Threats to Domestic Social Accountability: Development Assistance and Aid Effectiveness in sub-Saharan Africa

Independent Paper Jointly Funded by Idasa and ANSA

November 2010 In 2009, Western tax payers spent USD 120 billion1 on development globally. African organisations can influence how much of this money is spent. They can also ask for a greater portion for African organisations and hold decision makers accountable for how these funds are spent. This paper is a step towards demystifying how these funds are spent for African civil society to improve accountability.

Author: Alexander ORiordan Mr ORiordan is a consultant who has previously worked as adviser to the Governments of Kenya and Ethiopia in managing their relationships with donors. Mr ORiordan has also worked on aid effectiveness in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Moldova, Somalia, Viet Nam and Zambia.
1

OECD.org (2010); Development Aid at A Glance: Africa reports Africa received USD 52 billion in commitments in 2008.

PART 1: THREATS TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:..............................................................................3 ODA AND AID EFFECTIVENESS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA..............................................................3 1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................3 2. WHAT IS AID EFFECTIVENESS?..............................................................................................................4 3. WHY IS AID EFFECTIVENESS IMPORTANT TO GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY? 5 TABLE: SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES: GROWTH IN ODA, GDP. ODA AS % OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE.............5 4. BECAUSE WESTERN DONORS ARE COMMITTED TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION, ISNT THEIR PRESENCE GOOD FOR ACCOUNTABILITY? ............................................................................7 5. SPACES TO ENGAGE: THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING ACCESS TO DECISION MAKING..8 5.1. GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT CONSULTATIVE SPACES (TYPICALLY LED BY THE WORLD BANK).................................................................................................................................................10 WHAT IS GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT/HOW DOES CONSULTATION TYPICALLY HAPPEN?..........................................10 WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATION TYPICALLY LIKE? ..............................................................................11 HOW COULD CIVIL SOCIETY BE BETTER REPRESENTED? ....................................................................................13 5.2. NATIONAL AID COORDINATION ARCHITECTURE (TYPICALLY LED BY UNDP/UN RESIDENT COORDINATOR).........................................................................................................................14 WHAT IS THE AID COORDINATION ARCHITECTURE/HOW DOES CONSULTATION HAPPEN?.........................................14 WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATION TYPICALLY LIKE? ...............................................................................14 HOW COULD CIVIL SOCIETY BE BETTER REPRESENTED?.....................................................................................16 5.3. THE EU FAST TRACK INITIATIVE ON DIVISION OF LABOUR ................................................17 WHAT IS THE EU INITIATIVE /HOW DOES CONSULTATION TYPICALLY HAPPEN?.......................................................17 WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATION TYPICALLY LIKE? ...............................................................................17 HOW COULD CIVIL SOCIETY BE BETTER REPRESENTED?.....................................................................................19 5.4. GOVERNMENT (USUALLY MINISTRY OF FINANCE OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) DONOR COORDINATION OFFICES............................................................................................................................20 WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT DONOR COORDINATION OFFICE?..............................................................................20 WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATION TYPICALLY LIKE? .............................................................................20 HOW COULD CIVIL SOCIETY BE BETTER REPRESENTED?.....................................................................................21 6. NEXT STEPS..................................................................................................................................................22 ANNEX A: ODA TO RANDOMLY SELECTED AFRICA COUNTRIES (SOURCE OECD)..............25

Part 1: Threats to Social Accountability: ODA and Aid Effectiveness in sub-Saharan Africa 1. Introduction In November 2009, the Council of Europe agreed an operational framework to fast-track aid effectiveness in preparation for the 2011 meeting on aid effectiveness in Korea. In implementing this framework it is apparent that despite popular perceptions to the contrary European and other donors have made significant advances in aid effectiveness. Most of these advances have happened at the national level and focus on improving coordination and giving government greater ownership through establishing national aid architectures and better joint donor decision making. The importance of country level decision making has grown but is yet to afford significant access to accountability actors in Africa. The purpose of this paper is to explore how these decision making structures can: Improve participation of civil society in donor-government decision making, Better enable domestic accountability and Counterbalance current trends that undermine domestic accountability. Many stakeholders lament the rise of brief case NGOs2 and an apparent paucity of civic organizations meaningfully holding decision makers accountable in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. However, without strong institutions, good human resources and reliable funding, civil society is poorly positioned to build its capacity and protect itself from coercion. To enable critical civil society in sub-Saharan Africa to grow and build its institutional capacities there is a need for systematic investment. There are few signs that this sort of investment will come from private philanthropy as it so often has in the West. There is little indication that African governments are prepared to invest in building domestic accountability organisations. Without government funding or private philanthropy, the importance of directing donor funding to accountability organisations is of high importance. However, recent structural trends in how donor resources are managed appear to undermine independent critical society3. The Southern Africa
2 3

Refers to NGOs seemingly established expressly for the purpose of receiving grants. ANSA/IDASA 2010 Social Accountability in Africa, Chapter 12 and DANIDA Kenya (2009), Study of Public and Non-Public Delivery of Services: Accountability, Efficiency and Support to Nation Building and Democratic Decentralisation.

Trust4 points out that, donors are more likely to fund cost effective, malleable service delivery over critical accountability organisations. There is a growing divide between poorly resourced African organizations and well-resourced international NGOs speaking on behalf of African counterparts. African accountability/civil society organisations are comparatively rare and when arising tend to be poorly resourced and vulnerable to intimidation. Domestic accountability organisations are essential to democratic governance and poverty alleviation because they play a strong advocacy and watchdog role holding decision makers accountable. When poorly resourced they have little access to high level decision makers; this, in turn, creates incentives for donors to support international organisations to promote domestic accountability. To meet their Paris Declaration commitments to improving government ownership and better aligning to national development policies, donors are increasingly decentralising their funding decisions to the country level. Decentralised donor decision making is an enormous opportunity for African civil society to advocate for greater donor commitment to social accountability at the national level. If approached discretely and with due recognition of potential conflicts of interests, this paper could contribute to how African advocacy organisations better mobilise donor5 support. 2. What is Aid Effectiveness? Aid effectiveness is changing the rules and conditions determining how aid is delivered. The purpose of aid is vigorously debated with varying rhetorical emphasis on poverty reduction, economic and sustainable development growth and governance6. The aid effectiveness agenda, however, is dominated by the challenge of how Western donors can improve access to and relationships with developing countries. The primary goal is improving relationships with government. Aid effectiveness proposes to do this by building government capacity regardless the quality of the democracy or space for civil society.
Critical civil society is typically differentiated from civic organisations that see their primary mandate as providing services in partnership (and avoiding critical engagement) with decision makers. 4 Southern Africa Trust 2007 Aid Effectiveness: Trends and Impacts of Shifting Financial Flows to Civil Society Organisations in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa 5 This paper is targeted at ODA and not at the relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs; the paper also does not engage with the impact of international philanthropy. 6 See Weiss, J (2008) The Aid Paradigm for Poverty Reduction: Does it Make Sense? In Development Policy Review, 2008 26 (4): 407:426 or Freund, B (2010) Development Dilemmas in Post-Apartheid South Africa, South Africa, Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal.

In 2005, donors and governments signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration priorities are giving government greater ownership of donor resources, decreasing dissenting and alternative voices by improving harmonisation and increasing alignment with government policy and strategy. The first three of the five7 Paris Declaration principles are already being implemented. The remaining commitments are to improve mutual accountability and managing for results. Commitments to mutual accountability are partly being implemented through independent monitoring; managing for results is yet to be responded to in a uniform way. A greater share of donor resources is granted directly to government by way of budget support. Donors improve harmonisation through national coordination structures and are increasingly setting their priorities on those of the government (i.e. aligning response strategies and to national development plans). 3. Why is Aid Effectiveness Important to Governance and Accountability? Official development assistance (ODA) to most African countries has increased dramatically in real terms and as a proportion of public expenditure. Between 2003 and 2008 most sub-Saharan countries saw a dramatic increase in aid. And, ODA itself is growing: despite the financial crisis net ODA rose to USD 119.6 billion8 in 2009. ODA will likely grow more because current spending of 0.31% is much below the 2010 0.56% and 2015 0.7% targets of gross national income. Africa is positioned to receive a disproportionate rise in ODA in coming years. Of 2009s USD 120 billion only a fifth went to sub-Saharan Africa9 but growing fast: while Africas GDP grew around 5% ODA exceeded 15% per annum (annex).
Table: Selected African Countries: Growth in ODA, GDP. ODA as % of Government Revenue
Country 2008 ODA USD million 57 1,528 Annual Growth in ODA 2002-8 (OECD) 23.5% 23.5% 2009 est. GDP Growth Rate (CIA Fact Book) -0.4% 1.8% ODA % of Nat. Revenue10

Swaziland Kenya
7

11% 26%

The Paris Declaration includes commitments to mutual accountability and managing for results both of which are not being implemented at the same speed as those relating to government ownership. 8 2009 private giving in the USA dropped 3% to USD 304 billion (treble ODA). 9 Excluding humanitarian funding and debt relief. 10 Financial Times; see chart in Annex.

South Africa Ethiopia Malawi Uganda Ghana Mozambique

1,133 3,208 815 1,659 1,280 1,938

20% 20% 16.5% 16% 14.5% -1%

-1.9% 6.8% 5.9% 4% 4.7% 4.3%

2% 133% 164% 83% 38% 167%

Raising the level of ODA levels is often a political imperative. President Obama made doubling American aid an election promise. The UKs recently elected Conservative government slashed national expenditure in every sector except for aid and national health care. At the same time the numbers of donors is increasing: South Korea, for example, allocated USD 700 million to ODA in 2007 and will increase ODA fivefold by 2015. Other emerging donors include the Czech Republic, China, India, Turkey, the Gulf States and even South Africa. Traditional donors are also focusing more on Africa. Australia, for example, is opening new offices and Spain is directing more resources to sub-Saharan Africa. In a 2007 IDRC study, Chin and Frolic note that Africa is slated for the largest increases in Chinese foreign assistance over the next five years.11 Furthermore, an increasing proportion of funding is being directed to lower income countries like Malawi, Mozambique and Ethiopia. When governments rely mainly on tax revenue from elites and the private sector, there is a strong incentive for them to prioritise the needs of the rich over that of the wider population. Many African governments now raise as much money from donors as they do from revenue collection12. This further dilutes the incentive for governments to be directly accountable to the poor. It is important to remember that despite commitments to the contrary, Western donors are even less accountable to Africas poor than African governments are. As such, increasing aid volumes with a greater commitment to funding through government could prove a significant threat to social accountability in Africa. It is also important to remember that one of the key motivators for aid effectiveness is the perception that much of aid is spent ineffectively with little benefit to the poor. Civil society and accountability organisations have proven themselves cost-effective ways for improving the proportion of aid that goes to beneficiaries. These accountability organisations play an important oversight and watchdog role that decreases the likelihood of corruption and/or aid resources being captured by elites. As such, vastly increasing aid without a
11

Chin, G & B. Michael Frolic 2007, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The China Case, Ottawa, Canada: IDRC 12 This accountability relationship is often worsened by governments relying on narrow revenue sources, e.g. from resource extraction, taxing high value imports or concessions.

corresponding increase in accountability mechanisms does little to diminish the risk of using aid inappropriately. 4. Because Western Donors are committed to poverty alleviation, isnt their presence good for accountability?
"We should not underestimate the degree to which a whole set of relationships that Britain had in its old colonial days that went sour have been revitalised and given new life as a result of the country's passionate commitment to development. It has given us a huge position in the worldPeople in the west now understand one of the problems we have had - which is why I am such a huge believer in the issue of better governance - that whilst it might be good to spend 10m on a small scale agricultural project, you might be better spending that money reforming an agriculture ministry." Tony Blair, June 2010

Tony Blair sees the success of aid in improving a relationship gone sour. Repairing this relationship gives the UK a huge position in the world; people in the west now understand that aid money might be better spent reforming a ministry rather than helping small scale farmers. The dominant themes in aid effectiveness are not poverty alleviation, human rights or democratisation; they are: Using aid to improve dialogue with government13, Improving donor participation in government policy setting, Convincing African governments to use Western development models14. Western donors are frustrated that despite being the largest donors to Africa for decades, few countries appear to openly align themselves with Western interests. For European donors, the relationship is more aggravated by uncomfortable reminders and remnants of colonialism. Peter Wanyoni writes in Kenyas Daily Nation, for example15 whereas the murderous dictatorships of the Middle East never receive lectures about democracy or corruption.these diatribes remain the platform on which Western engagement with Africa is always based. Lets face it: the West owns us and knows it only too well. On the question of mutual accountability AFRODADs Charles Mutasa argued in 2008 that donors continue to use unfair, undemocratic and inappropriate policy
13

Mail and Guardian (July 1 2010), South Africa: Johannesburg, In an evaluation of donor performance in Mozambique in May, the government attacked donors by claiming that discussions "often degenerated into mutual accusations" and that relations between the government and donors had "ceased to be a partnership". 14 Development models includes agreeing western concepts on rules of trade, intellectual property rights, movement of capital, who defines a terrorist or a freedom fighter, etc. 15 Daily Nation (June 14, 2010: 13), Kenya: Nairobi

conditionality, in a way that skews recipient accountability away from the citizens of poor countries. [Government and civic groups in the South] at long last [recognise] the critical and indeed, legitimate role played by the other in achieving consistent, sustainable long term development 16. Such sentiments incentivise donors to prioritise improving their image over supporting critical civil society. The risks these trends pose to social accountability are not well voiced. In the parallel session at Accra17, civil society did not call for greater accountability, funding or access to accountability actors. Civil society rather argues that:
Development effectiveness means recognizing that the framework must be based on local, participatory and democratic ownership, without policy conditionalities, in order to move from a focus on managing for development results to one of social justice.18 OEC D 2009

Donors are systematically implementing their commitments to government ownership, alignment and harmonisation with little open recognition of the impact it may have on critical civic actors. Many critics have poorly voiced this threat; to enable domestic accountability, aid effectiveness will have to promote: Safe spaces for civic engagement and accountability, Support to building stronger African NGOs that speak on behalf of Africans, Incorporated accountability mechanisms in new programming, Civil society access and participation in high level decision making. 5. Spaces to Engage: The Importance of Gaining Access to Decision Making To improve ownership, relevance and relationships with government donors are increasingly decentralising their programming decisions to the country level. This decentralisation makes country level decision making structures more important. This decision making, however, tends to happen in forums at a national level that civil society is rarely familiar with. For many donors because of the political risk implied in
16

Mutasa, C (2008, September 4), Africa: Aid Effectiveness The Question of Mutual Accountability, allAfrica.com 17 The Accra meeting on Aid Effectiveness in 2008 was a follow up to the Paris meeting. The Accra meeting resulted in the Accra Agenda for Action (for aid effectiveness). 18 OECD: Civil Society Voices for Better Aids 2009 report An Assessment of the Accra Agenda for Action from a civil society perspective

dictating conditions from headquarters, there is a strong tendency19 to leave the decision of how to involve civil society (and potentially parliament) to country level decision makers. Much effort has been devoted to building aid effectiveness into the ethos of working with the grass roots. Rose Namara (2010) from Ugandas Management Institute argues for the role local authorities play in improving aid effectiveness. On the other end of the spectrum, civil society sees the opportunity to engage in international forums such as at the Accra, Ghana conference on aid that resulted in the Accra Agenda for Action. In Accra, civil society did not argue for greater transparency and access to civil society; rather the focus was on using aid effectiveness to demand greater accountability20 from civil society itself. Part of the challenge is to understand how decision making and funding works. A 2010 report on budget transparency in Mozambique finds:
"One of the main factors in limiting budget transparency is that reports, both central and local, are made too late and/or are not made available. With regard to the decentralised levels, the legal scenario is not conducive to transparency, and the links, in terms of planning, budgeting and accounting, from district to province, as well as from province to central level, are weak or non-existent." The Informal Governance Group Alliance21

The concerns raised by Mozambiques Informal Governance Group Alliance are not unique but a result of poor access to decision making. Donor data is complicated and will likely never be fully incorporated into national data. However, access to available information is largely available in national decision making forums. This paper aims to add value to the work already done by opening debate on how to improve accountability and access to these relatively new national level decision making structures. At the national/country level aid effectiveness opens at least four spaces in which accountability actors could better lobby decision makers: 1.) Consultative spaces required in implementing general budget support,
19

GTZs Task Team on Division of Labour and Complementarity, for example, advised this decision making to happen at country level on a case by case basis. (Regional Workshop on Country-Led Division of Labour Anglophone Africa, Kampala, Uganda: September 28, 2010). 20 Ibid., 21 Aid and Budget Transparency in Mozambique, May 2010, Maputo: The informal Governance Group and Alliance

2.) National/country level aid coordination structures (established in response to the Paris Declaration), 3.) The European and like-minded donors fast-track initiative on division of labour and 4.) Government donor coordination units/sections (typically housed in ministries of finance or foreign affairs). The descriptions elaborated below are the starting point for the second phase of this paper. In the second phase, key informants will be interviewed so as to better elaborate African best practices and how best to go ahead in demanding accountability in these spaces. 5.1. General Budget Support Consultative Spaces (typically led by the World Bank)
What is General Budget Support/How does Consultation Typically Happen?

General Budget support is a funding method that donors use to grant funds directly to government. These funds go straight into the general budget in the same way as tax revenue does; the money is not earmarked for particular activities. General budget support is used in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa and is popular for many donors because it incurs a lower administrative burden in spending (disburse) large resources. General budget support is also popular because it is a cost-effective way of contributing to government spending on social services like education and health. More importantly because general budget support makes governments dependent on donors for their general budget it is motivated as a good way to promote more meaningful dialogue between government and donors. In some countries budget support can constitute the majority of donor funds. In Zambia, for example, an EU official22 estimated in 2010 that 80% of the EUs next country programme would be in the form of general budget support. General budget support is typically implemented without a project steering committee or independent governance structure meaning little conventional opportunity for civil society to pressure decision makers. However, annual consultations on budget support are the norm and usually jointly hosted by the World Bank (a primary budget support donor) and the recipient government.

22

Author interview with EU in context of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support programmes annual consultations in Lusaka, Zambia on June 2nd 2010.

10

Annual consultations on budget support are good opportunities to make decision makers accountable for how these resources are spent. At these annual consultations indicators are chosen that donors use to decide performance if and when to releases resources into the government budget. Indicators can vary from the number of schools constructed to the percentage of, for example, municipal budgets that are made public and given access to civil society actors to ensure accountability. More importantly, as there is no distinction between the management of general budget support and that of national expenditure general budget support consultations are significant accountability opportunities.
What is Civil Society Representation typically Like?

At the donor consultation on setting performance indicators for general budget support in Zambia in 2010 there were no civil society representatives present. At the annual consultation with government, civil society made no presentation nor made its representative known. The most memorable mention of civil society at the June 2nd, 2010 consultation came when one donor asked the Government of the Republic of Zambia to be more accountable for how it used its resources. The government retorted by stating that the only organisations that need improve their accountability are NGOs. There have, however, been informal discussions about involving civil society in the budget support consultations in Zambia. Donors want to see participation from civil society and universities, the government position is more ambiguous. As of 2010 there was no clear civil society champion to lobby for greater participation and accountability. . Poor representation of NGOs in budget support processes is not unique to Zambia. Gould and Ojanen23, researchers at the University of Helsinki conducted extensive research into the consultative processes leading to the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (one precondition and the basis for general budget support). Gould and Ojanen successfully demonstrate that even when these consultative processes aim to improve participation from civil society, they tend to become consent building processes in which vulnerable and marginalized groups are most likely to be marginalized. As general budget support tends to be a multi-donor activity there is room to lobby like-minded donors to improve participation of civil society. Accountability is an important theme in general budget support but tends to concentrate on accountability in service delivery. This should provide a good entry point for civil society to advocate for greater accountability in decision making. Finally, the reason why access
23

Gould, J & J Ojanen (2003) Merging in the Circle The Politics of Tanzanias Poverty Reduction Strategy, Helsinki, Finland: Policy Papers 2,2003 Institute of Development Studies University of Helsinki

11

to this forum is so important is because the indicators agreed in the consultations are incorporated in national policy. Accordingly, when general budget support constitutes a large proportion of government budget, the selection of indicators becomes a de facto setting of government priorities. Setting of national priorities is very important for accountability actors.

12

Note24 Current Civil Society Access to Decision Making Potential to Increase Access to Decision Making Funding Currently Available for Civil Society Potential to Increase Funding Degree of Importance for Accountability

Low Mediu m

High

How Could Civil Society be Better Represented?

Donors and government jointly set indicators by which budget support is managed. These indicators determine what percentage of budget support is actually transferred to the budget. An indicator might be something like Raising the proportion of girls in primary school to 50%. The indicator is typically monitored on the basis of national government reports. On achievement of the indicator a tranche (%) of grant (sometimes loan) funding is released to the general budget of the beneficiary government. Should the indictor not be met, the government risks losing tangible/measurable payments. The setting and measurement of indicators are important entry points for civil society. Donors will typically formulate a common position on proposed indicators. Civil society could better raise their profile by lobbying like-minded donors to include indicators that measure inclusiveness and access for accountability. When it comes to measuring indicators civil society could play a much more important role. In many cases donors privately question the quality of government data; should civil society play a more systematic role in measuring government progress, it would be in a very strong position to influence how donors communicate with government. Furthermore, poor performance on the side of the government results in tangible loss of resources meaning that there are measurable consequences for governments not being accountable. To get involved civil society actors should target like-minded donors partaking in the budget support programme. Here civil society is most likely to find a sympathetic ear with Western bilateral and particularly the smaller donors (e.g. Ireland, Scandinavia donors, Netherlands, etc.).

24

Based on author estimations only will be verified in next stage of exercise.

13

5.2. National Aid Coordination Architecture (Typically led by UNDP/UN Resident Coordinator)
What is the Aid Coordination Architecture/How does Consultation Happen?

The UN and in particular UNDP has succeeded in carving a mandate for itself that takes advantage of current trends in aid effectiveness. In many countries the UN Resident Coordinator has positioned itself as the de facto host to the national donor coordination structure. The following illustration is an example of how aid coordination structures are at the country level. These structures typically involve an overall Donor Coordination Group such as the Donors Assistance Group in Ethiopia or the Cooperating Partners Group in Zambia. The group typically has dedicated staff housed in a secretariat. The secretariat is responsible for setting meeting agendas, documenting decision making and maintaining a working relationship with government. Feeding into this coordination structure are thematic or sector working groups such as in transport, private sector development and almost universally on governance and civil society.
Donor-Government High Level Forum

Ambassador s Group

Donor Coordinatio n Group

One UN/ Resident Coordinator

Thematic/ Technical/ Sector Groups

e.g. Transport

e.g. Governance and Civil Society

What is Civil Society Representation typically like?

Typically speaking there is no formal link between the donor coordination group and civil society. This is a major problem for social accountability because the donor coordination group is a consensus building mechanism; when contentious issues such as politicisation of aid are discussed with the government the donor coordination group serves to develop joint statements and joint approaches. Politicisation of aid, for example, was raised by Human Rights Watch as a major threat to social accountability, governance and human rights in Ethiopia. The government of Ethiopia formulated its defensive position and Ethiopias donors used the Donor Coordination Group (Donor Assistance Group) to form its own consensus position. This consensus position was primarily

14

targeted at protecting donors common working relationship with the Government of Ethiopia rather than to investigate the allegations appropriately. It is for this reason that civil society in Ethiopia found itself in many ways even more isolated after release of the Human Rights Watch report; while before the report donors were sympathetic after the report was released donors cooperated in jointly investigating the allegations and essentially agreeing with the governments position that there is no systematic evidence of political distortion of aid. A key factor enabling donors to come to consensus on these issues without engaging civil society is that civil society is in no way represented in Ethiopias donor coordination structure; furthermore, civil society is not even represented in the donor working groups on governance and on civil society. The national aid coordination architecture is primarily focussed on improving donor coordination and as such lends itself to forums that exclude civil society and government. However, there is pressure to improve access to government and improve transparency in decision making. Both of these drives are opportunities to improve civil society participation particularly in sector/thematic working groups. A good way to begin engaging is to identify like-minded donors, many of which feel the structure is inherently flawed because it is not representative. The aid coordination architecture on its own is a good place to advocate for system wide changes because it includes the majority of official and traditional development partners. This architecture is increasingly attracting emerging donors like Turkey and India although has been less successful with the Gulf donors and China. Because the decision making tends to be process oriented, however, it is not as important for accountability as general budget support. This architecture is an important starting point for designing new projects and developing coordinated responses to government positions. Accordingly, it is an important space for civil society to voice the need for accountability to be incorporated in new (particularly multi-donor) project design.
Note25 Current Civil Society Access to Decision Making Potential to Increase Access to Decision Making Funding Currently Available for Civil Society Potential to Increase Funding Degree of Importance for Accountability Low Mediu m High

25

Based on author estimations only will be verified in next stage of exercise.

15

How Could Civil Society be Better Represented?

Civil Society actors should coordinate at the country level to approach those donors most active in supporting critical civil society and advocate for civil society to be resourced and supported to play a role at the Donor Coordination Group level. Furthermore, civil society should identify like-minded donors that chair sector groups and argue for inclusion of civil society representatives at the sector working level. Furthermore, civil society should coordinate to develop a common priority position prior to every donor-government high level forum so as to ensure that accountability is on the agenda with clear recommendations on how best to facilitate it.

16

5.3. The EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour

What is the EU Initiative /How does Consultation typically happen?

The European Union committed to better organising its aid around common principles and targets in agreeing the 2009 Operational Framework to Fast-Track Implementation of Division of Labour. Division of labour is a commitment to better spread donor resources across sectors as well as to improve coordination so that donors speak with a common voice. This includes commitments from the EU and its member states for donors to: 1. Focus in no more than three sectors, 2. Increase the use of jointly managed projects (such as those typically managed by the UN and World Bank), 3. Grant government more decision making authority as to which sectors donors will be involved in, 4. Decrease dissenting views and improve partnership with government by identifying representatives (lead and active) donors at the sector level. The fast-track initiative has already started and is monitored by the EU Directors General of Development on a quarterly basis. The initiative calls for EU Member States to agree a common action plan by March 2010 to improve division of labour. Additionally, the EU and Member States are required to start drafting joint programming and response strategies at the country level. Planning and decision making happens in the EU / Member State Heads of Cooperation meetings. These meetings do not have designated space for civil society or social accountability26.
What is Civil Society Representation typically like?

There is no formal space made for civil society. However, European donors tend to be very open to civic engagement. At this stage the key reason civil society plays no role in this process is simply because civil society has not made significant effort to engage at the country level. This is primarily due to the fast-track initiative only starting in November 2009. The EU initiative involves many of the donors (e.g. Netherlands, Ireland, UK DfID and the Scandinavian donors) that are commonly associated as being long-term allies of African critical civil society. For this reason it is foreseeable that a coordinated approach to the EU Heads of Cooperation would yield positive results both in terms of requesting access to decision making and for funding to support accountability organisations27. In many countries the EU and member states constitute the majority of development assistance; improving
26 27

Neither European nor local NGOs participate. Many incorrectly believe that the European Commission funding for Non-State Actors could be used for accountability. It is not; this funding which typically constitutes around 1% of EU funding at country level is to develop partnerships between government and Non-State Actors (including business associations).

17

accountability, then, can have an important impact on accountability in the broader development partnership.

18

Note28 Current Civil Society Access to Decision Making Potential to Increase Access to Decision Making Funding Currently Available for Civil Society Potential to Increase Funding Degree of Importance for Accountability How Could Civil Society be Better Represented?

Low Mediu m

High

Civil Society actors should coordinate at the country level to approach the EU as well as the European donors most active in supporting critical civil society and advocate for civil society to be resourced and supported to play a role in the Division of Labour process. Furthermore, civil society should raise the need for independent grant making to ensure social accountability. The argument should be made that as Division of Labour and Aid Effectiveness will increasingly align with government and ensure greater ownership there is a need to ensure that dissenting civil society actors are not disempowered.

28

Based on author estimations only will be verified in next stage of exercise.

19

5.4. Government (usually Ministry of Finance or Foreign Affairs) Donor Coordination Offices
What is the Government Donor Coordination Office?

Many donors insist that the government designate a specific counterpart or interlocutor (typically the Ministry of Finance/National Planning or Foreign Affairs) to coordinate delivery of aid. In some cases this interlocutor is has very little authority over how donor funding will be spent. In other cases, however, all the authority for how resources will be spent is vested in the designated government officer. In the case of the European Union (EU), for example, few actors realise that at the country level the European Development Fund itself has no authority to spend its own resources. The EU agrees a five year country strategy and budget with the designated government officer and then is unable to spend against the budget without the explicit request of the government. Furthermore, the EU cannot take money out of the budget once it is committed. So, for example, because neither South Sudan nor Darfur is a recognised country the EU is unable to force the Government of Sudan to spend in these regions. The EU example is very important because with aid effectiveness trends it is likely that this model will be increasingly used to meet the goals in the Paris Declaration29. Furthermore, these donor coordination offices will be institutionally strengthened and required to play a much greater role in deciding how aid is spent at the country level.
What is Civil Society Representation Typically Like?

Civil society is very poorly represented in decision making in government donor coordination offices. To make matters worse many government officials display a clear and simmering distaste for civil society actors and the roles they play in accountability. Aid effectiveness will strengthen the role of government aid coordination offices. For sustainability and legitimacy reasons these offices are likely to grow to exercise much more control over donor resources. In Kenya, for example, the External Resources Department of the Ministry of Finance has actively approached civil society and want to see greater participation from Kenyan civil society particularly because they see this as an important counter-weight to what they see as the disproportionate influence of international NGOs. In Tanzania the Ministry of Finance has started a process to better coordinate civil society. At the first stage, this Ministry of Finance driven activity will be to design a division of labour systems by which the government will have preferred civil society representatives to consult on policy and resource distribution.

29

The EU and member states, for example are already working to agree joint country strategies by 2013.

20

Government officials in these offices are often under-resourced and subject to an enormous amount of critical pressure from donors, international and national NGOs. Further, officials themselves outgunned when trying to hold donors accountable to their commitments. African civil society can play an enormous role in strengthening governments hand in negotiating with donors. After all, donors will find it difficult to justify positions that African accountability actors and government agree on. Government and accountability actors also share a common interest in this area because improving transparency of government strategy development is an essential step in convincing donors to allow government more ownership. Although this relationship is sensitive, work needs to be done on conveying to government the value that accountability organisations can contribute to their relationship with donors. This could then lay the foundation for greater access and funding to African civil society.
Note30 Current Civil Society Access to Decision Making Potential to Increase Access to Decision Making Funding Currently Available for Civil Society Potential to Increase Funding Degree of Importance for Accountability How Could Civil Society be Better Represented? Low Mediu m High

The key to improving relationships with government donor coordination offices is in identifying mutual interests. In this regard, the legacy of colonialism combined with a history of donors bullying African governments are excellent entry points by which civil society could strengthen the hand of government. Donors typically use dissenting civil society to criticise African government positions as being in the interest of the elite. This broad handed distaste for government decision making is frequently applied even when governments are earnestly trying to direct aid programmes at the disenfranchised. By civil society improving dialogue with government they can offer government a united front against reluctant donors. Furthermore a common challenge to African civic actors and governments alike is that critical voices appear to be dominated by international NGOs leaving fewer spaces for African NGOs to play an active role. The reasons for this are complex but if civil society were to work with government coordination offices to divert a greater share of resources towards local NGOs, there are significant signs that this could be of mutual benefit for government and civil society.

30

Based on author estimations only will be verified in next stage of exercise.

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6. Next Steps A recent study in Kenya31 illustrates that African NGOs have real cause for concern that donors will largely not support civil society that publicly critiques and holds government accountable. Donor funding in Kenya typically constitutes 88% of funding to NGOs because there are few other opportunities for funding. In line with Dorothea Hilhorst32s conclusions that over time donors gain the advantage in setting NGO priorities, African organisations play less of a role in accountability because they struggle to find dedicated funding for it. Furthermore, the grant (contract) conditions make accountability itself a risky activity. With the notable exception of DANIDA, grant recipients in Kenya complain that donors do not pay core costs. Core costs include internal oversight services, representation costs, headquarter costs, etc. This means that civil society needs to recoup these costs elsewhere. Donors typically do not pay for: Resource mobilization and project design costs (often in the region of 50-60% of the time of key staff), Administrative overheads such as back office services which averaged around 10% of the running costs of large CSOs and NGOs (theses costs are typically higher for small organizations), So-called irregular costs such as paying bribes or facilitation fees (this is widespread in Kenya and significant although not easy to quantify), Project closing costs after the grant agreement has expired (depending on the grant agreement this can be significant: programme management staff typically reported spending two days a month responding to queries about projects that had closed), Ineligible expenditures typically resulting from inflexible, inappropriate or misunderstood donor procedures (estimated at around 5% of procurement budgets). These implementation costs need to be recovered. Donors do not allow civil society to accrue a profit meaning that unlike in a private corporation, profits are not available to offset unexpected losses. Many managers privately admit to recovering these costs through reallocating expenditure to inappropriate budget lines or to creative reporting. This practice makes civil society vulnerable because a close look at their financial records risks significant financial and reputational losses. In developed countries organisations are able to insulate themselves from this risk by sourcing philanthropic funding. In America, for example,
31

DANIDA Kenya (2009), Study of Public and Non-Public Delivery of Services: Accountability, Efficiency and Support to Nation Building and Democratic Decentralisation. 32 Hilhorst, D (2003) The Real World of NGOs, London: Zed Books

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private giving is almost three times the size of international ODA. Advocacy NGOs in most developing countries are almost entirely dependent on foreign donors.33 Donors unwillingness to provide longterm core funding to institution building forces many organisations to adopt management practice that resist intensive public scrutiny. Another problem is that there are no resources to finance project design. This combined with significant donor disincentives to change project design after grants awarded, are good incentives to choose a business as usual approach over being accountable to beneficiaries. It is no wonder, then, that increasingly disenchanted development activists are questioning whether CSOs are even effective civil society actors34. Furthermore as these organizations know they are vulnerable, they have a significant incentive to stay clear of confrontational or controversial subjects which often makes them complicit. Looking forward, this paper concludes that the next steps need to include identifying like-minded stakeholders that can play a meaningful role in advocating for social accountability to be a priority in aid effectiveness. This necessitates developing a narrative that serves the interests of growing African civil society. It is time to put to bed the notion that it is more important for African civil society to be accountable than to call for accountability. This means a specific call for greater resources, more independence and better access to decision making. This paper is intended to contribute to debate on how to gain access and better engage donors and government through the recently created forums this paper. In this regard, it is finally up to local accountability actors to improve their influence in all of the four forums. In order to provide a starting point section seven of this paper is intended as a stand-alone practice note that elaborates how to start identifying like-minded and sympathetic donors. The note elucidates specific and feasible actions which donors should be lobbied to support to better promote domestic accountability. This includes consideration of the need to establish independent grant makers35 specifically tasked with enabling accountability regardless the opinion of governments, donors, local and international NGOs. There is also a need to start elaborating how to improve African NGO capacity to engage donors at the national level; this necessitates a focus on skilling up NGO representatives to understand the sort of macro-level decision making
33

Parks, T (2008:214) The Rise and fall of Donor Funding for Advocacy NGOs: Understanding the Impact, Development in Practice, Vol. 18, No. 2, London: Routledge 34 See European Commission 2000 Evaluation of NGO-cofinancing Budget Line (europa.ec.eu). 35 The Southern Africa Trust also advocates for the need to establish African grant makers.

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that is used in budget support and donor coordination architectures. Finally, there needs to be consideration of how accountability actors can better express their concerns at the country level. Here it is important to recognise that the way forward does not start from scratch. In terms of gaining access to the general budget support decision making mechanisms, the next step will be to identify bestpractices through the World Bank Institute and African civil society networks. The one UN experience in Tanzania and Mozambique will serve as a good foundation to collate lessons learned and good practices in how civil society can open debate with UN driven structures on accountability. It is possible that these experiences with the One UN process may be applicable to identifying how to engage with the national aid coordination architecture (typically co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator or UNDP). South Africas donor coordination office has a long history of engaging critical civil society in decision making and its experiences will be collated. As the EU initiative is less than a year old, it is fertile ground to promote accountability and pilot lessons learned. African civil society has much to gain in developing stronger linkages with government. When governments shrink the democratic space, donors align themselves with government while voicing their concern through international NGOs. This practice is bad for African government and NGOs alike. More work is needed on how African NGOs can help governments hold donors more accountable. This then, will enable African civil society to set the tone for evaluating the legitimacy of African governments.

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Annex A: ODA to Randomly Selected Africa Countries (source OECD)

2002 Angola Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Rep. Chad Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea GuineaBissau Kenya Kiribati Lesotho Liberia Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 316.67 39.5 328.29 146.49 505.07 59.92 49.14 195.73 168.75 990.15 37.83 541.73 215.76 45.87 378.05 18.05 64.59 45.11 306.91 404.26 2013.54 87.81 231.48 250.36 105.11 336.55 224.48 13.98 1060.16 53.45 639.35 558.88 169.94 2003 444.3 35.62 460.86 196.55 963.8 122.02 47.33 236.23 260.3 1417.01 38.62 818.41 234.91 133.97 583.24 15.32 75.02 93.55 464.01 503.79 937.45 119.83 393.07 315.5 145.62 429.53 377.34 27.75 1411.16 59.69 904.07 759.48 175.89 2004 1109.7 54.93 544.46 341.75 873.99 124.88 104.13 302.96 211.64 1617.93 44.84 2212.75 278.21 73.15 683.73 13.34 70.09 201.33 508.33 625.91 1055.25 142.79 514.66 522.91 179.07 434.01 839.56 25.31 1694.41 67.25 1132.6 1033.09 183.18 2005 454.06 62.51 666.06 364.02 632.99 181.28 102.13 402.85 341.14 1821.13 59.27 1498.22 239.02 126.42 741.51 25.72 66.67 224.41 587.07 750.36 1235.09 106.97 509.4 6449.81 214.2 637.62 1717.05 60.82 1528.64 84.25 1201.21 1766.46 241.06 2006 295.42 81.64 1848.82 416.82 3074.59 143.46 185.15 298.96 123.04 5536.63 58.59 5204.84 225.89 97.47 1021.78 24.7 77.27 247.5 2816.61 2423.95 3014.22 149.96 1615.67 12374.93 371.18 780.46 1843.59 44.53 5563.04 83.46 4754.89 4045.91 268.32 2007 362.01 109.14 890.76 458.47 2018.38 182.57 188.8 365.98 143.98 2416.41 79.7 1096.07 247.97 123.19 1344.61 26.2 123.6 731.84 1722.68 979.5 1689.66 206.94 496.78 2019.11 364.48 978.53 1955.55 52.96 2747.97 132.8 1624.84 926.03 462.54 2008 384.07 744.49 960.71 521.54 1114.03 226.5 254.79 495.46 136.83 3208.29 294.73 1280.03 429.29 141.73 1527.85 26.44 152.34 1212.74 815.37 920.96 1938.39 208.09 580.83 1444.55 741.42 1133.43 2219.47 56.68 2314.69 410.84 1659.29 1096.37 605.17

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