Hitler's Strike for Tikhvin Author(s): Gerald R. Kleinfeld Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Oct.

, 1983), pp. 122-128 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1988082 Accessed: 21/09/2009 01:16
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Lake Ladoga Karelian Isthms

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by Gerald R. Kleinfeld Arizona State University

feldt and Tambs, Hitler's Spanish Legion (Southern Illinois UniversityPress, 1979). From Klein

LENINGRAD - the City of the Glorious October. In the Summer of 1941,Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Army Group North raced towards the birthplace of the Soviet Government. Sixteenth Army of Colonel Ernst Busch formed his right flank, Eighteenth Army of Colonel General Georg von Kachler his left, and Panzer Group 4 of Colonel Erich Hoepner his armored strike force.I Von Leeb's mission, according to the plan for Operation Barbarossa, was to destroy Soviet forces in his path and seize the City of Lenin. Eighteenth Army lurched forward along the coast, crashing through the Baltic republics and then thrusting towards Leningrad itself. Von Kuchler rolled past Soviet units bottled up in a pocket around Oranienbaum and set his sites on the sprawling metropolis ahead. The tank factory at Kolpino continued to churn out T-34s just beyond his forward lines. Busch, meanwhile, smashed forward along the inland route, and advanced toward the Volkhov River. Hitler had several options. He could order von Leeb to storm into Leningrad, but there would be the risk of street fighting that might devour his troops. He could have Army Group North skirt the city, and roll up the shoreline of the vast Lake Ladoga to unite with the Finns, who had entered the war to regain their old frontier with the Russians and were expected to move only as far as the former border posts. This option could spare his troops, and Leningrad would be cut off and left to starve or surrender. Its disadvantage lay in the fact that Tikhvin would lie on the German flank. Tikhvin was a hitherto obscure junction on the MoscowLeningrad rail line. Should it be left unmolested, Joseph Stalin could order supplies and troops north, where they could be offloaded in position to be thrust against the German siege. If Hitler hoped to starve Leningrad into submission, Tikhvin might be a key. The Tikhvin assault is an important operation for several reasons, but historians of the Russo-German war have tended to overlook it. Hitler pushed for it. He restructured the Leningrad front to accomplish it, but lost his nerve immediately after the assault began and ordered von Leeb to pull back. Von Leeb was originally against the attack, but, once involved, warmed to the idea and persuaded Hitler to allow him to go ahead. It was the

disaster that Hitler feared, and helped weaken what confidence the Fuhrer had in the commander of Army Group North. Shortly afterward, he was ready to accept von Leeb's resignation. On 7 September, the Finns, under Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, reached the Svir and prepared to receive their German allies. On 8 September, in a brilliant coup de main, Colonel Harry Hoppe led 424 IR (Infantry Regiment) of 126 ID (Infantry Division) into Schasselburg. The land route to Leningrad was closed. Von Leeb managed to create a ten kilometer-wide salient along the southern lakeshore but had difficulty in moving to the next stage of Hitler's plan. Provisions were transported by rail north from Moscow and south from the ice port of Murmansk through the junction at Tikhvin. From there, a rail line was built to a railhead near the lakeshore. The vital stores were then trucked to a makeshift port and ferried past the Germans to emergency docking facilities within the Leningrad defense perimeter. The Leningrad defenders fought desperately to hold out, and to breach the German blockade. On 24 September, Hitler flew to Smolensk to settle the problems at Army Group North and complete preparations for the coming assault on Moscow. Reluctantly, the Fuhrer decided to give von Leeb more assistance. He directed that two fresh infantry divisions be sent up - 250 ID (the "Blue Division"), a Spanish volunteer force then marching towards Smolensk, and 277 ID by rail at once from France. On 1 October, OKHasked Army Group North to comment about a new plan. What would von Leeb think about mounting a powerful eastward thrust across the Volkhov River, driving through Tikhvin and on northward to meet the Finns on the eastern lakeshore at the Svir River? The projected advance of Army Group Center against Moscow would result in a broad pullback of the enemy in the north, and Leeb could move ambitiously.2 The Field Marshal was extremely unhappy. Having just surrendered most of his armor to Army Group Center and barely survived a furious Soviet counterattack, he was now asked to launch a major offensive resting only on his remaining two armored and two motorized divisions. Since these were on the lakeshore, they

122

AFFAIRS MILITARY

wouldhave to be moved to Chudovo, whichwouldmean a delay. Still, it was an enticingpossibilitywhichcouldhave broadconsequences. If Army GroupNorthcouldreally seize Tikhvinand go on to reach the Svir, not only would Leningradfall like a ripe plumintothe Fuhrer'shands,butthe defeat of the Russianforces would endangerthe stability of the Soviet northernfront. There was another advantage as well. After crossing the Volkhovnear Chudovo, some of Busch'sdivisionscouldhead for Tikhvin while a second drive could be mounted southeast towardsBorovitschiin the strategic ValdaiHeights.Borovitschi was enormouslytempting. As von Bock marched on Moscow, Stalin was expected to pull back units to defend the capital, drawingforces from the Valdai. If Busch couldfollowand press hard,he couldcontributeto the envelopmentof Moscow.But was Army GroupNorthstrong enoughto undertakesuch ambitious plans?VonLeebdidnotthinkso. Buschagreedwithhim. Tikhvin wouldbe the new objective. The FUhrer had personally decided that General Rudolf Schmidttand XXXIX Corpscommand, not General Kunovon BothandI Corps,wouldcarry outthe operation.Leebreluctantly assented,andorderedthat the staff of I corps switch places with Schmidtt and his staff. The newly arriving 27 ID would join I Corpsonthe shore.A temporarycorpsstaff wouldbe organized underthe chief or ArmyGroupRear Areas, the elderly General Franzvon Roques,to take commandof the Spaniardswhenthey came up north of Novgorod.

THE next several days were dominatedmore by confusion

than certainty. Given an offensive launchedfrom the area aroundChudovo, shouldTikhvinand the Svir be the sole objective, or wouldHitlerchangehis mindagain andbolstervon Bock by choosingBorovitschifor the majorthrust,leaving Tikhvinas a secondaryobjective? Every day seemed to bring a new plan, calling for new dispositions. On 10 October, Leeb instructed Busch to prepare an order for the offensive. Sixteenth Army issued OrderNo. 24,envisagingno less thanthreepossibleattack plans: one towards Tikhvin, one towards Borovitschi, and a simultaneousadvancein bothdirections.Buschbelievedthat the latter was more likely and instructed II and X Corps to look forward to a double envelopmentof Lake Ilmen. They would marchon the Valdaifromthe southwestwhile von Roqueswould come down from the northwest,bolstered by motorizedtroops and anoth6rinfantrydivisionborrowedfrom XXXIXCorps.All would converge on Borovitschi. The remainder of Schmidt's forces wouldmove on Tikhvin.Then,von Bothcouldsweep in on the mouthof the Volkhov.3 Groupvon Roqueswas to take over in the Novgorodsector on 11October,with 250ID (the Spaniards) concentratedaroundthe GoldenCity. Schmidt'sXXXIX Corps wouldbe the main strike force, comprising2/3 of 126ID, 21 ID, 18ID (mot), 20 ID (mot), 8 PzD (Panzer Division), and 12PzD. The Army Order was being implemented when General Friedrich Paulus arrived in Pskov from OKHto discuss objectives with von Leeb. Leeb was worriedaboutthe road situation. Schmidtwas also unhappyand downrightpessimistic aboutthe roads. The terrain east of the Volkhovwas marked by broad swampsanddeepforests, throughwhichran a meagre system of trails and dirt roads. He knew that the official OKHmaps were unreliablein such cases. Schmidtimagined his armoredspearheads poking their way slowly along the paths, all the while harassed by flankingfire from Reds filtering aroundthem, led into tank traps, and often blocked by relatively insignificant enemy forces. An assault across the Volkhovin either direction seemed to be a wrong move. He urged Leeb to press for a full scale attack on the ValdaiHills southof Lake Ilmen. This would have the advantage of reinforcingthe Moscowadvance by endangering Kalinin and, with the Valdai in German hands, Schmidt believed that Russian resistance in the north would
OCTOBER 1983

collapse. Leningrad would then fall. Schmidt's plan gathered dust quickly. On the morningof 13 October,Paulus telephoned to PskovfromFuhrerHeadquarters ask if vonLeebbelievedthat one armored,one motorized,and twoinfantrydivisionswouldbe enoughto take Tikhvin.The anxiousLeeb respondedin the affirmative, especially since there were not enoughroads for more. For weeks, von Leebhad been assuredthat the Red Armywas at the end of its reserves, but intelligence soon indicated that Busch faced far strongeroppositionthan the Field Marshalhad described to Paulus. Six Soviet armies (each equivalent to a Germancorps) lay oppositehis easternfront.Three- 22,27,and 34 - were south of Lake Ilmen. Anotherthree were north- 52 (Lt. Gen. N. K. Klykov),4 (Gen.N. D. Yakovlev) and, guarding and Volkhovstroi the Volkhovdelta, 54 (Gen.M. S. Khozin,after 24 October,Lt. Gen. I. I. Fediuninski).Onemore army, 7 Independent Army (Gen. K. A. Meretskov)patrolled the Svir. The southerngroupwas part of Soviet NorthwestFront, Klykovand Yakovlev were directly subordinateto Soviet High Command (Stavka), and Khozinaligned with the LeningradFront. Leningrad Front was planninga de-blockingpincers assault on the Germanlakeshoresalient. Buschdid notknowthis, and it turned out to be pre-emptedby his own offensive across the Volkhov. Altogether,the seven Sovietarmies comprisedthirtyinfantry, two cavalry, and three armoreddivisions. Busch had five corps withfifteen infantry,two motorized,and two armoreddivisions. But numbersof divisionswere misleading.Onneitherside were they up to strength. The Germancorps were comprisedof units which had been in constant combat since 22 June. Armor and mechanizedelements were depleted, and replacementor spare parts inadequate. Effectives were also down, so that infantry divisions were scarcely two-thirdsof schedule. Red Armyunits, however,were also understrength,divisionshavingfewer effec-

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123

tives thanGermancounterparts. Manyhadbeenpumpedupwith half-trained untrained or recruits,butsome men were unreliable and defected. However, with their superior number, the Russians were by no means as weak as Hitlerbelieved, andSiberian reinforcements had already begun to arrive. If there was a German advantage, it was evaporating with time, and the Fuhrerstill had to make up his mindaboutthe attackobjective. Hitler's decision reached von Leeb on the afternoonof 13October.Tikhvin!The Borovitschithrustwas secondary,andcould come onlyafter success seemed assured.Now,afterthe Fahrer's changesof mindanddelays had imperilledany chanceshe might have for victory and it was already mid-October,Leeb could finally begin. On 14 October,Busch issued Army OrderNo. 25. "The enemy before Army GroupCenteris beaten and in large
part destroyed.... [One may reckon] with the enemy fading

8 PzD get across. Due to marshy bank conditionsat Grusino, 12PzD had to waitfor bridging.By thattime, 126ID was meeting bitterresistance as it drove east. Lauxwas also tryingto extend southwardsomewhat to open a crossing for 250ID. Meanwhile, the Spaniardswere raining artillery shells out of the Novgorod
area.6

rearwardbefore the front of the south wing of [ 161 Army."4The plan was clear. As ArmyGroupCenterswept throughKalininon its way to Moscow,Soviet resistance southof Lake Ilmen would collapse and II and X Corpswouldadvance towardsthe Valdai. Groupvon Roques,northof Lake Ilmen, wouldbe poised for its move towards Borovitschi,but would await the success of the Tikhvindrive beforeheadingout. I Corps,on the lower Volkhov, wouldalso wait until Operation Tikhvingot underway, and then wouldopenan assault onFediuninski.Thereshouldbe no trouble here, since Schmidtand XXXIXCorpswouldbe rollingstraight across Fediuninski'ssupply lines, which led throughTikhvin. Tikhvinand the Svir were the primaryobjectives.The assault wouldbeginon 16October.VonRoqueswoulduse the artilleryof 250ID and strong probes out of Novgorodby the Spaniardsto feint an attack in his sector, while Schmidt would cross the Volkhovin strengthnear Chudovo Kusinoand Grusino.Artilat lery and combat engineers of armoredand motorizeddivisions wouldhelpget 126ID and21 ID across, wherethey wouldquickly overcome the enemy and establish two bridgeheads- 126ID at Kusino and 21 ID to the north at Grusino. The RhinelandWestphalians 126ID (MajorGeneralPaul Laux) wouldget out of of the way and prepareeither to wheel south to join von Roques near the Msta River or northeastto supportSchmidt's push to Tikhvin.TheEast Prussiansof 21 ID wouldswingnorth.Without waiting for the bridgeheadsto be extended, the two panzer and two motorizeddivisionswouldfunnelthroughand strike at once on all available roads for Tikhvin- the SouthernGroup(8 PzD underBrigadierGeneralBrandenbergerand 18ID [mot] under Maj. Gen. FriedrichHerrlein)going over at Kusino;the Northern Group(12 PzD underBrig. Gen.Josef Harpeand20 ID[ mot] at Grusino).In fact, BuschurgedSchmidtto get the mechanized units movingthroughthe bridgeheadand towardTikhvinon the
first day.

light frost hung in the air duringthe early hours of 16October. The sky was almost cloudless as the assault boats glided heavily across the wide Volkhov.The surprise was total. The Russians did not even realize that the artillery preparation had heralded an attack. The Germaneffort was not only unexpected; it came against a thinly-manned line, because the Reds had been concentratingon both sides of the Ladoga lakeshore salient for their de-blockading attempt. Moreover,Schmidthad struck precisely at the junctionof 52 and 4 armies, directly at 267RD (Rifle Division) and 288RD. The engineers quickly moved in from the bank, ruefully observing the white crystals gently settling on the trees. The first snowfall of the Russian winter! By afternoon,the Soviets had recovered and resistance stiffened,butthe Germanswere able to beginferryingthe armor across under cover of darkness.5 On Friday morning, Busch, who had spent several hours at Schmidt'sheadquarterskeeping close to the action, reportedto von Leeb that progress was slow. Not until later that day could
124

Schmidtwas having troublewith the bridge at Kusino,where Laux was fighting hard to widen his perimeter. Soviet aircraft bombs.Onthe thirdsortie, flew overhead,strafinganddropping they damaged a section of the bridge. Repairs took four hours, the butthenRussiantanksforcedtheirway through line andblew anothersection. If was notuntilSaturdaynightthat the spanwas open again. The Red Air Force kept on coming, achievingoccasional air superiority and bravely challenging the advancing Germans, whose 88s were expected to do double duty. These excellent pieces were as important for antitank use as they served for Flak. The Kusinobridgeheadwas now about 15km wide, and 15km deep, butthe Russianswere resistingto the last man. All told,the prisonersas they tworegimentsof 126ID had alreadytaken3,211 8 punchedforward. Brandenberger's PzD was also across and rolling. Delayed by mines, the tankers pickedup many Ukrainian deserters. But it was slower going at the northerncrossing, and there was no sign of a pullback of Soviet forces. The defendingRussians were less of a problem,however,than getting the equipmentacross andout of the soggy bank.The groundwas not frozen, despite a thin snow cover, and the whole region was marshy and soft. All of thatwas nothingcomparedto the changeof weatheron 19 October.Anintermittentrain turnedopengroundto swamp,and the narrowdirt roads disappearedcompletely. Everythingbecame mired in a glue-likemud that was soon waist deep. It was the rasputitsa, the Russianseason of rain and mud. Bearers had to be used for supply and ammunition,and not even tracked vehicles could make any headway. The maps were worse than Schmidthadfeared. Theyshoweda main roadfor the armor,but the road did not exist. Late Sundaynight, 20 October,Klykovtried to coordinatehis forces and ordered a counterattackalong the entire front of 52 Army. Cooperatingwith an assault force of 4 Army, the Soviet general instructedhis troops to cut the Germansdown as they tried to flee back across the Volkhov.His 306RD was to "destroy" the enemy, 267RD to "obliterate," 288RD to "defend doggedly" and cooperate with Yakovlev's 4 Army. Yakovlev, however, was already in deep trouble.7 Nevertheless, Schmidt and Busch were beginningto be concerned aboutthe slow progress of the entire operation.Terrain andweatherdifficultieswere increasingand, althoughover 5,000 prisonershad been bagged, not much groundhad been gained. von Leebwas still hopefulaboutreachingTikhvineasily, andhad even requestedOKHto divert a panzergroupfrom ArmyGroup Centerat Kalininto help him put Borovitschiin a pincers. And that, while Moscowhungin the balance! OKHturnedhim down, but, more ominously,Hitler was keeping close watch on develboth opments.TheFuhrerspoketo the ArmyGroupCommander on Sundayand Monday.He was worriedaboutthe mud. Hitler asked Leeb whetherthe armorhad not been launchedon a mission from which they might never return. Von Leeb reassured him, and pointedout that Schmidthad finally succeeded in joining the Kusinoand Grusinobridgeheads. Monday, 21 October,five days into OperationTikhvin, was sorely depressing for Army GroupNorth. Laux and Brandenberger were planning to move on the substantial town (18,000 pop.) of MalayaVishera,but259RDhadbeenrushedupfromthe Valdai to block them, and the mud, waist deep in places, had forced the Germantankersto abandontheir armorand move on foot. Schmidtlamentedthat the advanceeastwardfrom Grusino
AFFAIRS MILITARY

Army respite, but Laux prepared to take Malaya Vishera. He was too weak, however, and Schmidt ordered a reorganization of the sector to allow more punch. Laux now tried an envelopment, which he began Wednesday morning. By evening, most of the town was in German hands. The terrain proved so marshy that some defending Soviet tanks sank up to their turrets in mud. To the north, Harpe's 12 PzD had only got as far as one-third of the way to Tikhvin. Meanwhile, more and more units arrived to bolster Klykov and Yakovlev. While XXXIX Corps was penetrating two Soviet divisions, the Russians brought in four more through Tikhvin and they mounted strong but fruitless counterattacks. Klykov and Yakovlev changed their tactics and tried infiltrating between the widely spread out German units, interdicting supplies and ambushing small columns of reinforcements. Schmidt was obliged to shift vitally-needed troops from his spearheads to escort transport elements, further slowing the already glacial advance. In eight days, he had advanced only about 35 kilometers. The weather and stiff Soviet resistance were beginning to worry the Fihrer. All did not seem to be going as he had planned. On the afternoon of 24 October, Hitler told von Brauchitsch that it might be best to discontinue the entire Tikhvin operation. Brauchitsch succeeded in preventing him from making any such decision but sent out a plea to von Leeb for an evaluation of the road situation and the chances for success. Bolstered by an opinion from Schmidt that the enemy was beaten and the estimate of Busch that 12 PzD might make it to Tikhvin within 24 hours, von Leeb flew to the Wolf's Lair on 26 October for a conference with Hitler. Their roles were now reversed. A cautious Hitler, worried about terrain and roads during the rasputitsa, asked Leeb once again if he did not agree that the motorized units were not going to get through. Even if they did, they would be in an exposed bridgehead. Knowing that von Brauchitsch agreed with him, the Army Group Commander emphasized the necessity of blocking the Leningrad supply route. They would have to reach Tikhvin, he pleaded, and pointed out that 12 PzD had already passed the halfway mark. The reports of XXXIX Corps indicated that frost was coming, and the marshes would soon freeze solid, enabling a rapid transit to the rail junction. The armor would roll right in. Now, when winter was imminent, was not the time to retreat. "A pullback across the Volkhov," Leeb insisted, "would be equivalent to a defeat.", Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded, for the

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moment. In a burst of sudden confidence,he granted his Field Marshalcompletefreedomof actionfor the future course of the operation.The burdennow fully on his shoulders, the veteran commanderflew back to Pskov.9 Von Leeb telephonedBusch at once. The commander of 16 Army was skeptical. He had just returnedfrom the front. The Soviets had defendedevery house in one little town. They were still capable of resistance. His mission had been to destroy the enemy, as well as to reach Tikhvinand the Svir. Since the Red Army had not been destroyed,a huge Tikhvinbridgeheadcould probablynot be held. Buschgreeted von Leeb withthe news that the Reds had airliftedthree battalionsout of Leningradto shore up the Tikhvindefenses, buttemperedthis by his estimate that no powerfulenemy force lay betweenSchmidtand his destination. They talked about cancelling the Borovitschi drive, but postponeda decisionin the hopethatthe freeze wouldimprovethings. Busch was still skeptical as the Field Marshaldeparted.10 Leeb and Schmidt, under increasing pressure, shifted their forces. Since Brandenberger's8 PzD and Herrlein's 18 (mot) were encounteringimpassable terrain moving northeast from Malaya Vishera on Tikhvin,they were pulled out completelyall the way back to Chudovo. The two divisions were orderedto recross the Volkhovat Grusinoand dash after Harpe's 12PzD. The latter had been exhaustedand was calling for Luftwaffeand infantrysupport,even for paratroopers.The roads were so bad that the Luftwaffewas air-dropping provisions. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ But 12Panzer was giving the Russians all that it had. In one assault, the Russians lost 400dead and 350wounded,to only 30 5~~~~.... German casualties. Rushing up, Brandenbergerof 8 PzD remarked that his men were carrying out their supplies on their backs and that replacementsfor his rifle units were only second grade conscriptswithflat feet andotherdisabilities.Theirfallout was averaging 60 percent!
..

Searching for directions in the snow. (From the author's private collection.)

THUS,

by the beginning of November, OperationTikhvin remained two unequalbridgeheads,based on Kusinoand 5

1983125 OCTOBER

Grusino,and connectedby a too-narrow corridoron the Volkhov east bank. Schmidt was convinced that he could take Tikhvin withhis twoarmoreddivisionsandonemotorizeddivision,buthe didwantmoreinfantry.Theenemyseemed at the endof his rope, throwingin patchworkunits, recruits with no training, ground personnelfrom Leningrad airfields,andeverythingelse he could spare from the metropolisitself. These troopswere desertingin flocks. As soon as the hard freeze arrived, XXXIXCorpswould roll forward.Identification new units,includingsome fromthe of Far East, did not cause him alarm. But his intelligence officers began to sound a note of concern. As late as 2 November, Harpe and the other division commanders were asked to comment about a possible withdrawal ratherthanstumblingexhaustedintoTikhvinamidevidencethat the Soviets were not giving ground as before. Harpe bitterly joinedhis comradesin rejecting any idea of retreat. The general urged that they go on until, after taking Tikhvin,they could be replaced with infantry. Withboth Germans and Russians battered and exhausted, further advance seemed possible, but no spectacularprogress could be expected. The Borovitschiphase of OperationTikhvinwas cancelled on 5 November. Alleyes nowturnedtowardsTikhvin.Friday,7 November,was critical. The Russians desperately attacked the corridor connecting the two bridgeheads, between Malaya Vishera and Grusnio.At Gladi,scarcely a dozenkilometerseast of Grusino,a reinforcedSoviet regiment was pushinghard. Schmidthad no reserves. Busch had no reserves either and begged von Leeb for anything. With point only seven kilometers from Tikhvin, Schmidt could hardly stop to rescue Gladi. But the Grusino crossing was in danger. The Field Marshalwatched tensely as the Germanlines swayed. Gladidid not fall, and Schmidtdrove for the prize. The defenders,led by Yakovlevhimself, included the remnants of four divisions, as well as mixed battalions of students, workers, and punishmentdetails. Harpe led 12 PzD, while Herrleinhad a reinforcedregiment and units of 8 PzD. In tandem, the two punchedinto Tikhvinlate at night on 8 November, catching the Russians by surprise. Yakovlev'sstaff barely escaped at the last moment. The Germanunits cleaned up the city and went over to the defense. Von Leeb exulted, proclaimingthat "the capture of Tikhvin has cut the water route to Leningrad.""1 Fuhrer Headquarters, the desperate struggle behind, now incredibly asked Schmidt whetherhe couldpushon, not to the Svir, but east to Vologda- a distance of 400kilometers in the dead of winter! XXXIX Corps had taken 20,000prisoners and captured 96 tanks, 86 artillery pieces, 58 antitanks, 8 antiaircraft, 361 machine guns, and a large quantity of miscellaneous military equipment. The cost had been heavy. The rifle companies of 12PzD were down to 35 effectives. ButRedresistancedidnotcollapsewiththe fall of Tikhvin.As4 Army disintegrated and remnants brushed into his rear, Meretskov,commanding7 IndependentArmy on the Svir, became deeply concerned. After consultation with Leningrad, Meretskov contacted Stavka and was given temporary command of the remains of 4 Army. Yakovlev was recalled. Meretskovrealizedthattherewas no time to delay. Thefrost had also come for ArmyGroupCenter,andvonBockhad turnedloose his armor. Moscowwas in grave danger. Not only to save Leningrad but also to retrieve the pressure on the Soviet capital, Stalinneeded a promptattack in the north.He urged Meretskov to move at once. Withthe Finns quiescent, he released 7 Army reserves to bolster what was left of the retreating forces. A practical military leader who realized that propagandawould not turnthe enemy back, Meretskovquicklysent up rations and supplies and began reorganizingthe units. He planned an immediate counterattack,beginning on 11 November, and managed to assemble four rifle divisions and a tank brigade.'2 126

On Tuesday, 11November, Meretskovopenedup with everything he had, includinghundredsof obsolescentT-26tanks and some of the new T-34s,against whichthe Germanshad no effective antitank weapons. In fact, the 88mm Flak was the best defense against a T-34. The shock sent Generals Harpe and Herrleinreeling. Mostof 8 PzD was now up to Tikhvin,and they were rushed in to stop the advancingRussians. Meretskovkept oncoming.Schmidt,given the commandof 2 Armyas rewardfor his success, asked von Leeb for permissionto stay on a few days duringthe crisis. The Field Marshalagreed, but neitherhe nor Buschthoughtthe situationwas anythingmorethana temporary problem. Brauchitschhad criticized Busch for having painted things too darkly when the Soviets threatenedto cut the bridgehead in two a few days earlier, and 16Army's commanderwas not about to repeat his mistake. OnSaturday,hordesof brandnew T-34soverranGermanfield positions.Thetanks rolledon untilthey came withinrange of the batteries of Artillery Regiment 18. That stopped them. That afternoon,Busch sent von Leeb an optimistic report claiming that, with not muchreorganizing,he couldreach the Svir, secure Tikhvin,and capturethe mouthof the Volkhovas well! Schmidt wouldhave been shockedif he hadseen Busch'sreport.Twodays later he was cautiouslyinstructinghis divisionalcommandersto be preparedto pull back supplyunits rapidly,but withoutpanic, and - above all - to be certain that only a few trustedofficers were told in advance. The Soviets were suddenlyhitting everywhere. In the south, against von Chappuiswith two divisions, 52 Red Army nowhad seven rifle divisions.AgainstXXXIXCorpsin the Talzy-Tikhvin sector was 4 Armywithfourrifle divisions,onearmoreddivision, von andfourotherarmoredunits. Opposite Both'ssix divisionsof I Corpswas 54Armywith rifle divisionsandparts of an armored brigade. In the face of a new evaluationof this enemy strength, Busch's next reportto von Leeb was ratherless optimistic.Still, he would not withdraw. While von Chappuispleaded for reinforcement,XXXVIIICorpsdug in, and refused to disgorgeits prize, holdingon witha tenacity whicheven Meretskovadmired. Schmidtdepartedfor 2 Armyreassured.On18Novemberhe was replaced by MajorGeneral Hans-Jurgenvon Arnim. The character of the fighting changed dramatically for the Germans in the first weeks of November. Attacking, a force could choose where to locate its center of gravity. By constantly moving, the assault could keep the enemy off balance and hurl line him back.NeitherGermansnorRussianshada continuous in the mud and morass of the early advance, and this, too, favored the attacker. All changed in November. The temperatures droppedfiercely, beginningthe worst winter in 140years. This happenedas the Germanadvance groundto a halt. The Wehrmacht, without winter uniforms, clung to villages and towns, which provided shelter against the cold. The swamps froze, making passable the open terrain between occupied hamlets. Busch had enoughmen to attack, but not to defend. Now, with Meretskovin command,the Russians seized the initiative, their superiority in numbers mounted constantly, and they could select where to locate the center of gravity of attack, could infiltrate and cut supplies, and could rain shells or mount assaults on numerousisolated posts and villages. Withexcellent winteruniformsand with lubricantsfor their weapons,the Russians could stay out longer in the open than the Germans who were, in any case, far less accustomedto the cold. Little panje ponies carried supplies more predictablythan commandeered Balkan remountsused by the Germans.Thoughshort of shells, the Soviets hurledattack after attack and decimatedthe shivering Germandefendersof the Tikhvinbulge. Encircledunits had no recourse but retreat. VonArnimwas underno illusionsas he saw his men struggling in the frigidweatherto standtheirgroundin whathadbecomean AFFAIRS MILITARY

exposed salient. Von Leeb dejectedly allowed the War Journal to show that "Army Group North has no reserves.... The enemy believes that he can succeed everywhere and all at once.' 2 While Stavka ordered the building of an emergency supply road bypassing Tikhvin through the taiga, Russian reinforcements continued to arrive. Von Leeb received some assistance as well, and tried to squeeze some men out of 18Army. He added two divisions fresh from France, but they were blooded before they could adapt to the cold and the tactics of Winter war in Russia. Two further divisions from the west were hurried up to assist the defenders of Tikhvin. When the Landser arrived, they found that the Soviets were virtually all around them. The panzer troops were fagged out but grimly fought on. On 19 November, Busch was forced to evacuate Malaya Vishera. Two regiments, savaged by five divisions, limped back to a new line. The Field Marshal knew the odds. He asked von Brauchitsch for still more infantry, but did not expect anything. Von Chappuis was begging for troops, and von Arnim had lost hope. Army Group North began to consider abandoning Tikhvin.

THE end was near. On 24 November, Stavka ordered a full

scale effort to cut off the Tikhvin bulge at the Kusino and Grusino crossings and to annihilate XXXIX Corps. On 30 November, Stalin personally telephoned Meretskov and instructed him to attack without delay. Twenty-nine trainloads of Soviet troops rolled towards Tikhvin, now surrounded on three sides. Meanwhile, the entire German eastern front had reached thye brink of disaster. Rostov, in the south, had fallen to the Red Army, and supply troops had panicked in the retreat. Hitler blamed everyone in sight but himself. Army Group Center was spent at the outskirts of Moscow, and von Bock was at the end of his rope. Von Leeb, the old campaigner, knew it was all over. As Moscow began to breathe again, he concluded that the enemy would probably turn on Leningrad, because the relief of Leningrad would be a political as well as military victory. Operation Tikhvin had come full circle. On 3 December, the Russians opened their battle to destroy XXXIX Corps and eliminate the Tikhvin bulge. Army Chief of Staff Halder offered von Leeb 100new tanks, but they would have been little use in weather so cold that the turrets could not rotate. While Hitler fumed that he still wanted to link up with the Finns, that he had told von Leeb in October the Operation would fail, von Arnim's outposts fell, one by one. The Field Marshal finally bowed to the inevitable and, on 7 December, ordered the evacuation of Tikhvin. There was no point in discussing where to stop the retreat. Only the Volkhov line seemed strong enough to hold. On 16 December, von Leeb flew into the Wolf's Lair to explain his situation to Adolf Hitler. He was received for breakfast and a two-hour conference. As the Army Group Commander described von Arnim's plight, the Fuhrer broke in to defend his allocation of more tanks at the moment when infantry was needed. Admitting that the armor was inadequate in cold weather, he stressed how useful it could be in defense. Von Leeb must have shaken him, however, since he then asked if the line of the Volkhov could be held. Reassured, he suggested that the Russians would soon try to liberate Leningrad now that the pressure on Moscow had been relieved. Since Army Group Center had evacuated Kalinin, a double tracked railroad was available for Stalin to send reinforcements to the units opposing von Leeb. He promised no new divisions for Army Group North, and von Leeb departed in a somber mood.'4

Army Group North was never again to attempt the broad sweep to the Svir. Indeed, as Busch licked his woundsbehinda frozenriver thatwas no barrier,Stalinpreparedto strikehardin January 1942throughthe weakened Germanlines -a double envelopmentof Lake Ilmen and anotherthruststraight through OCTOBER 1983

Chudovo. Eighteenth Army would itself be cut off and Leningrad relieved. Operation Tikhvin was born of Hitler's frequent changes of mind during the 1941 campaign. Having halted Army Group North at the gates of Leningrad, the Fthrer waited too long before reaching a decision on an alternative. By determining upon Tikhvin and the Svir as his objectives, he had to leave von Leeb an armored corps, which was then lost for the operation against Moscow. As before, he spread his forces too thin. Leeb was unwilling at first to strike for the Svir. He and Busch wanted a more limited operation, within their means. Schmidt, too, had great misgivings about rolling tanks through swamp roads and trails. They were all overruled. The High Command assumed that the Russians would collapse in the central front before the juggernaut of Operation Typhoon and, faced with a determined offensive mounted simultaneously in the north, pull back here as well. When intelligence on the eve of the Tikhvin offensive reported the substantial strength of the Soviet forces facing Busch, with no evidence that they might withdraw, Hitler gave the order to begin anyway. But he was not so overconfident that he could not change his mind. More than once, he hesitated and wanted to consider calling off the operation, only to be dissuaded by Leeb. As the battle wore on, Hitler finally committed more infantry divisions piecemeal, after the attacking forces had been bled white, but there were never enough troops to complete the drive. At a crucial point, 10 October, Colonel General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, was injured in an accident. He was incapacitated until 2 November, and was unavailable to provide counterpoise to Hitler's wavering. Leeb, realizing the importance of Leningrad, then wanted to keep pushing. He and Hitler still shared the hope that Army Group Center would take Moscow, a victory which should lessen Soviet resistance before Army Group North. Could Tikhvin, once reached, have been held? Von Leeb and Busch were convinced that it could, with more infantry. But there was no more infantry, the Russians were getting stronger all the time, and a bypass road was being constructed to skirt the junction. Tikhvin without the Svir was not crucial, and von Arnim could not man the perimeter until Spring, even with two more divisions. Other factors contributed to the Russian defensive victory, most of them common to more than one sector in the Winter of 1941.Hitler's indecision and intervention in the operation even on the divisional level had an important effect. However, the failure to equip his troops and to plan properly played a major role. The Soviets, on the other hand, had an able general, and a growing manpower superiority notwithstanding the use of untrained recruits and the loss of numerous defectors. The Russian soldiers were winter-hardy men, and their equipment functioned in cold weather. They had superior armor and other weapons. Yet, if the weather had cooperated with the Wehrmacht, these still might not have been enough. Schmidt had clearly outfought Yakovlev. The north did not seem as important in the Autumn of 1941as Moscow, but Leningrad uncaptured tied down and devoured besieging forces. The Tikhvin offensive was ambitious because it took place simultaneously with Operation Typhoon, and was not cancelled when the assumptions that produced it were proven wrong. It stumbled on as von Leeb and Hitler exchanged hesitancy. When it failed, von Leeb was compelled to stand guard, to watch and wait for the Soviet drive to attempt the relief of the City of the Glorious October. It came in weeks, with the opening of the new year, and almost succeeded. Von Leeb, worn out and pessimistic, retired in January. Hitler ignored Busch and replaced him with von Kuchler. REFERENCES 1. Walter Chales de Beaulieu, Der Vorstoss der Panzergruppe 4 auf Leningrad - 1941 (Neckargemand: Vowinckel, 1961), 109-127;A. Guillaume, The German-Russian War (London: War

127

Office, 1956), 15-16;Werner Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord 1941-1945

(Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1966), 72-74; FUlhrerDirective No. 21, Case Barbarossa, H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler's War Directives 193945 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1964), 50. 2. Fihrer Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941), No. 34a (12 Aug. 1941), No. 35 (6 Sept. 1941), Trevor-Roper, Directives, 90-98;Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45(New York: William Morrow, 1965), 121-128; Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Nord [War Journal of Army Group North, hereafter cited as KTB Nord], (28-29 Aug., 3-5 Sept. 1941), (Washington: U.S. National Archives Collection of Captured German Documents), Microcopy T311, Roll 53, Frames 7066080-5, 7065244-53;Burkhart Muller-Hillebrand (Gen-Maj.), Der Feldzug gegen die Sowjet-union im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront 1941-1945, U.S. Army Historical Division, Washington, U.S. National Archives Manuscript MS-P-114a, p. 179. KTB Nord (1 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065399. 3. KTB Nord (10 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065435; I Corps, Orders Received, 16Army Order No. 24 (10 Oct. 1941), T311/40/1199-1210; Army Group North, Draft Order for Tikhvin-Borovitschi Operation (Oct. 1941), T311/51/7064435-42. 4. I Corps, Orders Received, 16 Army Order No. 25 (14 Oct. 1941), T314/40/1224. 5. KTB XXXIX Corps (16 Oct. 1941), T314/025/1253; Gerhart Lohse, Geschichte der rheinisch-westfalischen 126. InfanterieDivision 1640-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, n.d.), 62; I. I. Fediuninski, Podniatye po trevoge, 2nd ed. Rev. (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo min-va Oborony SSR, 1964), 61. 6. Gerald R. Kleinfeld and Lewis A. Tambs, "North to Russia: The Spanish Division in World War II," Military Affairs, 37 (1973), 8-10. 7. 52 Red Army, Klykov Order, Captured Document (20 Oct. 1941), T315/484/636-7. 8. KTB Nord (27 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065499. 9. Memorandum of von Leeb visit to Hitler and von Brauchitsch (29 Oct. 1941), T311/51/7064485-8;KTB Nord (27 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065496-500.

10. KTB Nord (28 Oct. 1941), T311/53/7065502;

KTB 16 Army

(28 Oct. 1941), T312/544/8151502;Busch Memorandum (31 Oct. 1941), T311/51/7064251-6. 11. KTB Nord (8 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066410; XXXIX Corps, Instruction (7 Nov. 1941), T315/696/399; 18 (mot), Order for Assault on Tikhvin (8 Nov. 1941), T315/696/397; 12 PzD, Order No. 81 (8 Nov. 1941), T315/696/392-4; XXXIX Corps, Situation Map (10 Nov. 1941), T314/928/2607; KTB Nord (9 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066411. 12. Kiril A. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe narodu (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit. -ry, 1970), 236. 13. KTB Nord (12 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066419; KTB Nord, Situation Evaluations, 22 (26 Nov. 1941), T311/54/7066447. 14. Army Group North, Notes on Hitler-von Leeb Conference (17 Dec. 1941), T311/51/7064677-81.

Gerald R. Kleinfeld has been a Professor of History at Arizona State University since 1962. A graduate of New York University, he received his Ph.D. in 1961. He is the co-author of Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia, and his published articles concentrate chiefly on German military hisWar II tory and post-World German-American relations. This article was accepted for publication in June 1982.

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