Anthony G.

Sabarillo 083309 | Final Paper for Ph102 QQ (Ph104 X) The Beginning of Freedom, the Freedom of Beginning Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt are two philosophers who devoted their time and efforts not only to critiquing todays society, but also to exploring the origins of our current state of affairs and to opening the eyes of people to the fact that they have the capacity to exercise freedom. Although they had probably no personal and professional connection to each other, their lifes work basicallyalbeit not totallycontain similar ideas: There is more to this life than mindless labor, obedience, and conformity. Life brings the opportunity to create something totally new and unexpected. Freedom can exist in the middle of seemingly rigid, cyclical, and universal structures. People today can learn and build something new from the lessons of the past. In a nutshell, they point to the beginning of freedom itself and the freedom that lies in being a beginning ourselves. As exemplified by the quotations in the thesis statement, Arendt reconsiders the human condition and advises people to think what they are doing. Foucault encourages people to practically use his ideas, and not merely read about them in his books. This paper highlights these and other important concepts from the works of both Foucault and Arendt, and presents how these altogether serve as a necessary nudge on humanity towards the freedom that they, along with society, have denied themselves. In a sense, both of them seek to disturb us from the mindless slumber that is conformity, and rouse us to freedom and human action. First, in the section titled Rethinking Human Life, this paper outlines Arendt and Foucaults criticism of current society, and how humanity has come to this dehumanized and unfree state. In the second section, Learning from the Past,

this paper discusses the lessons they draw from Ancient Greek history and thought, treated either as guideposts for contemporary living or counterexamples for mans current lack of freedom. Both of them seem to think that the past can show people today that there are ways to be fully human and free. The paper concludes in the third section, Exercising Freedom, with Arendt and Foucaults assertions about mans capacity for freedom, and their call for people to rethink how they live their lives. Both of them admit they do not hold the answers, but they devoted their lives to helping people find the answers themselves. Rethinking Human Life In her book, The Human Condition, Arendt examines the human condition or the totality of all aspects of human living1 in order to reassert the importance of human action, of ones engagement with the public realm, or of an active life in the polis2. In light of this task, she draws examples from the Ancient Greece. She starts by identifying three main fundamental human activities of the vita activa or human life insofar as it is engaged in doing something3. Each activity corresponds to a basic condition of earthly life: labor corresponds to ones biological needs and processes; work corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence; and action corresponds to the human condition of plurality4. Labor and work do not constitute a fully autonomous and true human life since the former involve merely the attainment of physical

James Moody, Arendt: Prologue & Chapter 1, Sociology at Duke University, accessed February 20, 2012, http://www.soc.duke.edu/~jmoody77/TheoryNotes/arendt1.htm. 2 Majid Yar, Arendt, Hannah, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed February 20, 2012, http://www.iep.utm.edu/arendt/. 3 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 22. 4 Ibid., 7.

needs5 and because the latter is only an instrumental end, i.e. work itself just serves certain human wants like, as mentioned, a sense of permanence6, and comprises the world in which human activity is rooted7. Action, on the other hand, can be considered a truly free and human activity since it involves ones full autonomy to create something totally new8. For Arendt, [t]o be free meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It meant neither to rule nor to be ruled9. The polis makes this state of equality and freedom possible. Thus, to be fully human is to be able to act. Action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man10. However, to simply act by oneself or as one completely homogenous group is not considered action, for the condition of all political life is pluralitythe fact that our sameness does not lie in some fundamental essence but in the way in which no one is ever the same as any other human being11. This condition asserts our capacity to be a beginning. Action also requires the presence of others, since no human life can exist without other people12. Arendt says that before the modern age, activities for the fulfillment of bodily necessities and survival belonged to the private realm. But in our own time, the private and public realms are blurred. Their meanings for an individual or a citizen are eroded by what Arendt calls the rise of the social13. The rise of the social gave the private spherewhere household and housekeeping activities belongmuch importance,
5 6

Arendt, The Human Condition, 13. Yar, Arendt, Hannah. 7 Arendt, The Human Condition, 22. 8 Ibid., 177. 9 Ibid., 32. 10 Ibid., 22. 11 Ibid., 8. 12 Ibid., 22. 13 Ibid., 38.

and let it expand into the public realm. And since it is in the household that basic necessities are take care of, the rise of the social led to the emergence of a society of jobholders. According to Arendt, in a relatively short time the new social realm transformed all modern communities into societies of laborers and jobholders, whose primary concern is to sustain life processes14. Society, now considered one all-encompassing family or household, eliminates all possibility for action, just as the Ancient Greeks only exercised freedom through action outside the private realm. Thus, society demands that everyone just act in a certain way through the imposition of many rules. In this manner, just like in any orderly household, all are behaved and obey the rules. This is why conformity and normalization characterize modern society.15 To help establish this society of conformists, economics and other social sciences try to attain a scientific or deterministic character and label as abnormal or asocial those who deviate from the established norms16. In this manner, the social or behavioral sciences reduce man as a conditioned and behaving animal17. Society then takes on this monolithic, unchangeable character, which permits only one goal towards which all people should approach by virtue of the oneness of man-kind; however, though this one-ness can guarantee humanitys survival, but it can also assure its extinction18. And with this imposed sameness over the whole world, and the focus on labor as the fundamental human activity, the world lacks things that join men together by virtue of their diversity and

14 15 16 17 18

Arendt, The Human Condition, 46. Ibid., 40. Ibid., 42. Ibid., 45. Ibid., 46.

things that are not for mere consumption19. This state is called worldlessness, which makes it impossible for humans to establish communities and have a public life20. Arendt, in an earlier work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, identifies this condition of mindless obedience and one-ness as a requirement for the establishment of totalitarian rule. This is because [b]y pressing men against each other, total terror destroys the space between them... It destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space21. Totalitarianism is motivated by ideology, which claims to hold the key to history or an explanation for everything22. Human beings who have been reduced to an animal existence more easily succumb to and obey totalitarian rule, because their relentless laboring cuts their relationship to the world as a human artifice23. Combined with a state of worldlessness, laborers experience loneliness since each of their individual life-sustaining activities is no one elses concern. A rule over... lonely men is what develops into totalitarianism.24 The paper now turns to Foucaults description and critique of human life. In his work Discipline and Punish, he describes how power is produced and exercise in present society by discussing the architectural figure of the Panopticon. Jeremy Bentham imagined this structure as a way to more effectively monitor and control prisoners behavior. It is constructed in such a way that a guard or supervisor can observe all inmates

19 20

Arendt, The Human Condition, 118-19. Yar, Arendt, Hannah. 21 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 7th ed. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1962), 466. 22 Ibid., 159. 23 Ibid., 475. 24 Ibid.

without being seen himself25. Thus, the inmates, thinking that they are constantly supervised, exercise power on themselves by controlling their own behavior26. Foucault extends the notion and purpose of the Panopticon beyond prisonsto society at large. He mentions that [a]ll that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy27. Anyone can employ the mechanism of the Panopticon for any purpose that involves the production of the homogenous effects of power, be it for medical, educational, and religious institutions. Power then becomes seemingly inherent in the very system and society in which people live. In other words, power is automatized and disindividualized28. Although people control their own behavior, they are not exercising freedom because they are indirectly and effectively manipulated by the structures around them. Foucault, in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, talks about scientia sexualis (the science of sexuality), which employs procedures for drawing out the truth of sex. This is unlike the practice of ars erotica (the erotic art), which draws truth from pleasure itself, and not from some absolute law or criterion29. Foucault traces the birth of scientia sexualis from the institution of the Catholic practice of confession. He mentions that it has become a ritual which produces truth, and has since spread into other institutions in society: in the judicial system, in medicine, in pedagogy, in familial relations, in amorous relationships, in everyday life and in the
25

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan. 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 200. 26 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 201. 27 Ibid., 200. 28 Ibid., 202. 29 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 57-58.

most solemn rituals; moreover, this ritual relies on the power relationship between the confessor and the one confessing, the educator and the educated, the doctor and the patient30. Foucault wants to point out that the notion of the truth produced by confession is not necessarily liberatingit is in fact a product of power relations31. Learning from the Past After laying down the ideas of Arendt and Foucault, the paper now presents the references both have made to the way the ancient Greeks thought about and lived their lives. Arendt cites particular examples from Greek notions of equality, excellence, the polis, and the polis ideal size. For the ancient Greeks, equality was founded on their shared ability to distinguish themselves in the polis as the very best (aien aristeuein), instead of being merely the same as everyone else or collective conformity. They recognized the right to live among ones equals (homoioi). Thus, the public realm was for the exercise of individuality, the manner by which one showed who he truly is. It was this opportunity for revealing ones true self and for the love of the polis that each was ready to work for the citys justice, defense, and administration32. Arendt also compares modern societys notion of excellence with that of the ancient Greeks. Modern society has almost totally eliminated the notion of labor as a physically painful and tiring activity connected to poverty, and instead treats productivity as a manifestation of excellence33. The Greeks have a different idea of excellence (arete). For them, it is the achievement of people through their action and speech, instead of the progress of Mankind. They believed that true excellence
30 31 32 33

Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 58-59. Ibid., 59. Arendt, The Human Condition, 41. Ibid., 47-48.

had to be in the public realm, i.e. in the presence of other people. The modern social realm puts more importance on the collective successes of Mankind, and banishes action and speech into the private sphere. As a result, peoples capacity for action and speech has been degraded.34 The Greek polis addresses certain problems with or needs of human action: the need for a place with a sense of permanence, a place that fosters the conditions of plurality35. It also solves the problem of human actions futility, because through the polis, actions and speeches can be saved from obscurity and from being forgotten through the record of great deeds36. The Greeks also recognized the need to keep the polis population from ballooning, since action and speech have more strength in populations with not so large numbers. Big populations usually become subject to the rule of the laws of statisticswhere people just want to behave in a prescribed, mindless way.37 Foucault also refers to Greek notions of the aesthetics of existence and the care of the self in order to tell people that one can exercise freedom despite the structures of domination in society. In his book, The Use of Pleasure, Foucault points out that the Greeks had a way of stylizing their own selves. They did this through an aesthetics of existence without subscribing to fundamental or universal codes38. The Greek modes of selfstylization or self-creation can be classified into the following aspects: 1) the ethical substance, 2) the mode of subjection, 3) the practices of the self, and (4) the mode

34 35

Arendt, The Human Condition, 49. James Moody, Notes to Chapter 5: Action Sociology at Duke University, accessed February 20, 2012, http://www.soc.duke.edu/~jmoody77/TheoryNotes/arendt3.htm 36 Ibid. 37 Arendt, The Human Condition, 43. 38 Timothy OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics. (London: Continuum, 2002), 7.

of being or the telos of ethics39. Foucault then mentions four notions resulting from a reflection on sexual ethics: 1) aphrodisia or the ethical substance in sexual conduct, 2) chresis or the use of pleasure by the ethical person, 3) enkrateia or mastery of self, and 4) sophrosyne or moderation, the telos of the formation of the subject.40 These four notions point to the fact that Greek ethics is not only theoretical but also practical. Foucault defines aphrodisia as the set of acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure41. The Greeks manner of using (chresis) pleasure focused on reflecting on oneself rather than following some strict moral code42. Given the Greek notions of aphrodisia and chresis, Foucault contrasts Christian interiority from ancient Greek morality. The former involves thorough self-examination. The latter involves the elaboration of the self, self-mastery (enkrateia), and moderation (sophrosyne).43 This was for the purpose of moderating pleasures and not for the total deprivation of these.44 The Greeks also recognized the importance of passions, and lived these out by the proper use of pleasure. Foucault studies how Greek practices of medicine and philosophy incorporated this idea of use of pleasure and how these led to themes of austerity that involve four main axes of experience: a persons relation to his body, to his spouse, to his young lovers, and to the truth45. There are four types of stylization of sexual conduct that correspond to the mentioned axes: The types of
39 40

OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 12. Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1990), 37. 41 Ibid., 40. 42 Ibid., 54-62. 43 Ibid., 63. 44 OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 12. 45 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 32.

stylizations are: a dietetics concerned with the body, an economics concerned with marriage, an erotics concerned with the subject of boys, and a philosophy concerned with truth46. The Greeks practiced virtue through the three major techniques of the self: dietetics, economics, and erotics47. These did not impose on the Greeks obedience to a strict moral code. Foucault is not giving us the ancient Greek ethics as a replacement of our current system. He discusses their ethics in order to inspire us to also practice the care of the self (epimeleia heautou) amidst the states of domination. Foucault wants us to create something new based on their example48. Exercising Freedom In this final section, this paper discusses how Arendt and Foucault characterize freedom and its requirements, and how they both make people realize that they are more than conformist jobholders or docile bodies. Arendt turns our attention to the importance of rare deeds which are not captured by laws of statistics which hold true only for large population sizes. It is from rare deeds that people can find meaning in their everyday relationships, like how an important historical event is seen only in the few accounts that shed light on it. The laws of statistics deem as unimportant those events which deviate from ordinary everyday occurrences, when in fact these are the things which give most meaning to human life.49 Arendt emphasizes the importance of the public realm. The public signifies two phenomena: co-presence with others and the commonly shared world itself that serves as the venue for action. Co-presence with others is needed because other people need to see ones actions to affirm the reality of the world and
46 47 48 49

Foucault, The Use Foucault, The Use OLeary, Foucault Arendt, The Human

of Pleasure, 36. of Pleasure, 251. and the Art of Ethics, 84. Condition, 42-43.

of what one does, as opposed to mere private feelings or emotions, which do not assure anyone of reality.50 The world itself is also important. It is a place that people can share with one another, and it is linked to the work of human hands and the human activities conducted in it51. Our common world is not built on our common human nature but on the common objectives of our different perspectives and positions52. For Arendt, to act essentially means to begin, to lead, to rule or to set something in motion. To act is not just the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner and a beginning himself53. Thus, people are capable of bringing newness against the odds of statistical predictions and laws. Newness thus appears as a miracle. As Arendt puts it:
The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable.... If action as beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, if it is the actualization of the human condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals.54

With action and speech, a person can disclose or reveal who he is. In a persons capacity for action and in his uniqueness lies also his capacity for bringing a startling unexpectedness to the world, or that which has never happened before.55 Therefore, the strength of a person or leader does not lie in his achievements, but in his initiative and in his risktaking56. Arendt goes on to assert that each person, since he is acting among other persons who affect and are affected by one
50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Arendt, The Human Condition, 50. Ibid., 42-43. Ibid., 57. Ibid., 177. Ibid., 178. Ibid., 177-78. Ibid., 190.

another, is at the same time a doer and sufferer. His action, no matter how small, can start a series of chain reactions and consequently have a boundless effectno matter how limiting the circumstances may be. Arendt says that the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation57. Action, regardless of its content, can transcend all limitations and boundaries. Arendt also stresses that boundaries which serve to enclose private property, households and territories are necessary for the people to establish a physical identity. The laws that protect these necessary boundaries are important for maintaining the stability of human affairs.58 Arendt warns us that our mindless focus on laboring and belief in behaviorist theories can lead us to give up our individuality and to live a purely productive machine-like life59, where thoughtless and hopeless confusion reign60. In a sense, we are destroying what makes us humanour capacity for acting, speaking, and thinking about what were doing. But despite these warnings, despite the behavioral sciences attempt to reduce humanity to conditioned animals, she thinks there is hope. She thinks we still have that capacity for making, fabricating, and building, so that we can make a common world in which human action and speech can exist. We still have the capacity to start new processes through our actions.61 Finally, Arendt recognizes of thought or thinking. It may be true that fewer have this capacity. However, it remains possible for any human being who lives under the conditions of
57 58 59 60 61

Arendt, The Human Condition, 190. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 322. Ibid., 5. Ibid., 323.

political freedom. It may prove to be irrelevant for the future of our progressive modern world. But it remains relevant for the future of man. Thus, she advises us to think what we are doing62. Foucault, in his discussion of ones freedom to constitute oneself as a subject, asserts that the subject is a form, not a substance63. This form is not permanentit is not produced by disciplines. Like an artwork, we have the freedom to alter this form. Therefore, ethics can be considered as a stylized selftransformation. Like how a stylus is used to engrave a mark on some pliable material, a person can also make ones mark, to own ones character as ones own64. According to Foucault, to be ethical pertains to stylizing ones existence, and this existence frees us from the dictates of disciplinary apparatuses. For Foucault, the self as a constituted subject is an end to which we approach but never really reach. According to OLeary, this lifelong approach to self-transformation can serve as a guide on how to live. Also, Foucault speaks of how individual freedom involves ethically interacting with others, who are also free.65 This is similar to Arendts notion of copresence mentioned above. Foucaults works give us the process of how madness, criminality and sexuality were imposed on individuals. Foucault battles against these modern forms of subjection and calls us to refuse what we are.66 Foucault points to a way of escaping the domination of disciplinary apparatuses. He stresses that a
62 63

Arendt, The Human Condition, 5. Michel Foucault, interview by H. Becker et al., "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom" in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1994), 290. 64 Timothy OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics. (London: Continuum, 2002), 2-3. 65 OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 4-6. 66 Ibid., 111-113.

person is not only a product of power, but is also a vehicle of power67. The process of subjection itself leads to newly realized potentialities and these may be redirected against the very conditions which made them possible68. The system and structures of impositions are fragile, and a space for freedom can be opened up in their midst69. What can alter a machines processes are the very parts of these machines. But these cogs need to be able to exercise their own freedom and not just accept the dictates of the system in which they are enmeshed. Foucault does not believe in a given and definite self. And since we have no self to start with, the aesthetic selfcreation becomes an ethical imperative70. Today, we still have the problem of forming our lives. According to Foucault, the intellectuals ethics is to make one able to detach oneself from oneself, to alter not only others thoughts, but also ones own71. Thus, Foucaults primary is how resistance develops. For him, power structures are not intrinsically bad. These make up a set of strategy games. Power structures make it possible for societies to exist. The main issue is how to minimize domination and how to prevent dominations effects.72 Freedom is the condition human interaction in the polis73. According to Foucault, like the self, freedom is not a given. It is not something that arises from the destruction of power
67

Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, trans. Kate Soper, in Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980), 98, quoted in OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 113. 68 Foucault, Two Lectures, 113. 69 Michel Foucault, interview by Gerard Raulet, "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 36, quoted in OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 114. 70 OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 120. 71 Michel Foucault, interview by Francois Ewald, "The Concern for Truth" in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984 1988, ed. Lawrence Kritzman (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1988), 263. 72 Ibid., 298-299. 73 Ibid., 284.

relations. In fact, it need power relations to exist. According to OLeary puts, Freedom, therefore, is not a state for which we strive, it is a condition of our striving... It is as relational as power, as historically pliable as subjectivity74. Foucault thinks that freedom gives ethics its goal and possibility.75 Foucaults analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made.76 For Foucault, the basis of freedom is the relationship of oneself with self and with others77. Conclusion Like Arendt, Foucault does not claim to have the answers in his books. He thinks that the goal of the intellectual is not to dictate to other people what to do. For him, the intellectual must disturb the mental habits of peopleto make them reexamine what they are doing and what they now believe as fundamentals, when in fact, these are ever-changing. He treats his body of work as a toolbox from which people can find an idea or concept they can use for their own field78. Even the goal of his writings implies an imperative for people, i.e. he wants people to apply or use what he has written about. He is against mere readership, or what perhaps can be considered a passive absorption of knowledge. He wants people to act on such knowledge. While Arendt advocates thinking about what we are doing, Foucault also believes in using and realizing what we

74 75

OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 160. OLeary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 160. 76 Foucault, Truth, Power, Self, 2. 77 Clare OFarrell, Michel Foucault. (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2005), 107. 78 Michel Foucault, Prisons et asiles dans le mcanisme du pouvoir in Dits et Ecrits, Vol. 11 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 523-24.

have thought about. Both seem to tell us that we must put thought into action. Arendt and Foucault think this is possible because they still situate freedom in the middle of the things that seem to dominate us. Their ideas seem to complement and interact with each other. While Foucault says that subjects are the products of power, he maintains that each one is able to constitute himself as a subject, i.e. exercise power on himself through an aesthetic creation or stylization of existence. Arendt also adds optimism to the world of disciplinary apparatuses. She says that despite our being subjected to effects of the actions of other people, it is by their very presence that our own action is possible. It is in our sameness in being unique that makes freedom and individuality possible. Just as Foucault thinks it is the visibility of the inmates to the observer that make them control their own behavior and trap them, Arendt thinks it is by the visibility of ones actions that we can product of plurality.79 Thus, freedom lies in the very ubiquity of power because the Foucaults notion of power coincides with Arendts notion of plurality and natalitythe creation of something totally new. Foucault would have perhaps agreed with Arendt that power can never explain what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that it can never condition us absolutely80. Each human being, after all, is a new beginning. Arendt and Foucault have dedicated their work to making us realize this capacity or freedom of ours not only to begin, but to be a beginning ourselves.
79

be more assured

of their reality. In this sense, visibility for Arendt is a

Neve Gordon, On Visibility and Power: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault Human Studies 25, no. 2 (2002): 125-45. 80 Gordon, On Visibility and Power, 135.

Thesis Statement: To these preoccupations and perplexities, this book does not offer an answer. Such answers are given every day, and they are matters of practical politics, subject to the agreement of many; they can never lie in theoretical considerations or the opinion of one person, as though we dealt with problems for which only one solution is possible. What I propose in the following is a reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears. This, obviously, is a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness-heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of "truths" which have become trivial and empty-seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time. What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing"81. "I would like my books to be a kind of toolbox which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their area... I would like this little volume that I want to write on disciplinary systems to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not readers"82.

81

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 5. 82 Michel Foucault, Prisons et asiles dans le mcanisme du pouvoir in Dits et Ecrits, Vol. 11 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 523-24.