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Efectul Emotiilor in Cresterea Increderii in Sine
Efectul Emotiilor in Cresterea Increderii in Sine
Role of Emotions
An essential part of what makes us human, but often making us poor reasoners? An essential part of what makes us human, and responsible for making us as good reasoners as we are? Just a pain in the butt (make us bad reasoners, are evolutionary leftovers that are one of the least human parts of us, etc.)?
Preferred by normals
Preferred by VM patients
Normals eventually bet only on A. GSR indicates the better deck before they know that it is the better deck. Those with VMPFC damage continue to bet on deck B (as much as A, or more) they have little GSR Therefore, those with VM damage are poor decision makers. Therefore, ignoring the role of emotions will be disastrous to good explanations of cognition.
Cognitivism
Paul Grifths presents a theory of emotions, along with a critique of the cognitivist position. Cognitivism (Thagard attributes this kind of view to Oatley): 1. All emotions have corresponding propositional attitudes. 2. The kind of emotion elicited depends on the kinds of attitudes (e.g. desiring, believing, etc.) involved The 'big problem' for this theory is that it can't explain how emotion and beliefs can contradict one another Phobias (believe there is nothing to fear from a snake, but still fear it) Imagined stimuli (no reason that imagining a stimulus should cause an affect, but it often does)
Psychoevolutionary Theory
There is a set of 'affect-programs' that are automatic, modular, involuntary, and innate. They are triggered by stimuli and result in physiological changes and mental states (reex-like, but more complex and structured) They operate in parallel with, but independently from 'normal belief xation' (i.e., process of seeing a stimuli and coming to have some attitudes towards the propositions it gives rise to). Doesnt cover all emotions, just the basic/common ones
Cognitivism
Modularity (Grifths)
Modularity
Grifths claim that emotions are modular carries two central commitments: First, modules are informationally encapsulated This means they don't have access to information outside of their local processing (the information processing is strictly feedforward) Second, modules are often thought to be innate They have developed over evolutionary time to do a specic task (quickly and efciently) They are 'prespecied' by the genes under normal developmental conditions.
Universality of Emotions
Universality of Emotions
Discussion
Thagard and Grifths agree that the RTM version of CRUM fails. Both offer good reasons to expand CRUM in important ways (i.e., by taking into account new kinds of representational content and looking to see what novel processes might operate given that content) They also argue for stronger positions: Thagard thinks CRUM needs to be supplemented But, he doesn't specify what new kinds of representations will be needed, and why they would be different in kind from, say a distributed representation, which already is part of CRUM. Grifths suggests certain kinds of processing (informationally encapsulated processing) will be necessary to account for emotions He also thinks this processing is very different from what goes on in 'normal belief xation'. Given what we have learned about other modularity claims, it would be more prudent to suggest we just don't know enough about the system to know precisely how it is integrated into belief xation (to think that it is truly independent of more cortical processing, seems nave)