Crime Law Soc Change (2007) 48:7385 DOI 10.

1007/s10611-007-9077-1

Crime prevention through environmental design: financial hardship, the dynamics of power, and the prospects of governance
Patrick Parnaby

Published online: 28 September 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract Borrowing from Foucault (Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), Governmentality: The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (pp. 87104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) and Foucault and Gordon (Power-knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 19721977. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1980) and the work of governmentality scholars in general, this paper examines Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as a strategic form of governance. Using qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews with CPTED practitioners and supporters, I argue that the putative availability of expendable capital mediates, although does not necessarily negate, a practitioners ability to secure the conduct of conduct through the sharing of CPTED expertise. The importance of shifting power dynamics are examined before evaluating the data vis--vis contemporary scholarship in the areas of governmentality and crime and criminal justice research. According to Garland [22], high rates of crime have become not only a normal social fact, but an enduring part of Western, contemporary consciousness and culture. As part of this milieu, crime prevention has emerged as one of two primary pillars of government action vis--vis the crime problem, the other being the continued exercise of sovereignty [22, 28]. At the same time, however, and to varying degrees, neo-liberal ideologies have helped shift the practical and moral responsibility for crime prevention away from the state and onto the individual [36, 45]. Citizens are now expected to become prudent consumers of crime prevention advice or else face moral and/or ethical sanction for not holding up their end of the proverbial bargain [36]. However, by its very nature, governing at a distance [43] is never totalizing in its effect; the conduct of conduct is never absolute (see [18, 30]). This is particularly evident with respect to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). As I will demonstrate, the ability of CPTED practitioners to govern citizens depends, in part, on the latters ability and/

P. Parnaby (*) Sociology/Anthropology, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road East, Guelph, ON, Canada N1G 2W1 e-mail: pparnaby1@rogers.com

DO9077; No of Pages

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or willingness to finance the crime prevention project in question. Borrowing from Foucault [19] and Foucault and Gordon [20] and the work of governmentality scholars in general (see [21, 43, 45], I will argue that the putative availability of expendable capital mediates, although does not necessarily negate, a practitioners ability to secure the conduct of conduct.1 This argument will be developed in several stages. First, it will be necessary to provide a brief overview of CPTED before exploring its role as a strategic, neo-liberal form of governance. Second, and as a lead up to my central argument, I will use data collected from semi-structured interviews with CPTED practitioners to briefly illustrate how important cost considerations are when considering CPTEDs implementation. Third, I will explore the varied effects claims to financial hardship have on the flow of power between practitioners and clients as well as the concomitant impact such claims have on the potential for governance. Finally, I will examine these findings in a broader theoretical context by looking at how they might enhance our understanding of how contemporary governmentalities are translated into practical effects.

CPTED CPTED has its roots in the works of Jane Jacobs [26] (1961), Oscar Newman [34], and C. Ray Jeffery [27] (1971). Although each of them made unique contributions to CPTEDs theoretical and practical evolution, together they successfully problematized conventional criminological thinking by drawing attention to the physical environments role in the aetiology of crime and disorder. Today, proponents of CPTED generally argue that environmental design can reduce criminal opportunity, mitigate fear of crime, and contribute to a better quality of life ([15]; see also [34, 35]). Although approaches vary, for the most part CPTED practitioners apply variations on the following basic strategies: (1) territoriality involves using design to encourage proprietary behaviour among citizens while simultaneously generating environments where the perceived probability of citizen intervention is high [15, 34, 41]; (2) natural surveillance requires design that is conducive to clear lines of sight and that which is capable of orchestrating human activity such that surveillance opportunities are likely to be capitalized upon at the right moment in time and space; (3) access control involves using design strategies to effectively control the ingress and egress of individuals to and from a particular space; finally (4) image is about establishing and maintaining the overall aesthetic integrity of a space so as to communicate to would-be offenders that the space is worthy of respect (see also [50]). Grounded in rational choice and routine activity theories (see [10, 11]), and borrowing heavily from advances in environmental criminology (see [46]), CPTED assumes that offenders engage in a cost/benefit analysis when considering where and when to commit a crime. By strategically transforming the built environment to render it less amenable to crime and disorder, advocates believe crime can be prevented given that many offenders will tend to err on the side of caution.2

From this point forward I will use client or clients when referring to those receiving CPTED advice. For a more detailed explanation of CPTED in its applied form including the relevance of territoriality, access control, surveillance, and image see [12, 13, 15], or Schneider and Kitchen [47].

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The scientific CPTED literature has grown considerably since the 1970s (see [1, 9, 14, 32, 41]).3 At this stage, however, evaluations of CPTEDs efficacy have produced mixed results [33, 48]. Although there is evidence that CPTED and other situationally-based approaches to crime prevention work under certain conditions (see [9]), persistent methodological difficulties and the absence of adequate control groups for the purposes of comparing across structures and/or landscapes has made it hard to rule out spurious relationships (see [8, 33]). Moreover, because offenders experience their environments holistically, untangling the web of interconnected, aetiological factors has proven to be a formidable challenge. Nevertheless, police officers, academics, planners, and landscape architects from across North America continue to examine CPTEDs potential. Although many are public sector employees (police officers or town planers, for example), others sell their expertise privately. In fact, a cursory review of the Internet reveals hundreds of private security companies offering CPTED services. Whether inside or outside the academy, CPTED has become a competitive enterprise as interested parties look to capitalize on what it has to offer.

Governance, CPTED, and the prospects of partnership As Foucault [19] argues, governance emerged as a highly rational, calculated, and scientific affair after the 16th century. No longer exclusively wedded to the administration of pain and/or suffering, governance became a kind of ongoing problematic whereby the strategic conduct of conduct meant aligning the actions of subjects with the objectives of authority [19, 30]: individuals were to be managed and constituted, not just brutally coerced. Contemporary governance is no longer a centralized and hierarchically organized affair but, instead, emerges out of what is oftentimes a fragmented network of institutions (see [37, 44]). Within that network, power circulates, ...never localised here or there, never in anybodys hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth (Foucault and Gordon [20]; 98). Instead, individuals are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power (Foucault and Gordon [20]; 98) as they circulate between its myriad threads. Thus, religious and medical organizations, social workers, lawyers, and community groups, for example, promote various technologies of government (Rose and Miller [45]; 183) which seek to constitute and, thus, subjectify individuals by simultaneously aligning their conduct with existing or incipient governmentalities (see [30]). Choice is never completely abolished but is, rather, harnessed and redirected toward a particular end, thereby becoming the avenue through which power is exercised (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow [17]). OMalleys [36] work on prudentialism clearly explicates how crime prevention strategies operate as forms of governance. No longer the beneficiaries of a paternalistic state, citizens are now expected to make prudent choices on the basis of expert advice so as to manage their own crime-related risks [23, 38]. In so far as responsibility for crime prevention continues to shift from the state to individuals, the latter are now governed as consumers, partners, responsible members of the community and [as] active citizens

3 CPTEDs relationship to environmental psychology is explored by Brower [7], McDonald and Gifford [31], and Ham-Rowbottom et al. [25]. Issues pertaining to the ethical and political ramifications of its application are addressed by Davis [16], Rentschler [42], and Blakely and Snyder [3].

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within a neo-liberal context (OMalley and Palmer [38]; 148). As such, CPTED is a form of governance where the giving and receiving of crime prevention advice is intended to subjectify a client such that he or she chooses to regulate his or her own conduct, the conduct of other potential victims, and the conduct of potential offenders in accordance with CPTED principles (see [40]). However, because its application frequently requires access to expendable capital, governance becomes a function of whether property owners, designers, or managers are willing and/or able to spend the necessary funds. OMalley [36], Garland [22] and Rose [44] all acknowledge the economics of crime prevention within the context of larger discussions about shifting modes of governance vis-vis crime and criminal justice. However, little has been said about what an inability or unwillingness to absorb said costs might mean for theories of power and the conduct of conduct in particular. For example, in OMalleys [36] analysis of risk, crime prevention, and prudentialism, he notes: Not only does responsibility [for crime prevention] and thus critique shift, but so too do costs. Privatization of security practice and costs to be seen in the trend toward private security agencies, security devices, domestic security practices, neighbourhood watch schemes (with attendant insurance underwriting) generate the rudiments of a user pays system of policing security ([36]; 266). Furthermore, in a later piece on the relationship between crime-related risk and prudentialism, OMalley ([37]; 201) acknowledges that ...the prudent subject will invest resources in improving personal and property security. OMalley is correct in so far as this is the prevailing expectation within our neo-liberal context where prudentialism continues to inform existing and incipient governmentalities. Yet, the fact that some people are unable or unwilling to invest the necessary capital so as to implement particular crime prevention strategies is not, in a sense, factored back into the theoretical equation so as to round out our understanding of how the conduct of conduct and the flow of power unfolds under such circumstances. In Johnston and Shearings [28] analysis of contemporary governing strategies vis--vis policing and criminal justice, the authors outline what is essentially the dual nature of Western crime prevention. While, on the one hand, the emphasis on crime prevention partnerships reflects a risk-based and, thus, future oriented approach to governance, at the same time these strategies are paralleled by the exercising of sovereignty where pain and exclusion are common [28]. Although it would be unfair to critique the authors for not addressing what are, in a sense, the micro-dynamics of governance (in so far as it was never their intention to do so), it is unfortunate that so little is said about if, when, or how crime prevention partnerships breakdown. Likewise, Garlands exploration into governance and the problem of crime rightfully acknowledges how contemporary responsibilization strategies seek to enlist individuals and agencies into chains of coordinated, preventative action [22]. Although Garland makes reference to those individuals or institutions who are in a position ([22]; 188) to help reduce criminal opportunity, thereby suggesting that some are not in that position, little is said about what actually differentiates the two. To be clear, my intention is not to reiterate the argument that socio-economic status is inversely related to the probability of certain kinds of criminal victimization, however true that may be (see [29]). Rather, I am arguing that the ability of experts (in this case, CPTED experts) to effectively align the actions of subjects with prevailing governmentalities is, in part, a function of the latters willingness or ability to spend the necessary capital. By looking at it in these terms, the analytical lens is shifted to the behavioural dynamics that

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characterize the client/practitioner relationship which, in turn, allows us to deepen our understanding of how the flow of power and the conduct of conduct change as different financial limitations or opportunities are discussed or realized.

Methodology The qualitative data for this study were collected through semi-structured interviews with CPTED practitioners and supporters from across Southern Ontario. Using a snow-ball sampling technique, a total of 25 interviews were conducted, involving current (and retired) police officers, municipal politicians, landscape architects, urban planners, private security specialists, and security coordinators at several Ontario universities. Each of the recorded interviews (lasting 30 to 60 min in length) were transcribed verbatim. The interview data were then discourse analysed [46], beginning with a general open coding of the interview transcripts (see [2, 24, 49]) before moving on to the more rigorous axial coding stage (see [24]). After a lengthy process of collapsing and redefinition, a parsimonious list of important themes eventually emerged.

The cost of CPTED It goes without saying that crime prevention projects can present certain fiscal challenges. For CPTED practitioners, those challenges vary depending on myriad factors, including labour, materials, and professional fees for example. One important consideration is whether design changes will be made to an existing structure and/or landscape (commonly referred to as a retrofit) or whether changes will be incorporated into the planning stage well before a project is built. The latter scenario is generally the most cost effective and, according to Crowe [15], can lead to a significant return on investment in so far as well-designed environments not only prevent crime but are also more efficient. Unfortunately, however, environments designed and built long ago without the input of crime prevention experts often become hotspots for disorder, sometimes making an expensive retro-fit necessary. Perhaps not surprisingly, all 25 interviewees were well attuned to the financial considerations that accompany CPTEDs application. In fact, it was virtually axiomatic that CPTED be as cost effective as possible. For example, Dennis, a police officer and practitioner commented: I personally try and make any measures that I do very cost effective because everybody has budget constraints. James, also a police officer, shared a similar concern: I try and make things as cost effective for people as I can. Finally, Jennifer, a landscape architect, explained how the potential use of CPTED can generate financial concern even before construction begins: CPTEDs biggest problem it has in getting in place on a site is that people are afraid that its gonna cost them extra money. So youre constantly working that. They dont understand that CPTED problems can be mitigated by cheaper design sometimes [more] than involved design or design that articulates trouble. Although practitioners differed in terms of how long and how often they had worked with CPTED, they all agreed that financial considerations were of the utmost importance when the application of CPTED was being considered. Thus, the data clearly support Garlands assertion that value-for-money considerations have become prominent and explicit aspects of crime control discourse and practice ([22]; 185).

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The varied effects of claims to financial hardship It is not uncommon for the costs of CPTED to be more than a client is willing or capable of bearing, however. Under such circumstances, the client/practitioner relationship appears to embark along one of two possible trajectories: (1) a clients reluctance to spend the necessary capital renders the flow of power less reciprocal and, as a result, the conduct of conduct less likely; or (2) the social networks through which power flows begin to expand and become more complex as the practitioner and the client explore alternate financial arrangements for securing CPTEDs implementation. Each outcome will be examined in detail, followed by an analysis of how the perceived legitimacy of clients cost/benefit analyses might go along way in explaining these two very different outcomes. When power becomes less reciprocal The interview data suggests the subjectification process begins to break down the moment clients become reluctant to spend the necessary capital on CPTEDs implementation. Specifically, when clients become resistant for what are, ostensibly, financial reasons, the practitioners advice begins to fall on deaf ears. At this point, the flow of power becomes less reciprocal as opportunities for negotiation fade. For example, Gary, a private security specialist and consultant, commented: Once you start putting a dollar figure up and above what they were planning on doing, above what they were planning on spending, thats when people start to resist, especially when its a retrofit. Although the extent of the resistance in question is unclear, Garys observations begin to shed some initial light on how power relations change when a projects total cost begins to exceed a clients budgetary expectations. In another example, Brent, a police officer, commented on the differences between managing large and small-scale CPTED projects. Unlike Gary, Brent was forthright about the extent to which clients will resist CPTEDs application when projected costs are deemed too high: I have had no successes with expensive projects, but I have had successes with small things and if you can convince people that getting it right on the original design, versus retrofitting, could save some money ... and could have some positive benefits, its very well received. But ... if you go into a... a project... and say well were going to redesign a few walls and were going to move the window... youre dead in the water! Brents comments are noteworthy for several reasons. First, he alludes to the importance of convincing clients that CPTED is a cost effective and, hence, logical course of action. Thus, on a more theoretical level, his comments speak to the importance of the subjectification process as a means of rendering subjects willing and active participants in their own control (i.e., its very well received). That being said, Brent clearly identifies the point at which the subjectification process begins to break down. When the costs of CPTED are broached too quickly and/or when they are higher than expected, the flow of power become less reciprocal and the practitioner appears left with little, if any, opportunity for further negotiation (i.e., youre dead in the water!). Finally, Dean, a police officer who conducts CPTED audits on residential and commercial properties, shared his thoughts and frustrations about private business people who request a CPTED audit without ever having the intention of committing the necessary capital: When I do a business, and were talking thousands of dollars, changing doors and

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entrances ... nope! They say, were not going to. Oh well then [laughs] ... good luck to you [laughs]! Again, the implication here is that when clients are faced with an expensive and unanticipated CPTED proposal, the client/practitioner relationship begins to change. In this instance, Deans rather facetious response (i.e., good luck to you!) suggests he was no longer willing to advise the client. In fact, he later remarked that he or she was not worth [his] time. Again, the flow of power becomes less reciprocal (perhaps even nonexistent) in so far as Deans willingness to walk away all but terminates the relationship. What the above examples have in common is the following: (1) a client is presented with a CPTED proposal that is deemed too expensive; (2) there is a subsequent shift in the client/ practitioner relationship which renders the flow of power less reciprocal and thus less amenable to negotiation; and (3) the very possibility of securing the conduct of conduct is subsequently compromised. This, however, is not the only possible outcome. Power remains reciprocal and networks diversify A clients inability or unwillingness to spend the necessary capital does not always impede or completely obstruct the flow of power. In fact, under certain circumstances the flow of power appears to become more dynamic, traversing new axes as additional parties become involved in CPTEDs application. In the excerpt below, clients are once again confronted with an expensive CPTED strategy and begin to resist. Rather than terminate the relationship, however, Dean shows empathy and a willingness to explore new financial and logistical options: ...a lot of resistance would be ... well, I dont really know if I can afford that....a lot of times it is older people and they are [on] fixed incomes....lets say I say, oh, you should change your front door, or at least put a solid door on....and then dead bolts or something like that. Well, then theyre thinking well, thats 3 or 4 hundred dollars plus installation....Now they are looking at a big bill and theyre going, I cant really afford it. So then ... and I understand that. Okay, well how about this? And then we ...again, youve got to be creative. In this scenario, there is a clear indication that power continued to flow even after the clients initial statement of reluctance (i.e., Okay, well how about this? And then we ... again, youve got to be creative). Moreover, the flow of power appears on the verge of becoming more complex and dynamic in so far as being creative meant finding new preventative strategies and sourcing out different trades people to complete the job at a lower cost. In another example, Tim, a senior-level police officer, offered further evidence of this phenomenon. In his region, Community Service Officers (CSOs) often work closely with local residents on issues relating to crime prevention. In this instance, a local entrepreneur had been repeatedly burglarized and was experiencing financial difficulty. With mounting insurance costs and the need to spend additional capital to secure the store, the CSO took a more creative, financial approach. Tim explained: One case there was this little old lady running this old nick nack store in one of the small hamlets around [names town]. The insurance company wasnt going to insure her anymore because shed been hit [burglarized] twice. So, [names CSO], on her own initiative, went out and talked to the owner, and did a CPTED review and then invited the insurance company to sit down with the owner and presented it to both of them ... and the insurer based on the person making those changes ... said that he would insure her.

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Here, the financial and emotional misfortune that had befallen the little old lady set the stage for a more complex network of power relations. Rather than concede to the financial limitations, the practitioner sought alternate arrangements, eventually brokering an agreement with an insurance company. With additional parties involved and conditional obligations clearly identified via ongoing negotiation, power then flowed across several newly established axes. In so far as the store owner made the necessary changes, the conduct of conduct was at least partially realized. Likewise, Roger, an instructor and physical security specialist, shared his thoughts about the costs of crime prevention and how they factor into client/practitioner relations. When asked about peoples reluctance to spend the necessary funds, he commented: ...but when somebody is saying, you know what? I dont have two thousand dollars to spend right now for it. If I did, it might protect, but it might also turn my customers away ... they might not like that....And its not for anybody to say, well you didnt do it and look what happened. You should have listened to us. Its up to the people who assume the risk, and I mean if theyre cavalier about it, thats one thing. But if they make a conscious decision that this is how they are going to run their business, if its property related and nobody is being hurt ...um ...then we need to offer them our sympathy and help them out anyway. Here we see signs of a prudentialising logic in so far as Roger places responsibility for crime prevention squarely on the shoulders of clients (i.e., its up to the people who assume the risk). Of particular interest, however, is how a clients reluctance to spend the necessary capital is met with a degree of understanding in so far as he emphasizes the importance of continuing to help even when financial difficulties arise. Finally, Peter, a former police officer working in the private security industry, commented on his experience with an inner city housing complex plagued by crime and disorder. According to Peter, the residents, most of whom were visible minorities, had become so afraid and powerless they eventually cocooned themselves in their apartments. Moreover, because the proposed changes to the social and physical environment were expensive, neither the residents nor the property owner were in a position to help finance the transformation. Unlike other practitioners who saw financial limitations as an insurmountable barrier to the implementation of CPTED, Peter and his team secured tens of thousands of dollars in grant money to complete the project. Elaborating on the organizational challenges, he commented: It turns out that all the legitimate user groups vastly overtook everybody else there once we got the engaged [people] in the process....even people who didnt speak English, and there was a lot of people from Africa and a lot of small countries from around the world ...theyve been exposed actually to a lot of committees and NGOs and government organizations ...all their lives. Once they saw a government grant and the need for us to create a committee that would take command and charge of all the money we raised [they took part]. Well, it turns out that a lot of these people who dont even speak English have a hell of a lot of experience running a committee and government funding ...and uh ... vetting it out. What Peter described was a complex community initiative where residents, members of the private sector, and local activists worked together to finance and implement a multifaceted crime prevention initiative. Thus, in spite of financial hardship, the conduct of conduct was eventually realized but only after the social networks through which power flowed became more diverse and complex.

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Explaining the difference Thus, two different social trajectories are apparent. In the first, a clients reluctance to spend the necessary capital restricts the flow of power such that opportunities for negotiation are limited and the conduct of conduct becomes less likely. In the second, claims to financial hardship appear to set the stage for more dynamic power relations across multiple axes which, in turn, facilitate the conduct of conduct. How does one explain the difference? The data seems to suggest that it has much to do with whether the practitioner believes the client is acting responsibly with respect to his or her cost/benefit analysis: that is, whether the practitioner believes the client has carefully, and responsibly, weighed the pros and cons of investment. For example, in those instances where power relations became more dynamic and diversified, the practitioners did not appear to question the legitimacy of the clients claims and, at times, appeared empathetic. Dean, for example, validated older peoples claim to financial hardship by drawing attention to their fixed incomes, adding later that he empathized with their situation (i.e., and I understand that.). Likewise, Roger made it clear that so long as clients conducted a responsible cost benefit analysis he would be both empathetic and willing to help find alternative solutions (i.e., I mean if theyre cavalier about it, thats one thing. But if they make a conscious decision that ...). Tims use of the phrase little old lady implied a sense of trust and honesty, something he later affirmed when he acknowledged that the client was just so grateful to [the] constable for saving her livelihood. Finally, aware of the fact the residents could not finance the CPTED initiative on their own, Peter was clearly empathetic and openly acknowledged the extent to which their lives had been wrongfully compromised by crime and disorder. Demonstrating how the perceived illegitimacy of clients claims factor into the first scenario where the flow of power becomes less reciprocal and the conduct of conduct less likely is slightly more difficult because the examples provided above do not suggest an obvious incredulity toward clients positions. However, I am not convinced the argument is completely invalid because the data does offer what is, in a sense, indirect support for my hypothesis. Specifically, in the examples that follow, less reciprocal power relations can be inferred (unlike the previous examples where less reciprocal relations were obvious) as a result of a clients reluctance to spend the necessary capital while, at the same time, the perceived irresponsibility and thus illegitimacy of clients claims is made patently obvious. For example, when asked about the kinds of resistance he encountered while trying to promote the use of CPTED, Terry, a police officer, commented: ....and then there are other companies that uh .... Certainly [have] the ability to pay but I actually think its more the notion that ... uh ... its the willingness to pay you know? Its the greedy landlord that uh... snidely whiplashed type of thing, you know? as opposed to anything else. They dont ... they just dont want to spend the bucks. Here, Terry casts the reluctance of landowners in moral terms by suggesting their unwillingness to pay was a function of greed. He then negates other possible explanations (i.e., as opposed to anything else) before making the argument that their greedy position was, in fact, a chosen one (i.e., they just dont want to spend the bucks): not to be confused with those who cannot spend the necessary capital. Although Terry did not elaborate on whether he continues to work with such greedy clients, given his description it seems likely that both the flow of power and, thus, the conduct of conduct would be severely compromised if he were to choose to do so. In another example, Gary was asked to share his CPTED expertise with local politicians who were looking to encourage pedestrian traffic as a means of combating juvenile disorder

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in their downtown core. Gary offered several design-based solutions that were met with resistance, which he explained in the following way: In small towns, you get the small town mentality .... What do you mean were going to put up a small fence here? Its the main drag, people need to be able to walk.[imitating the politicians] Yeah, maybe so, but are people walking now? Well, no. Well, there is an old folks home there, what if you put a park bench every 150 or 200 feet? Do you think maybe those old folks will start walking from one to the other? Well, yeah. But that costs money! Yeah, but how else are you going to get people to use your sidewalks? Its a constant battle with the small town mentality. In lieu of their reluctance to finance his CPTED strategies, Gary calls the politicians capacity for rational thought into question. In fact, their position is attributed to a small town mentality as opposed to being the outcome of a legitimate cost/benefit analysis. Later in the interview, Gary edged closer to a more explicit ethical and moral critique of their position, suggesting that the city councilors tended to be close minded when it came to new ideas and even more resistant when those ideas posed a threat to their independence. Thus, resistance to CPTED for reasons that were ostensibly financial was said to be a function of the clients ignorance. Although Gary does not elaborate on how the consultation process eventually unfolded, one can only assume that securing the conduct of conduct would have been a political and practical challenge. Finally, in a slightly different example, Robert, a security consultant, shared his thoughts about clients who were reluctant to spend the necessary capital when it came to implementing CPTED. He commented: .... when things are given away for free, they are not appreciated to the degree had there been a cost associated to it. Through the police, organizations often requested CPTED audits for information purposes alone. When a considerable amount of time was spent on the audit and report (at no expense to the requesting organization) and the recommendations would not be implemented, I found this to be frustrating. I soon changed the method .... I took a bold approach and right out asked if the organization was willing to make changes, and if so, did they have any funding....If the answer was not positive, I advised that they would be put on a waiting list with low priority. Robert clearly takes issue with those who seek CPTED advice without ever intending to spend money on its implementation. In fact, it is the assumed illegitimacy of the clients position that, in the end, causes Robert to classify him or her as low priority. What is particularly interesting here is that the client is relegated to the margins precisely because the conduct of conduct was unlikely from the very outset. Although somewhat tentative at this stage, the data seems to suggest that the perceived legitimacy of a clients cost/benefit analysis goes a long way in explaining the two very different social dynamics. To review, if the practitioner believes the clients claim to financial hardship (i.e., their cost/benefit analysis) is legitimate, then there is a good chance power relations will remain reciprocal while perhaps becoming more dynamic and diversified as alternate financial and logistical arrangements are explored. However, if the practitioner believes the clients claims are illegitimate, the flow of power will become less reciprocal and the conduct of conduct less likely.4
4 Of course, without clients as interview participants, information about shifting power dynamics and eventual outcomes is derived strictly from practitioners experiences. That being the case, this analysis has been careful not to speculate on what exactly went through clients minds (not to mention the validity of their rationales or eventual decisions) while they were considering the implementation of CPTED.

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Discussion and conclusion In his discussion about degrees of rationalization and control, Foucault offers some insight with respect to the relationship between economic cost and changes in the density and complexity of power relations: ...the bringing into play of power relations as action in a field of possibilities may be more or less elaborate in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results (greater or lesser technological refinements employed in the exercise of power) or again in proportion to the possible cost (be it the economic cost of the means brought into operation, or the cost in terms of reaction constituted by the resistance which is encountered) [italics added] (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow [17]; 2234). Thus, Foucault argues that more elaborate relations of power are likely to unfold when the possible costs, whether social or economic, associated with a particular technology are high. However, the data presented here suggests something less axiomatic given that higher projected costs were shown to facilitate a partial or complete collapse of power relations, especially when practitioners believed clients cost/benefit analyses were somehow illegitimate. That being said, I think the evidence presented above helps clarify two important phenomena. First, it seems clear that the alleged availability of capital mediates the flow of power between clients and practitioners as well as the very prospect of effective governance. In so far as this is the case, we are presented with evidence that supports Foucaults contention that governance is always characterized by degrees of programmatic failure (see [30, 39]). Furthermore, in an attempt to theorize what OMalley et al. [39] referred to as the productive engagement between contestation (resistance) and rule, I would argue the fiscal resistance encountered by many CPTED practitioners is at least partially responsible for making them increasingly sensitive to the importance of costeffective crime prevention advice. Thus, in this case, programmatic failure that which is endemic to governance helps to continuously transform not only the technologies (i.e., finding more cost effective materials to use in preventative landscape design, for example) but also the governing logic itself (i.e., strategies of crime prevention must be as cost effective as possible in order to secure compliance). Second, the CPTED experience speaks clearly to the messy actualities of governance [39] where resistance and, I would argue, affectivity feature prominently in the partial transformation of governmentalities into practical effects. Indeed, as I have demonstrated, client/practitioner relations are fraught with normative judgements of personal character and capacities for rational thought: after all, some clients were considered greedy, closeminded, and cavalier. In general, the evidence brings to light the trials and tribulations that accompany and continuously redefine the logic of particular modalities of governance. In doing so, it speaks to the continued importance of conducting grounded, non-reified research in the governmentality field.

References
1. Atlas, R. (1991). The other side of CPTED. Security Management, 35(3), 6367. 2. Berg, B. L. (2001). Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 3. Blakely, E. J., & Snyder, M. G. (1999). Fortress America gated communities in the United States. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

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