Foreign retail groups in Russia - The limits of development Paul W. Sanders Burgundy School of Business, Dijon, France paul.sanders@escdijon.

eu The paper casts a Western perspective onto the specifics of the Russian retail environment, detailing the adaptations and strategies that accompany the establishment of Western retail groups. Russia has enjoyed strong single-digit growth for several years, resulting in rising living standards and a consumption boom that offers an important potential for volume retailing and distribution. Already today Russia is one of the top European consumer markets for food, beer, wine, mobile phones, automobiles and home improvements (DIY).1 Between 2004 and 2005 retail sales soared from 199 billion USD to 250 billion; they are estimated to reach 400 billion by 2010.2 According to Deutsche Bank projections, by the same year average retail expenditure will have risen threefold from its 2001 level of 1,007 USD, thus closing the gap with Central and Eastern Europe. Table 1. Annual per capita retail expenditure (in USD, 2001)3 Russia Czech Republic Germany France USA 1 007 1 931 4 358 5 125 9 137

Several reasons explain the comparatively high amount of Russian purchasing power, in spite of salary payments still lagging behind EU levels. Among them, a higher share of disposable income in total earnings, the absence of a culture of saving and availability of credit facilities,

Russia is expected to become the largest food and groceries market in Europe by 2020, s. Food and Drink Europe, Russia: A hard market to crack, 29 Jul 2005, http://www.foodanddrinkeurope.com/news/ng.asp?id=61632-s-p-russia-retail 2 AT Kearney, 2005 Global Retail Development Index ; Consulat gnral de France Saint-Ptersbourg, Mission conomique, La grande distribution Saint-Ptersbourg, 18 Jul 2006. 3 Deutsche Bank (UFG), in Wells, Kathryn, Consumer Boom as Spending Power Rises, Euroweek, 8 Apr 2005, pp. 8-11.

lower utilities and rent bills as well as the fruits of the shadow economy, which add an extra 40% on top of official GDP.4 The first home-grown groups, such as the discounter Pyaterochka, appeared in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis. In close parallel with the revival of domestic production capabilities, they benefitted from rouble devaluation and diminishing importations. Starting with a mere 17 St Petersburg stores in 1999, Pyaterochka attained a turnover of 1.6 billions USD, with about 1,000 store locations, in only five years. This rapid expansion was achieved via a franchising strategy inside Russia - boosted by an EBRD equity participation - and subsequent acquisitions and greenfield investments in the near abroad.5 The insertion of the new Russian retailers occurred in a retail landscape that continues to blend remnants of Soviet distribution with new formats developed during and after Perestroika: Produkti neighbourhood stores, Univermags and Universams in the residential districts, Goums and Tsoums in the city centres, kiosks and open-air markets, the successors to the kolkhoz markets. None of these correspond to the modern formats introduced into other Eastern European countries during the 1990s, and to this day modern hyper- and supermarkets constitute a minority in the Russian retail landscape. Table 2. Market share of five largest retail groups (in %, 2003)6 Netherlands France Germany UK Spain Czech Republic Poland Russia 93 88 70 67 48 27 17 5 (est.) Unlike conditions prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe, local agents continue to dominate the market. This strong local presence limits the leverage of foreign groups. First and foremost
4

The Power behind Russia's Top 100 Official Statistics Underestimate the Influence of the "Grey Economy", Financial Times, 2 Apr 2003. 5 AT Kearney, 2005 Global Retail Development Index 6 Deutsche Bank (UFG), in Wells, Kathryn, Consumer Boom as Spending Power Rises, Euroweek, 8 Apr 2005, pp. 8-11; Standard & Poors estimates cited in Food and Drink Europe, Russia: A hard market to crack, 29 Jul 2005, http://www.foodanddrinkeurope.com/news/ng.asp?id=61632-s-p-russiaretail

among the Russian retailers is X5 Retail, a group formed through the 2006 merger of Pyaterochka and the country's no. 1 supermarket chain Perekrestok, owned by Alfa Group. X5 has the declared mid-term aim of doubling its combined turnover of 2.4 billion USD (2005) and to compete directly with Auchan and Metro. Another important actor is Sedmoy Kontinent. Founded earlier than Pyaterochka, in 1994, this supermarket chain managed to triple its turnover between 2000 and 2002. Table 3. The top ten generic chains in Russia (2006)7 N Groupe 1 X5 Retail Group 2 Metro 3 Magnit 4 Auchan 5 Diksi 6 Kopeika 7 Sedmoy Kontinent 8 Lenta 9 Ramenka 10 O'Key Total Origin Russian Foreign Krasnodar Foreign St Petersburg Moscow Moscow St Petersburg Foreign St Petersburg Turnover (million USD) 3,210 2,539 2,299 1,013 998 904 879 813 570 532 13,575 Market share (%) 3.2 2.5 2.3 1.1 1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 13.8

In addition, a consolidation movement among the Russian market players is now in progress, with mergers between super- and hypermarket or between Moscow and St Petersburg-based operations taking place across the board.8 Some chains, such as Pyaterochka and Paterson, have also extended their reach to Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Again others have launched IPOs. Although a foreign retail presence can be dated back as far as the 1980s, Russian market involvement started in earnest in 2000, with the implantation of IKEA.9 Two other international heavy-weights, the German Metro Group with its cash and carry format and French hypermarket pioneer Auchan, followed in 2002. Since 2003 the movement has grown to a torrent, as a result of strong 'follower effects' derived from the previous large implantations as well as of positive assessments of Russian market potential by Goldman Sachs and AT Kearney. One of the latest additions to the Moscow landscape is Marks & Spencer, which arrived in 2005. As others before, the British retail institution found an environment burgeoning

Planetretail figures cited in I. Doiseau, Le temps des "global players", Points de vente, 21 May 2007 ; Commerce de dtail en Russie : un avenir incertain, Smart Money, 30 Oct 2006. 8 Examples are the mergers Pyaterochka-Karoussel-Perekrestok and Diksi-Megamart. 9 A notable exception is the Russian-Turkish joint venture Ramenka (Ramstore) which entered the Russian market in 1997

with opportunity. Only one year later it was already launching franchises across Russia - in St Petersburg, Nizhniy-Novgorod and Yekaterinburg. Table 4. The foreign presence generic retail groups (late 2006) Group Auchan Number and type of stores Locations 14 hypermarkets Moscow and suburbs, Saint-Petersburg, NizhnyMetro 31 cash and carry 7 Real hypermarkets 4 Media Markt Novgorod, Yekaterinburg Moscow, SaintSiberia (Omsk, Petersburg, Tula, Rostov- Novosibirsk) on-Don, Krasnodar, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Nizhny-Novgorod, Kazan, Ufa, Volgograd, Samara, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Lipetsk, Ryazan, Ulyanovsk, Naberezhnye Ramstore (Ramenka) 54 supermarkets et hypermarkets 9 malls 1 business centre Tchelny, Perm Moscow, Cheboksary, Krasnoyarsk, Kazan, Lipetsk, Murmansk, Naberejnye Tchelny, Nizhny-Novgorod, Samara, Stavropol, Ufa, Volgograd, Vologda REWE* IKEA Spar 26 Billa supermarkets 7 41 supermarkets and superettes Moscow Moscow, SaintYekaterinburg, Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, Smolensk, Sochi, Irkutsk, Rostov, Kirov, Serguiev Posad, Orekhovo-Zuyevo Nijni-Novgorod, Development projects

Rostov, Saint-Petersburg, Togliatti, Tver,

Petersburg, Kazan Yekaterinburg Moscow and region, Tula Doubling turnover by and region, Vladimir, Kostroma, NizhnyNovgorod 2007 ; launch of hypermarkets

Tradeka

3 Siwa supermarkets

Saint-Petersburg

*Via a joint venture with Muscovite holding Marta. Moscow, which accounts for 30 % of Russian retail trade, remains the prime location (and test market) for foreign implantations.10 Several factors such as purchasing power, standard of living, infrastructure as well as presence of a sizeable middle class (approx. 20% of total population) account for this preference. The most remarkable foreign retail development in Moscow are the three gigantic malls baptised Mega and located beyond the outer ring road, on the territory of the Moscow region. These malls mix several retail formats in one single suburban location: large hypermarkets, specialised chains, smaller brand stores as well as entertainment and hospitality facilities. About 200 smaller operators such as Polo, Adidas, Yves Rocher share retail space here with the project initiators IKEA, Auchan, OBI, Stockmann and M. Video. The ultimate aim of the arrangement is to pool resources and increase political leverage11, and the out-of-town location is crucial in more than one respect: on the one hand this places them closer to the centres of population density, located in the residential sleeper districts. On the other hand it allows them to escape the high rents as well as the jockeying for scarce retail space in central Moscow. Unsurprisingly, besides a continuing influx of luxury and high-end boutiques the only major inner city retail development in recent years is the new shopping centre Atrium Kurskaya. One may indeed ask the question why this development accommodates a Sedmoy Kontinent supermarket, but no foreign volume retailer. What are the mainsprings of the success of retailers such as Metro, Auchan and IKEA, and what can they tell us about axes of development for foreign groups? As in other emerging markets the ability to frame profitability into a long-term perspective is a key component of success. Auchan are well aware that their Russian hypermarkets will require several years of market presence in order to develop their full profit potential. In the same veneer, IKEA only broke even in 2005, despite the fact that its Russian stores are among the ten
10

The Moscow retail market was worth 48 billion euro in 2003; this compares favourably against, for example, the 80 billion euro Paris market. It should be noted that lack of storage facilities and risk of market saturation are motivating late entrants, such as the French Carrefour chain, to bypass Moscow and set up shop directly in one or several of the larger provincial agglomerations. 11 In 2004 an extortion attempt by regional government officials, in conjunction with the opening of the second Mega mall in Khimki, was successfully thwarted by a combined strategy of going public and an appeal by IKEA's Ingvar Kamprad and the other 200 tenants to President Putin, s. Curt Hazlett, Wild East Russia is an alluring but sometimes scary place for Western retailers, International Council of Shopping Centers, mai 2005, http://www.icsc.org/srch/sct/sct0505/atg_1.php; Hans Bengtsson, 'Ikea Refuses to Pay Bribes to Open Russian Shopping Center', The Epoch Times, 20 Dec 2004, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-20/25078.html

most visited on the planet.12 Due to high import tariffs foreign retailers rely on Russian supply chains (and not on their global supply chains). In 2002 IKEA sourced goods worth 50 million USD in Russia, after having invested 400 million USD into propping up their Russian supply chain. These environmental constraints can limit competitive power, but in the long run they may well be a blessing in disguise. To understand IKEA's approach one has to understand that the group's aim is not solely to gain market share, but also to access valuable resources and production capacity - wood, plastics, aluminium, textile and ceramics - for use as inputs in the global IKEA network.13 Metro entered the Russian market simultaneously with other markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, within the framework of an internationalisation strategy whose declared aim was to escape the oversaturation of its home market. The group which, besides the cash and carry concept, also runs the Real hypermarket and the Media Markt electronics chains, now realises a majority of its turnover outside Germany. As most other foreign chains the major part of its 140,000 in-store items is provided by 2,000 Russian suppliers. To facilitate its acceptance Metro grooms its image of good corporate citizen, communicating actively on its social responsibility and charity projects and cultivating its relationship with the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. As IKEA, it plans to place its Russian portfolio of activities in the top five of its worldwide network (in terms of numbers of locations and sales) and to use Russia as a global sourcing base. To this effect the chain is expanding sales into Siberia. Equally instructive is the case of Auchan. From the beginning Auchan opted for a discount strategy which was to allow the chain to take on both Metro's cash and carry network and the outdoor markets. Auchan tried to take advantage of its understanding of Russian consumer behaviour which besides gratification of genuine basic consumer need - also includes an element of pure curiosity that could be resumed under the term 'window shopping'. Accordingly, the French retailer tried to position its shopping experience as a more convenient version of a stroll around an outdoor market, with a similarly advantageous price-quality ratio. Auchan is the principal initiator of the Mega Malls, a concept cloned from its experience with retail developments across Eastern Europe.

12 13

The leader among the Russian IKEA stores received 40 million visitors in 2004. According to one article IKEA aims "to make Russia the major supplier of IKEA goods worldwide", s. Jorma Larimo, Ari Huuhka, Internationalization of the biggest Finnish and Swedish retailers in the Baltic States and Russia, Journal of East-West Business, 13 (1), March 2007, 82.

Although Auchan has been a highly profitable operation, it's introduction of the hypermarket concept raises questions of how far growth can actually go before saturation sets in.14 After all the success of the formula resides on three distinct elements, all of which are easy to copy: low prices, ample parking facilities and large retail areas offering a broad choice of food and non food products. Consequently, it did not take long for the concept to be copied by several other retailers.15 Even more serious than the competition are the cultural factors at work limiting the generalisation of the hypermarket concept on par with Western Europe. Keeping prices low depends on how well a retailer controls his supply chain. And in this respect the situation in Russia is nowhere as advantageous for retailers as it is in Western Europe, where supplier power is weak.16 Soon after its arrival Auchan also had to learn the paradox that their Russian locations had higher footfall compared to hypermarkets elsewhere, but at less sales volume. This is linked to imponderables such as limited car ownership, which renders the availability of parking space irrelevant while putting a cap on the size of purchases. Finally, the continuing preference of ordinary Russians for small daily purchases on markets, in neighbourhood shops and at kiosks counters the established Western concept of the weekly car ride to the hypermarket or superstore. What can we learn from these examples? Considering the requirement for long term commitment non-listed private companies (IKEA, Auchan) have a distinct advantage over their listed counterparts who need to focus on maximising shareholder utility. Private companies have the latitude to react in their own time to windows of opportunity which, as in the case of Russia, typically remain open for no more than 5 to 10 years. Another important consideration for foreign retail groups is access to high quality labour. Despite the fact that Russian universities churn out one million graduates per year and have twice as many students enrolled than their Chinese counterparts, this remains a bottleneck.17 Rather than focusing on the teaching of transferable, work-relevant skills, the educational system is still largely geared towards passive knowledge transmission. While IKEA's first batch of Russian recruits had a good level of education, they lacked initiative and were often unable to translate their knowledge into practical action. Also Russian education today produces many lawyers and
14

Graham Roberts, Auchans Entry into Russia: Prospects and Research Implications, International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, 33 (1), 2005. 15 Sedmoy Kontinent positioned itself against Auchan, by stating expressly that it was "one kopek cheaper than Auchan". 16 Already in 2001 several Russian chains, under the aegis of Sedmoy Kontinent and Perekrestok, formed an alliance to combat supplier power. 17 7 million compared to 3 million in China.

economists, but too few managers and engineers - a clear regression from the Soviet period. At the same time the fierce competition for the limited pool of available candidates forces foreign retail chains to adapt their remuneration practices and design staff retention policies. The third key to making the most of the Russian market is the optimisation of organisational learning and the creation of learning curves, expressed in a firm's knowledge management and knowledge sharing. From the onset IKEA downgraded the passive absorption of traditional abstract market surveys and information gathering in favour of a more active mode of organisational adaptation. IKEA cracked the market by concentrating on the acquisition of active knowledge, through its human resource policy as well as its cultivation of links with Russian suppliers and decision makers. The ability to create fluid information flows and feedback loops is closely connected to corporate culture, i.e. hierarchical organisation, characteristics of top management, risk profile, ability to communicate one's values, efficiency of information exchange tools and gateways, as well as general openness toward key stakeholders. What are the competitive mainstays of Western groups? In the face of reliance on local supply chains, these lie above all in factors of inimitability. Three avenues can be charted here: firstly, foreign groups hold a competitive advantage in the development, management and marketing of large shopping malls and precincts, such as the Mega Malls. One major success factor for the Mega project consisted in its excellent environmental scanning and subsequent marketing campaign, both based on inside knowledge of the Russian consumer and his mental universe. Thus, departing from the concept of 'pleasure purchase' in itself an important motivator in Russian consumer behaviour - Mega communicated on the slogan: "Shopping in Europe without visa, without travel." The second advantage is foreign muscle in specialized chains and niche markets. Even though food still accounts for the lion's share of retail purchases, a shift in line with Engel's law is already perceptible.18 In due course a growing share of consumer spending power will flow toward the non-food sector and contribute to the unprecedented growth of specialised chains. Already it is hard not to notice the continuing attraction of international luxury brands for the urban markets of Moscow and other agglomerations. While most noticeable from a visual point of view, the luxury market is by no means the most significant; nor is it the only place where foreigners can succeed. Table 5. Foreign specialised (non food) chains in Russia
18

The share of food purchases in budgets fell from 54 % to 39 % between 1998 and 2004.

Group Media Markt (Metro) Stockmann Intersport Karstadt Quelle Marks & Spencer Inditex (Zara) Hachette IKEA OBI Castorama (Kingfisher) Leroy Merlin K-rauta (Kesko)19 A S Watson Group (HWL)20 Douglas Body Shop Yves Rocher

Sector Electronics Department stores Sports and leisure equipment Mail order sales Textile, clothes, accessories Clothes, prt--porter Press Furniture, home equipment, accessories Home furnishings, DIY Home furnishings, DIY Home furnishings, DIY Home furnishings, DIY Cosmetics /beauty products Perfumery Cosmetics Cosmetics

Origin Germany Finland Switzerland Germany UK Spain France Sweden Germany UK France Finland Hongkong Germany UK France

For the time being foreign investment in specialised chains is still limited, in particular in comparison to other emerging markets such as China or Brazil. To give an example: so far practically no foreign pharmaceutical chain has entered the Russian market.21 Also the majority of foreign operators - such as French cosmetics chain Yves Rocher, present in Russia since 1990 - still prefer to enter via a local distributor or a franchising network. 22 In this respect the example of IKEA, but also the take-off of Marks & Spencer's Russian sales offer encouragement. This demonstrates what customer-oriented companies dedicated to identifying and satisfying unaddressed demand can achieve in Russia. Today unrealised consumer demand still exists in electronics, furniture, DIY and home improvements. Theoretically, Western chains are also competitive with their hard discount formats. Relying on economies of scale, global logistics and supply chains these players exert formidable marketing power. Reasons of fit make this the most promising sector of the Russian retail market: discount
19

Kesko acquired the stores of the St Petersburg Stromaster group which it commercialises under the K-rauta brand. 20 Watson entered the market through acquiring the St. Petersburg Spektr group. 21 The largest British pharmaceutics groups, Alliance Boots (Boots the Chemist), entered the market through a 2006 merger with Apteka Holding, Alliance Healthcare Russia, http://www.alliancehealthcare.ru/history.aspx?rel=1 22 If Russian chains continue to succeed in their drive for public listings then the road to expansion on the Russian market may also pass via the M&A route. As an example Dixon, the leading British electronics chain, has signed a cooperation agreement with Russian chain Eldorado, over which it holds a purchase option until 2011.

stores are typically small-scale, established throughout urban areas, they do not require car ownership and their prices are adapted to Russian pockets. In addition, the tendency for growth in this sector is reinforced by Russia's progress from growth market to mature market. With the change in the cycle a market reconfiguration takes place: outdoor markets and small grocers disappear (or at least suffer a heavy reduction in their presence), the supermarket format begins to limp, while hypermarket and cash & carry growth stagnates. The principal winner of this new stage is the discount format. In addition, entirely new mature market formats such as branded mini-stores in locations with heavy footfall or convenience stores in petrol stations, train stations or cultural establishments appear. The new trends find an expression in table 6. Table 6. Evolution of formats in the Russian retail market (% market share)23
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Discounters Supermarkets Hypermarkets Cash and carry 2002 2004

However, due to high entry barriers, in the form of complicated title registration procedures, the foreign advantage in the discount sector is as yet not exploitable. Considering that four of the top Russian retail groups (Pyaterochka, Diksi, Kopeyka, Magnit) started with a pure discount format, this is also the area where Russians have the greatest experience and where, as a consequence, competition is fiercest. The shunning of Russia as a retail destination by market leaders Lidl and Aldi should not come as a surprise; perhaps only the country's WTO adhesion could change entry opportunities. In view of the information detailed in the preceding lines it must be clear that the Russian retail boom is neither a fata morgana nor a Potemkin village. From the foreign retail group perspective, a Russian entry can be an effective antidote to declining domestic markets as well as an appropriate complementary position in their international portfolios. At the same time it is pertinently clear that mastering the ropes of Russian trade is no Sunday walkabout. And to
23

AC Nielsen figures, in 2005 Global Retail Development Index

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maintain competitive edge one has to rely on inimitability and uniqueness - qualities difficult to sustain in this industry. Thus, in view of the especially politicised nature of the Russian business environment, it is questionable how sustainable the activities of many non-specialised foreign retail chains actually are. Could the puzzling parallels between the current-day Mega Malls and the historical slobody (foreign quarters) of Old Russia be more than a simple coincidence? A second question follows from this: does a level playing field exist for Russians and foreigners? Under adverse conditions, could retail become 'off limits' to foreigners, on par with the so-called 'strategic sectors' of the Russian economy? The recent allegations of a hostile raid on Arbat Prestige, do nothing to dispel such fears and rekindle the controversy on the inalienability of private property and the enforcement of legal rights in Russia.24 Other critics contend that the current consumption boom could be short-lived and may not own up to the expectations of Western retail players. If present trajectories are to continue the Russian government will need to step up its efforts to contain inflation and promote social justice. In the long run this requires a better redistribution of wealth, the creation of a middle class and the development of an SME sector. In addition government will have to address the problem of negative demographics and wage an uncompromising war against corruption. It is on its ability to deliver on these challenges that the performance of any Russian government should be measured. Finally, one should not forget that the most pressing future needs of Russia are not in the consumer sector, but in the industrial goods sector. Over the next decades Russia will have to invest in the modernisation of infrastructure and transport networks, replace equipment and production units. And it would seem that foreign industrial heavy-weights, able (as they are) to rely on state-sponsored economic promotion policies, can look forward to perspectives that dwarf the benefits of the retail trade almost into insignificance. Therefore, before erupting into triumphalism one should appreciate that the current level of involvement is no more than the smallest common denominator in a myriad of possibilities for economic interaction between Russia and the EU. Unfortunately, realising the full potential of the relationship will necessitate a thorough, genuine and long-lasting thaw in relations. In the face of renewed Russian buoyancy and the EU's perceived weakness this is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Perhaps one should therefore consider foreign retail development in Russia as a first timid step in the right direction. Nothing more, nothing less.
24

Adle Smith, 'Les expropriations arbitraires demeurent un point noir de l'conomie russe', Les Echos, 28 Feb 2008, 8.

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Select bibliography A. T. Kearney, The 2005 Global Retail Development Index, Destination : Russia, http://www.atkearney.com/. A. T. Kearney, Emerging Market Priorities for Global Retailers The 2006 Global Retail Development Index, http://www.atkearney.com/. Antoine Boudet, Alfa Group met la main sur le numro un de la grande distribution russe, Les Echos, 13 Apr 2006. Antoine Boudet, Premire cotation pour le leader des supermarchs Moscou, Les Echos, 26 Nov 2004. Auchan cr une co-entreprise avec Tsentourion, Vedomosti (Moscou), 12 Dec 2006, www.rost.fr. Commerce de dtail en Russie : un avenir incertain, Smart Money, Moscou, 30 Oct 2006,in Les changes conomiques Russie/Monde francophone', http://www.rost.fr. Commerce : Moscou, ville ouverte, Les Echos, 30 Apr 2004. Isabelle Couet, Auchan renouvelle son accord de dveloppement avec la rgion de Moscou, Les Echos, 16 Dec 2005. Dreaming with BRICs : the Path to 2050, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 99, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf. Isabelle Doiseau, Le temps des "global players", Points de vente, 21 May 2007, 1002, pp. 3637. Patrice Drouin, Metro compense l'international l'atonie du march allemand, Les Echos, 2 Nov 2006. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Briefings Russia, http://www.economist.com/countries/Russia/ Food and Drink Europe, Russia: A hard market to crack, 29 Jul 2005, http://www.foodanddrinkeurope.com/news/ng.asp?id=61632-s-p-russia-ret Pierre-Angel Gay, Management : lorsque le distributeur ouvre, en 1996, aux portes de Varsovie, son premier hypermarch, il lui faut rapprendre le vrai "discount" En Pologne, Auchan rapprend le discount, Les Echos, 24 Fev 1998. A. Jonsson, U. Elg, Knowledge and knowledge sharing in retail internationalization : IKEA's entry into Russia, International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 16 (2), May 2006. 12

Kesko, Kesko in Russia, http://www.kesko.fi/index.asp? id=73B7F525B57043D3BD3816FDFAD83FE7. Metro Group, Eager to Consume, Retail in transition, Successful Market Entry, http://www.metrogroup.de/servlet/PB/menu/1080370_l1/index.html. Mission conomique, Ambassade de France, La grande distribution Saint-Ptersbourg, fiche de synthse, 18 Jul 2006, http://www.missioneco.org/russie/documents_new.asp? V=7_PDF_123130. Oganes Sarkisov, Russia : Russian Banking Industry - Robust Growth in Retail Banking, US Department of Commerce, 30 Jun 2006, <commercecan.ic.gc.ca/scdt/bizmap/interface2.nsf/vDownload/ISA_5267/$file/X_5133133. PDF>. A. Ostrovsky, B. Benoit, Metro Unveils 1bn Plan to Capitalise on Growth in Russia, Financial Times, 11 Jun 2003. Prime-Tass, A. S. Watson Acquires Russian Health, Beauty Chain Spektr, 3 Oct 2005, http://www.prime-tass.com/news/show.asp?topicid=72&id=385056. Rewe Group, Rewe Group Enters Russian Market, 8 Jul 2004, http://www.rewe-group.ch/. Stephan Richter, Russia's New Wild East, The Chief Executive, Dec 2002, http://www.findarticles.com Rosstat, Federal State Statistics Service, Admittance to Higher Education Institutions and Graduates of Higher Professional Education', http://www.gks.ru/wps/portal/. Russie - La Distribution Moscou, Le Moci, n 1486, Nov 2000. James Schofield, IKEA Wows the Russians, BBC News, 22 Fev 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1836004.stm. Tradeka International, http://www.tradeka.fi/. Kathryn Wells, Consumer Boom as Spending Power Rises, Euroweek, 8 Apr 2005, pp. 8-11. Yves Rocher prt des acquisitions dans les cosmtiques, L'actualit des fusionsacquisitions, 221, 9 Feb 2007, http://www.fusacq.com/fr/newsletter/newsletter_221.html.

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