Tonnies: In Habermasian terms, the colonization of the community by the forces of society(namely, market rationality).

Thus we assume a strategic orientation toward the other (Honneth)

The system (the market) invades social life. Is this different from Weber? Tonnies is not advocating a return back to traditionalist communities, but rather a new community that could arise. He refers to British guild socialism: labor and consumer cooperation in order to organize communities, but warns that this could devolve if it fell into a mere business ethic. Major premise: priority must be community, not society (defined as social relations)

What is conquered custom and religion from Tonnies? Why conquered custom? Honneth argues that, perhaps, this is a functionalist argument: the only way to ensure social reproduction (the continuation/persistence of social forms) is in a community, not in society. Conquered custom is this like Ivys idea of tradition, the positing of a nostalgic illusion?

Community, the individual presents herself authentically. Society, individual behaves strategically, concealing and pretending. In society, then, where does the self go? From where is it constructed? What happens to the self when civil societys influences are combined with mass representations influences? Do we simply balance ourselves among representations, stereotypes, etc, and strategically? Durkheim His book on suicide examines the higher rate of suicide in Protestants than Catholics. The argument is that there is a higher development of community in Catholics than Protestants. Resonances of Tonnies Sanctions are the visible traces of moral factssanctions are what the sociologist can study when he wants to study morality in a society. 3 types of sanctions: 1. Penal = legal 2. Civil = public blame 3. Moral = inner, self-sanctions These probably would point, then, to three types of moral facts, or three types of morality Moral and legal rules:

1. Universalistic rules a. Those rules concerned with our self-relationship our relation to ourselves Which then gives way to: b. Those rules concerned with our relationship to all others 2. Particularistic rules a. Family morality b. Professional morality c. Civic morality (state)

With 1a, Durkheim predicates his theory on the assumption that the individual must constitute herself as a moral subject before anything else; the restriction, internalized, on ones own egoistic desires, urges, etc., is the starting point for moral or social life. What does this assume about the self? 1b is particularistic: each type of work has its own ethics, and these ethics are separate from public democratic ethics. Universalistic rules, Durkheim steals from Kant, says Honneth Kant deals in his ethics mostly with 1b, the relation to all others, but also speaks about obligations to ourselves, which corresponds to 1a. Duty is different in an aristocracy than in a democracy Durkheim, paraphrased So duty differs according to the structuring principles of society, or rather/also the structure of society. Without existing groups, there is no morality of the group (?) Durkheims identification of social pathology is that there is no ethics in industry and trade. Here we see Durkheims positivism collapse he is no positivist, simply basing everything on empirical observation; he is mixing description and prescriptionhe also cant identify any sanctions (the observable signs of rules) so hes not just observing In the family morality, different families all have the same morality. In the civic morality, all citizens have the same morality. But in Professional Ethics, Durkheim find moral pluralism, different sets of professional ethics. He also says that the public doesnt take an interest in how internal matters of different professions are regulated. (This may have changed in the last hundred years.) A professional ethics can only exist on the basis of its own group. Who actually possesses the sanctions? The group. If there is no group to possess moral rules, then you wont have sanctions. The central pathology of modern societies is that there is a whole sphere of the social life of modern societies without any moral regulation, because it violates what society is all about. What society is about is to integrate moral groups which all have their own regulations. Durkheim thinks capitalism and socialism are two sides of the same coin because they both remove moral sanctions from economics. Capitalism wants total deregulation from economics. Socialism

believes there will not need to be regulation once property has changed its form from private to public. Durkheim sees this as their failure, since all society needs regulation on economic activity. Durkehims view of society and pathology here is nearly medical: one organ of society, economics, is, we could borrow from Rousseau, inflamed, and the organism, then, is at risk So Durkheim prescribes not exactly a return to the organized guilds, which had the legal power to regulate economic fields, but a revival of this concept in a new form of guild with that same power. So much of this is indebted to Hegels Philosophy of Right: 1. Family 2. Civil Society 3. State

Early sociologists all concerned with a Loss of Value due to capitalism, thus synthesizing Nietzschean and Marxist concerns. They are aware of the challenge of ethnocentrism and yet also aware of the challenge of the valuerelativism. How do these sociologists justify their value judgments (for what is a good society)? Empirical descriptions and normative judgments are often unconnected. Honneth: none of them really succeeded in solving the problem of how to connect the descriptive and prescriptive, or the normative and the empiricalhow to justify their normative claims. Functionalism: every phenomenon in a society, which doesnt contribute to the central societal function of social reproduction, can be seen as social pathology. Durkheim sometimes, but not without seeing its own failings, uses functionalism to ground his normative judgments and solve the above problem. Methodological crisis of social philosophy! Once universalism is worrisome, WHAT DO YOU DO? Every judgment on social pathology presupposed a standard meant to be universal. To only offer particularistic validity is not enough, and yet seemingly all there is. What now? After early sociologists (end of WWI) the mantle of social criticism returned to the field of philosophy Philosophical anthropology: followed Rousseau, but using mainly empirical methods to discover properties which defined human against pre-humans/non-humans (Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, H. Plessner) If you believe you have objective knowledge of a human nature, you can theorize social pathology with justificationso that is exactly what the philosophical anthropologists attempted.

Rousseaus Phil of Hist is a negative one Hegels Phil of Hist places self-realization at the end of history, not the beginning. Rphil anthro Hphil of hist Phil anthro discover original human condition/nature Phil of hist deduce universality from telos of human history Both escape the trap of relativism Digression: the modern society the fulfillment of the teleological process of reason. Back on track: Plessner: by returning to a type of community based on face to face interaction, the Hegel argued that one danger of modern societies is atomization, meaning the lack of communal bonds in bourgeiouse society. Plessner thinks the workers movement and the pre-fascist movement are worrisome, as they are the beginning of forming new communal bonds. Lukacs LIKES this. Lukacs: Reification is the necessary immediate reality for every person so that the conditions for selfrealization had been completely destroyed. Plessner based his thought on an anthropological conception of human identity formation. Humans have an excentric position toward ourselves, which animals do not have. This is the difference between being a body and having a body. Laughter and crying are phenomena which showcase this divide, when we are unable to mediate the two our body takes over. Humans must constantly search out, through experimentation, to find the right form of balance for them (Mill!) This requires a social public sphere where we can try on new identities. The city is the best example of this. (Playing and being allowed to play) The invasion of communities into the public sphere undermines the normative rules of the public sphere which allows for hiding oneself and playing with ones identity. So Plessner critiques Tonnies, positing a public sphere allowing for __ and doesnt need authenticity

Tonnies said the community allows for authenticity. But Plessner says identity formation presupposes a space where you can try out different selves, and this is a public sphere. What about the internet? What kind of public sphere is that? What about popular culture, mass culture; what kind of space for identity formation is that? Is the public sphere theorized as separate from mass culture, which has become so commercialized? Plessner defines social pathology as anything preventing human self-realization. Plessner tries to avoid simply contingent value judgments, by introducing a procedure that Rawls later introduced, namely the method of reflexive equilibrium: to go back and forth between moral intuitions we share at a certain moment and philosophical ideas about judgmentgo back and forth between the existing value judgments and the prefigured philosophical standards of justice, and go back and forth for so long that they ultimately come together Lukacs: We experience our surroundings as only thing-like. This is wrong because it abstracts from the organic nature of everything around us. We are only able to understand the extent of reification, from the perspective of the futurenamely, the perspective of a revolutionary proletarian SUCCESS. That is, only from a theoretical FUTURE can we understand the PRESENT. How strange!