Russian Studies in Philosophy, vol. 43, no. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 4774. 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

. All rights reserved. 10611967/2004 $9.50 + 0.00.

V.P. BRANSKII

Theoretical Foundations of Social Synergetics

Although in the last quarter of the twentieth century the synergetic approach to social phenomena became very popular, in many cases it does not go beyond the bounds of philosophical journalism. This is explained, apparently, by the fact that before one sets about applying the general theory of self-organization (which the German physicist [Hermann] Haken proposed calling synergetics in 1973) to society, one needs a correct and clear understanding of the theorys system of basic concepts and their intricate interconnections. This is impossible without a mastery of the methodology of the exact sciences.1 First of all, one must realize clearly that the central problem of synergetics is the interrelation between order and chaos. It is common knowledge that various types of order and chaos are unstable and prone to change one into the other: here and there ordered structures become disordered (order changes into chaos), while disordered structures become ordered (chaos turns into order).2 Let us note that such transitions are more fundamental in character than transitions from one ordered structure to another or from one disordered structure to another. From the point of view of physics, the meaning of all such transitions lies in the search for stability (a state in which transitions of the system
English translation 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text 2000 the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Teoreticheskie osnovaniia sotsialnoi sinergetiki, Voprosy filosofii, 2000, no. 4, pp. 11229. A publication of the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. Vladimir Pavlovich Branskii is a doctor of philosophical sciences and a professor at St. Petersburg State University. Translated by Stephen D. Shenfield.
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from one state to another cease). As we know from experience, the striving toward transition from a less to a more stable state and, in the final analysis, toward a state of maximum stability (under given conditions) is a natural property of any physical system. This striving manifests itself in two opposite tendencies: (1) a striving in closed (isolated from external interactions) systems toward a state of maximum disorder (chaos); and (2) a striving in open systems toward one or another form of order (under certain conditions). Because the measure of disorder (disorganization) is a quantity that in physics is called entropy, while the measure of order (organization) is, naturally, negative entropy, called negentropy or information,3 the first tendency expresses itself in the law of increasing entropy in an isolated system, and the second tendency in the law of decreasing entropy, that is, increasing negentropy, in an open system (through work performed on the system by its external environment). The situation, however, is complicated by the fact that the dividing line between a closed and an open system is not an absolute one. On the one hand, a closed system can become open by a breakdown in its isolation; on the other hand, an open system can become closed by becoming isolated from its environment. So the growth of entropy may give way to a decline and vice versa. Thus, in the world of ordinary linear systems, both the striving toward chaos and the striving toward order are, generally speaking, unstable.4 In the first half of the twentieth century a number of new dissipative systems, from [H.] Bnards hydrodynamic cells (1900) to [B.P.] Belousovs chemical clock (1951), were discovered, and they gave a completely new meaning to the problem of the interrelation between order and chaos. In 196768, the Belgian physicist-chemist of Russian origin, Ilya Prigogine, provided a theoretical basis for all these discoveries by showing that there exists in nature a completely new mode of the striving of a physical system toward a stable statea unique synthesis of order and chaos (instead of their succession). He constructed a model of the so-called Brusselator5an open chemical system in which during an auto-catalytic reaction, an uneven spatial distribution of the concentrations of the reacting substances, that is, an ordered structure whose character is not determined by external influences on the system, emerges spontaneously.6 Thus arose the theoretical conception of a dissipative system.7 The specific character of such a system consists in the fact that it is main-

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tained through a constant exchange of matter or energy or both simultaneously with its environment. Hence the term dissipative (dissipation is the scattering of matter and energy). If such exchange ceases the dissipative structure is destroyed and disappears. In this regard it differs essentially from ordinary equilibrium systems (Prigogine) such as crystals or fluids, which manage very well without this kind of exchange.8 One of the simplest and most striking examples of a dissipative system is the aforementioned chemical clockthe rhythmical change in the color of a homogeneous solution in a test tube from blue to red and back again under conditions of a constant inflow of some substances and outflow of others. If the inflow and outflow cease, the chemical clock stops. The most important peculiarity of a dissipative system lies in the fact that it combines order with chaos. The emergence of order in such a system is expressed, from the quantitative point of view, in a reduction of its entropy, but this occurs at the cost of increased disorder in its environment. The system not only emerges but also exists by absorbing order from its environment (it, so to speak, feeds on order) and, consequently, by exacerbating chaos there. Thus, the synthesis of order and chaos that is accomplished by a dissipative system consists in the fact that an ordered structure cannot exist without a disordered one, that order cannot exist without chaos. Instead of order and chaos excluding one another, as they do in equilibrium systems, they are now interconnectedthey complement one another in such a way that order cannot exist without the chaos that maintains it, nor chaos without the order that generates it: Chaos and order have turned out to be connected in a completely unexpected fashion.9 Besides the aforementioned aspect, the synthesis of order and chaos in a dissipative system also has another aspect: the ordered reaction of the system to chaotic influences from the environment. Different kinds of dissipative systems are stable in relation to (quantitatively and qualitatively) different classes of interactions with the environment. This circumstance, together with the scales of entropy export (and, correspondingly, of negentropy import) allows us to speak of different degrees of synthesis of order and chaos. Dissipative systems are distinguished by such properties as openness, nonequilibrium, and nonlinearity. Openness refers to the mode of exchange with the external environment. This can be an exchange of substances, energy, or information or all of them simultaneously (in various combinations, for example, substance and energy or energy and infor-

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mation). Nonequilibrium presupposes the presence of macroscopic processes of the exchange of substance, energy, and information among elements of the dissipative system itself. Nonlinearity, the capacity for self-action, is especially significant. Because they lack this capacity, linear systems react to external impacts in proportion to the latter: small impacts lead to small changes in the state of the system and large impacts to large changes (hence the term linearity, which refers to the linear character of proportional dependence). Self-action violates this proportionality: here small impacts can have very large consequences (a mouse gives birth to a mountain), while large impacts can have quite insignificant consequences (a mountain gives birth to a mouse). This disproportionality in the dependence of the state of the system on the state of its environment makes such systems, on the one hand, exceptionally stable in relation to large-scale unfavorable influences and, on the other hand, unusually sensitive to a certain kind of very small fluctuation in the state of the environment. At the same time, the system may experience a qualitative global shift in a certain direction that is not causally connected with the character of the small influences. One of the simplest examples of a nonlinear system is Prigogines Brusselator with its capacity for autocatalysis (in which the reacting substances themselves play the role of catalyst in the reaction). From what has been said it is clear that thanks to their nonlinearity, dissipative systems possess a very wayward character, which distinguishes them sharply from ordinary linear systems. Just as various kinds of chaos and various kinds of order can form ordered and nonordered structures (a hierarchy of chaos and a hierarchy of order), so dissipative systems can form chaotic and ordered structures of a higher rank. Moreover, ordered systems consisting of dissipative systems, in their turn, can exist only through a specific exchange with the environment; in the general case, an exchange of substance, energy, and information. From these systems it is possible to form dissipative systems of an even higher rank, and so on. Also possible are dissipative systems whose elements are replaced periodically by similar elements (systems connected with the succession of generations). It is not difficult to guess that the hierarchy of dissipative systems creates conditions for the appearance of various degrees of synthesis of order and chaos. And just as there are transitions between various forms of order, various forms of chaos, and various forms of order and chaos, so analogous transitions are possible between dissipative systems with dif-

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ferent hierarchical structures. Not all of these transitions are equally stable (from the point of view of the striving toward maximum stability). Among them, however, there is a transition that corresponds to the principle of maximum stability. From the point of view of the theory of dissipative systems, it is natural to call this transition development. And so, development is the growth in the degree of synthesis of order and chaos that is conditioned by the striving toward maximum stability. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the creators of the theory of dissipative systems noted that evolution may be regarded as a problem of structural stability.10 It is obvious that the concept of development in the indicated sense is universal in character, being equally applicable to inorganic, biological, and social phenomena. The generality of this concept is explained by the fact that its definition uses conceptions of order, chaos, and stability, the universality of which is not open to doubt. Against the background of the invisible ocean of the reciprocal transitions of chaos and order, the birth of the simplest dissipative systems as an elementary form of synthesis of order and chaos and their transition to more complex forms of synthesis (thanks to the formation of dissipative systems with a more complex hierarchical structure) is, apparently, objective realitys universal mode of attaining a state of maximum stability. In view of the instability of all transitions from chaos to order and vice versa, maximum stability can be achieved only by overcoming the very opposition between chaos and order. In light of what I have said, it is sufficiently evident that man (like any other organism) constitutes a typical dissipative system that can exist both physically and spiritually only if there is a constant exchange of substances, energy, and information with its environment (eating, breathing, heat exchange, excretion, reproduction, cognition, production of utilitarian and spiritual values, communication, and so on). A multiplicity of such systems forms one or another social organization or corporation (a family, a school, a firm, and so on). Such a corporation constitutes, in turn, a dissipative system: it exists only through a specific exchange of substances, energy, and information with its environment. Corporations of one rank form dissipative systems of a higher rank; as a result, a hierarchical dissipative structure emerges, which in the final analysis, coincides with the state (in sufficiently developed societies). The state too can exist only on condition of an exchange of substances, energy, and information with its natural and social environment. Thus, any society is a dissipative system. Moreover, it is a system

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with periodically changing elements, for the dissipative structure (social regime) within certain limits exists independently of the succession of generations (elementary dissipative systems). At first glance, it may seem that to describe a society in the language of dissipative systems is merely to reformulate long-known truths. However, we shall soon see that the application of the dissipative concept of development to society leads to very unexpected and far-reaching consequences. So the creators of the theory of dissipative systems were quite perceptive when they wrote: It is interesting to apply the theory of structural stability to the problems of social and cultural evolution.11 We saw that from a phenomenological point of view, development is nothing but a process of overcoming the opposition between order and chaos in view of the fundamental instability of both ordered and chaotic structures. Now we have to find an answer to the question of why development occurs rather than how it occurs. In other words, we must uncover the inner mechanism of development, that is, penetrate its essence, which cannot be observed directly and has always given scientists and philosophers a great deal of trouble. If we suppose that development is based on a process of selection, then to explain development we must answer three questions: (1) what is the set from which the selection is made; (2) who makes the selection; and (3) by what standard is the selection made. The first factor is aptly called the thesaurus, the second the detector, and the third the selector. The literal meaning of thesaurus is treasure house. The name conveys the meaning of the factor under discussion very accurately: it is the set of variants for selection. The richer the set, the better the chances of finding something really valuable (from the point of view of the person making the selection). The question arises: how does the set arise and what is the nature of its elements? The answer to this question lies in such an important concept of the theory of dissipative systems as bifurcation. The point is that every dissipative system has its specific magnitudes (control parameters), which characterize the fundamental properties of the system. For example, in the case of the Brusselator the role of such parameters is played by concentrations of the reacting substances. Each parameter has a critical (threshold) value: when that value is reached in the course of the systems quantitative evolution, a qualitative leap occurs. This is a point at which the line of evolution branches out and the process is called bifurcation (from the English fork).12 The initial quality as it were branches out into new qualities. The number of branches

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that originate in a given point of bifurcation determines the discrete set of possible new dissipative structures, to which a given (actually existing) structure can pass in a leap (saltation).13 Every such structure corresponds to a possible correlation among the elements of a system. These correlations can arise spontaneously as a result of the combination of interactions internal to the system with the systems external interactions with its environment. It is important to note that the aforementioned structures may differ very considerably from the initial structure. A dissipative system in a state of bifurcation is reminiscent of [V.M.] Vasnetsovs painting A Knight at the Crossroads [Vitiaz na raspute], and the spectrum of possible alternatives may be no less extravagant and dramatic. From what has been said it is clear that it is precisely bifurcation that determines the set of possible paths of development, that is, the thesaurus for the selection. At first glance, it appears that the choice among the indicated alternatives is a matter of pure chance (or, as the physicists say, the result of random fluctuation). One gets the impression that the bifurcational leap from one dissipative structure to another is not determined in any way. On close inspection, this opinion turns out to be mistaken: responsibility for the choice in reality lies with the inner interaction among the elements of the system that plays the role of detector. In the general case, such interaction is a clash between contradictory causes, some of which are in a state of competition and others in a state of cooperation. Competition signifies activity in different and even opposite directions,14 while cooperation signifies activity in a single direction. Since ancient Greek activity sounded like energy, joint activity acquired the name synergy.15 It is not difficult to guess that the end result of selection will be determined in the general case not by any one of the interacting causes but by the resultant of them all, in other words, by the superposition of all these causes. It is clear that this resultant is determined not only by the qualitative, but also by the quantitative aspect of interaction, that is, by the interrelation of forces among opposed causes. The latter depends on the distribution of cooperative tendencies or the interrelation of forces (synergetic) among the aforementioned causes. Hence it is clear that the detector, so to speak (rephrasing Einsteins well-known utterance), is devilishly cunning but not malicious, for he himself does not know in advance what the final result of the selection will be. At first glance, it may appear that a thesaurus and a detector suffice

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for an unambiguous choice. Deeper analysis, however, shows that this is not so. The point is that (as follows from the real practice of selection) one and the same detector may choose from one and the same thesaurus quite different elements, if one is following different rules; and, conversely, different detectors may choose one and the same element from different thesauri, if their rules coincide. And so, the third factor of the selectionthe selectoris the guiding rule on the basis of which the choice is made. In the case of arbitrary internal interaction in a dissipative system of any nature, such a rule is provided by the objective law governing the interaction.16 What I have said above makes it clear that for dissipative structures this law is the corresponding principle of stability: in dissipative systems the search for stability plays the role of natural selection.17 Bifurcation is an unstable state of a system. Moreover, different bifurcations generate different kinds of instability. In their turn, different types of internal interactions may be connected with different criteria of stability. So the principle of selection (the selector) is the definition of the state that the system must attain in order to be in a state of maximal stability under the given conditions.18 Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for an unambiguous (or at least close to unambiguous) selection is the combination of a thesaurus, a detector, and a selector.19 The general picture of the operation of selection is as follows. Random quantitative changes accumulate and reach a critical threshold at which they create qualitatively new material (bifurcational structures) for selection; the interaction (struggle) of conflicting causes establishes the procedure for choosing concrete elements from this material; and the law of stability, to which this interaction is subject, carries out a preliminary sorting of the material, playing the role of a selection filter. The result of selection is a mutation or fluctuation,20 that is, the realization of one of the bifurcational structures. Our attention is drawn to the unusually complex and delicate character of the mechanism of selection, which is masked by the fact that all the selection factors (thesaurus, detector, and selector) act together and merge in the process of selection into a single whole. This merging gives the whole process of creating a qualitatively new formation a highly puzzling appearance. It is not therefore surprising that to the observer who is not aware of the described factors of selection and their interrelations the birth of a new quality as a virtuoso combination of unusual elements with a cunning (intricate) structure

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seems to be a real miracle, an irrational act that does not lend itself to rational analysis (the mystery of emergence, to which in the twentieth century Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, and other philosophers devoted so much attention). In light of what has been said, synergetics may be regarded as the theory of the formation of new qualities.21 This can be justified, in particular, by a fact of no little importance: synergetics explains in a rigorous mathematical fashion (by means of systems of nonlinear differential equations) how an old quality branches out into new ones (the theory of bifurcation). The bifurcation mechanism explains how purely quantitative growth can lead to a qualitatively new choice.22 The operative mechanism of selection becomes even more complicated when we pass from elementary dissipative systems to composite ones, the elements of which are themselves dissipative systems. Of special interest are the generational systems that I have already mentioned. Here it is necessary to draw a distinction between local bifurcations experienced by system elements (microevolution) and global bifurcations experienced by the system as a whole (macroevolution). In course of the succession of generations, there is a gradual accumulation of local bifurcations and local mutations based on them. As a result, there arises a new control parameterthe number of local mutationswhich has its own threshold (critical) value. When this value is attained, the correspondence between the structure of the generational system and its elements is violated and there appears a global bifurcationa set of possible new structures of the system as a whole. In this way a global thesaurus takes shape. A global structure is selected from a set and is embodied in reality (a global mutation) by interaction among the elements of the system and by the global selectorthe law of stability of the system as a whole. It is important to emphasize that the process of selection and its consequencequalitative change of the generational systemare, in the final analysis, essentially connected with the succession of the generations of its elements.23 The question arises: how can the theory of development set out above be verified? For this we must first of all see what are the chief phenomenological signs of development that require rational explanation. It turns out that the characteristic features of any developing system are complexity (of internal structure), diversity (of forms of manifestation), and adaptation24 (to the external environment).25 These features have been studied particularly closely in dissipative systems in living nature.26

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As regards complexity, our attention is immediately drawn to the following hierarchy: cellstissuesorgansorganismsbiocenoses biosphere. It suffices to recall that mans cerebral cortex alone consists of about 100 billion nerve cellsa number of the same order of magnitude as the number of stars in our galaxy. No less impressive is the diversity of forms in which biological dissipative systems manifest themselves. Now let us look at the consequences that flow from the synergetic theory of development set out above. First of all, the mechanism of selection described above presupposes that the result of selection must possess a property such as hierarchical structure. This property is connected with the tendency of both homogeneous and heterogeneous dissipative systems, under certain conditions of interaction with the external environment, toward unification (integration).27 Such unification gives systems of a certain type under the stated conditions an advantage from the point of view of the principle of stability for the following reason: it leads to the replacement of competition between these systems by cooperation, and this leads to a more efficient exchange of substances, energy, and information. In other words, by creating a dissipative superstructure the original dissipative systems profit in terms of substances, energy, and information in their own dissipative exchange. The principle of maximum stability requires that such unification (integration) be repeated at a higher level (of integration of the systems that have arisen as a result of primary integration). The multiple integration of systems of different rank inevitably lends the structure of the whole a hierarchical character. I stress that this tendency is especially characteristic of dissipative systems, inasmuch as it acquires a special significance in the presence of exchange.28 Thus, selection facilitates the spread of hierarchy because in the bifurcational set of possible structures hierarchy is preferable from the point of view of the principle of stability. The tendency in favor of hierarchy makes it understandable why in the process of a systems development its structure tends to become more complicated. On the other hand, inasmuch as the most diverse successive bifurcations appear in the process of the transformation of random quantitative changes into qualitative ones, many possible directions of hierarchization arise. It follows that the result of selection must also possess a property such as branching. This means that under some conditions of interaction with the environment one direction of hierarchization is prefer-

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able, while under other conditions another direction is preferable.29 This diversity in directions of hierarchization inevitably introduces diversity into the development even of identical dissipative systems that undergo identical bifurcations but have different interactions with the environment. External interaction here will be nonspecific in the sense that it will be only the occasion for the systems hierarchization, not its cause. The cause will be the specific characteristics of the system itself. The diversity observed in the development of dissipative systems is therefore a natural consequence of the bifurcation mechanism (the play of bifurcations in Prigogines expression). But perhaps the most significant result of selection is a property such as the new nonlinearity or a different type of feedback. As I have noted, a dissipative system is capable of self-action. At times, therefore, it can play tricks that the most extravagant and whimsical mind would never dream of. Its reaction to an external influence can be quite disproportionate (excessively large or excessively small). It turns out that selection can modify (vary) the capacity of a system for self-action, choosing forms of that capacity that lend the system greater stability: a sufficiently rich thesaurus and a detector that uses a sufficiently demanding selector can lead to the formation of fundamentally new types of feedback. In other words, there appear types of self-action in which a reaction to external influences is achieved that secures the greatest stability of the system.30 It is obvious that the maximal correspondence between the behavior of the system and the environmental conditions (adaptation, goal-directedness, and rationality) will then be achieved automatically.31 Hierarchization, branching, and the formation of a new type of feedback together constitute what in the theory of dissipative systems customarily goes by the name of self-organization.32 This process differs from the process of organization in that its essence is explained by the nature of the system itself (and not by the action of external factors): We call a system self-organizing if without specific influence from without it acquires some kind of spatial, temporal, or functional structure.33 It is obvious that the theory of self-organization on the basis of selection provides an exhaustive explanation of all the aforementioned phenomenological indicators of development (complexity, diversity, and adaptation). The synergetic theory of selection that I have presented treats selection as a universal mechanism of the development of any dissipative system.34 Inasmuch as a society is such a system, this theory cannot but be applicable also to its development.

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The social thesaurus (the set of possible social structures) is created by social bifurcations. These are social crises associated with revolutionary situations, which occur periodically in all societies. It is generally known that a society as a social system finds itself in such a case in an unstable state, pregnant, as people usually say, with a social explosion (revolution). A crisis of this kind plays the role of a global bifurcation, the conditions for which usually mature in the course of crisis situations (local bifurcations) that affect specific social institutions and even individuals. There occurs something similar to what Marx once described when he said: You burrow well, old mole. Such a chaotic multiplicity of local crises is, as a rule, associated with a generational change.35 The growing discrepancy between the old social structure (in the general case, the form of government and property) and new social elements (new people and new corporations) gives rise in public consciousness to a set of ideas about possible variants (scenarios) of a different social structuring. These ideas (or at least some of them) usually reflect with one or another degree of precision real possibilities for the reconstruction of the global social structure. Consequently, a crisis state of a society presupposes the objective emergence of a set of possible new social structures, the realization of any of which can restore the lost correspondence between the global structure of the social system and its elements. Then there arises the problem of choice, and now it no longer affects the unconscious dissipative systems but such delicate creatures as living people with all their ideas, opinions, and experiences. As history shows, the specific character of the social detector lies in the fact that its function is carried out, in the final analysis, by the struggle (interaction) of various (including alternative) social ideals. It is precisely the clash (at times very cruel) of these ideals that determines exactly which of the possible structures of the social order will be chosen and realized: It is fascinating when two plots collide head on (Shakespeare). Here our attention is drawn immediately to three points. First, the struggle of ideals can by no means be reduced to a purely mental encounter between subjective images of some kind; it presupposes the social confrontation of their bearers in the form of living people, sometimes ready to make extreme sacrifices for the sake of realizing their ideals. Consequently, the struggle of ideals has its ultimate practi-

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cal manifestation in the collision of sacrifices.36 Second, the result of social selection of bifurcational possibilities (or, as people usually say, of historical alternatives) depends, as is to be expected, not only on the qualitative but also on the quantitative correlation of forces among the bearers of the various ideals. For this reason, the result of selection may be completely unexpected for all the bearers of ideals, inasmuch as in the general case it is determined by the resultant of all the social forces taking part in the interaction, and may not correspond to any of the ideals. This is one of the riddles of history (the irony of history) that Hegel aptly called the cunning of world reason.37 It is precisely this rather cloudy and mystical formula that splendidly describes the specific character of the social detector. Third, the fact that social selection is always carried out by a struggle of ideals clearly demonstrates its fundamental difference from biological selection: while the entire responsibility for the latter is borne by the struggle for existence, responsibility for the former lies with quite a different struggle, the struggle for transformation (or what Nietzsche called the struggle for power).38 While the struggle for existence aims at conformism (adaptation to the environment), the struggle for transformation aims at transformism (change of the environment). In the struggle for existence, the elements of the system are, so to speak, not greedy for fatstaying alive is good enough; in the struggle for transformation, these elements are crazy about fat. As for the social selector, this is usually one of the principles that guide the bearers of ideals in their struggle: (1) the principle of fundamentalism (irreconcilability); (2) the principle of compromise; (3) the principle of arbitration (neutralization); and (4) the principle of convergence (synthesis). The first principle preaches the cult of victory (no concessions to the enemyfight to the victorious end!). Complete victory requires the complete and unconditional capitulation of the vanquished, not only in the physical but also in the spiritual sense. The spiritual defeat of the vanquished signifies that he repudiates his own ideal, for the sake of which he has made so many sacrifices, and adopts the victors ideal. The most vivid and consistent historical embodiment of this cult of victory was the triumph of a victorious military commander in ancient Rome with its solemn ritual worked out to the last detail.39 The principle of compromise requires a search for mutual concessions and a readiness to forgo principles on some points, that is, to

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retreat from some demands of the warring ideals. The principle of arbitration signifies the mutual neutralization of alternative ideals and transfer of the choice to a third force (an external ideal different from those engaged in the struggle). Finally, the principle of convergence requires that a way out of the critical situation be found through the formation of a new ideal on the basis of a synthesis of the warring ideals. It is not difficult to see that the successful use of one or another principle as the selector depends on the correlation of forces among the bearers of the hostile ideals. If the bearer of ideal A is significantly stronger than the bearer of ideal B, then the principle of irreconcilability will bring him success, while the principle of compromise will bring him at least partial failure. Conversely, for B to try to make the choice between historical alternatives by relying on the principle of irreconcilability would be equivalent to suicide, while the principle of compromise might get him home and dry. If A and B are equal in strength, the principle of irreconcilability becomes senseless (a stalemate) and even dangerous to both (mutual exhaustion). * * *

The synergetic theory of social selection that I have briefly described provides a simple and clear solution to two of the most important and difficult problems of the philosophy of historythe problem of historical determinism and the problem of social progress. Let us examine them in turn. The result of social selection is a social mutationthe realization of one of the possible social structures that were present unseen in the stormy atmosphere of social crisis but whose existence no member of the given society could even suspect. And here the old and painful question rears its head: could things have been otherwise? And this question can be raised not only by the vanquished but also the victors and, if there are neither vanquished nor victors, then generally by any member of the new social system. The question posed lies at the very heart of the problem of historical determinism. It would seem that the question allows for only two answers: positive (voluntarism) and negative (fatalism). Contrary to expectation, the synergetic theory of selection demonstrates that there is a third answer that avoids this dilemma. As I have shown, the choice of a corresponding bifurcational struc-

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ture is determined unambiguously by the social detector and the social selector, that is, by the correlation of forces among the interacting ideals and the principle to which their interaction is subordinated. So if the correlation of forces and the principle in question are fixed (given), then a different historical path cannot be selected. Conversely, if they are not fixed, then, insofar as the social thesaurus (generated by the bifurcation) contains a number of alternative structures, history in this case can go both thus and otherwise (Aristotle). But then a new question arises immediately: what determines the correlation of forces and the principle of their struggle? History places responsibility for this on three factors: (1) interaction with the external environment (both natural and social); (2) the proper activity (monadic character) of the interacting elements of the social system, conditioned by the interaction of their subelements and contemporaneous to the bifurcational event; and (3) the history of interaction between elements of the system that precedes the event under consideration (the non-Markov character40 of the historical process). These factors give the problem of historical determinism quite different meanings depending on whether it is posed in relation to the past or the future. If the bifurcational event has already taken place, that is, if the historical path has been chosen, then all three factors are given and therefore the correlation of forces together with their principle is also given. Thus, in relation to the past the question And might things have been otherwise? is meaningless, for history has already been decided and it is impossible to influence the past. Although this history is always not pure necessity but a unity (an alloy) of necessity and chance, in the past we are always dealing with a real (realized) unity of the two, and nothing in it can be changed, however we might wish, for example, that Cleopatra had seduced the future Roman emperor Augustus, that Napoleon at Waterloo had not entrusted his reserves to General Grouchy, and that Stalin after World War II had repudiated the idea of world revolution. In relation to the future matters stand quite otherwise. Here none of the three factors indicated, on which the correlation of forces and the principle of their interaction depend, has had its effect yet, and therefore both the correlation of forces and its principle are not determined unambiguously. Moreover, if the investigator of a society is himself an element of that society, then through his activity he may influence (directly or indirectly) the formation of one or another correlation of forces and the adoption of one or another principle of their interaction. In view of

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social bifurcations, unambiguous prediction of a future social mutation is impossible here, and only a probabilistic forecast can be made (a survey of possible scenarios for the development of events and an assessment of the probabilities of these scenarios). However, there is a possibility of turning a forecast into a prediction and of confirming the prediction, to speak in the language of physics, experimentally. To do so, it is necessary to influence the correlation of forces between the warring ideals and the principle of their struggle in such a way as to bring about the correlation of forces and the principle of interaction that will ensure the choice of a bifurcational structure that the investigator finds desirable (a scenario for the development of events that he finds preferable). If theory and practice coincide, we can say that the prediction has been confirmed. Then no one will dare to assert that this is a coincidence. This is what a social experiment is. And all world history is a chain of such experiments.41 The situation here, of course, is essentially different from prediction in physics. There, such adjustment of the experimental data to the theoretical prediction is quite inadmissible. In this connection, a wellknown physicist once said that there is nothing more dangerous than a coincidence between the forecast of a bad theory and a dirty experiment. However, from what has been said it follows that what is considered a dirty experiment in physics is a quite clean experiment in history. Why is there no contradiction between the meaninglessness of the question And could things have been otherwise? in relation to the past and its meaningfulness in relation to the future (Can things be otherwise?)? It is because in the first case we pose a question concerning a real unity of necessity and chance that has already been realized, while in the second case our question concerns a possible unity of necessity and chance that has not yet been realized.42 Thus, only the synergetic theory of selection provides a solution to the problem of historical determinism that allows it to be combined with responsible social activism, avoiding the two extremes of blind fatalism (all is predetermined) and of irresponsible voluntarism (all is permitted). The synergetic theory of selection provides a no less cogent answer to the question of the existence and criteria of social progress. From the point of view of this theory, social progress is a chain of mutations of the social system that leads to the attainment of a greater degree of realization of some universally significant ideal. It is precisely the

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degree of realization of the ideal that constitutes the criterion of transition from a less perfect to a more perfector, as people usually say, from a lower to a higherstate of society.43 Hence two things immediately become evident. First of all, it is clear that there can be no objective criterion of social progress independent of social ideals. If, for example, the economic ideal is to create an industrial monster capable of instilling fear in the whole world, then the preferential development of heavy industry at the expense of agriculture may constitute economic progress. Conversely, if the ideal is to achieve an abundance of cheap home-grown farm produce, then the intensive development of agriculture at the cost of constraining the development of heavy industry may be regarded as progress.44 If the political ideal for the citizens of a given society is a republic, then they will regard a transition from a monarchy to a republic as political progress; but if their ideal is monarchy, then they will see the same political progress in a transition from a republic to a monarchy. Analogously in the ethical field, if a Spartan regime is the ideal, then stricter adherence to this regime will constitute ethical progress, but if an Epicurean regime is the ideal, then the same progress will be seen in the rejection of the Spartan regime. A very similar picture is observed in the esthetic sphere, where the concept of progress in the indicated sense works just as well as it does on the other floors of the social building. When the aesthetic ideal is an artistic work that corresponds to the ideal of the average person, artistic progress is seen in the perfection of the reproduction of various features of real objects; but when this ideal is a work that corresponds to the ideal of the spiritualistic person, a thoroughgoing exclusion of the portrayal of objects (a striving toward abstraction) will be regarded as artistic progress. It is obvious that if the criterion of artistic progress is taken to be a greater degree of realization of some universally significant esthetic ideal, then no difficulties with the concept of progress arise in the history of art.45 Second, the synergetic theory of selection explains why faith in progress is periodically lost in a society. The trouble is that the progressive development of a society requires that a certain social ideal be realized in the process of social development. But this is possible only when a most influential, dominant ideal appears in the interaction of ideals and imposes its imprint on the whole of social development. If an ideal is only a resultant of a multiplicity of ideals then one cannot speak

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of the realization of any specific ideal, and the criterion of progress becomes vague and diffuse. Where there is no clear-cut criterion it is, naturally, difficult to speak of progress. But when the relative equilibrium of ideals is broken and a dominant ideal makes its appearance, faith in progress is restored as decisively as it was lost in the age of confusion. Now we must turn to the social meaning of another important concept of synergetics that has acquired the name attractor. As experience shows, hierarchization cannot continue without limit and at some stage it comes to a halt. The limiting state that a system can reach as it undergoes hierarchization is determined unambiguously by the nature of the system itself and by the character of the environment with which the system interacts. In an environment with certain properties, a system that has reached the critical (threshold) state of hierarchization becomes unstable, and then the reverse process of dehierarchizationthe gradual (stage-by-stage, stepped) disintegration of a complex system into simpler systemsbegins. Generally, the simpler systems do not coincide with the original elements from which the system was formed. As a result of this process, an ordered hierarchical structure turns into a chaotic conglomerate of simpler structures (destruction of the system, collapse, catastrophe). Dehierarchization, however, also has a limit. When this limit is reached, it is not the original ordered system but the chaotic conglomerate into which it has turned that turns out to be unstable. And then the process of hierarchization starts anew. But this is no longer the same process as before, for it involves the stage-by-stage (stepped) unification of new elements, the formation of new structures, and the emergence of quite new interactions. From what I have said it is clear that there must be limiting states of a system in respect of both hierarchization and dehierarchization. The first is naturally called the simple attractor, and the second the strange attractor (from the English attraction). This term is connected with the fact that the aforementioned limiting states attract, as it were, the rest of the states toward themselves. Expressing ourselves figuratively, we may say that the simple attractor is the limiting state toward which order tends (strives), while the strange attractor is the limiting state toward which chaos tends. Thus, the development of a system, if observed over a sufficiently long period, is generally not reducible to hierarchization (transition from the simple to the complex) alone, but is an extremely complex and intricate process of stage-by-stage (multi-step) succession of processes of hierarchization and dehierarchization (transition from

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the complex to the simple). Moreover, the detailed specificity of this succession depends on the combination of the special characteristics of the developing system with those of its external environment. The question arises: what is the essence of this process? Does it have any kind of special meaning that is hidden from an outside view or cannot be observed directly? At first glance, such a process may seem quite senseless: all that is created during hierarchization is then destroyed; development becomes something like beating the air (a kind of Sisyphean labor). One gets the impression that the selection on which so many hopes were laid does not bring the system closer to a stable state, but moves it further away from such a state. Selection as it were runs wild. Meanwhile, there is one question that during the initial period of the development of the theory of selection always remains in the background but comes to the fore during the mature period: is there feedback between the results of selection and its mechanism? Or, in other words, what kind of influence do different results of selection exert on the factors of selection?46 As will become clear on further analysis, the essence of the process of the succession of hierarchization and dehierarchization, of the striving toward increasingly integrated forms of order and increasingly differentiated forms of chaos, consists in superselection the selection of the factors of selection themselves.47 This means a search for a completely new thesaurus, detector, and selector. It is obvious that the result of selection to a decisive degree depends on these latter. If the thesaurus turns out to contain much more complex structural formations, and the role of detector is assumed by a more qualified interaction, subject to a wiser law, then the result of selection will not be long in coming: it will differ sharply in quality. The situation here is reminiscent of that in which the task is to find a new mineral with unique properties. It is obvious that the probability of finding such a mineral is much greater if the search is conducted in a region that is rich in minerals, if the specialist engaged in the search is highly qualified, and if his instruments are well constructed. Now it is clear why there is need for what at first glance is such an unpleasant procedure as dehierarchization: it creates completely new elements that can serve as the basis for the formation of a spectrum of completely new structures (a new thesaurus). These new structures could not have arisen on the basis of the old elements. In addition, the interaction of these new elements proceeds in accordance with a new law (a new detector and a new selector). Conse-

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quently, it is precisely dehierarchization that endows changes in the development of a system with a radical (not cosmetic) character. This is why the synergetic theory of development is marked by an attitude toward chaos that is quite different from the attitude taken in the classical theories of development: To create chaos is sometimes very useful.48 The chief result of superselection consists in the qualitative deepening and quantitative acceleration of selection. It is precisely thanks to this circumstance that selection acquires the power to perform miracles. As is well known, the most important discovery of the theory of dissipative systems is the following: in contrast to a closed physical system in an equilibrium state, in which the probability of the formation of ordered structures on a macroscopic scale is vanishingly small, in an open system far from equilibrium, the probability of the formation of such structures can be as great as you like.49 Even if it were small at first, the discovery, as a result of superselection, of a new thesaurus, detector, and selector would make it as great as you like.50 Superselection manifests itself in an especially striking and dramatic manner in the struggle between the two opposite tendencies that can be observed throughout human historythe tendency toward the unification of social institutions and the tendency toward their disintegration. In the political sphere, this struggle often takes the form of the periodic formation of vast empires and their catastrophic destruction. The imperialist slogan expansion is everything (Cecil Rhodes) and its anarchist counterpart destruction too is a creative act (M. Bakunin) express the essence of this collision very well. There arises a very important and interesting question. How does superselection manifest itself in the sphere of cultural development? It must be noted right away that this is the most complex and difficult of all the problems encountered by synergetic theory in its application to society. We have already seen that superselection presupposes the existence of a multiplicity of attractors (limiting states of the hierarchization of a dissipative system). Each such attractor represents a local (relative) limit to complexity, that is, a degree of synthesis of order and chaos that exceeds all degrees of complexity known at the given level of development of the system. There arises, however, the natural question: where is all this going? Is there a global limit to the complexity of dissipative systems, or a global (absolute) attractor? In his well-known futurological work Summary of Technology [Summa Technologiae], the Polish writer Stanislaw Lem formulated this question as follows:

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Is there a ceiling to the complexity of systems?51 And Prigogine, the creator of the theory of dissipative systems, gave a rather evasive52 but on the whole negative answer: Complexity in nature cannot be reduced to some principle of global optimality;53 therefore there are no limits to structural stability [that is, to the system of attractors in dissipative systemsV.B.].54 Indeed, within the framework of ordinary selection there are no grounds for the existence of a limit to complexity. It is always possible to find a thesaurus, detector, and selector with which it will be possible to choose a formation more complex than any previously known one. However, the situation is quite different in the case of superselection. Precisely because superselection selects the factors of ordinary selection, it selects, in particular, selectors by their degree of stability (transition from the principle of a looser to that of a stricter stability), and there is a limit to the sequence of such selectors in the form of the principle of absolute stability. It is according to this principle that selection of thesauri and detectors is carried out. Thus, the limit to complexity is set by superselection precisely because the selection of the factors of selection tends in the direction of the full synthesis of order and chaos. Properly speaking, the global limit to complexity is nothing but such a synthesis. Real processes of development in inorganic and organic nature confirm this view of things. Thus, it is quite obvious that the limit to complexity in inorganic nature is the biological cell (with its genetic code), while the limit to complexity in living nature is man (with his brain that possesses consciousness).55 There arises, however, the question: is there an analogous limit to the development of social systems? In other words, is there a limit to the cultural development of mankind?56 In order to answer this question, we must take a closer look at the law of superselection. The point is that this law, as I showed above, presupposes two opposed tendencies in the development of a society: (1) the striving of social systems toward stability (equilibrium), and (2) the constant striving toward change (destruction of equilibrium). The first tendency is caused by the connection between social selection (like any selection) and the principle of stability; the second, by the generation, as a result of overcoming old social contradictions, of new contradictions that give a new impulse to development. At first glance, such a combination of mutually exclusive tendencies in a single system seems impossible. However, there exists one mode of development in which it becomes possible. This occurs when (and only when) in the process of

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development an attenuation or softening of contradictions (a reduction in their acuity) takes place. The concept of the attenuation of a contradiction means that: (1) new contradictions arise on the basis of a deeper unity of the elements of a system, that is, of their higher integration into a whole; (2) the degree of opposition between contradictory causes is reduced (the antagonism between them is terminated); and (3) the scale of the sacrifices necessary for the resolution of contradictions is reduced. The mentioned attenuation of contradictions becomes understandable and natural if we take into account the fact that the law of superselection operates in society not directly but (in contrast to nature) through the law of the differentiation and integration of ideals, leading to the formation and realization of a universal (absolute) ideal. It is a curious fact that the idea of the differentiation and integration of objective reality was formulated in its general form already in the philosophical systems of Hegel and Herbert Spencer, and the idea of the law-governed differentiation and integration of universal knowledge in the works of many historians of science. At the same time, right up until recently, theorists have manifested a strange inconsistency by avoiding the last step in these generalizationsto recognize the law-governed differentiation and integration of universal desires in history. Therefore, the operation of the law of the differentiation and integration of ideals can be interpreted as the idealization of particular (relative) human ideals. It is obvious that the product of such meta-idealization must be a universal (absolute) ideal. It is not difficult to understand that it is exactly the tendency toward the formation and realization of such an ideal that must generate the tendency toward the attenuation and gradual disappearance of social contradictions, for the existence of counteracting social factors is associated with the existence of opposed ideals (the struggle between ideals and anti-ideals). An absolute ideal cannot but lead to the general displacement of competition by cooperation. Naturally, I speak only of a tendency, that is, of some kind of stochastic (probabilistic, statistical) law that does not exclude local deviations from the indicated process (fluctuations). The realization of an absolute ideal must lead to the formation of some kind of limiting dissipative system, which it is natural to call a superattractor. A superattractor is characterized by these features: (1) A full synthesis of order and chaos, that is, an order that is stable relative to absolute chaos. This means, on the one hand, complete unity

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of action on the part of the elements of the systemglobal cooperation instead of the combination of local cooperation and local competition that we encountered previously. Thereby, it would seem, absolute order is established in the system and chaos disappears altogether. But, on the other hand, global cooperation itself acquires a chaotic character in the sense that it unpredictably changes direction in order to compensate for chaotic influences from the external environment. (2) A superattractor cannot be assigned either to the class of simple attractors or to that of strange attractors, for it overcomes the very opposition between these types of attractors. It is therefore appropriate to call it a superstrange attractor. (3) Inasmuch as a superattractor is the material embodiment of an absolute ideal, and this ideal represents absolute unity in an absolute diversity of desires, a superattractor is also an embodiment of such unity. That is why the path toward it lies through the consistent unfolding of the entire diversity of desires. (4) In contrast to biochemical and biological evolution, in which the limit to complexity is attained in a finite time, a superattractor is unattainable in principle within a finite period of time. To use mathematical language, you can approach a superattractor asymptotically for as long as you like without ever quite reaching it (within a finite interval of time). In this respect, such a system is reminiscent of the so-called limit point in mathematics. The endlessness of motion toward a superattractor is, in the final analysis, a function of its connection with the transformation of the object by the subject (transformism), which comprises the specific characteristic of social activity. Biochemical and biological evolution are finite because they are based on adaptation to the object (conformism). In the process of adaptation only the subject changes, while the object remains unchanged. Otherwise adaptation would lose its meaning. Conversely, in the transformation of the object changes in the object begin to interact with changes in the subject, and this process is potentially endless. Thus, the theory of social self-organization leads to the conclusion that in the potentially endless process of development there must exist a final limiting state with unique properties. The cause of the systems striving toward the superattractor is the natural process of superselection. From what I have said it is clear that the synergetic approach to social phenomena is by no means reducible to the rephrasing of well-known truths. As a result of this approach, a new system of social concepts is

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formed and new social laws are brought to light that it would have been impossible to discover without using these concepts. By taking the aforementioned laws into account, we obtain essentially new solutions to old social problems such as historical determinism, the criterion of social progress, the causes and nature of social crises, the existence of a limit to humanitys cultural development, and the sources and role of social utopias. Other questions are solved in an essentially new way. For this reason social synergetics is a new scientific discipline, which might equally well be called synergetic culturology and, possibly, synergetic sociology. Notes
1. Recently serious studies have appeared, which show how to approach the analysis of this difficult problem. A.P. Nazaretians monograph Agressiia, moral i krizisy v razvitii mirovoi kultury. Sinergetika istoricheskogo protsessa (Moscow, 1996) and G.G. Malinetskiis article Nelineinaia dinamikakliuch k teoreticheskoi istorii? (Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, 1996, no. 4) deserve special attention. As this article cogently shows, the task lies first of all in uncovering the social meaning of such fundamental concepts as bifurcation and attractor. Given the enormous complexity of social systems and changes in them, the greatest difficulty in clarifying the social nature of these concepts is to find a theoretical sieve that would separate the main facts from the less important ones without losing anything essential. Nazaretians monograph (as we shall see later) actually contains an answer to the question of how such a sieve can be found. It must be an investigation of the interrelations between the utilitarian (technocratic) and the spiritual (humanistic) tendencies in the development of mankinda clarification of how it is possible in a long-term historical perspective to attain technocratic-humanistic harmony, for only this can save mankind from the threat of self-annihilation. 2. See, for example, D. Kareri, Poriadok i besporiadok v strukture materii (Moscow, 1985), pp. 13, 159; P. Etkins [Atkins], Poriadok i besporiadok v prirode (Moscow, 1987), p. 183. 3. The term information is given here in quotation marks in order to emphasize that it is incorrect simply to equate information with negentropy. Although they coincide quantitatively, there is an important qualitative difference between them: information appears only where one ordered system is reflected in another, that is, where there is a relation between one order and another. To identify order as an objective property of a physical system with information is incorrect to say the least. 4. A linear system differs from a nonlinear one by its passive character, that is, its incapacity for self-action (capacity to experience only external influences). 5. In honor of the Brussels school of physical chemists, who first developed the general theory of dissipative systems. For a description of the Brusselator, see G. Nikolis [Nicolis] and I. Prigozhin [Prigogine], Samoorganizatsiia v neravnovesnykh sistemakh (Moscow, 1979), pp. 1023. 6. The initial substances and energy needed by the chemical reaction that is

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occurring in the system are introduced continuously into the system, and the end products of the reaction are removed. 7. For the definition of a dissipative system, see I. Prigozhin and I. Stengers, Poriadok iz khaosa (Moscow, 1986), p. 197; and Nikolis and Prigozhin, Samoorganizatsiia, pp. 7172. 8. For example, the better isolated a monument to a person is from external influences the longer it is preserved, while a person buried under the ruins of a building destroyed in an earthquake and deprived therefore of air, food, and heat quickly ceases to exist. 9. T.S. Akhromeeva, S.P. Kurdiumov, and G.G. Malinetskii, Paradoksy mira nestatsionarnykh struktur, in Novoe v zhizni, nauke, tekhnike. Matematika, kibernetika (Moscow, 1985), p. 29. 10. Nikolis and Prigozhin, Samoorganizatsiia, p. 22. 11. Ibid., p. 488. 12. G. Khaken [Haken], Sinergetika (Moscow, 1980), p. 138. 13. A discontinuous qualitative change in a system is usually called a mutation. 14. It must be emphasized that competition is only one component of inner interaction; the second, no less important component is cooperation. 15. It is precisely this circumstance that provided a pretext to call the theory of dissipative systems (structures) synergetics, although the first term is, without a doubt, the more precise. 16. From what has been said, the fundamental difference between goal-directed and random selection (no sharp distinction between these concepts is drawn in Darwinian theory) is clear: the former presupposes a law-governed search guided by a definite rule, while the latter presupposes a random search by an arbitrary choice of the variant. 17. G. Nikolis and I. Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo (Moscow, 1990), p. 89. 18. A chaos-generating dynamic system [a dissipative systemV.B.] functions as a specific kind of selector, rejecting the enormous majority of random sequences [bifurcational branchesV.B.] and retaining only those that are compatible with the corresponding dynamic laws [criteria of stabilityV.B] (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo, p. 224). 19. Note that if a single selector does not suffice to achieve a completely unambiguous selection it is in principle always possible to introduce an additional selector that will make the selection unambiguous. 20. Fluctuations are a physical analogue of mutations, while the search for stability plays the role of natural selection (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo, p. 89). 21. G. Khaken [Haken], Informatsiia i samoorganizatsiia (Moscow, 1991), p. 45. Such astonishing potentialities of matter in the presence of both a nonlinear dynamic and nonequilibrium conditions . . . evokes in us a feeling of profound wonder (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie slozhnogo, p. 212). 22. Prigozhin and Stengers, Poriadok, p. 269. 23. Thus, in a generational system there operates the law of correspondence of the global dissipative structure to its dissipative elements. Chaotic change in the elements upon reaching the corresponding threshold leads periodically to a structural explosion, as a result of which the old global system is replaced by a new one. 24. Adaptation is also called goal-directedness.

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25. See, for example, V. Grant, Evoliutsionnyi protsess (Moscow, 1991), p. 13. 26. The examples from biology that follow are merely illustrative in character and are by no means intended to limit the generality of the considered phenomenological indicators of development. 27. This is manifested with especial clarity in the structure of so-called colonial organisms, a particular example of which are the siphonophorae. 28. Not only cooperation but also competition is connected with such exchange. 29. There may also occur a bifurcation in which neither of the bifurcational structures is stable under given conditions. In that case the direction in question turns out to be a dead end. 30. I emphasize that the possibility of the emergence of very complex forms of feedback is created by the very hierarchization of dissipative systems, while the diversity of these forms is created by the diversity of directions of hierarchization. At the same time, the bifurcational mechanism of the emergence of such forms gives their formation a discrete (discontinuous) character, excluding the existence of a continuous series of intermediate forms. 31. I note that from the point of view of the synergetic theory of development, nonlinearity is a special case of goal-directedness and rationality, while, conversely, goal-directedness and rationality are a special case of nonlinearity. For man is also a dissipative system and therefore he too possesses nonlinearity. But his nonlinearity is of a specific kind. It is this specific nonlinearity that customarily goes by the name of rationality. 32. In the simplest cases, self-organization refers to the spontaneous formation within a dissipative system of spatial (the Brusselator) or temporal (the chemical clock) heterogeneity. 33. In the language of old-fashioned philosophy, this was called generation as distinct from fabrication (Khaken, Informatsiia, pp. 2829). 34. Hence it is clear that the Darwinian and also the synthetic theory of biological selection are only special cases of this general theory. 35. In particular, local centers of the new education for new generations usually come into contradiction with the old system of government; as a result, the number of people in society who are discontented with the existing regime multiplies. 36. Behind the ideals, of course, stand (utilitarian and spiritual) interests, but the essence of the struggle is described more accurately in terms of a clash of ideals, for an ideal directly shows how the social regime should be transformed. 37. One of the most striking examples of such an irony of history is the clash between the military plans of the Soviet and German high commands at the end of 1942 on the approaches to Stalingrad. The Soviet plan envisaged the encirclement of the German army in the Caucasus (Operation Saturn), the first stage of which was the encirclement of the Stalingrad German group (Operation Uranus). The German plan envisaged the relief of this group (Operation Winter Storm). Neither side knew of the intentions of the other. The simultaneous execution of Saturn and Winter Storm led to a result that neither side had expected: the German forces were unable to relieve the Stalingrad group, while the Soviet forces were unable to encircle the Caucasus group. 38. For this reason, the synergetic theory of social selection differs fundamentally from the theories of social Darwinism. The latter simply extrapolated the theory of biological selection to society, ignoring the specific character of social laws. So-

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cial synergetics not only does not ignore their specific character; on the contrary, it emphasizes it. 39. This is exactly that case of social selection for which the Hegelian formula is inapplicable, for the correlation of forces takes shape in favor of one of the ideals engaged in the struggle. 40. As we known, stochastic processes (that is, processes subject to a law formed through the interaction of a multiplicity of random events) may or may not be Markov processes. In a Markov process, change in the state of a system at a given moment is determined by its state only at the preceding moment and does not depend on the mode by which this state was reached. 41. Hence it is clear, inter alia, that calls to refrain from social experiments amount to calls to refrain from social choice, which in turn amount to the demand to stop history. 42. Given that the future passes into the past, there is nothing surprising in the fact that a question that had meaning in relation to the future becomes eventually meaningless. And then the harsh truth for the defeated triumphsVictors are not judged (Stalin). It is always possible, of course, to say that had the correlation of forces in the past been different, the choice might have been different. But the whole point is that given the realized unity of necessity and chance there cannot be a different correlation of forces. 43. The idea that such a criterion exists is especially characteristic of historical materialism. 44. It stands to reason that if the economic ideal is a balanced state of the economy then economic progress will be understood as requiring the proportionate development of both heavy industry and agriculture. 45. The difficulties connected with the use of the concept of artistic progress, of which B. Croce, T. Monroe, and others wrote in their time, resulted from ignoring the link between this concept and the concept of esthetic ideal. 46. It is characteristic that in Darwinian theory this question did not arise at all, while in the contemporary theory of biological selection it is only just beginning to be posed: The highest level of integration is expressed in the evolution of the very mechanisms of evolutiona problem that contemporary evolutionary doctrine is only starting to outline (A.V. Iablokov and A.G. Iusufov, Evoliutsionnoe uchenie [Moscow, 1989], p. 237; see also K.M. Zavadskii and E.I. Kolchinskii, Evoliutsiia evoliutsii [Leningrad, 1977]). 47. From what has been said it is clear that a distinction has to be drawn between random selection, goal-directed selection, and superselection. 48. Akhromeeva, Kurdiumov, and Malinetskii, Paradoksy, p. 47. I speak here, of course, not of just any kind of chaos but of constructive chaos (which should not be confused with destructive chaos). Constructive chaos prepares the ground for new development; destructive chaos leads to the systems dissolution. Constructive chaos is constructive through and by virtue of its destructiveness and destructive on the basis of and through its constructiveness. In destroying it constructs and in constructing it leads to destruction (E.N. Kniazeva and S.P. Kurdiumov, Sinergetika kak novoe mirovidenie: dialog s I. Prigozhinym, Voprosy filosofii, 1992, no. 12, p. 18). It is a curious fact that in the process of self-organization we can without difficulty find analogues of both Aristotles well-known four causes and Hegels no less

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celebrated three dialectical laws. Thus, the thesaurus assumes the role of Aristotles material cause, the detector the role of his efficient cause, the selector the role of his formal cause, and the attractor the role of his final cause. Correspondingly, the law of bifurcation assumes the role of Hegels law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change, the law of the interaction of competition and cooperation the role of his law of the unity and struggle of opposites, and the law of the alternation of order and chaos the role of his law of the negation of negation. What is more, the real connection between such laws can be discovered, apparently, only on the basis of the ideas of goal-directed selection and superselection. Otherwise, these laws (like these causes) may provide material for quite fruitless speculation. 49. Nikolis and Prigozhin, Samoorganizatsiia, p. 287. 50. This is a decisive argument against creationist attacks on the theory of evolution. 51. S. Lem, Summa tekhnologii (Moscow, 1968), p. 239. 52. Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie, p. 276. 53. Ibid., p. 88. 54. I. Prigozhin, Ot sushchestvuiushchego k voznikaiushchemu (Moscow, 1985), p. 137. 55. The circumstance that the biological cell, strictly speaking, goes beyond the limits of nonliving nature, while man goes beyond the limits of living nature does not contradict what has been said, for living nature is the limit of the development of nonliving nature, while society is the limit of the development of living nature. 56. It is characteristic that Prigogine also, albeit with less uncertainty, gives a negative answer to this question: Is evolution as a whole capable of leading to . . . a global principle [of stabilityV.B.] or, on the contrary, does every humanitarian system embody a unique realization of some complex stochastic process, for which it is impossible to establish rules in advance? Prigogine thinks that the second alternative is more correct (Nikolis and Prigozhin, Poznanie, p. 276).

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