1.

Argentina

Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical

Products
On 25 May 2001, India requested consultations with Argentina concerning Argentina s Law No. 24.766 and Decree No. 150/92. According to India, these measures constitute unnecessary obstacles to international trade and prevent Indian medicines, drugs and other pharmaceuticals from entering into the Argentinean market, thus discriminating against Indian drugs vis--vis like products of other countries and of Argentina. According to India, the above measures require that before entering the Argentinean market, all drugs and other pharmaceuticals must be registered with the National Administration of Drugs, Foodstuffs and Medical Technology, Ministry of Health of Argentina. The above Decree contains two annexes listing countries. In respect of Annex I countries, pharmaceutical products are required to be manufactured in facilities approved by the relevant governmental bodies of these countries or by the Argentinean Ministry of Health and meet the National Health Authority s manufacturing and quality control requirements.

In respect of Annex II countries, manufacturing facilities are required to be inspected and approved by the Ministry of Health of Argentina before export of these pharmaceutical products into Argentina. According to India, it does not figure in either of those two annexes. This alleged discrimination would have led to total lack of market access for Indian drugs and pharmaceutical products in Argentina. India considered that infringement of the following provisions have taken place: Articles 2 (especially 2.2), 5 (especially 5.1 and 5.2) and 12 of the TBT Agreement; Articles I and III of the GATT 1994; and Article XVI:4 of the Agreement establishing the WTO.

Armenia

Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes and Alcoholic Beverages

On 20 July 2010, Ukraine requested consultations with Armenia regarding Armenia's measures affecting the importation and internal sale of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. Ukraine alleged

that Armenia's law

On Presumptive Tax for Tobacco Products

of 24 March 2000 levies

discriminatory internal taxes on imported tobacco products and is therefore in violation of Article III of the GATT 1994 and paragraph 1.2 of Armenia's Protocol of Accession to the WTO. Moreover, the law imposes customs duties on such imported tobacco products at a rate of 24 per cent, which is higher than Armenia's WTO bound rate of 15 per cent. As to imported alcoholic beverages, Ukraine alleges that Armenia's law On Excise Tax of 7 July 2000 applies higher excise taxes on imported alcoholic beverages than on like domestic products. Ukraine considers that this is also inconsistent with Armenia's obligations under Article III of the GATT 1994. On 8 September 2010, Ukraine requested the establishment of a panel. On 6 October 2010, Ukraine requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 25 October 2010, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel.

European Communities Products

Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry

On 24 February 1997, Brazil requested consultations with the EC in respect of the EC regime for the importation of certain poultry products and the implementation by the EC of the Tariff Rate Quota for these products. Brazil contended that the EC measures are inconsistent with Articles X and XXVII of GATT 1994 and Articles 1 and 3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. Brazil also contended that the measures nullify or impair benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under GATT 1994. On 12 June 1997, Brazil requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 25 June 1997, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel.

Panel and Appellate Body proceedings Further to a second request to establish a panel by Brazil, the DSB established a panel at its meeting on 30 July 1997. Thailand and the US reserved their third-party rights. On 11 August 1997, the Panel was composed. The report of the Panel was circulated to Members on 12 March 1998. The panel found that Brazil had not demonstrated that the EC had failed to implement and administer the tariff rate quota for poultry in line with its obligations under the cited agreements. On 29 April 1998, Brazil notified its intention to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The report of the Appellate Body was circulated to Members on 13 July

1998. The Appellate Body upheld most of the Panel's findings and conclusions, but reversed the Panel's finding that the EC had acted inconsistently with Article 5.1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Appellate Body, however, concluded that the EC had acted inconsistently with Article 5.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture. At its meeting on 23 July 1998, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report.

Implementation of adopted reports The EC and Brazil announced at the DSB meeting on 21 October 1998, that they had reached a mutual agreement on a reasonable period of time for implementation, which was to be the period up to 31 March 1999

Brazil

Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags from India

On 9 April 2001, India requested consultations with Brazil concerning:

y

the determination by the Brazilian government to continue to impose anti-dumping duties on jute bags and bags made of jute yarn from India, based on an allegedly forged document regarding dumping margin attributed to a non-existing Indian company;

its refusal to reconsider the decision to continue anti-dumping duties on Indian jute products despite the fact that the non-existence of that company was brought to the notice of the authorities;

non-consideration of the fresh evidence regarding cost of production, domestic sales prices, export prices, etc., of Indian jute manufacturers, and refusal to initiate review of the decision to impose anti-dumping duties;

the general practice of Brazil regarding review and imposition of anti-dumping duties; and

Brazilian anti-dumping laws and regulations, including, but not limited to, Article 58 of Decree No. 1.602 of 1995.

According to India, the provisions with which these determinations and legal provisions appear to be inconsistent include, but are not limited to Articles VI and X of GATT 1994; Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 (especially 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and Annex II, 6.9, 6.10), 11, 12, 17.6(i), 18.3, 18.4; and Article XVI of the WTO Agreement. In addition, the determination to continue the anti-dumping duties allegedly nullifies and impairs benefits accruing to India under, or otherwise impedes the attainment of objectives of, the cited agreements.

The Dead Sea is drying up, with severe negative consequences on the ecosystem, industry and wildlife in the area. There have been several proposals for a canal to transport Mediterranean Sea or Red Sea water to the Dead Sea. Such a water project would reverse the negative impacts on the environment; that is, the erosion of the shoreline and disruption of the water column caused by declining water levels. The canal would reverse negative impacts on trade by revitalizing the potash works industry and tourism on the Israeli and Jordanian sides. The canal would also create new trade and development opportunities by using the 400-meter differential between the bodies of water to generate hydropower -- a much needed source of water for domestic, agricultural and industrial purposes. Although the benefits of such a project are clear, there are drawbacks, including cost. Additional cost-benefit analyses of a Dead Sea canal are necessary.

Both Israel and Jordan have conducted studies of a Med-Dead or Red-Dead Canal that would reverse debilitating trends in the Dead Sea basin and have additional spinoff effects, like the promotion of tourism. The Harza group sees the Red SeaDead Sea Canal as the next step in the peace process, that will occur when Israel and Jordan jointly realize the development potential of the Jordan Valley. Cooperation on a canal project could lead to other cooperative sectoral development, such as the marketing and expansion of Dead Sea tourism.

Construction on a canal has not yet begun. The proposed projects are costly and additional economic analyses are necessary. The lack of movement on the project may be contrasted with unilateral development projects in the 1950s like Israel's National Water Carrier (completed in 1964) and Jordan's 110-km East Ghor Canal on the Yarmuk River (completed in 1961) that were completed relatively quickly.

6. Forum and Scope: BILATERAL

A Dead Sea canal project would have to be negotiated between Jordan and Israel. There is no precedent for joint water development of the Jordan Rift Valley. Despite the fact that the two countries share a scarce common resource, they have pursued irrigation and diversion projects independent of one another for the past 50 years. In fact, in 1964, the Arab League countries attempted to sabotage Israel's National Water Carrier project by diverting Jordan headwaters. Israel anticipated Arab ambitions and wisely shifted the diversion point from the upper Jordan to Lake Tiberias. Given this history, a Med-Dead or Red-Dead Canal would mark the first cooperative water development project in the Jordan Valley. Such a project has potential for regional cooperation on large-scale desalination projects. For example, the point of intake for the original Med-Dead Canal would have run parallel to the Israel-Egypt border, which opens up the possibility of a tri-national (Egyptian-Israeli-Palestinian) agro-industrial complex providing a continuous supply of freshwater to agriculture in the Negev and Sinai Deserts. Similarly, a Red-Dead Sea route could lead to joint Jordanian-Israeli-Palestinian development of agriculture and industry in the Arava Valley. Even if large scale regional projects do not emerge, the Israeli and Jordanian governments must consider Palestinian participation in agreements/projects that affect the flow of water to Palestinian-occupied areas. Previous water allocation schemes, such as the Johnston Unified Water Plan of 1955 and the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty failed to consider Palestinian needs. The Palestinian Authority must be involved in any canal project that could potentially divert fresh water resources to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The ChadCameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project is a controversial project to develop the production capacity of oilfields near Doba in southern Chad, and to create a 1,070 km pipeline to transport the oil to facilities on the coast of Cameroon. The project was launched on October 18, 2000. It is operated by ExxonMobil (40%), and also sponsored by Petronas Malaysia (35%) and Chevron (25%). The governments of Chad and Cameroon also have a combined 3% stake [1] in the project. It was largely funded by multilateral and bilateral credit financing provided by Western governments. Debt based financing came from the International Finance Corporation in the amount of US$100 million, the private sector arm of the World Bank Group and the French export credit agency, COFACE, and the US-Exim Bank which will each provided US$200 million. IFC-coordinated private lenders offered a further US$100 million.[2] he World Bank's support was very important for the Consortium of oil companies, as they believed they needed the support of a humanitarian agency with international interests in order for the project to succeed. While the project's private sponsors, the Upstream Consortium, provided about 95% ($2.2 billion USD) of the financing for the pipeline, the World Bank also contributed through debt financing. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) provided a loan of about $100 million USD. $85.8 million of this went to COTCO and $14.2 million went to TOTCO, Cameroon and Chad's respective oil management companies. The IFC also aided in securing an additional US $300 million in private commercial lending for COTCO and TOTCO. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) provided US $92.9 million to Chad ($39.5 million) and Cameroon ($53.4 million) to finance the countries joint-venture pipeline companies. Last of the World Bank-provided financing was given through the European Investment Bank (EIB) which provided US $46.6 million to finance [4] Cameroon and Chad's equity in COTCO and TOTCO. Included in plans for the project was a revenue management law developed by the World Bank. This separated the oil revenues given to Chad into four required areas: a Future Generations Fund, health, education and other development projects, a fund to compensate the Doba region of Chad from where the oil was extracted and government reserves. The revenue management law also created the Petroleum Revenue Oversight Committee. The committee was established to oversee the spending of the oil revenues, and would include members of both the Chadian government and civil society Environmental impacts

In Chad and especially Cameroon, through which the pipeline stretches 890 km of the total 1070 km, there have been claims of adverse effects of the construction and maintenance of the pipeline on the indigenous communities and environment. One of the largest areas affected is in the coastal Cameroonian town of Kribi. Located eleven miles off the coast of Kribi is the export terminal facility. There has been much controversy regarding the alleged degradation the coastal reefs during construction. This has not only impacted the underwater habitat, but also the livelihoods of the local [12] people who depend on fishing as their main source of income. Since completion of the pipeline in 2007, there have been two known oil leaks at the transfer site eleven miles off the shore of Cameroon. The first occurred on January 15, 2007. Representatives for COTCO claimed that the leak was contained within a few hours and that the amount of spilled was not sufficient to cause any harm, though local fishermen did claim to have seen traces of the oil [13] ashore. The second oil spill was on April 22, 2010 at the same site. COTCO stated that the leaked

oil amounted to less than five barrels. Cameroonian NGO's Relufa and Centre pour l'Environnement et le Developpement have brought to light the inefficiencies of the oil-spill preparedness plan, as well as the lack of communication between COTCO and the surrounding communities. [14] The controversy the pipeline project has been affected by persistent charges and fears about corruption and the diversion of revenues ostensibly intended for poverty reduction towards arms purchases, particularly by the regime of Chadian President Idriss Dby. Opposition leader and parliamentarian Ngarledjy Yorongar of the Front of Action Forces for the Republic (FAR) accused National AssemblyPresident Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue of taking a bribe from Elf, then a partner in the project,