Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Let's Talk Kony 2012
Let's Talk Kony 2012
Let's Talk Kony 2012
Undergraduate Philosophy Council & Students for a Democra7c Society 19 April 2012
(1) Nature of campaign (coordina7on) (2) Nature of campaign (funding) (3) Claims of success (4) Visual Strategies more generally
First
point:
If
the
KONY
2012
video
went
viral,
that
did
not
happen
spontaneously
analysis
of
twi[er
pa[erns
suggests
this
was
a
very
well-orchestrated
campaign.
h"p://blog.socialow.com/post/7120244932/data-viz-kony2012-see-how-invisible-
networks-helped-a-campaign-capture-the-worlds-a"enEon
infrastructure was already set in place, triggered at the start of the campaign. Invisible Children has already been building an on-the-ground network of young supporters across the United States, ac7va7ng them all at the same 7me, as the campaign began.
(2)
Each
cluster
represents
users
from
dierent
physical
loca7ons.
The
large
cluster
on
the
top
right
includes
users
from
Birmingham
Alabama
who
were
some
of
the
earliest
to
publicize
the
video.
Other
clusters
in
the
graph
include
Pi[sburgh,
Oklahoma
City
and
Noblesville
Indiana.
(3)
The
hashtag
#Kony2012
ini7ally
trended
in
Birmingham
on
March
1st,
a
few
days
before
the
video
was
even
placed
online.
(4)
This
movement
did
not
emerge
from
the
big
ci7es,
but
rather
small- medium
sized
ci7es
across
the
Unites
States.
It
is
heavily
supported
by
Chris7an
youth,
many
of
whom
post
Biblical
psalms
as
their
prole
bios.
(5)
Invisible
Children
enlisted
the
help
of
their
supporters
in
barraging
celebri7es
to
come
out
in
support
of
the
campaign,
making
it
incredibly
easy
to
Tweet
at
Taylor
Swiq
or
Rihanna
within
two
clicks.
Once
celebri7es
came
on
board,
the
campaign
was
given
mul7ple
boosts.
h"p://blog.socialow.com/post/7120244932/data-viz-kony2012-see-how-invisible-
networks-helped-a-campaign-capture-the-worlds-a"enEon
there is nothing wrong with lots of American kids sending money o to a charity that will help kids in far o lands. Even if you avoid confusing charity with poli7cal ac7vism, and even if you overlook the other, suspect, sources of Invisible Children funding, it actually makes a dierence where you send your money and Invisible Children is not a good bet.
rich
opera7on,
which
more
than
tripled
its
income
to
$9m
(5.68m)
in
2011,
mainly
from
personal
dona7ons.
Of
this,
nearly
25%
was
spent
on
travel
and
lm-making.
Most
of
the
money
raised
has
been
spent
in
the
US.
The
accounts
show
$1.7m
went
on
US
employee
salaries,
$850,000
in
lm
produc7on
costs,
$244,000
in
"professional
services"
thought
to
be
Washington
lobbyists
and
$1.07m
in
travel
expenses.
Nearly
$400,000
was
spent
on
oces
in
San
Diego.
h"p://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/08/jacob-acaye-child-kony-2012?intcmp=239
Third Point: Lets set aside the important ques7on of whether Obama sending U.S. military advisors in Central Africa is a good thing for the people there or the people of the United States. Regardless, it is unlikely that the U.S. was moved to send advisors to Central Africa primarily for altruis7c/moral reasons. It is unlikely that KONY 2012 is anything other than a convenient ra7onaliza7on for policy mo7vated by realist mo7va7ons.
AUDIE
CORNISH:
.
.
.
I'm
wondering
if
you
can
describe
the
importance
of
the
poli7cs
behind
this
pursuit
of
Joseph
Kony.
SUDARSAN
RAGHAVAN:
.
.
.
Well,
there
are
several
reasons
for
this.
For
one
thing,
Kony
is
a
very
uncontroversial
target.
If
he
were
to
be
caught,
no
one
would
protest
that.
So
that's
one
reason.
Second
reason,
you
know,
even
though
they
are
weakened,
they
do
con7nue
to
be
a
threat,
and
the
Americans
are
concerned
of
threat
to
their
African
partners'
peace
and
security
in
this
region.
But
I
think
probably
what
some
analysts
have
told
me
is
that
there's
also
a
sense
that,
you
know,
the
Americans
want
to
support
the
Ugandans.
The
Ugandans
have
been
key
allies
of
the
United
States
in
counterterrorism,
especially
in
Somalia,
where
the
Ugandans
make
the
bulk
of
the
African
Union
Force
there
that
is
ghEng
the
al-Qaida-linked
miliEa
al-Shabaab,
which
certainly
the
United
States
consider
a
key
threat
to
its
own
security
and
to
regional
security.
There's
also,
you
know,
pressure
from
human
rights
groups,
like
the
Invisible
Children's
video
that
gained
so
much
a[en7on
over
the
past
few
weeks
is
also
adding
pressure
to
nd
Kony.
Months
into
Kony
Mission,
US
AcEon
Unclear
All
Things
Considered
(18
April
2012)
h"p://www.npr.org/2012/04/18/150903298/months-into-mission-u-s-acEon-against-kony-unclear
On
the
rst
page
a
report
of
the
killing
of
120
soldiers
the
war
lasted
a
long
7me
you
could
get
used
to
it
close alongside the news of a sensa7onal crime with a portrait of the murderer the eye of Mr Cogito slips indierently over the soldiers hecatomb to plunge with delight into the descrip7on of everyday horror a thirty-year-old farm labourer under the stress of nervous depression killed his wife and two small children
It is described with precision the course of the murder the posi7on of the bodies and other details for 120 dead you search on a map in vain too great a distance covers them like a jungle they dont speak to the imagina7on there are too many of them the numeral zero at the end changes them into an abstrac7on a subject for medita7on: the arithme7c of compassion.
role in many, if not all, episodes of mass murder neglect. This mechanism involves the capacity to experience aect, the posiEve and negaEve feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and ac7ons. Many researchers have begun to study the dance of aect and reason as it applies to decision making. I shall draw from this research to show how the sta7s7cs of mass murder or genocide, no ma[er how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atroci7es. The numbers fail to spark emo7on or feeling and thus fail to mo7vate ac7on. Genocide in Darfur is real, but we do not feel that reality. I shall conclude with sugges7ons about how we might make genocide feel real and mo7vate appropriate interven7ons. I shall also argue that we cannot only depend on our feelings about these atroci7es but, in addi7on, we must create and commit ourselves to ins7tu7onal and poli7cal responses based upon reasoned analysis of our moral obliga7ons to stop the mass annihila7on of innocent people.
Paul
Slovic,
If
I
Look
at
the
Mass
I
Will
Never
Act;
Psychic
Numbing
&
Genocide,
Judgment
and
Decision
Making,
2
(2007),
7995.
Paul
Slovic,
Numbed
by
Numbers,
Foreign
Policy.com
(13
March
2007).
For compassion, to be stricken with the suering of someone else as though it were contagious and pity, to be sorry without being touched in the esh are not only not the same, they may not even be related. Compassion, by its very nature, cannot be touched o by the suerings of a whole class or a people, or, least of all, mankind as a whole. It cannot reach out further than what is suered by one person and s7ll be what it is supposed to be, co- suering. Its strength hinges on the strength of passion itself, which, in contrast to reason, can comprehend only the par7cular, but has not capacity for generaliza7on. Hannah Arendt. 1963. On Revolu<on. Penguin, pages 85,86.
Closely
connected
with
this
inability
to
generalize
is
the
curious
muteness
or,
at
least,
awkwardness
with
words
that
.
.
.
is
the
sign
of
compassion,
in
contrast
to
the
loquacity
of
pity.
Passion
and
compassion
are
not
speechless,
but
their
language
consists
in
gestures
and
expressions
of
countenance
rather
than
in
words.
.
.
.
Compassion
.
.
.
abolishes
the
distance,
the
in
between
which
always
exists
in
human
intercourse,
and
if
virtue
will
always
be
ready
to
assert
that
it
is
be[er
to
suer
wrong
than
do
wrong,
compassion
will
transcend
this
in
complete
and
even
nave
sincerity
that
it
is
easier
to
suer
than
to
see
others
suer.
Because
compassion
abolishes
the
distance,
the
worldly
space
between
men
where
poli7cal
ma[ers,
the
whole
realm
of
human
aairs,
are
located,
it
remains,
poli7cally
speaking,
irrelevant
and
without
consequence.
Hannah
Arendt.
1963.
On
Revolu<on.
Penguin,
pages
85,86.