hlinka Guards and sympathizers with fascism as fighters against communism. The Union of Anticommunist Resistance took part in numerous openly fascist gatherings and in demonstrated in support of unveiling the Jozef Tiso memorial plaque. After a few unsuccessful attempts to place into the NMI top administration proven sympathizers of the of Hlinkas Slovak Peoples Party from the UAR ranks, the Slovak National Party changed its tactic and managed to achieve an appointment in the Parliament of Ivan Petransk who continues to run the Institute. Under Petransks Chairmanship the Institute has become a caricature of the originally intended activities. The very choice of staff is telling. They are often advocates of the Slvoak State of 1939 1945, such as Frantiek Vnuk (The Slovaks were the only ones who had a reason to deport the Jewish population.), Peter Mulk ( The case of bishop Vojtak ought to be viewed in light of the Catholic social teaching that requires the Catholics to develop their property. It should therefore not be claimed that bishop Vojtak aryanized properties, as his intention was to further develop Baldovsk Spa. ), Rbert Letz, Emlia Hrabovec and others. [Transl. note: Baldovsk Spa originally belonged to a Jewish owner and was subject to arization1 during the Slovak State.] Ivan Petransk, as SNS nominee, is someone who publicly stated his positive attitude to President Jozef Tiso. The same can be said about the former Archbishop Jn Sokol, who is known for his statements advocating Tiso. It is thus unsurprising to see I. Petransks supra-standard relationship with J. Sokol or the former MP J. Rydlo. Jozef Rydlo is one of the Members of Parliament who participated, side-by-side with the neo-Nazis, in events commemorating the executed Jozef Tiso. In the spring of 2010, the NMI leaders together with the Foundation of Matica Slovensk participated in the publication of The Diaries of Karol Sidor [Dennky Karola Sidora]. The Diaries were silent about the actual activities of Karol Sidor, the populist extremist and fanatical antiSemite. The publication was fixed with the introduction by Frantiek Vnuk without any mention of Sidors political extremism. I cannot see the publication of The Diaries as anything else than an obvious attempt to falsify Slovak history and glorify Slovak fascism. In the summer of 2010, the Institute organized a discussion about Otomar Kubala, the Head of the Emergency Units of the Hlinka Guard. Kibala was tried and executed after the war. In the discussion, Frantiek Vnuk was critical about the sentencing of O. Kubala and also about the postwar retribution justice in general. Karol Kubk, the son-in-law of Alexander Mach2, also participated in the discussion to commend the personality of Otomar Kubala.
1 2 Arization - the forced Jewish property assignment Alexander Mach - representative of the Hlinkas Party radical wing. He was participating on disintegration of Czechoslovakia. After formation of Slovak State, he became the head of the Propaganda Bureau. After 1939, he achieved the post of Commander in Chief of Hlinkas semi-military fascist guards, Minister of Internal Affairs and in 1940-1944 he gained the post of vice-president. He was very active in cooperation with Nazis. Alexander Mach was the initiative executor of persecution of Jews in Slovakia. After the war he escaped, but was disclosed by American Bureau and extradited to Czechoslovakia. He was sued all together with Tiso and Durcansky in Bratislava. Tiso and Durcansky were sentenced to death, Alexander Mach was committed to prison for 30 years. He was released in 1968.

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The recent activities of the Institute follow in the same spirit. According to law, the NMI should work towards the documentation of crimes committed by the populist regime on its own people. Instead of this, the Institute organizes such events as a Conference on The Slovak Republic 19391945 from the Perspective of Young Historians held on April 16, 2010. It described and discussed daily life in the Slovak State. The description of what the Institute should be doing remains marginalized. Within the five sections of the conference, nearly 40 authors attempted to present an image of the socio-political aspects, life in the army or in the Hlinka Guards, the Slovak school system, culture, church and the economic situation. The speakers analyzed a number of often controversial themes, pointed out the daily life of the Slovak soldiers at the front or behind the lines, repressions against the people in towns taken over by the guerillas, the life of Slovaks in the areas occupied by Hungary; they analyzed the living standards of the population and the freedom of religion. The publishing activities of the Institute are also controversial. Instead of documenting the crimes, the NMI publishes the aforementioned romanticized diaries of the perpetrators of crimes, or volumes such as the recently announced monograph about the SlovakItalian relations in 19391945. The author Peter Kubk addresses the cooperation between Slovakia and Italy in politics, trade, culture and sports during the period of fascism. The following quotation of the letter by the NMI Chair I. Petransk to the Central Union of Jewish Faith Communities, which he sent after many requests, illustrates the twisted perspective of the Institute. We asked the NMI to take a position on the activities of Jn Vojtak between 1939 and 1945. We were particularly interested to receive a position of the NMI on a matter that is rejected or questioned by the pro-populist historians: that Spisk kapitula under Vojtak arizated Baldovsk Spa. We repeatedly solicited an answer and waited for I. Petransks letter for over a year. When it eventually arrived, it served as a marvelous example of communist newspeak propagandistic language that makes a straightforward matter unclear. Here is a brief quotation from the letter: The attempt of the Bishop of Spi to acquire Baldovsk Spa, the area of which was in close proximity to the estates of the Bishopric. The Bishopric was involved in the case since early 1941, when it expressed an intention to purchase the property. The effort eventually led to the arization of the enterprise. We must not conceal the fact that the enterprise of the former Jewish owner Ladislav Fried was in long-term decline, in a devastated state and highly indebted. Arization was carried out in line with the legislation at the time. Yet it did not entail arization (aryanization?) in the sense as it is understood today, i.e. to enrich oneself with prosperous Jewish property or estates. This is proved, after all, by the accounts of the Bishopric. Young historians from the NMI raised their voices (M. Lacko a P. Sokolovi). Their commentaries, despite their unconvincing faade that pretends objectivity, speak clearly in support of the Slovak State and openly relativize the regime and its leaders. The following passage is from the commentary by P. Sokolovi:

A number of Tisos opponents today criticize him for cooperation with Hitler. The truth, however, is that he traveled to Berlin for the meeting with Hitler only after the leaders of Hlinkas Slovak Peoples Party approved his trip yet with a caveat that he should not make any commitments to the Germans related to the future of Slovakia. Tiso adhered to their words and even face-to-face to the feared Fhrer, despite the German pressure, because of the presence of the Hungarian army on the Slovak border, he refused to declare the Slovak State. To further illustrate the minimal differential between the opponents and sympathizers of the Slovak fascism, below is another quotation of the young historian of the NMI, Peter Sokolovi: The development of the image of the Slovak Republic of 1939 1945 today is not helped by the fact that, on March 143 extremists from both sides, left and right, are most visible. It however proves that ideological arguments prevail over the rational ones in the assessment of the Republic.

Conclusion
Anti-Semitism survives more in a latent than active form. Its bearer are (though not exclusively) neo-fascist and similar groupings such as the Slovak Brotherhood or the political parties into which the Brotherhood has been transformed. The results of the parliamentary elections show that the vision of the Slovak Brotherhood as a parliamentary party is not impossible. On the other hand, it is also true that the vision of the parliamentary Slovak National Party was similarly threatening twenty years ago. It is interesting that the Slovak Brotherhood doesnt militate against the Hungarians and even criticizes the Slovak National Party for its anti-Hungarian rhetoric. The Brotherhood gains its electorate in the regions with significant presence of a Roma population that represents a massive social problem for its neighbors. The Brotherhood is aware of the severity of the situation and the effect of long-term failure to solve the problem. Unlike the state institutions, the Brotherhood managed to convince a part of the population about its ability to resolve these problems. Anti-Semitism according to the Nazi model, however, remains the ideological platform of the Slovak Brotherhood. Because of the inability of the majority population to reflect on its own history, there is quite a broad spectrum of state and state-funded organizations that serve as a bridge between the radical manifestations of anti-semitism and racism on one hand, and state organs on the other. Anti-semitism and similar manifestations have never been marginalized in Slovakia. Quite on the contrary, they always strive to expand their influence and have been permanently testing the socio-political situation over the past decade, in a sense that they are trying to see what the political station allows them yet more to do (e.g. the activities of the NMI) and what is beyond the limits acceptability (the activities of the Slovak Brotherhood). Regrettably, this guaranties the continued survival of these activities.
3 March 14 the date of the foundation of the Slovak State in 1939.

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Lucia grekov
independent political scientist, Slovakia
The global war of terror and extremism has attracted attention to the role of religion in the world. Extensive interest emerged in finding out whether religious traditions are compatible with the institutions and values of liberal democracy (perhaps the most obvious is the interest in Islam and the new religious movements). Despite numerous proofs that show otherwise, many social scientists fear that we live in a secular era. Yet our times have seen major explosions of religious passions. Modernity is equally religious as the previous historical periods; perhaps it is in some ways even more religious. God is dead, or at least Nietzsche said so. For nearly one and a half century social sciences firmly believed that religion and religious traditions would inevitably disappear from social (and perhaps also private) life. It was also believed that modernization through scientific progress and bureaucratic specialization would free the society from preconceptions and the need to trust in the social care of churches. Voluminous empirical evidence suggests that belief and its practice are as important today as they have been in the past, perhaps even more so. New religious groups are emerging faster than secularists presumed. Recognized belief systems such as Catholicism or Islam continue to show an ability to attract new members. Spiritual groups do not disappear even in communist and post-communist countries, but keep re-emerging even after decades of persecution by the communist regimes.1 The following contribution intends to show the place of religion in the study of politics and particularly the phenomenon of a new form of religiosity religious extremism which is an important factor in political life and the study of politics. Religion inevitably triggers reaction. The study of the theme shows that, when interacting with the state and society, traditional and established religious groups (which have mostly the status of churches in Slovakia), do not trigger similar tensions and conflicts as in the case of new, non-traditional religious movements. The emergence, development, transformation, or disappearance of new religious movements is an age-old and natural process. The notion new in new religious movements identifies more of the status of a concrete religious group than the length of its existence. Synonyms to new include terms such as non-conformist, nonrespected, non-established, or non-registered. The foundation of the new religious movements (NRM) is an idea that responds to hitherto religious life and considers the previous religious visions insufficient and unsatisfactory. With this protest force the NRM thus enter into conflict with the majority in the society. Rejection of NRM is manifested by the majority with the
1 Greeley, A.: A religious revival in Russia? Journal for the Scientific, Study of Religion, 33(4):253-72, 1994.

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defamatory term sect. Conflict between NRM and the majority occurs at several levels within a family, in public, and within the legal system. The fundamental principles of liberal democracy include the protection of human rights, including religious rights. In this context we see two basic models. Under the first one the protection of minorities (including religious) is the supreme principle. The second model limits these rights in the interest of public safety. These two approaches show the complexity of the whole issue of non-traditional religions and the fundamental question of how to guarantee everyone fundamental human rights and how to prevent their breaches by the state or religious groups. The idea of religious freedom derives from the pluralism of religious life and is aimed against the dominant status of a single group of religious communities chosen by the state. Pluralism means peaceful coexistence of diverse religious traditions within a society. In order to express the quality of pluralism I use breadth and depth: by the breadth of pluralism I understand the number of religious institutions involved, and by depth, the extent to which these institutions enjoy equal status. Admittedly this model is affected by tradition and specific political, social, historical and cultural processes. This is obvious in monitoring legislation that create legal framework of relations between state and church (religious communities) in Slovakia. After the fall of communism in 1989, religious freedom was introduced to Czechoslovakia. Freedom meant removal of control of religious communities by the state and brought an opportunity to religious activities without any limitations. Religious freedom was reaffirmed in 1991 by a new law on freedom of religious belief and on the status of churches and religious organizations. The law still anticipated the registration of religious organizations, but for the first time it made it conditional upon the number of people who identify with the particular religious organization. The law retained and even extended the hitherto rights of the registered organizations. The federal law of 1991 remained in force in both successor states of the former federal Czechoslovakia after its disintegration in 1993. It was replaced in the Czech Republic by a law in 1992, while in Slovakia it remains in force. Religious freedom after 1989 enabled dozens of religious groups to operate in Czechoslovakia. Religious pluralism thus achieved breadth not seen before. In addition to Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities, there are also Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Taoist, and other religious groups. Their spectrum seems as wide as it is in Western Europe. Yet the law of 1991 also retained and reaffirmed the inequality of their status. Access to benefits for the registered religious groups became far more complicated because of the membership requirement. The minimal membership requirement for registration of a religious group was set at 20 thousand by another law (of 1992) applicable in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. Given the size of population it proved difficult to meet this condition.

The significant number of members required for the registration of a new religious group resulted in only four groups joining those already registered in the years between 1991 and 2010: Jehovahs Witness (previously banned by the communist regime), the New Apostolic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Later-day Saints, and the Bahai community. The required membership size and an exemption that was to give preference to Christian churches show that the free Czechoslovakia feared a swift transition to religious pluralism. Whilst it did not wish to limit the breadth of pluralism, it retained a significant difference in the legal status of religious groups. It was thus beneficial for the established religious organizations. It should be emphasized that the registration of a given religious group does not mean it guaranties quality. Vice versa, some religious groups that are not recognized by the state are not necessarily dangerous or detrimental to the society. The status of nontraditional, non-registered religious movements and religious minorities in Slovakia is affected by a rather significant degree of intolerance against differences. The media represents an area that most significantly reflects the tension between the new religions and society. One of the examples when the media played a major role in triggering an avalanche, was the participation of the former President of Slovakia Michal Kov at an event organized by the IIFWP (The Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace) founded by Rev. Moon in July 2006. The articles and reports that followed were directed against the minority religious organization; the information was false, distorted and aimed to depict the Church of Unification as a mysterious, secret and dangerous underground group. The reports often contained merely a summary of unfounded facts, euphemisms, distorted information and offences against Rev. Moon and the people who organized the evening event in the Slovak National Theatre. No reports offered any information about what kind of event was actually held in the theatre, who attended it and what was the program. Unverified and false facts disseminated by news reports lead to a lack of transparency that can easily turn the public opinion against the minority religious groups. The last major moral panic arose during the amendment to Act 201/2007 Coll. when the government accepted a parliamentary suggestion to make the registration of new churches stricter. According to the amendment, small churches wishing to register were to present 20,000 member signatures with statements of honor that they o belong to the concerned church. Previously signatures of supporters proved sufficient for the registration of a new religious community. Only six churches would be able to meet the condition set out by the clause (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Protestant of Augsburg Creed, Jehovahs Witnesses, and the Orthodox Christians). The requirement was accepted out of fear of registration by Muslims who initiated activities towards registration in 2006. In March 2007, an MP for the Slovak National Party, which was one of the three parties forming the governing coalition, stated that the objective of the stricter regulations for the registration of churches and religious

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groups was to prevent a development that would make our children pray in mosques and declares themselves to be Al Khaida ... 2. Even though only four religious groups were registered since 1989, udmila Mukov (Peoples Party Movement for Democratic Slovakia3) stated: We wanted to prevent any sect, perhaps even a dangerous one, from using funds from the national budget. I had information that students at a train station were signing something without knowing what it was, simply because someone was talking to them in English. 4 So far the only group of humorists that applied to the Slovak Ministry of Culture that collected 20,000 signatures by sympathizers was the Atheistic Church of Non-Believers. The Ministry refused to register it in December 2006 arguing that the organization was not an association of people of similar religious belief and also not an association of religious faith. It also outlined an understanding of religious faith as altogether unconnected with a specific religious view of life and the world. This problem that is dealt within the media and in the encounter between the majority versus minority religion (often non-Christian) has been troubling the mind of democracy based on freedom of confession in Slovakia. This problem has also been drawing attention by the surrounding countries and institutions that monitor its development. The UN Human Rights Commission pointed out in 2005 a number of critical points that are also breached by our non-discrimination law. The Minister of Culture told the media that this legislation doesnt in any way limit the freedom of confession, religion, or the very foundation of churches." The Slovak General Prosecution filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court requesting it to decide on the constitutionality of the law on freedom of religious belief and the status of churches and religious groups (Act 308/1991 Coll.). The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal by the General Prosecution in February 2010 and ruled that stricter regulations for the registration of churches and religious communities were not unconstitutional. The panic of course moved from the top to the grassroots and statements by church leaders promptly followed. According to the then-Archbishop Jn Sokol, everyone should have freedom of confession. But only four religions should be allowed to register Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, and Jewish. He argued that the 20,000 members threshold should be increased. The Bishop General of the Protestant Church Jlius Filo, however, stated that the threshold did not need to be increased and that members of other religious groups should not be discriminated against. Slovakias President Ivan Gaparovi assumed a cautious position: I think this deserves a wider analysis that should set the basis for a decision. The adoption of legislation that would also enable registration of religions recognized worldwide, which include a few hundreds of believers, tends to be supported more by smaller churches. That practically
2 3 4 See: http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/2007-international-religious-freedom-report-slovensk-republika.html [27.01.2010]. Smer- socilna demokracia, SMER Social Democracy (political party). In: Prosecutors Office Opens the Door to Church (Prokuratra otvra dvere cirkvm), Hospodrske Noviny, 1.2.2008.

places them outside the law and they cannot legally operate in any way, they are often forced to exist outside the healthy social life that naturally exerts pressure on them from all sides. It results in public disassociation, foul-mouthing, and discrimination which involves also public media and institutions discrimination. There are a number of additional cases generated by the media, such as Satanism that is a popular topic in the media, alternative pedagogy, and charismatic movements. Yet one new religious movement has been leading in media popularity in terms of space dedicated to it: the Church of Scientology. No other new religious orientation since 1989 triggered as many questions as the Church of Scientology. It has been surrounded by a mist of controversies, litigations, media attention, parliamentary debates, and news reports. Even though the Church of Scientology is not registered in Slovakia as a church (as a religious group), or as a civic association, it is still one of the most rapidly developing new religious groups. The above examples clearly indicate the moral panic according to Stan Cohen and Jack Zoung. When mass media triggered the state of public concern over certain religious groups, it was far greater that would correspond to the degree of actual danger. Moral panic was often translated into official measures aimed against the public evil or against the perpetrator of a seeming problem: new laws and regulations were adopted, and stricter oversight and harsher penalties were put in place. These inspired further news reports and further deepened the moral panic. It can be said in a way that the central theme of religion is violence in as much as it is nonviolence.5 We have to therefore expect religious violence and avoid increasing tensions between religious movements and the society. The examples from the world teach us that escalation of these tensions contributed to the violent conclusion that no one desired. Prevention of conflicts with religious groups is therefore of utmost importance. The globalization of various themes created brand new conditions for international and national conflicts. The theoretical approach of conflict resolution is gaining momentum.6 It often uses preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and comprehensive postwar reconstruction of regions and societies. The two-track diplomacy has moved to multi-track diplomacy. The actors within the latter thus include also international and local non-governmental organizations, scientists, universities, and representatives of churches and religious organizations. The resolution of conflicts, terrorism, and extremism are among the vital and most complex tasks faced by the international community. Conflicts have their own dynamics and progress though various stages. Each conflict is a unique event that requires an individual approach.
5 6 see: Candland, CH. (ed.): The Spirit of Violence: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography of Religion and Violence, Occasional Papers Number 6. Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, New York, 1992 Wallensteen, P.: Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System. Sage Publications, 2002

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In an effort to limit human and material losses, states and international organizations have to concentrate on the prevention of violence and the cultivation of conflict resolution. In the case of religious extremism, prevention lays in interfaith dialogue, in the non-marginalization of religion, its understanding, and the non-discriminatory approach to religious minorities, the non-exaggeration of the effect of repression and facilitation of denomination. They all have a major potential for conflict prevention and abuse of religion.

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Thompson, K. In: Critcher, C.: Critical readings: Moral Panics in the Media. Open University Press, Berkshire, 2006 Tomka, M.: Religious Change in East-Central Europe. In: Borowik, I. & Tomka, M. (eds), Religion and Social Change in Post-communist Europe. Nomos, Krakow, 2001 Wallensteen, P.: Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System. Sage Publications, 2002

The brighT FUTUre oF righT-Wing eXTreMisM in sLovaKia?

alojz hlina
activist, Slovakia
Right-wing extremism will be on the increase in Slovakia unless we find answers to some questions that we face. The increase of extremism can be faced by the following means: 1. Solve the Roma problems that represent the source of essential energy to right-wing extremism in Slovakia; 2. Activate civil society, particularly its ability to form an alliance on crucial issues; 3. Point out the activities by right-wing extremists de-glorifying and even ridiculing their alleged ability to realistically solve anything.

solving the roma problems

A number of conferences and seminars have been held to address this issue. They came out with a statement of fact that the issue is very complex and there is no simple recipe for its solution. It however does not mean at all that we ought to resign in seeking the solution. Quite on the contrary, if we resign, right-wing extremism will start offering simple solutions to the public. One of the solutions that might provide part solution is a project of mobile kindergartens and schools. I have discussed the project in a blog entitled Do not let the children to eat dogs, take drugs and end up in jail! How much wisdom is there in the ancient books? For instance: Jerusalem fell when children stopped attending schools. What tragedy is brewing in our Roma settlements? How much do the children suffer there? Children in the Roma settlements stop attending school and that is the seed of another tragedy for mankind. A tragedy that will be a time bomb in the society and will quietly tick to explode at the right time. The situation deteriorates and anxiety grows. Some already parasite on this situation. As long as the children in the settlements eat dogs, roll in dirt, fight for food with rats and especially stop attending schools, it will be bad not only for them, but also for us, the majority.

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Lets seek a solution again in the ancient books. They say: When Mohammed doesnt go to the mountain, the mountain comes to Mohammed. In our case it means that instead of eating sandwiches somewhere in Bratislava we need to take tetanus vaccination, take some other immunizations, increase our life insurance and go really help, not just speak nonsense. We need to help in a way that we at least save those children. We need to help by building mobile kindergartens, schools, and day camps in the settlements. There we can teach children to read; they will be able to wash there and eat. They will be in a clean, civilized environment. Even though they will return home in the evening, but they will know that they can come back in the morning. The project of mobile schools, kindergartens and crches is not financially demanding. Yet it requires resolve and conviction. The state should motivate people to go and work there, for instance through tax incentives; students can do their work experience there in order to have preferred access to dormitory room, etc The state will only benefit with each saved child from the settlement, which is set free from this environment and starts to live a normal life. We all will benefit from that.

We like this country and we shall defend it. Or so I hope. My hope might be lesser than before, but its there. This year the SNP square will belong to the people. It is reserved for them. Teenagers in boots will have to march somewhere else. Heroes in slippers will sit in front of TV or the computer. Those, who dont turn up because, because . And because especially because, because, because, because, because and because, because, because, because, because, because they will simply not be there. We like this country.

De-glorification of activities of right-Wing groups

The activities of right-wing groups and their leaders often serve as a source of inspiration for youth as well as adult population mostly with primary education. Their activities are mystified and glorified. They are assigned other attributes that may prove attractive to some groups. By showing that these false ideas are mere myth is a good way to significantly limiting extremist support among those groups. The event, by which I tried to send a signal with understandable language that heroism of some is a mere myth, was held on the day when the extremists for the first time marched to the statue of King Svtopluk. Below is an excerpt of my blog entry entitled The day Kotleba lost his flag:Since the investigation is underway, I shall only write about circumstances that have to effect on this reality. I walk daily by the Parliament and the castle, as I live nearby. So I did on Saturday. I knew that the Brotherhood were to be somewhere but I was unsure where. As it happened, I was passing by when they reached the castle. I am always interested in what is going on in the neighborhood, so I looked at what was going on. I had the honor to hear the part of M. Kotlebas speech. I used the pause when the megaphone broke down to express my opinion that I disagree with the talk about Zionists, Freemason and other gangs. The police had little understanding for my active entry in my (yours) neighborhood and took me away. Sometimes it hurts. It was interesting to see the action on a video recording: the members of the Brotherhood are thanking the police and shouting: Take the bastard away!. Part two took place nearer to the castle. It is subject to investigation and I shall therefore refrain for now from describing it. The fact is that, at the end of this, I ended up holding a flag of the Brotherhood. Over a year ago I managed to get a hold of the flag of the Slovak National Party (SNP). This set in motion the swan song for the SNS in motion and the supporters of Jn Slota nearly lost their position. Last weekend the Kotlebas also nearly lost their flag. Perhaps inspired by the heroism of the Slotas, the Brotherhood also asked the police to return the flag to them.

activation of Civil society, particularly by an ability to Form an alliance on Key issues

The second area is an ability to cooperate, to forge an agreement and unite. March 14, 2010 serves as a good example of an ability to send a clear signal of a united resistance against manifestations of extremism. On that day a number of events were held simultaneously and outperformed the event organized by a relatively small group of extremists. Had the city been empty with the only presence of young men in boots, the gain would have been for the extremists. Yet on March 14, 2010, the extremist march was only a secondary matter. I called this day D-Day in my blog: March 14 is the date of the foundation of the Slovak State [in 1939]. It is thus the date when teenagers in boots try to tell something to their fellow citizens of our country. So the D-Day will bring certain tension to our streets. We shall see how many brave people will protect our streets; how many brave ones will prefer to sit by their computers, or at a table drinking beer. We shall see how many people show up on the SNP square. This year, on March 14, teenagers in boots will yet again march through the streets, dressed in snazzy fashion with foreign labels which they do not understand. Wolves, the environmental forest protection organization, other environmentalists, a man from the Tatra Mountains who knows more than merely selling tickets to the public toilet, or an MO for the Slovak National Party ... Where will you be?

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Any warriors, moreover the heroes would die of shame to have lost their flag. Our heroes run to the police for help. Had I not been there, some simple Slovaks would have simplified the entire media output as follows: A few druggies and gays with rainbow flags danced around Svtopluk and beat our hero Kotleba to blood because he wanted to go and look at the parade. Kotleba would thus revive his status of a martyr as it is nearly a year that he became a martyr (to some) after the police intervention in arisk Michaany. Hlina destroyed Kotlebas theatric performance. Now it is no longer as idyllic and some will have to write the simple version somehow like this: Even though there were druggies and gays by the statue of Svtopluk, ours (the Kotlebas) were up by the castle. Why the hell did our boys let their flag be taken?! How do they want to protect us if they cannot even guard their flag? The fight against right-wing extremism will be a long-term challenge, but it has to be dealt with whilst it is at the bud. If it continues to gain strength and grows into a major fire, the fight against it will be very difficult. I pointed this out during the recent event organized by the extremists: Always better if they stand in a pile of manure than in a puddle of blood. I held the poster throughout the rally. I used the expression manure, because someone dumped a ton of manure at night to the place where the extremist rally was to be held. Prior to the rally I wrote a blog in which I point out the importance of being alert to the manifestations of extremism: No boots should stomp in front of the Parliament. If there wasnt enough misery, the people in the boots decided to come on September 19. They want to come in front of the Parliament to honor the statue of Svtopluk. I shant write about the statue. I want to write about what it is that the people in boots want. They could not care less about the statue. It would indeed help them to be inspired by the ideology and the man who considered Slavs to be an inferior race. To this the king of these people, their role model, the Reichs leader Hitler would certainly say from across the Danube: Pony muss weg! The Brotherhood, extremists, and neo-Nazis simple have come enjoy stomping in their boots in front of the Parliament. I have a major problem with them doing this in front of our Parliament. Today, as I write this, I picture the peoples will represented by Jn Slota who now even took a companion in arms: Vincent Luk. Why do I have to still watch how the the Brotherhood and a few teenagers with acne stomp in front of our Parliament? No boots should be stomping in front of the Parliament. We all should agree on this. It would be nicely symbolic if the two roosters Matovi and Kalik forget for a while what they told each other and went to the Parliament square to tell the extremists that no one will march in front of the Parliament in these boots. They can then perhaps lick their wounds. Yet this is a

serious matter. It would be nice if also other Members of Parliament from the opposing camps forgot for a while whether the VAT should be 19% or 20% and came to the Parliament square on Saturday, also so that they would not have to deal afterwards with the question whether we should transport the results of the job of the extremists because of hygienic reasons by the train or motorway. I shall be in front of the Parliament on Saturday and I invite MPs Igor Matovi and Rbert Kalik and of course all others who care that those in boots, even worse so, with false ideas, do not stomp in front of our Parliament. P.S.: A message to all those geniuses who identify in this counter-action just my interest to gain visibility, I would like to leave the message: shall be happy to give up this honor to be stared at and photographed for the keepsake books of the members of the Brotherhood anytime. I would be happy for someone else to do this, or else the Brotherhood will score greatly on the media-mental map of Slovakia because of September 18, 2010. Finally, there is no negotiating with right-wing extremism. Once you start it, you never stop.

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Miroslav Kus
political scientist, Slovakia
There is no one today who would deny freedom of expression. Even the toughest dictators swear by it, yet they place under the condition of the famous but . Under the communism in Czechoslovakia, everyone could enjoy full freedom of expression, as long as it was not used against the interests of communism, those of the workers, to questions the leading role of the communist party and the Soviet Union in the struggle against the world reactionaries. Yet what remains of thus understood freedom of expression? On the other hand, we cannot oversee its justified limitations. What good does freedom of expression do to me in a prison cell? What would Robinson Crusoe do with it on a deserted island? It is even pointless to speak publicly on a busy square when no one is willing to listen to me. If I attempt to do it in church during the mass, upset churchgoers would throw me out. Moreover, freedom of expression does not relate to any public speech. Everyone understands that it would be inappropriate to refer to freedom of speech in case of drunkards talk, marital quarrels or bickering among teenagers. Freedom of speech only applies to a particular type of verbal statements used in civil society. The fundamental prerequisite of its existence is freedom and equality of all citizens in dignity and rights. This sets out the limits of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression belongs to the fundamental human rights and freedoms which are not self-serving. Their sense or the objective of their implementation is to preserve and enhance human dignity. On the contrary, the breach of human rights and freedoms is always an attack on human dignity. This entails the dignity of every man, not just of the one who exercises the right, but also the one who is positively or negatively affected by the exercise of the right. If someone exercises their freedom of expression in a way that it humiliates the dignity of another man, for instance by speaking of them as of an inferior being, denying them the rights to equal treatment and thus a whole range of rights, this means an abuse of the freedom of expression for discriminatory purposes and thus the denial of the very meaning of the right. Freedom of expression also belongs to political freedoms. Therefore general philosophies about pure freedom per se wont tell us much about freedom of expression, for political freedom is not an internal freedom, but an instrumental and relational freedom, the main objective of which is to create conditions for freedom.1
1 Sartori, 1993, 303.

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Freedom of expression

Political freedoms are exclusively exercised within a concrete political community, i.e. today, within a specific state. More specifically, they are exercised within the legal democratic state where democracy provides equality of citizens and a right (as a set of binding and sanctioned norms) to their civic and political freedoms. If legal state law is superior to political power, as stated by J.J. Rousseau when he limited political freedom by obedience to laws which we ourselves set out in line with the general will of the people. In the contemporary legal state, this volont gnrale is entrusted in the hands of an elected legislative body that decides on the binding regulations under which the citizens exercise their political freedoms within a given state. It also means that these regulations vary from case to case in different democratic legal states (e.g. rights to abortion, euthanasia, etc.). Within this context, the Czech philosopher Jan Sokol differentiates three forms of freedom: freedom as an absence of barriers, freedom as an opportunity for choice, and freedom as a game according to set rules. Whoever understands freedom according to the first form, will remove ties and barriers; within the second form he would differentiate options of choice. Yet only under the third form he comes to understand the difference between barriers and rules: no game can be played without rules. The better rules and the better the referee, the better is the game. Without rules, the game would swiftly degenerate. Imagine for instance a football match without the rule of offside. In this sense, true human freedom is always limited as it inevitable requires rules.2 A lot of people understand freedom of expression only in the first sense, as a pubescent freedom. According to Sokol, a surprising number of people make do with this [form of freedom] until retirement; it also remains ingrained among scholars and philosophers; freedom as an absence of enforcement, removal of external barriers of my decisions and deeds ...3 Since the foundation of the UN OSN (1945) and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) mankind (in line with Sokols third form of freedom) started to set out rules of exercises of political freedoms in general and of the freedom of expression in particular, through the international human rights documents. According to the International Convention on Civic and Political Rights, the exercise of the freedom of expression carries along particular obligations and responsibilities. It can thus be subject to certain limitation; however, they may only be such as set out by law and that are necessary for: a) Respect of the rights and the reputation of others, b) The protection of national security, public order, public health or morals. No doubt the above limitations in point a) are aimed particularly against hate speech declaring race, ethnic and other hatred and related group supremacy. This is addressed by Article 4 of the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Race Discrimination adopted by all EU member states. They therefore undertook to deem a crime, by law, any dissemination
2 3 Jak liberalismus, jak svoboda? Listy 1/2002, 58. Jak liberalismus, jak svoboda? Listy 1/2002, 55.

of ideas based on race supremacy or hate, any incitement to race discrimination or any other violent act or incitement to such an act against any group of different skin color or ethnic origin ... . Slovakia has endorsed these universal rules of exercise of the freedom of expression in the Constitution (article 26 para. 4), in the Press Law and the civic code. Their clauses thus enabled to also include in our Criminal Code the clause on defamation of race, ethnic group and nation, which triggered a dispute in the Slovak media and among lawyers. This was not a legal dispute about terminology but about the very spirit of the Constitution and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which is endorsed by the Constitution. Its Preamble draws from the European experience with fascism of word and deed, when the failure to recognize human rights and their ridiculing led to barbaric activities offending the conscience of mankind. Precisely because of this ghastly experience of the Europeans, the passage on race defamation of race, ethnic group and nation was placed within the framework limiting freedom of expression in most European states. In this context, recognized Slovak lawyer Jn Hrubala writes: It is inadmissible and criminal in the Slovak Republic to declare national, religious, race, class, or other hatred, support and publicize movements that evidently lead to the suppression of rights and freedoms of the people and do not respect democracy. This particularly refers to Fascism and some manifestations of Communism, because fascist and communist ideologies as a manifestation and consequence of the freedom of thought do not respect a number of human rights or democracy itself. Democracy has to contain mechanisms that can suppress expressions of ideas which patently present an attempt to destroy democracy. There is no doubt about the necessity of such limitation of freedom of speech and thought within a democratic society.4 The Japanese academic Kinhide Mushakoji (UNESCO expert, lecturing at the UN university) considers statements that incite race or ethnic hatred to be a mirror image of xenophobia. The latter is not merely a fear of difference, of what is alien to a given person or group, but it is particularly manifested as suspicious or even rival position against those who are different, against foreigners. The features that differentiate foreigners from us are seen as inferior, even contemptible. Thus, phenomenological, racism and xenophobia relate to the same act, contempt in light of its object is manifested as racism, whilst in light of its subject it is xenophobia. A person who considers another person to be inferior and who declares their superiority against the latter is often a xenophobe, but in the eyes of the other is a racist. Mushakoji argues that xenophobia is highly infectious social pathology, which furthermore has grave political consequences. Freedom of expression presumes that civil society consists of individuals who strive for equal dialogue. Xenophobia, particularly in its more sophisticated forms, creates a situation that prevents such dialogue. In this sense xenophobia is a virus that destroys open communication between people.
4 Kresk, 1997, 268

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Freedom of expression

Hence unlimited freedom of expression, without barriers and civic responsibility for its content, cannot be among political rights, as it is outside their framework. At most it remains at the level of the aforementioned drunken talk. The European commemoration of the 60th anniversary of liberation of Auschwitz brought a remarkable appeal that should be brought to the attention to anyone of, when declaring the pubescent freedom of expression without the rules of the game carelessly separates words from: Antisemitism often starts with words; we must do everything to make sure it does not end up differently. Swastikas on the Nazis shoulders (also freedom of expression!) have already led directly to the yellow stars on the breast of those doomed and slogans:Jews to the gas chambers. Freedom of expression today has more delicate forms than a direct declaration of the socalled Auschwitz lie, hate speech or provocations with Nazi uniforms and symbols. No one prevents you from publicly offending your wife by saying that she is a whore, ugly and of weak mind. Yet when youstart saying this, everyone realizes that your marriage is in shambles or that you intend to make it such. No one prevents you from complaining about your neighbor, but doing so indicates bad neighborly relations. The same applies to neighborly relation between nations and countries. Exercising the right to the freedom of expression in a manner that does not offend partners or that prevents incitement or escalation of tensions between us, is a great skill of wise and tolerant politicians, journalists, and other public figures. It directly indicates the level of their political culture. We have our negative experience with this in Slovakia. Our nationalists waved the Czech card to the point of the break of the common state and today they equally irresponsibly pull out the Hungarian card against the Hungarian minority at home and against peaceful coexistence with neighboring Hungary. Globalization and revolution in information communication turned all countries of the world, including the Muslim ones, into our neighbors. What has been until recently an internal matter of a given country can now easily turn into an international affair that engages the entire world in one way or another. The same happened in the case of the Danish cartoons of Prophet Mohammed. Even though Denmark is miles away from the Muslim world, radical Muslim protests and threats resonated from everywhere. It means that we have to be far more sensitive when taking into account what is unacceptable, offensive, even blasphemous to our even most distant neighbors, unless we want to offend them or trigger a conflict. It is up to them to decide what they consider inappropriate, even though we may have our own opinion about it. It is a matter of their value scale, belief, lifestyle and it is something we have to respect inasmuch as we require them to respect us. We may have an impression that the degree of tolerance is not even on both sides, yet that does not change the matter. We tend to view negatively what is most often and most dramatically presented to us by the media, i.e. what happens on the street. A fanatical crowd urinated on

the Danish and other flags, burned them, screamed hate slogans, attacked embassies, thus venting its aggressive instincts. It was primitive and abominable, yet most participants at these hysterical gatherings were even unaware of the core of the matter: they just joined in. As a nation we have no reason to consider ourselves superior to them as we know too well similar situations from our recent history (e.g. anti-Jewish pogroms), and similar situations occur in different variations until today. All one needs to think of is the detestable hooliganism of our football or hockey fans, the infamous grandma-democrats [transl. note: elderly women who used to attend rallies of Vladimr Meiars Movement for Democratic Slovakia in mid-1990s], or the organized Orwellian minutes of hate in the sports hall in Bratislava during the party rallies under Vladimr Meiar. These fanaticized crowds on both sides are equally intolerant, unapproachable by rational arguments by those whom they hate. Yet there is someone who incites these crowds and makes their blood boil. We know who it is in Slovakia. An American expert on Islam, Bernard Lewis, suggests that in the Muslim communities this role is undertaken by fundamentalist mullahs (Muslim spiritual leaders) who speak a language that is understandable by simple Muslims.5 He argues, however, that today the theocracy of the Iranian mullahs is as corrupt and unpopular as was the previous regime. There are frequent arguments in the West that the Muslim world cannot understand and moreover accept Western democracy with its understanding of political freedoms in general and the freedom of expression in particular, since it is used to despotism and lacks our experience in building and implementing secular civil society. It thus represents clash of two different civilizations. Lewis points out that, such arguments is also ungrounded: Who speaks of dictatorship as of a method of social administration that has been ingrained there for ever, is mistaken. Repeating the thesis shows ignorance of Arab past, contempt for Arab present times and doubts about Arab future. The type of regime introduced by Saddam Hussein that continues to exist in a number of Arab countries has a modern, entirely contemporary origin and is altogether alien the foundation of Islamic civilization. There are older systems and traditions on which the nations of the Middle East can build their future.6 There are thus two conflicts that overlap today. The first started as a conflict over the caricatures and is not carried out at the level of freedom of expression versus religious bigotry, but at the level of freedom of expression versus the rules of its democratic regulation; when we breach them, we breach the exclusive rights of the others. The second long-term conflict is between dictatorship versus democracy, which started by the attack on the World Trade Center. It is no a conflict among different civilizations, but a continuation of the political conflict of the nature of the contemporary globalizing society led by the free world with fascism and communism. Even there does the humanistic interpretation of freedom of expression have its important place.
5 6 In: Foreign Affairs 5-6/2005 Ibid.

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Our humanistic rules differ entirely from the communist (and fascist) regulations on the freedom of expression. Whilst in the case of communism (or fascism) they are dictated by political arbitrariness of usurpers of power, the humanistic rules are an axiom of dignity of man which set the foundation of the modern concept of universal human rights and freedoms.

bibLiographY
Sartori, G.: Theory of Democracy (Teria demokracie). Archa, Bratislava 1993 Kresk,P., ed.: Citizen and Democracy (Oban a demokracia). MRG, Bratislava 1997

The DeveLopMenTs in The sLovaK MeDia in presenTing TheMes reLaTeD To inToLeranCe, raCisM Xenophobia anD anTi-seMiTisM
alena Kotvanov
Department of Human Rights and Equal Treatment, Government Office of the Slovak Republic, Slovakia
The media and media communication play an important role in creating the space of public discourse on sensitive issues related to intolerance, racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. The media provide information on developments in the society, pass on and publicize the content of political debates. They are thus one of the key sources of information on these developments. They become the material for monitoring of the phenomena and for an analysis of the media reflection and the means of presenting such information the degree of their accuracy and balance. Media monitoring has become the source of data on media reflection of a particular social phenomenon in a given period. A number of specific monitoring projects have been carried out in Slovakia, such as the image of minorities in the media1 or the manner of interpreting information on (anti)discrimination.2, we can mainly draw the assessment of the situation in the monitored area in Slovakia from the results of ongoing monitoring aimed at the manifestations of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism that has been carried out over the past two years.3 The project does not involve a typical media analysis, since the methodology had to be adjusted to the possibilities of collection and analysis of the available data, including their extent. On the other hand, the benefit of this monitoring is the extensive time period over which it was carried out and the possibility to identify developmental trends in this area. Quantitative analysis of data collected through the monitoring showed gradual increase in news related to extremism, racism and anti-Semitism in the Slovak media. The monitoring followed the incidence of news and transcription of programs, addressing the negative
1 2 3 The image of minorities in the broadcasts of selected electronic media. 2008. MEMO 98. http://www.memo98.sk/data/_media/ sprava_memo_mensiny_2008.pdf. How does the media inform about (anti)discrimination. 2010. ODZ. http://www.diskriminacia.sk/?q=node/1145. Kotvanov, A., Mncnerov, L.: 2009. Report on Media Monitoring with particular Focus on Manifestations of Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism [Sprva z monitoringu mdi so pecilnym zameranm na prejavy rasizmu, xenofbie a antisemitizmu]. Bratislava, SNSP, January June 2008.

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phenomena including racially motivated attacks, gatherings of extremist groups, support to groups aiming to suppress fundamental human rights and freedoms, manifestations of viewer violence and extremism in sports events. It also included positive or neutral facts, concrete measures for elimination of the above phenomena, analyses and statistics related to these phenomena and to anti-Semitism.4 While within the first six months of 2008 the monitoring detected a total of 166 news items with the above theme, the second half of 2008 brought 341 such news items, the first six months of 2009 it was 267 and in the second half of 2009 the figure reached 637 news items. The comparative table below shows that the most frequent themes gradually involved racially motivated attacks, manifestations of viewer violence and of extreme nationalism at sports events, police procedure (e.g. in the investigation of the Roma boys in Koice) and significant increase of information on gatherings of sympathizers with the extreme right (neoNazi) movements with the dangerous extreme nationalist and anti-Roma content in individual regions and towns in Slovakia, as well as in connection with anniversaries of historical events. Here these groups use the problems that arise from the coexistence of the majority population with the Roma minority in an effort to draw public attention and gain its support. In 2009 the strongest media items included the gatherings of the neo-Nazis in arisk Michaany in August 8 (133 news items) and in Krompachy on September 3 (60 news items/ articles), a gathering to commemorate the foundation of the Slovak State held on March 14, (25 news items/articles). In connection with racially-motivated attacks, the mediatized events included particularly the mistreatment of the Roma boys at the police station in Koice (8 articles). Another highly mediatized item was a decision of the Supreme Court of Slovakia to overrule the decision by the Ministry of Interior to dissolve the Slovak Brotherhood (18 news items/articles). The construction of a wall separating a Roma settlement from a town of Bystrany gained major media attention (38 news items). In connection with prevention, the major the creation of civic home guards in Roma settlements in the Spi region drew major attention (36 news items). The monitoring also identified a number of news items (15) concerning the danger of the spread of extremism on the Internet. These news items indicate a growing tendency to use the open space on the Internet and on virtual social networks to disseminate racism, particularly anti-Roma sentiments, but also to gather and share personal data, photographs and other detailed information about opponents of the extreme right movements.5 The table below categorizes and shows absolute numbers of new:

Table: number and structure of news concerning extremism in a monitored period, quantitative comparison

In addition to the evident increase of news volume, reactivity is another important feature of the media reflection on intolerance, racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the monitored period. Considerable quantitative differences in the monitored categories are largely determined by major (sometimes exaggerated) media response a particular event,6 and at other times lukewarm response. The identified themes thus do not present a regular component of media discourse (given the need to cautiously inform the public in Slovakia about their dangers). They are only deemed worthy of media attention in cases of mostly negative excesses. This is proved by the fact that over one third of the total number of the monitored news are those concerning gatherings, meetings or marches by the neo-Nazis in the summer of 2009; nearly one fifth of the news concerns racially motivated attacks, with the highly mediatized case of the humiliation of the Roma boys at the police station in Koicke; only less than one sixth of the news items focused on prevention of and measures against extremism and other monitored phenomena. The categorization in the table offers an additional important perspective on the structure of the Slovak media space in this context. Information about negative phenomena receives three times the space that is given to that on positive developments related to prevention and preventive measures, evaluation and statistics (977:318). It seems here that the media take a simplistic approach to the implementation of the media principle of negativity (negative news have a greater potential to draw attention) even though it leads to biased and inaccurate information about the monitored phenomena. The media do not seem to be fully aware of the impact of such an approach and of their share in social responsibility for it.
6 For instance, the most frequent topics identified by the monitoring include events related to the international football match DAC Dunajsk Streda and FC Slovan Bratislava on November 11, 2008 and a series of neo-Nazi gatherings and marches on Slovak cities and towns in 2009.

4 5

See the quoted reports for details on the methodology of the monitoring and categorization of news items. Report on Respect to Human Rights including the Principle of Equal treatment in the Slovak Republic in 2009 [Sprva o dodriavania udskch prv vrtane zsady rovnakho zaobchdzania v slovenskej republike za rok 2009], p. 120. [cit. 2010-07-15]. <http://www.snslp.sk/images/stories/file/spravy/sprava-dodrziavanie-lp-2009.pdf>.

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The Developments in the slovak Media in presenting Themes related to intolerance, racism Xenophobia...

A more detailed look at the means used by the media to address racism, neo-Nazism and the manifestations of hate monitored last year is offered by the qualitative analysis of selected data collected through the monitoring. Among the themes that were dealt by the media last year, the strongest and most visible theme was the reflection on the neo-Nazi marches and demonstrations in cities and town in central and eastern Slovakia. The greatest number of news items (133) covered the march in arisk Michaany. Detailed analysis of the topic showed absolute limits in the Slovak media in depicting themes related to intolerance, racism, xenophobia or anti-Semitism in general. The case of the march in arisk Michaany in 2009 became the most dominant item not only in quantitative terms (even though the monitoring does not enable assessment of the share of these news items on their overall volume, it seems that between October 5 to 8 the event significantly fuelled the media scene in Slovakia). The event had cross-border outreach (signaled and realized support and presence of members of the neo-Nazi groups from the Czech Republic and Hungary), and coincided with the culmination of anti-Roma violence in Hungary. The theme thus acquired centrality in daily press, electronic and Internet media, as well as in weeklies and other periodicals. The high media attention was also illustrated by the space (number of characters or the length of news or current affairs coverage) dedicated to the topic, and also the fact that vast majority of the monitored news prioritized this as the lead news item. The above is connected to one of the fundamental question of qualitative analysis of the media coverage of a given topic. Equally, there is the question of how the media handled the topic. It is clear that the case evolved in time, i.e. the accent and focus of the media was gradually shifted to other context and subjects. At the beginning of the case the media focused on informing about the rejection of the signaled march by the Constitutional representatives and simplistic description of the alleged reasons of the march, whilst underreporting on its actual causes and context. As the case evolved, the accent shifted to the themes of fear within the local Roma community. Immediately after the event, the central focus was on the police intervention against the neo-Nazis and their local sympathizers, its critical assessment by the police and state representatives and other opponents. It again marginalized the analytical approach to the very meaning of the march and the issues of coexistence of some Roma communities with the majority as an issue that surfaced along the case. Since the media dedicated significant space to reproducing the statements by those involved in the case, we ought to look at who commented on the theme and how. The aforementioned rejection of the manifestations of intolerance, extremism and racial intolerance by the Slovak President I. Gaparovi, Prime Minister R. Fico and Deputy Prime Minister D. aplovi was essentially retained at declaratory level of firm rejections and zero-tolerance to extremism. These statements were to a degree a reaction to the published request for help by the Roma leaders. Following the march and the police intervention, the event was primarily commented on by the officials of the Ministry of Interior and by the police justifying the adequacy and legality of the police intervention. Its critics (including the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee

for Defense and Security) considered the intervention altogether inadequate and unjustified. According to Vladimir Palko, MP, the collection of data on Roma criminality would prove far more important and effective. There were also voices that claimed the event was prepared and imported form abroad (probably Hungary). Overall the responses by the politicians were quite infrequent and the media repeatedly replayed the same statements. Since the statements did not draw from a specific analytical approach and realistic assessment of the situation and on an offer of possible solutions, they did not provide the media with a basis to process the case in a better quality and accuracy. In addition to the politicians, other actors received news space, though not in an adequate proportion. Among the Roma representatives, it was only the President of the Roma Initiative of Slovakia (RIS) and specialists on extremism from the non-governmental sector (People against Racism, Via Juris, Milan imeka Foundation). Yet M. Kotleba from the Slovak Brotherhood received substantial space. In comparison with the other actors, the media gave space for his statements (together with quotations and references to the website of the Slovak brotherhood (!)) in an effort to hunt for sensationalism. For example, an article titled The Brotherhood intends to repeat the Janov Pogrom (SITA, Webnoviny.sk , August 5, 2009) provided space to quotations and description of the situation that was over three times greater (286 words) than that dedicated to the police views (85 words) and 4.5 times greater than the view of the Romas (63 words). No space remained for editorial comments. It should be stressed that the media in general adopted the rhetoric7 of the Brotherhood, its formulations and even its argumentation. For instance, they thoughtlessly repeated the argumentation scheme that the reason for the march scheduled for August 8 (!) was an attack by two youths against a pensioner that occurred about a week prior to the march, in different variations: growing Roma attacks on the whites, attacks by the Ostrovany settlers, dangerous growth of criminality of non-adaptive Romas, etc. In connection with the march and the police intervention, the Slovak media repeatedly reproduced uncommented statements by the locals, such as The people on the playfield did nothing, have not attacked anyone physically, have not breach the public order. This suggested that there were no incidents and thus the problem did not lie in organizing such marches. For instance, an article Police Batons Silenced the Extremists (Hospodrske noviny, August 10, 2009) repeated three time an emotional quotation from the shouts of the upset crowd: You are beating decent people! Only a handful of media output showed an effort to unveil these manipulative interpretations and to follow actual meaning, interests and aims of the organizers of the march. The commentators and editors either themselves or by giving space to specialists grasped
7 7 Mobilization of the Slovak Brotherhood Triggered Fear, a protest against Gipsy terror, the issue of Gipsy criminality, hords of Gipsy criminals. Mobilization of the Slovak Brotherhood Triggered Fear, a protest against Gipsy terror, the issue of Gipsy criminality, hords of Gipsy criminals.

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the theme professionally.8 A number of these authors pointed out the fact that the Slovak Brotherhood used the vagueness of the statements by the politicians and the lack of concept of the police intervention, and ultimately the lack of preparedness of the media to their benefit. They thus gained unnecessary publicity and sympathies not only among the local population, but in general managed to gain quite a significant support of the public opinion. The choice of language further illustrates the way the media grasped the topic. The aforementioned adoption of the rhetoric of the Brotherhood led to quite a significant use of expressive terms, particularly in article headings.9 In an attempt to meet the demands for brevity, highlight and attractiveness, they often slipped into the position of tabloid language10 even in the media that are traditionally seen as serious. In an effort to attract at all cost, some headings thus even failed to correspond to the content of the articles (e.g. an article Sorting out the Romas, TV JOJ, August 5, 2009). With the use of such language and through an introduction of related typical associations,11 the media indirectly managed to satisfy the mass taste in this case rather than alert to the real threats of the revival on neo-Nazism.
8 See, e.g. Schutz, P.: Road to hell [Cesta do pekla]. SME, August 6, 2009, Pataj, R.: Road to ghetto [Cesta do geta]. SME August 10, 2009. Schutz, P. Extreme is here [Extrm je tu.] .tde August 10, 2009. Nicholson, T. Worthy of skinheads [Hodn holohlavch]. SME August 10,2009. Kostelansk, . The Police is gone, the problem remains [Policajti odili, problm zostva]. Pravda August 11, 2009, Schutz, P. Participants of the gathering [astnci zhromadenia]. Korzr August 11, 2009, Gloviko, J. The Government merely speaks of the Romas [Vlda o Rmoch najm ren]. SME August 11,. 2009. Kubk, P. Collective guilt [Kolektvna vina]. TREND August 13, 2009. Slikov, N. Editorial, August 14, 2009. Extremists wont resolve criminality [Extrmisti kriminalitu nevyrieia]. urnl. August 14, 2009. Bn, A. Majchrk, J. Drops of wrath [Kvapky hnevu]. .tde August 17, 2009. Silence before the storm in Michaany [Ticho pred brkou v Michaanoch]. August 5, 2009. Running to the relatives [Utekaj k prbuznm, TV JOJ August 7, 2009. The Romas assembled homeguars [ Rmovia postavili domobranu] SME August 7,. 2009. Fear in the settlement [Strach v osade] August 7, 2009. Men in balaclavas awaiting the Brotherhood [Pospolitos akaj kukli] August 8, 2009. arisk Michaany Day after [arisk Michaany de po]. August 9, 2009. The success of the extremists [spech extrmistov]. August 9, 2009. Demanding the Mayors head [iadaj starostovu hlavu]. August 9, 2009. The leader of the Brotherhood the days hero [Vodca Pospolitosti hrdinom da]. Hospodrske noviny August 10, 8. 2009, They want to show the crimes of the Romas [Chc ukza na zloiny Rmov] SME August 10, 2009. Kotleba for President [Kotleba na hrad]. Pravda August 10, 2009. Are they stealing more than the gajos? [Kradn viac ako gadovia?] Hospodrske noviny August 10, 2009. Failed manoeuvres [Nezvldnut manvre], Plus jeden de August 10, 2009. The police robots again received with dislike [Policajn roboti op zoali nevu]. August 10, 2009. Romas saved by water gun [Rmov uchrnili vodnm delom]. August 10, 2009. Romas as hot potato [Rmovia ako horci zemiak]. August 10, 2009. Romas laughing at us [Rmovia sa nm vysmievaj]. Plus jeden de. August 10, 2009. Publicize the statistics on Roma criminality [Zverejnite tatistiku o rmskej kriminalite] August 10, 2009. Romas were ready to fight! [Rmovia boli pripraven bojova!]. August 11, 2009. Michaany still fear the Romas. And the police. [Michaany sa alej boja Rmova. A polcie]. Pravda August 12, 2009. At that time in the East. In Michaany [Vtedy na vchode. V Michaanoch]. Hospodrske noviny. August 14, 2009. Abused fear [Zneuit starch]. ivot. August 15, 2009 etc.. It is worth pointing out in this context a phenomenon of the so-called xenophobia of headings described by linguist Marek Nekula over ten years ago as a phenomenon when the headings identify national or ethnic origin even in cases when the information is irrelevant (at the time it was typical for reporting on crimes). See: KADERKA, P. KARHANOV, K. (2002) The Image of Foreigners in the Media [Obraz cizinc v mdich]. Project report on 2002. Prague: stav pro jazyk esk AV R. http://www.cizinci.cz/files/clanky/122/Obraz_cizincu_v_mediich_Zprava_o_projektu_za_rok_2002.pdf.

This is also shown by a notable aspect of constructing the media image of the neo-Nazi march in arisk Michaany against the backdrop of problematic relations between the majority and the Roma communities. This entails (possibly unintentionally and subconsciously) a construct of trichotomic image of the problematic Romas (they), the unwelcome sympathizers of the Brotherhood (the other they) and us (we) who are disturbed by the situation, but are not directly concerned. In this sense the theme was often addressed as a problem between the Brotherhood and the Romas.12 The journalists enhanced such a construct, in addition to their obvious distancing13 from the Romas also by failing to sufficiently identify the neo-Nazi march as a threat to the democratic society in Slovakia, as an attack on human dignity and a risk of repeating the historically proven tragic mistake. The image assigned fear of the other only to the Romas, separated from the unconcerned majority. This suggests that the media reflection of the case was marked by typical flaws: a limited reporting approach, pretended objectivity and insufficient application of value-based approach that resulted in a distorted image of reality. It caused limited empathy and instead generated an atmosphere of ignorance, carelessness, even of an expectation of possible violence. It seems that the mental barriers to inclusive attitudes that are manifested by stereotypical perceptions led to the tendency to flatten and trivialize the problem. The findings present an urgent challenge to increase the degree of literacy of media communication on the part of producers and among recipients of news, to implement a more responsible approach by using a more sensitive language, rejecting stereotypes, reframing the public debate and rejecting dangerous models and clichs. The society must exert pressure on the media to act responsibly in their role of the defender of democracy in conjunction with an assertive and proactive approach of the advocates of implementation of human rights and non-discrimination who should receive an adequate media space.

10

11 Here a term banal nationalism is of relevance. According to its author Michael Billing, it operates with passive and imaginary forms of routinely used language even in the media, in this case it concerns the a priori negative image of the Romas as the others, the different ones. In this context the meaning of the term could be shifted into the position of banal racism that ultimately leads to excusing and legitimizing the exclusion of Romas as an ethnic group regardless of whether or not whether they are the subjects of socio-pathological phenomena.

12 The extremists have not come by so far [Extrmisti sa zatia neohlsili]. Hospodrske noviny, August 7, 2009. subtitle: Brotherhood versus Romas [Pospolitos vs. Rmovia]. 13 As narrator, a journalist can choose to include or to distance himself in reporting on a concrete group or identity.

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JoUrnaLisTs DiLeMMas in inForMing on eXTreMisT aCTiviTies (how the new Media alter our views)
roland Kyka
journalist, Slovakia
The protests by the Slovak Brotherhood [Slovensk pospolitos] and other groupings in the Summer of 2009 triggered a debate among journalists, non-profit organizations and specialists on right-wing extremism that point to a new aspect of this issue. The question is no longer whether or not to give extremists space in the mainstream media, but whether traditional media are able to identify the challenges, handle their new role within the society and help to educate viewers, listeners and readers. Slovak media are undergoing dramatic changes. After the society-wide breakthrough, the economic and social emancipation of the media, their adaptation to market conditions, commercialization and politicization over the past two decades,1 the major recent developments were brought about by the global economic crisis and the emergence of new media.2 The synergy of these two factors made the media seem often helpless. They are relatively slow to come to terms with new technologies and the losses caused by the credit crunch. The emergence of new media needs to be seen within the political and social context, as they change the system of dissemination of information. On the one hand, the absence of an authority on the Internet is conducive to democracy, particularly because of the easy access to information in countries with high degree of censorship, or when it serves as a platform for the organization of opposition and its activities. On the other hand, the Internet is vulnerable to abuse by the spread of hate speech and for the organization of non-democratic forces.

is ignoring the extremists the right ethical Choice?

Prior to the event organized by the Slovak brotherhood on the 8th of August, 2009, journalists and human rights activists debated how to cover the event in the media. A number of them suggested that it would be best to ignore the event and not to provide any information on it whatsoever. The arguments included the following:
1 2 Breka, S., Ondrik, B., Keklak, R.: Media and Journalists in Slovakia 2010 (Mdi a novinri na Slovensku 2010)., Paneurpska vysok kola, Bratislava, 2010. Social (new) media are web applications that enable development, easy transfer and exchange of content in form of text, images, video or audio recordings. Further information, e.g..: Sofko, L., Brake, D. K.: The Social Media Bible: Tactics, Tools & Strategies for Business Success. John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey, 2009.

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l A number of attacks were carried out at the time against the Roma and their housing in the neighboring countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic. (In Hungary a Roma man and his son were shot dead in front of their house in Tatrszentgyrgyi in February 2009,3 in May a married couple was violently stabbed in Abdszalk and a shooting took place attacking a Roma family home in Lengyeltot, in August a Roma woman was brutally murdered in Kislta.4 In the Czech Republic, the best known case involved an arson attack with inflammable bottles on a house of a Roma family in Vtkov, causing their 2-year old daughter Natlka 80% body burns.) l In their statements, the organizers often referred to an extremist event at the Janov settlement in Vtkov. Slovakia has no experience from modern history with preventing organized pogroms against a particular social group. In light of the statements by the organizers from the Slovak brotherhood, the groups protests in Michaany could have ended up as a pogrom. l Right-wing radicals started organizing themselves in order to create a legitimate political force that would enter the political contest in the then approaching regional elections and, within a longer horizon, the parliamentary elections. Whilst the actual political strength of the right-wing extremists was low at the time, the subsequent parliamentary elections showed that there was a concern that these groupings would transform themselves into a relevant force. There was a similar experience in the neighboring countries with the Hungarian Jobbik and its militant branch the Hungarian Guard, and with the Czech Workers Party [Dlnick strana]. l Last but not least, there was a chance that the activities of the Slovak Brotherhood would gain sympathies among certain social groups which would be otherwise unlikely to ever sympathize with the extremists. Within a short span, arisk Michaany experienced two violent crimes: a sales woman was murdered in a corner shop and the manager of the local stadium was beaten to death after he caught a burglar stealing a TV set. Both people enjoyed the respect of the local community. The common feature in the two incidents was that the perpetrators came from a nearby Roma settlement in Ostrovany.5 The dilemma of how to approach the media coverage of events organized by right-wing extremists is not a new one. The novelty merely laid in the concentration of factors. It proved to be a new experience for the Slovak media. This further facilitated the debate about the procedure, extent and ethics of journalism.
3 4 5 Bn, A.: Hunters and Victims (Lovci a obete). In tde, 9. 3. 2009. Drbek, I.: A murder of Roma woman was an attack on Hungary, says the Prime Minister (Vrada Rmky bola tokom na Maarsko, tvrd premier). In Pravda, 6. 8. 2009. Kyka, R.: Maneuvers (Manvre). In Plus 7 dn, 12. 8. 2009.

The dilemma does not merely lie in the definition. Whilst the European Court of Human Rights argues that the freedom of expression protects words and thoughts that are offensive, shocking or cause concern, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that any expression of national, racial or religious hatred that presents incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence shall be prohibited by law. Thus a statement containing national, racial or religious hatred that will not at the same time have the intensity of an incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence does not automatically fall under the definitions by the Pact.6 This approach is similar to the American understanding of freedom of speech. A number of models that guide ethical decision-making in journalism can help assess the consequences of media work.7 The fundamental framework is set out by the Ethical Code of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists: A journalist does no incite to hatred, discrimination based on race, ideology or religion, ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation.8 An ever-growing argument suggests that there is a difference between freedom of expression as exercised by an individual and that of a journalist. Remiov suggest that to draw the cartoons of Muhammad was a matter of the Danish artists freedom of expression. Freedom of expression and press exercised by the newspaper that first published the cartoons should have been limited by a sense of responsibility and a decision not to publish them.9 Had the media accepted such an interpretation of ethics of journalism, it is likely that no one would have informed about the events in arisk Michaany. Had this happen prior to the emergence of Web 2.010, such decisions would have been likely to be correct. Yet today social media not only change the media environment, but they should also shape the understanding of ethics of journalism by editorial desks, and indirectly also the understanding of freedom of speech. Inactivity by the traditional media to inform about the activities of right-wing extremists creates a possibility that the balance would tip towards the information sources within new media that provide the extremists with unlimited space. The damage thus caused is likely to exceed the potential threat of the spread of hate ideas. On the contrary, ethical and rational approach by the traditional media can contribute to greater plurality of views. The Internet contains a vast range of web pages; social networks are full of groups and profiles with hate content. Sometimes these can be successfully removed, sometimes not, depending on their registration abroad. In principle though, the expansion of extremists in cyberspace cannot be stopped. This has been confirmed by monitoring cyberhate on Facebook that has been recently carried out by the Slovak non-profit organization People against Racism
6 7 8 9 Barto, M.: Freedom of Speech: principles, safeguards, limit (Svoboda projevu: princpy, garance, meze). Leges, Prague, 2010 Burns, L. S.: Journalism. (urnalistika). Portl, Prague 2004. Ethical Code of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists (Etick kdex Slovenskho syndiktu novinrov). See: http://www.ssn.sk/?id=50&num=10&lang=sk Remiov, A.: Media Ethics (Etika mdi). Kalligram, Bratislava 2010.

10 A concept of the Internet as a platform based on user interaction. Users themselves create the content that improves through the effect of networking of the growing number of users. Further information, e.g.: Shuen, A.: Web 2.0: A Strategy Guide. Sebastopol: OReilly Media, 2008.

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with support by the Open Society Foundation.11 By the time a site or a group is successfully removed, dozens of others appear that contain mild or heavy racism. Traditional media thus play a role in acting as a safeguard and carrier of positive ideas, and a host of cultured discussion. When in the hands of extremists, it is unthinkable for new media to be open to discussion and a plurality of views. The nature of extremism does not permit disparate views. It fails to accept them and indeed automatically rejects and punishes them. Most blogs by right-wing extremists do not permit discussion (even though discussion is one of the essential elements of philosophy of blogging). Groups with hateful content on social networks seldom engage in discussions. On the contrary, they are an accumulation of related views.12 Had the traditional media decided to ignore their duty to report, the sole source of information about the events in ari would have been the Internet, or, more accurately, the extremists websites and servers. They come to the demonstrations well prepared; they have their own reporters equipped with cutting edge recording technology. Those are often hard to distinguish, as they do not carry the primary symbols that would identify their membership to the neo-Nazi community. Their accounts of the events appear in an accordingly edited and amended form shortly after the demonstration and police intervention. Demand for information first within the region and then possibly outside its boundaries would enable the spread of such biased information initially by the distribution of links, then through the exchange on social networks and eventually by the traditional self-publishing means. Any explanation would be pointless as it would be considered propaganda. Traditional media have to therefore remain if not primary, then at least an important and recognized source of information.

In its evening news program, TV JOJ warned that the police intervention turned the Kotlebas into local martyrs in public eye, chiefly because of the long term failure to solve the above problems. TV JOJ also mentioned violent hate crimes in neighboring Hungary. Press agencies monitored the event on the day and news servers also published the information. They quoted the locals, as a number of media later attempted to give an impression of racist sentiments arising among the towns population. SME daily defended the police approach. In addition to the Ministry of Interior, it quoted the previous Ministers. The daily also covered the event in its opinion column and gave space to the social anthropologist Tom Hrusti. He wrote that Europe received a warning in arisk Michaany on Saturday. He argued that we could no longer pretend that the racially motivated murders of the Roma in Hungary, the criminalization of immigrants in Italy, the statements by the British MEP about sinking the boats with African refugees, or the attacks on the Roma families in the Czech Republic do not concern us, just as previously people used to believe that the deportations of Jews did not concern them. He added that: How to stand against the growing extremism and the open manifestations of racist violence? Politicians have to resolutely reject extremist marches, and defend law and justice. Yet history shows that this is not enough. All genocides in human history have shown the dangers of being blind to hatred. Decent people have to tell right from wrong; they have to show their civic stance against whoever takes justice into their own hands.14 A number of media questioned the radical intervention by the police. Radio Expres pointed out that the Slovak Brotherhood used the fact that none of the post-communist governments has resolved the problems faced by the socially excluded Roma. Regardless of the outcome of the meeting in arisk Michaany organized by the Brotherhood, the event shows that Slovakia, too, is not immune to the escalation of ethnic violence, warned a weekly Tde. Together with other media, Tde pointed out that the views held by the majority population emerged in response to the severe situation in the region. One cannot ignore the fact that the tragic situation in the most deprived strata of the Roma population, frequent antisocial behavior or unwillingness to adopt more civilized norms fuel aversion among the majority population and increase the risk of violence. 15 Internet servers controlled by the extremists disseminated the information both prior to the scheduled march, during the event and immediately after the police intervention. Against the Current one of the best known websites of the Slovak right-winger extremists explained the justification of the protest inter alia with arguments about the biased media reporting: Despite the obvious and undoubted fact about who the perpetrator and who the victim was, the Slovak media twisted the fact and turned the Gypsies into victims. It is not the first time it happened. No one is interested in burglary attacks, murders and public fear villages in east Slovakia with Roma populations of over 10%.16
14 Hrusti T.: Mementos from ari (Mement zo aria). In SME, 12. 8. 2009. 15 Schutz, P.: Extreme is here (Extrm je tu). In .Tde, 10. 8. 2009.. 16 Intervention in arisk Michaany (Zsah v ariskch Michaanoch). See: http://www.protiprudu.info/zasah.html

Media messages from the march in arisk Michaany

A comparison of how the event was covered by the traditional and social media illustrates the two approaches. Three days prior to the march, the Slovak press agency SITA ran the information that the political elites rejected the event of the Slovak Brotherhood. SITA approached the then Prime Minister Robert Fico, President Ivan Gaparovi and Deputy Prime Minister Duan aplovi whose portfolio included minorities.13 All relevant dailies reported about the event before it started. They informed on the march itself and about the police measures and addressed the situation in the concerned Roma settlement in Ostrovany, as well as the fear of its inhabitants and their organization of home guards. On the day of the march and afterwards, the media provided relatively objective information about the event. They pointed out the inactivity by the government in solving social problems and the security issues in towns that experience higher rate of petty criminality committed by socially marginalized people.
11 Bihriov, I. (ed.): Facebook 1939. udia proti rasizmu, Bratislava 2010. 12 Kyka, R.: We All Are Naked on Facebook (Vetci sme nah na Facebooku). Forza Music, Bratislava 2010. 13 Rejects any events planned by the Slovak Brotherhood (Odsudzuje akkovek akcie, ktor pripravuje Slovensk pospolitos). See: http://hnonline.sk/c1-37987640-odsudzuje-akekolvek-akcie-ktore-pripravuje-slovenska-pospolitost

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Right-wing extremists learned how to use the Internet. Their online marketing is genuinely convincing. They are aware of the effect of a well-targeted hoax.17 Alarming and false news can affect a community itself, as well as its environment. Thus the spread of information of severely wounded, mutilated and nearly killed protesters. The server beo.sk ran a similar report about the demonstration: A policeman in heavy apparel pressed a demonstrators head into the ground nearly killing him by suffocation. His motionless body was dragged on the ground like a sack of potatoes. The locals shouted at the police to do something, as foam appeared in his mouth. The policeman who first beat him unconscious put fingers in the mans mouth and checked whether his tongue was free. He then stated that he was alright and just drunk (I know the man personally: he is an abstinent!).18 Ivan Skora, the leader of the Slovak Brotherhood immediately published his statement on the groups website: The demonstration against the Gipsy terror was to be dispersed anyway. It did not matter whether it was attended by active nationalists or merely by mothers with children. Because it is unthinkable in a multicultural society for a majority population to feel at home, safe and peaceful in their own country. Here a Gipsy minority has to be protected by law and a Slovak has to feel that he is merely a guest in his own country. He will thus be reminded with kicks and police batons on any occasion, in case he forgets that he is not entitled to demand his rights. We had an opportunity to see and experience an excellent example of this on Saturday. Excited policemen, encouraged by their superiors and motivated by a vision of salary bonuses, practiced the proven means of re-educating the disenchanted public by hitting their heads with batons. The peaceful and unassailing crowd however did not allow to be broken so easily.19 The extremists then tried to prove that the public identified with them: The brutal attack by [the then-Minister of Interior] Kaliks Mossad against the Slovak Brotherhood and their partners is rejected particularly in the Slovak rural population. People know that such an inadequate intervention gave further boost to the Gypsies. The next day an elderly woman was found stabbed in Jasov20

make it an increasingly preferred information source. According to the 2010 European Digital Competitiveness Report, 66% of the Slovak population uses the Internet (at least once a week) and 35% of users surf the web for news (which is above the European average of 31%).21 Alas, this does not correspond with the level of literacy of the Slovak population. Research has shown insufficient literacy and a growing social digital gap.22 Media education is not addressed adequately in school curricula. Texts recommended by the National Pedagogical Institute date back to 2005 and do not adequately (or at all) cover Web 2.0. Learners receive an explanation about the operation of traditional media television, radio, press. Yet there is no information about blogs, internet editions of newspapers, social networks etc., even though recent surveys show that 60% of social interaction among youth aged 20 or less takes place on the Internet. Traditional media can counterbalance the growing activity of right-wing extremists in cyberspace. Yet as the role of the Internet grows, it is important to focus on education of children and youth, as well as adults. Developed countries, such as Great Britain, have programs on attracting those who have not yet used the Internet, but especially on how to use it responsibly. Increasing digital literacy, particularly explaining the difference between the traditional and new media can reduce the spread of extremists information from the social media. Web 2.0. gave them tools to influence public opinion. It is important that civil society 2.0 responds to this effectively.

bibLiographY
Barto, M.: Freedom of Speech: principles, safeguards, limits. (Svoboda projevu: princpy, garance, meze). Leges, Prague, 2010. Bn, A.: Hunters and Victims (Lovci a obete). In .tde, 9. 3. 2009. Bihriov, I. (ed): Facebook 1939. udia proti rasizmu, Bratislava, 2010. Breka, S., Ondrik, B., Keklak, R.: Media and Journalists in Slovakia 2010 (Mdi a novinri na Slovensku 2010). Paneurpska vysok kola, Bratislava. Burns, L. S.: Journalism. (urnalistika). Portl, Prague 2004. Drbek, I.: A murder of Roma woman was an attack on Hungary, says the Prime Minister (Vrada Rmky bola tokom na Maarsko, tvrd premier). In Pravda, 6. 8. 2009. Ethical Code of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists (Etick kdex Slovenskho syndiktu novinrov). See: http://www.ssn.sk/?id=50&num=10&lang=sk.
21 Europes Digital Competitiveness Report 2010. See: http://www.epractice.eu/files/Europe%27s%20Digital%20 Competitiveness%20Report%202010%20-%20Commission%20Staff%20Working%20Document.pdf 22 See, e.g..: Digital Literacy in Slovakia 2009 (Digitlna gramotnos na Slovensku 2009): http://www.ivo.sk/5854/sk/aktuality/ digitalna-gramotnost-na-slovensku-2009

a Challenge: To increase Digital Literacy

Had the traditional media ignored the event in arisk Michaany, the material quoted above would have been served as the sole information source that no one would have been able to counterbalance. The growing use of the Internet in Slovak households and its popularity
17 Hoax is a mystification, alarming news spread via the Internet. 18 Orlick, J.: Protest in arisk Michaany - shame to the police and moral victory of the nationalists (Protest v ariskch Michaanoch potupa polcie a morlne vazstvo nrodovcov). See: http://beo.sk/reportaze/985-protest-v-sariskychmichalanoch-potupa-policie-a-moralne-vitazstvo-narodovcov 19 Skora, I.: Leaders Word Policemen have no interest in solving the Gipsy problem; they treated the locals with batons (Slovo Vodcu Policajti nemaj zujem riei cignsky problm a miestnych dedinanov poastovali obukami). See:: http://pospolitost.wordpress.com/2009/08/10/slovo-vodcu-policajti-nemaju-zaujem-riesit-cigansky-problem-a-miestnychdedincanov-pocastovali-obuskami/ 20 Clementis, S.: An adequate intervention? (Adekvtny zsah?). See: http://www.protiprudu.info/adekvatny.html

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Europes Digital Competitiveness Report 2010. See: http://www.epractice.eu/files/Europe%27s%20 Digital%20Competitiveness%20Report%202010%20%20Commission%20Staff%20Working%20 Document.pdf. Hrusti T.: Mementos from ari (Mement zo aria). In SME, 12. 8. 2009. Kyka, R.: Manvre. In Plus 7 dn, 12. 8. 2009. Kyka, R.: We All Are Naked on Facebook (Vetci sme nah na Facebooku). Forza Music, Bratislava, 2010. Remiov, A.: Media Ethics (Etika mdi). Kalligram, Bratislava, 2010. Shuen, A.: Web 2.0: A Strategy Guide, OReilly Media, Sebastopol, 2008. Schutz, P.: Extreme is here (Extrm je tu). In .tde, 10. 8. 2009

is LiMiTaTion To FreeDoM oF eXpression eFFeCTive? (is freedom of expression of extremists penalized in slovakia?)
sergej Danilov
Journalist, Slovakia

introduction
Is penalization of hate speech verbal expressions of hate really effective? According to the Slovak criminal code, crimes of so-called extremism are penalized. The laws prohibit, inter alia, public manifestations of sympathies with groups and movements that employ violence, threat of violence or threat of other severe damage aiming to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms, for instance by using flags, insignia, slogans, or uniforms. An offender faces 6 months to 3 years in prison. Racial or national defamation results in 1 to 3 years of imprisonment. On the contrary, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Slovak Constitution states that Everyone has the right to express their views in word, letter, press, image or by other means, and to freely search, receive and disseminate ideas and information regardless the state borders. Practice shows that the organs involved in criminal proceedings seem to only follow this excerpt from the Constitution. Yet Article 26 also contains paragraph 4 that states: Freedom of expression and the right to search and disseminate information may be limited by law, provided measures are required to protect rights and freedoms of others, of national security, public order, public health and morality. Kolkov and Krlik (2003) in Theme: Freedom of Expression [Tma: Sloboda prejavu]1 suggest that the Slovak Constitution (Article 26) together with the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10) set out three fundamental conditions that permit limitations of freedom of expression. All three have to be met before the rule is applied. The first states that limitations to the freedom of expression are identified by law. Kolkov and Krlik argue that the Criminal Code, for instance, limits inter alia the freedom of expression by penalization of racist statements or dissemination of fascist symbols.
1 Kolkov, M., Krlik, A.: Citizen and Democracy Everyday Law (Oban a demokracia prvo na kad de) Theme 1 (methodological handbook) Theme 1: Freedom of Speech (Sloboda prejavu). Citizen and Democracy, 2003 as part of the project Law through experience: interactive and participatory socio-legal training course for educators in youth detention centers supported by the EU schemes Socrates and Grundtvig (Prvo cez zitky: interaktvny a participatvny socilnoprvny trningov kurz pre vzdelvateky a vzdelvateov npravnovchovnch zariaden, podporen ES z programu Socrates, podprogramu Gruntvig). See: http://prison-education.oad.sk/sk/text7.html

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extremism crimes 140a

Crimes of extremism include crime of support to and propagation of groups aiming to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms according to 421 and 422; production of extremist material according to 422a; dissemination of extremist material according to 422b; possession of extremist material according to 422c; defamation of nationality, race and belief according to 423; incitement of national, race and ethnic hatred according to 424; incitement, defamation and threat to people on the basis of their race, nationality ethnicity or gender according to 424a; and crime based on a specific motivation according to 140/d and f.2

The anti-Roma electoral billboard of the Slovak National Party (SNS)3 ran a slogan: So that we dont feed those who dont want to work. In May 2010 the billboards generated criticism for incitement to racism and stereotyping Romas. status quo: A number of criminal appeals have been filed against the SNS in connection with the billboards. In its resolution the police stated: SNS merely wished to draw public attention to those citizens who severely abuse the social system, are not interested in working and wish to trigger widespread discussion about a theme that is part of the partys electoral agenda, while the person portrayed at the billboard is merely illustrative without any reference being made to any minority, be it ethnic or national.

examples from practice

Examples from practice illustrate that the organs involved in criminal proceedings approach penalization of verbal expressions of hate selectively and offenders often remain unpunished. Paradoxically, the freedom of expression as demanded by extremists is thus limited only marginally or not at all.

example 3
The manifestation of football fans not at and beyond football stadiums or of extremist groups at their meetings and marches offer yet another illustrative example for this study. In Bratislava, for instance, during the match between in K Slovan (Bratislava) and FC Spartak Trnava in 2010 ultra-fans of the guest club shouted at the public and members of the media in presence of the police: What are you staring at, you Jewish whores? Since the target wasnt merely the group of the rival ultra-fans, the incident involved expression of antisemitism. Extremists at their meetings regularly offend members of minorities, particularly Romas and homosexuals. status quo: Following criticism from the media and an order by Minister of Interior Daniel Lipic to review the conduct of the Bratislava police in September 2010, the regional police launched an investigation into antisemitism of the Trnava fans. Even though the police had detailed images of faces from the camera shots made by TV Markza, it placed the case ad acta in early 2011 arguing that the evidence failed to identify the offenders. In response to a query why the policemen on duty failed to get involved on the spot, the Regional Police Headquarters in Bratislava (KR PZ BA) stated that the police are not obliged to interfere if uncertain of the outcome. KR PZ BA also stated that the head of security did not consider the conduct of the fans to be a criminal act. According to Irena Bihriov, a lawyer and President of a civic group People against Racism, the conduct did involve defamation of nation, race and belief according to 423 of the Criminal Code. She argued that it did not matter whether the defamation was directed against a specific target, as it was sufficient that it was expressed publicly. She argued that the state is obliged to protect the honor, dignity and reputation of minorities.4 The Jewish community regularly criticizes the police for its lack of thoroughness and for the failure to resolve similar cases. In reference to the Spartak Trnava fans, the President of the Slovak Police Corps Spiiak stated in September 2010: The police in situ had other things to do than to deal with vulgar expressions.5
3 4 Rastislav enkirik elaborates this case further in his chapter elsewhere in this publication. See: http://futbal.rasizmus.sk/2011/02/19/monitoring-vysetrovanie-protizidovskych-nadavok-nikam-neviedlo/ See: http://www.sme.sk/c/5546779/antisemitske-pokriky-fanusikov-vysetria.html

example 1
Criminal appeal by Natlia Blahov, Member of the Slovak Parliament, against the portal Prop. sk for expressions of hate such as anti-Semitism, caricatures of the Roma and Hungarian minorities, for example Jew Island [idn ostrov; transl. note: a word twist referring to Rye Island - itn ostrov, an area in South Slovakia], No Entry to Gypsy Terrorists (Cignskym teroristom vstup zakzan), Arbeit and Freedom macht Frei. status quo: The police have been investigating the case for a number of months. SME daily covered the investigation in October. Even though the author of the caricature is known (he also illustrates the monthly Extra Plus), he has not yet been accused.

example 2

Act 305/2005 Coll. The Criminal Code. See: http://ww.vyvlastnenie.sk/predpisy/trestny-zakon/

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example 4:
A leaflet published by a Pchov city local branch of the Slovak heritage organization Matica slovensk, that was at the time under the administration of Marin Miun, Parliamentary candidate on the ballot of the radical far-right Peoples Party Our Slovakia, issued an invitation to a public meeting in city Martin with a slogan containing an expression asocial Gypsy parasites. status quo: The police rejected Matica slovensks central bureau criminal appeal, with which it defended its abused reputation. The policeman from the city of Martin argued that it was unclear whom the author of the leaflet had in mind, whether the reference was made to lying parasites or member of the Roma ethnic group. Following the statements from the police in the ilina region, the investigator from Martin reached a conclusion based on an analysis of the word Gypsy according to the dictionary of the Slovak language.6 He failed to take into consideration the known context of the expression and its authorship. Since 2009 the expression asocial Gypsy parasites has been regularly voiced at meetings of right-wing extremist and radical-nationalist groups. It has also been repeatedly used by Marin Miun, the head of the local branch of Matica slovensk. No one has yet even subjected him to questioning. The police argued that this wasnt a duty of the investigator and the prosecutor did not raise objections against the procedure.

parasites. A prosecutor filed an appeal at the Regional Court in Bansk Bystrica on December 14, 2010 for an offence of defamation of nation, race and belief according to 423/1/a of the Criminal Code. 8 Kotleba had commited the offence as an author of the leaflets against to Romas which he wrote during his campaign as an independent candidate for the regions municipal Presidency in September and October 2009. status quo: The District Court in Bansk Bystrica, with the ruling of Judge Peter Philadelphy on December 15, 2010 stopped the criminal proceedings against Kotleba. According to the judge, the evidence was inconclusive about whether Kotleba was behind the leaflets. Based on the preliminary evidence, the judge concluded that the results of the preliminary proceedings do not justify the court proceedings against the accused, as the analysis of evidence is inconclusive whether the act had been committed by the accused. Judge Philadelphy supported his conclusion with witness testimonies that did not identify a specific person who was behind the displays of the leaflets. No evidence proved that the accused participated in the distribution or dissemination of the aforementioned publicity material and/or was its author. The presented leaflet merely shows that it concerned the electoral campaign of the accused M. K. for the Presidency of the Municipal Region of Bansk Bystrica. Yet is has not been proven who is the author and who distributed and disseminated the leaflet.9 The Regional Court in Bansk Bystrica dealt with an appeal by District Prosecutor on January 18, 2011. The senate consisted of Presiding Judge Jn Dek and Judges Peter Chovanka and Juraj Babjak.10 The Regional Court overruled the appeal against the decision of the District Court: The District Prosecutor filed an appeal against the decision within the required time limit. Written justification states that the prosecutor does not identify with the conclusions reached by the court of the first degree. He pointed out that the accused was questioned as a witness when he confirmed that he is the author of the incriminated text. He also confirmed this in an appeal filed against the decision to accept the charges. When M. K. was subsequently questioned, he responded in a sense that he was unaware of any illegal nature of his conduct. The prosecutor then argued that there was no doubt about the authorship of the text concerned. He suggested that the Regional Court overrules the decision and requests the District Court to reopen the case and decide. Based on the appeal, the Regional Court reviewed the accuracy of statements of the decision that was subject to the appeal, against which the petitioner appealed, and reviewed the activities preceding the statement. The Court concluded that the appeal may only be accepted to a point of reason to terminate the criminal proceedings, since
8 9 Paragraph 1: Who publicly defames a) a nation, its language, a race or an ethnic group shall be sentenced to 1 to 3 years of imprisonment. Ruling by Judge Peter Philadelphy of the District Court in Bansk Bystrica on December 15, 2010, reg. no: 1T 126/2010.

example 5:
In 2009, Marin Kotleba, the Leader of the Peoples Party Our Slovakia saluted the participants at a meeting commemorating the foundation of the Slovak wart-time state with a greeting On guard! [Na Str!], which was originally used by the Hlinka Guards in Slovakia as the satellite of the Nazi Germany. status quo: The prosecutor overturned the accusation of an alleged crime of support and publicizing of groups aiming to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms, despite an expert statement that described the greeting as the one used by the paramilitary units of the totalitarian regime. The prosecutor stated that Kotleba did not use the entire gesture, i.e. he did not lift two fingers to an eye level.7

example 6:
This example also concerns the leader of the Peoples Party Our Slovakia Marin Kotleba. It involves a concrete case that was among the few that ended up in court, namely at the District Court in Bansk Bystrica. Kotleba faced criminal charges for displaying publicity material during his campaign for the Presidency of the Municipal Region of Bansk Bystrica in 2009. The leaflets contained a slogan calling for a removal of unjust benefits not only of Gypsy
6 7 See: http://www.expres.sk/spravodajstvo/sprava/11805/undefined?78 See: http://pospolitost.wordpress.com/2009/06/28/pouzivanie-pozdravu-na-straz-nie-je-trestnym-cinom-uznala-to-aj-prokuratura/

10 Ruling of the Regional Court in Bansk Bystrica on January 18, 2011, ref. no: 5 To 12/2011, IS: 6110011469.

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the Court sees the reason to terminate the proceedings in connection with other facts. The decision of the Regional Court on this issue showed that the District Court Judge terminated the criminal proceedings against Kotleba even though the leaflets served his campaign and Kotleba did not distance himself from them. Moreover, he admitted the authorship of the leaflets when questioned as a witness: The Regional Court was then unable to support the arguments in the resolution concerned that it was not possible to prove who wrote and distributed the text. This also results from the logical assessment of the matter that makes it obvious that the accused was bound to know the content of the leaflet which he used in his campaign for the post of Presidency of the Municipal Region of Bansk Bystrica in Bansk Bystrica and had been made aware of the text on the leaflet. Yet the Regional Court terminated the criminal proceedings against Kotleba for the offence of defamation of race, nation and belief according to 423/1/a) of the Criminal Court: On the other hand, the appellate court had at its disposal a leaflet that, according to the petitioner, was aimed against the Roma ethnicity and suggesting that the accused M.K., MA as an independent candidate for the post of Presidency of the Municipal Region of Bansk Bystrica states: with your confidence I will certainly manage (inter alia) to eliminate unjust benefits not only for Gypsy parasites. The interpretation of the text clearly shows that the accused did not have in mind the Romas as an ethnic group in its entirety, but only those who parasite on the benefits provided to them by the society. Ultimately, the statement does not only refer to the parasites from this ethnic group, but also to parasites from the majority population, what is highlighted by the conjunction not only. This interpretation makes it clear that such text, from the perspective of the accused, cannot meet the signs of an offence of defamation of nation, race and belief according to 423/1/a of the Criminal Code, since no intention of the accused to publicly defame an ethnic group, namely the Romas, can be proven. The government plenipotentiary for Roma communities Miroslav Pollk called the conduct of the courts on this case a creative alibism.11 In February 2011 Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities Rudolf Chmel issued a statement,12 which showed that, unlike the courts, he considered Kotlebas statements to be an attack against Romas in the entirety of the ethnic group. (According to Chmel, minorities are more vulnerable.) He appealed to the courts and all state organs to use all available means and persecute even the signs of racism, as they incite inter-ethnic tensions and enforce stereotypes against Romas.13
11 See: http://www.expres.sk/spravodajstvo/sprava/15102/kotleba-romov-nehanobil-podla-pollaka-ide-o-kreativny-alibizmus-sudu.html 12 See: http://vicepremier.sk/index.php?ID=24419 13 See: http://www.expres.sk/spravodajstvo/sprava/15117/na-rozsudky-sudov-ohladom-kotlebu-reagoval-aj-vicepremier-chmel.html

opinion
We do not need to change laws, because they do not work anyway, i.e. often no one is penalized for sympathizing with totalitarian ideologies or verbal expressions of hate. It is because of l Inactivity or conclusions by the police, l Decisions by the prosecution that overrule the conclusions of police investigators, l Court decisions made despite expert or witness testimonies. We can thus remove the limitations set out by the criminal law and allow the extremists to say whatever they wish without any consequences. There are a number of closed or open cases, but the offenders remain unpunished. Some suggest that, despite the real situation in Slovakia, there wont be even formal elimination of limitations of freedom of expression because of the countrys commitment derived from international legal obligations, in particular the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of the UN, to which Slovakia is party.14 The state can and ought to change the attitude of the police, prosecutors and judges in the area of racism and extremism. If the acts of racism and extremism are merely considered to be marginal crimes in comparison with theft, armed robberies, rapes, damages to health or murders, the groups behind extremist criminality are anti-systemic and their aim is to overthrow democracy. Otherwise virtually everything remains in declaratory form and the neo-Nazi or extremist groups do not need to fear persecutions.

Freedom of expression for the neo-nazis?

Petr Hjek, the Adviser to the Czech President Vclav Klaus called upon former dissidents Vclav Havel and Jan Ruml to show support to freedom of expression for the leading Czech neo-Nazis.15 He reacted to the court proceedings against them for displaying labels and organizing memorial event for the fallen Nazi soldiers. Hjek stated that It is very bad when right-wing extremists cannot say what they think. This leads to a decline of democracy and turns it into a caricature. Freedom of speech, opinion and political conviction applies only to those who hold the correct political opinion, the correct political belief. Hjek even suggested that he wished to create new stickers if the court case continued. He criticized the former heroic dissidents for not showing in support to freedom of speech because the case involved a political process with bearers of views and ideas alien to them. The news generated two contradictory discussion responses at SME.sk that best illustrate the different public views on freedom of speech for the neo-Nazis:
14 15 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Elimination_of_All_Forms_of_Racial_Discrimination See: http://www.sme.sk/c/5634209/klausov-poradca-sa-zastal-neonacistov-kritizoval-havla.html

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l Discussant sano b: Hjek has not stood by the neo-Nazis by a single word - he defended the freedom of expression and pointed out two important issues: 1) Democracy and the public discourse decline if freedom of expressionis a priori selective 2) Neo-Nazism will not disappear or die out if the politically correct left-wingers sweep it under the carpet. l Discussant blanc1: What does the freedom of speech for the neo-Nazis mean? When they shout for the need to gas someone or that the gas chambers never existed? A ban of such statements would not weaken democracy ... No politician in Slovakia has so far made statements similar to Hjeks. Daniel Lipic, the Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Iveta Radiov, is known for willingness to tolerate freedom of expression for extremists: It is up to us politicians, you, journalists and the opinion leaders to send the extremists to the margins of social developments. [Extremists] are impolite people with inferiority complex. But to use criminal law against them? I do not think the state has the right to do so, said Lipic in July 2010. Hjeks appeal to the former dissidents is controversial. While Havel and Ruml wished to defeat and remove the totalitarian regime, the aim of the Czech neo-Nazis is to eliminate democracy. Yet it is true that neo-Nazi groups are tolerated in the United States where then can even use the Heil Hitler greetings.

USA Heil Hitler greetings are permitted, but social influence of such extremists is minimal; they are a marginal subculture.

view 2
GERMANY Despite the growing power of the neo-Nazis, the parties such as NPD and their sympathizers remain marginal within the society; the elites are in opposition to them. USA People connected to extremist and racists associations appear on the side of the Republicans and appear in the media. Their theories on immigrants are adopted by conservative media. This view suggests that their influence is greater in the US than in Germany.

Conclusion
Each country has to find its own response to extremism as it grows from different roots. The role of the media that often limit themselves to reporting on marches of extremist groups without investigating their background is a cause of concern as it provides the public with an image that is open to interpretation. The media should inform about extremism-related issues critically and within context, so that the public can tell who addresses the issue.16 The state and organs involved in criminal proceedings should follow the law and eliminate phenomena that pose a threat to human rights and democracy. Even if they to not persecute the most extremist manifestations, it is in the interest of civil society that these phenomena are not altogether ignored or legitimated. These organs otherwise become self-caricature and the freedom of speech in Slovakia becomes de facto unlimited or limited merely ad hoc. A question then arises whether Slovakia is not bound by international accords merely formally and whether it should thus not step out of them and cancel the legislation that is to penalize hateful even if non-violent expressions of extremists (such as statements, gestures and symbols).

examples of Limitations of Freedom of expression: germany and Usa

How shall we respond to hate speech or verbal expressions of hate by extremist or hooligan groups particularly against minorities? Lets compare two countries with diametrically different approaches. Germany has strict law against expressions of neo-Nazism, while the US provides freedom of self-realization. What is more effective: to penalize verbal defamation and manifestations of hate, or not?

a premise
GERMANY strictly penalizes verbal expressions of extremists. USA allows freedom for extremists. There is no definitive answer to where the extremists posses greater influence and where they pose greater danger.

view 1
GERMANY The influence of the neo-Nazis is greater; they present a real threat; the number of attacks and public events is on the increase.
16 See: http://danilov.blog.sme.sk/c/241422/Reporting-on-extremist-politicians.html

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CYberhaTe 2.0 - righT Wing eXTreMisM anD MainsTreaM raCisM on The inTerneT as an everYDaY reaLiTY
ronald eissens
International Network against Cyber Hate, Netherlands
Firstly, to get it out of the way: why should we fight online hate? For that matter, why should we fight hate speech altogether? Hate and its vehicle, hate speech, causes misery, division, violence, sometimes murder, abuse, ethnic tension, war and terror. It distorts thinking. It is the enemy of logic. It pits us against each other. It is not a banal or harmless evil. Ultimately it wants to do away with democracy and murder those it does not like. For every pogrom, genocide, ethnic cleansing, ethnic war in history, there were words that started it all. Words of hate. There is a strong push on the part of online hate mongers to describe defamation and racism as journalism, claiming the freedom this status gives them. There is a strong tendency to publish or show anything on the Internet in the name of free speech, no matter if it is defaming, inciting hate or plain racist. The dominant mores seems to be hedonistic rather then freedomloving anything goes. So, how about that free speech? Should it not be total and limitless? Isnt that what freedom and democracy is about? First of all, total free speech does not exist. Even the U.S. constitution imposes limits to free speech. Secondly, should we, in the name of free speech and democracy, put no limits on speech at all, should we allow hate and extremism to grow unchallenged, then this could bring about the very end of democracy. A dictatorial regime will take over, and as its first act will abolish free speech. This is what those who propagate hate want. They want the ultimate power to do away with everything they dont like, including your free speech.

a short history of hate on the internet

From 1992 on, Neo-Nazis started to use the Internet to spread their rhetoric. Already in the in the pre-world wide web age German Neo-Nazis saw the potential of Information Technology, using Bulletin Board Systems and moving onto the web when it came available. In a sense, those German Neo-Nazis did not have to go far from home. As the journalist and writer Edwin Black proved, the information age was not born in Silicon Valley but in 1933 in Berlin. IBM aided the administration of the Holocaust with census cards and punch card

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technology, even after 1941, through full IBM subsidiaries managed from Switzerland. The Nazis had a problem and IBM had a solution to facilitate their final solution. It teaches us to be wary of those who say that they are only selling technology and dont care what it is used for. Thanks to the existence of Internet, there is more anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial available in the world than ever. But also thanks to the Internet, there is more information on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism available than ever was. These positions hardly cancelout each other, even if you believe that bad speech can be countered by good speech. No longer is it [in] the grubby bookstores, selling copies of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion under the counter. No longer is it the house-to-house delivered stencilled Neo-Nazi pamphlets, a hundred here, a thousand there. Now it's tens of thousands of websites and hundreds of thousands of expressions of racism, discrimination, anti-Semitism, hatred against Muslims, gays, Romas. Now it's millions of hits here and hundred of thousands of page views there. By now, the bulk of hate speech has firmly moved onto the Internet. Old media have become obsolete for spreading discrimination and hate. You will still be able to find Mein Kampf, or the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, or Hardwoods speeches did six million really die in the proverbial grubby bookstore or get it by post order through the Internet. But ask yourself, who under 30 years of age still reads books? Very few people. For most people under 30 and a lot above 30- Internet has become the main library, encyclopaedia, communication tool and entertainment centre. In the 17 years since the Internet took off, racism and discrimination have penetrated every nook and cranny. First only on extreme-right websites and in usenet newsgroups, but now you can find it on web logs, web forums, Youtube, in online games, in chat boxes, on Facebook, Myspace, et cetera. The number of websites offering anti-Semitism or Holocaust denial runs in the tens of thousands. Instances of Hate against Muslims have become uncountable. Were not only talking about dedicated Neo-Nazi or other extremist sites here. A normal popular web forum has 1000-plus postings per day, of which on average 50 are of a racist or discriminatory nature. There are thousands of web forums like that. If you add the thousands of extremist web forums that generate hundreds of hateful expressions per day, plus all the comments on social media sites like Youtube, twitter and Facebook, the total volume of hate on the net is mind-boggling. Im not even taking into account all the web logs, and the still existing Usenet newsgroups, historically known for their large hate content. It is impossible to really give exact figures on online hate. We only know that the volume is enormous, but registering and monitoring is a bit like trying to count fruit flies. There are lots of them, they die soon but since they breed fast new ones appear all the time.

The Current Web 2.0. reality

The modern interactive Internet with its blogs, forums, photo and video repositories like Youtube, social networking tools like Facebook and twitter, turn everybody into an instant publicist. Internet is the biggest soapbox in the world, and people who would not dare air their views offline find their outlet in posting them on the Internet, thinking they are totally anonymous. Internet is also the big recycler. Once something is online, it is almost impossible to get rid of it for good. We live in a copy & paste world. Hate on the Internet has become an everyday reality and a major factor in shaping how people form their opinions. They do that, consciously and unconsciously by checking whats on their Facebook wall, or on twitter. By googling something for a school project, and be presented by often incorrect or plain racist information. By reading their favourite blog. By interacting on their favourite webforum. Or even by playing a game like Ethnic Cleansing. The internet is unfiltered and as of yet, nobody is taught how to assess validity of information. Nor do teachers or parents have the knowledge or time to help. Which brings me to the sad reality that by sheer numbers, the hate speech posted by others than Neo-Nazis or right-wing extremists is of more influent and therefore more dangerous. Hate on the Net has become mainstream. Just like with the rise of the Populist parties all over Europe, mainstream haters often define their hate as political rhetoric. They want to save the country or Europe- from the Muslim invasion. They want to get attention for the power that Jews have. Often they disguise their true intentions more craftily and say that they are concerned about immigration and the survival of democracy. Populist parties work hard to mainstream hate, and the mainstream racists and bigots on the Internet do exactly the same. The result: more division, more support for racist ideas, more hate crime. To go right into some examples of that; The 2004 murder of Dutch publicist and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands by a Muslim extremist was incited through the Internet, and in itself led to a high volume of incitement on the Internet after the fact. Web forums and blogs were inundated by thousands of anti-Muslim expressions, calls to firebomb Mosques and kill Muslims. This resulted in a violent wave of arson attacks and attacks on Muslims or perceived Muslims in the Netherlands. A Mosque and an Islamic grammar school burned down; there was an attempt to blow up another Mosque. In total 174 violent attacks took place, of which 36 arson, one murder, 12 cases of assault and 23 cases of destruction of property. I know that there is resistance against the thought that online incitement to hatred leads to violence in the physical world and this mystifies me. It is a given. Strangely enough, some think that depicting naked women or a breast, or showing two men or two women kissing each other on TV or on the Internet leads to something. Well, to what exactly? To sex? Or to people all of a sudden turning gay? Isnt it quaint how incitement to sex or to gay love is seen as an automatic reality, while incitement to hatred is not? The horrible message seems to be: hate

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crime is ok, sex is ok but dont show it, homosexuality is absolutely not! We shield our children from seeing nudity and expressions of gay love, but we have no problem with them seeing the most horrible violence and racism or to let them play violent computer games.

solutions
In dealing with online hate, there are a number of possible solutions. The first being removal, one of the main tools of the International Network against Cyber Hate (INACH). INACH was founded in 2002 as a means to mitigate cyber hate. INACH is a trans-national network with members in 18 countries (16 in Europe and 2 in North-America). All our member bureaus have different ways of working. Some work through the method of semi-voluntary removal, almost all work on education, some of us get rid of hate by naming and shaming or by working with the internet industry, some work exclusively on the basis of incoming complaints, others go out and patrol the Net. All of us monitor, do research and publish. We are a practical and flexible network geared towards possibilities rather than debate on seemingly opposed legal issues. Since 2002, we secured the removal of more than 15000 expressions of hate, have initiated a number of court cases and have gotten more than 60 online Racists or AntiSemites convicted. By using the various national and international anti-hate speech legislations we aim to curb the communication of hate speech, by this preventing the recruitment of others who do not yet hate, and prevent hate crime in the physical world. The second important tool that INACH uses is Education. Since especially youth runs the risk of being misled, indoctrinated and recruited, most of us also engage in educational projects. As the use of the Internet in schools increases, students seeking information are confronted with racist and anti-Semitic websites or sites with otherwise discriminatory content. Teachers and parents need help and advise on the way they can best filter and assess information in order to protect and guide children and students. At the same time those educators need a reference guide themselves. To make this possible our Dutch and German members created educational CD-ROMs with practical information on how to recognize and combat racism, Holocaust Denial, anti-Semitism and discrimination on the Internet. The CDs include teaching modules, explanations of the different kinds of online hate, manuals on the extreme-right, racist symbols and rhetoric commonly used by racists to recruit youngsters, facts prejudice, examples of what is happening on the Internet, tips on how to assess websites and what can be done when encountering cyber hate. The CDs use a multi-layered approach to make them suitable for use by teachers, parents and (high) school kids. Additionally, our member in the US, the Anti Defamation League has a multitude of online resource guides, training programs and educational modules. Then there is the option of Filtering. We are in favor of that for schools and school kids only. We work from the premise that filtering does not solve the problem. To us filtering is similar to closing the windows when there is violence out in the streets; you dont see it so it is not there.

Then there is the option of Countering by counter speech. This is the most difficult of all solutions. To do this as a project you need discipline, a lot of knowledge and a lot of staff. Of course everybody can do this in the evening, at home, or as a school project. Go to a blog or webforum and counter discrimination or other hate speech. Give information, post links to valid material, counter falsehoods. Lastly: the Internet is no longer a new thing. A whole generation who grew up without knowing a time with Internet. Internet is now an integral part, and a crucial part, of this world, of our lives and our shared experience. Its a tool that is used every day for good and for bad. We need to use more energy in adding more valid material to the Net and getting rid of (more) bad stuff.

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haTe-MoTivaTeD CriMes: Characteristics, impact and the role of international organizations in their elimination
Daniel Milo
OBSE/ODIHR, advisor for combating racism and xenophobia, Slovakia
What are hate-motivated crimes? How do they differ from other criminality? What are their specifics and what options are there for the organs of the state and international organizations to facilitate their elimination? These are questions to which the answers would require a space far larger than available in this volume. Yet I hope that the following section at least somewhat outlines the answers.

Defining hate crimes

The notion of hate crimes is quite new in many countries and thus often requires broader explanation. There are a number of definitions of hate crimes, yet all share the following features: l Hate crimes have to first carry the signs of a crime according to the legal system of a given country; l Secondly, the crime has to be the type in which the offender chooses the target of the crime (involving an individual, a group of people or property) on the basis of their real and presumed belonging to connection with one of the so-called protected characteristics. These are then considered to be crucial characteristics which are either inborn or their change means a major intervention in ones own identity. The most frequent characteristics cited in connection with hate crimes include gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, language, religion, sexual orientation, and mental or physical disability. The objective of such a broad definition of hate crimes is to embrace the maximum possible cases when the offender intentionally chooses a victim of an attack precisely on the basis of belonging to and connection with the above protected characteristics. A hate crime offender thus chooses the victim not for them being an individual, but as a representative of certain values or characteristics that are represented by a given group. An attack is thus not directed against a concrete person, but against an entire group of people identified by their belonging to a particular race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. The person (or a building) against whom

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the attack is directed merely represents the entire group. Such deed is derived from prejudice against the group that is manifested through violence. This principle is called selection principle. It is closely connected with another characteristic feature of hate crimes: an absence of other material motivation of a deed (e.g. material profit). There are certainly other cases of mixed motivation, when the victims belonging to a particular group plays a role in their selection as target, even though the motivation of the crime is material profit. An example here may be robbery attack against a victim of Jewish origin. The primary motivation is material profit, but the offender chooses a victim on the basis of prejudice that all Jews are rich and the offender thus chooses specifically this victim. The term hate crime appeared first in the US legislation in 19691, when the federal act on hate crimes was adopted. Further legislation2 on hate crimes expanded the range of protected characteristics and activities subject to the federal protection. Over time the American legislation in this area has become a model to a number of other countries. There are two basic models of legislation related to this criminal activity in criminal codes of individual countries. The first model defines hate crimes as specific factual circumstances with their own provisions in the criminal codes. This model contains different approaches to the definition of the range of objects of the attack (persons only, or people and property), protected groups/characteristics as well as forms of the crime (threat of violence, use of violence, etc.). This legislative model is used for instance in the USA and Great Britain. The second model involves the use of qualified factual circumstances that defines a crime (race, national, religious or other hatred) as a specific feature of the crime that is penalized by a higher degree of criminal sentence. This model also contains differences in the application of hatred as a factor that motivates the application of a more severe criminal sentence (e.g. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) or only in the case of some factual circumstances. The legislation on hate crimes in the Slovak criminal code is derived mainly from the second model and works with specific motivation to the deed3 that leads to the search of qualified factual circumstances and more severe criminal sentence (crimes of intentional killing, murder, manslaughter, health damage, violence against a group of nationals, etc.). It should be noted that in connection with the legislation on hate crimes the term hate crimes identifies rather a type or category of crimes that differ from the others by their nature and effect, rather than by specific clauses on criminal codes of individual countries.4 Within the term hate crimes we can subsume certain type of deeds sanctioned by the criminal code also
1 2 3 Federal Hate Crime Law - United States Code, Article 18, 245(b)(2). See: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/245.html Hate Crime Statistics Act (1990), Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (2009) 140/d) of the Criminal Code: A specific motif is understood to be committing a crime with the intention to publicly inflame violence or hatred against a group of people or an individual because of their belonging to some race, nation, ethnicity, gender, or religion, if it is an excuse for threat because of the aforementioned reasons. Though, as has been stated, there are a number of countries whose criminal codes define hate crimes.

when there are no specific clauses of the criminal code defining the term in a given country. The term hate crimes thus seems to be more a legal concept than a legal definition in the legislative sense.

Different types of hatred

A common mistake in assessing hate crimes is to define hate in the name of this type of crime. Even though the title uses the notion hate, hate is not necessary for the crime to be defined as hate crime. An offender does not have to necessarily feel hate against a particular victim of hate crime. It is sufficient if the selection of the victim was motivated by their belonging to a particular group defined by common characteristic. Yet not every crime in which the offender feels subjective hatred against the victim, falls into the category of hate crimes. For instance, if a husband physically attacks his wifes lover (the attack being motivated by personal hatred) the attack wont be considered a hate crime. On the contrary, if an offender throws a fire bottle into a house inhabited by Romas, he does not have to personally hate the victims in order for the crime to be qualified as a hate crime.

Consequences of hate crimes

Another feature that differentiates hate crimes from other types of criminality is their impact at an individual, group, and national level. Because of their nature, these attacks, whether aimed against persons or property, have more far-reaching consequences than common crimes. Their impact at an individual level is obvious in form of post-traumatic shock, lasting sense of threat and even behavioral changes in victims. The approach by the police can significantly affect the degree of effect of the crime on the victim. The effect of these crimes at group level is determined by the principle of selection an attack is not aimed against a concrete victim who is merely a chance representative of a given group. Its other members thus feel a justified sense of threat and fear that they may become the victims of an attack in the future. Hate crimes are thus identified as message crimes, i.e. crimes that send a message to the entire group: You are not welcome, we hate you. This naturally triggers a sense of threat among the entire group, not merely in the very victim of the attack. At the national level, the consequences of hate crimes are significant. In a situation when one or more groups feel threatened and insufficiently protected against violent attacks, their natural response is a growth of tension and distortion of principles of coexistence with other groups within the society. If the state organs particularly the police and prosecution are not effective enough, they bagatelize or alleviate the motifs of these attacks. When the attacks recur, the group concerned may take justice into its own hands. Its members often organize their own guards or attacks against the actual or presumed perpetrators of hate crimes. These attacks inevitably trigger a reaction. If, at this stage, there is no swift and effective

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intervention by the state, the situation may escalate from a localized conflict into extensive racially, ethnically or religiously motivated disorder.

activities by osCe and oDihr

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as the supreme regional security organization with 56 member states, has been the first international organization to start dealing with the issue of hate crimes in 2003. Working on the basis of its comprehensive approach to security that contains three dimensions (political-military, economic-environmental and human) and aware of the potential effect of hate crimes at national level, the OSCE adopted in 2003 a decision5 that authorized the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to collect data, evaluate good practice, and develop activities in prevention and resolution of hate crimes. ODIHR deals with hate crimes at several levels: l Assistance to states in developing legislation on hate crimes l Through specific training programs provides capacity building for organs involved in criminal proceedings to effectively apply legislation , l Increasing awareness about the significance and effect of hate crimes among government authorities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, l Data collection and analysis of hate crimes across the OSCE region, their publication in an annual report the only one of its kind at the international level, l Supporting civil society efforts in the areas of monitoring, reporting and assisting victims of hate crimes. In order to assure that OSCE member state distinguish, define and fight against hate crime, ODIHR developed seminar series and trainings for police, prosecution, judiciary, nongovernmental and international organizations. ODIHR published a number of publications, manuals and tools to support these activities:6 l Hate crimes in the OSCE region7 incidents and responses (an annual report on the incidence of hate crimes and examples of good practice among members states and NGOs in hate crime prevention and resolution); l Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide outlines in an accessible way the reasons and arguments for the adoption of legislation in this area and offers examples and commentary on a number of possible solutions;
OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03, Tolerance and Non-discrimination. Maastricht, 2, December 2003. See: http://www.osce.org/mc/19382 See all at: http://tandis.odihr.pl/?p=ki-hc See: http://www.osce.org/odihr/73636

l Preventing and Responding to Hate Crimes A Resource Guide for NGOs in the OSCE Region8 offers a definition of hate crime, practical advice on how to prevent and respond to this phenomenon, and also contains a useful list of additional sources; l Understanding Hate Crimes is a series of brochures for different countries aiming to help the police, local authorities, prosecution and NGOs to better understand the issue of hate crimes; l TANDIS Tolerance and Non-Discrimination l Information System (http: //tandis.odihr.pl) is a public website that provides information on issues related to tolerance and non-discrimination, international standards and instruments, national reports, annual reports from member states and international organizations, and on planned activities within this field. It all these activities, ODIHR works in cooperation and partnership with non-governmental organizations who are often most closely working with the victims of hate crimes; their role in monitoring and assistance to the victims and in education and training of different professionals is irreplaceable.

Conclusion
Hate crimes are a complex phenomenon that requires focused attention and cooperation of all actors at national as well as international level. The negative effect of these crimes and their potential to pose a threat to stability and security of society thus call for a coordinated effort supported by knowledge, professional capacities, and funding. This chapter and the overview of tools and material published by ODIHR will hopefully help the interested parties in better orientation and finding adequate tools that can aid activities aimed at the fight against this specific type of criminal activity.

5 6 7

See. http://www.osce.org/odihr/39821

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WorDs anD piCTUres Can hUrT: DeaLing WiTh anTi-MinoriTY iMages anD LangUage
robert gould
Centre for European Studies, Carleton University, Canada

introduction
In order better to show how anti-minority or anti-foreigner statements and images work, I shall do the following: 1) outline the fundamental strategies of such statements and pictures; 2) outline the tactics used; 3) in order to make these strategies, tactics, and counter-proposals clearer I shall then examine several visual examples and outline how they work; 4) examine some anti-minority statements and make suggestions of possible ways of dealing with them; 5) finally I shall suggest approaches to dealing with such language and images. I shall be looking only at public statements, verbal or pictorial, by political parties and politicians or the media, not at policy documents, where, however, racist words and stereotypes are certainly present.1 Overall one can say that in anti-minority statements and images there is a common pattern of separation of the majority from the minority, and this means the creation and reinforcement of a pattern of opposition. Fundamentally the anti-minority Right structures relations between majority and minority around the theme of hostility2 and around social antagonism arising from what are presented as unbridgeable and unchangeable cultural differences. This is the premise on which so much of the anti-minority language and pictures are based. A war metaphor is frequently employed: minorities are implicitly, and sometimes even explicitly, presented as enemies. And, as opposed to opponents with whom one can reason, enemies are people to be eradicated.

Fundamental strategies
The basic strategy in the creation of hostility by the anti-minority anti-immigrant Right is FEAR. This can be observed in innumerable cases and is used across the whole of Europe from the Irish Sea to the Black Sea. Some examples will be discussed shortly, but as a foundation
1 2 As demonstrated, for example by Peter Drl, Ethnicized Laziness: Roma in the Slovak Social Policy Discourse , M.A. Thesis, Central European University, Budapest 2006. Paraphrased from Ivan Leudar, Jacqueline Hayes, Jir Nekvapil and Johanna Turner Baker, Hostility Themes in Media, Community and Refugee Narratives, Discourse & Society 19(2) 2008: 187-221.

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I shall cite two examples where a politician and a publicist very close to a political party speak openly of this strategy. Both are from countries close to Slovakia. The first is taken from an interview on 15th January 2004 between Oliver Geden, a researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, and Eduard Mainoni, of the Bndnis Zukunft sterreich and at that time Staatssekretr in Vienna. Mainoni made the following statement: Thats the current situation. But lets look at the central issues, particularly concerning foreigners. Whats the background? Its peoples fear, in this case Austrians fear of losing their identity. All political parties, even a part of the business world, work with fear, with the business of fear.3 The second statement was made by perhaps the most successful graphic artist and publicist for the anti-minority Right, Alexander Segert. He frequently works for the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) in Switzerland, often in connection with their anti-foreigner / anti immigrant campaigns. He has also provided material for the FP in Austria. In a newspaper interview he is quoted in the following way: The fear game, thats part of politics, said Alexander Segert, PR man for the SVP. Its totally legitimate to appeal to this emotion. Without it, the message just doesnt get across, neither on the left nor the right.4 The second fundamental strategy of the racist / anti-minority Right is the notion of the essential inferiority or hostility of the foreigner or minority. This is related to the dangers to be outlined in a moment. It might appear illogical that inferior people represent a threat, but that does not prevent its repeated use.

The second tactic is to state or suggest that individuals in the minority group which, as mentioned above, is stigmatized as inferior, are 1) all alike; 2) incapable of change; and 3) their whole culture is incapable of change. This contributes to the construction of an us and them opposition in which any sympathy is removed from the minority group or individuals belonging to it. A further tactic is to take over positively-loaded key words, shift their meaning and turn them around to their own advantage. Examples of this would be patriot5 or multicultural. In Germany the latter was taken over by groups hostile to the presence in that country of large numbers of resident foreigners, with the result that on 16th October 2010 the Chancellor had to distance herself publicly from the term.6 Similarly, the Right will frequently employ inference, suggestion and code words to remain (just) within the law. All these strategies and tactics are widely used all across the whole of Europe (and elsewhere). They are used at all levels of politics, from national parliaments to cities, towns and villages7, and of course in bars and on the street. In an open society, there is always public competition for resources; this means that some social conflicts are inevitable. This is the case even in a theoretical country with an absolutely uniform population. But in fact, no country has an absolutely uniform population. The Right frequently exploits social conflicts by presenting them as cultural or resulting from different group mentalities, or religious differences. And these group mentalities or cultures are always represented as unchangeable. It is essential to undermine these arguments. Before looking at concrete examples and ways to counter them, it is important to emphasize the fundamental principle that one should always attack the basis, the premise on which the opponents argument is based. The premise can be unspoken, particularly in the case of the inferiority strategy. But it is no less powerful for being unspoken; and it is all the more powerful for being able to refer implicitly or explicitly to age-old prejudices. Alternatively the premise can be spoken: They are invading us (British National Party in the UK); They are colonizing us (British National Party in the UK and Jobbik in Hungary); They will take over our country (broadly used in Latvia).

Tactics
What are the tactics within this over-all strategy, what does the Right want you to be afraid for; what do they say is threatened? Principally it is the following: 1) the country as a nation state in the sense of the political embodiment of an ethnic group; 2) the culture of the country / people; 3) the language of the country or its titular nation; 4) the religion of the country or its titular nation; 5) the nation itself; 6) the economic wellbeing of the nation and its citizens; 7) the physical security of individuals. Other topics are introduced to fit particular circumstances.
3 Das ist die derzeitige Situation. Aber gehen wir vielleicht einmal zu ihren Schwerpunkten, speziell in der Auslnderpolitik. Was ist der Hintergrund? Es ist die Angst der Menschen, der sterreicher in dem Fall, vor Verlust der eigenen Identitt. Alle politischen Parteien, sogar ein Teil der Wirtschaft, funktionieren ber die Angst, ber das Geschft mit der Angst. Interview Eduard Mainoni korrigierte und autorisierte Fassung 15.1.2004, 17:45 Uhr, Salzburg, transkribiert am 27.1.2004 korrigiert und autorisiert zurck am 29.1./9.2.2004; http://www.florianklenk.com/2006/09/22/mainoni-das-ungekurzte-interview-aus-dem-bauch-der-fpo/ viewed 13 January, 2011. Genau wie das Spiel mit der Angst. Das gehre zur Politik dazu, hat der SVP-Werber Segert ... gesagt. Es ist absolut legitim, dieses Gefhl anzusprechen, sonst geht die politische Botschaft, links wie rechts, an den Leuten vorbei. Die Welt 16th October 2009, article Streit um Minarettenverbot erreicht Deutschland; http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article4867285/Streit-um-Minarettenverbot-erreicht-Deutschland.html viewed 13 January, 2011.

Cited for Belgium in the following work: Alexander Husler Antiislamischer Rechtspopulismus in der extremen Rechten die PRO-Bewegung als neue Kraft? in Stefan Braun, Alexander Geisler, Martin Gerster (eds.): Strategien der extremen Rechten. Hintergrnde - Analysen - Antworten, VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 130-147; see p. 141. See also the many examples in Maria Golubeva and Robert Gould (eds.) Shrinking Citizenship: Discursive Practices that Limit Democratic Participation in Latvian Politics, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York City, 2010; poster 72 for H.C. Strache (FP) for the election in Vienna on 1 October, 2010: viewed at www.fpoe.at on October 10, 2010. See Robert Gould, The Death of German Multiculturalism: What Angela Merkels shock talk is hiding, Ide fdrale1(2), December 2010; http://ideefederale.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Dec_2010.pdf. (The English translation follows the French-language version.) Examples are cited in Robert Gould, Some Recent Discourses of Exclusion in the EU in Golubeva and Gould, pp. 15-50.

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visual examples
With these I shall show how some of this rhetoric works. Posters are an effective means of public communication. The basic strategy and tactics are fundamentally the same as those of verbal communication. The following now-famous poster was designed by Alexander Segert for the SVP campaign in the anti-minaret referendum of 29th November, 2010. The national flag, the symbol of the nation and the state, is presented as being dominated by the minarets and by the woman in a burqua. The slogan is added to encourage the citizen-voter to take action in a certain way.

The image works by suggestion and inference. There is no overt statement attacking Islam or any racial group. But the message could not be clearer. It is set up in such a way that the figure of the woman is faceless: this means she is not an individual; she is just one of an undifferentiated group, and implies that all members of the group are the same. It also means that it is really not possible for the viewer to sympathize or empathize with her. All this is part of a process of delegitimation, of placing the minority outside society and outside the limits of reasonable consideration. With the next example, published by the British National Party, I want to show a variant of this poster and at the same time to indicate that many of the linguistic and visual techniques employed by the anti-minority Right are highly transferable across languages and national boundaries.

The poster uses fear as the fundamental strategy the fear of the loss of national identity, of the loss of control. The danger is heightened as the minarets are made to resemble rockets, which are fundamentally aggressive. Just as a great deal of anti-minority language does, the poster works from a basis of already-existing prejudice. Moslems are presented as totally and unchangeably different, with Islam in total contradiction to Swiss identity. The image implies that there is no point of contact between the two. It also implies that Swiss identity does not allow for religious difference of this nature. Allowing for difference is a vital point I shall come back to in the final segment when dealing with ways to counter anti-minority language.

The Fact statements in English at the bottom of the image are a translation into English (with modification of the party names) of statements used by the Freiheitliche Partei sterreichs in the campaign for the European Parliament elections in the spring of 2009.8 Because they are presented as facts they carry more weight. An important dimension of the second statement is the implication that only the British National Party can save the country, which is in danger. The fundamental strategy of this poster and the statements is fear.
8 Available at that time on www.fpoe.at, and accessed on 11 August, 2009.

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The version used by the Front National in France represents an intensification of the techniques just outlined. It was created for the regional elections in south-eastern France in March 2010.

refuted. Logically, the implicit claims in the poster that Sharia law is about to replace the Civil and Criminal Codes and that Algerian practices will dominate the French state are ridiculous. But the poster, as also very many verbal anti-minority statements, does not operate through the application of logic: as indicated, they operation by means of emotion principally that of fear. Consequently it is essential, but not easy, to find ways of reducing or removing the emotional impact. I shall come back to this again in the final segment of the presentation.

verbal examples
The examples above also function by means of categorization. Exactly what one calls an individual or a group is of capital importance.9 This is because, traditionally, and in many peoples minds, ethnic or religious categorization is very rigid, exclusionary, evaluative, and is frequently employed in order to emphasize difference, inferiority, and the absence of any common ground. Consequently it is essential never to accept terminology or categories which are being used to this end. In the mixed populations of virtually all countries in Europe this is now of primary importance. An example from the publicity for the election on 10th October 2010 in Vienna will illustrate this.

Again, the fundamental strategy is fear. The tactics include the following: evocation of the term Islamisme, meaning a policy of changing the social and political structures in a country in order to make Sharia the sole source of law. Verbally this makes clear the strategy of creating fear of a complete takeover and a reversal of Frances fundamental policy of the separation of religion and the state. The suggestion of loss of control and identity is intensified with the superimposition of the Algerian flag on the map of France. The long shadow of the minarets over the whole of France and extending into other countries in Europe suggests a danger for the whole of Europe. Thus the strategy aims also create the view of an irreconcilable polar opposition of France and Algeria, French people and Algerians, France and Islam, Europe and Islam. This naturally works to the detriment of the many French citizens who are of Algerian background. These examples now provoke the question of how one might counter these or similar posters. The first thing is to recognize that the permanent presence of a significant number of Moslems in France and Europe has to be faced squarely. Refusing to discuss openly the social changes and the shifts in religious practices is simply not a constructive option. It is essential to demonstrate that religious and ethnic differences are legitimate and normal in any society and do not constitute a threat to the state; and such differences do not take anything away from the long-established population. Any statement or implication that this is the case has to be

As indicated, for example, in Blackledge, A.: Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World, Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture 15, John Benjamins, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2005.

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The two verbal categories with which this poster operates are Home and Islam, suggesting the direct and irreconcilable opposition of home / Austria / Vienna and Islam. It emphasizes this by means of the Austrian flag and the regional Austrian / Viennese form daham, instead of the standard German daheim. Once more, the question is how to undermine this message of separation, of us and them and to express inclusion and common features. The following possibilities present themselves: a) Demonstrating inclusion by using the same local dialect term but in conjunction with a foreign name: In Wien ist Mehmet auch daham (Vienna is Mehmets home, too); b) Showing proximity, acceptance and association: Nil ist meine Nachbarin (Nil is my neighbor); c) Showing shared values or interests across religious differences: Mein Nachbar ist Muslim; wir whlen beide SP (My neighbor is a Muslim; we both vote Social Democrat) or wir spielen beide Fuball ( we both play football), or wir spielen zusammen Fuball ( we play football together). On a practical level, one thing is clear, however: such slogans or expressions to counter antiminority language have to be finely tuned to the local situation and to local dynamics. The following example drawn from a purely verbal text (the manifesto of the Bndnis Zukunft sterreich) for the Austrian elections in 2006 illustrates the explicit use of certain frequentlyused tactics used within the fear strategy: If we fail to preserve the homogeneity of society over the next few years and to reduce immigration to an acceptable and unavoidable level, the migrants will bring about a massive shift in values. The resulting conflicts can represent a real danger for the whole of society.10 It speaks of migrants (Zuwanderer), but they form a resident and permanent minority within Austrian society. This is the starting point of a process of deligitimation of the minority, a process which continues throughout the passage and depicts the minority as causing extreme harm to individuals and society as a whole. The statement starts from the explicit premise that society is homogenous and the implicit premise that it is unchanging. But society is neither. The statement also contains a further implicit premise, namely that individual identity is absolutely fixed within group identity, and there can be no shift on the part of anyone. This is contrary to observed practices, where, for example, people switch party allegiances, leave a religion, or even (as the writer has done) move from one language for daily use to another. The statement asserts also that migrants will cause a massive shift in societys values. This is based on the unspoken premise that migrants are absolutely incapable of adapting and that a minority will destabilize society. It asserts also that migrants will inevitably cause conflicts.
10 Taken from the section sterreich zuerst sterreich ist und bleibt kein Einwanderungsland: Wenn es in den kommenden Jahren nicht gelingt, die Homogenitt der Gesellschaft zu sichern und die Zuwanderung auf das vertretbare und notwendige Ausma zu beschrnken, verursachen die Zuwanderer einen massiven gesellschaftlichen Wertewandel. Die damit einhergehenden Konflikte knnen zu einer effektiven Gefahr fr die Gesamtgesellschaft werden.

This reinforces the fear strategy by means of the use of blame. Because it presents the threat as arising from the differences between a supposedly homogenous society culturally distinct from migrants who are incapable of change, it presents the problem arising from immigration and the presence of minority immigrants as absolutely insoluble. These premises and this sort of argument cannot be accepted. In this particular case it would be essential to undermine the three premises: a) homogeneity, b) inability to change on the part of individuals, c) inability to change on the part of both the majority group and the minority group.

roma
It has been argued that prejudiced talk about Roma people in Central and Eastern Europe is more extreme than the anti-alien, anti-immigrant talk in Western Europe,11 and that the language used places the Roma beyond difference, beyond the moral order; in other words, as total outcasts, and fundamentally inferior. A recent statement by a minister in another EU country did exactly this.12 This may be partly due to a situation described in the following way: in the ECE countries a division between national identity and citizenship [in either sense] has never been successfully made,13 and Roma are historically and currently the native alien and the constant alien in a range of countries. It is not necessary to repeat here the range of anti-Roma language used in the region. This has been sufficiently documented in numerous studies.14 Suffice it to say that it seeks to cast a whole ethnic group as inferior and pathologically different. This verbal tactic of totally discrediting an identifiable minority and the consequent denial of any possibility of dialogue, solidarity or empathy with them also functions by never presenting individuals in a positive way. For the anti-minority Right here are no integrated minority persons. The minority people are always a group or even a mass in our midst. Frequently, as in the cases cited by Nicolae, there is also a process of dehumanization and transfer into a pathological situation. And once a group has been dehumanized and pathologized, violence against them is justifiable or even called for, as was the case with an anti-Roma campaign by
11 See Tileaga, C.: Romanies: Accounting for extreme prejudice and legitimating blame in talk about the Romanies, Discourse & Society; 16(5) 2005, 603-624. 12 Sofia News Agency http://novinite.com/view_news.php?id=120548 (dated 27th September, 2010) viewed 15th January, 2011. 13 Kapralski, S.: Democratization in the Post-Communist Europe: a Romani Perspective. In: Schleinstein, N., Sucker, D., Wenninger, A., Wilde, A. (eds): gesis, Thematic Series Social Sciences Eastern Europe, Leibniz Institut fr Sozialwissenschaften, Berlin 2009(2), pp 5-11 (8). 14 See the publications of the NGO People against Racism, www.rasizmus.sk. See also Tileaga and Kapralski (above); Joachim Krau, The Roma People in Romania, gesis, pp. 20-22; Valeriu Nicolae Words that Kill, Index on Censorship, 35: 1 (2006), 137 141; Gwendolyn Albert, How Central European Populism Exploits Anti-Roma Sentiment in Populism in Central Europe eds. Vclav Nekvapil and Maria Staszkiewicz, Association for International Affairs (AMO) Prague, pp. 143-155; in the same publication: Marie Gailov, Populism in the Context of The Roma Question pp. 65-67: available at http://www.amo.cz./publications/populism-in-central-europe.html?lang=en .

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the newspaper The Sun in England in 2005.15 Such statements (wherever made) rule out any possibility of peaceful co-existence. With reference to the English newspaper, the Sun, I have switched to the media, rather than party-political rhetoric and advertising. Here the situation is particularly acute for the following reason: in a serious commentary on the news media it was stated, Marginal groups, and among them ethnic-minority groups, will never be selected as newsworthy unless they do or say something that fits the stereotype ().16 And there are virtually no positive stereotypes of minorities. The principal reason is that creation of difference is always evaluative: the majority group is always valued upwards or portrayed as superior, while the minority is always devalued and inferior. Revealingly, the presentations by Irena Bihariov17 and Alena Kotvanov bear out the general statement just made and add some new stereotypes to the catalogue of long-existing ones. An important part of this evaluation process is that the boundaries of cultures are always closely guarded to prevent cross-over. In addition, for the anti-minority Right and for many people, any gain on the part of a minority is seen as a loss of power or status by the majority. This is a premise (completely false) on which their arguments are based; consequently it is necessary to combat this premise.

Two: Language in the form of frequently-used concepts and arguments creates facts; consequently it is important to work on shifting the public discussion. And here we are back at an additional approach to my earlier statement of the necessity of attacking the premise on which any argument is based. One must repeatedly point out that difficulties or problems are of a social, economic or educational nature. They do not come from unchangeable cultural or racial differences, or personal (or group) inferiority. The reason absolutely to insist on this point is that difficulties which are presented as coming from so-called unchangeable cultural or racial differences can never be solved by political decisions or policies (and the anti-minority Right knows this). On the other hand, social, economic or educational problems can be dealt with politically though slowly. This also links to my point that one should never accept the classifications or categories of the anti-minority Right. Three: Within the suggested shift, it is important to move the public discussion in the direction of the view that group identity allows for differences.18 Ultimately, it is this which will undermine messages aimed at emphasizing the otherness of the minority person or group.19 Four: The Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS in Riga conducted a three-year project monitoring parliamentary and media debates on minorities in Latvia. The results were communicated via press releases, press conferences, interim reports, and meetings with politicians.20 The presentations at the Open Society Camp by Alena Kotvanov and Irena Bihariova indicated that this is being done locally in Slovakia. Such projects could be coordinated or extended to include parliamentary and media debates in Slovakia or elsewhere, over a longer period of time. As Gregory Fabian suggested in his presentation on Bosnia,21 it is important to cultivate relations with sympathetic journalists. Five: The aim of all racist language and images is to divide society, to create and emphasize difference. Consequently, in order to combat such language and images, it is important to emphasize common needs, interests, etc. which bridge groups. Common features need to be foregrounded. six: Any counter to prejudiced language or images should be well prepared and also have a long-term strategy in mind. In each town council, NGO, citizens group, interest group, lobby, etc., which is interested in dealing with anti-minority statements or images, one person in the group should be charged with preparing counter strategies. To prevent racist statements becoming fixed in the publics mind, and to counter-attack while the news is still fresh, these
18 See, for example, Ruud Koopmans, (with Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy), in Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005 p. 202, (speaking of British citizenship). 19 One practical and very visible step towards the incorporation of difference has been undertaken in the United Kingdom: the headscarf is an authorized part of the uniforms of the police forces and the United Kingdom Border Agency. Moslem women who wish to wear a headscarf may do so when on duty. 20 For results and analyses see Golubeva and Gould 2010. 21 Strategies in the Fight against Violence and Hate

What to do about it?

It is important to recognize that anti-minority language and pictures are statements about the identity of the majority - but without having to name specific characteristics of the majority. They function through the them and us or them versus us view of identity based on outright hostility. Consequently it is essential to do everything possible to undermine this view of identity and the hostility. one: An important psychological factor fundamentally relevant for much of these hostile words and images is that they portray or threaten the loss of something. The possibility, threat, or danger of losing something important which one already has (e.g. losing control, identity, money, or language) is extremely powerful. In many of the cases examined, and in very many other cases, the possibility of losing identity, culture or money is in the foreground. Fear is being created also by the possibility of loss. This is very powerful indeed. And the antiminority statements claim that the loss is going to occur because of unalterable cultural or racial differences. Because loss is so powerful, it is vital to offer something. Just what one should or could offer, must be determined by local dynamics.
15 See Nicolae for further information. 16 Harley, J.: Understanding News, Methuen Studies in Communication, Methuen, London and New York City: 1982 quoted in Erjavec, K.: Media Representation of the Discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovenia. Discourse & Society 12(6) 2001; 699-727. 17 Erb, R., Kohlstruck, M.: Die Funktion von Antisemitismus und Fremdenfeindschaft. In Braun, S., Geisler, A., Gerster, M.(eds): Strategien der Extremen Rechten: Hintergrnde, Analysen, Antworten, Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2009, 419-439; pp. 430-431.

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counter strategies will be more effective if they are implemented as soon as possible after the introduction or publication of the items they wish to counter. This presupposes a degree of preparedness on the part of the person delegated for this task. seven: In outlining the processes by which such language and images work, attention has been drawn to the fact that emotion is a very significant factor, in fact, perhaps even the most significant. Consequently it is important to find ways to use emotion in the counterstrategies. To summarize: Undermine the premises on which the anti-minority position is based; never accept the opponents categories, terminology, or arguments particularly those using fear; employ language which has a positive emotional content; and demonstrate that there is something to be gained by tolerance and acceptance of difference. As was emphasized in the discussion at the Open Society Camp, just what is proposed in this direction has to be based on the local dynamics and situation, but it needs to include the notions of a more peaceful open society, one which is better suited to the modern economy which depends on the skills and brains of all citizens. One further thing is clear: to use a modern advertising term, minorities are branded as negative and even destructive. This is the result of ancient prejudices and has been reinforced by modern political expediency. To overcome this, to change the brand, a consistent, focused, long-term multiple strategy is required,22 of which attention to language is just one part. and finally: The 2006-2007 training program of the very successful Swiss anti-minority party, the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), was headed Successful Political Communication Can Be Learned.23 It included the topics of Rhetoric, Argumentation Training, Comebacks and Retorts, Dealing with Print Media, and Dealing with Electronic Media. Organizations wishing to mount effective campaigns against racist and anti-minority language could profit from the example of the SVP.

Die Welt, 16th October 2009, article Streit um Minarettenverbot erreicht Deutschland. See: http://www. welt.de/politik/ausland/article4867285/Streit-um-Minarettenverbot-erreicht-Deutschland.html. Drl, P.: Ethnicized Laziness: Roma in the Slovak Social Policy Discourse, M.A. Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, 2006 Erb, R., Kohlstruck, M.: (eds): Die Funktion von Antisemitismus und Fremdenfeindschaft fr die rechtsextreme Bewegung. In: Braun, S., Geisler, A., Gerster, M. (eds): Strategien der Extremen Rechten: Hintergrnde, Analysen, Antworten, Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2009 Erjavec, K.: Media Representation of the Discrimination against the Roma in Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovenia, Discourse & Society 12(6) 2001. Fabian.G: Strategies in the Fight against Violence and Hate, this volume Gailov, M.: Populism in the Context of The Roma Question. In: Nekvapil, V., Staszkiewicz, M. (eds): Populism in Central Europe. Association for International Affairs (AMO) Prague, 2007. See: http://www. amo.cz./publications/populism-in-central-europe.html?lang=en Geden, O.: Interview Eduard Mainoni korrigierte und autorisierte Fassung 15.1.2004, Salzburg, transkribiert am 27.1.2004 korrigiert und autorisiert zurck am 29.1./9.2.2004. See: http://www. florianklenk.com/2006/09/22/mainoni-das-ungekurzte-interview-aus-dem-bauch-der-fpo/. Golubeva, M., Gould, R. (eds.): Shrinking Citizenship: Discursive Practices that Limit Democratic Participation in Latvian Politics, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York City, 2010. Gould, R.: Some Recent Discourses of Exclusion in the EU. In: Golubeva and Gould. Gould, R.: The Death of German Multiculturalism: What Angela Merkels shock talk is hiding, Ide fdrale1(2), December 2010. See: http://ideefederale.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Dec_2010. pdf . Harley, J.: Understanding News, Methuen Studies in Communication, Methuen, London and New York City, 1982. Husler, A.: Antiislamischer Rechtspopulismus in der extremen Rechten die PRO-Bewegung als neue Kraft? in S. Braun, A. Geisler, M. Gerster (eds.): Strategien der extremen Rechten. Hintergrnde - Analysen - Antworten, VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 130-147; see p. 141. Kapralski, S:, Democratization in the Post-Communist Europe: a Romani Perspective in eds. N. Schleinstein, D. Sucker, A. Wenninger, A. Wilde, gesis, Thematic Series Social Sciences Eastern Europe, Leibniz Institut fr Sozialwissenschaften, Berlin 2009(2), pp 5-11 (8). Kotvanov, A.: The Slovak Media Scene: Developments regarding the Presentation of Intolerance, Racism, Xenophobia and Antisemitism Topics, this volume. Koopmans, R. (with Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, F.): Contested Citizenship. Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 202. Krau, J.: The Roma People in Romania, gesis, pp. 20-22. Leudar, I., Hayes, J., Nekvapil, J. and Turner Baker, J.: Hostility Themes in Media, Community and Refugee Narratives, Discourse & Society 19(2) 2008: 187-221.

bibLiographY
Albert, G.: How Central European Populism Exploits Anti-Roma Sentiment. In: Nekvapil, V., Staszkiewicz, M. (eds): Populism in Central Europe. Association for International Affairs (AMO), Prague, 2007. See: http://www.amo.cz./publications/populism-in-central-europe.html?lang=en Bihariov, I.: Myths and Prejudices, this volume Blackledge, A.: Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World, Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture 15, John Benjamins, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2005. Der Zrcher Bote, Nr. 14, Friday April 7, 2006. See: http://www.svp-neerach.ch/Aktuell/2006/ schulungsprogramm.pdf.
22 See Fabian, G.: Strategies against violence and hate (this volume) for information on a multiple-strategy approach. 23 Erfolgreiche politische Kommunikation ist lernbar: Der Zrcher Bote, Nr. 14, Friday April 7, 2006, page 5: http://www.svp-neerach.ch/Aktuell/2006/schulungsprogramm.pdf accessed 15 January, 2011.

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Nicolae, V.: Words that Kill, Index on Censorship, 35:1 (2006), 137 141. Sofia News Agency: http://novinite.com/view_news.php?id=120548 (dated 27th September, 2010), accessed 15th January, 2011. Tileaga, C.: Romanies: Accounting for extreme prejudice and legitimating blame in talk about the Romanies, Discourse & Society; 16(5) 2005, 603-624.

i aM noT a raCisT, bUT...

irena bihriov
People against Racism, NGO, Slovakia
The notion of racist tends to be used today as a socially unacceptable label. Even the extreme right distances itself for its socially unacceptable content. Whilst there was no problem in the past for the extreme right rhetoric to mull over inequality of races and prioritize the Aryan race, today the extreme right uses the notion in a far more sophisticated manner. The statements of the right contain pressing topics which are publicly debated, polarize social discourse and confirm to a part of the public that there is indeed an enemy homosexuals, Romas, Hungarians, liberals, migrants. Such views often link the national, ethnic, religious or sexual characteristics of these enemy groups to such notions as criminals, parasites, pests, etc The repertoire of hate attitudes against minorities that are created prima facie from innocent stereotypes is not merely a weapon of the far right. Its members mostly offer this as their key agenda, an approach that makes them more legible. Yet similar stereotypical formulations can be also observed among standard political parties. It is not uncommon that what is said by a member of an extreme right movement in a simple and explicit terms, the same is said in a more subtle and elegant manner by a politician from the standard political spectrum. The broad public that itself is a primary source of negative stereotypical myths about minorities has acquired a false belief that only a young man with shaved head hiding a tattoo of Hakkenkreutz under his T-shirt and causing violence to members of minorities can be the carrier of racial, ethnic and national hate. As long as anyone merely says that the Romas are criminals who require a small court and a long whip, is not merely seen as a racist in public eyes, but the public often identifies with such a position. This attitude is symbolically illustrated by an oft-used phrase: I am not a racist, but ... (... I dont like those who come here to steal our work, I dont like parasitism of Romas). On the one hand, the society thus isolates the phenomenon of national or ethnic hate as a matter exclusively related to the extreme right. On the other hand, the public is willing to join the line of argument that gives an excuse to or facilitates such hate. It is ultimately this attitude that assists the right wing extremist groups as they build their political capital under the cover of acceptable stereotyping of minorities.

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Most Common Myths about Minorities The romas

Romas are the most common target of hate speech in discussions about minorities. Only exceptionally a view emerges that would not fall within the negatively tinted context of such a debate. Such attitudes often ignore the fact that ethnic Romas are as culturally, educationally and economically stratified as is any other minority in Slovakia. Yet the label Roma is almost exclusively applied to individuals of Roma origin who live in segregated environment in extreme poverty. Alternatively, it is used as a synonym for asocial lifestyle.

Affairs and Family does exclusively finance the cost of the social benefits. It is thus technically impossible for the Romas to use the bulk of the state income from taxation. In connection with members of the Roma minority who live in settlements and their massive profit, one has to bear in mind their social reality within the context of the conditions set out by law in order to have the right to certain social benefits or contributions. Provision of most benefits is conditional upon proof of permanent residence that is often hindered by an absence of legal settlement related to the occupation of premises in the Roma settlements. Provision of some benefits, which are commonly assumed to be most often used particularly by the Roma settlers, is only available upon satisfying concrete requirements. For instance, child support after birth of the first three children can only be provided to a mother who is not under-age and has regularly attended obstetrics checkups during pregnancy.2 Similarly, housing subsidies are accessible only through a complicated process.3 These subsidies can only be provided to people in material need that is proved by ownership of or tenancy in the estate concerned. Perhaps the most easily accessible benefit to the people in the settlements is a subsidy in material need.4 Here, however, two interesting points should be highlighted, as they somewhat demythologize the view of the lavish lifestyle of the Roma settlers that is made possible by the social benefits. First, the amount of this benefit to date represents Euro 157.60 per couple with 14 children and Euro 212.39 to a couple with more than 4 children.5 This questions the theory about the high birth rates among the Romas who thus aim to parasite on social benefits. The amount of the benefit ceases to increase after the fourth child. Similarly, the financial difference between the benefit provided to a couple with one or, for instance, eight children is negligible. Second, there are statistics from the Head Office for Labor, Social Affairs and Family on the percentage of people in the overall volume of users of social benefits provided in material need (March 2010).6 The chart shows that the greatest share among the users of this benefit are individuals without children (62%), whilst couples with 4 and more children represent only one-third share, and the share of individuals with 4 or more children is 0%.

The Majority and positive exceptions

The anti-Roma rhetoric is often accompanied by a mistaken categorization of Romas as mostly parasites and criminals and a few positive exceptions. Yet evidence shows that 60% of people of Roma origin in Slovakia live an integrated life and 40% inhabit settlements and urban ghettoes.1

roma privileges
A widely discussed theory suggests that Romas are a privileged group with a wider extend of social rights and are privileged in a number of ways to the detriment of the majority. Article 12 of the Slovak Constitution invalidates this theory as it rejects privileging in fundamental rights and freedoms on the basis of ethnicity. Furthermore a whole range of additional legislation sets out conditions of provision of social benefits. The supporters of this theory often fail to account for the fact that provision of social benefits is connected with socio-economic situation of the applicant (e.g. income, number of people in the household, etc). Thus any Slovak national who meets these conditions entitled to the benefits regardless his ethnicity, origin, etc

social parasitism
Another frequently stereotypical attitude towards Romas arises from a view that it is the Romas who are the greatest consumers of public tax. An alternative view suggests that the Romas from settlements are able to access a massive portfolio of social benefits. In reality it is of course undeniable that the expenditure earmarked for social policy is not the sole or fundamental account of the national budget. Not even the Ministry of Labor, Social
1 http://www.romovia.vlada.gov.sk/3554/listfaktov.php

2 3 4 5 6

Act 235/1998 Coll. Act 235/1998 Coll. on child benefits at birth, on parental benefits after the birth of three children simultaneously or after having twins repeatedly over a period of two years. Act 599/2003 Coll. on material need as further amended. Ibid. Ibid. http://www.upsvar.sk/statistiky/socialne-davky-statistiky.html?page_id=10826

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Culturally alien element and a Thief of Jobs

A perception of a foreigner in Slovakia tends to be connected with a view of a foreigner as a carrier of an alien culture that is incompatible with the values of the majority. There is also a prejudice that foreigners in Slovakia might one day occupy the job market and push out the locals. In reality, the foreigners in Slovakia come from EU15, USA or South Korea ... as highly qualified experts, consultants and entrepreneurs."8

Muslims
Given their numbers, Muslims represent only a marginal religious group in Slovakia. Yet the public attitude to them is quite misguided.

Terrorists and Militant islam

Traditional myths about Muslims are linked to the view of terrorist threat. This was certainly not helped by the global political war on terror that was fuelled by the world media, which portrayed a terrorist through an automatic overlap with an image of a Muslim. In addition to the above largely socio-economic clichs about Romas, there are also stereotypes about Roma criminality, their alleged aforementioned intention to have a large number of children in order to use them to access social benefits, or the less defamatory, yet similar stereotypes and generalizations which suggest that Romas have a natural talent for music. It may be appropriate to speak of a certain demonization of Islam. The public discourse often limits its code to disputes over the interpretation of the institute of holy war. Yet such line ignores the fact virtually every sacred book of one of the global religions contains a passage that can be used by a narrow group of fanatical adherents to give it their own meaning, even though the remaining members of the religious community would in no way identify with such an interpretation.

Migrants
Even though Slovak nationals in most regions do not often come to contact with foreigners, the latter are viewed by the local majority through a shifted perspective. This proves that stereotyping and myths are not merely fuelled by negative experience with individuals, that serves as a model for the entire group, but on the contrary by a lack of experience.

Cultural occupation
Muslims are often accused of bringing to Europe elements that distort its cultural identity. Yet this view does not reflect some context that is particularly shaped by integration processes in a given European country. The current generations of children of migrants from Muslim countries experience cultural interaction with other members of the population. This can be seen for example in that the children of Muslim parents seldom identify today through religion. Another ignored fact shows that the coexistence of culturally diverse communities within a country always occurs within the intentions of a legal state. This reduces the reality of various paranoid scenarios which speak of introduction in the EU of punishments by stoning or polygamy. Finally, the cultural identity of Europe was never homogenous and unchangeable. The changes and shifts in ideological and axiological system of Europe also arise with the influence of liberalism, relativism or other modern ethical, philosophical, and ideological concepts.
8 Ibid.

backwardness and social Dependence

In the view of the Slovak public, a typical profile of a foreigner living in Slovakia is someone who tends to arrive from backward countries, lacks adequate education, economic self-sufficiency, does not speak the local language and relies upon the national social system. In reality, the share of foreigners in active age was 90% in 2008, whilst up to 62% of foreigners living in Slovakia in 2008 came from the EU member states ... Following Slovakias entry in the EU, a typical migrant is a man (81%) aged 2534 with a relatively advanced level of education (32% were university educated in 2008).7
7 Vaeka, 2009, 22

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support to the stereotyping of Minorities Mementos from slovakia

The key factors that significantly help enhance stereotypes include: Limited information; lack of education in the society political discourse (legitimization of defamatory statements in political speeches, political parasitism on social themes with ethnic elements, etc) Media ("hot themes", that use the example of specific members of minorities to impose a profile of the entire group, tabloid twists to minority themes, etc) Misinterpretation of foreign experience (problems with suburban segregated ghettoes as a representative example of the consequences of migration, etc).

political Discourse
The billboard campaign of the Slovak National Party (that has seats in the Parliament) in the May 2010 election serves as an example of dubious juggling with the Roma stereotypes. The Party used a photograph of a Roma and used graphic tools to add stereotyping elements (golden chain and tattoos) and added the text: So that we dont feed those who dont want to work! Even though a number of non-governmental organizations filed an appeal for criminal proceedings against the Slovak National Party (SNP), suspecting it of a crime of incitement of race, ethnic, and national hatred, the campaign was found to be within legal limits. The argument for turning down the appeal by the Office of Judicial and Criminal Police in Bratislava Old Town was based on a conviction that the intention of the SNP merely intended to trigger nation-wide debate about the people who severely abuse the social system. With such argument the organ that is among those responsible for criminal proceedings identified with the very message of the billboard. This can also be seen as further means of legitimizing stereotypical attitudes.9

Limited information
The above factors also play a role in the Slovak context. For instance, the limited awareness among a significant portion of the population about social legislation often leads to public perceptions of the Romas as socially privileged individuals. There are also gaps in the awareness of the legal institute of discrimination. This is shown by the frequent mood and attitudes among the majority that presents itself as a victim of discriminatory practices with a lesser extent of rights than those available to minorities. The extent of public information on racism and the status of minorities often illustrates the level of online discussions and the activity of users of virtual social networks.

Media
In 2010 the Slovak public was shocked by the case of a sniper in Devnska Nov Ves who, under still unclear motivation, gunned down a number of his neighbors and passersby.
9 More on the campaign in R.enkiriks chapter in this volume.

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The manner in which the major Slovak media gradually provided information about the case triggered chaos and confusion and above all anti-Roma hysteria in public attitude. A few hours following the incident, news started to circulate in the media that the victim was a family of Roma dealers and the case involved account settling within drug mafia. In the next stage, the most popular television channel aired a confusing report that informed that the murdered victims were problem Roma neighbors of the sniper. Some other media added that the inhabitants in the given suburb repeatedly requested the municipality to assist them in solving misbehaving Roma neighbors, but since the competent authorities did not help, it was possible that the sniper took justice in his own hands. Even though it was eventually discovered that the report concerned an entirely different family (the victims of the shooting included only a single person of Roma origin who had no connection with the report or the profile of the problem neighbor), the public was not discouraged from making excuses or sometimes even glorifying the sniper. These massively adopted attitudes were demonstrated by signs of gratitude and messages to the sniper where the shooting took place.

education
Dissemination of facts is the key weapon against nationally and ethnically hateful stereotypes and myths. In order to make them accessible to the majority of the population, they have to be incorporated into educational processes. Youth education (pupils and students in secondary schools) does not necessarily have to be carried out through reading of compulsory texts. Different proven learning practices are available, which engage students in direct interaction with members of minorities (e.g. living libraries, workshops, discussion groups, etc).

visibility of a Theme in the Media, support of positive examples

If information aimed to dispel stereotypes is to reach not merely pupils and students, but also middle and older generation, it needs to include a theme with which they can identify, that is visible within their context, either through media support to positive examples or at least through an occasional education column in the mainstream media.

an offer of Constructive solutions

As the representatives of the extreme right profit from unsolved social problems of the Roma minority, it is essential that relevant experts and standard political parties offer constructive solutions as an alternative to the solutions offered by the extremists. Otherwise the society, under the pressure of such problems, shifts into the position that perceives the extremists as the only ones who truly care about the problems of common people.

attitude of public authorities, individual engagement

Finally, a change in defamatory public discourse about minorities cannot occur without voices that neutralize it. This can be aided by a voice of a public authority or media figure, but also from the general public through engagement in online discussions, blogs, or through the mere dissemination of ones own positive experience.

Demythologizing tools
To eliminate all negative prejudice against minorities would be a utopian ambition. It is important not to underestimate those attitudes that seriously touch upon the honor and dignity of members of minorities, which at the same time are given force by social uncritical acceptance of facts.

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bibLiographY
Marcinin, A, Marcininov, : The Cost of Exclusion of Romas (Straty z vylenia Rmov). Nadcia otvorenej spolonosti, Bratislava, 2009. Vaeka, M: Public Attitudes to Foreigners and Migration from Abroad in the Slovak Republic (Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraninej migrcii v Slovenskej republike). IOM - Medzinrodna organizcia pre migrciu, Bratislava, 2009. Act 235/1998 Coll. on child benefits at birth, on parent benefits after birth three children simultaneously or after having repeatedly twins over a period of two years. Act 599/2003 Coll. on material need as further amended.

CoMbaTing haTe CriMe ThroUgh CoMprehensive aDvoCaCY sTraTegies

gregory Fabian
International Human Rights Consultant, Slovakia

introduction
Combating hate crime may be perceived by civil society advocates as a very cumbersome task as it is difficult to know exactly the right approach to choosing issues to address as well as objectives and outputs to address them. Furthermore it is difficult to determine specifically what advocacy tactics might be undertaken to achieve and objective in combating hate crime or to address a currently important issue. Often NGOs will chose to work on one issue or objective depending upon the local conditions using certain tactics or activities while failing to consider the entire scope of tactics and activities which might be used. Thus it is important to formulate comprehensive advocacy strategies which can produce more effective outcomes and objectives. This paper will consider how activists might make their advocacy strategies more comprehensive through the use of a variety of advocacy tactics, and will feature a true case study illustrating a comprehensive advocacy strategy for securing adequate housing for a Roma community which had been living without adequate housing and essential services for over 40 years. While the issue in this case was the deprivation of the right to adequate housing, the root cause was the deep hatred and prejudice of the non Roma community which lived nearby. Thus many of the tactics which were used can be useful both in preventing hate crimes as well as seeking remedies for victims.

Where to start
Whether combating hate crime or the hatred of a minority group by another group which deprives the minority of their rights, advocates must remember that if they apply a human rights based approach (HRBA), governments have a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights of all in society and in particular, the rights of those who are the most vulnerable. If employed, a HRBA approach will enable advocates to define specifically what the most important issue is in combating hate crime in their area of responsibility, and how to address it.

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Combating hate Crime Through Comprehensive advocacy strategies

The Duty to respect, protect, promote, and Fulfill

It is essential for advocates to note that under international human rights law, the duties to respect, protect promote and fulfill all imply different obligations on governmental duty bearers. Here is a summary of those obligations: respect is a negative obligation, which requires the state to refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons to the enjoyment of the rights. This also means that the state should abstain from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal measure, which violates the integrity of the individual or which in any way interferes or limits his/her right to pursue the enjoyment of the rights in the international human rights instruments to which the state is obligated. e.g. to refrain from arbitrary forced evictions. protect places a positive obligation on the state to prevent the violation of any individual's rights by a third party e.g. private employers interfering with the right to work or rights at work by non-compliance with basic labour standards. promote places a positive obligation on the state to create a conducive atmosphere in which people can exercise their rights and freedoms by promoting awareness of their rights through public education e.g. measures to promote tolerance and prevent discrimination in access to rights. Fulfill places a positive obligation on the state to institute active measures that enable each individual to access entitlements to the right and which cannot be secured through exclusively personal efforts. State parties are also obliged to provide a specific right when an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize the right themselves by the means at their disposal, e.g. people in disaster situations or those in dire need. Furthermore, states are required to take the appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, and other measures towards the full realization of rights.

What specific activities will you undertake to achieve your output? 5) Whose rights (i.e. which rights-holders) are you concerned with specifically, and what part of government will be the target of your activities? Will it be the executive branch (those who carry out the laws), the legislative branch (those who make the laws) or the judicial branch (those who enforce the laws) or any combination of these branches? What tactics will you employ to achieve your objective? 6) In addition to identifying the specific rights-holders and duty-bearers, who can be your partners to help you identify what duty-bearers have and have not done to address your objective, and who might even partner with you to achieve your objective? And what resources do you have available in order to pursue your objective? 7) What human rights benchmarks and indicators will you use to periodically assess and report on the extent to which the rights-holders are addressing the objective which you are pursuing, and to identify any obstacles to achieving an output?

Tips on alternative Ways of identifying issues or Choosing objectives for advocacy

As an alternative to using a HRBA to identify issues or objectives for advocacy, advocates can use the recommendations of human rights treaty bodies to your country such the UN Human Rights Committee, and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, where such recommendations deal with hate crime. Also international governmental organizations such as the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance and international non governmental organizations often issue country reports with specific recommendations for each government. These also are a rich source of advocacy objectives or issues.

seven steps to developing a comprehensive advocacy strategy

1) When advocates select a certain issue they wish to address or an objective they desire to pursue to combat hate crime, a comprehensive advocacy strategy should be developed using the HRBA. This may be done by answering the following seven questions: 2) Who is the specific duty bearer within government who is obligated by law to address a chosen issue relating to hate crime, what are her/his human rights obligations, and is the duty-bearer respecting, protecting, and fulfilling them? 3) Based on your findings in step 1, what is the objective that you choose to pursue to address a specific hate crime issue? 4) What output will you try to achieve as the next step toward your objective, and what deadline will you set for achieving the output? What outcome do you hope to achieve in performing the output?

The Ten point plan for Combating hate Crime

The international non governmental organization, Human Rights First has established a Ten Point Plan for Combating Hate Crimes1 which, while directed at governments, can also serve as a rich source of ideas for establishing advocacy objectives or issues. The plan is as follows: We call on all governments of the 56 participating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to implement the following ten-point plan for combating violent hate crimes within their own countries as well as the recommendations for strengthening the capacity of the OSCE in this area:

See: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/fighting-discrimination/recommendations-for-governments/

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Ten-point plan for Combating hate Crimes

1) acknowledge and condemn violent hate crimes whenever they occur. Senior government leaders should send immediate, strong, public, and consistent messages that violent crimes which appear to be motivated by prejudice and intolerance will be investigated thoroughly and prosecuted to the full extent of the law. 2) enact laws that expressly address hate crimes. Recognizing the particular harm caused by violent hate crimes, governments should enact laws that establish specific offenses or provide enhanced penalties for violent crimes committed because of the victims race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, mental and physical disabilities, or other similar status. 3) strengthen enforcement and prosecute offenders. Governments should ensure that those responsible for hate crimes are held accountable under the law, that the enforcement of hate crime laws is a priority for the criminal justice system, and that the record of their enforcement is well documented and publicized. 4) provide adequate instructions and resources to law enforcement bodies. Governments should ensure that police and investigatorsas the first responders in cases of violent crimeare specifically instructed and have the necessary procedures, resources and training to identify, investigate and register bias motives before the courts, and that prosecutors have been trained to bring evidence of bias motivations and apply the legal measures required to prosecute hate crimes. 5) Undertake parliamentary, inter-agency or other special inquiries into the problem of hate crimes. Such public, official inquiries should encourage public debate, investigate ways to better respond to hate crimes, and seek creative ways to address the roots of intolerance and discrimination through education and other means. 6) Monitor and report on hate crimes. Governments should maintain official systems of monitoring and public reporting to provide accurate data for informed policy decisions to combat violent hate crimes. Such systems should include anonymous and disaggregated information on bias motivations and/or victim groups, and should monitor incidents and offenses, as well as prosecutions. Governments should consider establishing third party complaint procedures to encourage greater reporting of hate crimes and conducting periodic hate crime victimization surveys to monitor underreporting by victims and under recording by police. 7) Create and strengthen antidiscrimination bodies. Official antidiscrimination and human rights bodies should have the authority to address hate crimes through monitoring, reporting, and assistance to victims.

8) reach out to community groups. Governments should conduct outreach and education efforts to communities and civil society groups to reduce fear and assist victims, advance police-community relations, encourage improved reporting of hate crimes to the police and improve the quality of data collection by law enforcement bodies. 9) speak out against official intolerance and bigotry. Freedom of speech allows considerable latitude for offensive and hateful speech, but public figures should be held to a higher standard. Members of parliament and local government leaders should be held politically accountable for bigoted words that encourage discrimination and violence and create a climate of fear for minorities. 10) encourage international cooperation on hate crimes. Governments should support and strengthen the mandates of intergovernmental organizations that are addressing discriminationlike the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and the Fundamental Rights Agencyincluding by encouraging such organizations to raise the capacity of and train police, prosecutors, and judges, as well as other official bodies and civil society groups to combat violent hate crimes. Governments should also provide a detailed accounting on the incidence and nature of hate crimes to these bodies in accordance with relevant commitments.

a Case study to illustrate a Comprehensive advocacy strategy

In order to illustrate how to develop a comprehensive advocacy strategy, the following case study is presented. A number of observations can be made in examining it. First, the advocacy strategy used in the case study involved many different tactics to address many issues which arose during this three-year advocacy campaign such as the use of electronic and print media, a UN treaty body mechanism, strategic litigation, expert technical consultants, policy negotiations with municipal and central government duty bearers, NGO coalition building, interventions of international governmental and non governmental organizations, etc. By no means will every advocacy campaign involve the use of all of these tactics. Nor will many advocacy objectives be so extended involving so many actors and resources. Instead, most advocacy objectives or issues might involve only the use of one or two of these tactics. The choice of tactics will be determined by the level of complexity and intractability of the hate crime issue as well as the human and financial resources of the advocacy organization or organizations involved. Also some of the tactics were used consecutively, some in tandem. Furthermore, many were used simultaneously and cumulatively which demanded an acute sense of timing and solidarity among all the advocacy partners. In the end it was the cumulative effect of these tactics and the solidarity among the advocacy partners which finally tipped the scales in favor of the Roma community in this instance.

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The reader should consider especially the tactics used in the case study which his or her organization does not often employ in its advocacy. It is the diversity and cumulative effect of such tactics which in the end, will lead to the achievement of an objective or the resolution of an issue regarding hate crime.

was entitled to compensation of some sort. Instead, they were to be forcibly relocated. In addition, there was no evidence that the temporary housing would be adequate. Human Rights Officers from the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina attended the meeting and put the Minister on notice of his international human rights treaty obligations to the Butmir Roma community regarding adequate housing including legal security of tenure, as well as their duty to protect the community against unlawful forced evictions. In their research, the OSCE human rights team discovered that SIDA had allocated approximately 1 million KM (511.292 Euro) for permanent housing for community members and that Caritas would use the funds to construct new housing for members of the Butmir Roma community. Furthermore, it was discovered that Caritas had a comprehensive plan to address other social needs of the community such as school attendance and other matters essential to their social inclusion. Cantonal authorities though, had shown little interest in either proposal. Thus Cantonal authorities planned to spend 720.000 KM (368,130 Euro) of taxpayers` money to forcibly relocate the Butmir Roma community to a container settlement in a temporary location, when they could have accepted the SIDA offer of 1 million KM (511.292 Euro), allocated land in an adequate location, and used the 720,000 KM (368,130 Euro) for necessary infrastructure which would support a permanent settlement with adequate housing. The OSCE Team was able to find free legal representation for the Community members by liasing them with the Sarajevo office of the Spanish Legal Aid NGO, MPDL. Many members of the community signed agreements for MPDL lawyers to represent them, and MPDL began to take steps to initiate litigation on their behalf. This created bargaining power for Community members and encouraged Cantonal authorities to consider the SIDA/Caritas plan. Further, SIDA and Caritas insisted that they could not invest any funding or other efforts toward temporary housing, which further increased the Community`s leverage. In a shift by the Sarajevo canton authorities, the Cantonal Minister for Housing took charge of the matter which further improved matters for the Roma community. As part of the campaign, the OSCE Team also developed a press strategy which employed both the electronic and print media in its campaign for adequate housing for the Butmir Roma. Further, as BIH was due to report to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) on its compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the OSCE team liaised the European Roma Rights Center and national Roma NGOs with the Human Rights Committee on the matter of the forced Butmir relocation. This resulted in the HRC`s issuance of principal concern and recommendation no. 23 on 22 November 2006 concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina which reads as follows: 23. The Committee notes with concern that the State party intends to forcibly relocate the inhabitants of the Roma settlement at Butmir, purportedly because it lacks the necessary

Case study: The relocation of the butmir roma Community in sarajevo

On 3 June 2009, 270 members of the Roma community (32 families) living in the Butmir settlement in Sarajevo were relocated into 33 new housing units in 8 new two-floor buildings. The dwellings were funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and constructed by Caritas Suisse (Caritas) on land and infrastructure donated by various municipalities within the Sarajevo Canton. This separation and integration of community members into various municipalities was with the consent of community members and Roma NGO representatives. The Butmir Roma settlement, which had been inhabited by the Roma community for over 40 years, had been regarded as one of the worst Roma settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Roma community members lacked access to adequate housing including facilities essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition such as safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating, lighting, sanitation facilities, refuse disposal, storage, and emergency services. None of the children were attending school. Unemployment was very high. But while the result was a success, the process was complicated and protracted involving the concerted and sustained advocacy of many players. This effort followed a number of unsuccesful attempts by Cantonal authorities to relocate the settlement over the years. The latest attempt began in July, 2006 when the Cantonal Minister for Urban Planning and Environmental Protection called a meeting with members of the Community at the Ministry to inform them that they would be moved to a temporary container settlement in the Vlakovo settlement on the outskirts of Sarajevo within a few weeks. They were informed that this was necessary because they were illegally occupying a water protection zone which had been designated as such only a few years before. A new non-Roma settlement which had been built across the street from the Roma settlement after the Bosnian War would not be relocated, though, because the authorities deemed that the non-Roma settlement had the necessary infrastructure to prevent water pollution. Furthermore, the non-Roma community was pressuring Cantonal authorities to evict their Roma neighbors. Initially, there was no indication that the authorities would comply with the Roma settlers` right to an eviction process which complied with international human rights laws and standards. Nor was there any consideration that after occupying this land for 40 yrs perhaps the community

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infrastructure to prevent pollution of the water supply, while no such relocation plan exists for the non-Roma families living across the street. It also notes with concern that the relocation plan reportedly lacks any detail as to the legal remedies and compensation available to Roma families concerned (articles 2, 17, 26) The state party should reconsider the relocation plan for the roma settlement at butmir, taking into account the residence entitlements of the inhabitants of the settlement which has existed for 40 years, as well as alternative solutions to prevent pollution of the water supply. The state party is reminded that any relocation must be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner and must comply with international human rights standards, including the right of individuals to an effective remedy, compensation, and provision of alternative adequate housing. In August 2007 the Sarajevo Cantonal authorities accepted the SIDA/Caritas proposal and a forced relocation to a temporary container settlement was averted. And finally, in June 2009, after difficulties in site selection, members of the Butmir Roma community had adequate housing.The main lesson learned was that duty-bearers` proposals of temporary relocations of Roma settlements until permanent housing can be secured are not advised from a human rights perspective as such proposals eliminate the capability of the Roma community to create bargaining power for adequate housing by taking legal actions to avoid unlawful forced eviction. It should be remembered that often the only thing that duty bearers want is to move the Roma off the land they occupy as quickly as possible. Actions taken to defend their rights to prevent an unlawful forced eviction and demand adequate housing are the only real bargaining chips which the Roma community has. Thus, the longer the Roma community fights to stay on the land it occupies, the more leverage it creates. Another lesson is that funds spent on temporary housing could be used for adequate permanent housing which includes legal security of tenure and access to essential services. A temporary relocation could be considered if, and only if, a. there is an executed legally binding agreement for a permanent relocation in place which complies with international human rights standards for adequate housing, b. funds have been allocated, and c. construction has begun. Further, it should be noted that such temporary housing must also comply with international human rights standards for adequate housing. But even if these conditions are met, it is still the case that the funds spent on temporary housing are a waste of resources which could be dedicated to permanent housing. The most important lesson learned is that campaigns for adequate housing for members of the Roma community require sustained and comprehensive advocacy strategies involving many actors working in concert including the press, international governmental and non governmental organizations, rights holders, NGOs, donors, independent experts, etc. Above all, they require persistence, determination and unity on the part of all parties involved.

reCoMMenDeD reaDing
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Preventing and responding to hate crimes, a resource guide for NGOs in the OSCE Region. Warsaw, 2009, http://www.osce.org/odihr/39821 OSCE/ODIHR: Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2009. Warsaw, 2010, http://www.osce.org/odihr/73636 OSCE/ODIHR: Hate Crime Laws A Practical Guide. Warsaw, 2009, http://www.osce.org/odihr/36426 European Network against Racism (ENAR), Combating Racist Crime and Violence: Testtimonies and Advocacy Strategies, May 2009, http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/AdvocacyBooklet_ EN_lowres.pdf European Unon Agency for Fundamental Rights: Towards More Effective Policing Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic Profiling. Belgium, 2010, http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/ attachments/Guide_ethnic_profiling.pdf OSCE/ODIHR: International Action against Racism, Xenophobia, Intolerance and Anti-semitism in the OSCe Region A comparative study. Warsaw, 2004, http://www.osce.org/odihr/13995 The Southern Poverty Law Center: Ten Ways to Fight Hate A Community Response Guide. Montgomery, Alabama, 2010, http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/Ten_Ways_2010.pdf

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praCTiCaL soLUTions oF Cases oF raCe DisCriMinaTion WiTh The Use oF TooLs oF LegaL proTeCTion in sLovaKia
tefan ivanco
Centre for Citizens and Human Rights, Slovakia
Human rights protection in the world derives from the premise that all people are equal in dignity and have equal rights. Regardless of any characteristic that differentiates people, all men have equal dignity and rights. Manifestations of discrimination distort this equality between men. Discrimination is an activity that limits people in their exercise of human rights guarantied to them and that reduces their human dignity. Both history and the present show that one of the most widespread causes of discrimination is the fact of belonging to a different race, national or ethnic origin. The manifestations of race discrimination are prohibited by numerous international laws for the protection of human rights. It is also prohibited by the Slovak legislation. The following chapter shall explain the current protection against race discrimination in Slovakia in practice. The author draws from long-term practical experience of non-governmental organization Center for Civil and Human Rights (hereafter referred to as the Center) in solving concrete case of race discrimination in Slovakia using the existing tools of legal protection. In order to define race discrimination within the context of this chapter, we may face some ambiguities and ought to therefore give it some attention. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Race Discrimination (ICERD) is an international accord adopted by the UN in 1965. It interprets race discrimination as a breach of equality in the exercise of any guarantied rights and freedom on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin. This understanding includes any discrimination or limitations of man on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin in different areas of life including any violence on people on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) monitors the implementation of the Convention by the signatory states. For instance, it monitors manifestations of unequal treatment in different areas of public life, as well as manifestations of extremism, xenophobia and antisemitism, hate speech, incidence of racially motivated crimes, racially motivated violence by the police, etc. This paper shall not address the entire range of unlawful manifestations of race discrimination. It focuses on manifestations of direct discrimination on race grounds in light of the definition

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practical solutions of Cases of race Discrimination with the Use of Tools of Legal protection in slovakia

set out by the antidiscrimination act1 - on a case when man is treated less favorably in similar or comparable situation in concrete areas of public life defined by law. In our context the vast majority of these cases involve discrimination of the Roma minority in access to services, employment, health care or education. In comparison with hate crimes on race grounds, these cases represent unlawful activities that are founded on race intolerance or prejudice, yet normally not meriting racially-motivated crimes as defined by the Slovak Criminal Code. There are additional legal norms, most importantly the antidiscrimination act that serve as protection against it. The Center started to deal with cases of race discrimination by using the antidiscrimination law after its adoption in 2004. The objective was to use the law in concrete cases of discrimination in courts in order to enable this legislation to become a more effective legal tool of protection against discrimination. Admittedly, this was not the sole legal tool used by the Center in solving the cases of race discrimination. Somewhat paradoxically at first sight, we initially dealt with a number of cases by filing a criminal appeal and argued that the discrimination meant committing racially-motivated crime.2 This involved cases of unequal treatment that we believed took place in public, concretely cases of limiting access to members of the Roma minority to public service, preventing them from entering restaurants, dance clubs, etc. Organs involved in criminal proceedings reviewed these cases particularly depending on argumentation in the criminal appeal, suspecting incitement to race hatred or defamation. The examination of circumstantial evidence involved an assessment whether the objective condition of a given crime was met, in particular whether the deed was committed publicly and whether the discrimination also involved verbal racial defamation. It may be unsurprising that no one was found guilty in these cases. Even though in some cases of discrimination of access to services the organs conducting criminal proceedings initiated the proceedings, but later terminated them, and passed the case to offence or administrative proceedings (district authority, inspectorates of the Slovak Trade Inspection). In other cases the criminal proceedings have never been initiated and the case was promptly passed to administrative proceedings or the appellants were addressed directly to the court. A remarkable example in this context involves a case when the Romas were not allowed to come to a lake that also served for summer recreation. The pond was administered by one of the villages in the region Preov region. The municipal council issued an order in 2006 that banned access of the inhabitants of the Roma minority to the lake. This regulation at the time even attracted media attention. Based on an appeal, the relevant prosecution ruled the regulation as unlawful. Yet the discrimination continued in practice. In the summer of 2007 a group of young Romas was prevented from accessing the lake by ticket sellers requesting form them fictitious membership cards. A non-Roma staff member and a partner of the Center purchased tickets without difficulties and was allowed to the area of the lake. The seller explained that the membership cards are only requested from the Romas to prevent them entry
1 2 Act 365/2004 Coll. on equal treatment in some areas and on protection against discrimination as further amended. 423 of the Criminal Law 300/2005 as further amended: Defamation of nation, race and belief or 424 Incitement to national, race and ethnic hate.

to the area. The organs involved in criminal proceedings initiated proceedings on the grounds of service duty was eventually terminated by a member of the police corps. This decision was later overruled by the prosecution as unlawful and an appeal was filed against the mayor of the town for crime of defamation of nation, race and belief. The district court freed the mayor, but the regional court overruled the decision and returned the case to the district court. The latter confirmed its original decision arguing that it was not possible to prove adequately that the order to discriminate against the Romas was given by the mayor himself. This decision was then confirmed by the Regional Court in Preov as an appellate court.3 The means of how the prosecution approached the case was an exception and, from our point of view, surprisingly progressive, since the very discrimination of young Romas in connection with the lake was not linked to verbal defamation. The approach suggested that, if discrimination on race grounds meets the condition of taking place in public, is it possible to interpret the unequal treatment as a manifestation of defamation that reduces the seriousness of the damaged party. Therefore it does not have to involve merely the typical oral or written expression of defamation.4 The aforementioned unlawful discriminatory regulation of the municipal council, which started the entire process, might have played a role in the examination of the case. Regardless of whether the organs involved in criminal proceedings examine a given case of race discrimination, our experience shows that it is important to notify the police of the incident and for the discriminated parties to file a criminal appeal or an offence appeal. When arriving to the location of the incident, the police may tend to play down the case. Yet it should ultimately document the incident and hear witness testimonies. This may be useful later if the damaged parties decide to demand their rights in court through litigation in line with the antidiscrimination law. Specifically, in case of race discrimination of access to public service, it is useful for the discriminated parties to request the police to carry out alcohol level tests, as the alleged drunkenness of the damaged parties is often one of the major arguments used by the discriminating party to explain why they prevented the appellants from entering a restaurant, dance club, etc. Yet the Criminal law is not the only crucial tool of protection against unequal treatment on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin. Even ICERD does not require qualification of all manifestations of race discrimination as crimes. In any case, however, it requires a ban on all discrimination according to the definition set out by the Convention. It also requires its elimination and provision of effective protection against race discrimination to anyone through courts or other state organs, including the right to demand just and adequate compensation for
3 4 Decision by the District Court in Vranov nad Topou, ref. 2 T 66/08 of May 24, 2010 in conjunction with the decision by the Regional Court in Preov, ref. 7 To 75/10 310. In this context one can quote, inter alia, the decision by the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic on 2000 on 198 on the Criminal Law 140/1963 Coll. as further amended (law valid until December 31, 2009) on the merit of crime of Defamation of nation, ethnic group, race and belief. It is a similar reading as that available in the Slovak Criminal Law. The Court reminds that defamation means any intentional limitation of respect and may happen in any form: Defamation is a subjective, severely offensive manifestation. () It may be manifested in any form. () The offensive nature of the manifestation may arise from its content and means of the expression, the means of its exercise or from other circumstances under which it was carried out. Ref. 7 TDO 989/2002.

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any damage caused as a result of discrimination. Do the civil courts and the antidiscrimination legislation in Slovakia provide such protection? The brief answer is: no. After more than six years since the adoption of the Antidiscrimination Law it can be said that this legal norm does not guarantee an effective protection against race discrimination. With the adoption of this law, Slovakia fulfilled its commitment linked to the EU membership and its requirement to introduce relevant antidiscrimination directives into the national legal system. Following its adoption the Law served as an useful tool to increase awareness about discrimination. Yet it remains underutilized in legal practice as a practical tool for the protection of those discriminated against. There are only a handful of final court rulings by based on this Law. In addition, a number of first and second degree court decisions may be seen as controversial in light of quality within the context of the international antidiscrimination legislation.5 The practical implementation of the antidiscrimination law in cases of discrimination seems to face three main obstacles: 1) The decision-making process at courts is protracted. Proceedings for the protection against discrimination last several years, even though the delays in court proceedings are not specific only to the litigations about discrimination. 2) The court decisions on discrimination are often inconsistent and even controversial; the courts often fail to sufficiently reflect the specific aspects of antidiscrimination legislation, such as the institution of the reversed burden of proof. 3) The courts do not tend to perceive race discrimination as an activity that severely reduces human dignity; they are reluctant to award the damaged parties any compensation for race discrimination. Today, the appeal for ones right at courts in connection with discrimination and specifically race discrimination requires a lot of patience and a significant degree of personal activism to fight for ones rights. One has to be also aware that the outcome of the dispute is less certain than it may initially seem by looking at the merit of the case. The above flaws are well illustrated by a court case that was decided in the fall of 2010. It was one of the first cases of race discrimination initiated according to the antidiscrimination law back in 2005. It concerned discrimination against three young Roma activists who objected to the denial of access to one of the restaurants in Michalovce on grounds of their Roma origin. The District Court in Michalovce decided for the first time in August 2006 and ruled that the Romas were discriminated against, but rejected the claim of the racial grounds for the discrimination. The court altogether failed to explain the grounds for the discrimination. In 2007, the Regional Court in Koice, as an appellate court, overruled the original decision as confusing and returned the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. The latter reviewed the case in January 2008 and decided that the Romas were indeed discriminated
5 In November 2010 the Center published a Collection of Court Decision on Matters of Right to Equal Treatment. In addition to court decisions in the Czech Republic, United Kingdom and the European Court of Justice, it contains decisions by the Slovak courts on cases of discrimination. The publication is available electronically at www.poradna-prava.sk

in the caf on the grounds of their ethnicity. The court ordered the owner of the caf to send the Romas a letter of apology, but refused to assign any financial compensation for discrimination and for the consequent breach of dignity of the damaged party.6 In September 2010 the Regional Court in Koice confirmed the decision which is now in force. We find the argument behind the courts refusal to assign any compensation as controversial and not in line with the international standards for the protection against race discrimination. The case is currently at the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. The clients, in cooperation with the Center, are also considering taking additional legal steps. An important issue linked to the application of the antidiscrimination law involves the actual possibilities of proving discrimination in civil law proceedings. Discrimination often occurs suddenly, unexpectedly, without witnesses (e.g. in case of access to employment) and in many cases is not easy to prove. Despite the existing institution of the so-called reversed burden of proof in antidiscrimination disputes (i.e., the defendant, not the petitioner, has to prove that they did not discriminate if the petitioner presents the court with facts that suggest discrimination), it is important for the petitioner to be able in the proceedings to identify facts on the basis of which the court has a good reason to believe that the discrimination did occur. In some antidiscrimination proceedings the Center provides legal representation, sound recording of the so-called testing is important as it proves the discrimination occurred in public. It is good that the Slovak courts today generally accept this evidence. The need to improve the implementation of the antidiscrimination legislation in courts in cases of race discrimination in practice is highlighted in one the other current recommendations for Slovakia by the aforementioned UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.7 The Committee reminds that the Slovak National Center for Human Rights (a state institution whose powers include also practical provision of legal aid in court proceedings to discriminated parties) should play a more active role in the practical implementation of the antidiscrimination law. So far, the Centre has not been very active in this aspect of its agenda. Within the relevant administrative proceedings, the powers to review and sanction some manifestations of discrimination also falls on state institutions such as the Inspectorates of the Slovak Trade Inspection, the Labor Inspectorates or the National School Inspectorate. Yet in practice their activities against discrimination are also limited. In the future, more effective and flexible sanctions against certain cases of discrimination would benefit from an extension of powers of the Slovak National Center for Human Rights to enable it to directly penalize manifestations of discrimination, as is the case in some other countries, such as Bulgaria or Hungary. The Centers powers currently limit the possibility to carry out independent investigation. In any case, the implementation of the antidiscrimination law by courts ought to be remembered. The antidiscrimination law in its current reading is, in principle, a good legal tool that can provide the discriminated parties with a high degree of compensation, such as different forms of apology, including financial compensation for non-material damages or other losses. In light
6 7 Decision by the District Court in Michalovce of January 29, 2008, ref. 12C/139/2005 - 158 CERD/C/SVK/CO/6-8. p. 10

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of its implementation in practice, however, we cannot expect any swift development. It will be important for the Slovak courts to work in the future with cases of discrimination in practice and to gradually improve the interpretation of the antidiscrimination legislation, to form a national judicature in cases of discrimination and for the positive decisions by courts to motivate other discriminated people to appeal for their rights. Positive verdicts of courts in support of the discriminated parties may also help the prevention of manifestations of discrimination within the society. Our courts face an uneasy task. In the near future they will have to deal with, inter alia, the examination of specific manifestations of race discrimination, such as race segregation of Roma children in schools. We hope that the numbers of those who successfully appeal for their rights in courts in connection with discrimination will continue to grow.

a sTorY oF one peTiTion (i.e. Does sLovaKia ToLeraTe raCisM?)

rastislav enkirik
social expert and culture scientist, Slovakia
The following contribution shall offer a concrete example pointing out an alarming inconsistency between the declared and actual approach to the issue of intolerance, racism and extremism in the slovak republic. This is not a phenomenon that is hard to decipher, but an official part of an electoral campaign that attracted public attention. Externally, through multilateral commitments, internal norms, and program documents, Slovakia joined the part of the international community that thoroughly defends human rights and freedom (including human dignity). It also aims to create an effective barrier to xenophobia, intolerance, racism, and overt and hidden forms of extremism in public life. From the formal point of view, there is thus no reason to criticize the Slovak Republic. This makes the actual social praxis in Slovakia more controversial. The practices balance on a thin rope that separates populism, nationalism and radicalism from overt manifestations of racism and extremism. Regrettably, these are not mere excesses, but a lasting and escalating process. It witnesses the pitifully limited applicability of human rights in this area, the vulgarity and aggression of the rhetoric of public figures (including the constitutional leaders), the success of political populism aimed at atavism of human nature, the lasting historical frustration of the Slovak society and consequent socio-cultural stereotypes. The campaign prior to the 2010 Parliamentary elections is a peak of the iceberg in this negative trend. Up to then, open incitement to ethnic hate and racism was a matter of agenda of marginalized extremist political forces. Prior to the 2010 elections, a parliamentary party reached for these practice. Though the party is generally considered nationalistic, it is not extremist. In its electoral campaign, the Slovak National Party (SNS) used billboards that depicted semi-naked Roma in a poor household. It was accompanied by the following text: so that we dont feed those who dont want to work.

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a story of one petition

robert Kalik, Minister of the interior sr Despite the limited media support and within short time, most experts and activist in this field joined the signatories, as did the relevant civic initiatives, non-governmental organizations and institutions: Agency Pohoda (Michal Kak) Aspekt (Jana Cvikov, Jana Jurov) People in Need (Gabriela uvadov) Initiative Bratislava Open (ubica Trubniov) Initiative Otherness (Jn Benec) Institute for Public Affairs (Grigorij Mesenikov) Conservative Institute of M.R.tefnik (Peter Zajac, Ondrej Dostl) The billboards caused swift outrage among a number of public leaders and attracted media attention. In her immediate response to this wave, the Vice-Chair of the SNS confirmed that the Party wished to use the billboards to point out the problems with the Romas. She supported her argument using statistics about Roma criminality, unemployment and dependence on the national social benefits. Subsequent arguments by the SNS stating that it is not a Roma who is on the billboard were mere pragmatic response to public criticism and alibism under the pressure of possible legal criminal punishment. As a citizen and as a specialist on this area, I filed an appeal to the general prosecution sr on the grounds of suspected incitement of race hatred. At the same time I initiated the petition for Cleansing the public Life of Manifestations of racism and other Forms of political extremism. The petition was to express concern about overt manifestations of racism and incitement of race hatred, to strictly reject such breaches of ethical, cultural and legal norms including Slovakias international commitments. The appeal demanded a clearcut position by the competent constitutional leaders as is expected of them by the mandate of their delegated role. The appeal also demanded the organs involved in criminal proceedings to take a decisive approach in line with the law and the ethics of public service. On June 7, 2010, the signatories of the petition published media information and delivered the petition together with an open letter to the competent constitutional leaders: ivan gaparovi, president sr pavol paka, speaker of the slovak parliament robert Fico, prime Minister sr Duan aplovi, Deputy prime Minister sr responsible for human rights Option of Choice (Adriana Mesochoritisov) Milan imeka Foundation (Laco Oravec) Citizen, Democracy and Responsibility (arlota Pufflerov) Civic Initiative We dont Want to Stand By (Miroslav Kocr) SOCIA Foundation for Social Change (Helena Wolekov) For Mother Earth (Pavol irok) Association of Young Romas (Ivan Mako) Association for Social Reform (Pavel Hanut) Rastislav enkirik, Lucia Piussi, Ladislav Snopko, ubica Trubniov, arlota Pufflerov, Dorota Nvotov, uba Lesn, Eduard Chmelr, Juraj Mesk, Jozef Hato, Juraj Alner, Katarna Zvack, Filip Vaga, Hana Fbry, Lucia Stasselov, Duan Katuk, Katarna Fabini, Daniel Pastirk, Vladimr Ondru, Jana Cvikov, Mikul Huba, Klmn Petcz, Zuzana Kus, Frantiek Guldan, Patrcia Garajov-Jariabkov ............ (409 people). Generally speaking, practically the entire specialist public unanimously agreed that the controversial billboard of the sns was a manifestation of racism and incitement to ethnic hate. A legal expert who was asked for consultation shared the same view. In light of the above, the verdict of the organs of criminal proceedings is therefore even more surprising. After moving the appeal from the General Prosecution to other local prosecution and police departments, a common policeman from Bratislava - Star Mesto turned down the appeal (no qualified factual circumstances could be proved). Everyone who independently filed the same appeal received a photocopy of the decision without an opportunity to comment,

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defend their appeal, on the judicial evidence (in connection with racially motivated crimes the Slovak legal system requires expert evidence for the particular motif). The speech of this administrative procedure was equally remarkable. Whilst similar cases require year to process, the entire chain of relevant organs managed to process the case within a few days, priori to post-electoral changes in posts. The destiny of the petition is equally sad. none of the approached constitutional leaders responded personally, even though the petition was accompanied by a personal open letter. statistically, we can summarize the responses as follows: 100% neglect of responsibilities derived from the delegated role; 100% carelessness for flagrant manifestations of racism in public life. The following recapitulations say it all: speaker of the parliament no response prime Minister - no response Deputy prime Minister - no response president - vague response from the department for communication with the public (...Mr President supports the positions in line with the petition ...) Minister of interior - irrelevant response (following the elections the appointed President of the Police Corps sent a letter about the work of the police...). Even though the government changed after the elections, the concrete problem remains half a year without an adequate response. Yet even the exercise of the supreme conditional roles should have its continuity, there is a central evidence of post and of matters dealt with and open issues. One cannot even hide behind more immediate and global problems, because political radicalism and extremism are undoubtedly among the global and most pressing problems today not only worldwide, but also in Slovakia. Extremists managed to be appointed to a regional government (the Municipal Region of Bansk Bystrica). They also missed only few decimal points in the election in order to receive the state funding to cover their electoral expenses (de facto providing state subsidies to further their activities!). These are warning signals. Leaving public racist manifestations of the parliamentary party unnoticed would mean to voluntarily open the public life to infiltration by political extremism. It is utterly irresponsible to ignore the explosive potential of manipulated and polarized Slovak society (majority minority, Romas non-Romas, us them ) or to allow the simplified ideologization instead of the objective identification of complex social and economic problems. The public in Slovakia is increasingly skeptical of the institutions responsible for the oversight of the implementation and the exercise of law. There is a growing apathy about public problems and a tendency toward simplified and populist solutions. The sensitivity margin in the public to different cases, evident injustice and immorality is set alarmingly high. This state of the society has always experienced dramatic and tragic developments.

This chapter has been written in a non-standard way. It is not a report, it includes no news, no information, analysis or lecture, but a reflection. Yet is it possible to use standard and formal procedures to respond to the chain connection of non-standard phenomena and events? The forgotten SNS billboard case of the 2010 elections and the subsequent events, including the story of a petition cannot be accidental, a situational collapse caused by the elections. It is probably a far more serious and complex phenomenon that deforms the public life of the slovak society over a long time perspective. I fear that the next elections will further reduce the threshold of manifestations of racism in public life. It is even possible that these practices will bring success to the extremists and enable their share in political power. As long as the state remains silent in the current state of affairs, it actually helps such development. It is thus time to speak up, to truthfully and especially honestly answer the fundamental question: Does slovakia tolerate racism or does it not?

petition for Cleansing the public Life of Manifestations of racism and other Forms of political extremism
It is with grave concern that we noted open manifestations of racism and incitement to race hatred made by the Slovak National party on its billboards depicting a Roma man with a text: So that we dont feed those who dont want to work. The obvious fact that the billboards depict a member of the Roma ethnic group and also in that the text targets this ethnic group, has not been denied in their first reactions by the very representatives of the SNS. The racist nature of this reality remains unaltered by the current effort by the SNS to question the nationality of the man depicted on the billboards. Open racism in the electoral campaign with impermissible breach of ethnic, cultural as well as legal norms is in direct contradiction with the legal system of the Slovak Republic and with international accords and other binding documents to which Slovakia acceded. With even greater concern we observe the carelessness of the leading representatives of the Slovak Republic in response to this overt racist attack that triggers negative emotions and basic passions in political contest. With their passivity, the representatives of power abuse the delegated mandate to support political extremism. Such attitude causes serious doubts about the fundamental orientation of the Slovak Republic and disqualifies our country internationally. The manifestations and spread of racism and other forms of political extremism in public life are impermissible, unlawful and are generally deemed the greatest global threat. Therefore: We strictly reject any form and manifestation of racism and extremism in public life and encourage political parties toward correctness in the current electoral campaign.

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At the same time we ask the constitutional leaders to assume unambiguous and clear-cut position on the above manifestations of racism as derived from their responsibility connected with the exercise of their public role that has been delegated to them. We particularly request the President of the Slovak republic, the Speaker of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for human rights and ethnic minorities, and the Minister of Interior to take and publicize an appropriate statement on this matter. We also call for swift and decisive action by the organs involved in criminal proceedings as requested by law and public service ethics.

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