ASSESSING THE BASIS FOR TEA PARTY SUPPORT:

SOCIAL IDENTITY, POLITICAL PREFERENCES OR SPECIFIC ATTITUDES

Clint Swift University of Missouri Working Paper (DO NOT CITE)

INTRODUCTION: There are two prominent schools of thought on what makes for the basis of partisan attachment. The first views partisan attachment as a rational choice based on policy preferences (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). The other, in line with Campbell et al (1960), eschews a deliberative process rooted in preferences in favor of an explanation that takes partisanship as deeply rooted in social identity (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). The rise of the Tea Party since the 2008 presidential election provides us with an interesting opportunity to expand our understanding of what leads individuals to support relevant political organizations with explicit electoral aspirations. The question that this paper seeks to address expands upon the literature mentioned above by attempting to identify the antecedents to political support for the Tea Party. The social identity hypothesis of partisanship advanced by Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) suggests that individuals decide which party to support based on the kinds of social groups that they perceive to be associated with the parties. They then select a party that has an associated social identity most closely aligned with their own. Although the Tea Party may have certain features in common with political parties they run candidates in elections and are not explicitly bound to any single issue or group of issues they cannot easily be forced to fit into the social identity hypothesis for a few reasons. First, the Tea Party does not possess a stable political history of the kind that foments attachments with long established social identities. The recent emergence of the Tea Party has not allowed for the development of a perceived connection between its

supporters and established social identities.1 Second, if we attempt to discern the kinds of social groups represented by the Tea Party we necessarily resort to associating with it those groups who we perceive as being closest to its political outlook. It essence we resort to political preferences as a shortcut to allotting the Tea Party with a base social identity. Finally, because of the Tea Party s functional inclusion within the Republican Party it would be difficult to distinguish those social identities associated with the latter from the former. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: These considerations point us towards an approach to understanding support for the Tea Party not in terms of social identity but in terms of political preferences. This constitutes the initial hypothesis of this paper: H1A: General indicators of political preferences better explain support for the Tea Party among Democrats, Republicans and Independents than indicators of social identity. In other words, when general political preferences are taken into account, social identity does not play a role in determining Tea Party support. This expectation not only follows from specific considerations about the Tea Party but also from previous research on partisanship more generally. Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) have found, using ANES data from 2004, that ideology is more strongly associated with party identification than is social identity. H1A articulates the expectation that this relationship is extended to Tea Party support as well.

1 The inverse, however, may be true. It is possible that the Tea Party has been successful in disassociating or alienating itself from certain social identities, naming racial and ethnic minorities. How the role of alienating certain social groups fits with the social identity hypothesis in regards to the Tea Party is beyond the scope of this paper.

The second hypothesis of this paper posits that specific attitudes on salient political issues provide more explanatory power than measures of general preferences in regards to Tea Party support: H1B: Specific Political Attitudes better explain support for the Tea Party among Democrats, Republicans and Independents than indicators of general preference or social identity.

This hypothesis is derived from the presumption that general political preferences are summations of specific attitudes. Considering this, as determinants of Tea Party support specific political attitudes should provide a more comprehensive explanation. The expectation is that when these measures of specific attitudes are introduces, the effects of general preferences will no longer be significant. Our confidence in these first two hypotheses is bolstered by the fact that Tea Party support is not distributed evenly among partisans. Table 1 shows a strong linear relationship between partisanship and affective evaluations of the Tea Party. Since party is so strongly associated with ideological self-placement (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), it is reasonable to propose that Tea Party support will follow a similar pattern. <<Table 1 about here>> The apparent association in Table 1 might lead us to believe that any relationship between attitudes and Tea Party support is simply a spurious to partisanship. However, there are two reasons to doubt this interpretation. First, as previously noted, research has indicated that partisanship is, at least in part, a function of political preference. Therefore the relationship cannot be purely spurious, but the effects of political preferences may be conditions by partisanship. The second consideration however might cast some doubt on a causal chain that passes through partisanship on its way to Tea Party support. Tea Party
3

organizations have not been shy in criticizing the Republican Party. In fact, the numerous high-profile Tea Party challenges to incumbent Republicans in the 2010 congressional primaries would indicate a degree of opposition between the two. This would cast doubt on the claim that strong Republicans are more than likely strong Tea Party supporters. When these two groups are in conflict, what determines support for one over the other? This paper asserts that party is in fact spurious to attitudes, as indicated by the causal map in Figure 1. <<Figure 1 about here>> That party may be spurious to attitudes, however, does not mitigate the fact that nearly three-quarters of Tea Party supporters identify as Republicans. That supporters are so highly concentrated within the Republican Party and that the parties display significant differences in preferences and attitudes necessitate an additional set of hypotheses. These hypotheses mirror the initial set, except that the unit of analysis shifts from all respondents to only Republican respondents: H2A: General indicators of political preferences better explain support for the Tea Party among Republicans than indicators of social identity. H2B: Specific Political Attitudes better explain support for the Tea Party among Republicans than indicators of general preference or social identity. In these hypotheses the expectation is that the patterns observed among the population as a whole are similarly reflected among only Republicans. In other words, Tea Party support among Republicans is a factor of political preferences, not social identity and moreover, a function of specific attitudes more so than general preferences. DATA AND METHODS: Data:

This analysis will utilize the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study along with the ANES 2010 Panel Recontact Survey. These studies were internet based surveys conducted by the American National Election Studies (ANES) between January of 2008 and July of 2010. The initial panel study contained a total of 21 monthly waves from January 2008 to September 2009. The 2010 recontact contained a single wave occurring in June and July of 2010; these data were matched and merged to the 2008-2009 data using the unique case identifier corresponding to individual respondents across the whole period of the study. Of the first 21 waves, 10 were constructed by ANES and primarily contained politically relevant questions. The remainder of the waves were constructed by third party researchers and covered a variety of non-political subject matter. This analysis will only draw from data obtained in the 10 initial ANES waves and the one additional recontact wave. The 2008-2009 study contains two cohorts, the first of which (cohort 1) was recruited by telephone in late 2007. Cohort 2 was recruited using the same methodology in the summer of 2008. The initial telephone samples were obtained using a stratified random-digit-dialing methodology meant to provide a representative sample of U.S. citizens with landline phone numbers, age 18 and older as of the 2008 presidential election (DeBell, Krosnick and Lupia 2010, 18). Potential respondents were offered $10 per month to complete each wave of the survey. Those respondents included in the study who did not own a computer or have access to the internet were offered a free web ready machine as well as internet access for the duration of the study. Cohort 1 completed an initial wave of survey questions in

January of 2008. Cohort 2 was added to the study in the ninth wave in September of 2008. Table 1 shows the per-wave number of respondents for ANES waves. <<Table 2 about here>> Dependent Variable: The dependent variable in this analysis is the degree of affective support for the tea party, derived from a single question in the 2010 recontact wave. This variable is measured as a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from dislike a great deal (1) to like a great deal (7). Table two shows the distribution of responses for the dependent variable. <<Table 3 about here>> Although it may be more logically consistent to infer that attitudes shape the degree of tea party support, previous research has indicated that partisan affiliation can also shape attitudes (see for example: Bartels, 2002 and Gerber, Huber and Washington, 2010). This analysis does not treat tea party support as a kind of party identification, however the potential effects of participation in Tea Party activities and even a loose affiliation with Tea Party groups or representatives may be expected to parallel those accompanying party identification. Measuring the dependent variable in the final wave of the ANES study allows us to lag the independent variables and control for any potential reverse causality. Independent Variables: The social identity variables include the demographics age, gender, religion, region and race. The socioeconomic variables of income and education are also included as indicators of social identity.2

See appendix table 1 for a summary of the variables used in this analysis, including the questions on the ANES survey and how each variable is measured. 6

The primary explanatory variables used in this analysis measure general political preferences and specific politically relevant attitudes. General political preferences are measured using the standard 7-point ideology self-placements scale as well as a 7-point scale examining support for candidate Obama (measured at wave 10). Political attitude variables are grouped into four categories: social, racial, economic, and security attitudes. Each category contains a series of variables based on relevant questions in the ANES survey about general political attitudes or opinions based on specific salient policy issues. Social attitudes are measured based on opinions on three salient social issues: gay marriage, firearms laws (specifically, conceal and carry permits) and abortion. The first two of these variables are measured using responses to a single question coded along the seven-point favor/oppose scale. Attitudes on abortion are measured using an eight-point additive index of pro-life attitudes based on responses to questions that asked whether abortion should be legal under several different circumstances. Respondents receive a value of zero (0) if they answer that abortion should be legal under all seven circumstances and a value of seven (7) if it should be illegal under all circumstances. Racial attitudes are measured using four variables that assess the respondents support for affirmative action programs, views on the current degree of racial discrimination, amnesty for illegal immigrants and an attribution of inequality scale. The first three variables are measured with ordinal scales based on responses to a single survey questions.3

Attitudes on affirmative action and Amnesty are measured using the seven-point support/oppose scale mentioned above. Assessments of the current amount of racial discrimination are measured using a fivepoint scales ranging from a great deal (1) to none at all (5).
3

The attribution of inequality scale is an additive index based on responses to eight questions that ask respondents how important certain considerations are for explaining the income gaps between blacks and whites. 4 Four of the eight questions identify considerations that speak to inherent differences between the races (e.g. blacks have less ability or god made blacks and whites differently ), whereas the other four identify systemic or institutional considerations (e.g. persistent employment discrimination or government policy). The variables are measured along a five-point ordinal scale with possible responses ranging from very important to not at all important . The first set of variables were coded so that the not at all responses equal zero (0) and the very important ones equal four (4). The second set was coded in the inverse order. The values of these variables were summed into a 32-point additive scale where higher perceived inherent racial differences for inequality received higher scores. The economic attitudes category contains three variables meant to measure different dimensions of politically relevant economic views. The first variable measures support for increased taxation on individuals in the upper income bracket (making $200,000 a year or more). This variable is measured on a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from favor a great deal (1) to oppose a great deal (7). The second variable in this group ascertains views on the provision of government services, where respondents are asked whether the federal government should provide more or less services than they currently do. This variable is measured on a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from a lot more (1) to a lot less (7). The third variable asks whether the federal government should do more or less to influence private business and is measure the same as the previous variable.

These questions were asked in wave 20 of the panel study. 8

Attitudes on national security are measured using three variables that examine support for the suspension of habeas corpus protections for suspected terrorists, court order requirements for obtaining wire-taps on suspected terrorists and a deadline for withdrawing troops from Iraq. These three variables are all measured using the sevenpoint favor/oppose scale. FINDINGS: Not surprisingly, Tea Party supporters do appear to be distinct from the rest of the population in terms of both political preferences and attitudes as well as in terms of some measures of social identity. Figures 2a and 2b compare Tea Party supporters to the rest of the population along these two dimensions. <<Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here.>> As figure 2a indicates, the Tea Party supporter contingent contains statistically significant fewer women, Blacks and Catholics from the rest of the population. The only groups identified by these findings as being more strongly represented within the Tea Party supporter contingent are Southerners. These findings largely hold true even when Tea Party supporters are only compared to Republicans, the one exception being for Blacks5. However, a number of social identities fail to yield statistically significant differences, including Latinos, Jews, those with college degrees and the wealthy. Thus, figure 2a presents us with some indications that Tea Party support may in fact be a function of social identity, contrary to our hypothesis (H1A). Figure 2b compares Tea Party supporters to the rest of the population in terms of preferences and specific political attitudes. For the purposes of this figure all responses

This is most likely the result of too few Black republican respondents in the sample. 9

have been standardized so that positive numbers indicate more conservative mean responses. All of the differences shown in attitudes and political preferences are statistically significant.6 Unlike with the social identity distinctions, figure 2b shows across the board differences in both comparison groups. Although these findings provide support for this paper s hypotheses, a more thorough tests that that examines these variables combined effect is necessary. <<Insert Table 4a about here>> Table 4a 7 reports the results of OLS models where social identity, political preference and attitude variables are regressed on Tea Party support for all respondents. Model 1 in table 4a shows the results when only social identity variables are included. This models reports that all of the social identity variables save age and income are significant and together explain a little less than 12 percent of the variation in Tea Party support (R2 = .117). However, when we introduce political ideology into the model, the variables for Southerners and Catholics are no longer significant and the R2 more than triples (.371).8 When we introduce the level of support for candidate Obama into the model (model 3), virtually all of the social identity variables become insignificant except for Protestantism and level of education. Models 1 through 3 in table 4a clearly demonstrate that indicators of political preference perform better in predicting Tea Party support than the social identity variables, confirming H1A.

6 7

Significance was tested using independent sample T-tests. Test for multicollinearity were conducted on all of the OLS models presented in this paper. None of these models yielded variation inflation factors (VIF) greater than 4, well below the standard of 10 for identifying multicollinearity issues. 8 Interestingly, age becomes significant and negative when controlling for ideology. This indicates that when we take account of ideology, respondents are less likely to support the Tea Party as they increase in age. 10

To test H1B, model 4 introduces the variables measuring specific political attitudes. In model 4, Protestantism remains (marginally) significant while income replaces education in significance. All other measures of social identity do not reach traditional levels of significance. All of the coefficients for the attitude variables are in the expected direction and eight of the thirteen are statistically significant. If we examine them by groups we find that three of the four racial attitude variables, two of the three economic variables and two of the three national security variables are significant. Only one of the social attitude variables is statistically significant. Although the introduction of the attitude variables reduces the magnitude of the preference variables to a great extent, both preference variables remain significant. In terms of H1B, these findings are not entirely conclusive and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that preferences matter at least as much as attitudes when we consider the entire population. <<Insert Table 4b about here>> The results that we find when we consider only the Republicans within the sample are significantly different from those in table 4a. Table 4b shows the OLS results on the Republican sample. The social identity model (model 5) indicates that Tea Party supporters are more likely to be male and protestant than other Republicans, but show no statistically significant differences on any of the other social identity variables. When we introduce ideology, Protestantism is no longer significant while the variable for Black respondents is. The introduction on this single variable, as with model 2, increases the R2 significantly, in fact it more than doubles (from .058 to .129). In model 7, when the second preferences variable is introduces, the only social identity variable that remains significant is gender and we again observe an increase in the R2 of nearly double. As with the entire sample, the

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findings of models 5 through 7 strongly indicate that Tea Party support among Republicans is a better explained by political preferences than social identity, confirming H2A. The introduction of the attitude variables in model 8 do not alter this general finding however, it does change the significance of the social identity variables. When controlling for attitudes we find that gender is no longer significant but religion is (both Protestantism and Catholicism). The pattern of significant groups of attitudes largely reflects that in model 4 except that none of the national security attitudes are significant. This would seem to indicate that attitudes on national security do not constitute a significant consideration for Tea Party support among Republicans. More interestingly, model 8 shows that when attitudes are controlled for, political ideology is no longer significant. This finding strongly supports H2B and indicates Republicans and Tea Party supporters are differentiated by their attitudes on specific issues more than they are by their self-reported political ideologies. CONCLUSIONS: The analysis undertaken in this paper indicates that Tea Party support, like partisanship (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), is more a function of political preferences than social identity. Furthermore, there are indications that among Republicans the group within which most Tea Party supporters are found a specific set of political attitudes accounts for Tea Party support. Although not related to a central hypothesis of this paper, it may be beneficial to make a preliminary attempt at understanding the particular constellation of attitudes that constitute Tea Party support. <<Insert Table 5 about here>>

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Table 5 presents standardized coefficients for the significant preference and attitude variable in models 4 and 8 so that we can more precisely compare the magnitudes of each variable s effects to one another. These standardized coefficients indicate that in both models the economic attitude variables are some of the most potent indicators of Tea Party support. When looking at the entire sample, they are the strongest coefficients among the attitude variables. For the Republican sample they are joined by attitudes regarding conceal and carry permits and granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants. The most interesting finding in table 5 however is that support for candidate Obama out performs every other variable in both models. That this holds true even when ideology and specific attitudes are accounted for is somewhat puzzling. This indicates that support for Obama encompasses some aspect of Tea Party support that is not controlled for in the model. Because this variable is measured prior to the 2008 election, it cannot be related to any specific policies that President Obama has instituted since his inauguration. It is possible that candidate Obama espoused some specific policy proposals in the campaign that Tea Party supporters were particularly opposed to and were not accounted for in the attitude variables in the model. Another possibility is that some dimension of race attitudes is being measured via support for candidate Obama that is not being accurately measured in the variables already included. The specific orientation towards candidate Obama among Tea Party supporters that is apparent in this analysis certainly deserves additional scholarly focus.

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WORKS CITED: Abramowitz, Alan and Kyle Saunders. 2006. Exploring the Bases of Partisanship in the American Electorate: Social Identity vs, Ideology. Political Research Quarterly 2 (June 2006): 175-187. Bartels, Larry. 2002. Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. Political Behavior 24: 117 50. Campbell, Angue, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. New York: Wiley. DeBell, Matthew, Jon A. Krosnick, and Arthur Lupia. 2010. Methodology Report and User s Guide for the 2008 2009 ANES Panel Study. Palo Alto, CA, and Ann Arbor, MI: Stanford University and the University of Michigan. DeBell, Matthew, Vincent Hutchings, Simon Jackman, and Gary Segura. 2010. Methodology Report and User s Guide for the ANES 2010 Panel Recontact Survey. Palo Alto, CA, and Ann Arbor, MI: Stanford University and the University of Michigan. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, Ebonya Washington. 2010. "Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment." American Political Science Review 104 (4 November): 720-744.

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Figure 1: Hypothesized Causal Relationship between Partisanship, Political Attitudes and Tea Party Support.

Table 1: Affective Evaluation of the Tea Party By Partisanship*

Democrats View of The Tea Party Favorable Neutral Unfavorable Total
6.5% (47) 37.3% (268) 56.1% (403) 100.0% (718)

Independents
2.6% (34) 56.4% (93) 23.0% (38) 100.0% (165)

Republicans
52.0% (344) 38.2% (253) 9.8% (65) 100.0% (662)

N = 1545 *Parties included leaners. Note: Correlation for 7-point scales: r = .578, p < .001

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Table 2: Per-Wave Respondents (ANES Waves only) Wave N

January 2008 (Wave 1) February 2008 (Wave 2) June 2008 (Wave 6) September 2008 (Wave 9) October 2008 (Wave 10) November 2008 (Wave 11) January 2009 (Wave 13) May 2009 (Wave 17) July 2009 (Wave 19) August 2009 (Wave 20)
a

1,623 1,457 1,420 2,586 2,628 2,665 2,543 2,389 2,313 2,273

June-July 2010 (Recontact Wave) 1,561 Source: Table reproduced from DeBell, Krosnick and Lupia (2010, p. 7) a N for the 2010 recontact is from DeBell, Hutchings, Jackman and Segura (2010)

Table 3: Support for the Tea Party

-3. Dislike A Great Deal -2. Dislike A Moderate Amount -1. Dislike A Little 0. Neither Like Nor Dislike 1. Like A Little 2. Like A Moderate Amount 3. Like A Great Deal Total Frequency 338 131 45 626 63 183 188 1574 Percent 21.5 8.3 2.9 39.8 4 11.6 11.9 100.0

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Figure 2a: Comparing the Social Identity of Tea Party Supporters.

Note: Positive numbers indicate larger portion among Tea Party supporters. 15 Tea Party Supporters vs. All Others Tea Party Supporters vs Other Republicans 9.1* 10 Percent Diference in Mean Response

8.9*

2.5

3.7 1.4

0 -0.3g -5 -2.2 -1.5 -5.1* -8.4* -7.9* -0.8 -0.3 -2.6

-10

-15 -15.3* -20 -17.1* Female Black Latino Catholic Jewish Southerners College Degree Income $100K+

*Difference is statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed). Chi-squared tests.

g

Expected cell count for at least one cell was less than 5 for Chi-squared test.

Figure 2b: Comparing The Percent Difference in Mean Responses of Tea Party Supporters.*
Note: Positive numbers indicate more conservative mean Tea Party response. 35 Tea Party Supporters vs. All Others Tea Party Supporters vs Other Republicans Percent Diference in Mean Response 30 25 21.3 20 15 10 6.3 5 0 Social Attitudes Race Attitudes Economic Attitudes Security Attitudes Support for Candidate Obama Political Ideology 13 13.1 18.6 17.6 11.8 9 26.9 24 26.8 33.2

*Calculated based on results of independent sample t-tests. All differences are statistically significant at p < .01.

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Table 4A: OLS results for predictors of Tea Party Support. Social Identity, General Political Preferences and Specific Political Attitudes for All Respondents.
Model 1 B Age Male Black Latino Protestant Catholic South Income Education Ideology Obama Gay Marriage Abortion Amnesty Affirmative Action Attribution of Inequality Tax the Rich Government Services Business Regulation Habeas Protection Wire Tapping Iraq Deadline (Constant) N R
2

Model 2 SE B -.008** .204* -.790*** -.436* .316** .050 .122 -.012 -.096** .553*** --------------1.080** SE (.003) (.089) (.178) (.211) (.106) (.120) (.096) (.012) (.029) (.024) --------------(.350) 1357 .371 .159 -.315 -.171 .236* .049 .104 -.008 -.066* B -.006

Model 3 SE (.003) (.083) (.170) (.198) (.099) (.113) (.090) (.011) (.027) (.027) (.025) -------------(.340) 1357 .449 B -.003 -.064 .037 -.007 .283* .210 -.004

Model 4 SE (.003) (.093) (.203) (.218) (.110) (.126) (.099) (.013) (.031) (.036) (.031) (.025) (.020) (.024) (.021) (.026) (.056) (.012) (.025) (.031) (.026) (.023) (.022) (.024) (.449) 931 .570

-.007 .527*** -.536* .962*** .523*** .321** .011 --------------

(.004) (.103) (.250) (.120) (.140) (.112) (.014) ---------------1383 .117

-1.253*** (.208)

-.035** -.022 .116** .182*** .019 -.080*** .006 .041 .064* .127* .048*** .106*** .023 .112*** -.052* .005 .070** -1.029*

-.214*** (.033)

.338*** .340*** --------------.189

Conceal and Carry Permit --

Amount of Discrimination --

1.573*** (.409)

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p< .05.

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Table 4B: OLS results for predictors of Tea Party Support. Social Identity, General Political Preferences and Specific Political Attitudes for Republicans Only.
Model 5 B Age Male Black Latino Protestant Catholic South Income Education Ideology Obama Gay Marriage .007 .446** -1.655 -.150 .463* .03 .234 .006 -.030 ---SE (.005) (.135) (.916) (.392) (.182) (.206) (.143) (.020) (.044) ---------------(.552) 578 .058 .004 .349** -1.875* -.199 .312 -.008 .198 .000 -.045 .339*** --------------.311 B Model 6 SE (.005) (.13) (.883) (.378) (.177) (.199) (.138) (.019) (.043) (.050) --------------(.531) 578 .129 .004 .350** -.938 .114 .319 .088 .167 .004 -.019 .191*** .287*** --------------.949 B Model 7 SE (.004) (.124) (.846) (.360) (.168) (.189) (.131) (.018) (.041) (.051) (.036) -------------(.528) 578 .217 .109 -1.144 .519 .619** .454* .080 -.027 -.011 .032 .147** .073 -.089** -.010 .082* .099* .165 .040* .090* .101* .095* -.048 -.001 -.023 -1.826* B -.001 Model 8 SE (.005) (.144) (.989) (.478) (.193) (.221) (.144) (.020) (.049) (.064) (.044) (.043) (.032) (.035) (.032) (.048) (.087) (.020) (.035) (.049) (.041) (.032) (.031) (.039) (.708) 391 .396

Conceal and Carry Permit --Abortion Amnesty Affirmative Action ---

Amount of Discrimination -Attribution of Inequality -Tax the Rich Government Services Business Regulation Habeas Protection Wire Tapping Iraq Deadline (Constant) N R
2

------.325

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p< .05.

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Table 5: Standardized Coefficients for Significant Preference and Attitude Variables in Models 4 and 8.
Model 4 All Respondents .114** .198*** --.099*** -.063* .055* .112*** .119*** -Model 8 Republicans Only -.168** --.129** .113* .094* -.095* .124* .108* .114* --391

Ideology Obama Gay Marriage Conceal and Carry Permit Amnesty Affirmative Action Amount of Discrimination Attribution of Inequality Tax the Rich Government Services

Business Regulation .119*** Habeas Protection -.057* Iraq Deadline .087** N 931 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p< .05.

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Appendix Table 1: List of variables, ANES questions and measurements.

Variable Name TeaParty IDoct08 Obama GayWed Question Measurement Wave(s) F1 10 10 Do you like the Tea Party movement, dislike it, or neither like nor 7-point scale (-3 =Dislike a great deal, 3 = Like a great deal) dislike it? Standard ideology questions 7-point (-3 = extremely liberal, 3= extremely conservative) Do you like Barack Obama, dislike him, or neither like nor dislike 7-point scale (-3 =like a great deal, 3 = dislike a great deal) him? Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) homosexuals to marry members of their own sex and have regular marriage laws apply to them? Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose giving permits 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) to allow any adult to carry a concealed handgun if they have never been convicted of committing a crime and they have passed a test showing that they know how to use the gun safely? Next, we d like to ask you about some situations in which a 8-point additive index (0 = Legal in all situations, 7 = Illegal in all situations) woman might want to have an abortion. For each one, please say whether you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose it being legal for the woman to have an abortion in that situation: Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing universities to increase the number of black students studying at their schools by considering race along with other factors when choosing students? How much racial discrimination is there in the United States today? Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Measured using 8 questions that ask respondents the reasons for income inequality between Blacks and Whites. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose raising federal income taxes for people who make more than $200,000 per year? Do you think that the government should provide more services than it does now, fewer services than it does now, or about the same number of services as it does now? 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal)

11

CCPermit

11

pro_lifea

2 and 10 AffAct

9 5-point scale (1= A great deal, 5=None at all) 20 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) 1 and 10 32-point additive index. 20 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) 1 and 10 7-point scale (-3 = A lot more, 3 = A lot less)

DiscrimNow Amnesty
a

InequAtt TaxRich
a

GovtServices

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Variable Name BizReg

Question

Measurement

Wave(s)

Habeas

WireTapa

IraqDeadline Male Age Black Latino Protestant Catholic South Income

Do you think the U.S. federal government should do more to 7-point scale (-3 = A lot more, 3 = A lot less) influence how businesses operate in this country, should the federal government do less to influence businesses, or should the government do about what it's doing now to influence businesses? Imagine that the U.S. government suspects a person in the United 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) States of being a terrorist. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government being able to put this person in prison for months without ever bringing the person to court and charging him or her with a crime? Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) government being required to get a court order before it can listen in on phone calls made by American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists? Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose setting a 7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal) deadline for withdrawing all U.S. troops from Iraq? Dummy ( 1 = Male, 0 = Female) Age on Nov 2, 2008. Dummy ( 1 = Black, 0 = Non-Black) Dummy ( 1 = Latino, 0 = Non-Latino) Dummy ( 1 = Protestant 0 = Non-Protestant) Dummy ( 1 = Catholic 0 = Non-Catholic) State of residence recoded into regions according to Census regions (top code) Dummy ( 1 = South 0 = Non-South)

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1 and 10

1 and 10 10 1 and 9 1 and 9 1 and 9 1 and 9 1 and 9 1 and 9 1 and 9

19-point scale: 1 - less than $5,000 2 - $5,000 to $7,499 3 - $7,500 to $9,999 4 - $10,000 to $12,499 5 - $12,500 to $14,999 6 - $15,000 to $19,999 7 - $20,000 to $24,999 8 - $25,000 to $29,999 9 - $30,000 to $34,999

10 - $35,000 to $39,999 11 - $40,000 to $49,999 12 - $50,000 to $59,999 13 - $60,000 to $74,999 14 - $75,000 to $84,999 15 - $85,000 to $99,999 16 - $100,000 to $124,999 17 - $125,000 to $149,999 18 - $150,000 to $174,999 19 - $175,000 or more

1 and 9

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Variable Name Educ

Question

Measurement 14-point scale: 1 - No schooling completed 2 - Nursery School to 4th grade 3 - 5th or 6th grade 4 - 7th or 8th grade 5 - 9th grade 6 - 10th grade 7 - 11th grade 8 - 12th grade No Diploma 9 - High School Graduate 10 - Some college, no degree 11 - Associate degree 12 - Bachelor's degree 13 - Master's degree 14 - Professional or Doctorate degree

Wave(s)

1 and 9

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