On the Brink of World War III 1

Berlin in Crisis Kennedy vs. Kruschev: On the Verge of World War Three

James Bunch HIST 202, Section 49Y-11F Professor Hays December 4, 2011

On the Brink of World War III 2 On the Brink of World War Three Introduction If were going to start a nuclear war, well have to fix things so it will be started by the President of the United States. Not by a trigger-happy sergeant on a truck convoy at a checkpoint in East Germany. (Kempe, p. 260) Those words were spoken by the President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, as we set the stage for the events of Berlin in 1961. Kennedy administration official William Kaufman said, Berlin is the worst moment of the Cold War.

It is often thought that the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was the closest the superpowers of the Cold War came to Armageddon, the ultimate nuclear winter of destruction; however, the chess game of diplomacy and one-upsmanship going on between American President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev a year earlier in Berlin really can be pointed to being the brink of the Third World War. In fact, it was the events of the Berlin Crisis that led Nikita Kruschev to hold off on sending missiles to Cuba until 1962.

On the afternoon of October 27, 1961As ten Soviet T-72 tanks stood approximately 100 yards opposite ten American M-48 Patton tanks at historic Checkpoint Charlie, the official crossing between the Soviet Zone (East Berlin) and the Allied Zone (West Berlin), it signified the first time in history that American and Soviet troops and weaponry faced off against each other. (Kempe, 2011) How different would modern history be if a jittery trigger finger on any of the weapons assembled twitched just enough to launch us into the war to end all wars? Kennedy realized the importance of this fact when he made our opening comment to a trusted advisor.

What were the contributing factors that brought the world to the brink of another major war a little over 15 years after ending the previous one?

On the Brink of World War III 3 Setting the Stage

While Kennedy and Kruschev are the main players, there are a number of other people that helped to shape the events, either cooperatively or for their own purposes. The leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Walter Ulbricht, felt that Kruschev did not take his claims about the situation in East Germany seriously. East German refugees were streaming out of the country through West Berlin in record numbers. The brain drain included many bright, young minds and also took away the strong younger workers that would be needed to run the factories.

The refugee situation also created difficulties for West Germany. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was concerned about the situation, but he held the German view that the goal should be reunification of the two Germanys into one cohesive country again, not the status quo that had developed with two countries and two Berlins. His task was made difficult by West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, a political opponent and outspoken critic of Adenauers policies.

Since Berlin was governed by a four-power pact following World War Two, Kennedy also had to deal with the conflicting views of Frances Charles de Gaulle and Britains Neville Chamberlain. Chamberlain wanted a dialogue among powers while De Gaulle, the war-weary veteran, felt that the only way to deal with Kruschev was on terms he could understand, force and the threat of unleashing the nuclear winter.

In addition to the many American figures and advisors, we find Kennedy turning to retired General Lucius Clay, hero of the Berlin Airlift. Clays arrival during the crisis in Berlin was seen as a sign of hope by the weary citizens of Berlin, East and West. He had a loosely-knit mandate from Kennedy but this did not define his authority or the extent of operations.

On the Brink of World War III 4 A New Dawn Arises

The Berlin Crisis is really a study in the relationship between Kruschev and Kennedy. Nikita Kruschev was an old fox, a veteran of the political maneuvering that takes place at the highest levels of Soviet government. As one of Josef Stalins closest confidants, he was the person Stalin turned to during the pivotal Battle of Stalingrad in World War Two that turned the tide against Hitler and basically saved the Soviet Union from German occupation. As Stalins successor he was responsible for leading his country and the entire Communist bloc forward, yet he renounced many of his mentors policies and even had his body removed from the revered spot next to Lenin and buried in the ground along the Kremlin wall by lesser officials. Kruschev actually advocated a peaceful coexistence with the West and not war, contrary to Communist belief at the time. The refugee crisis was making this very difficult.

John F. Kennedy, the brash young Senator from privilege and status, was the youngest person to ever hold the highest office in America. He did not possess the experience of older politicians and he did not realize the way in which power was really wielded at the highest levels, a fact that would prove to put him at a significant disadvantage in dealing with Kruschev. Kennedy surrounded himself with advisors and allowed these people to debate the issues while Kennedy sat back and listened. Sometimes a consensus would come to fruition, but usually the result was two conflicting views that Kennedy had to choose from, with his own personal feelings coming into play. The mixed messages he was getting from these trusted advisors led to a series of misinterpretations that led to the precipice of nuclear disaster in Berlin.

On the Brink of World War III 5 The Honeymoon Nikita Kruschev was under political pressure at home. The Soviet Union had just suffered through a second disastrous harvest of crops and was stunted in a lack of dialogue or progress with American President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Soviet Union had shot down the CIA spy plane, the U-2 and pilot Gary Francis Powers, as it cruised high above the Siberian plains on a reconnaissance mission. His standing was shaky and the sharks in the water were smelling blood. John Kennedy narrowly defeated Richard Nixon to succeed Eisenhower. Kruschev saw this as a chance to improve relations with the United States. He felt that Kennedy, even though his father was a staunch anti-Communist, would be receptive to improved relations between the two nations. In his New Years toast of 1961, Kruschev was very conciliatory in his remarks, To a peaceful coexistence among all peoples, a gesture he hoped would be reciprocated by Kennedy. Kruschev also hoped to align with West Germany. Kennedys inaugural remarks indicated a receptive tone toward Kruschevs toast and seemed to set the stage for improved relations. Kruschev was eager to meet with Kennedy to discuss Berlin; in fact, this was always at the top of his agenda and he continually reverts back to this whenever he met with U.S. officials, such as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Tommy Thompson. Kennedy wanted to meet with the other Western leaders before a summit, a fact that Kruschev felt was another stalling tactic by the Americans. The start of the Berlin Crisis may even be attributed to remarks by Kruschev in 1958. He announced he was going to renounce post-war agreements, a move to legitimize the East German government; however, it was these agreements that held the key to the fragile stability in Europe at this time. The West was not in any position to agree to such a move and give up Berlin.

On the Brink of World War III 6 It is thought that this Berlin ultimatum was also done, in part, to get Eisenhowers attention. While on a trip to the Soviet Union, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey was summoned to the Kremlin to receive Kruschevs mandate. Kruschev used the example how he removed troops to make Austria a free and neutral country to indicate his vision for Berlin as a neutral entity. This served as a conduit to Eisenhower and Kruschev expected a reply. This led to a visit to the United States by Kruschev in 1959. He was met with great fanfare but there were several missteps that led to Kruschev feeling slighted and mocked, such as being denied the chance to visit Disneyland on a tour of Los Angeles. This put Kruschev in a poor state of mind and the talks with Eisenhower at Camp David never really had a chance to show any progress. Kruschev was prepared to retract his Berlin ultimatum if a summit could be held and Ike agreed to a Paris summit, albeit under pressure from Adenauer and de Gaulle to hold the line. All progress to this point was thrown to the wind when Powers U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. At first, Kruschev felt that this was done by underlings in the American hierarchy to undermine the upcoming Paris Summit; however, Eisenhower publicly acknowledged he authorized the flights. Kruschev felt betrayed and slighted, once again falling into one of his sour moods. Chinas Mao branded Kruschev a Communist betrayal and support at home was again becoming increasingly shaky for the Soviet leader. The failure of Eisenhower to apologize led to Kruschev scuttling the Paris talks and at that point he basically gave up on Eisenhower, but not on the United States. As America led up to the next election it is interesting to note that both Republicans and Democrats courted Kruschev. Kruschevs distaste for Eisenhower led to his desire that Richard Nixon not become the next American President, a fact he later took credit for by failing to release Powers.

On the Brink of World War III 7 Kennedy felt that Eisenhower did not grasp the importance of the Berlin situation. He privately referred to Ike as that old asshole so there really was no love lost between the two men. Ike returned the sentiments, feeling that JFK was an impudent womanizer who rode the coattails of his rich family wealth into office. Eisenhower briefs Kennedy that the best he can expect to gain in Berlin is to maintain the status quo. In response to Kennedys warm inauguration comments, Kruschev releases from captivity two U.S. airmen that went down in Soviet waters and were being held as spies. He also stopped jamming Voice of America radio broadcasts in Eastern Europe and printed the entire unedited text of Kennedys inaugural address in the Soviet press. He truly felt that he would be able to carry on a dialogue with Kennedy and was reaching out in unprecedented ways. The tide turned and the honeymoon quickly ended, mainly because of a diplomatic faux paux. Kruschev made ceremonial remarks at a Communist gathering, remarks he had made several times in the past, that were critical of the West and of dealings with America. This was done to placate the hard-liners in his midst. Ambassador Thompson cabled Washington with his report but failed to mention the remarks were nothing new by Kruschev and all is well. Kennedy did not have this information so when he made his first State of the Union address he took a hard line. Kruschev was outraged and felt Kennedy was sending him a personal sleight in the message. Ambassador Thompson was an experienced diplomat. He felt that Eisenhower failed to pick up on the post-Stalin easing of relations and urged Kennedy to explore a dialogue with Kruschev. Thompson realized that our actions in Germany threatened the survival of the entire Communist bloc if the refugee exodus continued without resolution.

On the Brink of World War III 8 Kennedy Steps In It Even though Kennedy felt that Thompson did not get it about Berlin and continued to feel none of the urgency displayed by Kruschev, he did want to hold a summit with the Soviet leader as a platform to get to know each other with no agenda or defined talks. Part of the reason that JFK was leaning this way was the influence of former Truman cabinet member Dean Acheson. Acheson was a hawk and felt that the only way to deal with the Soviets was by a display of force and power, not through diplomacy and dialogue. It was agreed by all that the loss of West Berlin would be catastrophic and the seriousness of the matter needed to be communicated to the Kremlin. This attitude may have led to Kennedys albatross, the disastrous Bay of Pigs debacle in Cuba. Some feel this was done to impress upon the Soviet Union our desire that democratic rights not be infringed upon, in Berlin or anywhere else, for that matter. While the operation had no U.S. assets or direct involvement, it was clear this was a U.S. initiative from the start. The covert involvement of the United States may have been an effort to insure that the USSR would not take action in Berlin. At the last minute the entire mission, a remnant of the Eisenhower administration, was changed without sufficient intelligence and resulted in a disaster of the highest order. Kruschev was delighted that Kennedy had so botched the Bay of Pigs operation. He now felt he could get the best of Kennedy and wanted to meet with him as soon as possible and showed the cycle of emotions experienced: first, his initial flurry to try to meet with JFK immediately after the inauguration; second, his withdrawal following the State of the Union address; and third, the new revival to meet a weakened Kennedy.

On the Brink of World War III 9 In the background, Kruschev had been dealing with Ulbrichts demands about East Germany and the Berlin situation. Both held the view that Germany would never be reunited and that the eventual isolation of West Berlin would lead to eventually merging into one Berlin under East German rule. In fact, Kruschev met with U.S. reporter Walter Lippman and laid out his plans, perhaps in the hopes this would spur Kennedy to meet. His first position was a moratorium for 2-3 years that would allow both Germanys to work something out. His fall-back position was of grave concern, turning over full authority to control access into West Berlin into the hands of Ulbricht, an act that was expressly forbidden by the Berlin agreement, which stated that the Soviet Union was responsible for access and that East German troops were prohibited from even entering the city. Another significant misstep during this time was that JFK gave approval for his brother Bobby, the U.S. Attorney General, to meet behind the scenes with Soviet spy Georgi Bolshakov, an underling who would be a direct conduit to Kruschev; however, while Moscow was pulling strings and feeding Bolshakov misleading information, Robert Kennedy had the full approval of his brother and was empowered to speak for the President. Through this intermediary process, the Vienna Summit became a reality.

On the Brink of World War III 10 Little Boy Blue Meets Al Capone1 Against the advice of many in his administration, de Gaulle, and Adenauer, Kennedy agreed to meet Kruschev for a summit in Vienna, Austria. The criticism for this meeting was not limited to those close to Kennedy; The German newspaper Der Zeit compared Kennedy to a traveling salesman whose business interests had fallen on hard times, who hoped that meeting with his competitor would improve his prospects. (Wall Street Journal, 1961) The hawks felt that Kennedy was rushing into this meeting and that would be seen as a sign of weakness following the Bay of Pigs. They also felt he was walking right into Kruschevs trap about Berlin, a situation that Kennedy could not expect to gain ground with the Soviets. Kennedy felt he had no option but to agree to the meeting. Kennedy took the rare step of a second State of the Union address to tell Americans that he was going to meet the Soviet leader. He stressed, No formal agenda is planned and no negotiations will be undertaken. (New York Times, 1961) Kruschev felt that Kennedy was setting the stage for a defiant confrontation. The two men were entering this summit with entirely different agendas, another ingredient in this formula for disaster. Among Kruschevs plan was still the desire to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, effectively turning over the control for access to Berlin to the East Germans; it would be they, not the Soviets, who would then be the perpetrators blockading West Berlin.

11

Vienna-based U.S. diplomat William Lloyd Stearman would later teach university students about the summits lessons in a lecture he called by this tag line.

On the Brink of World War III 11 Another factor that remained secret until several years later was the health issues being dealt with by Kennedy. He had a myriad of issues that would be exacerbated by the long trip. In addition, he was also being treated by an unconventional doctor who prescribed frequent injections of a potpourri concoction that included a myriad of drugs that had significant side effects, among these being hyperactivity, nervousness, mood swings ranging wildly from overconfidence to bouts of depression, and impaired judgement. (Hirsch, 1997) Kennedy stopped enroute to visit with French President Charles de Gaulle, who took on the role of mentor and gave advice based upon his many exchanges with Kruschev. He told Kennedy that Kruschev would threaten war and rattle his sabre and suggested Kennedy simply ignore his outbursts as one would react to the playground bully. Two Days of Agony As the summit in Vienna begins, it was apparent that Kruschev wanted to control the dialogue and upstage Kennedy as much as possible. In significant preparation leading up to the summit, Ambassador Thompson had strongly cautioned Kennedy of becoming engaged in an idealogical debate with the more experienced Soviet leader. That would be playing right into his hands; however, the cocky Kennedy did not heed this advice and felt he could manage the older man. This proved to be a vital mistake, as Kruschev took Kennedy apart, piece-by-piece, issueby-issue, like a surgeon performing brain surgery. Kruschev seemed to treat Kennedy like a child that had been caught with his hand in the cookie jar. Kruschevs raw power was overpowering Kennedys more subtle charms. (Kempe, p. 229)

On the Brink of World War III 12 Kennedy pleased Kruschev by admitting that the Bay of Pigs was a mistake. Kennedy also became the first Western leader to recognize the division of Europe as permanently accepable. Other criticisms included Kennedys failure to challenge Kruschev on the use of force in the GDR (such as riots in 1953) and Hungary (the revolt of 1956), or use the refugee exodus to a better life in the West in defense of his position. This resulted in Kruschevs perception of the weakness of the American President being reinforced further. If Kennedy thought the first day went poorly, he could not have been prepared for the barrage of the second. Kruschev would pursue his agenda on Berlin relentlessly. Kennedy was under the impression they would first talk about disarmament but the Soviet master would have no part of that and hammered his point home time and time again. He had no other focus. Kruschev warned that Moscow had waited as long as they could and would no longer sit by and allow the Berlin issue to be sidelined once again. He told Kennedy that the Soviets would give up all rights in Berlin to the East Germans who would make Berlin a free city. U.S. troops could remain but only in coexistence with Soviet troops (not just in East Berlin but all of Berlin). This resulted in a new Soviet position on Berlin. Kennedys reply was that U.S. commitment to Berlin and Germany was resolute and Kruschevs position was unacceptable. One significant note about the discussions this day is Kennedy became the first U.S. President to use the term West Berlin, as all previous references to the city did not differentiate between the Soviet Sector and the Allied Sector. Kennedys position became one that he would follow that history would regard as tacit approval to the construction of a wall, that the Soviets were free to do whatever they wanted to do in East Berlin, as long as access to West Berlin and the status quo were not in jeopardy. Kennedy felt that Kruschevs ultimatum gave the U.S. a choice of either going to war or giving up on Berlin.

On the Brink of World War III 13 The Wall The aftermath of Vienna would become the reality of the Berlin Wall. Kruschev felt that Kennedy would remain passive to Soviet actions. Kruschev became like a shark smelling blood in the water, giving Ulbricht the green light to barricade East Berlin on July 6, 1961. By this point the refugee exodus was threatening to implode East Germany and the effect could ripple across the entire Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe. Kruschev felt his options were either cutting off traffic to and from Berlin and risking a war with the United States or building a wall, a prospect he felt Kennedy had given him as long as it did not affect West Berlin and allied access to the city. Ulbricht was now in his moment. He already had a plan in place to seal the border and now that Kruschev had given his blessing he moved into action. His plan involved quickly putting up a barbed wire perimeter around all 96 miles of West Berlins perimeter, bringing all trams and trains to a stop at a crucial time, and blocking all exit from the crucial Freiderichstrasse Station. He planned to do this on an early Sunday morning, a period when traffic and movement would be at its least. State Security Chief Erich Hoenecker (who would later become what turned out to be the last East German Premier) was tasked with overseeing the massive manpower that would undertake this historic task. Another message that Kruschev interpreted as a message from Kennedy that the U.S. would not intervene in action to seal the border occurred when Senator William Fulbright appeared on ABC Television. His remarks included comments that the Soviets could reduce tensions by closing the West Berlin escape hatch for refugees. This only served to reinforce the comments to the Soviet leader by Kennedy to this effect. Kennedy remained silent on Fulbright.

On the Brink of World War III 14 In a final meeting between Kruschev and Ulbricht in Moscow on August 3, 1961, the two men went over the details of Ulbrichts plan. Kruschev cautioned Ulbricht to stay within East Berlin entirely and not to risk confrontation with the Americans or impede Allied access. Ulbrichts Operation Rose was set for the middle of the night ten days later. Following the closure, East Berliners would only be granted access to West Berlin by issue of special passes. There would be a ten-day moratorium on travel to East Berlin by those from the west, with the exception of Allied personnel accorded unrestricted access by the Status of Forces Agreement. Kruschev is said to have agonized over the action to close the border but felt that his only option to prevent the downfall of the entire Soviet satellite empire was through containment. It was Reuters News Agency East German correspondent Adam Kelley-Long who was the first to report on the massive operation to seal the border in the morning hours of August 13, 1961. A source reportedly told him that tonight was not the night to go to bed early. In a matter of hours the border was sealed while the West stood by and watched. The four-power agreement expressly prohibited any East German military presence in Berlin; however, it was Ulbrichts well-orchestrated plan that had tens of thousands of GDR regular army, Volkspolizei (the Vopos), and factory militia, a paramilitary force of informers and subversives. This would later be another point of contention, why Kennedy did nothing while this blatant violation was allowed to take place. Ulbrichts plan did not call for a wall to be erected immediately; he was concerned that the West may intervene. It was not until Kennedy stood by and did nothing that Ulbricht determined there would be no intervention, another tacit signal that nothing would be done about the actions to seal the border or the new East German role in matters.

On the Brink of World War III 15 One Last Sequence of One-Upsmanship In later disclosures of his memoirs, JFK tells how he was relieved that Kruschev did not push the issue in West Berlin or impede Allied access. He would not realize until later how his inaction only emboldened the Soviet Premier to press further ahead. Kruschevs major moment was the biannual Communist Party Congress, the 21st edition in October of 1961. Kruschev announces that the Soviet Union will detonate a 50-kiloton nuclear device, again catching the intelligence services of the West flat-footed. Kennedy felt he had to respond but the current American nuclear strategy was narrowly-focused and gave the President few options to maneuver. A new four-phase strategy regarding Berlin was formulated, with increasing escalation from a small scale conventional engagement to full nuclear war. This new strategy was to see American first-strike capabilities employed to its advantage. Kennedy decided on his response to the Soviet test. He made public the true nuclear capability of the United States military and showed the Soviets how far ahead the Americans had progressed in this arena. He also released information that hinted at American intelligence reports about Soviet missile locations. In poker parlance, he showed his hole cards without all the cards being dealt, similar to having a pair of aces in the hole. He used this very public response to send a message to Kruschev that he was prepared to call his bluff.

On the Brink of World War III 16 The Crisis Begins Why, you ask, do I state that now the crisis begins? Wasnt the start of the Berlin Crisis the moment that Ulbricht set in motion his plan to seal the border? It would be concise if the situation was that simple, because as far as Kennedy was concerned, as long as the Soviets and East Germans did not encroach into West Berlin or impede access to East Berlin, he was satisfied with the result. What Kennedy could not envision was Ulbricht taking his inaction as a sign that the American response to further actions would be all bark and no bite. This led to Ulbricht imposing increased border inspections on Allied personnel, not only a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement, but also in defiance of Kruschevs edict that no actions to impede Allied access would be undertaken. In fact, Kruschev had also decided at this time to hold off on deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, an act that played out and ran the course in 1962, Once the border was sealed President Kennedy sent retired General Lucius Clay to Berlin as his personal representative. Clays role muddied the waters, at best, as the chain of command was not clear and Clay had no real authority. Clay was taking the hard line, just as he had when he was singlehandedly responsible for the success of the Berlin Airlift when Stalin prohibited access by the Allies to West Berlin along the 120-mile Helmstedt Autobahn between Checkpoint Alpha and Checkpoint Bravo. Clay would push the envelope, often with no coordination among the military brass or the State Department. His maverick style would eventually lead to the standoff at Checkpoint Charlie. He told diplomatic personnel not to submit to the harassing document checks being undertaken by the East Germans at the border.

On the Brink of World War III 17 On the evening of October 22, 1961, Americas top diplomat in Berlin, E. Allen Lightner, Jr. and his wife, was preparing to go to the theater in East Berlin. As they attempted to cross into East Berlin at the Freiderichstrasse Crossing, the East German Vopos asked to see his papers, disregarding the diplomatic license plates on his vehicle. Lightner refused and attempted to move forward before being blocked in. He was entirely inside East Berlin. He called Clay from his car phone with reports of the situation. Clay immediately mobilized a platoon of the 2nd Battle Group to respond and provide escort for the diplomat. When the troops arrived, the Vopos backed off. Armed soldiers escorted Lightners vehicle through the border crossing, a process repeated twice. This was an historic moment as it became the first time in post-war Berlin that fullyarmed U.S. forces entered the Soviet sector. It appeared that the situation settled down when a Soviet officer finally appeared and took charge of the scene, stressing to his East German counterparts that Allied access to East Berlin was not to be impeded; however, the following morning the GDR said that only U.S. military personnel in uniform would be allowed passage without being challenged to produce their identity documents. On October 27, ten U.S. tanks moved into position at Checkpoint Charlie as they had every day for the past several to back up escorts of cars into East Berlin. After the tanks had retreated to return to their temporary base at Templehof Air Base, at approximately 4:45 PM, officers spotted ten tanks square off 100 yards across from the bright white line signifying the line that divided the Soviet Zone from the American Zone. These tanks appeared Soviet but their markings were obscured and the crews wore non-descript black uniforms with no insignia. It appeared the Soviet Union was attempting to conceal their involvement in the dispute; however, it was quickly determined that these tanks were brand new Soviet T-54s.

On the Brink of World War III 18 At this point the tanks en-route to Templehof are summoned back to Checkpoint Charlie. As the American tanks return, they find that the Soviet tanks have already retreated back out of sight beyond Unter Den Linden and the wide expanse on the east side of the line. The next day had the Soviet and American tanks squared off again. President Kennedy then returned to the back door diplomacy undertaken by Robert Kennedy and Georgi Bolshakov. The result this time was favorable. Kennedys message to Kruschev saying that he wanted to end the confrontation, asking the Soviets to withdraw and that the Americans would do the same, was favorably received and on October 28th at 10:30 PM Kruschev ordered his tanks away from the border. This was followed half an hour later by the withdrawal of the American tanks. While the crisis was averted and the imminent start of World War Three was avoided, things would never be the same. The failure of U.S. action to stop the construction of first the temporary barrier and later the Berlin Wall led to almost another 30 years of oppression for millions of people in the Soviet Bloc. The Cold War was sharpened with the sudden erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. (Adler, p. 637) I personally witnessed the impact of the Berlin Wall. I lived the bureaucracy of Flag Orders to transit the Helmstedt Autobahn to and from West Berlin. With an Allied Forces-Berlin escort, I was able to drive through Checkpoint Charlie uncontested, my escorts ID badge and my U.S. Forces vehicle license the only requirement to bypass a border inspection. I also lived the joy of the ecstatic Berliners when the first crack opened in the Berlin Wall in 1989. I danced on the Berlin Wall with German comrades. I watched as the flow of people from East Berlin streamed into West Berlin, returning with armloads of groceries and toiletries.

On the Brink of World War III 19 I was so taken by the moment that I returned with a can of black spray paint and added my graffiti to the Berlin Wall: They Came, They Saw, They Did a Little Shopping. Imagine my surprise to see my message adorning the front page of Stars and Stripes, the American military newspaper in all of Europe. It was only through hard-line diplomacy that this symbol of oppression came down. Ronald Reagans immortal words to the Soviet Premier during the last stage of the Cold War, Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall, was the symbolic end to a string of firm acts meant to bring the Soviet Union to their knees. It is often opined that had Kennedy taken a similar stance with Kruschev that this atrocity would have never been built, that the Soviets would have understood a message of possible force. That certainly was General Clays intent. It is a shame that Kennedy did not follow the example set by one of his predecessors, Harry Truman, who allowed Clay to carry out the Berlin Airlift. Had Kennedy followed Clays advice, we may have never had to live though the Berlin Crisis, or the resulting Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, which is how I support my assertion that it was the Berlin Crisis, not the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had the world perched on the verge of World War Three.

On the Brink of World War III 20 References Adler, P.J. & Pouwels, R.L. (2008). World Civilizations. Boston, MA: Thomson Kempe, F. (2011). Berlin 1961. New York, NY: G.P. Putnams Sons Wall Street Journal. (1961, June 1). European Review. Retrieved from www.online.wsj.com New York Times. (1961, May 26). Kennedy Called For a Defense. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com