Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp.

607629, 2011 0160-7383/$ - see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain

www.elsevier.com/locate/atoures

doi:10.1016/j.annals.2010.11.015

COOPERATION AMONG PROMINENT ACTORS IN A TOURIST DESTINATION

Pietro Beritelli University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

Abstract: Cooperative behavior in tourism destination communities is a condition for sustainable planning and development. However, evidence is lacking on how actors choose to cooperate. Previous research in institutions, organizations, and communities show that formal, contract-based as well as informal, relation-based cooperation occur jointly or in substitution, depending on the context and the subject of research. However, neither the approaches nor their underlying dimensions have been tested for the reality of tourist destination communities. For a European Alpine tourism destination the results show that only relation-based items, in combination with communication variables, strongly positively inuence cooperative behavior. The paper suggests a series of implications for tourism destination planning and concludes with indications for further research. Keywords: contract-based cooperation, relation-based cooperation, social network analysis, tourism destination. 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION Cooperation plays a central role for tourism destination communities. Cooperation is a central requirement for sustainable planning and development of destinations (Bramwell & Lane, 2000), for the advancement and realization of projects (Vernon, Essex, Pinder, & Curry, 2005), and for the establishment and operation of destination governance structures (Yuksel, Bramwell, & Yuksel, 2005). In this con text, the communities comprise a variety of stakeholder groups that interweave across networks of actors of private and public institutions (Dredge, 2006), and must nd at least partial consensus (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999). The literature on cooperative action among stakeholders in tourism communities describes conceptualizations (Selin, 1993), then provides rst empirical evidence (Selin & Chavez, 1995), and nally improves the notions from different perspectives and institutional angles, mainly with the help of case studies (Aas, Ladkin, & Fletcher, 2005; Getz, Anderson, & Sheehan, 1998; Presenza, Sheehan, & Ritchie, 2005; Sheehan & Ritchie, 2005).

Pietro Beritelli is Assistant Professor at the University of St. Gallen and Deputy Director at the Institute for Public Services and Tourism (Dufourstrasse 40a, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland. Email:< pietro.beritelli@unisg.ch>), where he studies Business Administration. 607

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Thus far, most of the research on cooperation and cooperative behavior, in tourism destinations as well as in other industries, analyzes the institutional level and centers on the rms and stakeholder groups as the object of research. This paper is novel in two respects. First, the paper extends research on this topic to the level of the individual. The study in this report analyzes a network of 42 prominent actors with respect to their formal connections, their relational preferences, their communicative and their cooperative behavior, revealing the underlying dimension of institutional cooperation. Second, the research empirically applies social network analysis to the prominent actors network. With the help of network data the study tests the relevance of two cooperation approaches which are often used as either complementary or substitutive, namely the formal, contract-based and the informal, relation-based approach. The paper investigates the importance of interpersonal versus professional connections and identies the role of communication in the initiation and realization of cooperative action. The results show that cooperative behavior in tourism destination transpires via interpersonal preferences, which likely override institutional agreements. Embedding an actors behavior in the destination community context and therefore taking account of the multiple relations that affect him and the various cooperation processes hes involved in, extends the current research on organizational and institutional cooperation to the individual level with respect to both professional and personal conditions. LITERATURE REVIEW For a purposeful approach, this section rst explains the need for cooperation and highlights the peculiarities of cooperative behavior in tourism destinations with the help of selected literature. While cooperation research in tourism destinations offers numerous contributions, theoretical foundations are meager. Therefore, in the second section the prevalent theories which explain cooperative behavior provide a differentiated picture of the phenomenon. In the third section, the constructs and items derived from the theories set the basis for the empirical research presented in the subsequent section. Figure 1 explains the logic of the three parts of literature research by emphasizing the main purposes and pointing out that cooperative behavior takes place in three different contexts (regions and communities, organizations/rms, institutions/administrative and governing bodies) and at three different levels (individual, groups, organizations). Cooperation in Tourism Destinations In communities, three phenomena constrain cooperative behavior among stakeholders and their institutions (Ostrom, 1991). The rst one is the tragedy of the commons, with no incentive for institutions to avoid the overexploitation of common resources (e.g. natural

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distinguishing the theories underlying cooperation and

deriving the constructs and items for the empirical research

identifying the need and the peculiarities of cooperation in tourist destinations

2.2. Theories explaining cooperation

2.3. Determinants and constructs of cooperative behavior

2.1. Cooperative behavior in tourist destinations

objects of research regions and communities organizations/ firms institutions/ administrative and governing bodies level of research individual groups organizational

Figure 1. Connection Between the Three Parts of Literature Research

landscape, cultural assets) (Hardin, 1968), and therefore the lack of pricing of public goods due to missing property rights. The second one is the prisoners dilemma, which induces the actors, under the conditions of limited information and non-repeated rounds, not to cooperate even though they would be better off if they cooperated (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). The third one is the challenge of collective action, whereby collective failure and the individuals inability to acknowledge the importance of collective goods increases with the size of the groups, their homogeneity, and the lack of institutional structures that promote collective action (Olson, 1965). Hence, cooperation among stakeholders in tourism destination communities is necessary but per se neither obviously occurs nor is formally established (e.g. through public authorities). Cooperative behavior is multilayered and uid when rms and institutions act with public goods and within the public space. In fact, shared beliefs and preferences, stable membership, and continued and direct relationships are typical characteristics for local and regional communities (Singleton & Taylor, 1992). Nee describes this in the following way:
Formal rules are produced and enforced by organizations such as the state and rms to solve problems of collective action through thirdparty sanctions, while informal norms arise out of networks and are reinforced by means of ongoing social relationships, to the extent that members of networks have interests and preferences independent of

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what rulers and entrepreneurs want. The respective contents of informal norms and formal organizational rules are likely to reect opposing aims and values (Nee, 1998, 8687).

Consequently, in light of community-based tourism planning, cooperation is a process of joint decision making among autonomous, key stakeholders of an inter-organizational, community tourism domain (Jamal & Getz, 1995). Empirical research on cooperation among stakeholders in tourism destinations is rather recent and presents a wide range of issues and challenges. A substantial body of literature deals with community planning and the role of local institutions and local residents (Getz & Jamal, 1994; Gill & Williams, 1994; Ritchie, 1999; Robson & Robson, 1996). Although community planning approaches are criticized (Taylor, 1995), they are an expression of what happens in everyday life in tourist communities: people meet in their professional environment or privately; talk about issues and about other people; form a view on something; have disputes or form friendships; and make decisions at a personal and institutional level. While earlier contributions in this eld focused on the community as a social system consisting of local residents, recent empirical research discusses community planning with a more strict classication of stakeholder groups, of which the local residents are at most one (Byrd, 2007; Huybers & Bennett, 2003; Reed, 1997; Ryan, 2002; Timothy, 1998; Wang & Fesenmaier, 2007). While stakeholder theory addresses morals and values in managing an organization (Freeman & McVea, 1984), it does not help understand why individuals, stakeholder groups and organizations cooperate or not. In fact, gathering stakeholders at a round table is no guarantee for initiating collective action, launching joint projects or sealing alliances. The mechanisms and conditions for cooperation are specied in a number of different theories. Theories Explaining Cooperation Cooperation studies at different levels (i.e. between institutions/ administrations, between rms/organizations, and in communities) distinguish six major theories/approaches: (1) game theory, (2) rational choice theory, (3) institutional analysis, (4) resource dependence theory, (5) transaction cost economics, and (6) social exchange theory. While they could all be used as a single research approach, today they complement one another and contribute jointly to the understanding of the complex phenomenon of cooperation. Perhaps the rst most specic theory laying the fundaments of cooperative behavior is game theory, whereby a set of players carries out a set of moves and attains payoffs for each combination of moves (i.e. strategies). Cooperative games have been described early in the development of game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Not surprisingly, game theory was the rst approach to help forge a theory of cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Even until recently, some

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empirical research on cooperative behavior rests on pure game theoretical assumptions, between institutions (Dinar & Wolf, 1994), between organizations (Heide & Miner, 1992; Hollander, 1990), and between individuals in communities (Bardhan, 1993; Carpenter, Daniere, & Takahashi, 2004). Compared to the other approaches, game theory could be seen as the stem out of which the younger branches have evolved. The rst main branch, tightly linked to game theory, is rational choice theory. It assumes that the behavior of individuals maximizes personal advantage (Arrow & Hahn, 1971). Rational choice theory has become popular to explain cooperative behavior in studies of interest groups, coalitions and bureaucracy (Dinar & Wolf, 1994; Dunleavy, 1991; Gately, 1974; Lang, 2002). However, individuals act as members of organizations as well; and organizations originate and affect cooperative behavior with given rules and norms. Hence, institutional analysis helps understand the structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperative behavior (North, 1971). Like rational choice, institutional analysis is predominantly used for cooperation studies between administrative bodies and international institutions (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Martin & Simmons, 2005), as it offers direct access to questions regarding the development of strategies at an institutional level. Additionally, in order to specify imbalances in cooperation, resource dependence theory implies that organizations have different resources which are a basis of power. Hence, organizations are dependent on each other because of different endowments due to their differing environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Contributions on cooperation referring to resource dependence theory are found not only at the institutional/national level (Christiansen, 2001; Remmer, 1998) but also at the organizational (Lee, Chen, & Kao, 2003; Lusch & Brown, 1996) and at the tourism community level (Jamal & Getz, 1995; Timothy, 1998). Following the thread of rationality laid by game theory, we come to transaction cost economics. In contrast to rational choice, which explains the maximization of advantages or prot, transaction cost economics assumes that individuals and organizations minimize all the costs incurred in economic exchanges (including cooperation processes). Transaction costs are determined by their frequency, specicity, and uncertainty as well as by the limited rationality and the opportunistic behavior of the involved actors and organizations (Williamson, 1979). In cooperation studies, transaction cost economics is valuable particularly at the organizational level (Fritsch & Lukas, 1999; Gulati, 1995; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Luo, 2002; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). However, all the above mentioned studies have combined transaction cost economics with the sixth major theory: social exchange theory. Related to rational choice theory, social exchange theory emphasizes social traits of cooperative games like anticipated reciprocity, expected gain in reputation and inuence, altruism and

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perception of efcacy as well as direct reward (Blau & Alba, 1982; Ekeh, 1974; Emerson, 1962; Homans, 1962). Empirical research on cooperative behavior based purely on social exchange theory could be found in the eld of inter-organizational cooperation (Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Rodrguez & Wilson, 2002) and in tour ism networks and communities (Aas et al., 2005; Pesamaa & Hair Jr., 2007, 2008). Beside these six major theories/approaches, there are single contributions that highlight specic facets of cooperative behavior. For example, cooperation research may focus on contractual dimensions and hence ground itself in contract theory and negotiation theory (Ness & Haugland, 2005) or may look at cultural differences by confronting individualism with collectivism (Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998). Other research stems from organizational theories, such as organizational learning (Doz, 1996), the resource-based view (Denicolai, Cioccarelli, & Zucchella, 2009), communicative rationality (Innes, 1996), or a purely structuralist perception (Williams, 2005). To summarize, cooperative behavior is worthwhile if there is a payoff based on a strategy (game theory) that maximizes advantages (rational choice theory). Actors must take into account that cooperative games take place in an institutional context with different norms and rules (institutional analysis) and different resource endowments, which cause different distribution of power (resource dependence theory). Cooperative behavior is also convenient if costs incurred over the whole process are minimized (transaction cost theory). Finally, cooperative behavior takes place in a social context in which the actors strive to gain reputation and rewards (social exchange theory). The next section derives a set of constructs and items from the discussed theories which help develop the measurement construct and the variables for the empirical study. Determinants and Constructs of Cooperative Behavior Literature on cooperation repeatedly combines and sometimes contrasts (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006) two main types/approaches, namely the formal, contract-based and the informal relation-based one. Both approaches could be seen as complementary or alternative perspectives in the discussion of cooperation (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). While formal contract-based cooperation is often a subject of research for cooperative behavior between institutions and administrative and governing bodies (Christiansen, 2001; Dinar & Wolf, 1994; Martin & Simmons, 2005; Remmer, 1998), informal relation-based cooperation is distinctive for cooperation in regions and communities (Aas et al., 2005; Bardhan, 1993; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Denicolai et al., 2009; Timothy, 1998). The rst one regards cooperation as a formal agreement which originates in institutional and organizational resources and assets (Fritsch & Lukas, 1999; Lee et al., 2003; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006), economic dependencies (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Remmer, 1998; Rodriguez, Langley, Beland, & Denis, 2007), and

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explicitly expected mutual gains (Gately, 1974; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Ness & Haugland, 2005). The formality of contracts relates not only to the results of the cooperative actions but also to the governance of relationships established in the course of the cooperation process (Ness & Haugland, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Hence, it originates in the professional and institutional context, in which individuals and organizations operate. In contrast, informal relation-based cooperation emphasizes mutual trust (Bardhan, 1993; Denicolai et al., 2009; Pesamaa & Hair Jr., 2007; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), personal commitment (Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), and interrelationships (Chen et al., 1998; Innes, 1996; Rodriguez et al., 2007). These dimensions could drive cooperative behavior in an organizational context, in which formal contracts govern as well. However, they are so important that they could substitute the role of formal contracts (Gulati, 1995; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Both approaches take into account that cooperation is a multiple-round game at organizational (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) as well as individual levels (Carpenter et al., 2004; Doz, 1996; Luo, 2002; Rodrguez & Wilson, 2002), and that cooperative behavior is supported by effective communication (Aas et al., 2005; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Figure 2 illustrates the connection between the six theories and the formal contract-based versus the informal relation-based cooperation

institutional analysis

rational choice theory

transaction cost economics

resource dependence theory

game theory

social exchange theory

formal contractbased cooperation

institutional, organizational resources economic interdependencies explicit mutual gains

informal relationbased cooperation

mutual trust personal commitment interrelationships

effective communication multiple rounds

communities of individuals institutions/ administrative and governing bodies organizations/ firms

cooperation at various levels and with different intensities in tourist destinations

Figure 2. Linking Theories, Cooperation Approaches, and the Application to Destinations

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approach. While institutional analysis, rational choice theory, and transaction cost economics clearly point to the importance of formal contract-based cooperation, social exchange theory relates to the informal relation-based approach. Research based on the resource dependence theory as well as the game theory applies for formal as well as for informal cooperation. Reading Figure 2 from top to bottom, the theory level indicates the specic mechanisms that are relevant in cooperation. The formal and the informal approach relate both to the dimensions which account for the theoretical mechanisms. Analyzing these dimensions helps operationalize the variety of possible cooperation mechanisms which occur in tourist destination communities, because as we see in the bottom circle, cooperation involves institutions, organizations, and individuals and cooperative behavior produces various forms and intensities of cooperation. As indicated above, for tourism destination communities there may be both formal contract-based as well as informal relation-based types of cooperation approaches, depending on the specicity of the agreement and the conditions and circumstances under which the actors convene. As the actors represent institutions and organizations, they are not only rational in their decision to cooperate but they also show a propensity to cooperate in a professional environment. Hence, we can assume that on one hand cooperative behavior is supported by professional acquaintance and institutional/organizational connections. On the other, we must assume that actors are likely to cooperate if they trust and understand each other, sometimes independently from their institutional/organizational afliation. But which of the two assumptions is valid? Or are both equally relevant? These issues underlie the fundaments of the empirical research. While the theories presented in the previous section help explain the broader context of cooperative behavior and serve as cornerstones for the nal discussion section, the differentiation between formal contract-based and informal relation-based cooperation denes the item selection for the empirical study. METHOD Research Questions and Measurement Construct In the empirical part, the research hypothesizes and tests four constructs for cooperative behavior derived from the literature research: formal contracts; relational preferences; communication behavior as modulating construct between the rst two; and cooperative behavior as the dependent construct. Eleven variables represent the constructs: The rst three relate to formal contracts. They are (1) institutional connection (actors cooperate because their institutions are formally connected to each other) (Gulati, 1995; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001), (2) professional contact (actors cooperate because of professional reasons, even if they would not want to; working together is explicitly not formulated as cooperation) (Innes, 1996;

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Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2007; Timothy, 1998), and (3) political contact (actors cooperate because they share common political interests or are obliged to work together at the political level, e.g. municipal authorities, commissions) (Benson, 1975; Yeung, 1997). The next three reect communication behavior, namely (4) communication intensity (actors communicate with some people more intensely than with others) (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Rodrguez & Wilson, 2002), (5) contact ease (actors have easier access to some people than to others, e.g. if they want to discuss something with them or if they want to initiate a collective action) (Christiansen, 2001; Rodrguez & Wilson, 2002), and (6) information exchange (actors share information about the destination and about other people, including gossip) (Heide & Miner, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Three other variables refer to relational preferences, which are (7) sympathy (actors like some people more than others) (Bardhan, 1993; Pesamaa, Ortqvist, & Hair, 2007), (8) trust (actors trust some people more than others) (Gulati, 1995; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Zaheer et al., 1998), and (9) understanding (actors get along with some people better than with others) (Gulati, 1995; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). Finally, (10) starting initiatives (actors launch initiatives and projects more easily with some people than with others) (Carpenter et al., 2004; Ness & Haugland, 2005; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer et al., 1998), and (11) success of initiatives (implemented initiatives are more or less successful) (Doz, 1996; Lee et al., 2003; Ness & Haugland, 2005), describe cooperative behavior. The context of cooperative behavior among actors and organizations in tourist destination communities comprises various areas of cooperation (e.g. the formal creation of a marketing pool, the development of a jointly owned sport facility, the establishment of a sales deal with the help of travel packages) and various intensities of cooperation (e.g. the formulation and the development of a common price strategy in the committee of a transport association, the shuttle service between a hotel and a ski school). Additionally, cooperative behavior takes place between and among public institutions and private organizations as well as between single individuals and therefore in a setting in which the term cooperation assumes different meanings depending on the role of the respondents and the organizational context in which they operate. The research of this paper is not to investigate which type of cooperation is originated and founded on which dimensions. It does neither categorize nor evaluate any type of outcome from cooperative behavior. As a matter of fact, it focuses on the drivers of human behavior that lead to establish every kind of cooperation. Independently from the abovementioned differentiations of cooperation, the herein presented study assumes that cooperative behavior leads through formal or informal conditions to more or less successful results. Hence, the variables starting initiatives and success of initiatives reect the whole universe of cooperative processes as understood by various respondents in various settings. By asking them about the success of initiatives, the study takes into account that every respondent could

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consider more than one initiative and therefore more than one cooperative process. Thus the answers comprise the individuals perception of possible multiple rounds, a dimension which is only explicitly operationalized in longitudinal studies. Based on the abovementioned considerations, two null hypotheses guide the empirical research of this paper:
1. The approaches of formal contract-based and informal relation-based cooperation are not valid for the case of a tourist destination community. 2. Cooperative behavior is not depending on variables referring to formal or to informal cooperation.

Figure 3 presents the constructs relating to the hypotheses. Institutional connections, professional contact, and political contact are assumed to refer to formal ties (named here formal contracts) while sympathy, trust, and understanding represent relation-based variables (named relational preferences). The construct communication behavior could relate both to formal contracts and/or relational preferences, because communication intensity, ease of getting in contact, and information exchange are observable in either environment. Hence, this construct acts as a modulating dimension between the other constructs. Finally, starting initiatives and success of initiatives reect

formal contracts

communication behavior

institutional connection (My institution and X's institution are connected. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

professional contact (I have professional contact with X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

communication intensity (I often have contact with X. valued 1, 2, 3, 4)

contact ease (It's easy for me to get in contact with X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

political contact (I have political contact with X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

information exchange (I exchange information with X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

relational preferences

cooperative behavior

sympathy (I find X likeable. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

trust (I trust X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

starting initiatives (I could start initiatives/ projects well with X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2) success of initiatives (My initiatives/ projects with X have been successful. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

understanding (I get along well with X. valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

Figure 3. Hypothesized Constructs and Variables

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the effect of cooperative behavior. In Figure 3, the sentences in parentheses refer to the question as formulated in the questionnaire. Research Site The case for the empirical research is a midsized tourist destination in the European Alps. The destination consists of ten small municipalities and in 2005 had a population of approximately 17.000 people as well as a total area of 563.18 km2. The destination is well-known as a winter sport resort for visitors from German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) and has recently gained popularity in further European markets like the BENELUX countries. While the destination still counts only approximately two million tourist overnights per year and the local economy is not solely depending on tourism, local and regional authorities consider investments in tourism a key issue for the next generation. Hence, public authorities are absorbed with issues regarding land use planning, road and trafc, and public costs due to strong seasonality. Simultaneously tourism entrepreneurs are challenged by workforce recruitment from bordering regions and staff professionalization, price positioning and differentiation as well as day tourism and alliances and current mergers between the four ski area companies and numerous small hotels and guesthouses. These central issues have stimulated a series of planning projects and workshops over the past ve years or so with the aim of increasing joint collaboration between the destinations organizations and institutions. Hence, the analyzed destination is an ideal case study for capturing the facets of cooperative behavior currently happening at different levels for different reasons and among different actors representing different stakeholder groups and institutions. Survey Instrument and Data Collection The eld work for this study includes in-depth interviews supported by a semi-structured questionnaire. In a rst step, twelve prominent actors were interviewed from a group of private companies and public authorities, which a year earlier had participated in a process of destination strategy development. Among other questions, the respondents could name a maximum of ve other prominent actors, thus producing a snowball sample (Scott, 2000, 56), which ended with 42 complete interviews and two non-participants. The snowball sample ended with the last respondent naming other actors which had already been interviewed. Returning back to all the 42 actors and confronting them with the relationships to the other 41 would have not been purposeful because of the following reasons. First, nominating prominent actors implies a minimal acquaintance with the named individual and hence a high probability that the respondent could answer reliably and completely. As a matter of fact, few respondents named some individuals whom they did not know personally (12 out of 171 nominations).

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Confronting the respondents with relationship oriented questions referring to all the 41 actors would unnecessarily prolong the research as well as the duration of the interviews and yield useless data. Second, we can assume that nominating other individuals implies a particular relationship. One that is in fact related to some kinship, possibly originated from a cooperative process. Hence, by asking the respondents to name other actors they reckon to be important, we have a reliable indication not only for acquaintance but also for previous and/or current formal and/or informal cooperation. For the named actors, every respondent could either conrm (2, 1) or reject (2, 1) the attribute (i.e. the variable) with regard to the named person (see Table 1). The variable communication intensity is coded with a slightly different scale (4 = daily, 3 = weekly, 2 = monthly, 1 = yearly). The data collected in the eleven network matrices all refer to the same relations among actors. So, the networks form a set of multiplex data, with simultaneous multiple relations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The respondents could choose whether to ll out an online survey to which they had direct access or to be interviewed personally or by telephone. The majority of the respondents preferred to be interviewed by phone. This approach proved to be effective, because the respondents mostly preferred to deliver information if they could speak personally and explain their answers, which at the end delivered a clear and distinct choice along the Likert-scale. Data Treatment and Analysis The subsequent analyses used the eleven asymmetric, valued networks with the original codication from the interviews. Obviously, not every link between actors implies an initiative/cooperation. In 12 out of 171 nominations the respondents had never cooperated with
Table 1. Rotated Factor Loadings for Out-Degree Centralities
Variables Factor 1 (eigenvalue 41.9%) .07 .10 .09 .12 .25 .50 .80 .47 .59 .72 .74 Factor 2 (eigenvalue 18.8%) .73 .74 .69 .34 .15 .49 .07 .12 .02 .04 .24 Factor 3 (eigenvalue 9.3%) .24 .14 .26 .80 .82 .31 .18 .74 .70 .53 .35

Institutional connection factor 2 Professional contact factor 2 Political contact factor 2 Communication intensity factor 3 Contact ease factor 3 Information exchange not assignable Sympathy factor 1 Trust factor 3 Understanding factor 3 Starting initiatives factor 1 Success of initiatives factor 1

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the named persons before. Thus, missing data are not valued and are represented with a zero in the analyses. The analysis consists of three steps. First, for the eleven asymmetric, valued matrices, Freemans centrality degrees produced distinct out-degree and in-degree centrality lists. The merged out- and in-degree lists for the eleven variables generated two separate lists, one with only outdegree and one with only in-degree values. A factor analysis with principal component analysis and VARIMAX factor rotation yielded three factors for out-degrees and two factors for in-degrees. For the research at hand, the results from the factor analysis provided the empirical background to discuss the hypothesized constructs and dene the variables for the third analysis. Second, an average transformation procedure merged the original asymmetric, valued matrices assigned to the respective factors resulting from the factor analysis. The average transformation procedure added the cell values of the matrices and divided them by the number of matrices, reducing two or more matrices to one. Third, regressions and correlation analyses of the network matrices used a QAP (quadratic assignment procedure). The algorithms adopt quadratic assignment procedures to develop standard errors to test for signicance of association. In a rst step, they compute coefcients and related measures between the cells of the two data matrices by considering the cell values in the rows as well as in the columns of the respective matrices. In a second step they synchronously and randomly permute rows and columns of one matrix and recalculate the correlations or the regressions as well as the other measures (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Step-wise elimination of non-signicant variables for the multiple regression produced a distinct model, while the correlations between the variables allowed to exclude covariance of independent variables in the regressions. The nal model presents all independent variables having signicant values, the model t producing a signicant value (at least p < 0.01), and the Pearsons correlation coefcient between the two independent
Table 2. Rotated Factor Loadings for In-Degree Centralities
Variables Factor 1 (eigenvalue 81.0%) .74 .93 .97 .98 .98 .10 .89 .97 .95 .94 .90 Factor 2 (eigenvalue 9.8%) .22 .27 .10 .04 .12 .98 .40 .14 .23 .07 .21

Institutional connection factor 1 Professional contact factor 1 Political contact factor 1 Communication intensity factor 1 Contact ease factor 1 Information exchange factor 2 Sympathy factor 1 Trust factor 1 Understanding factor 1 Starting initiatives factor 1 Success of initiatives factor 1

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variables being <0.3. All analyses were executed with the UCINET 6 package (Borgatti et al., 2002). RESULTS Tables 1 and 2 display the rotated factor loadings for the out-degree and in-degree matrices. The factor analysis for the out-degrees with a cumulative eigenvalue percentage of 70% produces three factors; and the analysis for the in-degrees with a cumulative eigenvalue percentage of 90.8% identies two factors. The more differentiated picture of the factor analysis for the out-degrees reects some basic consideration of the hypothesized constructs. Factor 2 corresponds to the construct formal contracts, and factor 1 adds to the construct cooperative behavior the item sympathy. Factor 3 combines the remaining variables of the construct relational preferences (i.e. trust and understanding) with two variables of the modulating construct communication behavior, namely communication intensity and contact ease. According to the out-degrees, the variable information exchange is not clearly assignable to any factor. However, the factor analysis for the in-degrees identies information exchange as one single factor. Based on the factor analyses above and referring to the second research question, the QAP regression model is based on one dependent and three independent variables, just as illustrated in gure 4: one matrix with the merged variables sympathy, starting initiatives, and success of initiatives, named cooperation and sympathy and used as a dependent variable, one matrix with the merged variables institutional connection, professional contact, and political contact, named as the original construct formal contracts and used as the rst independent variable; one matrix with the merged variables trust, understanding, communication intensity, and contact ease, named relational communication and used as the second independent variable; and one matrix with variable information exchange, named information exchange, used as the third independent variable. Table 3 presents the results from the regression model. In the rst regression model, the variable formal contracts produces a non-significant result (p. 0.154) and hence is eliminated. The second regression yields the model as presented in Table 3 with a strongly positive inuence of relational communication and a weakly negative effect of information exchange on trust and cooperation. Table 4 displays the Pearsons correlation coefcients between the dependent and independent variables, proving that the nal model

Table 3. Regression Model for Trust and Cooperation Model and Coefcients Signicant at p < 0.01

Adj. R2 0.76

Standardized coefcients Relational communication Information exchange

0.88 0.05

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Table 4. QAP Correlation Coefcients all Coefcients Signicant at p < 0.01

Variables Cooperation and sympathy (1) Formal contracts (2) Relational communication (3) Information exchange (4) (1) (2) (3)

0.15 0.87 0.17

0.18 0.36

0.25

with the independent variables interpersonal communication and information exchange passes the test against covariance. DISCUSSION Validity of Hypothesized Constructs The results from the factor analysis show that not all the hypothesized constructs are valid. While formal contracts in the factor analysis of the out-degree lists consist of exactly the three items hypothesized in Figure 3, the other constructs look slightly different. As expected, the variables in the construct communication behavior relate to different factors. In particular, information exchange plays its own separate role, as indicated by the factor analysis from the out-degree list and conrmed by the factor analysis from the in-degree list. In contrast, communication intensity and contact ease refer to trust and understanding. Hence, for the case of the tourism destination, the variables with regard to information and communication do not connect to the formal, contract-based environment but rather to the informal, relation-based environment of the prominent actors. Finally, cooperative behavior is a stand-alone construct, however, with the addition of sympathy, a variable expressing social afnity and bridging to the strong inuence of relation-based collaboration. Figure 4 visualizes the nal results. In summary, contrasting the contract-based approach with a relationbased approach proves to be a valid and useful differentiation. Whereas the relation-based approach shows a strong effect on cooperative behavior, the contract-based one is not inuential. Hence, in the tourism destination, relevant actors cooperate with one another detached from formal professional or political bonds, on the basis of mutual trust and understanding reinforced by efcient and frequent communication. Effects on Cooperation and Sympathy The adjusted constructs after the factor analysis and the QAP regression results deserve a thorough discussion. First, sympathy goes along with starting initiatives and success of initiatives and not with trust and understanding. Two phenomena explain

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formal contracts
institutional connection professional contact

information exchange

information exchange

political contact

relational communication
trust understanding

cooperation and sympathy

starting initiatives

success of initiatives

communication intensity

contact ease

sympathy

Figure 4. Conrmed Constructs and Inuence on Cooperation and Sympathy

this rather counter-intuitive result. For one, trust and understanding are different from sympathy because they are part of cooperation as a recurring and reinforcing process (Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). In fact, trust and understanding (slowly) evolve with the help of supporting and facilitating communication and therefore must constantly pass the test against betrayal and misunderstanding. In contrast, sympathy expresses a subjective feeling or emotion towards another person, and is suggested it is a component for cooperative behavior (Frank, 2001), not a condition or outcome of the cooperation process. In fact, from an economic point of view, sympathy is an inverse function of distance (Sally, 2002; Smith, 1759) and therefore an interdependent utility function (Fontaine, 2008), while trust and understanding persist despite distance. Recent behavioral game theory takes into account that interdependencies during the games lead to sympathy, just as cooperation processes occur (Binmore, 1998; Camerer, 1997; Green, 2002; Sally, 2001). Second, information exchange relates neither to communication intensity nor to contact ease. As operationalized in the in-depth interviews and presented in the method section information exchange includes the following additional explanations: exchanging information about things happening. . .or about people. . .maybe gossip as well. Combined with the fact that information exchange has a weak negative inuence on cooperation and sympathy, this activity is less a process of enforcing relations or socializing and more a stand-alone rule, induced by the community as a social system. The rule of information exchange

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requires the actors to (regularly) adhere to it, as in a sort of ritual. In this sense, information exchange is attributable to the norms and obligations occurring in the development of social capital theory (Burt, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 2000), and more specically as shared codes and language as part of the cognitive dimension of social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). This helps explain the variables slightly negative effect on cooperative behavior and sympathy, suggesting that (self-)imposed rules in order to maintain ones personal integration in a community do not necessarily increase sympathy towards others. In fact, they increase distance because one feels obliged to exchange information with people one dislikes or even with people perceived as rivals (Mauss & Evans-Pritchard, 1954). Concurrently, the less people exchange information with others, the less they may be biased and therefore the higher the tendency to initiate an unbiased cooperation. Third, the variables in the new construct relational communication correspond to the notions presented in the literature research about relation-based cooperation. Communication intensity and ease of getting in contact support trust and understanding. All of them are a strong fundament for cooperative behavior. Thus, for the surveyed actors, cooperation inside the destination is subject to interpersonal bonds and their development. CONCLUSION Implications The results in this paper point to a series of implications for practice and for research. Although an analysis of the six major theories on cooperative behavior could not be carried out systematically, some specic results refer directly to them. First, cooperative behavior among actors and stakeholder groups in tourism destinations is an interpersonal business. Cooperative behavior is not based on clinical games and does not follow pure rational theoretic principles. This explains why alliances, mergers or simply collective initiatives and projects are not realized despite the logic based on rational economic principles. Hence, when selecting and approaching the appropriate constellation of representatives e.g. for destination planning and development, considering the people rst, and secondly the institutions they represent, is an effective and promising approach. Second, tourism destination communities distinguish themselves less by formal rules and norms of cooperation and more by autonomous key actors, a phenomenon described in policy research with the help of actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997) or collective memory (Rothstein, 2000), where past individual experiences affect future behavior more than the individuals afliation to his institution. Formal, contract-based connections and cooperation may permeate small communities such as tourist destinations as well. In fact, companies

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develop and install cooperation agreements, while public institutions like municipalities create their norms and laws. Institutions are dened as the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990). However, the origin of effective cooperation is produced spontaneously in the course of social interactions in networks of personal relations, a less complex structure of personal interactions which generally occurs in smaller groups (Nee, 1998, 87). Communication intensity reinforced through multiple rounds of cooperation as well as effectiveness of getting in contact (in line with transaction cost economics) foster collaboration. Hence, in order to increase cooperation or launch collective action, planners must pay attention to previously installed bonds of trust and understanding among actors, recognizable through intense communication; a fundamental condition which has been described in an exploratory study, so far (Saxena, 2006). Third, information exchange among actors leads neither directly to cooperation nor indirectly to trust or understanding. Launching a collective action between companies whose actors already exchange information but do not exhibit kinship would likely fail. The rule of social exchange theory, according to which anticipated reciprocity leads the actors to offer information in order to gain reputation and inuence and a reward, works inversely. The more information exchange takes place, the less the involved actors will exhibit cooperative behavior, as they already feel that they have complied with the social norms, or they think that exchanging information with perceived competitors is the rule to follow if one wants to be accepted in the community. As a matter of fact, information exchange is a formal process under circumstances of interdependencies (Levine & White, 1961), in order for the actors to stay up to date. Fourth, cooperation processes require reciprocal sympathy. Identifying and highlighting interdependencies among the actors and their institutions helps induce cooperative behavior. In fact, resource dependence plays a central role as cooperative actions take place. However, before and after the cooperative games occur, actors are locked in bounded rationality and are required to repeatedly learn from every experience with their counterparts. The interdependencies which lead to the necessary sympathy during the process are characteristic to community-structured tourism destination, as organizations and institutions are embedded in a system built on and affected by goods with public character (Olson, 1965). Limitations and Further Research The paper has its limitations. First, the results are valid for one destination and could reect the idiosyncratic behavior of individuals in a local/regional culture that is different from those in other destinations. Second, the research in this paper reects only a point in time. No longitudinal data are available.

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Further research in this eld could address the following topics: First, the application of the research in this paper or similar approaches to other destinations could increase the external validity of the results presented herein. Second, longitudinal studies that observe particular dimensions like trust and understanding as well as communication could help describe the mechanisms that foster or hinder cooperative behavior. Third, in this paper, information exchange is discussed as a possible rule adopted in communities. Further research on why and how people exchange information could reject or conrm the observation presented herein and reinforce the importance of social exchange theory. Fourth, analyses of interdependencies among local actors and their need to cooperate combined with sympathy as a control variable could reject or conrm the behavioral game theory context, in which cooperation occurs among actors in communities. REFERENCES
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