Cojuangco vs Palma A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J.

Palma, despite his subsisting marriage,wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus,the latter filed on November 1982, a complaint disbarment against respondent. Palmamoved to dismiss the complaint. On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSGf o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . T h e A s s i s t a n t S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l h e a r d t h e testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the presence of respondents counsel.O n M a r c h 1 9 , 1 9 8 4 r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d w i t h t h e O S G a n u r g e n t m o t i o n t o s u s p e n d proceedings on the ground that the final actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to thedisbarment proceeding, but it was denied. The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of hisoath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of law for a period of threeyears. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that heis a bachelor because his first mar riage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity.Issue: Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage.Held: Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal conviction whenhe declared before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does not need judicial declaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vsTerre, the same defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was alsosought. We held: xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should haveknown that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a secondmarriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio isessential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held thatmistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold JordanTerre to his own argument, his frist marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamousand criminal.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Complainant,

Adm. Case No. 2474

Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J., PUNO, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, versus SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, *AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA, *CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, and **CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, Respondent. Promulgated:

September 15, 2004

X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.1[1]

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.

The facts are undisputed:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad.2[2] He frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption

Convent. On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. only the next day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is legal. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded. It was

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married

to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.

On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition3[3] for declaration of

nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision4[4] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint5[5] for disbarment, imputing to respondent the following acts:

a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about respondents courtship and advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3) children;

b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;

c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria Luisas parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor. x x x.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6[6] on the ground of lack of cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath. There is no allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants daughter with utmost sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.

In the Resolution7[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the investigation.

Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 645388[8] a Resolution9[9] (a) setting aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings10[10] on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order.11[11] In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the disbarment proceedings.12[12]

Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. October 19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:

On

Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and terminated.13[13] In his Manifestation,14[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against respondent.

On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the ground that he needed more time to locate vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.15[15] resolution.16[16] Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered submitted for

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Thus: She recommended that respondent

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the following acts which warrant his disbarment:

a)

Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant;

b)

His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage;

c)

The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term spinster with respect to Luisa.

There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.

For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondents penalty to only one (1) year suspension. Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.17[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.18[18]

Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.

While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer,19[19] however, professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification20[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage21[21] from the

December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City.

Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend.22[22]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.23[23] His act of

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.24[24] Measured against this definition, respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:

1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25[25] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of

marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred. As such, there can be

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,26[26] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession, warranting respondents disbarment.

(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,27[27] respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,28[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,29[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his law education, and thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. For this, respondent was disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,30[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment. The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity.31[31] How could respondent

perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away. Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.32[32] Naturally, she was an easy prey.

Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent

judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,33[33] a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him,34[34] or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,35[35] then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.36[36]

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:37[37]

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad. When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.38[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.39[2] On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.40[3] In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.41[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved.42[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.43[6]

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.44[7] In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account. It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.45[8] Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.46[9]

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,47[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.48[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.49[12] Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.50[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession. Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer: CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.51[14] We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave. A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondents" calling card:6 Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Grace Park, Caloocan City

Tel: 362-7820 Fax: (632) 362-7821 Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD. 1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied) Hence, this complaint. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. 7 The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8 Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty. We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty. The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules. Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14 Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. 15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16 Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause. This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. 18

Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits. Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1 With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause. 24 As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession. Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings. A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. 27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyers name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address;

(d) telephone number and (e) special branch of law practiced.28 Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof. The Case and the Facts Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 3, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise: "x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. "Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats." 6

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, 7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8 He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed. He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents. As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 9 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation. As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice." Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit 11 of the two police officers who had assisted them. Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant. After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon. On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainants Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution. The CBD received complainants Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any. The IBPs Recommendation On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty." The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The Courts Ruling We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability Violation of the Notarial Law The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. 21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22 Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.23 These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements. In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows: "The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument." For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest. It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry. Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija. We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law. We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint. As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement. It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. 28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public. Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case. Lawyer as Witness for Client Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client." Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states: "Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except: a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like; b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel." Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, 31 except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32 The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients. "Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33 Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.34 Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons: First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law. Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense

and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.36 The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. 37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. 38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases. No Proof of Harassment The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability. 39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police. WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur. ARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005 Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed account. Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he

had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice. Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE AC-5365. April 27, 2005 Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault. Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005 Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein, complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6 months. The governors of the IBP increased the penalty for 2 years. Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law. Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing

parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the practice of law. RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA. A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005 Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his frustrations of the outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. The letter contained derogatory and malignant remarks which are highly insulting. The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of appearing before the court, he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as the first one. The court was thus offended with his remarks. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his letters addressed to the court. Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, to which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Thus, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Heirs of Herman Rey, represented by ARACELI Vda. DE ROMERO vs. Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr. A.C. No. 6192 June 23, 2005 Facts: Atty. Venancio Reyes is counsel for Heirs of Herman Rey for which they are intervenors in a civil case involving multiple sale of a piece of land. There were three buyers however, and to settle the case, they had agreed to a Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement, dated June 16, 1995, was signed in three stages, first by Elizabeth Reyes and her husband, then by complainants and their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte Jr., and last, by Antonio Gonzales, Veronica Gonzales for and on behalf of V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. and by herein respondent. Later, the RTC which houses the records of the case was destroyed by fire, thus The complainants filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case, which was granted by the RTC of Bulacan. The documents attached to the motion were the basis for the reconstituted records. Because of the circumstances of signing of the Compromise Agreement, the copy submitted to the RTC bore only the signatures of Elizabeth Reyes, her husband, complainants, and that of their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte. After a lapse of two (2) years from the date of the

Compromise Agreement, V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. still has not complied with its obligation toward complainants. Hence, complainants filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution against V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. for such failure. Atty. Reyes filed a motion for the case was premature. Later he raised the issue that the Compromise Agreement was not valid since it was not signed by Veronica Gonzales. Hence, the RTC rued that the Compromise as unenforceable. Thus, herein, complainants filed this administrative case against Atty. Venancio Reyes Jr. charging him with willful and intentional falsehood, in violation of his oath as a member of the Philippine bar. IBP investigating commissioner found him guilty of violation of his oath. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Venancio Reyes is administratively liable. Held: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as the parties representatives but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. In assailing the legality of the Compromise Agreement, he claims good faith. He maintains that he should not be faulted for raising an allegedly valid defense to protect his clients interests. The records show, however, that his actions bear hallmarks of dishonesty and doublespeak. Atty. Reyes is one of negotiating panel in the compromise agreement. He impressed upon the parties and the trial judge that his clients were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then, suddenly and conveniently, he repudiated it by falsely alleging that one of his clients had never signed it. True, lawyers are obliged to present every available remedy or defense to support the cause of their clients. However, their fidelity to their causes must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth and justice. In Choa v. Chiongson this principle was explained thus: While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law Thus, herein, Atty. Venancio Reyes, was ordered suspended for 1 year. JESUS M. FERRER vs. ATTY. JOSE ALLAN M. TEBELIN A.C. No. 6590. June 27, 2005 Facts: Ferrer obtained the services of Atty. Tebelin in a case against Global Link as a result of a vehicular accident through the falut of Global Links driver. Ferrer paid Atty. Tebelin P5, 000.00 as acceptance fee and gave him all pertinent documents. However, Ferrer filed an administrative case against Atty. Tebelin alleging that the said lawyer abandoned his case. However, Atty. Tebelin expressed his willingness to return the money and denied having abandoned the case. However, during the proceedings, herein Ferrer died. Atty. Tebelin was nowhere to be found in his given address. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tebellin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant. Held: The court held that Atty. Tebelin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant. The death of a complainant in an administrative case notwithstanding, the case may still proceed and be resolved. As in the case of Tudtud v. Colifores, the court ruled that The death of the complainant herein does not warrant the non-pursuance of the charges against respondent Judge. In administrative cases against public officers and employees, the complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses. Hence, the unilateral decision of a complainant to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his death, as in the case at bar, does not prevent the Court from imposing sanctions upon the parties subject to its administrative supervision. This Court also finds respondent, for ignoring the notices of hearing sent to him at his address which he himself furnished, or to notify the IBP-CBD his new address if indeed he had moved out of his given address. His actuation betrays his lack of courtesy, his irresponsibility as a lawyer. This Court faults respondent too for welting on his manifestation-undertaking to return the P5,000.00, not to mention the documents bearing on the case, to complainant or his heirs. Such is reflective of his reckless disregard of the duty imposed on him by Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retaining lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. Thus, the court suspended Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin from the practice of law for Two (2) Months and is ordered to return to complainants heirs the amount of P5, 000.00, with legal interest.

JUDGES; UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING JUDGMENT , A VIOLATION OF RULE 70 SECTION 11 OF THE RULES OF COURT DORCAS PETALLAR VS. JUDGE JAUNILLO PULLOS A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004 Facts: Complainant Dorcas Petallar averred that after the preliminary conference in a case for forcible entry, he, as plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to submit their respective position papers and evidence. Two months from the submission of their position papers, complainant personally went to the Court to verify the judgment had been rendered. He caused his lawyer to file a motion for rendition of judgment which was duly received by the court on August 6, 2001 but still no judgment was rendered on December 27, 2001 when the complaint was filed. Hence, complainant Petallar charged Judge Juanillo Pullos, former presiding judge of the MCTC of Surigao del Norte of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 & Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as Rule 140, Section 4 & Rule 70, Section 10 & 11 of the Rules of the Court for undue delay in rendering a decision in a case for forcibly entry. Issue: Whether or not respondent be held liable for undue delay in rendering judgment. Held: Respondent is guilty of undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the parties had filed their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000. thus, respondent had until March 4, 2000. Had there been circumstances which presented him from handling down his decision within the prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from the Court for an extension within which to render judgment. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decisions within the period fixed by law constitutes serious violation of Article III, section 16 of the Constitution. Judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. A judge cannot by himself prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Without any order of extension granted by the court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. COMPLAINTS FOR DISBARMENT; FORMAL INVESTIGATION MERCEDES NAVA VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN SORONGON AC No. 5442. January 26, 2004 Facts: Respondent Atty. Sorongon had been the counsel of complainant Mercedes Nava for years. The former informed her of his intention to withdraw as her counsel in two of her cases due to a stroke that paralyzed his right body but proposed to be retained in two other criminal cases with lesser paper works. He filed his withdrawal on December 4, 1996 and was granted by the court. Complainant alleged that while she continuously paid for the respondents services, the latter represented other clients with hostile interests and cases filed against her. Complainant cried that respondent assisted one Francisco Atas in filing a formal complaint for 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22 against her. She sent a letter to respondents expressing her disbelief and reminding him of his ethical and moral responsibility as a lawyer. Complainant prayed that an investigation be conducted regarding this unfortunate actuation and deplorable behavior as well as respondents double standard attitude. Thereafter, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a resolution suspending respondent from the practice of law for one year considering his clear violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interest. Issue: Whether or not a formal investigation is mandatory in complaints for disbarment. Held: In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement. The court may dispense with the normal referral to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines if the records are complete and the question raised is simple. Similarly, if no further, factual determination is necessary, the court may decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleading on record. Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it out rightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.

ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS VILLARIN AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004 Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and respondent Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against the latter and Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate of a child of the respondent and also stated that they were married in May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province. The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within 10 days but they failed to comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents unserved with notation moved, same as when served personally. Complainant was required anew to submit the correct, present address of respondents under pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint. She disclosed respondents address at 12403 Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten letter. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be disbarred. The Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin was returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the resolution requiring comment was never deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty. Alejandro. Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship with another woman are grounds for disbarment. Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. We can do no less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct. Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against Atty. Villarin was referred back to the IBP. VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO FILE BRIEF BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA VS. ATTY. BALMES OCAMPOS AM No. 4401. January 29, 2004 Facts: Complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged the services of respondent Atty. Balmes Ocampos in a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. An adverse decision was rendered against complainants. Atty. Ocampos filed a Notice of Appeal at their behest. The Court of Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but Atty. Ocampos was granted a 90-day extension. The extended period lapsed without an appellants brief being filed, hence their appeal was dismissed. The dismissal was not challenged, but complainants filed a complaint contending that respondent violated his duty to inform them of his failure to file appellants brief and of the dismissal of the appeal. Issue: Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the protection of the clients interests. Held: A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. By failing to file appellants brief, respondent was remiss in the discharge of such responsibility. He thus violated the Code of Professional which states: Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after attaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. That respondent accepted to represent complainants gratis et amore does not justify his failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty. Every case deserves full attention, diligence, and competence regardless of its importance and

whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a counsel of record is under obligation to protect the clients interest. If a party has a counsel of record, a court does not recognize any other representation in behalf thereof unless in collaboration with such counsel of record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he in fact filed a motion for extension of time to file brief, he was under obligation to discharge his professional responsibility.

S po u s e s O LB E S V S . At t y. V I C TO R V . D E CI E M B R E AC - 5 3 6 5. Ap r i l 27 , 2 005 Facts: Att y. V ictor V . Decie mbre wa s gi ven fi ve blank checks b y Spouses Olbes for securit y of a loan. Aft er the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Att y. De c ie mbre filled up four of the five chec ks for P 50, 000 with differ ent mat urit y date. All chec ks were dishonored. Thus, Att y. De cie m bre fled a c ase for esta fa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the s pouses Olbes to file a disbarment cas e against Att y. Deci e mbre with the Offic e of the Bar Con fidant of this Court. In the report, Commi ssioner Dula y reco mmended that respondent be suspended from the p ractice o f la w for t wo ye ars for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of P rofess ional Responsibility. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Att y. Deci e mbre wa s in accord with his fault. Held: Membe rship in the legal profe ssion is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only le arned in the law, but also kno wn to possess good moral chara cter. -bound servant of societ y whose conduct is clearl y circu ms c ribed by infle xible norms of la w and ethics, and whose primar y dut y is the adva nce ment of the quest for tr uth and justice, for which he ha guardian of truth and the rule of la w, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. La wyers should act and comport themselves w ith honest y and integrit y in a glaringl y clea r that the Code of P rofessional Responsibility wa s seriousl y trans gr essed b y his male volent act of filling up the blank checks b y indicating a mounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite His was a bra zen act o f fals ific ation of a co mmer cial document, resorted to for his materi al gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merel y unacc eptable practices that ar e disgrac e ful and dishonorable; they re veal a basic moral fl a w. The stan dards of the legal professio n are not satisfied b y conduct that mer el y enable s one to escape the penalties of cri minal la ws. Considering the depravit y of the offense co mmitted by r espondent, we find the penalt y reco mmended by the I BP of suspension for two years fro m the practic e of la w to be too mild. His propensity for e mplo ying d eceit and mi srepres entation is reprehensible. His mi suse of the filled -up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitel y fro m the practice of l a w e ffective immediatel y.

A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004] FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent. RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not? The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied: You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx. Thereafter, the respondent said: Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer! To this the complainant remarked: Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx. Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said: Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x. Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public. Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent. In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied: The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit: In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2. Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated: After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court. Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City. Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others. From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them. Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court. Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case. On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states: SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied) In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus: For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2] In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the exception.

We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5] Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus: This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x. Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7] On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9] WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court. SO ORDERED. PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Present: A.C. No. 7056

Complainants, PANGANIBAN, CJ, PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, - versus CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO -NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ Atty. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

Promulgated: Septiembre 13, 2006

x- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must uphold truth and justice above everything else, even above their own and their clients interests. They must be willing and able to stand for their convictions against all odds; to carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to be beacons for the weak, the oppressed and the marginalized. For failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent must be sanctioned.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment52[1] filed by Plus Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:

On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called [tenants/farmers] x x x.

On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.

*Tenants/farmers+ filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of DARAB cases abovementioned alleging under oath that they were MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN or mere tenants of

subject properties, acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. x x x.

On Dec*ember+ 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due course to the same x x x.

On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is representing TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were bona fide members of the *Kalayaan Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that they received the Decision on March 14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence x x x.

On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment (referring to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated November 15, 1999 x x x) with a prayer x x x to include the name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION representing the following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the] pleading. Also, a Contract of Retainership dated April 4, 2001 was attached to the Motion x x x to make x x x KDC represented by Respondent, *the+ retained x x x counsel on record x x x.

After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Willy Roxas). x x x.

On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, was issued on July 25, 2001 and an extension of or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued dated August 24, 2001, as a result of the active participation of Respondent x x x.

Emboldened by the two (2) TROs coming from DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed an Indirect Contempt case dated August 28, 2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of Directors, Edgardo Garcia and [its] counsel Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office. x x x.

Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further, that the DARAB Central Office refused to hear arguments from Petitioners on the two (2) questionable TROs, Petitioners decided to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on [December] 20, 2001 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, this Court sees no impediment for the IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial adjudicator.

SO ORDERED.

This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a Petition, but said Petition was dismissed with finality x x x.

Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified Action to Quiet Title before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and maliciously stop the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999. x x x.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law as [KDC] LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact, under the Retainership Contract submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite, it was specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be collected as counsel on record for the cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was effectively used [for] unlawful solicitation of clients in the practice of law with non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to become counsel on record *sic+ x x x.

On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO and dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata because the Court of Appeals ruled that, x x x the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become final x x x and that, prescription does not run against registered land. x x x.53[2]

In his Answer54[3] dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against him. He averred that by filing the action to quiet title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his clients. According to him, they sincerely and honestly believed that their possession of the litigated land had already ripened into ownership. He explained thus:

Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with *the+ previous owner in the decisions of PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB CASE NO. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402030-99; R-402-031-99) the said farmers, are not precluded, by any law or jurisprudence, from entertaining in good faith an opinion or belief that they could legally be considered as owners of the subject-property precisely because of the undisputed fact that they have been in possession thereof in an open, continuous, public, uninterrupted possession for more than fifty (50) years. x x x.

It was on the basis of *a+ sincere and honest belief and opinion o*f+ acquiring ownership of the land through prescription that the said farmers had decided to pursue and file the Action to Quiet Title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.

xxx

xxx

xxx

It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA*D+, Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in DARAB CASE No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99, [i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance compensations. They did not in any way, involve [the] question of ownership of the subject property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title), filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.

xxx

xxx

xxx

As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete discretion *of+ what legal strategy or cause of action to undertake on their behalf and the complainant and their counsel have no business or right to interfere with or dictate [upon] the respondent on how to protect the rights and interests of said farmers under the applicable law and jurisprudence.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before the Ombudsman), as a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his right, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be, especially if they are poor and uneducated like the said farmers.55[4]

In a Reply56[5] dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of the possession of the subject land by respondents clients had already been settled in the case for disturbance compensation. Complainants maintained that the PARAD Decision, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, clearly stated that these clients were mere tenants of the land. Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by respondent in good faith, especially when he had previously acknowledged the rights of complainants as landowners.

On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina, commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). During the hearing, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In his April 30, 2005 Report,57[6] Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.58[7] Allegedly, respondent had maliciously concealed the defeat

of his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts,59[8] in order to secure a temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision dated November 15, 1999.

Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful practice of law was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of respondent to do so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.

Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended by the investigating commissioner. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-172,60[9] the board of governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of IBP Commissioner Espina. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action,61[10] pursuant to Rule 139-B Section 12(b).

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,62[11] protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law.63[12] They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.64[13] Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.65[14]

Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession.66[15] Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath.67[16]

In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records show, however, that his course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision dated November 15, 1999.

It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a different forum to pursue his clients lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients as tenants and acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision.

Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of ownership of the land, he cannot feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients and complainants, as correctly observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.

The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his declaration that his clients were pauper litigants. His prayer for an exemption to pay court fees, on the ground that they did not have sufficient income,68[17] was granted by the trial court. Earlier, however, he admitted that they had engaged the services of his legal office for a fee of P20,000, in addition to P2,500 per appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he even alleged that they were willing to post a bond to answer for damages, in the event that the court ruled in favor of the defendants. These facts contravene his claim that his clients could not afford to pay the appropriate court fees.

In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law.

This obligation, however, must never be at the expense of truth and justice,69[18] as explained in Choa v. Chiongson:70[19]

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.71[20]

Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to challenge the

allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an admission of the truth of the accusation. We note that complainants successfully substantiated their claim that respondent, who held himself out as a law partner of the KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates, was rendering legal services together with persons not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it.72[21]

Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,73[22] which we quote:

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.74[23]

Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. In line with jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law. 75[24]

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID76[1] TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC

Present:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,

BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO and ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008.77[2] The resolution requested the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid78[3] (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 provided:

RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008 RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE COURTS AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER AND PROSECUTORS OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID

CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL. WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as []Guideline[s] on Legal Aid[]) provides: Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may often lead to injustice, for which reason, it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly all legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum possible assistance to indigent and deserving members of the community in all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestall injustice. WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In order to attain the objectives of legal aid, legal aid office should be as close as possible to those who are in need thereof the masses. Hence, every chapter of the IBP must establish and operate an adequate legal aid office. WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter has long been operational, providing free legal services to numerous indigent clients, through the chapters members who render volunteer services in the spirit of public service; WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various mediation centers and prosecutors offices are collecting fees, be they filing, docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be they original proceedings or on appeal; WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same indigency and merit tests used by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other than indigency, are disqualified from availing of the services of the PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting defenses, and other similar causes; WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt from the payment of docket and other fees for cases, be they original proceedings or on appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Section 16D of R.A. 9406 (PAO Law), without the need for the filing of any petition or motion to declare them as pauper litigants; WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the same benefits or privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of docket and other fees before the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices; WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other fees from the IBP Legal Aid clients poses an additional strain to their next to non-existent finances; WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the National Legal Aid Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental Chapter is insufficient to even cover the incidental expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less answer for the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices and mediation fees collected by the Philippine Mediation Center; NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of Officers of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to move the IBP National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary requests or representations with the Supreme Court, the Philippine Mediation Center, the Department of Justice and the National Prosecution Service and other quasi-judicial agencies to effect the grant of a like exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees to the IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients, towards the end that IBP Legal Aid clients be automatically exempted from the filing of the abovementioned fees; RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be furnished to Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno, IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors, Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, the National Supervisor of the Philippine Mediation Center, the National Labor Relations Commission, the Civil Service Commission and other quasi-judicial bodies and their local offices; RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and National Officers to make the necessary representations with the National Legislature and its members to effect the filing of a bill before the House of Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment

of docket, filing and or other fees in cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and prosecutors offices and the mediation centers. Done this 23rd day of September 2008, Cagayan De Oro City. Unanimously approved upon motion severally seconded.79[4]

The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the IBP, through the NCLA, to comment thereon.80[5]

In a comment dated December 18, 2008,81[6] the IBP, through the NCLA, made the following comments:

(a)

Under Section 16-D of RA82[7] 9406, clients of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to the institution of action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, clients of legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters do not enjoy the same exemption. IBPs indigent clients are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court;

(b)

They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, i.e., certifications from the barangay and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. However, not only does the process involve some expense which indigent clients could ill-afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about the tedious process of obtaining these documents;

(c)

Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives from the government is barely enough to cover various operating expenses;83[8]

(d)

While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from the legal aid subsidy),84[9] said allocation covers neither the incidental expenses defrayed by legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases nor the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and the prosecutors office, as well as mediation fees and

(e)

Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be issued by the Supreme Court granting IBPs indigent clients an exemption from the payment of docket and other fees similar to that given to PAO clients under Section 16-D of RA 9406. In this connection, the Supreme Court previously issued a circular exempting IBP clients from the payment of transcript of stenographic notes.85[10]

At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the administration of justice, particularly, the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration of justice.86[11]

We now move on to determine the merits of the request.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING AN IDEAL A REALITY

Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. As such, it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.87[12] (emphasis supplied)

The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our society.88[13] Among others, it has exercised its power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights89[14] to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged and to allow them

to step inside the courts to be heard of their plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are permitted under Section 21, Rule 390[15] and Section 19, Rule 14191[16] of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis.

The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to improve the administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively,92[17] assists the Court in providing the poor access to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under the supervision of the NCLA.

A NEW RULE, A NEW TOOL FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Under the IBPs Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the combined means and merit tests shall be used to determine the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid:

ARTICLE VIII TESTS SEC. 19. Combined tests. The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the [NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass upon the request for legal aid by the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the consideration of other factors adverted to in the following sections. SEC. 20. Means test. The means test aims at determining whether the applicant has no visible means of support or his income is otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources necessary to

engage competent private counsel owing to the demands for subsistence of his family, considering the number of his dependents and the conditions prevailing in the locality. The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas Filipino Workers, fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged groups. SEC. 21. Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not the applicants cause of action or his defense is valid and chances of establishing the same appear reasonable. SEC. 22. Other factors. The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the failure to render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in given cases and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered. SEC. 23. Private practice. Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is not availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law, or taken advantage of by anyone for personal ends. SEC. 24. Denial. Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already receiving adequate assistance from any source other than the Integrated Bar.

The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients:

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) ARTICLE I Purpose Section 1. Purpose. This Rule is issued for the purpose of enforcing the right of free access to courts by the poor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution. It is intended to increase the access to justice by the poor by exempting from the payment of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal, qualified indigent clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters nationwide. ARTICLE II Definition of Terms

Section 1. Definition of important terms. For purposes of this Rule and as used herein, the following terms shall be understood to be how they are defined under this Section: (a) Developmental legal aid means the rendition of legal services in public interest causes involving overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged groups and marginalized sectors; Disinterested person refers to the punong barangay having jurisdiction over the place where an applicant for legal aid or client of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office resides; Falsity refers to any material misrepresentation of fact or any fraudulent, deceitful, false, wrong or misleading statement in the application or affidavits submitted to support it or the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be submitted annually under this Rule which may substantially affect the determination of the qualifications of the applicant or the client under the means and merit tests; Legal fees refers to the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as a necessary incident of instituting an action in court either as an original proceeding or on appeal. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees, stenographers fees (that is fees for transcript of stenographic notes) and commissioners fees; Means test refers to the set of criteria used to determine whether the applicant is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family; Merit test refers to the ascertainment of whether the applicants cause of action or his defense is valid and whether the chances of establishing the same appear reasonable and Representative refers to the person authorized to file an application for legal aid in behalf of the applicant when the said applicant is prevented by a compelling reason from personally filing his application. As a rule, it refers to the immediate family members of the applicant. However, it may include any of the applicants relatives or any person or concerned citizen of sufficient discretion who has first-hand knowledge of the personal circumstances of the applicant as well as of the facts of the applicants case. ARTICLE III Coverage Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from payment of legal fees. Persons who shall enjoy the benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal, granted under this Rule shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified to receive free legal aid service from the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall be determined based on the tests provided in this Rule. Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. The following shall be disqualified from the coverage of this Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. (a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by developmental legal aid or public interest causes involving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit organizations, nongovernmental organizations and peoples organizations whose individual members will pass the means test provided in this Rule; Persons who do not pass the means and merit tests; Parties already represented by a counsel de parte;

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(b) (c)

(d)

Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings with respect to the filing of collection or unlawful detainer suits against their tenants and Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office previously in a case where the NCLA or chapter legal aid office withdrew its representation because of a falsity in the application or in any of the affidavits supporting the said application.

(e)

Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. The NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the following: (a) Cases where conflicting interests will be represented chapter legal aid offices and Prosecution of criminal cases in court. ARTICLE IV Tests of Indigency Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters. The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee, as the case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by the combined application of the means and merit tests and the consideration of other relevant factors provided for in the following sections. Section 2. Means test; exception. (a) This test shall be based on the following criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his immediate family must have a gross monthly income that does not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos. In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency (printed at the back of the application form) stating that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicants affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the applicants affidavit. (b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the developmental legal aid program such as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged groups. Section 3. Merit test. A case shall be considered meritorious if an assessment of the law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal service will be in aid of justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into consideration the interests of the party and those of society. A case fails this test if, after consideration of the law and evidence presented by the applicant, it appears that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. The effect of legal aid or of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law, the proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in a given case and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered. ARTICLE V Acceptance and Handling of Cases Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. The following procedure shall be observed in the acceptance of cases for purposes of this Rule: (a) Filing of application An application shall be made personally by the applicant, unless there is a compelling reason which prevents him from doing so, in which case his representative may apply for him. It shall adhere substantially to the form made for that purpose. It shall be prepared and signed by the applicant or, in proper cases, his duly authorized representative in at least three copies. by the NCLA and the

(b)

Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or with the chapter legal aid committee. The NCLA shall, as much as possible, concentrate on cases of paramount importance or national impact. Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be referred by the NCLA to the proper chapter legal aid committee of the locality where the cases have to be filed or are pending. The chapter president and the chairman of the chapters legal aid committee shall be advised of such referral. (b) Interview The applicant shall be interviewed by a member of the chapter legal aid committee or any chapter member authorized by the chapter legal aid committee to determine the applicants qualifications based on the means and merit tests and other relevant factors. He shall also be required to submit copies of his latest income tax returns and/or current tax declaration, if available, and execute an affidavit of indigency printed at the back of the application form with the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicants affidavit. After the interview, the applicant shall be informed that he can follow up the action on his application after five (5) working days. (c) Action on the application The chapter legal aid committee shall pass upon every request for legal aid and submit its recommendation to the chapter board of officers within three (3) working days after the interview of the applicant. The basis of the recommendation shall be stated. The chapter board of officers shall review and act on the recommendation of the chapter legal aid committee within two (2) working days from receipt thereof; Provided, however, that in urgent matters requiring prompt or immediate action, the chapters executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may provisionally act on the application, subject to review by the chapter legal aid committee and, thereafter, by the chapter board of officers. The action of the chapter board of officers on the application shall be final. (d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted. In the following cases, the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office, through the chapters executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may accept cases provisionally pending verification of the applicants indigency and an evaluation of the merit of his case. (i) (ii) Where a warrant for the arrest of the applicant has been issued; Where a pleading has to be filed immediately to avoid adverse effects to the applicant; Where an appeal has to be urgently perfected or a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed has to be filed immediately; and Other similar urgent cases.

(iii)

(iv) (e)

Assignment of control number Upon approval of the chapter board of officers of a persons application and the applicant is found to be qualified for legal assistance, the case shall be assigned a control number. The numbering shall be consecutive starting from January to December of every year. The control number shall also indicate the region and the chapter handling the case. Example: Region93[18]

Chapter

Year

Month

Number

GM (f)

Manila -

2009

03

099

Issuance of a certification After an application is approved and a control number duly assigned, the chapter board of officers shall issue a certification that the person (that is, the successful applicant) is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office. The certification shall bear the control number of the case and shall state the name of the client and the nature of the judicial action subject of the legal aid of the NCLA or the legal aid office of a local IBP chapter. The certification shall be issued to the successful applicant free of charge.

Section 2. Assignment of cases. After a case is given a control number, the chapter board of officers shall refer it back to the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter legal aid committee shall assign the case to any chapter member who is willing to handle the case. In case no chapter member has signified an intention to handle the case voluntarily, the chapter legal aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapter board of officers together with the names of at least three members who, in the chapter legal aid committees discretion, may competently render legal aid on the matter. The chapter board of officers shall appoint one chapter member from among the list of names submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter member chosen may not refuse the appointment except on the ground of conflict of interest or other equally compelling grounds as provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility,94[19] in which case the chapter board of officers shall appoint his replacement from among the remaining names in the list previously submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter legal aid committee and the chapter board of officers shall take the necessary measures to ensure that cases are well-distributed to chapter members. Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance and handling of cases. The following policies and guidelines shall be observed in the acceptance and handling of cases: (a) First come, first served Where both the complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and defendant/ respondent apply for legal aid and both are qualified, the first to seek assistance shall be given preference. Avoidance of conflict of interest Where acceptance of a case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter legal aid office, the applicant shall be duly informed and advised to seek the services of a private counsel or another legal aid organization. Where handling of the case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter member assigned to the case, the client shall be duly informed and advised about it. The handling lawyer shall also inform the chapter legal aid committee so that another chapter member may be assigned to handle the case. For purposes of choosing the substitute handling lawyer, the rule in the immediately preceding section shall be observed. (c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary No member of the chapter or member of the staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office shall directly or indirectly demand or request from an applicant or client any compensation, gift or present for legal aid services being applied for or rendered. Same standard of conduct and equal treatment A chapter member who is tasked to handle a case accepted by the NCLA or by the chapter legal aid office shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients. He shall treat the

(b)

(d)

client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the said clients case in a manner that is equal and similar to his treatment of a paying client and his case. (e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits Any falsity in the application or in the affidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of a disinterested person shall be sufficient cause for the NCLA or chapter legal aid office to withdraw or terminate the legal aid. For this purpose, the chapter board of officers shall authorize the handling lawyer to file the proper manifestation of withdrawal of appearance of the chapter legal aid office in the case with a motion for the dismissal of the complaint or action of the erring client. The court, after hearing, shall approve the withdrawal of appearance and grant the motion, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring client from availing of the benefits of this Rule in the future. (f) Statement in the initiatory pleading To avail of the benefits of the Rule, the initiatory pleading shall state as an essential preliminary allegation that (i) the party initiating the action is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and therefore entitled to exemption from the payment of legal fees under this Rule and (ii) a certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article is attached or annexed to the pleading. Failure to make the statement shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling. The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an appeal. (g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading A certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article shall be attached as an annex to the initiatory pleading. Failure to attach a certified true copy of the said certification shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling. The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an appeal. (h) Signing of pleadings All complaints, petitions, answers, replies, memoranda and other important pleadings or motions to be filed in courts shall be signed by the handling lawyer and co-signed by the chairperson or a member of the chapter legal aid committee, or in urgent cases, by the executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions. Ordinary motions such as motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing and manifestations may be signed by the handling lawyer alone. (i) Motions for extension of time or for postponement The filing of motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing shall be avoided as much as possible as they cause delay to the case and prolong the proceedings. Transfer of cases Transfer of cases from one handling lawyer to another shall be affected only upon approval of the chapter legal aid committee.

(j)

Section 4. Decision to appeal. (a) All appeals must be made on the request of the client himself. For this purpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request to appeal. (b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If the handling lawyer, in consultation with the chapter legal aid committee, finds that there is no merit to the appeal, the client should be immediately informed thereof in writing and the record of the case turned over to him, under proper receipt. If the client

insists on appealing the case, the lawyer handling the case should perfect the appeal before turning over the records of the case to him. Section 5. Protection of private practice. Utmost care shall be taken to ensure that legal aid is neither availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law nor taken advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.

ARTICLE VI Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of Exemption Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee may, in justifiable instances as provided in the next Section, direct the handling lawyer to withdraw representation of a clients cause upon approval of the IBP Board of Governors (in the case of the NCLA) or of the chapter board of officers (in the case of the chapter legal aid committee) and through a proper motion filed in Court. Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. Withdrawal may be warranted in the following situations: (a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted, where it is subsequently ascertained that the client is not qualified for legal aid; Where the clients income or resources improve and he no longer qualifies for continued assistance based on the means test. For this purpose, on or before January 15 every year, the client shall submit an affidavit of a disinterested person stating that the client and his immediate family do not earn a gross income mentioned in Section 2, Article V, nor own any real property with the fair market value mentioned in the same Section; When it is shown or found that the client committed a falsity in the application or in the affidavits submitted to support the application; When the client subsequently engages a de parte counsel or is provided with a de oficio counsel; When, despite proper advice from the handling lawyer, the client cannot be refrained from doing things which the lawyer himself ought not do under the ethics of the legal profession, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, witnesses and litigants, or the client insists on having control of the trial, theory of the case, or strategy in procedure which would tend to result in incalculable harm to the interests of the client; When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the client does not cooperate or coordinate with the handling lawyer to the prejudice of the proper and effective rendition of legal aid such as when the client fails to provide documents necessary to support his case or unreasonably fails to attend hearings when his presence thereat is required; and When it becomes apparent that the representation of the clients cause will result in a representation of conflicting interests, as where the adverse party had previously engaged the services of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the subject matter of the litigation is directly related to the services previously rendered to the adverse party.

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. The court, after hearing, shall allow the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office to withdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for such withdrawal exists. Except when the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the immediately preceding Section, the court shall also order the dismissal of the case. Such dismissal is without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred if the withdrawal is based on paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding Section. ARTICLE VII Miscellaneous Provisions

Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the client was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. In case, attorneys fees have been awarded to the client, the same shall belong to the NCLA or to the chapter legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as the case may be. It shall form part of a special fund which shall be exclusively used to support the legal aid program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In this connection, the chapter board of officers shall report the receipt of attorneys fees pursuant to this Section to the NCLA within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on attorneys fees received by IBP chapters pursuant to this Section in its liquidation report for the annual subsidy for legal aid. Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. The NCLA shall prepare the standard forms to be used in connection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shall prepare the following standard forms: the application form, the affidavit of indigency, the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person, the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be submitted annually under Section 2(b), Article VI, the certification issued by the NCLA or the chapter board of officers under Section 1(f), Article V and the request to appeal. The said forms, except the certification, shall be in Filipino. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall make translations of the said forms in the dominant dialect used in their respective localities. Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma pauperis. Nothing in this Rule shall be considered to preclude those persons not covered either by this Rule or by the exemption from the payment of legal fees granted to clients of the Public Attorneys Office under Section 16-D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma pauperis under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. Legal aid service rendered by a lawyer under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV hereof shall be credited for purposes of compliance with the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall issue the certificate similar to that issued by the Clerk of Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. ARTICLE VIII Effectivity Section 1. Effectivity. This Rule shall become effective after fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service and the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, shall form a solid base of rules upon which the right of access to courts by the poor shall be implemented. With these rules, we equip the poor with the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily enforce their rights in the judicial system.

A FINAL WORD

Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.

The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.

WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this resolution.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 1370

May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2 On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues. In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyermember in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside. Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 19862003? We rule in the negative. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5 The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.7 Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration. The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus: For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction. The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues. Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP. Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise: . . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

8. VIOLETA R. TAHAW, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS P. VITAN, respondent. A.C. No. 6441. October 21, 2004 Facts: Victoria Tahaw (Tahaw), the complainant, secured the services of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan (Vitan) for filing appropriate action for a partition of a real property located in Makati City delivering to respondent 4 checks amounting to P30,000.00. Upon verification to check if a case has been filed for and in her behalf, she was issued a certification by the Clerk of Court in Makati that no such case was filed prompting Tahaw to write the respondent informing him that she was terminating his services as counsel and demanded the refund of the P30,000.00 to which Vitan failed to return prompting to file a complaint of disbarment or suspension with IBP. Issue: Whether or not the non filing of a case constitute a remiss in the lawyers responsibilities which can be penalized by disbarment or suspension with the IBP. Held: The Court agreed with the recommendation of the IBP that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities. He is found guilty of violation of Canons 7 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to file the necessary pleading for his clients case and for the failure to return and immediately deliver the funds of his client advanced for the purpose of filing the said case, upon demand, and even after his commitment with the IBP to do so. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. The trust and confidence of clients require in a lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. Nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. The respondent was suspended for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 9. REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.

PER CURIAM A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998 Facts: Remedios Tapucar (RTapucar), complainant and Atty. Lauro Tapucar (LTapucar) were married with 11 children. When respondent became a CFI judge, he cohabited with Elena Pea with whom he had 2 children. A certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted upon the respondent. Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, the Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. However, the order of dismissal as a judge did not even propel RTapucar to change his ways, and even continued living with Elena which resulted to abandonment of complainant and his children. Respondent later contracted marriage with Elena while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsisted which resulted to the alleged suffering of her children because of their fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Complainant filed the petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Issue: Whether or not the actions of the respondent constitute grounds for disbarment. Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Members of the Bar, must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning

and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is disbarred and his name is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. 10. ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent. A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003 Facts: Atty. Ismael Khan, Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office filed a case for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services against Rizalino T. Simbillo who advertised himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist which appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed that similar advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6, 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5, 2000. Simbillos advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court. After he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper and in the October 5, 2001 Issue: Whether or not Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. Held: Atty. Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, suspended from the practice of Law for one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration; Rule 2.03 A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01 A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,

undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. The following elements distinguish legal profession from business: 1. A duty of public service 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage encouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. 11. Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009 Facts: Pedro Linsangan (Linsangan) of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office filed a complaint of disbarment against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino (Tolentino) for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services alleging that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to said respondent with the promise of financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano convinced him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and use respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not, Tolentinos actions constitute disbarment. Held: The court adopted the findings of the IBP on unethical conduct of the respondent whereby it found the respondent to have encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provide; Rule 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: Rule 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE. This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. Based on such, Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is found to have violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, of the CPR and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. 12. Dominador Burbe, complainant, vs Atty. Alberto C. Magulta AC No. 99-634 Facts: Dominador P. Burbe (Burbe) filed a complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta (Magulta). Burbe engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Consequent to the agreement, respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful to which Magulta intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts (P 25,000.00) for the filing of the case. After a couple of months, the petitioner did not receive any feedback as to the status of his case which prompted him to make several follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case had already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutors office while the lawyer

allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. Doubting the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to verify the progress of the case only to find out that no such case had been filed. Petitioner confronted Magulta where he continued to lie with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioners feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Magultas actions should be meted out with suspension, disbarment or any disciplinary action. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the findings and decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: with complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent on the part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. 13. Roberto Soriano vs Atty. Manuel Dizon A. C. No. 6792 Facts: Roberto Soriano filed a complaint affidavit for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide constitute moral turpitude and should result in his disbarment. Issue: 1. Whether or not Atty. Dizon violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities. 2. Whether or not his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude which warrants

disbarment. Held: On the first issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP that the respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1of the Code of Profes sional Re sponsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to fulfill his civil liabilities. He has brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts and has also shown through this actions that he is wanting in even a ba sic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended hi s sentence and gr ant ed him probation. It has been four years already since he was ordered to settle his civil liabiliti es to compl ainant and yet, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill his civil obligations. Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Thus, on the second issue, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of selfimportance. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which is definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. The appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar. Thus, the decision to order the disbarment of Atty. Dizon and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys. 14. HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, Complainant, vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, Respondent A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979. Facts: Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City

Judges. Issue: Whether or not respondents acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service. Held: In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated that I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record. This claim is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action. That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the respondent admits having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established in the practice of law. The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others as reflected in his letter to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City which contains defamatory and uncalled for language.es virtual law library The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations.

Pepsi Cola vs Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 518 (1998) Facts: The case is a petition for review and certiorari by the petitioner upon the denial by the lower and appellate court on their motion for reconsideration for the postponement of the hearing due to unavailability of their witnesses and for declaring that the petitioner waived its right to present evidence in support to its defense. The case began from the civil action filed by private respondents who won from the Pepsi Number Fever Promotion" sponsored by petitioner Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., wherein numerous holders of the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored and paid by

petitioner due to an alleged mistake in the security codes in the crowns. While the private respondents are finished presenting their evidence, the petitioner continues to file a motion for postponement due to unavailability of witnesses. The schedule for presentation of evidence began on May 28, 1993 and with frequent postponement, the court issued a warning to the petitioners counsel that the scheduled hearing on January 20, 1995 shall be intransferrable in character. Notwithstanding said warning, petitioner moved for postponement again which motion was denied by the court for unreasonable delay on the case. The court of appeals affirmed the said decision hence this petition for certiorari ISSUE: WON the court erred in denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. RULING: The court held that the petitioner was given ample time to prepare for their witnesses causing the trial to take up to 2 years due to their motion for postponement and reminded the counsel of the petitioner that they have the duty to give proper administration of justice without any delay and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Yumol vs Atty. Ferrer, Sr. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005

Facts: The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human Rights, files a disbarment case against respondent, Attorney IV said commission on ground for grave misconduct. The respondent was found to have issued 2 orders awarding custody of a child to a complainant in the Commission, ordered a bank to reinstate the bank account of the said complainant, engaging in private practice, notarizing public documents, and attending court hearings while filling up his DTR at the Commission as present at the same time. The case was referred to the IBP and the investigating commissioner recommended suspension for 2 years which was modified by the IBP Board to 6 months. ISSUE: WON respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following alleged acts: 1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government employee; 2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records; 3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and 4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for engaging in private practice. RULING: The court held on the following: 1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to some conditions with indispensable requirement to secure approval from the CHR. In the absence of such approval, the respondent is not allowed in private practice and proved to have falsified his attendance in the DTR while appearing in court at the same time without approved leave of absence. 2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR authorized his practice as a notary public.

3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is merely to investigate all forms of human rights violation. They cannot try and decide cases. With the above constituting grounds for suspension of lawyers stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the court ruled to modify the suspension of 1 year as sufficient sanction.

Cruz v Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737 October 25, 2004

Facts: The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended suspension of respondent in the practice of law for 3 months which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit. ISSUE: WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct. RULING: The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to such a magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby dismissed the case due to lack of merit. Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000 FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate. I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar. R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally

upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.

In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975

FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the 1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained in all subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation also revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his application to take the bar examination. ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the examination result of a bar candidate. RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in his application for the bar exam while under oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties with due care.

Tapucar vs Tapucar A.C. No. 4148 FACTS: Disbarment was filed against Atty. Lauro Tapucar by his wife on grounds for gross immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances. Prior to the disbarment case, an administrative case was filed against Atty. Tapucar in connection with his cohabitation in which he was penalized with 6 months suspension without pay. He continued the illicit affair that gave rise to another charge against him on grounds for conduct unbecoming for a court officer and gross immoral conduct which caused his dismissal and separation from the service as a judge. He continued his cohabitation that born 2 children and he eventually marry the paramour in the subsistence of his previous marriage and completely abandoned his real family. The wife migrated in the States but was receiving complaints from their children left in the Philippines who are humiliated with said act of Atty, Tapucar. This caused the wife to institute a disbarment case to shield their daughter with her daughter-lawyer representing her case. The IBP commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Tapucar. RULING: The court held that it is a settled rule that good moral character is a precedent condition for admission in the legal profession and must be remain intact to maintain ones good standing as member in the Bar. The facts showed that despite previous sanction to Atty. Tapucar, he continued his illicit affair and he even showed arrogance in the face of charges against him in the presence of the IBP commission. Thus, he was disbarred and his name was stricken out from the rolls of attorneys.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995 FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated. ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office. RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who

have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan. Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999. Facts: Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and a father of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam subject upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age of 35 years old. There was a question regarding his citizenship therefore he was not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar. ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his citizenship. RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect his Phil. Citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for being a Chinese citizen.

Tan vs Sabandal B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992 Facts: Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to finally take oath and practice the law profession after considering his plea for forgiveness and showing willingness to reform along with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which is a testimonial by the IBP Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its President, a counsel for the in-laws of Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members. The court allowed the IBP to manifest testimony to certify as to the good moral character of the respondent and asked for a comment from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested that they see no impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the RTC Judge informed the court of the civil case against the respondent concerning the mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a free patent. The civil case however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged of any crime. Subsequently, Tan already forgave the respondent and withdrew her opposition for the taking of oath of office of the respondent while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide. ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office

RULING: The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed the civil case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together with the testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending case against him. The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent. Although there were testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without any knowledge of the case against him. The commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty. With the practice of law a matter of privilege and not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member of the law profession therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the respondent to take oath.

In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillion A.M. 192 August 3, 1978 FACTS: The IBP adopted a resolution on Admin case against Atty. Edillion on matter involving his membership due delinquency, recommending striking his name from the rolls of attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues. Atty. Edillion contends that the Rules of Court 139-A and the IBP bylaws are unconstitutional and thereby questioning the power of the court to compel him to become an IBP member as well as the provision of the Rules of Court requiring payment for membership fee of the IBP. ISSUE: WON the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP. RULING: Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Re: Application of A.M. Hernandez July 27, 1993 FACTS: Hernandez is a Filipino citizen who have a degree of Juris Doctor from Columbia Law School in New York and passed the bar examinations in the same City in 1990. He is currently taking bar subjects in Ateneo Law School and taking a 5 month bar review course there. He now asks the court to allow him to take the bar exam in the Phils. ISSUE: WON the S.C. may allow him to take the bar exam in the Phils. RULING: Yes, he may be allowed to take the bar because there were some instances in the past where a Filipino studied law in a foreign law school and were allowed to take the bar in the Philippines. However,

the court held this time that in the following year, applicants for the Bar must study in a local law school in the Phils. And must present certifications required by Section 5 and 6 of Rule 138 to be able to take the bar. Such certification however is not issued to foreign law school graduates therefore anyone who wants to take the bar in the country should study in any of the law schools in the Phils. to be able to take the bar exam.

In re: Amparo 65 SCRA 120 (1974) FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a piece of paper during the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the paper until the head watcher threatened to report him to the authorities. The paper contains the list of duration of penalties and formula computing them, which Amparo justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out of his pocket as he tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an investigation ensued. ISSUE: WON Amparo is guilty for his actions. RULING: Yes. He violated Rule 133, section 10 prohibiting examinees from bringing papers, books, or notes into the examination room. Amparo committed an overt act indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading notes. The report of the bar showed that he did not passed the bar thus the court ordered he will not be allowed to re-take the bar the following year. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law. ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual membership. RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is denied.

Santos Jr. v Llamas A.C. No. 4749 1.20.00 FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP membership dues. For years, the respondent does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law profession. Now of old age, he contends that he is engaged in the limited practice of his profession and as a senior citizen, he is exempt from paying taxes and membership dues with the IBP. ISSUE: WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen. RULING: No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP members to pay the annual fee and failure thereof for 6 months merits suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for removal of the members name from the Rolls of Attorney regardless one is a practicing lawyer or not. His non-renewal of his PTR is a misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Diao v Martinez 7 SCRA 745 3.29.63

FACTS: 2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on false representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite academic qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and recommended to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education. I: WON Diao may continue to practice the law profession. RULING: The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he had acquired a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take the bar exam. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from the Rolls of Attorneys. Vda. De Mijares v Justice Villaluz A.C. No. 4431 6.19.97 FACTS: Complainant files a disbarment case against the respondent on grounds of bigamy after contracting a marriage with another woman several months after their marriage. Respondent contends theirs was a sham marriage in an effort to protect the complainant from the administrative case on

immorality to be charged against her by her legal researcher and that during their marriage his marriage with his first wife was subsisting since the declaration of its annulment was not yet final and executory pending publication of the decision. The administrative case was referred to Associate Justice Purisima of CA for investigation who recommended suspension of the respondent for 2 years with a warning that similar future misconduct shall be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: WON respondent be disbarred. RULING: Yes. The mere admission of the respondent of contracting the marriage with the complainant while knowingly his first marriage subsists and then married another woman after said marriage with complainant is a gross misconduct. His claim that he married complainant to protect her from the administrative charge against her is unfounded since one cannot correct a wrong by doing another wrongful act. Finding the respondent morally unfit in the practice of the law profession, the court upheld the recommendation of Justice Purisima.