Bourdieu and Social Order: Habitus as an Alternative to the State

a paper by Suzie Wagner

for

Dr. Lisa Brush Post-Classical Sociological Theory

Fall 2011

University of Pittsburgh Department of Sociology

Introduction In the field of Political Science, and more specifically, International Studies, knowledge about society focuses on the state actor as the essential producer of social order. That focus manifests itself in a variety of sub-fields in that discipline. Most specifically, the field of post-conflict peacebuilding centers its epistemology, methodology, and subsequently, its praxis, on the notion of the state. But by focusing so exclusively on the state, that discipline fails to examine even the possibility that social order instead can beand arguably isproduced not by the state but by subjects in interaction with one another. In Sociology, Pierre Bourdieu sets out to ask and answer the question: how is practical mastery of social interaction produced and how can knowledge about those practices be produced in an accurate way? In answering this question, Bourdieu also addresses the problem of how orderly societal life is possible in the absence of a state actor. By arguing for social scientists to focus on the principle that produces the order observed, Bourdieu establishes two essential points: first, that such order exists; and second, that it can be theorized and examined in a way that avoids the pitfalls of both symbolic interactionist approaches and structuralist approaches to understanding societies. In this paper, I describe how Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory of Practice can be applied to the question of social order. First, I identify and define a selection of concepts useful for understanding social order. Applying the definition of each concept to the phenomenon of social order, I generate a series of hypotheses to guide empirical inquiry during field research. In the following section, I briefly describe three narrative accounts as to how these concepts might interact one with the others to produce social order. In the final section, I briefly suggest some implications of this approach to understanding social order. Selection of Concepts Habitus Bourdieu's habitus is a set of dispositions that influence, but do not determine, the behavior of subjects who inhabit a given habitus. For Bourdieu, the practice is more than, and different from, a set of rules that governs interactions (p. 17). The habitus is a "strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations" (p. 72), "a system of schemes of perception and thought" (p. 18). The habitus is comprised of objective, motivating, and cognitive structures, each of which produce and are produced by the principles the habitus generates in a dialectic relationship. Habitus is experienced at the individual, subjective level, but it is not an individual system (p. 86). Most generally, the habitus "causes an individual agent's practices, without either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be none the less 'sensible' and 'reasonable'" (p. 79). Habitus also "enables agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations" (p. 72). When the habitus remains mostly concealed from the individual it possesses, the habitus produces the behavior that appears as a phenomenon to be studied (for example, the gift exchange) (p. 18). The habitus also makes possible regularities in practice through interaction with the structured and structuring structures (see below): The habitus, the durably generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus. (p. 78) The habitus also establishes a common understanding: "in imposing different definitions
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of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, [habitus] cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and vice versa" (p. 78). Importantly, the habitus works at a below-conscious level: it "cannot give what it does give to be thought and perceived without ipso facto producing an unthinkable and an unnameable" (p. 18).1 The dispositions that comprise the habitus act as schemes that can be transferred easily to novel situations: a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, function at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems, and thanks to the unceasing corrections of the results obtained, dialectically produced by those results. (pp. 81 82) The habitus produces principles, but itself partially is a product of structures and dispositions. The "habitus is produced by different modes of generation, by conditions of existence" (p. 78), and is in part determined not by the intended consequences of the actor behaving, but rather is produced by the history of the practices and structures that have generated the principle of the habitus (p. 72). Summary of habitus Habitus is a "product of history," it "produces individual and collective practices," is a "system of dispositions," is the principle that gives behavior in a group continuity and regularity without relegating that regularity to a rule, and it explains irregularities in social practices (p. 82). To sum, [a]s an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others. This paradoxical product is difficult to conceive, even inconceivable, only so long as one remains locked in the dilemma of determinism and freedom, conditioning and creativity. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95) The habitus contributes to a sense of social order because it ensures some regularity in social practice. It enables individuals to make correct assumptions about the sensibility that motivates others' behaviors, at the same time that it makes an individual's behavior sensible to others. In contrast, theories relying upon the state to explain social order suggest that the state's threat of violence to the individual person motivates individuals to behave correctly. Bourdieu replaces the external authority of the state (threat of violence to the person) with internal (cognitive and motivating) and external (objective) structures (see below). In this way, social order is produced by the habitus, which is only partly structured by the state in some circumstances, but not necessarily so. That is to say, social order can be explained not by the state's authority, but merely by the structures of the habitus (which may or may not include the state). The social scientist, therefore, can generate hypotheses about habitus and social order: - when a single habitus possesses more individuals more deeply in a social circumstance, more social order is likely; and
This quote in particular recalls the one-dimensionality theorized by Marcuse. The habitus and other concepts described below (misrecognition, e.g.) at a glance seem theoretically consistent with The One-Dimensional Man.
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- when fewer habitus possess the individuals in a social circumstance (greater synchronization of habitus), more social order is likely. Structures Bourdieu describes structures as the durably permanent institutions and objects (material, cultural, and symbolic) that both give structure to the set of principles generated by the habitus at the same time that they are given structure by the set of principles that are generated by the habitus. Structures both actively produce the habitus and are produced by the product of the habitus, in a dialectic relationship. Thus, the structures help to produce the dispositions that comprise the habitus. For Bourdieu, understanding the dialectical nature of the structures is imperative: without that nature, the agency of the subject would be reduced to nothinga mere product of historical determinism (pp. 21, 84). Structures "work" by disposing individuals to certain behaviors through structured structures. Objective structures, e.g. the Kabylia house, structure the cognitive and motivating structures. All together, these three types of structures generate a principled set of dispositions that comprise the habitus. In order to "work," the structures must be embodied (see below): "Every confrontation between agents in fact brings togethersystems of dispositions and, through these habitus, all the objective structures of which they are the product, structures which are active only when embodied in a competence acquired in the course of a particular history" (p. 81). Some structures are produced by a sort of faulty statistical calculation performed by the individual in given situationsspontaneous interpretation of statisticswhich, in contrast with scientific experiments that use statistics as a resource, give more weight than appropriate to early events, rather than more recent events that might actually be cuing a change in the structures. In his description of the Kabylia house and how that house structures the cognitive structures, Bourdieu implies that the material structures produce principles that structure the cognitive structures, which in turn, (re)produce objective structures that (re)produce cognitive structures. In that passage, Bourdieu seems to imply that the body of the female and the male comprise the originating structure that structures the objective structures, which eventually are structured by the cognitive and motivating structures (pp. 8995).2 Because the mind is structured by the objective structures in the inhabited space, and because those objective structures inform the structure of the mind, the mind that produces the structures must be the originating source. That the male body is oriented outward, and the female body oriented inward, lead to the embodiment of these principles in the structures of the mind, which then leads to the structuring of objective structures in terms of this male/female distinction.3 The concept identifies a durable, stable source of the generative principle in the habitus and therefore helps to explain social order apart from the state. In the case study Bourdieu describes, the inhabited space occupied by the individual produces the structures; that space is shared by the group, and the group therefore shares the principles that generate the structure. In that example, the state is not the source of social order. That is not to claim that the state never can be the source of social order; to the extent the state is the structuring structure, the structure that is produced by and therefore produces the generative principle, the state can be one of an array of sources of social order. That said, nothing about the state is essential to the production of social order. The social scientist can generate hypotheses about structures and social order:
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But see Butler for a critical assessment of this implication. See note 2 above. 4

likely.

- when a group of individuals inhabits the same structures, social order is more likely; and - when the structures are structured by the same generative principle, social order is more

Dispositions Dispositions are the structures that generate principles for behavior within a habitus. A set of dispositions comprises a habitus. Dispositions [are] structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (p. 72) Dispositions predispose individuals to a way of being in a group. They are inculcated into the individual, and when they have been "durably inculcated," they "engender aspirations and practices objectively compatible with those objective requirements," while at the same time making "the most improbable practices" unlikely, because the dispositions cause other practices to be literally unthinkable (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 77). The concept contributes to understanding social order because it explains how the structures interact with each other to produce behavior. Assuming individuals inhabiting the same circumstances share the same structures, which are themselves generated by the principles of the dispositions, social order should be manifest. In contrast, a theory of social order as produced by the state pays little or no attention to a concept like dispositions. No dispositions are necessary because the authority of the state bears down on the individual through the threat of physical violence to the person.4 The social scientist can hypothesize about dispositions and social order that: - when the a group of individuals possess the same dispositions, more social order is likely. Objectification Objectification is the means through which social practices come to be seen as opus operatum. Through repetition over time and in history, practices take on an objective connotation, and individuals experience practices as objects rather than as modus operandi. Objectification helps to conceal this truth about social practices. Objectification also helps individuals to understand the practices by others in an interaction (p. 81). For his theory, Bourdieu uses objectification as an important mechanism in explaining the modes of domination (see below). It is also an essential concept in order to understand misrecognition (also see below). Bourdieu also uses objectification to explain the origin of all three types of structures. Objectification transforms social practices into objects that become the structures that generate the habitus. Objectification also helps relieve the dominant class in a society of the necessity to constantly reproduce their effective domination. When social, economic, and cultural capital are all objectifiedthrough, say, titles (academic degrees, e.g.)the dominating classes are no longer required to constantly reiterate the modes of their domination. "Objectification guarantees the
But see Foucault's panopticism for an explanation of state authority that relies not on physical violence but techniques of discipline internalized by the individual.
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permanence and cumulativity of material and symbolic acquisitions" (p. 184); the objective mechanisms "play a part both in setting up and in concealing lasting relations of domination" (p. 189). Objectification is a mechanism that helps produce social order, but is less likely to be identifiable by a social scientist. It is a relationship between practices and structures, a relationship that turns practices into structures. Therefore, a social scientist can deduce objectification by identifying practices and their corresponding structures. A social scientist can do little to hypothesize directly about the relationship between objectification and social order. That said, a social scientist might hypothesize that to the extent practices are correlated with structures, objectification is the connective mechanism correlating the two concepts. Following such a hypothesis, the hypotheses related to structures also emerge from the objectification concept. In addition, - when objectification is a reliable and efficient process, social order is more likely. Doxa, Heterodoxy, Orthodoxy Doxa is a condition in which the arbitrariness of social practice is misrecognized as naturally occurring. It occurs when "there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-evident" (p. 164).5 Orthodoxy and heterodoxy imply "awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs" (p. 164) where orthodoxy seeks to restore doxa (but never fully can) and heterodoxy seeks to replace it with discourse anew. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy are mutually constitutive and are, by necessity, present in a group where doxa has been revealed for what it isthe misrecognition as natural of that which is actually arbitrary in the social practices. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy each can only exist in its relationship with the other: without heterodoxy, there can be no orthodoxy, and vice versa (p. 169). This misrecognition of the arbitrary as natural prevents the individual from realizing or becoming aware of the structures that help to produce the habitus. A necessary precondition of the presence of heterodoxy and orthodoxy is an objective crisis, though that crisis is not necessarily a sufficient condition (p. 169). For his theory, Bourdieu uses these three concepts to explain how the boundary between the universe of (orthodox or hererodox) discourse and the universe of doxa, in the twofold sense of what goes without saying and what cannot be said for lack of an available discourse, represents the dividing-line between the most radical form of misrecognition and the awakening of political consciousness. (p. 170) The concept doxa helps describe the conditions under which social order might emerge. Doxa implies the synchronization of habitus, or lack of exposure to alternative ways of social practice, which would lead individuals to question the legitimacy of one social practice versus another. When doxa is present, social order is manifest. Heterodoxy disrupts social order because it disturbs the misrecognition of social practices and questions the authority or legitimacy of the dominant social practices. Orthodoxy, in contrast, supports social order because it seeks to restore doxa. Here again, theories of the state focus mostly on the threat of violence to the person as the factor motivating individuals to create and maintain order in a society. Where those theories use the presence of the state to explain social order, Bourdieu uses the presence of doxa to explain social
Here again, the concept doxa seems consistent with Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man, in that one-dimensionality might be defined in Bourdieu's terms as the ideal doxa.
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order. The social scientist can hypothesize about doxa, heterodoxy, and orthodoxy, and the state: - when doxa is present in a circumstance, social order is manifest; - when heterodoxy and orthodoxy is present in a circumstance, social order is less likely; - when heterodoxy is more present than orthodoxy in a circumstance, social order is less likely; and - when orthodox is more present than heterodoxy in a circumstance, social order is less likely. Embodiment Embodiment is one mechanism through which a subject is inculcated with practical mastery of principled patterns of behavior (p. 87). Embodiment can occur when the principles underlying behavior that, in part, produces the habitus are symbolically designated through language or art, or other forms of cultural and symbolic capital (p. 87). But even when principled practice remains outside the symbolic, inculcation remains possible through the inhabited space of the subject. An inhabited space allows for the "objectification of the generative schemes" which leads one to embody the principles that underlie the construction of that inhabited space (p. 89). In this way, embodiment inculcates the individual with the generative principle that structures the space. For his theory, Bourdieu uses the concept of embodiment to explain how inculcation occurs, which ultimately helps to explain how objectification occurs, how misrecognition is possible, and what the differences are between doxa, heterodoxy, and orthodoxy. Embodiment "works" by inculcating the individual with the generative principle that is structured by the structures and helps to generate dispositions. When the individual embodies these principles, and therefore embodies the generative principles, the individual is likely to reproduce the social practices that have been objectified and are being objectified by that very reproduction of the practice. Because embodiment is a product of both discourse about social practice (e.g., teaching) and when discourse is unavailable, the inculcation of the generative principles, it contributes to social order by working on all individuals in a circumstance in similar ways, thereby producing similar dispositions and tendencies in social practice. As with many of the other concepts, the theories of social order that rely upon the state typically have little to say about mechanisms such as embodiment.6 State authority works directly upon the individual through the threat of physical violence. The social scientist can hypothesize that - when embodiment is an effective and reliable process, social order is more likely. Genesis Amnesia Bourdieu describes genesis amnesia as a subject's apparent forgetting that the objective structures, which partially produce patterns of practice, are based on history. Because the patterns of behavior are objectified as opus operatum, the individual is able to understand these structures as natural within the habitus, rather than as something arbitrary, something that the individual is also producing through action. These patterns of behavior are unconscious, because they are based upon historical patterns, usually reproduced through mimicking behavior rather than through discourse. This is because they are literally unthinkable (p. 79). Genesis amnesia is one concept Bourdieu uses to explain how misrecognition is possible. Genesis amnesia contributes to social order because it conceals the true source of the social
6

But again, see Foucault's panopticism. 7

practices, which masks the arbitrariness of the social practices. By concealing the origin of social practice, genesis amnesia renders it less and less likely that an individual will question the legitimacy or authority of a social practice. The concept has interesting implications when compared to theories of social order and the state. In some ways, it seems possible that genesis amnesia makes possible the viability of theories of the state as the source of social order. Because the origins of the social practicesthe structures, dispositions, and habitusare concealed, individuals can explain (through learned ignorance) that the "real" source of social order is the state. The social scientist can hypothesize that - when genesis amnesia is reliable and effective, social order is more likely. Inculcation Inculcation is the process by which the structures are internalized within the individual (p. 19 20). Inculcation is "a privileged moment for formulating the practical schemes and constituting them as principles" (p. 20). When individuals are inculcated with structures, they are disposed toward the social practices generated by the habitus. Bourdieu uses this concept to explain how individuals embody the structures and become disposed toward producing the social practices. Inculcation occurs through pedagogy, through the writing and teaching of grammars and rhetoric, and is always accompanied by some type of objectification (p. 20). Inculcation contributes to social order to the extent that it is a reliable and effective mechanism linking structures and embodiment of the structures by individuals. In contrast to theories of the state, inculcation relies upon the internalization of dispositions that tend to produce certain regular behaviors. Theories of the state focus upon state authority and suggest that authority is what produces regular behavior. The social scientist can hypothesize that - when inculcation is reliable and effective, social order is more likely. Misrecognition Misrecognition occurs when individuals perceive social practices as natural and given rather than arbitrary. Misrecognition is a concept Bourdieu uses to explain how practices can become objectified through time. When practices are misrecognized, the practice is understood by the group to be the natural way of interacting; this understanding leads to the objectification of practices but the objectification of practices also leads to misrecognition (p. 163164). Through its relationship with objectification, misrecognition also supports doxa, in that misrecognition helps to ensure the arbitrariness of doxa remains secret (p. 168169). Misrecognition contributes to social order to the extent that it is a reliable and effective mechanism linking structures and inculcation. Here again, as with inculcation, theories of the state focus on external authority to produce regular and regulated behaviors whereas misrecognition is a persistent ignorance as to the source of the practices that produce social order. The social scientists can hypothesize that - when misrecognition is reliable and effective, social is more likely. Modes of Domination Bourdieu explains that the modes of domination in a group fall between two extremes. On the one hand, domination must be constantly reproduced because there is little or no economic or material capital that, having become objectified, can stand in for the symbolic capital that produces domination, and hence, order, within a group. On the other hand, the modes of domination may be completely objectified, because economic and cultural capital has become objectified. In this latter case, the dominating class must spend little or no time or energy in reproducing the modes of domination because those modes reinforce the domination by their very objectification. The
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dominant class must literally do nothing in order to remain dominant. Whether the dominant class must or must not actively reproduce the modes of domination, it is these modes of domination that help explain how order is possible because system stability is the result. Through domination, the dominant class engenders authority. That authority helps maintain stability in social order. In contrast, theories of the state and social order typically do not acknowledge the possibility of various modes of domination in society. The state is the dominating actor; what varies is not the actor but rather the extent to which those occupying the state hold the power to dominate (e.g., strong states versus weak states). In these theories, social order does not derive from mode of domination, but rather from how effective the state is in dominating, a fine, but nonetheless important, distinction. The social scientist can hypothesize that - when modes of domination are less objectified, and therefore being constantly reproduced by the dominant classes, social order is more likely; - when modes of domination are less objectified, and therefore being constantly reproduced by the dominant classes, the authority that produces social order is more likely to change; - when modes of domination are more objectified, and therefore reproduced automatically through the social objects, social order is more likely; and - when modes of domination are more objectified, and therefore reproduced automatically through the social objects, the authority that produces social is less likely to change. Order Apart From the State Not chosen completely arbitrarily, the preceding list of concepts each contributes to understanding how order can emerge in society, apart from the imposition of a sovereign state authority or will. In this section, I explain three ways these concepts can fit together to shed light on order in society apart from the state. Genesis amnesia contributes to social order because, like misrecognition, the greater the genesis amnesia, the less capable individuals are of questioning the legitimacy of the social practices. Individuals experiencing genesis amnesia and misrecognition remain unaware that the social practices are truly arbitrary and instead experience them as natural, given objects. Alternatives to these misrecognized practices are so unthinkable they are simply unthought. By remaining in the realm of the unthinkable, these practices become objectified, and tend to be reproduced through practice. The social practices reinforce structures, which in turn structure the habitus and the dispositions that produce the habitus. Objectification leads to social order because the practices and structures that become objectified partially produce the habitus that is shared by the individuals in the group. The greater the objectification, the greater the likelihood that individuals will embody them, will be inculcated by them, and will misrecognize them as naturally given. As described above, the greater the misrecognition and genesis amnesia, the greater the social order. As the objectification of practices transforms practices into structures, and the structures interact to produce the set of dispositions that comprise the habitus, order should increase with greater objectification of practices. In the same way, the greater the synchronization of habitus inhabiting individuals in a social space, the greater the social order should be present. Each of the concepts ultimately leads to the habitus; to the extent the concepts increase the depth and breadth of habitus in a social circumstance, each contributes to social order. In this conceptualization, habitus is the privileged concept that links the other peripheral concepts together. It is important to note that many of the hypotheses about social order generated from Bourdieu's Outline of a Theory Practice rely upon the synchronization of habitus. For example, embodiment can be a quite reliable and effective mechanism to create the cognitive structures that
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generate principles for behaviors. But even when it is effective, it will only contribute to social order if the principle embodied is the same principle for most (or all) individuals in a circumstance. That implies that the individuals must share the habitus in order for embodiment to contribute to social order. In this way, the hypotheses about social order and embodiment (and inculcation, misrecognition, and objectification) rely upon the synchronization of habitus to be true. But when multiple habitus interact in a circumstance, the hypotheses are unlikely to hold true. In fact, is rather likely their opposites will hold true. Another way to examine social order using Bourdieu's concepts is to focus on doxa, heterodoxy, and orthodoxy. The greater the doxa present in a social setting, as compared to heterodoxy and orthodoxy, the greater should be the social order in the setting. As before, the greater the embodiment, inculcation, synchronization of dispositions, objectification, genesis amnesia, and misrecognition, the greater presence the doxa should have. As heterodoxy increases, and more orthodoxy is needed to maintain domination by the dominating class, the lesser the social order will be present. In this conceptualization, doxa is the privileged concept that links the other peripheral concepts together. Finally, Bourdieu's concept of modes of domination helps explain and examine social order apart from the state. When the modes of domination are objectified through economic and cultural capital, social order should be more present, and should be more stable over time. That is to say, the way things are should be more persistent, less likely to change, because the structures are more objectified, consequently more deeply embodied, and hence more likely to remain misrecognized. Legitimacy is less likely to enter into the social discourse. Hence, manifest social order. In this conceptualization, modes of domination is the privileged concept that links the other peripheral concepts together. Potential Implications If Bourdieu's concepts are used a framework to guide empirical inquiry, and subsequently do yield evidence that order apart from the state is indeed possibleeven probablethe privileged status afforded the state in many social scientific fields might be justifiably eroded. That erosion is important for several reasons. First, as globalization continues to gain attention as a phenomenon to be studied, scholars are searching for frameworks to understand how society might change in the future. Bourdieu's concepts can guide that search for understanding. But even aside from potential state erosion caused by globalization, the post-conflict peacebuilding field directs most, if not nearly all, its resources on state building. In fact, one criticism leveled at the field is that "peace" is taken as an uncontested idea that is founded upon the presence of a functioning state. But given the field's dismal record at permanently resolving violent civil conflict, one rightly wonders whether the problem is the dogged determination to fix the state, rather than to produce peace. If social ordersome semblance of peaceis possible apart from the state, evidence of that possibility might provide the justification necessary for the peacebuilding field to shift its focus away from statebuilding toward other ways of contributing to social order. An analysis using Bourdieu's concepts might produce such evidence. Conclusion All this is certainly not to suggest that Bourdieu's concepts of social order produce peace as an uncontested ideal. Indeed, the modes of domination described by Bourdieu may be no more or less peaceful than when life is dominated by a predatory state. Rather, the purpose is to suggest that individuals themselves, in interaction with others in a social context, can produce social order without relying upon an external authority to command obedience. To the extent that is a factual statement, the usefulness of this sort of approach to peacebuilding (and theorizing about a
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globalized world of the future) is in its recognition of the creative potential of humans interacting in a positive environment with one another. At the very least, such evidence from an empirical study should give the field of peacebuilding, and social scientists theorizing about the future, the courage to look away from the state and the pessimistic view of humans that enables its dominance toward a more optimistic view that sees a more robust potential for humanity.

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