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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff

Adam S. Sieff Columbia University B.A. 2011: Political Theory and International Politics

The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace

Causal Mechanisms for Conflict Under Unipolarity

Given the prevalence of American hegemony in international affairs, a

thorough understanding of the implications of unipolarity is historically more relevant than ever. The conventional wisdom shared among most American theorists (and policy-makers) suggests that a unipolar world is peaceful. Even realists, typically the most pessimistic of prognosticators, giddily predict peace when it comes to unipolarity. As William Wohlforth puts it: In contrast to the past, the existing distribution of capabilities generates incentives for cooperation.1 Though the particular mechanics behind this conclusion vary from theorist to theorist, most forms of the argument assume that the loss of peace, war, is the product of miscalculated power differentialswhat Geoffrey Blainey called a disagreement about relative bargaining positions.2 Arguments like Wohlforths seem to find unipolarity desirable for three reasons. First, unipolarity, by definition, voids the possibility of hegemonic rivalry.3 Great-power war is thus necessarily nullified in a definitively unipolar system. Second, as hegemonic power comes to be concentrated within a single state, disagreements about relative power positions become less likely and lesser states are thought to have little choice but bandwagon with the unipole and orient their policies to avoid its enmity. Consequently, asymmetric wars fought between a great and a lesser power are thought to become unlikely. Third, because of the possibility that a unipole will intervene, it is predicted that conflict prone rivalries for security or prestige will be substantially reduced among minor states for which power disparities are less clear. 4 Minor wars are thus also predicted to decrease under conditions of unipolarity. In sum, because of clarified power calculations, cheerleaders of unipolarity observe a positive correlation between international peace and the extent, and degree, to which the international system is unipolar. It is unsurprising that these unipolar enthusiasts are also the most optimistic about the prospects for peace in Americas current unipolar moment.5 However, we should be leery of this conclusion. Of the three reasons
1

William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), p. 38 2 Geoffrey Blainey, Power Culprits and Arms, in Conflict After Cold War Arguments on Causes of War and Peace (3rd Edition). Ed. Richard K. Betts, New York: Longman, 2007. For other theories of war predicated on disagreement over power distribution see: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, pp. 5-41. 3 Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, p. 23 4 Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, p. 25 5 Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, (1990/1991), pp. 23-33. Krauthammer argues not only will U.S. unipolarity be peaceful and durable, but that the only limitations upon its peaceful durability is the extent to which the U.S. disengages and declines to exploit its preponderance of power; Wohlforth similarly notes that the health of the system depends on the United States ability to disregard the international systemand provide order. (Wohlforth, p. 8)

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff given in support of unipolarity, only the first is indisputable. Additionally, the emerging empirical record shows that unipolarity is far from peaceful. As Nuno Monteiro points out, the United States has been at war for twelve out of twenty years since the Cold War ended.6 At the price of much blood and treasure, the U.S. has committed large forces to Kuwait Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Remarkably, the first two decades of unipolarity representing less than 10 percent of American historyaccount for more than 25 percent of the countrys total time at war.7 Events seem to be challenging the notion that unipolarity makes for peace. Indeed, while the certain absence of great power war is a clear advance towards peace, it does not necessarily follow that unipolarity also reduces other types of conflict, as Wohlforth and others presume. To be truly peaceful, unipolarity must not create new avenues of conflict to replace those that it eliminates or mitigates.8 In fact, this paper theorizes that a unipolar structuring of the international system creates significant new avenues conflict, the particular type of which depends upon the grand strategy chosen by the unipole. Resultantly, unipolarity cannot be said to be peaceful, certainly no more peaceful than any of the previous international arrangements that preceded it, and possibly even less peaceful. The first section presents a typology for the observable conditions of unipolarity, including the types of states, war, and unipole grand strategies. The subsequent three sections discuss the three variants of significant conflict replacing great power war that emanate from the structural specific dynamics of the unipoles grand strategy. These three sections are colored by historical studies from the past twenty years of unipolar experience. However, these do not serve to scientifically test my argument. As other scholars have already discovered, two complications arise when attempting to test any theory of unipolarity in its modern form. First, we have had only two decades of modern unipolarity. This is much too short a period to test the structural logic of the international system that I describe. Secondly, the United States has steadily pursued a decidedly interventionist strategy for much of the past twenty years, limiting opportunities to evaluate the consequences of a strategy of abandonment (Section IV).9 The final section concludes, ruminating upon policy implications currently facing the United States as a unipole, and the proper role of realist theory in analyzing unipolarity more generally.

6 7

Nuno P. Monteiro, "Three Essays On Unipolarity," Diss. University of Chicago, 2009, p. 12 Bruce Porter calculates that the United States spent 45 years at war from 1776-2009. See: Bruce D. Porter, The Warfare State, American Heritage Vol. 45, No. 4 (1994), p. 58 8 As Monteiro suggests, the peacefulness of any international system depends on (1) the frequency and (2) destructiveness of interstate wars. Since there is no clear way to predict how wars will escalate in destruction, it is thus difficult to determine their devastation beforehand. I consequently concentrate on the likelihood of military conflicts. Therefore, a system that is likely to cause many wars is not peaceful. 9 This is not, however, to detract from the pertinence of this project. There is still great value in designing a logical framework to understand the ramifications of unipolarity even if its empirical manifestations are still emerging. Regarding the limitations of empirically testing arguments on unipolarity see: G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences, World Politics Vol. 61, No. 1 (2008), p. 25; Monteiro, Three Essays p. 13.

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I. The Conditions of Unipolarity: A Typology 1.1 States and Their Relations Three state types follow from unipolar conditions. Obviously, the first is the unipole. The unipole is a state which enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state, or, indeed, all other powers combined.10 Unipolar status, however, does not imply absolute hegemony. Indeed, it is assumed that the unipole will sometimes leave the bargaining table with less than it had sought.11 Still, unipolarity means that, more often than not, the unipoles will is realized. Notably for the purposes of this argument, that implies the freedom to independently pursue a grand strategy without the imperative of an existential security threat forcing its hand. The second and third types of states are both in the category of minor states. Minor states, simply put, include every state other than the unipole. Of the minor states, we can call one type self-sufficient, and the other dependent.12 The difference depends on a minor states ability to deter a threatening unipole. As the name implies, a self-sufficient minor state is capable of this, while a dependent state is not. Importantly, a state which possesses a nuclear deterrent is necessarily self-sufficient.13 As Waltz noted, nuclear countries neither gain nor lose much in military conflict with one another. 14 Consequently, no unipoleno matter how mightywould knowingly risk the destruction of its own cities to advance some lesser political objective against a self-sufficient state. The mere possibility of nuclear use causes extreme caution all around. Since they can guarantee their own security, self-sufficient states are inclined to bandwagon with the unipole.15 John Mearsheimer describes this process as abandoning hope and joining forces with [a] dangerous foe to get at least some small portion of the spoils.16 However, while this may be true for dependent states, self-sufficient statesbecause of their nuclear arsenal stand to benefit greatly by integrating into, and receiving a preferred position within, the unipole-run system without having to abandon hope in deference to the unipole.17 For these same reasons, a state without a nuclear deterrent, meanwhile,
10 11

Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, p. 7 Ibid, p. 9 12 Compare to Mearsheimers self-help, or Monteiros extreme self-help. 13 On how even a very small nuclear arsenal can guarantee survival see: Lawrence Freedman, I Exist; Therefore I Deter, International Security Vol. 13, No. 1 (1988), p. 194; Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, in Betts, ed., pp. 451-461; Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993), p. 54 14 Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, p. 54 15 Michael Mandelbaum writes that states who can afford to accommodate the unipole should because the unipole is able to provide key benefits in the form of security assurances, access to economic flows, and even sovereign legitimacy. Mandelbaum, however, does not consider why some states may not choose to do so, and how this might lead towards conflict. See: Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath, New York: Public Affairs, 2005. 16 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton: New York, 2001, p. 139. 17 There is thus an incentive for nuclear states to restrict membership to their club. As the club grows, the lesser their share of the benefits, both in wealth and relative power. In Sections II and III, we will see how this contributes to conflict. See footnote 35 below.

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff cannot be self-sufficient in a nuclear environment. Such is the case for the dependent minor state. However, unlike the self-sufficient state, the dependent state does not have an incentive to bandwagon with the unipole. To do so, as Mearsheimer argues, the dependent state would knowingly accept a lesser share of the systems benefits and cede some, if not all, of its power projection. As a result, there is an incentive for dependent minor states to resist the unipole. Not all dependent states choose this strategy. However, those that do not resist are really exceptions to the rule. As T.V. Paul finds, weaker states choose to resist greater powers when the status quo becomes intolerable and they fear a deterioration of, or no change in, the status quo in the future.18 Since self-sufficiency is the most certain means of tolerable survival in unipolarity, I offer that dependence alone is grounds for resistance. I call this variant of dependent states that resist the unipole desperate dependent states. These states are at the heart of conflict under unipolarity. Given this incentive to resist the unipole, how does a desperate dependent state deter a unipole? Traditionally, minor states balance externally by obtaining a security guarantee from another powerful state. Since unipolarity presupposes no competing Great Powers, the desperate dependent state can only seek the security guarantee of a self-sufficient state. Self-sufficient states, however, are not likely providers of security guarantees to dependent state. First, as we have already said, self-sufficient states are likely to bandwagon with the unipole. As a result, they are unavailable to offer a security guarantee. Second, atypical self-sufficient states that do not bandwagon with the unipole are still unlikely to satisfy a desperate dependent states security needs. These states, because of their more limited power projection capabilities, must concentrate on their own defense by not committing their power instruments (including their nuclear deterrent) to other states. For the same reason, should an atypical self-sufficient state still offer a security guarantee, any guarantee it makes would be unreliable, and therefore of no value to a dependent state. To illustrate this point, let us consider a hypothetical situation. The year is 2015; Iran has acquired 20 deliverable nuclear weapons and has offered extended deterrence to a new Shia government in Iraq that acts as its puppet by attacking designated U.S. targets. Iran has threatened to strike Tel Aviv if the territorial sovereignty of Iraq is violated. Presume Iran have made its threat highly credibly by issuing public decrees reiterating their commitment, and have gone so far as to subsume the commitment into a religious imperative. Further, let us presume they have placed troops and aid groups in border regions as trip wires, and have demonstrated a general indifference toward bloodshed.19 Now, let us imagine that an oil pipeline in southern Iraq owned by a U.S. firm has been the target of a terror attack sponsored by the Iraqi government under the direction of Tehran. A few American engineers have died. In response, the U.S. assembles a task force in Kuwait with the intent of crossing into Iraq to guard the pipeline from future attacks. The Iranian strike plan allocates 12 missiles to strike Tel Aviv, and divides the remaining eight warheads between Incirlik airbase in Eastern Turkey and three other known U.S./Israeli counterforce targets in the region.

18 19

T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge: New York, 1994, p. 16. On the art of commitment, see: Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale: New Haven, 1967, pp. 38-92

PUBLIUS Vol. 1 No. 1 In this scenario, will the Iranian threat deter the U.S. invasion? Quite simply, it will not. First, the threat is so disproportionate to the transgression that it cannot be taken seriously. Secondly, this incredibility is amplified by inviting a second-strike on the Iranian people. Even if Iran successfully destroys the four regional counterforce targets, the U.S. maintains Cold War stockpiles designed to destroy 2/3 of former Soviet population centers and 3/4 of former Soviet industry. Given these stockpiles and the relative size of Iran, the U.S. could possibly decimate every Iranian population center, plus its industrial centers and all of its counterforce targets, once it mobilizes its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Unless Iran has a death wish, it could never be believed to actually use its nuclear deterrent in this situation. This illustration demonstrates that, even if a self-sufficient state offers a dependent state a security guarantee, its guarantee is not credible, and thus unreliable. To deter a unipole, a dependent state must therefore seek an alternative to external balancing. It does this by balancing internally and procuring a nuclear deterrent of its own. The dynamics which follow from this attempt to proliferate produce a mechanism for war and trigger a chain of future conflict that it is the focus of this theory. 1.2 Possible Types of War From this delineation of state types, two types of interstate wars follow: asymmetric wars and minor wars. Asymmetric wars involve the unipole and any other state, typically desperate dependent states. Minor wars involve any two minor states, including self-sufficient states and dependent states. As already mentioned, there are no great power wars in unipolarity.20 In sections II, III and IV, I demonstrate how unipolarity replaces great power wars with asymmetric and minor wars resulting from the grand strategy pursued by the unipole. 1.3 Unipole Grand Strategy Options I argue that a unipole has three main strategies it can pursue relating to the status quo: (1) expansion (2) status-quo preservation and (3) retrenchment.21 By status quo, I mean the international political alignments and distribution of power present in the international system at any moment.22 An expansion strategy seeks to reshape the status quo to align with the unipoles interests, a status-quo strategy seeks to maintain the status quo, and an retrenchment strategy only seeks to assure the survival of the unipole without regard for maintaining the global status quo. The following three sections present mechanisms for conflict that follow from each of these three options, demonstrating that unipolarity is not peaceful, and at least no more peaceful than systems which preceded it.
20

18

See footnote 3 above. In using these categories, I draw from Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Rosss delineation of grand strategy options, as well as G. John Ikenberrys discussion of post-war order formation, and Nuno Monteiros discussion in his Three Essays. See: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-54; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001 pp. 50-51; Monteiro, p. 24 22 Monteiro, p. 25
21

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff II. Causes of Conflict Under Expansion 2.1 Expansion and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Under expansion, the unipole seeks to revise political alignments in its favor or increase its own relative distribution of power. Since states can never be certain of other states specific intentions, they must assume that a unipole preponderant in power which appears bent on predation may soon target them for coercion or concession.23 As already discussed, self-sufficient states have much to gain by deferring to the unipole and have little reason to fear coercion. The targets of a unipoles expansion strategy are thus those states that remain: namely, desperate dependent states. These states have validly concluded that only self-sufficiency would free them from perpetual imperilment. They consequently have an elevated willingness to suffer and are more likely to resist the unipole and risk confrontation to improve their position. As Paul notes, because desperate dependent states stand to lose everything anyway under an already unbearable status quo, these states are willing to risk a war they would certainly lose in order to become selfsufficient.24 Thus, in the absence of perfect technological suppression, we can expect desperate dependent states to seek nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent and determinant of sufficiency. 2.2 Proliferation, Preventative War and its Ramifications Whether or not understood as aggression, proliferation necessarily reduces the relative power advantage of the unipole. As Matthew Kroenig concludes, the spread of nuclear weapons imposes more strategic costs on powerful states because it undermines their ability to deploy conventional forces as a source of strategic advantage.25 However, proliferation is not immediate. From the point that a state begins to seek a deterrent, there is a window of opportunity in which the proliferating state is still vulnerable to attack. Considering the fleeting opportunity to intervene before a deterrent can be obtained, the unipole subsequently has an incentive towards using preventative conventional military force to stay a loss of power.26 The result is asymmetric preventative war. This process has deleterious and self-perpetuating ramifications of its own, for both the unipole and the international system. First, a preventative war emphasizes the unipoles status as an unparalleled aggressor and highlights the risks associated with prolonged dependence. The devastation reaped upon the helpless state that resists the unipole serves not to discourage other dependent states from giving challenge, but rather to accentuate the urgency with which they must pursue self-sufficiency. While dismembered corpses spread to the four corners of the Roman and British empires served to intimidate potential resistors during the classical and middle ages, the nuclear age is different. The promise of proliferation (selfsufficiency) is too great to ignore with stakes (survival) as high as they are.

23 24

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 32 Paul, Assymetric Conflicts, p. 173 25 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Feb. 2009), p. 127 26 Monteiro, p. 36

PUBLIUS Vol. 1 No. 1 Second, because a unipole at war is not under constraint to follow through on its obligations, when a unipole launches a preventative war it decreases the value of its security guarantees.27 To that end, such a war may encourage bandwagoning dependent states to seek their own deterrents. For the same reason, a preventative war also reduces the future value of a unipoles security guarantee. As a result, we can expect more dependent states, including those allied with the unipole, to balance internally in the future as well. Third, a preventative war sufficiently distracts the unipole to open a window of opportunity for these dependent states to seek deterrents. Rational dependent states will take advantage of the war to proliferate with less fear of intervention since the unipole is occupied expending resources (and the attention of its media) elsewhere. For similar reasons, fighting a preventative war prevents a unipole from intervening elsewhere in the globe (leading to an artificial state of abandonment) so we might also expect to observe minor wars during this time. In sum, despite the cheerleading of primacists like Wohlforth, Krauthammer and Kristol, a strategy of expansion in fact imperils international security. Through the mechanism elaborated above, an expansion strategy leads to proliferation, preventative war, more proliferation, the possibility for minor wars, and the probability of additional preventative interventions in the future for similar reasons. Note, however, that it is not proliferation itself that is the seed of conflict in this model, but rather the unipoles reaction to proliferation. Indeed, if all states were permitted to proliferate, we might expect a relatively peaceful international system.28 This matter is taken up in Section V. 2.3 Historical Study: Iraq War (2003-2006) The dynamics discussed above launched the 2003 American war with Iraq. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saddam Hussein became increasingly convinced that his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was responsible for his states security. He even attributed the weapons with his ability to deter American commanders and limit Operation Desert Storm from reaching Baghdad in 1991. From 1991 to 2003, his goal was to retain Iraqs intellectual capacity to develop WMD, including nuclear deterrents, while cooperating with international sanctions for as long as needed before recommencing weapon production.29 Despite the atrocities he committed against his own citizens and his perhaps autocratic interest in state preservation, Hussein nonetheless behaved exactly as one would expect a leader of a desperate dependent state to act. In response to the terror attacks of September 2001, the Bush administration set out upon a strategy of expansion. The administrations goal was to reorient the political alignment in the Middle East by planting a
27

20

Waltz notes that, even without distractions, unipolarity in general tends to discredit the reliability of security guarantees: absence of threat permits policy to become capriciousa countrys policy becomes sporadic and self-willed See: Kenneth L. Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 29 28 See: Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better 29 Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 30, 2004, pp. 1, 5, 9.

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff cooperative regime in Iraq and eradicating the states alleged WMD that were thought to pose a threat to U.S. power, interests, and personnel in the region. In fact, during the months leading up to the war, the WMD argument was one of those most emphasized to the public by the administration as a reason for taking preventative action. As President Bush said in October 2002, facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proofthe smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud, a line that was subsequently repeated by then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice several times that winter in interviews.30 As Lawrence Freedman concluded, September 11 established in Washington the notion that the potential threats posed by Iraqs WMD should be dealt with before they became actual.31 In other words, the window for preventative war should not be allowed to pass without taking forcible action. Confronted with the threat of imminent invasion, Iraq could not secure a security guarantee against the United States. Self-sufficient states France, Germany and Russia opposed the Security Council resolution in the UN but ultimately did nothing to prevent the U.S. from pursuing conflict unilaterally. Saddam nevertheless seemed to think that Russia or France, because of their economic flows into Iraq, would eventually intervene. At worst, he presumed that his superior forces would put up a heroic resistance that would dissuade the Americans from persisting in the fight.32 Of course, he was wrong. There was a preventative war, neither France nor Russia intervened, and Saddams brigades were easily toppled. As one would anticipate, the war fostered the expected ramifications. First, other desperate dependent states escalated their efforts to proliferate. Within a month of the invasion on April 24, 2003, North Korea announced that it possessed nuclear weapons and would be unaffected by any U.S. plans for regime change in the country.33 The immediate response given by President Bush, his Defense Secretary and his Secretary of State was to float the possibility of preventative war there as well. Iran has also since seriously accelerated its nuclear program, culminating at the time of this writing in a censure issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency on November 27, 2009.34 Notably, China, a nuclear state, joined others in chiding Tehran a week after President Obama met with Chinese officials in Beijing. While we cannot yet know the contents of their conversation, it is probable that the President at some point invoked the importance of keeping the nuclear club selective for the sake of maintaining disproportionate benefits in both security and the economic system.35 Whether conflict ensues in either arena is to be observed, but would not be unexpected.

30

Quoted in: Lawrence Freedman, War in Iraq: Selling the Threat, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 2004), p. 11 31 Quoted in: Ibid, p. 38 32 Kevin Woods, James Lacey and Williamson Murray, Saddams Delusions: The View from the Inside, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85 No. 2 (May/June 2006), p. 3 33 David Sanger, North Korea Now Says It Possesses Nuclear Arsenal, New York Times, April 25, 2003 A1 <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/25/world/north-korea-says-it-now-possesses-nuclear-arsenal.html? scp=4&sq=north%20korea&st=nyt&pagewanted=all> 34 Helene Cooper and William J. Broad, Iran Censured Over Nuclear Program by U.N. Watchdog, New York Times, November 27, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/28nuke.html> 35 See Footnote 17 above.

PUBLIUS Vol. 1 No. 1 Second, the war in Iraq has produced the sort of distraction and limitation proposed in Section 2.2. Since 2003, typologically minor wars in Sudan, Congo and Somalia have killed and displaced millions with minimal U.S. acknowledgment, let alone action.36 This is not to suggest that the U.S. has had a strategic interest in either of these wars meriting an intervention, but rather to confute the primacists assumption that minor wars would not be possible under a unipolarity in which the unipole disregards the international systemto provide order.37 Indeed, both theory and the historical record seem to suggest otherwise. To summarize, the 2003 Iraq War seems to follow the pattern predicted by the theory: (1) Under unipolarity, Iraq continuously sought nuclear weapons as certain means of self-sufficiency and ultimate deterrence; (2) its pursuit of the weapons challenged U.S. relative power, creating an incentive for preventative war; (3) the resulting preventative war encouraged other desperate dependent states to proliferate, creating new possible points of conflict; (4) the war may have also prevented the U.S. from intervening from other minor wars across the globe. III. Causes of Conflict Under Status Quo Strategies 3.1 Status Quo Strategies and Nuclear Non-Proliferation A status quo unipole seeks to maintain political alignments and its relative distribution of power. Again, since states can never be certain of other states specific intentions, they must assume that a unipole preponderant in power may soon target them for coercion or concession, or even abandon the international system altogether.38 As Waltz asserts, even if a dominant power behaves within moderation, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. This effect is amplified when the absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.39 Because states can only approximate the contours of the long shadow of the future, obtaining self-sufficiency remains paramount. As Robert Jervis writes, both American overexpansion and the fear that it will eventually withdraw encourages others to get nuclear weapons.40 However, one of a unipoles favored means of maintaining relative power balances is by restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, often under the banner of promoting international peace and security.41 To do this, the unipole needs to compel the compliance of lesser states. Self-sufficient nuclear states, already in possession of adequate deterrents and assured of their own security, are likely to accommodate the unipole in this project. Certain dependent states, for reasons discussed earlier, are likely to do the same.42 Once again, desperate dependent states are at the heart of conflict, this
36

22

Figures from: 100,000 More Dead in Darfur than Reported, CNN, April 22, 2008 <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/04/22/darfur.holmes/index.html> 37 See Footnote 5 above. 38 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 32 39 Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, p. 29 40 Robert Jervis, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan. 2009), p. 212 41 See E.H. Carrs chapter on the harmony of interests in: E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939, Macmillan: London, 1948 p. 53 42 See Section 1.1

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff time under a status quo strategy. As under expansion, these states will seek to internally balance against the unipole by seeking nuclear weapons regardless of the unipole, and its coalition, demanding non-proliferation. 3.2 Proliferation, Preventative War and its Ramifications Revisited The balance of power is a basic factor of the status quo and a unipole determined to maintain that balance (and its own primacy) will act by definition, with preemptive force if necessary, to secure existing distributions. If a proliferating state is discovered to be developing nuclear technology, we can assume that the unipole will first seek diplomatic overtures to avoid instigating armed conflict. After all, any war certainly risks unsettling the status quo. First, a war requires the redirection of resources to one area that necessarily detracts from those allocated to another. For example, a unipole may seek to maintain the status quo by dispersing its troops throughout the globe. These deployments keep foreign governments and militias in check simply by being there. They function in this sense as tripwires, as Schelling described them, and are crucial and effective means of maintaining political alignments and order.43 As a result, when a unipole draws on these resources to fight preventative wars, it jeopardizes the alignments and stability of other areas of the globe. Secondly, a war prods a unipoles dependent allies to question the reliability of its nuclear umbrella. These dependent states in turn may begin to seek self-sufficiency, further altering the balance of power, and infringing upon the unipoles own relative power more specifically. Consequently, a preventative war also jeopardizes the stability of power within its own coalition. For these reasons, a unipole will strenuously exhaust all of its diplomatic options. However, given the nature of desperate dependent states,44 persuasion eventually fails. As Paul writes, because of the intolerability of the status quo and the implications that prolonged negotiations has for its ceaseless perpetuation, extended negotiation has implications for the outbreak of war.45 For Paul, this meant a conventional attack against the greater power by the weaker power. In the context of nuclear proliferation, this means that the desperate dependent state will go forward with its nuclear weapons program despite persuasive overtures, leading ultimately to a unipole initiated preventative war. Faced with a certain and immediate threat to political alignments and its own relative power, and a possible future threat to political alignments and its own relative power, a unipole will choose to risk the future costs in order to neutralize the immediate threats. However, while it is possible that a unipole will be able to quickly resolve the immediate threat with a campaign of rapid dominance (shock and awe)46 that avoids extended resource redirection and diminished credibility to client states, the likelihood is that it will not. To quote Clausewitz, action in war is like movement in a resistant

43

What can 7,000 American men [garrisoned in Berlin] do? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there. (Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 47) 44 See: Section 1.1 45 Paul, Asymmetric Wars, p. 18 46 Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, National Defense UP: Washington D.C., 1996, pp. 24-25

PUBLIUS Vol. 1 No. 1 element...one always falls far short of the intended goal.47 Indeed, in such a preventative war, we can expect to observe the predictable developments: client dependent states will seek deterrents of their own; non-client dependent states will use the distraction as an opportunity to proliferate; minor wars may break out under conditions of artificial abandonment. In sum, the ramifications are not dissimilar from those observed under expansion: status quo unipolarity leads to proliferation, preventative war, more proliferation, the possibility for minor wars, and the probability of additional preventative interventions in the future for similar reasons. Note, once again, that the causes for war are not the use or possession of nuclear weapons, but rather the pursuit thereof. Overall, even under a nonaggressive status quo strategy, unipolarity is not peaceful. 3.3 Historical Study: Iran and North Korea (1991-2003, 2006-Present) Immediately following the Cold War, the United States pursued a status quo strategy. The Clinton presidencys selective primacy48 perhaps demonstrated this best. As Posen and Ross observed, Clintons administration never fully settled on a particular posture, but rather employed varying approaches to condition specific situations.49 The result of this, I would argue, was largely to maintain existing political alignments and power distributions. Paramount in this effort was the indiscriminate prevention of nuclear proliferation.50 As declared in the U.S. national security strategy of February 1995, a critical priority of the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Countries weapons programs, and their levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among our most important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral relations.51 At the same time, Iran and North Korea were two of the few dependent states who had not bandwagoned with the U.S.52 As desperate dependent states under status quo unipolarity, the countries sought to proliferate to guarantee their own security. Though both countries had explored nuclear self-sufficiency in the past, their efforts to proliferate redoubled as soon as the Cold War ended and the option of securing a bipole patron evaporated. David Albright and Paul Brannan point out that, between 1993 and 2003, North Korea sought to elude the U.S. and IAEA inspectors to develop a breakout capacity.53 Indeed, it seems North Korea was also apparently well aware that a unipole pursuing the status quo would launch a preventative war if the nuclear threshold were ever crossed. Consequently, the goal was to have the machinery and systems in place to quickly cross the threshold and announce the deterrent should the unipoles strategy shift. Indeed, when the U.S. shifted
47 48

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Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton UP: Princeton, 1984, p. 119 Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," p. 44 49 See also: William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, Feb. 1995, p. 12 50 Ibid, p. 6 51 Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 13 52 Iraq could have fallen under this category as well, as it also sought a deterrent in the early years of unipolarity because of uncertainty and desperation. However, since Iraq later became the target of a domination strategy, I have instead chosen to discuss that case in Section II. See above: Section 2.3. 53 David Albright and Paul Brannan, Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities, U.S. Institute of Peace Working Paper, Oct. 23, 2007, pp. 2-3

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff to a strategy of expansion, this is precisely what happened in April 2003.54 The U.S. has not yet pursued preventative war with North Korea, but it has remained an option since the DPRKs capability was first discovered in 2003, and seemingly resurfaces each time the country produces a test detonation.55 It is possible that such a war has not taken place largely because the U.S. has been dealing with an equally compelling threat in Iran, much closer to its current involvements in the Middle East. Iran also pursued a nuclear program during the first decade or so of status quo unipolarity.56 As with North Korea, though Irans nuclear program has its origins much earlier, Iranian efforts to proliferate escalated under unipolarity. Until the revolution in 1979, while the Shahs Iran was a component of the U.S. dual pillar strategy to contain the Soviets in the Middle East, President Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace Program helped the Iranians pursue nuclear technology.57 This relationship ended after 1979, but the technical information, left unrealized until the 1990s, remained. Greg Bruno argues that Irans reinvigorated effort to proliferate in the 90s derived from an increased U.S. presence in the region following the 1991 Gulf War.58 In other words, Irans uncertainty about U.S. intentions under unipolarity following the Cold War, combined with a near immediate U.S. presence in the Middle East, prompted Iran to more hurriedly develop a covert deterrent. These efforts, as already discussed, intensified during the first four years of the Bush presidency when the U.S. pursued an expansion strategy in the region.59 By 2007, after the Bush administration had abandoned the expansion strategy to pursue a posture more reminiscent of status quo maintenance,60 the National Intelligence Council was convinced that Iran had made significant progress towards this end.61 Indeed, on September 25, 2009, it was further revealed that Iran had an additional nuclear reactor operating in Qum.62 As of this writing, Iranian leadership has backed down from their original willingness to cooperate with the IAEA, the UN and (most importantly) the United States to have their lightly enriched uranium stockpiles exported and converted into harmless fuel rods in France and Russia.63 Iran now appears to be continuing to develop its

54 55

See Footnote 33 above. See: Mark Thompson, Could North Korea Provoke a New Korean War? Time, June 10, 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1903717,00.html> ; Associated Press, North Korea Warns of Nuclear War, June 14, 2009 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31352692> 56 National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Washington, D.C., November 2007, p. 6 57 Greg Bruno, Irans Nuclear Program, Council on Foreign Relations: New York, Sept. 29, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/> 58 Ibid 59 See: Section 2.3 above. 60 Jackson Diehl, Retreat from the Freedom Agenda, Washington Post, April 24, 2006 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/23/AR2006042301017.html> 61 See: Footnote 55 above. 62 See: David Sanger and William Broad, U.S. and Allies Warn Iran Over Nuclear Deception, New York Times, Sept. 25, 2009, A1 < http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/world/middleeast/26nuke.html 63 See: David Sanger, Tehran Rejects Nuclear Accord, Officials Report, New York Times, Oct. 29, 2009 < http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/world/middleeast/30nuke.html>

PUBLIUS Vol. 1 No. 1 nuclear capacity,64 while doing its best to stall and avoid preventative action from the United States.65 This is to be expected of a desperate dependent state operating in status quo unipolarity. However, how long the Iranians can stave off conflict is unclear. As already discussed, the momentum towards war is building as the United States develops a coalition of states opposed to Iranian proliferation.66 So far, the U.S.-led coalition has only issued stern warnings, but sanctions seem soon to follow. Again, as already discussed, a unipole will want to exhaust all of its diplomatic options before redirecting resources and discouraging allies by launching a preventative war.67 If these fail, which this theory predicts they will, an argument for preventative war will likely emerge. In fact, some in policy circles have already begun to make it.68 Certainly, a U.S.-led preventative war risks destabilizing the Levant and incurring uprisings against U.S. forces already stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, we should expect to observe minor wars (perhaps in the Korean peninsula) especially in those places from which troops and materiel are extracted. Additionally, we may also expect discouraged allies to proliferate themselves. However, as a unipole seeking to maintain the status quo, these are risks (even costs) that the United States will be willing to absorb. To summarize, U.S. relations with North Korea and Iran since 1991 seem to follow the pattern predicted by the theory: (1) North Korea and Iran covertly sought nuclear weapons as certain means of self-sufficiency and ultimate deterrence under uncertain conditions; (2) their pursuit of such weapons, once discovered, challenged U.S. relative power, setting forth current diplomatic efforts to disarm both countries; (3) these efforts have had limited success; (4) negotiations are ratcheting towards armed conflict and arguments for preventative war already abound. IV. Causes of Conflict Under Retrenchment 4.1 Retrenchment, Proliferation and Regional Hegemony Under retrenchment, a unipole allows political alignments and power balances to fluctuate freely, and seeks only to preserve the security, liberty, and property of [its] people.69 This unipole is only concerned by those who have the power to threaten its sovereignty, territorial integrity, or safety. Rightfully concluding that no state70 has this power, the unipole isolates itself
64

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See: Associated Press, Iran, Defiant, Approves Plan for 10 Enrichment Sites, New York Times, Nov. 29, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/11/29/world/AP-ML-Iran-Nuclear.html> 65 See: Steven Erlanger, Frustration as Iran Stalls on Deal, New York Times, Nov. 20, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/world/middleeast/30nuke.html> 66 See: Footnote 34 above. 67 See: Section 3.1 above. 68 See: John Bolton, Sanctions Wont Work Against Iran, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204731804574383162213828906.html> 69 Doug Bandow, Keeping the Troops and Money at Home, Current History, Vol. 93, No. 579 (January 1994), p. 10. (Cited in: Posen and Ross, Competing Visions, p. 12) 70 Some may argue that non-conventional actors (like terrorists) can threaten the safety of a unipoles people and property and therefore a unipole can never truly abandon the international system. However, this is a threat that exists regardless of structural conditions and which must be dealt with by all states, at all times, under all conditions. Consequently, our definition of abandonment does not preclude a unipole from

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff and abandons the international system. Because retrenchment proposes that the unipole stay out of political conflicts and wars abroad, a retrenching unipole has no need for political instruments and relationships with other states.71 This means the unipole is unavailable as a security guarantee under retrenchment. For the same reason, a retrenching unipole has little interest in interfering with nuclear proliferation: so long as the unipole maintains a deliverable, debilitating and destructive second strike deterrent, it could care less who does or does not possess nuclear weapons. 72 Conflict thus results from regional specific dynamics. As a result, in regions of nested unipolarity,73 we can subsequently expect to observe the dynamics of conflict discussed in previous sections, only this time within regional subsystems. Here, self-sufficient regional hegemons will suppress desperate dependent states efforts to proliferate, tending toward preventative war and its deleterious repercussions.74 Meanwhile, in multipolar regions, existing literature points to two main mechanisms of conflict. First, regional powers will seek local hegemony to maximize their security, leading to war.75 Second, in multipolar regions of greater parity, even if one state achieves primacy the system still tends toward disagreements over power positions and power miscalculations. 76 These in turn lead to wars that aim to settle these disagreements and miscalculations. In bipolar regions, conflict results from competition between hegemons in close proximity to one another.77 While bipolarity creates a stable dynamic for balanced alliance systems, the close proximity of the powers creates both a constant tension and an increased opportunity for proximate causes of conflict to emerge. As a result, the odds of conflict are high. In sum, though retrenchment removes the unipole from any possible conflict, the strategy still risks minor wars that emanate from the various dynamics of the structures that have preceded unipolarity. By definition, retrenched unipolarity is therefore no more peaceful than any of these other arrangements. 4.2 Historical Study: To Be Determined In the modern era of unipolarity, the United States has consistently pursued an internationalist grand strategy of either expansion or status quo maintenance.78 Consequently, any historical illustration provided here would be misleading. While situations of quasi-abandonment have emerged during U.S. engagements elsewhere, the ensuing conflicts were mostly intrastate.79 The Second Congo War and the Blood Diamond War between Sierra Leone and Liberiaboth interstate warsare notable exceptions.

combating threatening terror cells, it only implies a disregard for status quo political alignments and power balances. 71 Posen and Ross, Competing Visions, p. 13 72 Ibid, pp. 14-15 73 Monteiro, Three Essays, pp. 51-52 74 See Sections II and III above 75 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 141 76 See: Blainey, Causes of War 77 Monteiro, p. 52 78 See: Monteiro, Three Essays, p. 55; Posen and Ross, Competing Visions, p. 16 79 See discussion of conflict in Africa during Iraq War in Section 2.3.

PUBLIUS Vol. 1 No. 1 However, there are reasons to suggest that the U.S. may pursue a retrenchment strategy in the future. First, U.S. strategies of expansion, and now to maintain the status quo, are causing the U.S. to overextend its capabilities.80 These costs not only limit the ability for the United States to project its power abroad, but also spillover budgetary limitations into domestic affairs. Domestic opposition combined with reasonable policy argumentation may incite a strategic shift towards retrenchment. Second, as the U.S. continues its status quo and expansion strategies, we can expect more states under the U.S. security umbrella to seek self-sufficiency.81 As a result, there will be less incentive for the unipole to engage.82 If this happens, predictions for conflict abound. Fareed Zakaria predicts a world in which problems fester and the buck is endlessly passed until problems explode.83 Niall Ferguson foresees an anarchic Dark Age in which civilization retreats into a few fortified enclaves.84 As Monteiro points out, U.S. policymakers know these implications of retrenchment as well. Our military presence in Europe, for example, is not designed to protect against foreign threats, but rather to prevent conflicts resulting from power competition in a multipolar region.85 V. Conclusion: Unipolarity, Non-Proliferation and Realism This paper began by considering three claims issued by a popular argument that suggests unipolarity is peaceful. In the subsequent sections, I endeavored to reveal the fallacies in two of these claims. I further argued that these two fictions overwhelm the validity of the third claim, undermining the argument as a whole. In sum, unipolarity is not peaceful. Under conditions of expansion or status quo preservation, conflicting incentives for proliferation and repression lead to preventative war and trigger a chain of future conflict. Under retrenchment, wars result from regional specific dynamics of conflict that have existed in previous structures of the international system. In terms of international peace, unipolarity is certainly no more peaceful, and possibly even less peaceful, than other structural arrangements. The paradox of unipolarity ultimately revolves around the issue of proliferation. While the international system would arguably benefit from the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sense that credible deterrents encourage security, the unipole enjoys its greatest advantages when other states, deprived of nuclear weapons, cannot resist its will. Security is not a problem for the unipole, but it is for all other states. However, the unipole fails to realize that as long as it seeks to maintain this relative advantage by suppressing proliferation it foments tension that exposes itself to war and, possibly, decline. The United States may soon be on the cusp of this realization. For the time being, it remains a status quo unipole.
80

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See: Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Thin Green Line, Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: Washington, D.C., (Aug. 14, 2004); Associated Press, U.S. Military at Breaking Point, Pentagon Study Shows, Associated Press, Jan. 25, 2006 81 See: Sections 2.2 and 3.2 82 Monteiro, Three Essays, p. 49 83 Fareed Zakaria, Preview of Post-U.S. World, Newsweek, Feb. 5 2007 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16843382/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/1098/> 84 Niall Ferguson, A World Without Power, Foreign Policy, (July-August 2004), p. 34 85 Monteiro, Three Essays, p. 52

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The Delusion of a Unipolar Peace Adam S. Sieff Ultimately, however, a retrenching unipole may give the international community its best chance for peace. Though we might observe some minor wars at first, a system in which all states can proliferate to the point of selfsufficiency is likely promote more cooperation.86 With apologies to Stanley Kubrick, there can be no doomsday gap. In fact, the certainty of doom commands cooperation, not competition. But by allowing states to freely pursue deterrents, does the unipole risk its long-term status as a sole power and immediately surrender the benefits of its position? This raises another critical question: is engaged unipolarity desirable even for the unipole? On the one hand, engaged unipolarity provides near perfect security and permits international domination and the imposition of ones will and ideology. On the other, this requires near constant warring and intervention, places heavy burdens on the military and the economy, and comes at the expense of domestic welfare. This is not to say that unipolarity is not durable, rather that it bears hidden costs. Since a near perfect level of security can arguably still be had under retrenchment, a simple preference equation emerges. In this sense, a potentially engaged unipole must decide what it prefers: (1) the ability to shape international norms, penetrating deep into sovereign states and affecting the attitudes and dispositions of foreign peoples, or (2) the robustness of its own domestic society, including the welfare of its citizens and the vitality of its defense forces. My posing of this question does not presuppose a correct answer. Different states presented with this opportunity will ultimately arrive at different conclusions. (Indeed, in the case of the United States, they may ultimately even do so at different times.) However, from the perspective of realism, the answer should be clear. The fact is that the obsession with relative power, and subsequent myth of non-proliferation, have overtaken and obscured their original means and ends in realist theory. According to offensive realism, states seek relative power advantages, and thus suppress proliferation, to ensure a secure sphere for civil life to flourish. When the original offensive realists like Alcibiades, Machiavelli and Hobbes were making this case, there was no magic bullet to level the field. As a result, every inch counted in the ultimate struggle for security. Of course, this is no longer the case. For 65 years, we have been perfecting this magic bullet to the point that, now, we can credibly assure the security of every societys civil sphere. By disentangling these means and ends, a realist should find that efforts at non-proliferation are not only injurious to the repressors, but also foolishly anachronistic. The United States should take note.

86

See: Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better