CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE Police Power METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs.

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road beside Bel-Air Village. Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. ISSUE: Has the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) the mandate to open Neptune street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? HELD: None. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA, police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area Eminent Domain REPUBLIC v. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G. R. No. 137569. June 23, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner spouses Inocentes and Milagros de la Rama were owners of a piece of land. In 1983, B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of portion of the subject land. In 1988, the de la Ramas entered into a contarct with respondent Guerrero whereby they agreed to sell (contract to sell) to respondent the entire property. There was a partial payment. In 1990, the government filed an expropriation case involving the said land pursuant to B.P. Blg. 340 and deposited the payment. The government approved the payment of just compensation to the de la Ramas as registered owners. In 1991, Guerrero intervened in the expropriation case and moved that just compensation be paid to him instead of dela Rama on the ground that the latter agreed to sell to him the disputed land and that he has already filed a case for specific performance to compel dela Rama to convey to him the said land. ISSUES: 1. Does the owner of a land subject of expropriation proceedings lose the right to dispose said land before the payment of just compensation?

2. Who should be entitled to the payment of just compensation? The vendor or vendee? HELD: (1) NO. The owner of a land subject to expropriation proceedings may still dispose of the same before payment of just compensation to him. The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As explained in Municipality of Binan v. Garcia: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, " of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take property sought to be condemned for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of complaint" . . . . The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. (2) It is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation. Thus, in 1988, the De la Ramas still had the authority to transfer the ownership of their land and convey all rights, and therefore Guerrero as vendee, has the right to receive just compensation. Carp Law; Just Compensation; Jurisdiction FRANCISCO H. ESCAO, JR., et al. vs. CA et.al. G.R. No. 101932. January 24, 2000. FACTS: Pursuant to EO No. 229, petitioners offered 59.6 hectares of land to the government through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) but rejected the valuation of the land fixed by DAR for being much lower than the actual fair value. Petitioners then filed a petition for just compensation in the Special Agrarian Court of Bohol. Respondent Land Bank filed a motion to dismiss. Meanwhile, on June 14, 1990, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 405, which vested on the Land Bank primary responsibility to determine land valuation and the compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or Compulsory Acquisition (CA) arrangement as governed by Republic Act 6657, known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988." Thus, Land Bank moved to suspend proceedings or dismiss the Escaos' petition. In addition to the grounds stated in its earlier petition, Land Bank also alleged that as a land reform matter, the case falls within the primary jurisdiction of the DAR; that valuation by the PARO was not the final determination since it still was subject to the final determination of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which had original and appellate jurisdiction; and that since the matter had not passed through all the required stages, there was no exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA granted Land Bank's petition.

(1) Does Land Bank has the right to make the valuation of land pursuant to EO No. 405, even after the just compensation case was filed with the Special Agrarian Court. (2) May the court take cognizance over cases of just compensation under the CARP law. HELD: (1) No. Land Bank has no right to make valuation as a case for just compensation was already filed with the Special Agrarian Court. Rule 13 Sec. 11 of DARAB's new rules of procedures clearly states that in the event that a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner could bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. (2) Yes. DARAB recognized that jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. Special Agrarian Courts which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]. The provision of Section 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are taking under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. What [agrarian] adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question."

ISSUES:

Carp Law; Beneficiaries; Leasehold Tenants GREENFIELD REALTY CORP., et. al vs. LORETO CARDAMA, et. al. G.R. No. 129246. January 25, 2000. FACTS: Respondents claiming that they are the proper beneficiary of the subject land under CARP Law are successor in interest of the leasehold right of the deceased Hermogenes Cardama who began leasehold tenancy over a 37 hectare of land owned by the petitioner since 1978 through a verbal agreement. The Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favor of respondents holding that they are in fact the civil law lessee of the subject land as evidenced by the receipts and the letter terminating the lease which was done prior to the submission of the land for conversion. Petitioner appealed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which ruled that respondents are not bona fide tenant of the subject land. ISSUE: Are the respondents leasehold tenants of the subject land and therefore qualified and proper beneficiaries of the subject land under the CARP law. HELD: NO. The records of the case are replete with relevant evidence which are adequate to support the conclusion that Hermogenes Cardama is the bona fide tenant of the subject property. Undeniably, the land is not cultivated by Hermogenes Cardama alone but with other tenants who are likewise qualified and who are related to him. Thus, it can be said that the entitlement of the other

possessors is not by virtue of succession to the rights of a predecessor-in-interest, but in their individual capacity as tenants therein simultaneously with an ascendant. It is to be noted that the land herein involved is more than 10 hectares which cannot be personally cultivated by Hermogenes Cardama alone. "Under Section 22 of RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, those entitled to the award of the land are: 'SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority: a) agricultural lessees and share tenants; b) regular farmworkers; c) seasonal farmworkers; d) other farmworkers; e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands; f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and g) others directly working on the land.' Thus, being the agricultural lessees on the land, petitioners are the qualified beneficiaries absent any showing that they have been validly ejected or removed therefrom. BILL OF RIGHTS Miranda Doctrine PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. EDWIN NAAG, ET AL. G.R. No. 123860. January 20, 2000 FACTS: Edwin Naag and his other two companions attacked Atty. Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and his wife inside their home in Olongapo City. Rosita Fontelera, though wounded, was able to run and seek help at the "Siesta Pizza" owned by Angie Dizon. Rosita was shouting "Si Edwin, taga-Novaliches; si Edwin, taga-Novaliches." Rosita Fontelera died on arrival at the hospital. Based on the final words of Rosita Fontelera, the Olongapo police were able to apprehend Edwin Naag in Novaliches without a warrant. Naag executed a waiver relative to his warrantless arrest and subsequent detention. During the interrogation, a certain Atty. Norberto de la Cruz was the lawyer who signed Naag's confession as assisting counsel. According to Atty. de la Cruz, he was at the La Paz Batchoy Restaurant in front of the police station when Pfc. Leo Batinga showed him a "ready-made sworn statement, a sort of confession" of Naag which they asked him to sign, as assisting counsel. He further testified that while accused-appellant said he had voluntarily executed the same, he (Atty. De la Cruz) nevertheless insisted that another investigation be conducted in his presence. However, his name only appeared at the bottom of the document and not on the title thereof. Naag was merely informed of his constitutional rights and was questioned in Tagalog, a dialect which he understands. He admitted that he was present when the crime was committed and participated in the stabbing. Based on his extrajudicial confession, the trial court convicted Edwin Naag for two counts of murder aggravated by abuse of superior strength.

ISSUES: Is the extrajudicial confession admissible? Was the accused assisted by counsel during the interrogation? Is it sufficient to inform the accused of his constitutional rights (Miranda doctrine) without explaining his rights to him? Was there an effective waiver of these rights even if these were not explained fully? HELD: NO. The extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because the facts reveal that the accused was not assisted by counsel while he was being interrogated. Neither was he sufficiently informed of his rights nor has effectively waived them since his rights were merely recited to him. Anent the extrajudicial confession, the Court believes that the Naag s claim that there was really no investigation made in the presence of counsel because after he had been interrogated by the police, he was simply made to sign the confession. The title of the confession says that the confession was taken in the presence of P/Lt. Esteban, but not in the presence of Atty. De la Cruz as well. There was no reason why the name of Atty. De la Cruz was omitted in the opening statement of the confession. It just shows that Atty. De la Cruz was not really present at the investigation allegedly conducted on November 16, 1990. In the second place, an examination thereof shows that Atty. De la Cruz's name was simply added at the end of the confession after it had been prepared. The confession appears to have been prepared on a typewriter different from that used to type the name of the Naag, Atty. De la Cruz, and the acknowledgment clause and the name of the Assistant City Prosecutor before whom the confession was sworn to. The text of the confession is darker suggesting that the ribbon used was new, whereas the names of Naag, Atty. Norberto de la Cruz, and the Assistant City Prosecutor, as well as the acknowledgment clause are lighter, suggesting that the ribbon used was almost faded. It does not appear that Naag effectively waived effectuation of the rights in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution, which provides:Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Authoritative interpretations of the Miranda rule as embodied in Art. III, 12(1) require, however, that the suspect in custodial interrogations be warned: (1) that he has a right to remain silent; (2) that he has a right to the assistance of counsel; (3) that if he cannot afford counsel one will be provided to him; and (4) that anything he will say can and will be used against him. While Naag was told what his rights were and answered in the affirmative when asked whether he understood what he had been told, the crucial question is whether he effectively waived the effectuation of these rights. The Court found that he did not and, therefore, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. Naag was not asked whether he was willing to testify even without the assistance of counsel. If he was willing to testify only with the assistance of counsel, he should have been asked if he had one. If he said he wanted to have counsel but could not afford one, he should have been asked if he wanted one to be appointed for him. As a result of the investigator's failure to ask these questions before taking down accused's statement, there was no effective waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel.

Rights of the Accused; Right to Counsel; Extra-judicial Confession PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TITO ZUELA y MORANDARTE, et. al. G.R. No. 112177. January 28, 2000. FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged of the crime of robbery with homicide. They were arrested without any warrant. During their custodial investigation, they were made to sign an affidavit confessing the crime charged without the assistance of any counsel due to the reason that no lawyer can be found in their area. They were subjected to torture because of their refusal to sign the affidavits. Subsequently, they were forced to do so in order to avoid further injury to their persons. Since there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, the extra-judicial confessions of the three accused became the significant factor in their conviction. ISSUES: (1) Are the accused denied of their right to counsel during custodial investigation? (2) Can the extra-judicial confessions can be used against the accused? HELD: (1) The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this point that the law requires the assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the person undergoing interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel (2) NO. There was no evidence that the accused executed a waiver of their right to counsel. In light of these facts, accused's extra-judicial statements are inadmissible in evidence. "An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence." Despite the fact that the reason for the absence of lawyer during the custodial investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the area, the Court could not be lenient in this case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any given place is not a valid reason for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled confessions. Equal Protection; Due Process PHIL. REGISTERED ELECTRICAL PRACTITIONERS, et. al. vs. JULIO FRANCA, et. al. G.R. No. 87134 January 20, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner filed before the RTC an action for declaratory relief and/or prohibition, assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering pursuant to RA 184. Said resolution was approved by the Professional Regulation Commission, then headed by respondent Julio FRANCA, Jr. In said resolution, the Board adopted guidelines for the implementation of the Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Program for electrical engineers. Included therein is a requirement that beginning January 1, 1988, every electrical engineer must earn credit units of CPE before his license could be renewed. Petitioner assailed that the resolution is violative of the Constitution's equal protection and due process clauses, prohibition

against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and mandate for the protection of the rights of workers. ISSUE: Does Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering violate the petitioners' rights as guaranteed by the Constitution? HELD: NO. Supervening events have rendered moot this constitutional inquiry. On July 25, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 266, entitled "Institutionalization of the Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Programs of the Various Professional Regulatory Boards (PRBs) under the Supervision of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)." E.O. No. 266 found it imperative to impose upon registered professionals the completion of the CPE as a pre-requisite for the renewal of their licenses. Avowedly, CPE would enable the professionals "not only to upgrade or improve their technical knowledge and skills but also to keep them abreast with modern trends and technology in their respective professions, thereby assuring the rendition of highly qualitative professional service/s that will be globally competitive under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and at the same time securing the safety and protection of the public. Arrest without Warrant; Plain View Doctrine PEOPLE vs. ELAMPARO GR. No. 125689, March 31, 2000 FACTS: Policemen of the Kalookan Police Station conducted a buy bust operation. During the course of apprehending the alleged "runner" Erwin Spencer who ran inside the bungalow type house, the police saw appellant Joel Elamparo repacking five bricks of marijuana in a news paper inside the house's sala. Elamparo was arrested and found guilty for violation of section 8, Article II of RA 6345 (illegal possession of prohibited substance). Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest. ISSUE: Is the arrest of the appellant inside the house of his father valid inspite of the failure of the apprehending officer to secure search warrant? HELD: Yes, the arrest is valid. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits a search and seizure without judicial warrant. However, this is subject to exceptions: 1) search incidental to lawful arrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4) customs searches; 5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The present case falls within the plain view doctrine. The "plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: a) the law enforcement of officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in the position in which he can view a particular area; b) the discovery of evidence in the plain view is inadvertent; c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye in hand and its discovery inadvertent. Searches and Seizures PEOPLE v. ESTRADA G.R. No. 124461. June 26, 2000

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, the People questioned the order of the trial court questioning the search warrant it issued and ordering the return of the seized goods to respondent on the ground that the warrant failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. The Supreme Court, in its decision dated September 25,1998, denied the petition. The People filed a motion for partial reconsideration of said decision arguing that the seized drugs subject of the void warrant can no longer be returned because the same are contraband goods as they were illegally imported. ISSUE: Should the seized drugs which are subject of the void search warrant be returned to its importer despite the fact that these were illegally imported? HELD: NO. Even if the medicines or drugs seized were genuine and even if they contain the proper chemicals or ingredients for their production or manufacture, if the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search warrant were declared illegal. It might be the burden of the party seeking the issuance of a warrant to convince the issuing magistrate that probable cause exists, and to procure the proper admissible evidence to show that the party against whom the warrant is directed is not duly authorized by the Bureau of Foods and Drugs. However, if there is an allegation that the possession of the goods or things seized were illegal for lack of appropriate permit from the duly authorized agencies, the party seeking the return of her seized properties must show the corresponding permits or authority to manufacture, sell or possess the same. The pharmaceutical genuineness of the drugs or medicines is not a sufficient justification to demand its return. There must be compliance with the requirements of the law regarding permits and licenses. It is the State's obligation to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them (Art II, Sec 15, 1987 Constitution), in order to develop a healthy and alert Citizen (Art. XIV Sec. 19), it became mandatory for the government to supervise and control the proliferation of drugs in the market. We can't afford to take any risk, for the life and health of the citizenry are as precious as the existence of the State. Unlawful search PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CHE CHUN TING G. R. No. 130568, March 21, 2000 FACTS: Following a series of buy-bust operations, the NARCOM apprehended Mabel Cheung Mei Po, a suspected drug courier. On interrogation, Mabel cooperated with the Narcom agents and revealed that the source of the drugs is a certain Che Chun Ting. Hence, an entrapment team was formed. Mabel called the accused and ordered one (1) kilo of shabu . The accused asked Mabel to pick-up at a certain Unit 122, Roxas Seafront garden. The Narcom agents and Mabel proceeded to the place. The door of Unit 122 was opened, and a man came out and then handed a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance to Mabel. The NARCOM agents immediately arrested the man, who was positively identified by Mabel as Che Chun Ting. The NARCOM agents thereafter searched the Unit 122 in coordination with the security guard on duty at Roxas Seafront Garden, and in the presence of Che Chun Ting, allegedly found several plastic bags containing the same chrystalline substance. The substance turned out positive for methylamphetamine

hydrochloride or shabu. The one handed by Che Chun Ting to Mabel weighs 999.48 gms; those seized from Unit 122 weighs a total of 5, 578.68 gms. Accordingly, the accused Che Chun Ting was found guilty by the trial court on August 22, 1987 for delivering , distributing, dispatching in transit 999.48 gms of shabu; and for having in his custody possession and control 5, 578.68 gms. of the same regulated drug. ISSUE: Was the search lawful? HELD: No. The accused was admittedly outside unit 122 and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the Narcom operatives. Moreover, it is borne by the records that unit 122 was not even his residence but that of his girlfriend, and that he was merely a sojourner therein. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of the house constituted a permissible area within his reach or immediate control, to justify a warrantless search therein. As a consequence of the illegal search, the thing seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having obtained from a polluted source, the fruit of poisonous tree. Warrant of Arrest; Determination of Probable Cause ABDULA, et. al. vs JAPAL GUIANI GR No. 118821. 18 February 2000 FACTS: An information for murder was refiled against the petitioners and the order or arrest was immediately issued the following day. Petitioners argue that the warrant of arrest should be recalled considering that the respondent judge did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. ISSUE: Is the warrant of arrest valid when the respondent judge admitted that there was "no reason for him to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed"? HELD: NO. Ho vs. People summarizes the existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows: FIRST, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge; SECOND, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause; the judge must decide independently with his own supporting evidence other than the prosecutor's bare report; and, LASTLY, it is not required that the complete records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. The respondent judge's statement is an admission that he relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists and with this act, the judge fails in his constitutionally mandated duty to personally determine the existence of probable cause. Unlawful Arrest PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAPAL G. R. No. 124526 March 17, 2000 FACTS: On April 22, 2000, the office of the Drug Enforcement Unit District received a call from a reliable informant that the accused, who had a standing warrant of arrest, had been seen at Jocson St. Sampaloc, Manila. The warrant of arrest was issued by then Judge Roberto Barrios for failure of

the accused to appear at the hearing of a criminal case involving illegal possession of .3381 gram (less than 1 gram) of "shabu" which was earlier filed against him. The police operatives arrested the accused pursuant to the issued warrant and conducted a search of the vehicle where the accused and his wife were found. In the course thereof, the policemen found a light plastic bag in the backseat containing three (3) bricks of suspected marijuana. When the suspected marijuana was examined, the chemist on duty testified that the test confirmed that the same were marijuana, a prohibited drug. ISSUE: Was the arrest lawful?

HELD: NO. It must be pointed out that the warrant of arrest against the accused was issued only because he failed to appear during his arraignment in another criminal case. The information in said criminal case charged the accused of possession of .3381 gram of "shabu". The amount of illegal substance allegedly recovered from him, i.e., less than one (1) gram, hardly make him a "notorious drug dealer" making it unjustifiable to arrest him pursuant to the abovementioned warrant of arrest. Arrest; Release on Recognizance PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000. FACTS: A criminal case was filled against private respondent Javellana. On August 8, 1989, respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda issued an order placing private respondent Javellano to the custody of the clerk of court, Atty. Del Rosario. This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario but went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Subsequently, clerk of court, Atty. Del Rosario was appointed judge. ISSUES: 1) Is private respondent still in the custody of the clerk of court even after the same was appointed as judge. 2) Does a person placed under preventive detention or serving sentence may still practice law or any other profession for that matter. HELD: 1) NO. Private respondent was no longer under the custody of the clerk of court from the time the latter was appointed judge. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking. Since the perceived threats to private respondent Javellana's life no longer exist. Thus, the trial court's order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

2) YES. As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Right To Counsel PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. ELBERTO BASE G. R. No. 109773. March 30, 2000 FACTS: Accused-appellant Elberto Base was convicted of the crime of murder for the killing of Brgy. Capt. Julainito Tagle.Accused denied having anything to do with the killing of the victim and alleges, in sum, that he was tortured to admit his crime. He alleged that the investigator did not take down his real answers and was not given the opportunity to read in whole or in part the typewritten report and it was only upon arraignment that he came to know that the statement taken from him which he was forced to sign was actually a confession. He likewise claimed that although the sworn statement bore the signature of one Atty. Reyes, he neither knew nor saw Atty. Reyes at the PC detachment where the investigation was conducted. Thus, on appeal he contended that the sworn statement made by him is inadmissible in evidence because it was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel "of his own choice." ISSUE:. Does the counsel of the accused necessarily be that of his own choice so as to satisfy the constitutional right to counsel of his own choice? HELD: No. Section 12(1) Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that, any person under investigation for the Commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel "preferably of his own choice". If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Numerous decisions of these court rules that for an extra-judicial confession to be admissible, it must be: (1) voluntary; (2) made with the assistance of competent and independent; (3) express and (4) in writing. The mantle of protection afforded by the above quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of an offense although he is not yet in custody. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through a menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentially for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. However, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently desires, but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. While the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of

counsel de parte is not absolute. The word "preferably" under Section 12 (1) Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede nay obstruct the progress of investigation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former appointment during the course of the investigation. To be effective counsel a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accuse to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Right To Counsel During Custodial Investigation; Admission Of Guilt PEOPLE v. ORDONO GR No. 132154. June 29, 2000 FACTS: The case is an automatic review of a conviction for rape with homicide meted out on Pacito Ordono and Apolonio Medina by the RTC Br. 34 La Union imposing upon them the capital punishment of death. Pacifico Ordono and Apolonio Medina were suspected to have raped and strangled to death a fifteen year old girl. However, for lack of evidence directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home. Subsequently, the two returned to the police station and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. The police conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing but without the assistance of counsel. The two even confessed to a reporter who had tape-recorded their confessions. However, on arraignment the two accused pleaded not guilty in a sudden and complete turnabout of events. The two accused now claims that they were coerced into admitting that they committed the crime. They claim that their written confessions are not admissible as evidence against them since these were made without the assistance of counsel. ISSUES: 1. Is the written confession which was made without the assistance of counsel admissible in evidence against an accused who voluntary went to the police station to confess to the commission of the crime. 2. Can an interview with media reporters be admissible as evidence against the accused? HELD: (1) NO. Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four fundamental requirements: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of a counsel: (c) the confession must be express: and (d) the confession must be in writing. Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused s right to counsel to adequately

protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwisw condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the permicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible against him. This exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. Even the presence of the accused's parents, spouse, children, the municipal mayor, judge, priest or minister be sufficient to substitute for the presence of counsel during the custodial investigation in the absence of a valid waiver of the right to counsel. A waiver to be valid must be in writing and signed in the presence of counsel (2) YES. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on TV or Radio are deemed voluntary and admissible as evidence. The interview was not an investigation as the response of the accused to the queries was made to reporters and not to law enforcement officers hence even if these were uncounselled they did not violate the rights of the accused under our Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual like a news reporter. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are addressed to the State and its agents.

Custodial Investigation; Right to Counsel PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. CIELITO BULURAN, et al. GR No. 113940 , 15 February 2000 FACTS: Accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of murder in the lower court and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages. ISSUE: Were their constitutional rights violated when they were not represented by counsel during the custodial investigation conducted by the police which later on presented them for inquest to the City Prosecutor. HELD: NO. Neither one of the accused executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of the conviction. In this case, the basis of the conviction by the trial court was the testimonies of the eyewitnesses. Custodial Investigation; Right To Be Informed; Right To A Counsel Of Choice PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO GALLARDO, et. al. G.R. No. 113684. January 25, 2000. FACTS: On the basis of the sworn extra-judicial confessions of the accused, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court an information charging the accused with murder. The suspects Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police

Department and were investigated. During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present and administered the oath on the jurat of the statements. Accusedappellants signed their statements admitting the killing of Edmundo Orizal. During the trial, the accused alleged that they were not informed of their constitutional rights and filed a demurrer to evidence arguing that the prosecution failed to establish that the signed statements of the accused were procured in violation of Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Is the extrajudicial confession admissible as evidence against the accused. HELD: Yes. The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their oath. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Under the rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with. Custodial Investigation; Right To Counsel Of Choice PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY OBRERO GR No. 122142. May 17, 2000 FACTS: Accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero was charged and convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide on the strength of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him following his apprehension by agents of the national police. Said confession was executed at a police station with the assistance of Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila, who happened to be at the station where accused-appellant was detained when the latter confessed to the crime imputed to him. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extra-judicial confession and further claims that Atty. De los Reyes was not the counsel of his own choice.

ISSUE: Is an attorney who is at the same time a station commander of the WPD, acting as counsel of the accused in a custodial investigation satisfies the requirement for independent counsel mandated by Article III Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: NO. As observed in People vs Bandula, the independent counsel required by Article III Section 12 (1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as a PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation , his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation. Writ of Habeas Corpus ERLINDA ILUSORIO vs. ERLINDA BILDNER, et. al GR Nos. 139789, 139808, May 12, 2000 FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio and herein petitioner Erlinda Kalaw contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years, after which they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. On December 30, 1997 upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States he stayed with his wife for about five months during which time, according to two of their daughters and herein respondents, petitioner allegedly gave Potenciano an overdose of the latter's prescribed medication. Following Potenciano's decision not to return to petitioner's home and live in a condominium in Makati instead, Erllinda Ilusorio filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals which granted her visitation rights instead and at the same time recalled the previously issued writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss. HELD: NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire in to all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve the person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice. Freedom of Association; Right to Strike; Due Process ACOSTA v. COURT OF APPEALS GR No 132088. June 28, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances. On the basis of reports submitted by their respective

school principals that petitioners participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with the return to work order, they were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations, among others. They, however, failed to answer the charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating Committees, then Sec. Carino found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed the orders of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Carino to the Merit Systems Protection Board and later to the CSC. The CSC modified the said order and found that petitioner Acosta guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. She was meted out the penalty of suspension of six months without pay. ISSUES: 1.) Can petitioners as government employees join the mass actions for redress of their grievances? 2.) Did the Sec. Of Education violate the teachers' right to Due Process? HELD: (1) NO. Public school teachers don't have the right to strike. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common cause of action is inconsequential since the substance of the situation and not their appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages. It bears stressing that suspension of public of services, however temporary will inevitably derail services to the public which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied to government employees. (2) NO. There was no violation of due process in the case at bar and even if there was such violation it has been our constant ruling that an appeal is curative of any supposed denial of due process. After full ventilation of their case before the MPSB and CSC and later on before the CA, petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process.

Propriety Of Court's Decision

ELIGIO MADRID vs. C.A. ET. AL. GR No. 130683 May 31, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Eligio Madrid was convicted by the trial court of homicide on the strength of the affidavits and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision prompting petitioner to file this petition assailing, among others, the trial Court's failure to satisfy the constitutional standard of clear and distinct articulation of facts and law in trial court decision writing.

ISSUE: Is the summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties absent any analysis of the evidence or reference to any legal basis in reaching the conclusion will satisfy the constitutional requirement for trial court decision writing HELD: NO. The decision failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Section 14 Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The requirement that the decisions of the Courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the process of legal reasoning. It is, thus a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Reglementary Period for Deciding Cases in the Regional Trial Court REQUEST OF JUDGE IRMA ZITA MASAMAYOR vs. RTC-Br.52 A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC, March 21, 2000 FACTS : Judge Masamayor wrote a letter to the Court, asking for an extension of 90 days within which to decide a criminal case on the ground that the case "involves legal questions which require careful study for which she has no enough time considering the heavy caseload of the single-sala court over which she presides." The Court, in its resolution, granted the request but gave her an extension of 45 days only within which to decide the case and directed her to furnish the Office of the Court of Administrator with a copy of her decision. Judge Masamayor asked for another extension for 30 days but the same was filed after the expiration of the first extension of 45 days. Subsequently, assuming that the 30-day extension was granted, Judge Masamayor, informed the Court that she had decided the case. ISSUE: Is the judge liable for gross negligence for failing to render the decision within the reglementary period required by the Constitution? HELD: YES. Judge Masamayor alleged that she learned about the granting of her request more than three (3) months after the resolution was released granting only a 45-day extension that is why she filed the second request for extension out of time. But Judge Masamayor had no right to presume that her request for 90 days would be granted. It was only after more than 120 days from the expiration of the reglementary period of 90 days that she was finally able to decide the case. Moreover, the contention that she had a heavy caseload is not justified. A heavy caseload may excuse a judge's failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, but not his/her failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the same on time. Citizenship ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the

Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness against him, he remarked that he is convinced that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines, because of his broad knowledge of Philippine history. And for this reason, he does not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as that of the petitioner himself. Moreover, he did not bother to (1) state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, s7; (3) that he conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of s2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. ISSUE: May the Court of Appeals deny an application for Philippine citizenship on the basis of documents not presented before the trial court and not forming part of the records of the case? HELD: YES. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 section 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that "These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient". Reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient . Reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that the decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.